Annotations to "Kant with Sade"

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The preceding translation is based on the version of "Kant avec Sade" published in the paperback "Points" edition of Ecrits II, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1971, pp. 119–148. This was the third of three publications, and it corrects a number of errors which occur in the earlier versions.

The following annotations to the text began as part of my own effort to understand the text, one of the most difficult of the Ecrits. In particular, the essay demands a great deal of knowledge from the reader, both textual and historical. It has always been my feeling that a great deal of Lacan’s legendary difficulty lay in these demands, and these annotations are an attempt to provide a partial response to them. It is my hope that they will render the text at least more approachable. I have attempted, to as great an extent as possible, to avoid providing an interpretation of the text, to limit myself to the realm of information, and to restrict my focus to what needs to be known to understand a given paragraph. It is my hope that these strictures will spare the reader hours of research while allowing him or her to formulate his or her own interpretation of the text. Some readers may find the information presented here redundant; others may find it insufficient. If each bit of information is useful to someone, that is sufficient for me.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the many people who helped me with this project. I am particularly grateful to Michael Syrotinski, who took the time to review the translation line by line with me while it was still in its early stages, and to Haun Saussy and Debra Keates. At later stages I benefited from the knowledge and attention of Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss, and Jacques-Alain Miller. I hope that the many others who chipped in will be able to recognize their contributions.

In order that this information not interfere with the direct reading of the text, I have chosen to key the annotations to page and paragraph number in the translation. No marking has been made in the text. A paragraph continuing from a previous page is designated ¶ 0 in these notes, while ¶ 1 designates the first full paragraph on a page. The following short title forms and abbreviations have been used throughout:

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p. 55, ¶1: "literary."

Lacan's use of "les lettres" here would seem to refer to the realm of "belles lettres" or even literary criticism. One of the main targets here would likely be Jean Paulhan (a frequent user of the phrase), who writes:

Reiterating them through ten volumes and supporting them with a thousand examples, a Krafft-Ebing was to consecrate the categories and distinctions the Divine Marquis traced. Later, a Freud was to adopt Sade's very method and principle. There has not, I think, been any other example, in our letters, of a few novels providing the basis, fifty years after their publication, for a whole science of man.


Further, in his deposition in the 1957 trial of Jean-Jacques Pauvert for publishing Sade (the account of which Lacan refers to [cf. footnote 10 and annotation below]), Paulhan in fact makes this connection:

Sade was led . . . to hold that man was wicked, and to show in detail, in all fashions, this wickedness which he was the first to found upon sexuality; this is a thesis which Grodeck, Freud, and a hundred others took up later. . . . The writers of the nineteenth century, beginning with Lamartine and continuing, if you wish, with Freud and Nietzsche, vulgarized the work of the Marquis de Sade.


If it is excessive to admit, as some have upheld, that this work has dominated the twentieth century, one nevertheless cannot contest its originality, nor the importance of the field of studies which it offers to all those who are interested in the new field of psychotherapy of which Sade is a precursor before Krafft-Ebing,
Havelock Ellis, before the discoveries of Freud. . . .

See also note 21 and annotation below.

p. 55, ¶3: "happiness in evil."

p. 56, ¶1: "the eternal feminine."
Cf. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust II, verses 12104–12111, in Goethes Werke, Hamburg, Christian Wegner Verlag, 1949, vol. 3, p. 364: "Alles Vergängliche / Ist nur ein Gleichnis; / Das Unzulängliche, / Hier wird's Ereignis; / Das Unbeschreibliche, / Hier ist's getan; / Das Ewig-Weibliche / Zieht uns hiran (Everything transitory is only a parable; the inadequate, here becomes event; the undescrivable, here is accomplished; the eternal feminine draws us upward)."

p. 56, ¶1: "Man fühlt sich wohl im Guten."
Cf. WA, vol. 7, p. 193; Beck, pp. 61–62:
There is an old formula of the schools: Nihil appetimus, nisi sub ratione boni; nihil aversamus, nisi sub ratione mali. It is often used correctly, but often in a manner very injurious to philosophy, since the expressions boni and mali contain an ambiguity due to the poverty of the language. . . . The German language has the good fortune to possess expressions which do not permit this difference to be overlooked. It has two very different concepts and equally different expressions for what the Latins named with the single word bonum.

For bonum it has das Gute (the good) and das Wohl (well-being). . . .

p. 56, ¶2: "phenomenal succession [enchainement phénoménal]."
I have translated enchainement—"enchaining"—as "succession" due to the emphasis Kant places on time as the location of the causality within which the phenomenal subject is caught. Cf. WA, vol. 7, pp. 219–220; Beck, pp. 97–98:
The concept of causality as natural necessity, unlike the concept of causality as freedom, concerns only the existence of things as far as it is determinable in time, and consequently as appearances in contrast to their causality as things-in-themselves. If one takes the attributes of things in time for things-in-themselves, which is the usual way of thinking, the necessity in the causal relation can in no way be united with freedom. They are contradictory to each other, for the former implies that every event, and consequently every action which occurs at a certain point of time is necessary under the condition of what preceded it. Since the past is no longer in my power, every action which I perform is necessary because of determining grounds which are not in my power. That means that at the time I act I am never free. . . .
At every point in time I still stand under the necessity of being determined to act by what is not in my power, and the a parte priori infinite series of events which I can continue only by an already predetermined order would never commence of itself. It would be a continuous natural chain [eine stetige Naturkette], and thus my causality would never be freedom.
In this paragraph Lacan presents several pages of Kant’s argument in an extremely compressed form. We will present here only those passages from which he draws directly. The first, the one to which he himself refers (WA, vol. 7, p. 193; Beck, pp. 75–76), reads as follows:

All inclinations taken together (which can be brought into a fairly tolerable system, whereupon their satisfaction is called happiness) constitute self-regard (solipsismus). This consists either of self-love, which is a predominant benevolence towards one’s self (philautia) or of self-satisfaction (arrogantia). The former is called, more particularly, selfishness; the latter, self-conceit.

Several pages later, in the course of describing the origin of the feeling of respect for the moral law, Kant writes (WA, vol. 7, p. 196; Beck, p. 78):

Since the idea of the moral law deprives self-love of its influence and self-conceit of its delusion, it lessens the obstacle to pure practical reason and produces the idea of the superiority of its objective law to the impulses of sensibility; it increases the weight of the moral law by removing, in the judgement of reason, the counterweight to the moral law [mithin das Gewicht des ersteren relativ . . . durch die Wegschaffung des Gegengewichts . . . hervorgebracht wird] which bears on a will affected by sensibility. Thus respect for the law is not the incentive to morality; it is morality itself, regarded subjectively as an incentive. . . .

I have, for example, made it my maxim to increase my property by every safe means. Now I have in my possession a deposit, the owner of which has died without leaving any record of it. Naturally, this case falls under my maxim. Now I want to know whether this maxim can hold as a universal practical law. I apply it therefore to the present case and ask if it could take the form of a law, and consequently whether I could, by the maxim, make the law that every man is allowed to deny that a deposit has been made when no one can prove the contrary. I immediately realize that taking such a principle as a law would annihilate itself, because its result would be that no one would make a deposit [weil es machen würde, dab es gar kein Depositäum gäbe]. A practical law which I acknowledge as such must qualify for being universal law; this is an identical and therefore self-evident proposition. Now, if I say that my will is subject to a practical law, I cannot put forward my inclination (in this case, my avarice) as fit to be a determining ground of a universal practical law. It is so far from being worthy of universal legislation that in the form of a universal law it must destroy itself.

On the distinction between analytic and synthetic, cf. the Introduction to Kant’s first Critique (WA, vol. 3, p. 52; Smith, p. 48 [A 7/B 10–11]):

Analytic judgements (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity; those in which this connection is thought without identity should be entitled synthetic. The former, as adding
nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely breaking it up into those constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly, can also be entitled expliative. The latter, on the other hand, add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any wise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it; and they may therefore be entitled ampliative.

Kant goes on to posit three propositions about synthetic judgments (WA, vol. 3, pp. 55–58; Smith, pp. 52–54 [B 14–17]):

1. All mathematical judgements, without exception, are synthetic . . .
2. Natural science (physics) contains a priori synthetic judgements as principles. . . .
3. Metaphysics, even if we look upon it as having hitherto failed in all its endeavours, is yet, owing to the nature of human reason, a quite indispensable science, and ought to contain a priori synthetic knowledge.

We should further note that analytic judgments all depend upon a prior synthesis, and that synthetic judgments cannot be made on the basis of concepts alone, but require an intuition (whether sensuous as in experiential judgments or a priori as in mathematical judgments).

p. 57, ¶4: “Long live Poland! . . .”

Before retouching, the text reads: “Beautiful though it may be, it’s not a patch on Poland. Ah gentlemen, there’ll always be a Poland. Otherwise there wouldn’t be any Poles! [Ah! messieurs! si beau qu’il soit il ne vaut pas la Pologne. S’il n’y avait pas de Pologne il n’y aurait pas de polonais!]” (Alfred Jarry, Ubu roi, Acte V, Scène IV, Oeuvres complètes, textes établis, présentés, et annotés par Michel Arrivé, Paris, Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1972, vol. 1, p. 398; Ubu Rex, trans. Cyril Connolly and Simon Taylor Watson, in The Ubu Plays, New York, Grove Press, 1969, p. 73).

p. 58, ¶2: “jouissance.”

I have followed the now classic approach of leaving jouissance untranslated. See Sheridan’s note in FFC, p. 281; see also Stuart Schneiderman’s Preface to Returning to Freud: Clinical Psychoanalysis in the School of Lacan, ed. and trans., Stuart Schneiderman, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980, p. vii. Although it is not a strict equivalent, I have translated droit de (or à) jouir de as “right of enjoyment over,” in order to emphasize the legal meaning which is so important in this context (see particularly the citation from Sade in the annotation to p. 60, ¶0 and footnote 3, below, where he differentiates between the right of property and the right of jouissance). As an element of the French legal vocabulary, jouissance designates the benefit gained from the possession or use of a thing; it refers to a relation to these benefits and not to the ownership of the thing itself. Thus someone who has a droit de jouissance can, for example, alienate (rent) the benefits he gains from an object, but he cannot alienate (sell) the object.

p. 58, ¶3:

On the Sadian maxim, cf. the formulation first given in L’ethique, p. 96: “Let us take as a universal maxim for our action the right to enjoyment [droit de jouir] over an other whomever he may be, as an instrument of our pleasure.” Cf. also p. 237, where Lacan cites the following passage from Juliette (OC, vol. 8, p. 71; Juliette, pp. 63–64): “Pray avail me of that part of your body which is capable of giving me a moment’s satisfaction, and, if you are so inclined, amuse yourself [jouissez] with
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whatever part of mine may be agreeable to you.”

p. 58, ¶6: “humor is the betryer [trans-fuge] in the comic of the very function of the ‘super-ego.’”


As regards the origin of jokes, I was led [in Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious] to assume that a pre-conscious thought is given over to the unconscious for momentary revision. A joke is thus the contribution made to the comic by the unconscious. In just the same way, humour would be the contribution [Beitrag] made to the comic through the agency of the super-ego [Freud’s emphasis].

Given the use of a number of thematically related examples below (Saint-Just and the Terror, Kant’s “apologue”), it is worth noting that Freud’s primary example, both here and in the section of Jokes . . . on humor, is that of gallows humor (Galgenhumor): “A rogue who was being led out to execution on a Monday remarked: ‘Well, this week’s beginning nicely’” (Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, SA, vol. 4, p. 213; SE, vol. 8, p. 229).

p. 58, ¶12:


p. 59, ¶6:


p. 59, ¶9: “fun.”

In English in the original. Cf. the question Lacan poses to Roman Jakobson in a conference at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, December 2, 1975:

D’eux comes from de illis.
Deux from duo.
Is the phoneme destined to seize upon equivocality, or is it a happenstance for French ears?
Is it not this equivocality (which is what interpretation plays upon) which is what makes a circle of the symptom with the symbolic? Since, intervening in a certain manner upon the symptom, one finds oneself equivocating.
Is there a side of linguistics which is treatable as such?
It would be the side which is always the one to which the analyst must be sensitive: fun.


p. 59, ¶10 and note 3:

Philosophy, pp. 318–319:

Never may an act of possession be exercised upon a free being; the exclusive possession of a woman is no less unjust than the possession of
slaves; all men are born free, all have equal rights: never should we lose sight of these principles; according to which never may there be granted to one sex the legitimate right to lay monopolizing hands upon the other, and never may one of the sexes, or classes, arbitrarily possess the other. Similarly, a woman existing in the purity of Nature's laws cannot allege, as justification for refusing herself to someone who desires her, the love she bears another, because such a response is based on exclusion, and no man may be excluded from the having of a woman as of the moment it is clear she definitely belongs to all men. The act of possession can only be exercised upon a chattel or an animal, never upon an individual who resembles us, and all the ties which can bind a woman to a man are quite as unjust as they are illusory.

If it then becomes incontestable that we have received from Nature the right to express our wishes to all women, it likewise becomes incontestable that we have the right to compel their submission, not exclusively, for then I should be contradicting myself, but temporarily.

Sade here inserts a note:

Let it not be said that I contradict myself here, and that after having established, at some point further above, that we have no right to bind a woman to ourselves, I destroy those principles when I declare we now have the right to constrain her; I repeat, it is a question of enjoyment [jouissance] only, not of property: I have no right of possession upon the fountain I find by the road, but I have certain rights to its use [jouissance]; I have the right to avail myself of the limpid water it offers my thirst; similarly, I have no real right of possession over such-and-such a woman, but I have incontestable rights to the enjoyment of her; I have the right to force from her this enjoyment, if she refuses me it for whatever the cause may be.

p. 60, ¶6: “amboceptive.”

“Amboceptor” is a term introduced by the German hematologist and immunologist Paul Ehrlich (1854–1915) to describe his concept, no longer in use, of the structure of complement-fixation (an important process in immunology). Etymologically, the word means “taking from both.” Lacan uses the term in a discussion of the effect of separation produced by the objet a in a passage from the seminar on anxiety (L’angoisse, Seminar 10, 1962–63, unpublished, session of March 6, 1963):

It is not so much the child which pumps the mother’s milk as the breast . . . I want to place the accent upon the privilege, at a certain level, of elements that can be qualified as amboceptors. Which side is the breast on? On the side of what sucks or on the side of what is sucked? . . . Is it enough to qualify the breast as a partial object? When I say amboceptor, I emphasize that it is just as necessary to articulate the relation of the maternal subject to the breast as that of the baby to it. The cut is not made at the same place for both; there are two cuts, so far apart that they even leave two totally different waste-products [déchets].

p. 60, ¶8:

Lacan’s text actually reads, “. . . unveiled as Etre-là, Dasein, of the agent . . . ,” that is, giving the standard French translation of Heidegger’s Dasein.
Because English translations of Heidegger usually leave *Dasein* untranslated, I have here allowed it to stand alone.


Idealization is a process that concerns the object; by it that object, without any alteration in its nature, is aggrandized and exalted in the subject’s mind. Idealization is possible in the sphere of ego-libido as well as in that of object-libido. . . . It would not surprise us if we were to find a special psychical agency which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic satisfaction from the ego-ideal is ensured and which, with this end in mind, constantly watches the actual ego and measures it by that ideal. . . . We may reflect that what we call our “conscience” has the required characteristics. Recognition of this agency enables us to understand the so-called “delusions of being noticed” or more correctly, of being watched, which are such striking symptoms in the paranoid diseases. . . . Patients of this sort complain that all their thoughts are known and their actions are watched and supervised; they are informed of the functioning of this agency by voices which characteristically speak to them in the third person (“Now she's thinking of that again,” “now he's going out”). This complaint is justified; it describes the truth. . . . What prompted the subject to form an ego-ideal, on whose behalf his conscience acts as a watchman, arose from the critical influence of his parents (conveyed to him by the medium of the voice). . . .

p. 61, ¶3: “Grimmigkeit.”

*Grimmigkeit* means wrathfulness; the reference is to Jacob Böhme (1575–1624), a German shoemaker and mystic, author of *The Aurora* and numerous other mystical tracts. Cf. Lacan’s comments in *L’ethique*, p. 255):

There were already at the time of courtly love people called Cathars, to whom I made a passing allusion and for whom there was no doubt that the Prince of this world was something comparable enough to this supremely wicked being. The *Grimmigkeit* of the Böhman God, a fundamental wickedness as one of the dimensions of supreme life, proves to you that it is not only a libertine and anti-religious thought which can evoke this dimension.

It is probably Böhme to whom Kant refers in the following passage from the “Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason” (WA, vol. 7, pp. 251–253; Beck, pp. 125–127):

So long as practical reason is pathologically conditioned, i.e., as merely regulating the interest of the inclinations by the sensuous principle of happiness, this demand [that theoretical reason should yield primacy to practical reason] could not be made upon the speculative reason. Mohammed’s paradise or the fusion with the deity of the theosophists and mystics, according to the taste of each, would press their monstrosities on reason, and it would be as well to have no reason at all as to surrender it in such a manner to all sorts of dreams [*Träumereien*]. . . . Without [the thesis of the moral destiny of our nature] either the moral law is completely degraded from holiness, by being made out as lenient (indulgent)
and thus compliant to our convenience, or its call and its demands are strained to an unattainable destination, i.e., a hoped-for attainment of holiness of will, and are lost in fanatical theosophical dreams [schwär

mende . . . theosophische Träume] which completely contradict our knowledge of ourselves.


OC, vol. 8, p. 386; Juliette, p. 399.
This term immediately precedes the passage cited in the second annotation to p. 64, ¶1 below.

p. 61, ¶4: “Schwärmereien.”

Schwärmereien is a distinctively Kantian term which means fanaticisms or mysticisms; Schwärme, from which the former is derived, means swarms (black is schwarz). Cf. WA, vol. 7, p. 208; Beck, p. 88:

If fanaticism [Schwärmerei] in its most general sense is a deliberate overstepping of the limits of human reason, moral fanaticism is this overstepping of limits which pure practical reason sets to mankind. Pure practical reason thereby forbids us to place the subjective determining ground of dutiful actions, i.e., their moral incentive, anywhere else than in the law itself. . . .

Kant had previously given a slightly more technical definition of the term (WA, vol. 7, p. 190; Beck, p. 73):

The mysticism [Mystizism: at the end of the paragraph Kant speaks of Schwärmei in such a way as to equate the terms] of practical reason . . . makes into a schema that which should only serve as a symbol, i.e., proposes to supply real yet nonsensuous intuitions (of an invisible kingdom of God) for the application of the moral law, and thus plunges into the transcendent.

The explanation of this distinction between symbol and schema is to be found in § 59 of the third Critique (WA, vol. 10, pp. 295–297; Meredith, pp. 221–223):

All hypotyposis (presentation, subjectio sub adspectum) as a rendering in terms of sense, is twofold. Either it is schematic, as where the intuition corresponding to a concept is given a priori, or else it is symbolic, as where the concept is one which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate. In the latter case the concept is supplied with an intuition such that the procedure of judgement in dealing with it is merely analogous to that which it observes in schematism. In other words, what agrees with the concept is merely the rule of this procedure, and not the intuition itself. Hence the agreement is merely in the form of the reflection, and not in the content. . . . All our knowledge of God is merely symbolic; and one who takes it, with the properties of understanding, will, and so forth, which only evidence their objective reality in beings of this world, to be schematic, falls into anthropomorphism, just as, if he abandons every intuitive element, he falls into Deism which furnishes no knowledge whatsoever—not even from a practical point of view.

p. 61, ¶8: “henchman [suppôt].”

The most common current use of this word is in the phrase “suppôt du démon,” meaning someone who furthers the devil’s aims. Formerly, it had a philosophical sense of support, in the sense in
which a subject or a substance is the support of its predicates or attributes (the obsolete word "supposite" is listed in the *Oxford English Dictionary* in this sense).

p. 62, ¶2:
"since it is not articulatable there even though it is articulated in it [pour n'y être pas articulable encore qu'il y soit articulé]."

Cf., on this somewhat gnomic formulation, a favorite of Lacan's, "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious," where a causal relation between the two clauses is established (*Ecrits*, p. 804; *EAS*, p. 302): "To put it elliptically: it is precisely because desire is articulated that it is not articulatable [que le désir soit articulé, c'est justement par là qu'il n'est pas articulable], I mean in the discourse best suited to it, an ethical, not a psychological discourse."

p. 62, ¶6: "($\mathfrak{O}a$).

The formula for the fantasy was first introduced in the seminar on unconscious formations (*Les formations de l'inconscient*, Seminar 5, 1957–1958, unpublished), and was constantly reinterpreted by Lacan. To trace the history of these reinterpretations is well beyond our scope here. We can, however, provide a brief note on the stamp ("poinçon"; Sheridan, in *FFC* and *EAS*, translates this as "punch"). When first introduced, Lacan says simply that its "quadratic" form reproduces that of the "Schema L" (see annotation to "Schema 2" below). In a note to "The Direction of the Cure and the Principles of Its Power" (*Ecrits*, p. 634; *EAS*, p. 280), he writes, "The sign registers the relations envelopment-development-conjunction-disjunction." This interpretation of the stamp as a set of logical operations is continued in *The Four Fundamental Concepts* (*Les quatre concepts*, p. 190; *FFC*, p. 209), where Lacan breaks it into vectorialised upper and lower halves, respectively representing the logical operations of union (U, the *vel* of alienation [see annotation to p. 63, ¶3 below] and intersection (\(\cap\), separation). Finally, in a passage of "Subversion of the Subject . . ." which obviously refers back to the present context, Lacan writes (*Ecrits*, p. 816; *EAS*, p. 313):

This is what is symbolised by the acronym ($\mathfrak{O}a$) which I have introduced, in the form of an algorithm of which it is not an accident that it breaks the phonemic element constituted by the signifying unity right down to its literal atom. For it is created to allow a hundred and one [vingt et cent] different readings, a multiplicity which is admissible just as long as it remains caught in its algebra.

p. 63, ¶3: "*vel.*"

Cf. "Position de l'inconscient," *Ecrits*, pp. 841–842:

Alienation resides in the division of the subject which we have just designated in its cause. Let us advance in its logical structure. This structure is that of a *vel*, new in this production of its originality. This requires its being derived from what is called, in so-called mathematical logic, union (already recognized as defining a certain *vel*).

This union is such that the *vel* which we call the *vel* of alienation imposes a choice between its terms only in order to eliminate one of them, always the same one whatever the choice may be. Its stake is thus limited, apparently, to the conservation or not of the other term, in the case of a binary union.

This disjunction is incarnated in a fashion which is highly illustrable, if not dramatic, as soon as the signifier is incarnated at a more per-
sonalised level in a demand or in an offer: in “your money or your life” or in “freedom or death.”

The only question is that of knowing whether or not (sic aut non) you want to conserve life or refuse death, for as far as the other term of the alternative: your money or freedom, is concerned, your choice will be disappointing in any case.

It is necessary to take heed of the fact that what remains is truncated in any case: it will be a life without money,—and it will also be, for having refused death, a life slightly impoverished at the price of freedom.

These are the stigmata which the vel which here functions dialectically inflicts upon the vel of logical union, which, as is known, is equivalent to an and (sic et non). As is illustrated by the fact that in the long run it will be necessary to let go of life after one’s money and that in the end only the freedom to die will remain.

In the same way our subject is confronted with the vel between a certain sense to be received and petrification. But if he keeps the sense, it is this field (that of sense) out of which the nonsense produced by its changing into a signifier will take a bite.


p. 63, ¶4: “What does it want? [Que veut-il?]”

Cf. on this phrase, the following passage from “Subversion of the Subject,” as well as Graph 3, which it describes (Écrits, pp. 814–815; EAS, p. 312):

For it is clear that the state of nescience in which man remains in relation to this desire is not so much a nescience of what he demands, which after all may be circumscribed, as a nescience as to whence he desires.

And it is to this that we respond by the formula that the unconscious is discourse of the Other, in which the of must be understood in the sense of the Latin de (objective determination): de Alio in oratione (completed by: tua res agitur).

But also in adding that man’s desire is the desire of the Other, in which the of provides the determination which the grammarians call subjective, namely that it is qua Other that he desires (which is what provides the true import of human passion).

This is why the question of the Other, which comes back to the subject from the place from which he expects an oracle, phrased as a Che vuoi?, What do you want?, is the one which best leads to the path of his own desire—if he sets out, thanks to the skills of a partner by the name of a psychoanalyst, to reformulate it, be it without knowing it, as “What does it want of me [Que me veut-il]?”

p. 63, ¶6: “aphanisis.”

The term aphanisis was first introduced by Ernest Jones in “The Early Development of Female Sexuality,” Papers in Psycho-analysis, 5th edition, London, Baillière, Tindall and Cox, 1950, pp. 439–440:

The all-important part played in male sexuality by the genital organs naturally tends to make us equate castration with the abolition of sexuality altogether. This fallacy often creeps into our arguments even though we know that many men wish to be castrated for, among others, erotic reasons, so that their sexuality
does not disappear with the surrender of the penis. With women, where the whole penis idea is always partial and mostly secondary in nature, this should be still more evident. In other words, the prominence of castration fears among men tends sometimes to make us forget that in both sexes castration is only a partial threat, however important a one, against sexual capacity and enjoyment as a whole. For the main blow of total extinction we might do well to use a separate term, such as the Greek word "aphanisis."

The passage upon which Lacan relies in his reinterpretation of this term reads as follows (pp. 444–445):

The girl must choose, broadly speaking, between sacrificing her erotic attachment to her father and sacrificing her femininity —i.e., her anal identification with the mother. Either the object must be exchanged for another or the wish must be; it is impossible to retain both. Either the father or the vagina (including pregenital vaginas) must be renounced. . . . The boy is also threatened with aphanisis, the familiar castration fear, by the inevitable privation of his incest wishes. He also has to make the choice between changing the wish and changing the object, between renouncing the mother and renouncing his masculinity —i.e., his penis. We have thus obtained a generalisation which applies in a unitary manner to boy and girl alike: faced with aphanisis as a result of inevitable privation, they must renounce either their sex or their incest. . . .

Cf. Les quatre concepts, pp. 189, 191; FFC, pp. 207–208, 210:

One analyst felt this, at another level, and tried to signify it in a term which was new, and which has never since been exploited in the field of analysis —aphanisis, disappearance. Jones, who invented it, took it for something rather absurd, the fear of seeing desire disappear. Now, aphanisis is to be situated in a more radical way at the level where the subject manifests itself in this movement of disappearance which I have qualified as lethal. In still another way, I have called this movement the fading of the subject. . . .

Alienation consists in this vel, which —if you do not object to the word condemned, I will use it— condemns the subject to appear only in this division which, it seems to me, I have just sufficiently articulated by saying that, if it appears on one side as sense, produced by the signifier, it appears on the other as aphanisis.

Cf. annotations to p. 62, ¶6 and p. 63, ¶3 above.

p. 63, ¶7 and footnote 4:


The true barrier which stops the subject before the unnameable field of radical desire inasmuch as it is the field of absolute destruction, of destruction beyond putrefaction, is properly speaking the aesthetic phenomenon inasmuch as it is identifiable with the experience of the
beautiful—the beautiful in its bursting radiance, the beautiful which is said to be the splendor of the true. It is obviously because the true is not such a pretty sight that the beautiful is, if not its splendor, at least its cover. . . . It stops us, but it also indicates to us the direction in which the field of destruction is found (p. 256).

When does this plaint begin? At the moment at which she crosses the entry of the zone between life and death, where what she said she already was takes on exterior form. Indeed she had long told us that she was already in the kingdom of the dead, but this time it is consecrated in the facts. Her torture will consist in being closed up, suspended, in the zone between life and death. Without yet being dead, she is already stricken from the world of the living. . . . The violent illumination, the sheen of beauty, coincides with the moment of crossing over, of realization of Antigone’s Ate. . . . The effect of beauty is an effect of blinding. Something is still happening beyond, which cannot be looked at. Indeed, Antigone has herself declared, the whole time—I am dead and I want death. When Antigone portrays herself as Niobe being petrified, with what does she identify?—if not this inanimate in which Freud teaches us to recognize the form in which the death instinct is manifested. It is indeed a question of an illustration of the death instinct (pp. 326–327).

p. 64, ¶1 and footnote 5:

*OC*, vol. 8, pp. 356–357; *Juliette*, pp. 369–370:

Fierce and long has been my struggle against the shameful yoke of religion, my friends; and I must confess to you that I am yet its captive insofar as I still have hopes of a life after this. If it is true, I say to myself, that there are punishments and rewards in the next world, the victims of my wickedness will triumph, they will know bliss. This idea hurls me into deepest despond, owing to my extreme barbarity this idea is a very torture to me. Whenever I immolate an object, whether to my ambition or to my lubricity, my desire is to make its suffering last beyond the unending immensity of ages; such has been my desire, and had been for a long time when I broached it to a famous libertine whom I was greatly attached to in days gone by, and whose tastes were the same as mine. He was a man of vast knowledge, his attainments in alchemy and astrology were especially noteworthy; he assured me that I was correct in my suspicion that there were punishments and rewards to come; and that, in order to bar the victim from celestial joys, it is necessary to have him sign a pact, writ in his heart’s blood, whereby he contracts his soul to the devil; next to insert this paper in his asshole and to tamp it home with one’s prick; and while doing so to cause him to suffer the greatest pain in one’s power to inflict. Observe these measures, my friend assured me, and no individual you destroy will enter into heaven. His agonies, in kind identical to those you will make him endure while burying the pact, shall be everlasting; and yours will be the unspeakable delight of prolonging them beyond the limits of eternity, if eternity could have limits.
p. 64, ¶1: "particles of evil."
Cf. OC, vol. 8, pp. 386–387; Juliette, pp. 399–400:

I see eternal and universal evil as absolutely indispensable in the world. The author of the universe is the most wicked, the most ferocious, the most horrifying of all beings. His works cannot be anything but the result or the incarnation of his criminality. Without his wickedness raised to its extremest pitch, nothing would be sustained in the universe; evil is, however, a moral entity and not a created one, an eternal and not a perishable entity: it existed before the world; it constituted the monstrous, the execrable being who was able to fashion such a hideous world. It will hence exist after the creatures which people this world; it is unto evil that they will all enter again, in order to re-create others perhaps more wicked yet, and that is why they say all is degraded, all is corrupted in old age; that stems from the perpetual re-entry and emergence of wicked elements into and out of the matrix of maleficient molecules.

p. 64, ¶2: "the second death."
Cf. L’ethique, pp. 248–250, where Lacan cites the following passage from the “System of Pope Pius VI” (OC, vol. 9, pp. 175–177; Juliette, pp. 771–772):

No destruction, no fodder for the earth, and consequently man deprived of the possibility to reproduce man. Fatal truth, this, since it contains inescapable proof that the virtues and vices of our social system are nought, and that what we characterize as vices are more beneficial, more necessary than our virtues, since these vices are creative and these virtues merely created; or, if you prefer, these vices are causes, these virtues merely effects; proof too that a perfect harmony would have more disadvantages than has disorder; and proof that if war, discord, and crime were suddenly to be banished from the world, the three kingdoms, all checks on them removed, would flourish so as to unsettle and soon destroy all the other laws of Nature. Celestial bodies would come to a halt, their influences would be suspended because of the overly great empire of one of their number; gravitation would be no more, and motion none. It is then the crimes of man which, stemming the rise of the three kingdoms, counteracting their tendency to preponderate, prevent their importance from becoming such as must disrupt all else, and maintains in universal affairs that perfect equilibrium Horace called rerum concordia discors. Therefore is crime necessary in the world. But the most useful crimes are without doubt those which most disrupt, such as refusal to propagate and destruction; all the others are petty mischief, they are even less than that, or rather only those two merit the name of crime: and thus you see these crimes essential to the laws of the kingdoms, and essential to the laws of Nature. An ancient philosopher called war the mother of all things. The existence of murderers is as necessary as that bane; but for them, all would be disturbed in the order of things... This dissolution benefits Nature, since 'tis these disassembled parts she recomposes. Thus does all change effected by man upon organized matter far more serve Nature than it displeases her. What is
this I say? Alas! to render her true service would require destructions more thorough, vaster than it is in our power to operate; 'tis atrocity, 'tis scope she wants in crimes; the more our destroying is of a broad and atrocious kind, the more agreeable it is to her. To serve her better yet, one would have to be able to prevent the regeneration resultant from the corpses we bury. Only of his first life does murder deprive the individual we smite; one would have to be able to wrest away his second, if one were to be more useful to Nature; for 'tis annihilation she seeks, by less she is not fully satisfied, it is not within our power to extend our murders to the point she desires.

Lacan explicitly constructs an analogy between the "second death" and the Freudian death drive: "... the death drive ... is of the same order as the System of Pope Pius VI. As in Sade, the death drive is a creationist sublimation ..." (p. 251).

p. 64, ¶2:
"with which he symbolizes in the wish that ... [avec lequel il symbolise dans le voeu que ...]."

Lacan here uses "symboliser" without a direct object. One would expect something to be symbolized "in the wish. ...," for example, or to be symbolized "with (the vanishing or fainting of the subject)." This usage would seem to accord with the following passage from "D'un syllabaire après coup," attached to "Sur la théorie du symbolisme d'Ernest Jones," Ecrits, p. 719:

Jones advances here expressly in order to enunciate the principle by which Jung excludes himself from psychoanalysis.

It is resumed in a word which pertinently recalls that the thing is always there, wherever it may take its label from. What Jones intends to parry is the hermeneuticization of psychoanalysis.

We might also note that Littré lists the first meaning of "symboliser" (one "little used today," he says) as "to have conformity," and the second as "to speak in symbols." The more usual sense, "to represent by a symbol," he describes as a neologism. One of his historical examples (from Ambroise Paré, a sixteenth-century surgeon) has a marked resemblance to Lacan's construction: "Si l'air est semblable à la maladie, il symbolise en indications avec la maladie" (my emphasis).

p. 64, ¶4 and footnote 7:
The text referred to reads as follows:

My work on Buddhism was composed in the latter months of the life of Eugène Burnouf. It was intended for the Revue des deux mondes, and was indeed the first contribution I sent to that review. M. Buloz, of all men the least Buddhist, praised me regarding some accessories; but, respecting the body of the work, declined to believe the truth of the assertions it contained. To him, a real Buddhist in flesh and blood appeared quite inadmissible. In the face of all the proofs I adduced in support of my thesis, he obstinately replied: "It is impossible that there are people
that dumb." Burnouf died, and my essay remained in my desk. I now bring it to light because I consider that the absence of Buddhism left a gap in my studies of religious history.


p. 65, ¶6: "ready-made."

In English in the original.

p. 65, ¶6: "denies the existence of the Other."


p. 65, ¶7: "eternal object."


SCHEMA 2:

The two graphs, and particularly this one, bear a morphological resemblance to the "Schema L" (see *Ecrits*, pp. 53, 548; *EAS*, p. 193):

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S _______ a
   ^
  a'     A.
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There is, however, no way to reduce the one to the other. In the "Table commentée des représentations graphiques" in *Ecrits*, Jacques-Alain Miller, after paraphrasing the definitions of the terms, notes (p. 907): "The transformation from the first to the second schema, which "is not translated . . . by a symmetrical reversion upon any axis or center," only expresses the displacement of the function of the cause, following the temporality of the Sadian fantasy." The only variant of the particular schema given here that I have been able to find in the Lacanian corpus is one inscribed in the transcript of the seminar on anxiety (January 16, 1963). The text would seem to call for such a schema, but it is not sufficiently explained there either to shed light on these schemas nor to vouch for the authenticity of the details. This variant has the following appearance:
The Présidente de Montreuil was Sade's mother-in-law, who repeatedly had him placed in prison.

Lély's book is reprinted as the first two volumes of Sade's *Oeuvres complètes*. The passage reads as follows (vol. 2, pp. 538–541, footnote 1, p. 541):

All Sade's biographers have made the same grave error regarding the reason for the Marquis's arrest on 15th Ventôse, Year IX. Without due checking they have adopted the view that it was *Zoloe et ses deux acolytes*, and anonymous pamphlet pillorying Josephine Buonaparte, Mme Tallien, Mme Visconti, Tallien, Barras, and Napoléon himself, that was the reason for the arrest. It has been assumed that this pamphlet, which appeared in July, 1800, was Sade's work, and that to arrest him as the author of *Juliette* and *Justine* was merely a convenient cover for the vengeance of the First Consul, who found his marital honor deeply wounded by the pamphlet. But the available sources in no way justify this view. . . . The whole story, as hitherto presented by Sade's biographers, depends on his having been the author of this lampoon. There is, however, not the slightest proof of this. In the absence of proofs, internal evidence might count for something. But however hard one strains one cannot trace any hint of Sade's style in the pamphlet. . . . But though it was not on any personal order of the First Consul's that Sade underwent the horrors of a renewed imprisonment which was to last till his death, it remains none the less true that this arbitrary detention was the work of a regime in which one could already feel the growing tyranny of Napoléon, and it was by decisions signed personally by him in privy council on July 9 and 10, 1811 and April 19 and again March 3, 1812 that Sade remained in prison.


On the manifestations of this tyranny in the realm of the Interior, it might be useful to consult [Henri] Forneron [*Histoire générale des émigrés pendant la Révolution française*, 3rd edition (Paris, Plon, 1884)], vol. II, p. 358: "It is not widely known that the state prisons of Napoléon were as full of suspects as those of Robespierre . . . ; some were chained to iron rings; prisoners were killed after a mockery of judgment, like Frotté and his officers, like the duc d'Enghien, like General Prévost de Boissy and the young Vittel; at other times the death remained enshrouded in mystery, like the cases of Pichegru and Captain Wright. Deportations to the islands continued under the Consulate."
Annotations to "Kant with Sade"

Note 2 on the same page, however, which occurs at the very end of the paragraph cited above, seems more relevant to the problem in question:

What is more, in leafing, with great distaste, through this nauseating rhapsody called Le Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, we found, relative to the author of Justine, the following passage . . . : "[Napoléon] said that while emperor he had had described to him and had glanced at the most abominable book to which the most depraved imagination had ever given birth: a novel which, even under the Convention, had revolted, he said, public morality, to the point where its author was imprisoned, and had remained so ever since and, he believed, was still alive."

p. 66, ¶3: "that a thicket [fourré] efface even the trace upon the stone of a name that would seal his destiny."


Finally, I absolutely forbid that my body be opened on any pretext whatsoever. I urgently insist that it be kept a full forty-eight hours in the chamber where I shall have died, placed in a wooden coffin which shall not be nailed shut until the prescribed forty-eight hours have elapsed, at the end of which period the said coffin shall be nailed shut; during this interval a message shall be sent express to M. Le Normand, wood seller in Versailles, living at number 101, boulevard de l' Egalité, requesting him to come in his own person, with a cart, to fetch my body away and to convey it under his own escort and in said cart to the wood upon my property at Malmaison near Epernon, in the commune of Emance where I would have it lain to rest, without ceremony of any kind, in the first copse [taillis fourré] standing to the right as the said wood is entered from the side of the old chateau by way of the broad lane dividing it. The ditch opened in this copse shall be dug by the tenant farmer of Malmaison under M. Le Normand's supervision, who shall not leave my body until after he has placed it in said ditch; upon this occasion he may, if he so wishes, be accompanied by those among my kinsmen or friends who without display or pomp of any sort whatsoever shall have been kind enough to give me this last proof of their attachment. The ditch once covered over, above it acorns shall be strewn, in order that the spot become green again, and the copse grown back thick over it [et le taillis se trouvant fourré comme auparavant], the traces of my grave may disappear from the face of the earth as I trust the memory of me shall fade out of the minds of men save nevertheless for those few who in their goodness have loved me until the last and of whom I carry away a sweet remembrance with me to the grave.

p. 66, ¶4 and footnote 9: "Not to be born. . . ."

(Sophocles I, trans. Robert Fitzgerald, p. 134.)

p. 66, ¶s 5–6 and footnote 10:

(Gentlemen! it is precisely because you have read him, that I speak to you about him; it is precisely because we have all been cowardly enough to peruse these fatal lines, that we should forewarn the honest and happy ones who still do not know about these books. For,) do not fool yourselves, the Marquis de Sade is everywhere; he is in all the libraries on a certain mysterious and hidden row which one always finds; it's one of those books which is usually placed behind St. John Chrysostom, (or Nicole's *Traité de morale,* or Pascal's *Pensées.* Ask those Commissaries who take lots of inventories after deaths where the Marquis de Sade is not to be found. (And, as that is one of those books which the law does not recognize as personal property, it always happens that a businessman's clerks, or his boss, grab it first, and thus [Garçon gives: Even the police]) turn it over to public consumption. . . .

Cocteau's written deposition is presented in the following fashion (*L'affaire Sade,* p. 62):

Garçon: Here is the letter from M. Jean Cocteau, which had been cited: "Mon cher Maitre, Sade is a philosopher, and after his fashion a moralizer. . . ."

The President of the Court: Jean Cocteau says that?

Garçon: Yes, *Monsieur le président.* "To attack him would be to attack the Jean-Jacques of the *Confessions.* He is boring, his style is weak, and his only worth comes from the reproaches directed towards him. The least American detective novel is more pernicious than the most audacious of Sade's pages. In condemning him, France would default on its holy duty."

The President: I'm in agreement on one point: that he's boring.

Garçon: On that point we all agree.

p. 66, ¶7: "The posture breaks up."

*OC,* vol. 3, p. 475; *Philosophy,* p. 293.

p. 66: indented citation.

"Il est bon d'être charitable / Mais avec qui? Voilà le point." Cf. Jean de la Fontaine, "Le serpente et le villageois," *Fables,* Livre sixième, vol. XIII, in *Oeuvres complètes,* texte établi et annoté par René Groos et Jacques Schiffrin, Paris, Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1954, vol. 1, pp. 142–143: "Il est bon d'être charitable; / Mais envers qui, c'est là le point. / Quant aux ingrains, il n'en est point / Qui ne meure enfin misérable." (It is good to be charitable; but towards whom, that is the point. As for ingrates, there isn't one who doesn't die miserably in the end.)

p. 67, ¶1:

The reference is to Charles Chaplin's 1947 film *Monsieur Verdoux,* in which a former bank-teller (played by Chaplin) supports his paraplegic wife and child in provincial comfort through marrying a series of other women, murdering them for their money, and disposing of their bodies by incinerating them. The Buddha story is likely based on "The Hare-Mark in the Moon," a fable drawn from the Jataka Book, in which stories of the past lives of the Buddha are recounted. The future Buddha, in a past life as a hare, offered himself as dinner to Sakka, disguised as a mendiant Brähmin, in order to keep the precepts. The story is translated in Lucien Stryk, ed., *World of the Buddha: A Reader,* Garden City, NY, Doubleday & Co., 1968, pp. 5–10.

p. 67, ¶2: "'But what,' you will ask, 'are all these metaphors and why. . . .'"

Cf. Raymond Queneau, "L'explica-

p. 67, ¶3: "spintrian [spinthrienne] jouissance."

"Spintrian" is the adjective form of "spintry," etymologically related to both "sphinx" and "sphincter," and defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as "a species of male prostitute." The entry under the adjective form gives a generalization: "pertaining to those that seek out, or invent new and monstrous forms of lust."

p. 67, ¶9: "bastardized."

The heraldic mark connoting bastardy is known in French as "barre sinistre." (The correct English term is "bend sinister," although "bar sinister" is often used.)

p. 67, ¶12 and footnote 11:


I have thus brought together for you two cases which Kant does not envisage, two forms of transgression beyond the limits normally assigned to the pleasure principle opposed to the reality principle considered as a criterion, namely, the excessive sublimation of the object, and what is commonly called perversion. Sublimation and perversion are both a certain relation of desire which draws our attention upon the possibility of formulating, in the form of a question, another principle of another (or of the same) morality, opposed to the reality principle. For there is a register of morality which is directed from the side of what there is at the level of *das Ding* [the Thing], namely the register which makes the subject hesitate at the moment of bearing false witness against *das Ding*, that is, the site of his desire, be it perverse or sublimated (p. 131).

The striking import of the first example rests on the fact that the night spent with the lady is paradoxically presented to us as a pleasure, weighed against the pain to be undergone, in an opposition which homogenizes them. . . . But note this—it is sufficient for us, by some effort of conception, to shift the night spent with the lady from the rubric of pleasure to that of *jouissance*, inasmuch as *jouissance*—no need of sublimation for this—implies precisely the acceptance of death, in order for the example to be annihilated. To put it another way, it is sufficient that *jouissance* be an evil . . . (p. 222).

p. 68, ¶0 and footnote 12:


p. 68, ¶1 and footnote 13: "Fontenelle."

The reference occurs in the chapter of the *Critique* on "The Incentives of Practical Reason," in a discussion of the feeling of respect (WA, vol. 7, p. 197; Beck, p. 79):

Fontenelle says, "I bow to a great man, but my mind does not bow." I can add: to a humble plain man, in whom I perceive righteousness in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, *my mind bows* whether I choose or not, however high I carry my head that he may not forget my
superior position. Bernard le Bovier, seigneur de Fontenelle, was born in 1657. He was a member of the Académie française and Secretary of the Académie des sciences from 1697 until 1740. The author of the Dialogues des morts, the Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes, and the Diggersion sur les anciens et les modernes, Fontenelle died at the age of 100 in 1757, some thirty years before the publication of the second Critique.

p. 68, ¶5: "Et non propter vitam vivendi perdere causas."

Cf. Juvenal, Satire VII, verses, pp. 79–84:

Esto bonus miles, tutor bonus, arbiter idem / integer; ambiguae si quando citabere testis / incertaeque rei, Phalaris licet imperet ut sis / falsum et ad moto dictet peruria tauro, / summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori, / et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.

(Be a stout soldier, a faithful guardian, and an incorruptible judge; if summoned to bear witness in some dubious and uncertain cause, though Phalaris himself should bring up his bull and dictate to you a perjury, count it the greatest of all sins to prefer life to honor, and to lose, for the sake of living, all that makes life worth having.)


p. 69, ¶3:

Philippe Pinel (1745–1826) was named director of the chief physician at the hospital/prison of Bicêtre in 1793, and took up a similar position at the Salpêtrière in 1795. The reforms made by Pinel in the treatment of inmates (releasing many from chains and, generally, changing a prison into an asylum) are generally credited with beginning both the humanitarian and the strictly medical treatment of the insane. In the version of this essay published in Critique, Lacan refers, for this whole section, to the third part of Michel Foucault’s Histoire de la folie. See particularly the chapter “Naisance de l’asile,” 2nd ed., Paris, Gallimard, 1972, pp. 483–530 (Madness and Civilization, trans. Richard Howard, New York, Vintage, 1973, pp. 241–278. On “moral insanity,” see pp. 543–544 [not translated by Howard]).

The hospital of Charenton-Saint-Maurice was founded in 1670 to care for indigent patients, under the direction of the order of the Petits Pères. It was closed in 1795 and reopened by the Directory in 1797, under the Ministry of the Interior, to treat the insane. Sade spent nine months there in 1789, and was confined there from 1803 until his death in 1814. See Lély, vol. 2, pp. 347–348, 585–586; OC, vol. 2, pp. 275–276, 546–547.

On August 2, 1808, Antoine-Athanase Royer-Collard, head doctor at Charenton, wrote to the minister of the police to demand that Sade be removed from the asylum (Lély, vol. 2, pp. 595–597; OC, vol. 2, pp. 557–559):

There exists at Charenton a man whose audacious immorality has, unhappily, made him too famous, and whose presence in this asylum entails grave improprieties: I mean the au-
thor of the infamous novel Justine. This man is not mad. His delirium is that of vice, and it is by no means in an institution dedicated to the medical treatment of insanity that this sort of delirium should be repressed. It is necessary that the individual infected by it be submitted to the severest sequestration, whether to shelter others from his furors or to isolate him from all objects which might exalt or sustain his hideous passion.

I hope that your Excellency will find these reasons sufficiently powerful to order that M. de Sade be assigned another place of reclusion than the asylum of Charenton. It would be vain to renew the prohibition of any type of communication between him and the other inmates; this prohibition would be no better executed than it has been in the past, and the same abuses would still occur. I do not ask that he be sent to Bicêtre, where he has previously been placed, but I cannot prevent myself from suggesting to your Excellency that a jail or a dungeon would be much more appropriate for him than an institution dedicated to the treatment of the sick, which requires the most assiduous surveillance and the most delicate moral precautions.

p. 69, ¶8:
Cf. WA, vol. 10, pp. 270–277; Meredith, pp. 196–203 (§54). Kant classifies both jest and humor as agreeable rather than fine arts, because of their relation to bodily well-being, mediated through the affect of laughter. "Laughter is an affection arising from a strained expectation being suddenly reduced to nothing" (WA, vol. 10, p. 273; Meredith, p. 199). Cf. also the reference made by Freud, cited in the annotation to p. 73, ¶7 and footnote 19 below.

p. 70, ¶0: "helot."

p. 70, ¶5: "Thus Milan. . . ."
Cf. WA, vol. 7, p. 137; Beck, pp. 27–28:
It is therefore astonishing how intelligent men have thought of proclaiming as a universal practical law the desire for happiness, and therewith to make this desire the ground of the will merely because this desire is universal. Though elsewhere natural laws make everything harmonious, if one here attributed the universality of law to this maxim, there would be the most complete opposite of harmony [Einstimmung], the most arrant conflict, and the complete annihilation of the maxim itself and its purpose. For the wills of all do not have one and the same object, but each person has his own (his own welfare), which, to be sure, can accidentally agree with the purposes of others who are pursuing there own, though this agreement is far from sufficing for a law because the occasional exceptions which one is permitted to make are endless and cannot be definitively comprehended in a universal
rule. In this way a harmony [Harmonie] may result resembling that depicted in a certain satirical poem as existing between a couple bent on going to ruin, "Oh, marvelous harmony, what he wants is what she wants"; or like the pledge which is said to have been given by Francis I to the Emperor Charles V, "What my brother wants (Milan), that I want too." Empirical grounds of determination are not fit for any universal external legislation, and they are just as little suited to an internal, for each man makes his own subject the foundation of his inclination, and in each person it is now the one and now the other which has preponderance. To discover a law which would govern them all by bringing them into unison [allerseitiger Einstimmung] is absolutely impossible.

p. 70, ¶10: "between center and absence."

p. 71, ¶3 and footnote 15:
WA, vol. 7, p. 129; Beck, p. 20:
Now a rational being's consciousness of the agreeableness of life which without interruption accompanies his whole existence [das Bewusstsein eines vernünftigen Wesen von der Annäherlichkeit des Lebens, die ununterbrochen sein ganzes Dasein begleitet] is happiness, and to make this the supreme ground for the determination of choice constitutes the principle of self-love.

p. 71, ¶4:
Louis-Antoine Léon Saint-Just (1767–1794) was elected to the Convention Nationale in 1792 (at the age of 25, he was its youngest member). He first came to prominence with his speech of November 13, 1792 demanding the unconditional execution of Louis XVI. He became a member of the Committee of Public Safety in May of 1793 and was one of the leading figures in the Terror. He was guillotined along with Robespierre on 10 thermidor an II (July 28, 1794). Lacan here refers to a passage from his "Rapport . . . sur le mode d'exécution du décret contre les ennemis de la Révolution (13 ventose an II)": "Let Europe learn that you want neither an unhappy man nor an oppressor upon French territory; let this example bear fruit upon the earth; let it propagate the love of virtues and happiness! Happiness is a new idea in Europe [Le bonheur est une idée neuve en Europe]." (Oeuvres complètes, édition établie par Michèle Duval, Paris, Editions Gérard Lebovici, 1984, p. 715.) Lacan makes a reference to this same passage in the essay "The Direction of the Cure" (Ecrits, pp. 614–615; EAS, p. 252):

This is why people imagine that a psychoanalyst should be a happy man. Indeed, is it not happiness that one is asking of him, and how could he give it, common sense asks, if he did not have it to some extent himself?

It is a fact that we do not disclaim our competence to promise happiness in a period in which the question of its extent has become so complicated: principally because happiness, as Saint-Just said, has become a political factor [le bonheur, comme l'a dit Saint-Just, est devenu un facteur de la politique].

To be fair, the progress of humanism from Aristotle to St. Francis

p. 71, ¶5:

“The widow” is slang for the guillotine. Organt is Saint-Just’s first work, a long, fantastic, and slightly licentious poem, published in 1789 (Oeuvres complètes, pp. 50–238). One might wonder, regardless of whether he left “the fantasies of Organt” behind him, if Saint-Just did not “make Thermidor his triumph.” There is a veritable myth of Saint-Just, which seems to be largely due to Michelet, who called him the “archangel of the Terror,” centering around his appearance (and silence) upon the tribunal of the Convention on the penultimate day of his life. (Cf. Serena Torjussen, “Saint-Just et ses biographes,” Annales historiques de la Révolution française, vol. 51, no. 236 [April-June 1979], pp. 234–249.) Lacan himself will later refer to Saint-Just in “La science et la vérité,” a transcription of the opening seminar of the year 1965–66 (L’objet de la psychanalyse) (Écrits, p. 866):

Thus in a movement, perhaps playful in echoing the defiance of Saint-Just, raising his voice to the heavens to enshrine in the assembled public, the avowal of being nothing more than what turns to dust, he says, “and which speaks to you,”—the inspiration came to me that, seeing in Freud’s path an allegorical figure strangely coming to life and the nudity worn by her who rises from the well shivering with a new skin, I would lend her my voice.

“I, the truth, I speak . . .” and the prosopopeia continues. Think of the unnameable thing which, able to pronounce these words, would go to the being of language, in order to hear them as they should be pronounced, in horror.

The passage Lacan refers to, from the posthumously published manuscript known as the Fragments d’institutions républicaines, reads as follows (Oeuvres complètes, p. 986): “I despise the dust of which I am made and which speaks to you [Je méprise la poussière qui me compose et qui vous parle]; this dust may be persecuted and killed! But I defy anyone to take away the independent life that I have given myself in the centuries and in the heavens.

p. 72, ¶1: “d’Este gardens.”

The gardens at the Villa d’Este in Tivoli, near Rome, were built between 1560 and 1575 by Cardinal Ippolito II d’Este. They are primarily famous for the variety, number, and complexity of their waterworks.

p. 72, ¶9 and footnote 16:

The complete title is Philosophy in the Bedroom, or the Immoral Teachers, Dialogues Intended for the Education of Young Ladies [La philosophie dans le boudoir, ou Les instituteurs immoraux, Dialogues destinés à l’éducation des jeunes demoiselles].

p. 72, ¶10: “La Mothe le Vayer.”

François de la Mothe le Vayer
(1588–1672) was the preceptor of Louis XIV from 1652–1660. His primary educational works are *De l'instruction de M. le Dauphin* (1640), and *Géographie, Rhétorique, Morale, Economique, Logique et Physique du Prince* (1651–1656).

Cf. *Dialogue entre un prêtre et un moribond*, first published by Maurice Heine in 1926 (*OC*, vol. 14, pp. 53–64; *Philosophy*, pp. 165–175). The dialogue ends with an authorial “Note” (*OC*, vol. 14, p. 64; *Philosophy*, p. 175): “The dying man rang; the women entered; and after he had been a little while in their arms the preacher became one whom Nature has corrupted, all because he had not succeeded in explaining what a corrupt nature is.”

In English in the original.

Cf. *Sade*, *OC*, vol. 3, pp. 494–495; *Philosophy*, pp. 311–312:

It is with utmost candor that I confess that I have never considered calumny an evil, and especially in a government like our own, under which all of us, bound closer together, nearer one another, obviously have a greater interest in becoming acquainted with one another. Either one or the other: calumny attaches to a truly evil man, or it falls upon a virtuous creature. It will be agreed that, in the first case, it makes little difference if one imputes a little more evil to a man known for already having done a great deal of it; perhaps indeed the evil which does not exist will bring to light the evil which does. . . . If, on the contrary, a virtuous man is calumniated, let him not be alarmed; he need but exhibit himself, and all the calumniator's venom will be turned back upon the latter. For such a person, calumny is merely a test of purity whence his virtue emerges more resplendent than ever.


It is on the side of this attraction that we should search the true meaning, the true mystery, the true import of tragedy—on the side of the agitation which it brings with it, on the side of the passions, doubtless, but of the singular passions which are fear and pity, since through their agency, *di eleou kai phobou*, through the agency of pity and fear, we are purged, purified of everything of that order. That order, we can already recognize it—it is, properly speaking, the series of the imaginary. And we are purged of it through the agency of an image among others (p. 290).

Catharsis has the meaning of purification of desire. This purification can only be accomplished, as is clear just from reading Aristotle's sentence, insofar as one has at the very least situated the crossing of its
limits, which are called fear and pity (p. 372).

p. 73, ¶7 and footnote 19:


The factor of “bewilderment and illumination” [Verblüffung und Erleuchtung], too, leads us deep into the problem of the relation of the joke to the comic. Kant says of the comic in general that it has the remarkable characteristic of being able to deceive us only for a moment. Heymans explains how the effect of a joke comes about through bewilderment being succeeded by illumination. He illustrates his meaning by a brilliant joke of Heine’s, who makes one of his characters, Hirsch-Hyacinth, the poor lottery-agent, boast that the great Baron Rothschild treated him quite as his equal—quite “famillionaire.” Here the word that is the vehicle of the joke appears at first simply to be a wrongly constructed word, something unintelligible, incomprehensible, puzzling. It accordingly bewilders. The comic effect is produced by the solution of this bewilderment, by the understanding of the word.

p. 74, ¶0:


p. 74, ¶1 and footnote 20:


A text written about the same time as the revision of this footnote allows us to almost positively identify the academician referred to in the note as Jean Paulhan, who was elected to the Académie française in 1964 (“Présentation” to Ecrits, Paris, Editions du Seuil, collection “Points,” 1970, vol. I, p. 10):

I would want to be credited with having been forced, by this delay which was imposed upon me, of eight years [i.e., not being allowed to teach between the end of the occupation and 1953, date of the Rome discourse], to bray, the length of this report, nonsense [pousser ( . . . ) d’aneries], let us be exact: de paulhaneries, which I can only hee-haw for the ears which hear me. Even dear Paulhan didn’t in the least hold a grudge against me, he who knew just how much “Kant with Sade” would explode in his bestiary. [A footnote attached here reads:]
The N.R.F., were an n. doubled in its acronym [sigle].

The Nouvelle revue française, the leading literary magazine of France between the two world wars and edited by Paulhan since 1925, was taken over by Drieu la Rochelle during the occupation, and ceased publication in 1943. The journal reappeared in 1953 under the title of La nouvelle Nouvelle revue française, only reverting to the original title in February of 1959. We can fur-
ther note that when Lacan first announced to the seminar his plans to write "Kant avec Sade," (L'identification, Seminar 9, 1961–62, session of March 28, 1962, unpublished), he did so with a complimentary and detailed discussion of Paulhan's "Le marquis de Sade et sa complice." See also annotation to p. 55, ¶1 above.

p. 74, ¶2:

The epigraph to Sade mon prochain reads, "If some freethinker [esprit fort] had taken it upon himself to ask Saint Benoît Labre what he thought of his contemporary the Marquis de Sade, the Saint would have answered without hesitation: 'He is my neighbor [mon prochain],''" 1947 edition, p. 9. This text is dropped from the 1967 edition. Benoît-Joseph Labre, 1748–1783, famous for his rigorous observance of poverty, was canonized in 1881.

p. 74, ¶5:


What is the point of a precept enunciated with so much solemnity if its fulfillment cannot be recommended as reasonable? . . . Not merely is this stranger in general unworthy of my love; I must honestly confess that he has more claim to my hostility and even my hatred. He seems to show not the slightest trace of love for me and shows me not the least consideration. He must make meless before the consequence of the commandment to love one's neighbor, what arises is the presence of the innate wickedness which inhabits this neighbor. But then it also inhabits myself. And what is more a neighbor to me than this heart within myself, that of my jouissance, which I dare not approach? For as soon as I

For Lacan's reading of the relation between Freud and Sade on this point, cf. the following passages from L'éthique, pp. 92, 219, 229, and 233:

If something, at the summit of the ethical commandment, ends up, in a way which is so strange, so scandalous for the sentiment of some, by being articulated in the form of You will love your neighbor as yourself, it is that the law of the relation of the human subject to himself is that he make himself, in his relation to his desire, his own neighbor (p. 92).

Each time that Freud stops, as if horrified, before the consequence of the commandment to love one's neighbor, what arises is the presence of the innate wickedness which inhabits this neighbor. But then it also inhabits myself. And what is more a neighbor to me than this heart within myself, that of my jouissance, which I
approach it — this is the sense of Civilization and Its Discontents — this bottomless aggressiveness arises, from which I recoil, which I turn back against myself, and which, in the very place of the vanished law, comes to give its weight to that which prevents me from crossing a certain border at the limit of the Thing (p. 219).

It is thus not an original proposition to say that the recoil from the You will love your neighbor as yourself is the same thing as the barrier before jouissance, and not its opposite (p. 229).

[My] neighbor doubtless has all this wickedness of which Freud speaks, but it is none other than that from which I recoil in myself. To love him, to love him as myself, is at the same time to necessarily advance in some cruelty. His or mine? you will object to me — but I have just explained to you that nothing says that they are distinct (p. 233).


The text reads: “Comparing himself to others, the philosopher of apathy strengthens his conviction that he is alone; or rather, he ceases to belong to the unique world of all men, and that he has attained, in a waking state, in his own world, the state of nature.” The footnote reads: “Such seems to be the necessary culmination of sadist thought. This is not to say that Sade’s characters attain it, nor perhaps even Sade.” This entire passage also does not appear in the 1967 edition.


When choosing certain elements I did not really think of imitating Sade, but it’s possible I did so uncon-
I'm more naturally inclined to view and conceive a situation from a Sadian or sadistic point of view rather than, say, a neorealist or mystical one. I said to myself: What should the character use—a gun? a knife? a chair? I ended up choosing more disturbing objects, that's all.


p. 75, ¶1: "penisneid."
"Penis-envy."

p. 75, ¶2: Diotima.

p. 75, ¶2: "Noli tangere matrem."
"Touch not the mother." The reference is to the Vulgate version of John 20:17, "Noli me tangere." The entire verse in the King James version reads, "Jesus saith unto her [Mary Magdalen], Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my father: but go unto my brethren, and say to them, I ascend unto my Father, and your Father; and to my God, and your God."

p. 75, ¶2: "V . . . ed and sewn up."
Eugénie's mother, Mme. de Misteval, is indeed raped and sewn up at the end of Philosophy in the Bedroom (pp. 362–367), making "violated" [raped, violée] the obvious choice here to complete "V . . . ée." But "veiled" [voilée] is equally possible; perhaps more important still would be "submitted to the operation of the V (in the graph)," as will [volonté] and as vel.