Immanuel Kant
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

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NOTES ON THE CREATION OF THE BI-LINGUAL TEXT OF KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON / KRITIK DER PRAKTISCHE VERNUNFT

First, I would like again to thank a few friends for encouraging me to finish this project. They are: Adrian Johnston of Atlanta and Daniel Collins of Buffalo.

The choice using the Lewis White Beck translation was an arbitrary on my part. I could just have well used several other translations. But the fact of having the German text next to the translation, paragraph by paragraph, should decrease the importance of which English translation I have used, because ultimately, all translations are problematic and none are perfect.

Speaking of paragraphs, I am amazed at the number of times, that Lewis Beck has chosen to make new paragraphs where the German text does not. I am not saying that it is wrong, but it is something one might not notice unless one had the text in German open to the same page constantly before one. Another peculiarity, Beck like many other translators, seems to ignore the fact that some of the original German text is in italics. I have never been able to figure out why translators do this in general.

It was quite thrilling for me to see for the first time Kant’s Categorical Imperative in German, as “Handle so, daß die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne.” (page 30 in the English). I have heard this “So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law.” throughout most of my life, but never had the opportunity to actually see it in German before now. If I were to really take Kant’s Categorical Imperative seriously, I would have every one on earth preparing bi-lingual texts such as this. Yes, why not?

Another very famous quote, “Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüt mit immer neuer und zunehmenden Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: Der bestimmte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir.” (the first sentence of the conclusion, page 169 in English).
Again, I am totally amazed that there does not exist even one bi-lingual translation of this very well-known and well-studied text. One would think that by now there would be several bi-lingual editions using different translations. One of the reasons I have prepared this text is to show that there is definitely a need for such serious texts to be available in this form, of which admittedly this is only a crude prototype.

Richard G. Klein
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New York City
Immanuel Kant
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten

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PRACTICAL REASON

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Critik
der praktischen Vernunft
von Immanuel Kant.

Riga,
bev Johann Friedrich Hartknoch
1788.
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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

I

Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, published in 1788, is the second of his three Critiques, the others being the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and the *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* (1790). It is likewise the second of his three most important writings in moral philosophy, the first being the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), and the third being the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797).

The relation between the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* is much like that between the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Prologomena*. For each of the first two Critiques, Kant wrote a briefer, less "scholastic," work on the same topics. The shorter works follow the analytical or regressive method; they begin with experience and regress upon its a priori presuppositions or principles without which it would not be possible to have that kind of experience. In these shorter works, starting points are found in mathematical and scientific knowledge (*Prologomena*) and in "common knowledge of morality" (in the *Foundations*). In each, everything is based "upon something already known as trustworthy, from which we can set out with confidence and ascend to sources as yet unknown." ¹ These "sources as yet unknown" are the forms of intuition and categories (in the *Prologomena*) and the moral law and freedom (in the *Foundations*).

The method of the Critiques, on the other hand, is synthetic. That is, they begin with principles and thence proceed to experiences which they organize, conceptualize, and render intelligible. Only by this method can philosophical knowledge "present all its articulations, as the structure of a peculiar cog-

¹ *Prologomena* §4.
nitive faculty, in their natural combination.” The *Critique of Practical Reason*, therefore, begins as it were where the *Foundations* ends, and retraces its steps. For this reason, Kant tells us, the *Critique of Practical Reason* presupposes the *Foundations* only “in so far as that work gives a preliminary acquaintance with the principle of duty and justifies a definite formula of it; otherwise it is an independent work.” This definite formula, of course, is the categorical imperative, reached in the second section of the *Foundations* and in §7 of the *Critique*.

To be more specific, the *Foundations*, as the work giving an analysis of ordinary moral consciousness, begins with ordinary moral judgments and the felt constraint of duty. It seeks to bring their basis to light, and does so by formulating the moral law expressed as a categorical imperative and a theory of freedom as the condition for making and realizing the demands of this imperative. The *Critique of Practical Reason*, on the other hand, begins with definitions, and proceeds quickly, in a quasi-deductive manner, to the formula of the moral law and the theory of freedom. The works, therefore, for a considerable distance go along the same path, but in opposite directions.

Nevertheless, the *Critique* contains material which, Kant says, would be out of place in the *Foundations*, for it must show the unity of practical and theoretical reason. The full investigation of this unity constitutes the chief advance made in the *Critique of Practical Reason* beyond Kant’s earlier work. This unity was asserted in the first *Critique* and assumed in the *Foundations*: only in the *Critique of Practical Reason* is this assumption “deduced” or justified. Only in the light of this larger and deeper problem of showing that there is no conflict of reason with itself in its claims to knowledge and in its use in practical conduct does Kant deal adequately with many of those most profound philosophical problems concerning the relations among knowing, believing, and acting.

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4*Critique of Pure Reason*, A xx.
5*Metaphysics of Morals*, Introduction, ii.
6*Critique of Pure Reason*, A 940 = B 868.
tack on pretensions to supersensible knowledge, which appear
as metaphysical dogmatism and moral fanaticism,* affirmatively it establishes the structure, range, use, and validity of
concepts (like that of cause in the first Critique, duty in the sec-
ond) that cannot be objectively valid if derived from experi-
ence, but that are essential if science and morals are to "make
sense." Without critique having both these affirmative and neg-
ative functions, Kant thinks it is not possible to draw a line be-
 tween legitimate and illegitimate metaphysics, or to defend
legitimate knowledge from attacks properly made only on dia-
lectical illusion masquerading as higher wisdom.

So much for the word "critique." And what is "practical rea-
son"? To say, as Kant does, that practical reason is the same as
will is instructive only when we understand his theory of rea-
son itself. In the Critique of Pure Reason there are three cogni-
tive faculties of the mind: sensibility, which is receptivity to
sensations under the forms of space and time; understanding,
which is the faculty of conceptualizing and synthesizing data
into knowledge of objects, the synthesis occurring under rules
established by concepts called categories; and reason, which is
the faculty of synthesizing knowledge of objects into systems
(such as the "realm of nature," the whole system of phenom-
enon under laws). Reason guides the construction of knowledge
in its systematic aspect, by directing our search for the absolute
conditions of all contingent conditions, which will support the
entire edifice of knowledge. This is the ideal of reason in its
theoretical aspect; but when its search leads it to make asser-
tions that concern supersensible realities that belong in the
realm of the older metaphysics, it produces only philosophical
illusions.

Now, Kant tells us, all things in nature, including human
beings, behave in accordance with laws. But only a rational
being can have and act according to a conception of laws. A fall-
ing body, for instance, "obeys" Galileo's law in the sense of
merely illustrating it; but human beings endowed with con-
sciousness and reason, can govern their behavior by their concep-
tion of this law. By their knowledge of Galileo's law, they
may decide whether it is safe to jump from a certain height, and
may thereby overcome their fear of doing so. Such a concep-
tion of law is possible only for a rational being; and we say that a
man or woman acts voluntarily when his or her conception of a
law, and not a momentary impulse, governs his or her behavior.
To take another example: a man as a creature of impulse unwill-
tingly instantiates psychological "laws" in sexual behavior; but
as a rational being, possessing insight into the causal laws of
psychology, he may discern consequences of his possible ac-
tions, and thereby modify his behavior and act in ways which in
fact thwart his impulses. Such a man, we ordinarily say, has a
strong will; he acts rationally, not merely impulsively; rational
order and system are introduced into his activities by the gov-
ernance of reason.

We can thus see that when Kant says the will is nothing but
practical reason, what he says is not so very startling, but is
implicit even in the common usage of the word "will." "Will" is
the name we ordinarily give to the subjective experience of
control of impulse by reason, and not to the merely emotional
or impulsive aspect of behavior.

The book before us is a critical examination of will under-
stood in this sense, as practical reason, reason applied in con-
duct. And its main thesis is that though practical reason gen-
erally has an impulsive component or drive, which it more or less
successfully guides by maxims and rules of experience, it is also
possible for one's reason to guide one's behavior without
any drive springing from variable, subjective impulses directed
to the gaining of pleasure. Such reason provides not just long-
range control of impulses but, as pure practical reason, it can
provide the motives and even set the goals of action. The law
conceived by reason in this capacity is not an empirical law of
nature, nor even a law of human nature learned from
psychology—no, it is moral law, and the imperative to obey it
is a categorical imperative, not hypothetical and contingent
upon the actual presence of a given impulse.

*Ibid., pp. 88, 143.
Kant tells us, in the opening sentence, that the work is called *Critique of Practical Reason* and not *Critique of Pure Practical Reason* because its task is to show that pure reason can be practical, and it does so by a critical examination of reason's entire (both pure and empirical) practical use. This suggests that this *Critique* has only the second, the affirmative, function distinguished above. But this is not correct, for there is a dialectical illusion even in pure practical reason, as we shall see; and this must be resolved. — The lack of parallelism in the titles is unfortunate in another respect: it has led superficial readers and a not insignificant number of philosophical thinkers into believing that Kant established a dichotomy between “pure” and “practical” reason. But if this is believed, it is safe to say that not a single doctrine of his ethical theory has been or can be understood. Kant is trying to show that pure reason can be practical, and must be practical if morality is not an illusion; he is trying to show that it is practical of itself, and not merely as “the slave of the passions” (Hume), or other, nonrational components of personality.3

We are now in a position to appreciate the full import of the title of the book, *Critique of Practical Reason*. Affirmatively, the book is to work out the pure a priori laws of conduct, and thus to establish beyond doubt that pure reason can be practical and that the principles of pure reason will constitute a metaphysics of morals understood as rational knowledge of the moral law in all its ramifications. Negatively, it will examine the presuppositions of practical reason to prevent them from being passed off as insight into a supersensible world. These two tasks are carried out, respectively, in the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason and in the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.

III

The Analytic has as its task the establishment of the possibility of a priori (universal and necessary) practical principles

3As held by Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139a, 1177b; *On the Soul*, 432b) and most other philosophers and psychologists.

(moral laws), and it accomplishes this in the first two chapters. They give the formula of the moral law (§ 7), its differences from maxims and rules of practice (§§ 1–4), its intimate relation to the autonomy (freedom) of the will as practical reason (§§ 5, 6, 8, and pp. 43–51), and the connection between moral principles and moral concepts (good and evil) (Chapter II). Chapter III of the Analytic is one of the most effective of all of Kant’s writings, manifesting on every page his own profound moral commitment and giving a vivid and memorable phenomenology of moral experience. Its purpose is to show the way in which human beings come to be moved by the thought of duty, and this account of reverence for the law as the motive to morality has important implications for Kant’s theory of moral education, as given in the Methodology at the end of this *Critique*.

Though the argument is somewhat more formal, elaborate, and rigorous, most of the Analytic will be at least partly familiar to those who have read the *Foundations*, and I shall therefore turn to new material not touched upon, or at most intimated, in the *Foundations* but fully developed in the present work. Most of this material is in the Dialectic.

IV

To understand fully the Dialectic of the second *Critique*, we must recall some of the teachings of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.10 In the Dialectic of that book, Kant was concerned with claims that the human mind inevitably makes (when not forewarned by critical philosophy) — to have knowledge of what is beyond the sphere of possible sense experience. The mind claims to have knowledge from pure reason unrestricted by the

10Fortunately, at various places in the second *Critique*, Kant reminds the reader of what he has said in the first. But inasmuch as these passages may appear somewhat cryptic to anyone who has not read the first *Critique*, it is perhaps permissible also for me to try to give a brief summary of this part of his theory of knowledge.
conditions of our senses; such knowledge of the intelligible world is claimed to exist in speculative metaphysics. Now speculative metaphysics, however unwarranted its assertions, is not idle twaddle; reason makes claims to such knowledge not arbitrarily, but for a perfectly sound purpose: as rational beings, who want to know the “reasons” for things, we seek for completeness in knowledge, with no unsupported foundations and no loose ends. Such completeness is not achievable by simply adding empirical facts and more empirical facts to the infinitely expandable store of factual information. Not more knowledge, but a different kind of knowledge, is required if our knowledge is to be seen as a coherent, perfect, and self-supporting whole. No sane man has ever claimed to possess such a perfect omniscience; but some more or less vague ideal of what such knowledge would be like has been effective in the history of science and philosophy from Parmenides to Einstein. What Kant does in the Dialectic of the first Critique is to show that this ideal inevitably leads to certain specific metaphysical dogmas. Such systematic organization of our knowledge, he says, would have to include knowledge that there are first causes in the world, that there are permanent substances, and that there is a necessary being. These are the familiar doctrines of classical rationalistic metaphysics: that the will is free, the soul immortal, and God real.

Yet any theoretical argument to show that these are true is dialectical, i.e., fallacious and illusory. The Dialectic of pure theoretical reason is the exposure of the fallacies involved in all such arguments. Kant does not thereby prove that these metaphysical dogmas are false; he merely shows that they cannot be known to be true on grounds of theoretical knowledge, and that reason’s speculative need for such truths is bound to go unsatisfied and frustrated—that, in the end, “it embraces not Juno, but a cloud.”

Minor details aside, much of Kant’s argument as well as his conclusions would be acceptable to many philosophers of today who base their skepticism of metaphysics on quite other considerations; this aspect of Kant’s philosophy makes him one of the most important antecedents of pragmatism and modern positivism. But then Kant goes further, and attempts to show not merely the unattainability of this kind of ideal knowledge but also its undesirability. If such knowledge of supersensible reality were possible, it would be found to be in conflict with the conceptual foundations of morality.

In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, which was written while the Critique of Practical Reason was taking shape in Kant’s mind, he wrote: “I have found it necessary to deny knowledge [of supersensible reality] in order to make room for faith. The dogmatism of metaphysics [i.e., the belief that there is knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality] is the source of all that unbelief, always very dogmatic, which wars against morality,”11 the dogmatism of metaphysics being simply an extension of the principles of empirical nature (which principles exclude freedom, God, and immortality) to supersensible reality. But by denying knowledge, he necessarily leaves a “vacant place” at the apex of our pursuit of knowledge.12 In its negative function, the Critique of Pure Reason clips the wings of speculation to keep it from presumptuously trying to fill this (cognitively) empty place with its own unproved Ideas.

We are now ready to examine the Dialectic of the second Critique. Assume, for the moment, that morality entails belief in God, freedom, and immortality—why Kant says it does so will be mentioned later. If reason in its practical aspect (as the “organ” of morality) requires that the theoretically empty space in the system of knowledge be filled by assumptions, in default of which the moral experience would be illusory and the moral law invalid; and if these assumptions conflict with no principles that theoretical reason can establish; then, says Kant, pure reason in its practical capacity has primacy over pure reason in its speculative (theoretical) capacity. It can therefore legitimately make—indeed, for the sake of morality it must

11Critique of Pure Reason, B xxx.
12Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 50, 108.
make—these assumptions. But it makes them not as claims of knowledge but as matters of faith, or as what Kant calls "practical postulates." If we mistook the authority of practical reason and claimed that these postulates gave us any knowledge, we would not only exceed the competence of theoretical reason but would actually threaten the foundations of morals themselves.

The ideas of God, freedom, and immortality are merely possible for speculative reason, not actual. But Kant says that they are necessary for morality. They therefore fit this "empty space" in the system of theoretical knowledge, and acceptance of them is justified by the primacy of practical reason.

We turn now to the final question: how does Kant show that morality requires such postulates? The same answer does not fit all of them. The postulate of freedom differs markedly from the others, and therefore we must briefly discuss each of them separately. Generally speaking, we can say that freedom is required for the establishment of the moral law itself, while the other postulates are required only for the resolution of an antinomy into which practical reason itself falls.

In the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant de-

velops an antinomy between the concept of freedom and that of natural causation. That is, he gives a proof that the connection of events under the laws of nature is the only necessary connection, and then he gives an equally valid proof that there is a "causality of freedom," i.e., that new causal chains can occur in nature. The first member of such a chain might be an act of will which is not an effect of some earlier natural event. He resolves this antinomy by arguing that both statements are true and that there is no contradiction between them. The first is true, but it concerns events only as phenomena in time. If the empirical events that are the objects of scientific knowledge were events among things in themselves, the principle of natural causation would be absolutely true without restriction, there would be an irresolvable conflict between freedom and causal determinism, and freedom would have to be surrendered. But if the events we observe are only phenomena, i.e., appearances of things in themselves as organized by our own sensibility and understanding, as he believes he has shown, in others parts of the Critique of Pure Reason, to be the case, then the causality of freedom might hold of the relation of realities to appearances while mechanical determinism would still hold of the connections among the observed events themselves. The two principles might therefore be true, each in its own context. Thus the Critique of Pure Reason shows that freedom is not incompatible with natural necessity and is thus a possible concept. But the first Critique does not have the task of showing that it is actual, i.e., that there is freedom.

The Critique of Practical Reason, however, shows that the moral law, which is given as a "fact of pure reason," reciprocally implies and is implied by the concept of freedom. In as-

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19Critique of Practical Reason, Bk. II, ch. II, sect. 3: "On the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its Association with Speculative Reason." This chapter should be carefully compared with the writings of other defenders of the "right" or "will" to believe beyond theoretical evidence, among whom Kant is often counted. But the differences between Kant and, for instance, William James and Kierkegaard are at least as important as the similarities. The chief difference is, in Kantian language, that since they have not shown that pure reason can be practical (which, indeed, they deny), their claim that there is a right to believe beyond the evidence is based on premises having no objective validity, and the resulting belief is therefore irrational and subjective. Kant, on the other hand, claims that the legitimate belief in these postulates is objective and rational, though not cognitive; it is based on demands of pure reason and not on what James called "our passionate nature." What is unique in Kant's view is precisely the point that "rational" is not restricted in meaning to "cognitive." See Kant's reply to Thomas Wizenmann, p. 151.

20Critique of Practical Reason, Bk. II, ch. II, sect. 9: "Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties to his Practical Vocation." This is not quite true in fact, for there are sections of the Critique of Pure Reason that are concerned with moral questions. It would be more accurate to say: a critique restricted to an examination of theoretical and speculative reason would give no grounds for asserting more than the possibility of the idea of freedom.

asserting that human beings are morally obligated, Kant is asserting that freedom is real, even though nature, including human nature, can be understood *scientificaly* only under the principle of strict causal necessity. Kant's concept of freedom is not equivalent to that according to which free actions have no causes, or to the theory (soft determinism), popular in his time and in ours, that actions are free if they are psychologically determined by one's own settled character and not by momentary stimuli. Kant holds the more daring conception that there is a causality of freedom, or a noumenal and a phenomenal causation; in present-day terminology he holds a theory of *real agency* and compatibilism.\(^{17}\)

The other two postulates are quite different, and it is generally recognized, even by Kant himself, that the argument for them is less coercive. Pure practical reason has its own antinomy and the exposure and resolution of this antinomy is the negative task of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. It arises in the concept of "the highest good," which is the ideal of moral perfection conjoined with happiness proportionate to the degree of perfection attained. Striving for the highest good is required by the moral law, but the highest good cannot be made real unless the soul is immortal and God exists. The moral law is vain if it commands us to do the impossible; hence either the moral law is invalid, or the highest good is possible. Now since we have the "fact of pure reason"\(^{18}\) to show that the moral law really does bind us, and since the criticism of speculative reason showed no impossibility in either immortality or God (but only the impossibility of a theoretical proof of them), the assumptions are justified. They are held by rational faith, and not in the form of a claim to metaphysical knowledge of the nature of ourselves and of the being of God.

Hence the *Critique of Practical Reason* performs two func-

\(^{17}\)Ibid, pp. 97ff.


\(^{19}\)From *Critique of Practical Reason*, pp. 31, 43.
SKETCH OF KANT'S LIFE AND WORK

Immanuel Kant was born in Königsberg, East Prussia, (now Kaliningrad, Russia) April 22, 1724. His family were among the Pietists, a Protestant sect somewhat like the Quakers and early Methodists. Pietism's deeply ethical orientation and singular lack of emphasis on theological dogmatism became a part of Kant's nature and a determining factor in his philosophy. After attending the University of Königsberg and serving as tutor in several aristocratic families, Kant became an instructor at the university. He held this position for fifteen years, lecturing and writing on metaphysics, logic, ethics, and the natural sciences. In the sciences he made significant but, at the time, little recognized contributions, especially in physics, astronomy, geology, and meteorology.

In 1770 he was appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Königsberg, and in 1781 he published his most important work, the Critique of Pure Reason. This work opened up new fields of study and problems for him at an age when most men are ready to retire; but for Kant there followed a period of nearly twenty years of unremitting labor and unparalleled accomplishment. Merely a list of the most important writings shows this: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783); Idea for a Universal History (1784); Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786); second edition of Critique of Pure Reason (1787); Critique of Practical Reason (1788); Critique of the Faculty of Judgment (1790); Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793); Perpetual Peace (1795); Metaphysics of Ethics (1797); Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798); The Conflict of the Faculties (1798). He died in Königsberg, February 12, 1804.

Kant's personality, or at least a caricature of it, is well known. Most people who know nothing else of Kant do know that the
housewives of Königsberg used to set their clocks by the regular afternoon walk he took, and that his life was said to pass like the most regular of regular verbs. But a truer picture of his personality—less pedantic, Prussian, and Puritanical—comes to us from the German writer Johann Gottfried Herder:

I have had the good fortune to know a philosopher. He was my teacher. In his prime he had the happy sprightliness of a youth; he continued to have it, I believe, even as a very old man. His broad forehead, built for thinking, was the seat of an imperturbable cheerfulness and joy. Speech, the richest in thought, flowed from his lips. Playfulness, wit, and humor were at his command. His lectures were the most entertaining talks. His mind, which examined Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, and Hume, and investigated the laws of nature of Newton, Kepler, and the physicists, comprehended equally the newest works of Rousseau . . . and the latest discoveries in science. He weighed them all, and always came back to the unbiased knowledge of nature and to the moral worth of man. The history of men and peoples, natural history and science, mathematics and observation, were the sources from which he enlivened his lectures and conversation. He was indifferent to nothing worth knowing. No cabal, no sect, no prejudice, no desire for fame could ever tempt him in the slightest away from broadening and illuminating the truth. He incited and gently forced others to think for themselves; despotism was foreign to his mind. This man, whom I name with the greatest gratitude and respect, was Immanuel Kant.

NOTE ON THE REVISED EDITION

The first edition of this translation was published by the University of Chicago Press in 1949. It underwent minor emendations in subsequent printings by the Liberal Arts Press and by Macmillan, but the present edition is substantially revised.

The underlying text is that of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin, 1912), edited by Paul Natorp. Intentional departures from that edition are indicated in brackets and footnotes. The marginal pagination and the pagination in the running heads refer to the Academy edition. Kant's prodigal use of Fettdruck and Sperrdruck has not been followed in our sparing use of italics.

I am grateful to reviewers of earlier editions and other Kant scholars (especially Dr. Robert J. Benton) for detecting some errors which I am now glad to correct.
Kant often gives formal definitions of his terms, but then disregards them. It is unfeasible to insist on translating a word in German always by the same word in English. But I wish to call attention to several lexical decisions I have had to make.

1. **Vorstellung**, the generic name for any content of consciousness, is translated as "representation" when verbal exactitude in a technical expression is called for; in less formal contexts it is translated as "conception," "thought," or "idea."

2. **Idee**, referring to a concept of reason to which no intuition is adequate, is translated as "Idea" (capital I). When used less formally and technically, it is translated as "idea" (lower case i).

3. **Sinnlich** and its derivatives are translated as "sensible," and so on, in epistemological and metaphorical contexts. They are translated as "sensuous," and so forth, when they refer to emotions and sentiments.

4. **Wille** and **Willkühl** are translated as "will" and "choice," respectively.

5. **Triebfeder** is translated as "drive" (Abbott's "spring," and, in earlier Beck editions, "incentive").

6. **Bestimmungsgrund des Willens** is translated sometimes as "ground of determination of the will" and sometimes as "motive."

7. **Allgemeine Gesetzgebung**, following Paton, is translated sometimes as "giving universal law" instead of "universal legislation."

8. **Achtung** is translated as "respect," "reverence" being reserved for **Ehrfurcht.**

9. **Ding an sich** is an expression Kant employs only once in the second **Critique**, his usual locution being **Ding an sich selbst.** According to Gerold Prauss (**Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich** [Bonn, 1974]) the latter locution is adverbial rather than adjectival, and elliptical for "thing regarded as it is in itself." The distinction is important, because the first suggests that there are two **kinds** of things, viz., appearances and things in themselves, whereas the second suggests that there is one kind of thing in two contexts (as it appears, and as it is regarded in itself). The locution "thing in itself" is so deeply entrenched in philosophical writing that I do not wish to challenge it in the medium of a translation and a footnote, though I have argued elsewhere for a "two-aspect" rather than a "two-thing" interpretation. I use the longer expression where I think the shorter and less cumbersome form is likely to be misleading.

10. **Absicht** translated as "intention."
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

Immanuel Kant
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft
PREFACE

Why this Critique is called simply Critique of Practical Reason and not Critique of Pure Practical Reason, though the parallelism between it and the critique of speculative reason seems to demand the latter title, will be sufficiently shown in the treatise itself. Its task is merely to show that there is a pure practical reason, and, in order to do this, it critically examines reason’s entire practical faculty. If it succeeds in this task, there is no need to examine the pure faculty itself to see whether it, like speculative reason, presumptuously overreaches itself. For if pure reason is actually practical, it will show its reality and that of its concepts in action, and all disputations which aim to prove its impossibility will be in vain.

With the pure practical faculty of reason, the reality of transcendental freedom is also confirmed. Indeed, it is substantiated in the absolute sense needed by speculative reason in its use of the concept of causality. For this freedom is required if reason is to rescue itself from the antinomy in which it is inevitably entangled when attempting to think the unconditioned in a causal series. For speculative reason, the concept of freedom was problematic but not impossible; that is to say, speculative reason could think of freedom without contradiction, but it could not assure any objective reality to it. Reason showed freedom to be conceivable only in order that its supposed impossibility might not endanger reason’s very being and plunge it into an abyss of skepticism.

The concept of freedom, in so far as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason. All other concepts (those of God and immor-

[4]

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| Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft | Vorrede |

Warum diese Kritik nicht eine Kritik der reinen praktischen, sondern schlechthin der praktischen Vernunft überhaupt beteiligt wird, obgleich der Parallelismus derselben mit der spekulativen das erstere zu erfordern scheint, darüber gibt diese Abhandlung hinreichenden Aufschluß. Sie soll bloß dartun, daß es reine praktische Vernunft gebe, und kritisiert in dieser Absicht ihr ganzes praktisches Vermögen. Wenn es ihr biest gelingt, so bedarf sie des reine Vernunft selbst nicht zu kritisieren, um zu sehen, ob sich die Vernunft mit einem solchen, als einer bloßen Anmaßung, nicht übersteige (wie es wohl mit der spekulativen geschieht). Denn wenn sie, als reine Vernunft, wirklich praktisch ist, so beweist sie ihre und ihrer Begriffe Reality durch die Tat, und alles Vernünftigen wider die Möglichkeit es zu sein, ist vergeblich.

1 Mit diesem Vermögen steht auch die transzendente Freiheit nunmehr fest, und zwar in derjenigen absoluten Bedeutung genommen, worin die spekulative Vernunft beim Gebrauche des Begriffs der Kausalität sie bedurfte, um sich wider die Antinomie zu retten, darin sie unvermeidlich getäfet, wenn sie in der Reihe der Kausalverbindung sich das Unbedingtete denken will, welchen Begriff sie aber nur problematisch, als nicht unmöglich zu denken, aufstellen konnte, ohne ihn seine objektive Reality zu sichern, sondern allein, um nicht durch vorgebliche Unmöglichkeit dessen, was sie doch wenigstens als denkbar gelten lassen muß, in ihrem Wesen angefochten und in einen Abgrund des Skeptizismus gestürzt zu werden.

Der Begriff der Freiheit, so fern dessen Reality durch ein apodiktisches Gesetz der praktischen Vernunft bewiesen ist, macht nun den Schlußstein von dem ganzen Gebäude eines Systems der reinen, selbst der spekulativen, Vernunft aus, und alle andere Begriffe (die von Gott und Unsterblichkeit), welche, als bloße Ideen, in dieser ohne Haltung bleiben, schließen sich nun an an ihn an, und bekommen mit ihm und durch ihn Bestand und objektive Reality, d. i. die
realities. That is, their possibility is proved by the fact that there really is freedom, for this idea is revealed by the moral law.

Freedom, however, among all the ideas of speculative reason is the only one whose possibility we know a priori. We do not understand it, but we know it as the condition* of the moral law which we do know. The ideas of God and immortality are, on the contrary, not conditions of the moral law, but only conditions of the necessary object of a will which is determined by this law, this will being merely the practical use of our pure reason. Hence we cannot say that we know or understand either the reality or even the possibility of these ideas. Nevertheless, they are conditions of applying the morally determined will to the object (the highest good) which is given to it a priori. Consequently, the possibility of these conditions can and must be assumed in this practical context without our knowing or understanding them in a theoretical sense. To serve their practical function, it suffices that they not contain any internal impossibility (contradiction). Here we have a ground of assent which, in contrast to speculative reason, is only subjective, but which is just as objectively valid to an equally pure but practical reason. Thus, through the concept of freedom, the ideas of God and immortality gain objective reality and legitimacy and indeed subjective necessity (as a need of pure reason). Reason is not thereby extended, however, in its theoretical [5] knowledge, the only thing which is different is that the possibility, which was heretofore a problem, now becomes an assertion, and the practical use of reason is thus connected with the elements of theoretical reason. This need is not just a hypoth-

*To avoid having anyone imagine that there is an inconsistency when I say that freedom is the condition of the moral law and later assert that the moral law is the only condition under which freedom can be known, I will only remind the reader that, though freedom is certainly the ratio essendi of the moral law, the latter is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. For had not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we would never have been justified in assuming anything like freedom, even though it is not self-contradictory. But if there were no freedom, the moral law would never have been encountered in us.

*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft

| Möglichkeit derselben wird dadurch bewiesen, daß Freiheit wirklich ist; denn diese Idee offenbart sich durchs moralische Gesetz.

Freiheit ist aber auch die einzige unter allen Ideen der spek. Vernunft, wovon wir die Möglichkeit a priori wissen, ohne sie doch einzusehen, weil sie die Bedingung des moralischen Gesetzes ist, welches wir wissen. Die Ideen von Gott und Unsterblichkeit sind aber nicht Bedingungen des moralischen Gesetzes, sondern nur Bedingungen des notwendigen | Objekts eines durch dieses Gesetz bestimmten Willens, d. i. des bloß praktischen Gebrauchs unserer reinen Vernunft; also können wir von jenen Ideen auch, ich will nicht bloß sagen, nicht die Wirklichkeit, sondern auch nicht einmal die Möglichkeit zu erkennen und einzusehen behaupten. Gleichwohl aber sind sie die Bedingungen der Anwendung des moralisch bestimmten Willens auf sein ihm a priori gegebenes Objekt (das höchste Gut). Folglich kann und muß ihre Möglichkeit in dieser praktischen Beziehung angenommen werden, ohne sie doch theoretisch zu erkennen und einzusehen. Für die letztere Forderung ist in praktischer Absicht genug, daß sie keine innere Unmöglichkeit (Widerspruch) enthalten. Hier ist nun ein, in Vergleichung mit der spekulativen Vernunft, bloß subjektiver Grund des Fäuruhraltens, der doch einer eben so rei-

* Damit man hier nicht in konsequenzen anzutreffen wähne, wenn ich jetzt die Freiheit die Bedingung des moralesischen Gesetzes nenne, und in der Abhandlung nachher behaupte, daß das moralische Gesetz die Bedingung sei, unter der wir uns allererst der Freiheit be-

wältigen können, so will ich nur erinnern, daß die Freiheit allerdings die ratio essendi des moralischen Gesetzes, das moralische Gesetz aber die ratio cognoscendi der Freiheit sei. Denn, wäre nicht das moralische Gesetz in unserer Vernunft eher deutlich gedacht, so würden wir uns niemals berechtigt halten, so etwas, als Freiheit ist (ob diese gleich sich nicht widerspricht), anzunehmen. Wäre aber keine Freiheit, so würde das moralische Gesetz in uns gar nicht anzutreffen sein.

| A 5.6
ical one for some arbitrary speculative purpose, of the kind that one must assume if he wishes to complete the use of reason in speculation; it is rather a need, with the status of a law, to assume that without which an aim cannot be achieved which one ought to set before himself invariably in all his actions.

It would certainly be more satisfying to our speculative reason if those problems could be solved just by themselves without such a detour and if insight into them could be put up for practical use; but our speculative faculty is not so conveniently disposed. Those who boast of such elevated knowledge should not hold it back but present it for public testing and acclaim. They wish to prove, very well, let them prove, and the critical philosophy will lay down its weapons before them as victors. *Quid statis? Nolint. Atqui licet esse beatiss.* 1 Since they do not actually wish to prove, presumably because they cannot, we must again take up these weapons and seek, in the practical use of reason, sufficient grounds for the concepts of God, freedom, and immortality. These concepts are founded upon the moral use of reason, while speculation could not find sufficient guarantee even of their possibility.

Now is explained the enigma of the critical philosophy, which lies in the fact that we must renounce the objective reality of the supersensible use of the categories in speculation and yet can attribute this reality to them in respect to the objects of pure practical reason. This must have seemed an inconsistency so long as the practical use of reason was known only by name. However, a thorough analysis of the practical use of reason makes it clear that the reality thought of here implies no theoretical determination of the categories and no extension of our knowledge to the supersensible. One then perceives that all that is meant in attributing reality to those concepts is that an object is attributable to them either in so far as they are contained in the necessary determination of the will a priori or be-

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1 An allusion to Horace Satire I, 1, 19. A god gives men the privilege of changing places with each other. The god speaks: "What are you waiting for? Maybe they don't wish to change, yet they might be happy."

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1 Übersetzung des Herausgebers: (Spräche ein Gott: ...) Was verweilt ihr? So wollten sie nicht. Und könnten doch glücklich sein.

2 Akad.-Ausz. : sieden. usw. | A, 7, 8
cause they are indissolubly connected with the object of this
determination. The inconsistency vanishes because the use
which is now made of these concepts is different from [6]
that required by speculative reason.

So far from being incoherent, the highly consistent structure
of the Critique of Pure Reason is very satisfyingly revealed
here. For in that work the objects of experience as such, in-
cluding even our own subject, were explained as only appear-
ances, though as based upon things regarded as they are in
themselves; consequently, even in that Critique it was empha-
sized that the supersensible was not mere fancy and that its
concepts were not empty. Now practical reason itself, without
any collusion with the speculative, provides reality to a super-
sensible object of the category of causality, i.e., to freedom.
This is a practical concept and as such is subject only to prac-
tical use; but what in the speculative critique could only be
thought is now confirmed by fact. The strange but incontro-
testible assertion of the speculative Critique, that the thinking
subject is only an appearance to itself in inner intuition, now
finds its full confirmation in the Critique of Practical Reason;
the establishment of this thesis is here so cogent that one
would be compelled to accept it even if the first had not already
proved it.*

In this way I can also understand why the most weighty criti-
cisms of the Critique which have come to my attention turn
about these two points: first, the reality of the categories as ap-
plied to noumena, which is denied in theoretical knowledge
but affirmed in practical; and, second, the paradoxical demand
to regard one’s self, as subject to freedom, as noumenon, and
yet from the point of view of nature to think of one’s self as a
phenomenon in one’s own empirical consciousness. So long as

mit dem Gegenstande derselben unzertrennlich verbunden sind, so verschwindet jene
Inkonsequenz, weil man einen andern Gebrauch von jenen Be-
grieffen macht, als spekulative Vernunft bedarf.

Dagegen er-
öffnet sich nun eine vorher kaum zu erwähnende und sehr be-
friedigende Bestätigung der konsequenten Denkungs-
art der spekulativen Kritik darin, daß, da diese die Gegen-
stände der Erfahrung, als solche, und darunter selbst unser
eigenes Subjekt, nur für Erscheinungen gelten zu lassen,
ihnen aber gleichwohl Dinge an sich selbst zum Grunde zu
legen, also nicht alles Übersinnliche für Erdichtung und
dessen Begriff für leer an Inhalt zu halten, einschärft:
praktische Vernunft jetzt für sich selbst, und ohne mit der
spekulativen Verabredung getroffen zu haben, einem über-
sinnlichen Gegenstande der Kategorie der Kausalität, näm-
lich der Freiheit, Realität verschafft (obgleich, als prakti-
schem Begriffe, auch nur zum praktischen Gebrauche),
also dasjenige, was dort bloß gedacht werden konnte,
durch ein Faktum bestätigt. Hiebei erhält nun zugleich die
befremdliche, obzwar unstreitige, Behauptung der speku-
lativen Kritik, daß sogar das denkende Subjekt ihm
selbst, in der inneren Anschauung, bloß Erschei-
nung sei, in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft auch ihre
volle Bestätigung; so gut, daß man auf sie kommen muß,

dann die erstere dieser Satz auch gar nicht bewiesen hätte.∗

Hiedurch verstehe ich auch, warum die erheblichsten
Einzwürfe wider die Kritik, die mir bisher noch vorgekom-
men sind, sich gerade um diese zwei Angel drehen: nämlich,
einerseits, im theoretischen Erkenntnis geleugnete und
im praktischen behauptete objektive Realität der auf No-
menen angewandten Kategorien, andererseits die para-
doxe Forderung, sich als Subjekt der Freiheit zum Noumen,
zugleich aber auch in Absicht auf die Natur zum Phänomen
in seinem eigenen empirischen Bewußtsein zu machen. Denn,

∗ Die Vereinigung der Kausalität, als Freiheit, mit ihr, als Natur-
mechanismus, davon die erste durchs Sittengesetz, die zweite durchs Na-
turgesetz, und zwar in einem und demselben Subjekte, dem Menschen,
fest steht, ist unmöglich, ohne diesen in Beziehung auf das erstere als
Wesen an sich selbst, auf das zweite aber als Erscheinung, jenes im
reinen, dieses im empirischen Bewußtsein, vorzustellen. Ohne dies
ist der Widerspruch der Vernunft mit sich selbst unvermeidlich.

[A 9, 10]
one had no definite concept of morality and freedom, no
conjecture could be made concerning what the nounon was
which should be posited as the ground of the alleged ap-
pearance, and even whether it was possible to form a concept of it,
since all the concepts of the pure understanding in their theo-
retical employment had already been assigned exclusively to
mere appearances. Only a detailed Critique of Practical Rea-
sion can set aside all these misconceptions and put in a[7]
clear light the consistency which constitutes its chief merit.

So much for the justification of the fact that the concepts and
principles of the pure speculative reason are now and again
reexamined in this work, in spite of the fact that they have al-
ready been scrutinized in the Critique of Pure Reason. This
might not seem proper in the systematic construction of a
science, since matters which have already been decided
should only be referred to and not discussed again. But here it
is allowed and even necessary, for these concepts of reason are
now seen in transition to an altogether different use from that
made of them in the first Critique. Such a transition makes nec-
 essary a comparison of their old and new employment, in order
to distinguish clearly the new path from the previous one and at
the same time to call attention to the connection between
them. One must not, therefore, think that such considerations,
including those devoted to the concept of freedom in the prac-
tical use of pure reason, are only interpolations which serve to
fill out gaps in the critical system of speculative reason, for this
is complete in its design. They are not like the props and but-
resses which usually have to be put behind a hastily erected
building, but they are rather true members making the struc-
ture of the system plain and letting the concepts, which were
previously thought of only in a problematic way, be clearly
seen as real.

This reminder pre-eminently concerns the concept of free-
dom, for it is surprising that so many boast of being able to
understand it and to explain its possibility, yet see it only
psychologically. But if they had carefully pondered it from a
transcendental standpoint, they would have seen its indis-
so lange man sich noch keine bestimmte Begriffe von Sitt-
llichkeit und Freiheit machte, konnte man nicht | erraten,
was man einerseits der vorgeblichen Erscheinung als Nou-
men zum Grunde legen wollte, und andererseits, ob es über-
halb auch möglich sei, sich noch von ihm einen Begriff zu machen,
wen man vorher alle Begriffe des reinen Verstandes im theo-
retischen Gebrauche schon ausschließungsweise den bloßen
Erscheinungen gewidmet hätte. Nur eine ausführliche Kritik
praktischen Vernunft kann alle diese Mißdeutung heben,
und die konsequenten Denkungsart, welche eben ihren größ-
ten Vorzug ausmacht, in ein helles Licht setzen.

So viel zur Recht fertigung, warum in diesem Werke die
Begriffe und Grundsätze der reinen spekulativen Vernunft,
welche doch ihre besondere Kritik schon erlitten haben, hier
hin und wieder nochmals der Prüfung unterworfen werden,
welches dem systematischen Gange einer zu errichtenden
Wissenschaft sonst nicht wohl geziemt (da abgeurteilte Sach-
en billig nur angeführt und nicht wiederum in Anregung
gebracht werden müssen), doch hier erlaubt, ja nötig war;
weil die Vernunft mit jenen Begriffen im Übergange zu
einem ganz anderen Gebrauche betrachtet wird, als den sie
dort von ihnen machte. Ein solcher Übergang macht aber
ine Vergleichung des älteren mit dem neueren Gebrauche
notwendig, um das neue Gleis von dem vorigen wohl zu
unterscheiden und zugleich den Zusammenhang derselben
bemerken zu lassen. Man wird also Betrachtungen dieser
Art, unter andern diejenige, welche nochmals auf den Be-
griff der Freiheit, aber im praktischen Gebrauche der reinen
Vernunft, gerichtet worden, nicht wie Einschließlich betrach-
ten, die etwa nur dazu dienen sollen, um Lücken des kri-
tischen Systems der spekulativen Vernunft auszufüllen
(denn dieses ist in seiner Absicht vollständig), und, wie es
bei einem übereilten Baue herzugehen pflegt, hintennach
noch Stützen und Strebepfosten anzuzeigen, sondern als
wahre Glieder, die den Zusammenhang des Systems bemerk-
lisch machen, und Begriffe, die dort nur problematisch vor-
gestellt werden konnten, jetzt in ihrer realen Darstellung
einsie hen zu lassen.

Diese Ersinnung geht vornehmlich den
Begriff der Freiheit an, von dem mit Befremdung be-
merken muß, daß noch so viele ihn ganz wohl einzusehen
und die Möglichkeit derselben erklären zu können sich rüh-
men, indem sie ihn bloß in psychologischer Beziehung be-
trachten, indessen daß, wenn sie ihn vorher in transzenden-
taler genauer erwogen hätten, sie so wohl seine Une nte bhr-

1 Akad.-Ausg.: sum.
pensability as a problematic concept in the complete use of speculative reason as well as its complete incomprehensibility, and if they subsequently passed over to the practical use of this concept, they would have been brought to the same description of it in respect to its principles which they are now so unwilling to acknowledge. The concept of freedom is the stumbling block of all empiricists but the key to the most sublime practical principles for critical moralists, who see, through it, that they must necessarily proceed rationally. For this reason, I beg the reader not to run lightly through what is said about this concept at the end of the Analytic.

I leave it to the connoisseur of this kind of work to judge whether such a system into which practical reason has been developed through a critique of this faculty has cost much or little trouble, especially in gaining the right point of view from which the whole can be rightly sketched. It presupposes the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, but only in so far as that work gives a preliminary acquaintance with the principle of duty and justifies a definite formula of it*; otherwise it is an independent work.

The reason the classification of all practical sciences is not completely carried through, as the *Critique of Speculative Reason* did this for the theoretical sciences, lies in the nature of the practical faculty of pure reason itself. For the specific definition of duties as human duties, which is necessary to a classification of them, is possible only if the subject of this definition

*A critic* who wished to say something against that work really did better than he intended when he said that there was no new principle of morality in it but only a new formula. Who would want to introduce a new principle of morality and, as it were, be its inventor, as if the world had hitherto been ignorant of what duty is or had been thoroughly wrong about it? Those who know what a formula means to a mathematician, in determining what is to be done in solving a problem without letting him go astray, will not regard a formula which will do this for all duties as something insignificant and unnecessary.

*Gottlob August Tittel*, who in his *Über Herrn Kant's Moralreform* (1785), asked, “Is the entire Kantian reform of ethics to limit itself just to a new formula?”
(man) is known in his actual nature, at least in so far as this knowledge is needed in determining his relation to duty in general. Getting this knowledge, however, does not belong in a critique of practical reason as such, which gives an account of the principles of the possibility of duty, of its extent and limits, without particular reference to human nature. Consequently, this classification belongs to the system of science, not to the system of criticism.

I have, I hope, given a sufficient answer, in the second part of the Analytic, to a certain critic, truth-loving and acute and therefore worthy of respect, who made the following objection to the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals: the concept of the good was not established before the moral principle, as in his opinion was necessary. I have also paid attention to many other objections which have come to me from men who show that the discovery of truth lies close to their hearts, and I shall continue to do so; but those who have their old system so much before their eyes that they have already decided what should be approved or disapproved desire no discussion which could stand in the way of their private views.

2 The anonymous author (H. A. Pistorius) of a review of the Foundations in Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, LXVI, Part 2, 447 ff. See Daniel Jenisch's letter to Kant, May 14, 1787.

* One could also raise the objection that I have not previously explained the concept of the faculty of desire or the feeling of pleasure. This reproach would be unfair, however, because this explanation, as given in psychology, could reasonably be presupposed. But then the definition given in psychology might be so framed that the feeling of pleasure would be made basic to the determination of the faculty of desire (as this is commonly done); and, as a result, the supreme principle of practical philosophy would necessarily turn out to be empirical, a conclusion which would have to be proved first and which is, in fact, completely refuted in this Critique. Therefore, I shall give this explanation in the way it ought to be given in order to decide properly this controversial question at the beginning.

Life is the faculty of a being by which it acts according to the laws of the faculty of desire. The faculty of desire is the faculty such a being has of causing, through its ideas, the reality of the objects of these ideas. Pleasure is the idea of the agreement of an object or an action with the subjective conditions of life, nach der Beschaffenheit, mit der er wirklich ist, obzwar nur so viel als im Verhältnis auf Pflicht überhaupt nützlich ist, erkannt worden; diese aber gehört nicht in eine Kritik der praktischen Vernunft überhaupt, die nur die Prinzipien ihrer Möglichkeit, ihres Umfanges und Grenzen vollständig ohne eine besondere Beziehung auf die menschliche Natur angehen soll. Die Einteilung gehört also hier zum System der Wissenschaft, nicht zum System der Kritik.

Ich habe einem gewissen, wahrheitliebenden und scharfen, dabei also doch immer achtungswürdigen Rezensenten jener Grundlegung zur Met. d. S. auf seinen Einwurf, daß der Begriff des Guten dort nicht (wie es seiner Meinung nach nötig gewesen wäre) vor dem moralischen Prinzip festgesetzt worden,** in dem zweiten Hauptstücke der Analytik, wie ich hoffe, Genüge getan; eben so auch auf manche andere Einwürfe Rücksicht genommen, die mir von Männern zu Händen gekommen sind, die den Willen blicken lassen, daß die Wahrheit auszumitteln ihnen am Herzen liegt (denn die, so nur ihr altes System vor Augen haben, und bei denen schon vorher beschlossen ist, was gebilligt oder missbilligt werden soll, verlangen doch keine Erörterung, die ihrer Privatsache im Wege sein könnte); und so werde ich es auch fernerhin halten.

* Ein Rezensent, der etwas zum Tadel dieser Schrift sagen wollte, hat es besser getroffen, als er wohl selbst gemeint haben mag, indem er sagt: daß darin kein neues Prinzip der Moralität, sondern nur eine neue Formel aufgestellt worden. Wer wollte aber auch einen neuen Grundsatz aller Sittlichkeit einführen, und diese gleichsam zuerst entdecken gleich als ob vor ihm die Welt, in dem was Pflicht sei, unwissend, oder in durchgezogenem Irrtum gewesew wäre. Wer aber weiß, was dem Mathematiker eine Formel bedeutet, die das, was zu tun sei, um eine Aufgabe zu befolgen, ganz genau bestimmt und nicht verfehlen läßt, wird eine Formel, welche dieses in Ansehung aller Pflichtt überhaupt tut, nicht für etwas Unbedeutendes und Entbehrendes halten.

** Man könnte mir noch den Einwurf machen, warum ich nicht auch den Begriff des Begehungsvermögens, oder des Gefühl der Lust vorher erklärt habe; obgleich dieser Vorwurf unberechtigt sein würde, weil man diese Erklärung, als in der Psychologie gegeben, billig sollte voraussetzen können. Es könnte aber freilich die Definition desselben so eingerichtet sein, daß das Gefühl der Lust der Bestimmung des Begehungsvermögens zum Grunde gelegen wäre (wie es auch wirklich gemeinhin so geschieht pflegen), dadurch aber das obige Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie notwendig empirisch ausfallen müßte, welches doch allererst auszumachen ist, und in dieser Kritik gänzlich widerspricht. Daher will ich diese Erklärung hier so geben, wie sie sein muß um diesem strengen Punkt, wie billig, im Anfange entschieden zu lassen. - Leben ist das Vermögen eines Wesens, nach Gesetzen des Begehungsvermögens zu handeln. Das Begehungsvermögen ist das Vermögen desselben, durch seine Vorstellungen Ursachen von der Wirklichkeit der Gegenstände dieser Vorstellungen zu sein. Lust ist die Vorstellung der Übereinstimmung des Gegenständes oder der Handlung mit den subjektiven Bedingungen des Lebens.
When it is a question of determining the origin, contents, and limits of a particular faculty of the human mind, the nature of human knowledge makes it impossible to do otherwise than begin with an exact and (as far as is allowed by the knowledge we have already gained) complete delineation of its parts. But still another thing must be attended to which is of a more philosophical and architectonic character. It is to grasp correctly the idea of the whole, and then to see all those parts in their reciprocal interrelations, in the light of the derivation from the concept of the whole, and as united in a pure rational faculty. This examination and the attainment of such a view are obtainable only through a most intimate acquaintance with the system. Those who are loath to engage in the first of these inquiries and who do not consider acquiring this acquaintance worth the trouble will not reach the second stage, the synoptic view, which is a synthetic return to that which was previously given only analytically. It is not to be wondered at if they find inconsistencies everywhere, though the gaps which they presume to find are not in the system itself but in their own incoherent train of thought.

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i.e., with the faculty through which an idea causes the reality of its object (or the direction of the energies of a subject to such an action as will produce the object).

I need no more than this for the purposes of a critique of concepts borrowed from psychology; the rest is supplied by the Critique itself. The question as to whether pleasure is always the ground of the faculty of desire or whether under certain conditions it only follows upon a particular modification of this faculty — this question, as is easily seen, remains unanswered by this explanation; for it consists only of terms belonging to the pure understanding, i.e., categories, which contain nothing empirical. Such a precaution against making judgments by venturing definitions before a complete analysis of concepts has been made (usually only far along in a system) is to be recommended throughout philosophy, but it is often neglected. It will be noticed throughout the critiques of both the theoretical and the practical reason that there are many opportunities for supplying inadequacies and correcting errors in the old dogmatic procedure of philosophy which were detected only when concepts, used according to reason, were seen in reference to the whole of reason.

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Reading Erkenntnis with Vorländer instead of Elemente.
I have no fear, with respect to this treatise, of the reproach that I wish to introduce a new language, since the kind of thinking it deals with is very close to the popular way of thinking. This objection, moreover, could not have been made even to the first Critique by anyone who had really thought his way through it instead of merely turning the pages. To make up new words for accepted concepts when the language does not lack expressions for them is a childish effort to distinguish one's self not by new and true thoughts but by new patches on old clothes. If any reader of that work can show that he knows more common expressions which are as adequate to the thoughts as the ones I used seemed to me, or can demonstrate the nullity of the thoughts themselves and therewith of the terms used to express them, he should do so. The first would greatly oblige me, for I only want to be understood; the second would be a service to philosophy itself. But, as long as those thoughts stand, I very much doubt that expressions both more suitable to them and more common can be found.*

In this manner the a priori principles of two faculties [12] of the mind, cognition and desire, are to be discovered and their scope and limits determined. Thus the firm basis is laid for a systematic philosophy, both theoretical and practical, as a science.

* More than this kind of unintelligibility, I fear some misinterpretations, here and there, of expressions which I have sought out with the greatest care in order that the concepts which they mean may not be missed. Thus, under the heading “modality,” in the table of categories of practical reason, the “permitted” and the “forbidden” (subjective-practical meanings of the possible and the impossible) have almost the same significance, in popular usage, as the categories which immediately follow them, namely, “duty” and “contrary to duty.” Here, however, the former mean that which is in agreement or disagreement with a merely possible precept (as, for example, the solution of problems of geometry or mechanics); the latter, however, indicate what is in such a relation to a law actually lying in reason as such. This difference of meaning is not entirely foreign to ordinary language, but it is somewhat unusual. For instance, an orator is not permitted to forge new words or constructions, but this is permitted, to some extent, to a poet. In neither case, though, is there any thought of duty, for if anyone wishes to forfeit his reputation as a speaker, no one can prevent him. Here it is a question of the difference of the imperatives correspond-

Ich besorge in Ansehung dieser Abhandlung nichts von dem Vorwurfe, eine neue Sprache einführen zu wollen, weil die Erkenntnissart sich hier von selbst der Popularität nähert. Dieser Vorwurf konnte auch niemanden in Ansehung der ersteren Kritik befallen, der sie nicht bloß durchgeblättert, sondern durchgedacht hatte. Neue Worte zu künsteln, wo die Sprache schon so an Ausdrücken für gegebene Begriffe keinen Mangel hat, ist eine kindische Bemühung, sich unter der Menge, wenn nicht durch neue und wahre Gedanken, doch durch einen neuen Lappen auf dem alten Kleide auszzeichnen. Wenn daher die Leser jener Schrift populärere Ausdrücke wissen, die doch dem Gedanken eben so angemessen sein, als mir jene zu sein scheinen, oder etwa die Nichtigkeit dieser Gedanken selbst, mithin zugleich jedes Ausdrucks, der ihn bezeichnet, darzutun sich getrauen: so würden sie mich durch das erstere sehr verblenden, denn ich will nur verstanden sein; in Ansehung des zweiten aber sich ein Verdienst um die Philosophie erwerben. So lange aber jene Gedanken noch stehen, zweifele ich sehr, daß ihnen angemessen und doch gangbare Ausdrücke dazu aufgefunden werden dürften.*


* Mehr (als jene Unverständlichkeit) besorge ich hier hin und wieder Mißdeutung in Ansehung einiger Ausdrücke, die ich mit größter Sorgfalt ausgesucht, um den Begriff nicht verfehlen zu lassen, darauf sie weisen... So hat in der Tafel der Kategorien des praktischen Vernunft, in dem Titel der Modalität, das Erlaubte und Unerlaubte (praktisch-objektiv Mögliches und Unmögliches) mit der nächstfolgenden Kategorie der Pflicht und des Pflichtwidrigen im gemeinen Sprachgebrauch beinahe einerlei Sinn; hier aber soll das erstere dasjenige bedeuten, was mit einer bloß möglichen praktischen Vorschrift in Einstimmung oder Widerstreit ist (wie etwa die Auflösung aller Probleme der Geometrie und Mechanik), das zweite, was in solcher Beziehung auf ein in der Vernunft überhaupt wirklich liegendes Gesetz steht; und dieser Unterschied der Bedeutung ist auch dem gemeinen Sprachgebrauche nicht ganz fremd, wenn gleich etwas ungewöhnlich. So ist es z. B. einem Redner, als solchem, unerlaubt, neue Worte oder Wortfügungen zu schmadern; dem Dichter ist es in gewissen Fällen erlaubt, in keinem von beiden wird hier an Pflicht gedacht. Der wird sich um den Ruf eines Redners bringen will, dem kann es niemand wohlen. Es ist hier nur um den Unterschied der Imperativen, unter...

1 Akad.-Ausz.: "sind."
Nothing worse could happen to all these labors, however, than that someone should make the unexpected discovery that there is and can be no a priori knowledge at all. But there is no danger of this. It would be like proving by reason that there is no such thing as reason, or we say that we know something through reason only when we know that we could have known it even if it had not actually come within our experience. Thus knowledge through reason and a priori knowledge are the same thing. It is a clear contradiction to try to extract necessity from an empirical proposition (ex pumice aquam), and it is equally contradictory to attempt to procure, along with such necessity, true universality to a judgment (for without it no rational inference is possible, and consequently no inference is possible by analogy either, since the latter has an at least pre-

ing to the problematic, assertoric, and apodictic ground of determination. Similarly in the note where I compare the moral ideals of practical perfection in the various philosophical schools, I have differentiated between the Ideas of wisdom and holiness, although I have shown them to be fundamentally and objectively identical. But I take wisdom, in that note, only in the sense in which man (the Stoic, for example) lays claim to it, and thus as it is thought of subjectively as a human characteristic. (Perhaps the term "virtue," which the Stoic made so much of, would show even better the characteristic of this school.) But the term "postulate of pure practical reason" can occasion the worst misinterpretation if confused with the meaning which postulates have in pure mathematics, where they are of apodictic certainty. The latter, however, postulate the possibility of an action, the object of which one previously knows a priori, theoretically and with complete certainty, to be possible. Those of the pure practical reason, however, postulate the possibility of an object (God and the immortality of the soul) from apodictic practical laws, but therefore only for the use of a practical reason. This certainty of the postulated possibility is not in the least theoretical and consequently also not apodictic, i.e., not a necessity known by the reference to an object; it is a necessary assumption, rather, with reference to the subject as conforming to the objective practical laws of reason. Thus it is merely a necessary hypothesis. I could not discover for this subjective yet true and absolute rational necessity a better term than "postulate."

¹ The rather acerbic tone from here to the end of the Preface is directed against J. G. Feder, the author of Über Raum und Caussalität [sic] zur Prüfung der kartischen Philosophie (1787) and editor of the notorious review of the first Critique, which led to the polemics of the Prolegomena.

² "water from a pumice stone" (Plautus Perse 1. i. 14).
sumed universality and objective necessity and therefore presupposes it). To substitute subjective necessity, i.e., custom, for the objective which pertains only to a priori judgments would be to deny to reason the faculty of judging an object, of knowing it and what belongs to it. It would mean, for example, that what usually or always follows a certain prior condition could not be inferred to follow from it, since that would imply objective necessity and an a priori concept of a connection. It would mean only that similar cases may be expected, as animals expect them. It would be to reject the concept of cause as fundamentally false and a mere delusion of thought. As to attempting to remedy this lack of objective and consequently universal validity by arguing that one sees no reason not to attribute to other reasonable beings a different type of ideation — well, if this sort of argument should yield a valid inference, then our ignorance would render us greater services in widening our knowledge than all our reflections. Simply because we do not know any reasonable beings other than men, we would have the right only to assume them to be of the same nature as we know ourselves to be, and therefore we would really know them. I need not mention the fact that universality of assent does not prove the objective validity of a judgment, i.e., [13] its validity as knowledge, but only call attention to the fact that, even if sometimes that which is universally assented to is also correct, this is no proof of its agreement with the object; it is rather the case that only objective validity affords the ground of a necessary universal agreement.

Hume would find himself completely at ease in this system of universal empiricism of principles, for he desired, as is well known, nothing more than that a merely subjectively necessary concept of cause, i.e., custom, be assumed in place of all objective meaning of necessity in the causal concept; he did this in order to deny to reason any judgment concerning God, freedom, and immortality; and he knew very well how to draw conclusions with complete cogency when once the principles were conceded. But even Hume did not make his empiricism so universal as to include mathematics in it. He held its propo-
sitions to be analytic, and, if this were correct, they would indeed be apodictic; but this would not give us any right to conclude that there is a faculty of reason which can make apodictic judgments also in philosophy, for in philosophy they would be synthetic, as the law of causality is. But if one assumes a universal empiricism, mathematics will also be involved.

When, however, mathematics comes into conflict with that reason which admits only empirical principles, as this inevitably occurs in the antinomy, since mathematics irrefutably proves the infinite divisibility of space which empiricism cannot allow, there is an obvious contradiction between the highest possible demonstrable evidence and presumed inferences from empirical principles. One might ask, like Cheselden's blind man, “Which deceives me, sight or touch?” (Empiricism is based on touch, but rationalism on a necessity into which we can have insight.) Thus universal empiricism is revealed to be genuine skepticism, which has been falsely ascribed to Hume in this unlimited sense, for he let mathematics stand as a sure touchstone of experience, instead of admitting no touch- [14] stone (which can be found only in a priori principles) even though experience consists not merely of feelings but also of judgments.

Since in this philosophical and critical age no one can be very much in earnest about such an empiricism, and since it is presumably put forward only as an exercise for judgment and to place the necessity of rational principles in a clearer light by contrast, we can only be grateful to those who trouble themselves with this otherwise uninstrucive work.

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6William Cheselden (1688–1752), an English surgeon, famous for his operation of iridectomy which cured some forms of blindness.

*Names which refer to the followers of a sect have always been accompanied by much injustice. It is as if someone said, “N. is an idealist.” For although he not only admits, but even emphasizes, that our ideas of external things correspond to real objects, he will still hold that the form of their intuition depends not on them but on the human mind.

...
INTRODUCTION
OF THE IDEA OF A CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

The theoretical use of reason is concerned with objects [15] of the merely cognitive faculty, and a critical examination of it with reference to this use deals really only with the pure cognitive faculty, because the latter raised the suspicion, which was subsequently confirmed, that it might easily pass beyond its boundaries and lose itself among unattainable objects or even among contradictory concepts. It is quite different with the practical use of reason. In the latter, reason deals with the grounds determining the will, which is a faculty either of bringing forth objects corresponding to conceptions or of determining itself, i.e., its causality to effect such objects (whether the physical power is sufficient to this or not). For here reason can at least attain so far as to determine the will, and, in so far as it is a question of volition only, reason does always have objective reality.

This, then, is the first question: Is pure reason sufficient of itself to determine the will, or is it only as empirically conditioned that it can do so? At this point there appears a concept of causality which is justified by the Critique of Pure Reason, though subject to no empirical exhibition. That is the concept of freedom, and if we now can discover means to show that freedom does in fact belong to the human will (and thus to the will of all rational beings), then it will have been proved not only that pure reason can be practical but also that it alone, and not the empirically conditioned reason, is unconditionally practical. Consequently, we shall have to make a critical examination, not of the pure practical reason, but only of prac- [16] tical reason as such.

For pure [practical] reason, once it is demonstrated to exist, is

[16]
in no need of a critical examination; it is pure reason itself which contains the standard for the critical investigation of its entire use. The critique, therefore, of practical reason as such has the obligation to prevent the empirically conditioned reason from presuming to be the only ground of determination of the will. The use of pure [practical] reason, if it is shown that there is such a reason, is alone immanent; the empirically conditioned use of reason, which presumes to be sovereign, is, on the contrary, transcendent, expressing itself in demands and commands which go far beyond its own sphere. This is precisely the opposite situation from that of pure reason in its speculative use.

Yet because it is still pure reason, the knowledge of which here underlies its practical use, the organization of the Critique of Practical Reason must conform, in its general outline, to that of the Critique of Speculative Reason. We shall therefore have to have a Doctrine of Elements and a Methodology. The former must have as its first part an Analytic as the rule of truth and a Dialectic as an exhibition and resolution of illusion in the judgments of practical reason, only the order in the subdivision of the Analytic will be the reverse of that in the Critique of Speculative Reason. For in the present work we begin with principles and proceed to concepts, and only then, if possible, go on to the senses, while in the study of speculative reason we had to start with the senses and end with principles. Again the reason for this lies in the fact that here we have to deal with a will and to consider reason not in relation to objects but in relation to this will and its causality. The principles of the empirically unconditioned causality must come first, and afterward the attempt can be made to establish our concepts of the ground of determination of such a will, their application to objects, and finally their application to the subject and its sensuous faculty. The law of causality from freedom, i.e., any pure practical principle, is the unavoidable beginning and determines the objects to which it alone can be applied.

PART I

DOCTRINE OF THE ELEMENTS OF
PURE PRACTICAL REASON

BOOK I

ANALYTIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

CHAPTER I

PRINCIPLES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

§1. Definition

Practical principles are propositions which contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will. They are objective, or practical laws, when the condition is recognized as objective, i.e., as valid for the will of every rational being.

REMARK

Assuming that pure reason can contain a practical ground sufficient to determine the will, then there are practical laws. Otherwise all practical principles are mere maxims. In the will of a rational being affected by feeling, there can be a conflict of maxims with the practical laws recognized by this being. For example, someone can take as his maxim not to tolerate any unavenged offense and yet see at the same time that this is only his own maxim and not a practical law and that, if it is taken as a rule for the will of every rational being, it would be inconsistent with itself.

In natural science the principles of what occurs (e.g., the...
principle of equivalence of action and reaction in the communication of motion) are at the same time laws of nature, for there the use of reason is theoretical and determined by [20] the nature of the object. In practical philosophy, which has to do only with the grounds of determination of the will, the principles which a man makes for himself are not laws by which he is inexorably bound, because reason, in practice, has to do with a subject and especially with his faculty of desire, the special character of which may occasion variety in the rule. The practical rule is always a product of reason, because it prescribes action as a means to an effect which is its purpose. This rule, however, is an imperative for a being whose reason is not the sole determinant of the will. It is a rule characterized by an "ought," which expresses the objective necessitation of the act and indicates that, if reason completely determined the will, the action would without exception take place according to the rule.

Imperatives, therefore, are valid objectively and are quite distinct from maxims, which are subjective principles. Imperatives determine either the conditions of causality of a rational being as an efficient cause only in respect to its effect and its sufficiency to bring this effect about, or they determine only the will, whether it be adequate to the effect or not. In the former case, imperatives would be hypothetical and would contain only precepts of skill; in the latter, on the contrary, they would be categorical and would alone be practical laws. Maxims are thus indeed principles, but they are not imperatives. Imperatives themselves, however, when they are conditional, i.e., when they determine the will not as such but only in respect to a desired effect, are hypothetical imperatives, which are practical precepts but not laws. Laws must completely determine the will as will, even before I ask whether I am capable of achieving a desired effect or what should be done to realize it. They must thus be categorical; otherwise they would not be laws, for they would lack the necessity which, in order to be practical, must be completely independent of pathological conditions [see footnote, p. 78—Trans.], i.e., conditions only contingently related to the will.
Tell someone, for instance, that in his youth he should work and save in order not to want in his old age—that is a correct and important practical precept of the will. One easily sees, however, that the will is thereby directed to something else which he is assumed to desire; and, as to this desire, we must leave it up to the man himself if he foresees other resources than his own acquisitions, does not even hope to reach old age, or thinks that in case of need he can make do with little. Reason, from which alone a rule involving necessity can be derived, gives necessity to this precept, without which it would not be an imperative; but this necessity is dependent on only subjective conditions, and one cannot assume it in equal measure in all men. But for reason to give law it is required that reason need presuppose only itself, because the rule is objectively[21] and universally valid only when it holds without any contingent subjective conditions which differentiate one rational being from another.

Now tell a man that he should never make a deceitful promise; this is a rule which concerns only his will regardless of whether any purposes he has can be achieved by it or not. Only the volition is to be completely determined a priori by this rule. If, now, it is found that this rule is practically right, it is a law, because it is a categorical imperative. Thus practical laws refer only to the will, irrespective of what is attained by its causality, and one can disregard this causality (as belonging to the sensuous world) in order to have the laws in their purity.

§2. Theorem I

All practical principles which presuppose an object (material) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are without exception empirical and can hand down no practical laws.

By the term “material of the faculty of desire,” I understand an object whose reality is desired. When the desire for this object precedes the practical rule and is the condition under which the latter becomes a principle, I say, first, that this principle is then always empirical. I say this because the determining...
ground of choice consists in the conception of an object and its relation to the subject, whereby the faculty of desire is determined to seek its realization. Such a relation to the subject is called pleasure in the reality of an object, and it must be presupposed as the condition of the possibility of the determination of choice. But we cannot know, a priori, from the idea of any object, whatever the nature of this idea, whether it will be associated with pleasure or displeasure or will be merely indifferent. Thus any such determining ground of choice must always be empirical, and the practical material principle which has it as a condition is likewise empirical.

Second, a principle which is based only on the subjective susceptibility to a pleasure or displeasure (which is never known except empirically and cannot be valid in the same form for all rational beings) cannot function as a law even to the subject possessing this susceptibility, because it lacks [22] objective necessity, which must be known a priori. For this reason, such a principle can never furnish a practical law. It can, however, be counted as a maxim of a subject thus susceptible.

§3. Theorem II

All material practical principles are, as such, of one and the same kind and belong under the general principle of self-love or one’s own happiness.

Pleasure from the representation of the existence of a thing, in so far as it is a determining ground of the desire for this thing, is based upon the susceptibility of the subject because it depends upon the actual existence of an object. Thus it belongs to sense (feeling) and not to the understanding, which expresses a relation of a representation to an object by concepts and not the relation of a representation to the subject by feelings. It is practical only in so far as the faculty of desire is determined by the sensation of agreeableness which the subject expects from the actual existence of the object. Now happiness is a rational being’s consciousness of the agreeableness of life which without interruption accompanies his whole existence, and to make this the supreme ground for the determination of choice

§8. Lehrsatz II

Alle materiale praktische Prinzipien sind, als solche, insgesamt von einer und derselben Art, und gehören unter das allgemeine Prinzip der Selbstliebe, oder eigenen Glückseligkeit.

Die Lust aus der Vorstellung der Existenz einer Sache, so fern sie ein Bestimmungsgrund des Begehrens dieser Sache sein soll, gründet sich auf der Empfindlichkeit des Subjekts, weil sie von dem Dasein eines Gegenstandes abhängt; mithin gehört sie dem Sinne (Gefühl) und nicht dem Verstande an, der eine Beziehung der Vorstellung auf ein Objekt, nach Begriffen, aber nicht auf das Subjekt, nach Gefühlen, ausdrückt. Sie ist also nur so fern praktisch, als die Empfindung der Annahmlichkeit, die das Subjekt von der Wirklichkeit des Gegenstandes erwartet, das Begehren vermag bestimmt. Nun ist aber das Bewußtsein eines vernünftigen Wesens von der Annahmlichkeit des Lebens, die ununterbrochen sein ganzes Dasein begleitet, die Glückseligkeit, und das Prinzip, diese sich zum höchsten Bestimmungsgrunde der Willkür zu machen, das Prin-
constitutes the principle of self-love. Thus all material principles, which place the determining ground of choice in the pleasure or displeasure to be received from the reality of any object whatsoever, are entirely of one kind. Without exception they belong under the principle of self-love or one's own happiness.

**COROLLARY**

All material practical rules place the ground of the determination of the will in the lower faculty of desire, and if there were no purely formal laws of the will adequate to determine it, we could not admit (the existence of) any higher faculty of desire.

**REMARK I**

It is astonishing how otherwise acute men believe they can find a difference between the lower and the higher faculty of desire by noting whether the representations which are [23] associated with pleasure have their origin in the senses or in the understanding. When one inquires into the determining grounds of desire and finds them in an expected agreeableness resulting from something or other, it is not a question of where the representation of this enjoyable object comes from, but merely of how much the object can be enjoyed. If a representation, even though it has its origin and status in the understanding, can determine choice only by presupposing a feeling of pleasure in the subject, then its becoming a determining ground of choice is wholly dependent on the nature of the inner sense, i.e., it depends on whether the latter can be agreeably affected by that representation. However dissimilar the representations of the objects, be they proper to understanding or even the reason instead of to the senses, the feeling of pleasure, by virtue of which they constitute the determining ground of the will (since it is the agreeableness and enjoyment which one expects from the object which impels the activity toward producing it) is always the same. This sameness lies not merely in the fact that all feelings of pleasure can be known only em-

zip der Selbstliebe. Also sind alle materiale Prinzipien, die den Bestimmungsgrund der Willkür in der, aus irgend eines Gegenstandes Wirklichkeit zu empfindenden, Lust oder Unlust setzen, so fern gänzlich von einerlei Art, daß sie insgesamt zum Prinzip der Selbstliebe, oder eigenen Glückseligkeit gehören.

**Folgerung**

Alle materiale praktische Regeln setzen den Bestimmungsgrund des Willens im unteren Begehrenvermögen, und, gäbe es gar keine bloß formale Gesetze desselben, die den Willen hinreichend bestimmten, so würde auch kein oberes Begehrenvermögen eingeräumt werden können.

**Anmerkung I**

Man muß sich wundern, wie sonst scharfsinnige Männer einen Unterschied zwischen dem unteren und oberen Begehrenvermögen darin zu finden glauben können, ob die Vorstellungen, die mit dem Gefühl der Lust verbunden sind, in den Sinnen, oder dem Verstande ihren Ursprung haben. Denn es kommt, wenn man nach den Bestimmungsgründen des Begehrens fragt und sie in einer von irgend etwas erwarteten Annehmlichkeit setzt, gar nicht darauf an, wo die Vorstellung dieses vergnügenden Gegenstandes berkomme, sondern nur, wie sehr sie vergnügt. Wenn eine Vorstellung, sie mag immerhin im Verstande ihren Sitz und Ursprung haben, die Willkür nur dadurch bestimmen kann, daß sie ein Gefühl einer Lust im Subjekte voraussetzt, so ist, daß sie ein Bestimmungsgrund der Willkür sei, gänzlich von der Beschaffenheit des inneren Sinnes abhängig, daß dieser nämlich dadurch mit Annehmlichkeit affiziert werden kann. Die Vorstellungen der Gegenstände mögen noch so ungleichartig, sie mögen Verstandes-, selbst Vermnunftvorstellungen im Gegensatze der Vorstellungen der Sinne sein, so ist doch das Gefühl der Lust, wodurch jedes doch eigentlich nur den Bestimmungsgrund des Willens ausmachen (die Annehmlichkeit, das Vergnügen, das man davon erwartet, welches die Tätigkeit zur Hervorbringung des Objekts antreibt), nicht allein so fern von einerlei Art, daß es jederzeit bloß empirisch erkannt werden kann, sondern
prically, but even more in the fact that the feeling of pleasure always affects one and the same life-force which is manifested in the faculty of desire, and in this respect one determining ground can differ from any other only in degree. Otherwise how could one make a comparison with respect to magnitude between two determining grounds the ideas of which depend upon different faculties, in order to prefer the one which affects the faculty of desire to the greater extent? A man can return unread an instructive book which he cannot again obtain, in order not to miss the hunt; he can go away in the middle of a fine speech, in order not to be late for a meal; he can leave an intellectual conversation, which he otherwise enjoys, in order to take his place at the gambling table; he can even repulse a poor man whom it is usually a joy to aid, because he has only enough money in his pocket for a ticket to the theater. If the determination of the will rests on the feelings of agreeableness or disagreeableness which he expects from any cause, it is all the same to him through what kind of representation he is affected. The only thing he considers in making a choice is how great, how long-lasting, how easily obtained, and how often repeated this agreeableness is. As the man who wants money to spend does not care whether the gold in it was mined in the mountains or washed from the sand, provided it is accepted everywhere as having the same value, so also no man asks, when he is concerned only with the agreeableness of life, whether the representations are from sense or understanding; he asks only how much and how great is the pleasure which they will afford him over the longest time.

Only those who would like to deny to pure reason the power of determining the will without presupposing any feeling whatsoever could deviate so far from their own exposition [24] as to describe as quite heterogeneous what they have previously brought under one and the same principle. Thus, for instance, a person can find satisfaction in the mere exercise of power, in the consciousness of spiritual strength in overcoming obstacles in the way of his designs, and in the cultivation of intellectual talents. We correctly call these the more refined
joys and delights, because they are more in our power than others and do not wear out, but, rather, increase our capacity for even more of this kind of enjoyment; they delight and at the same time cultivate. But this is no reason to pass off such pleasures as a mode of determining the will different from that of the senses. For the possibility of these refined pleasures, too, presupposes, as the first condition of our delight, the existence in us of a corresponding feeling. So to assume this difference resembles the error of ignorant persons who wish to dabble in metaphysics and who imagine matter as so subtle, so supersubtle, that they almost get dizzy considering it, and then believe that they have conceived of a spiritual but still extended being. If, with Epicurus, we let virtue determine the will only because of the pleasure it promises, we cannot later blame him for holding that this pleasure is of the same sort as those of the coarsest senses. For we have no reason to charge him with delegating the representations by which this feeling is excited in us to the bodily senses only. So far as we can tell, he sought the source of many of them in the employment of the higher cognitive faculty. In accordance with the principles stated above, that did not and could not deter him, however, from holding that the pleasure which is given to us by these intellectual representations and which is the only means by which they can determine the will is of exactly the same kind as that coming from the senses.

Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher and yet the most rarely found. The ancient Greek schools afford more examples of it than we find in our syncretistic age, when a certain shallow and dishonest system of coalition between contradictory principles is devised because it is more acceptable to a public which is satisfied to know a little about everything and at bottom nothing, thus playing the jack-of-all-trades. The principle of one's own happiness, however much reason and understanding may be used in it, contains no other determinants for the will than those which belong to the lower faculty of desire. Either, then, no higher faculty of desire exists, or else pure reason alone must of itself be practical, i.e., it must be able to
den und Ergänzungen, weil sie mehr, wie andere, in unserer Gewalt sind, sich nicht abnutzen, das Gefühl zu noch mehrerem Genuß derselben vielmehr stärken, und, indem sie ergötzen, zugleich kultivieren. Allein sie darum für eine andere Art, den Willen zu bestimmen, als bloß durch den Sinn, auszugeben, da sie doch einmal, zur Möglichkeit jener Vergnügen, ein darauf in uns angelegtes Gefühl, als erste Bedingung dieses Wohlgemuths, voraussetzen, ist gerade so, als wenn Unwissende, die gerne in der Metaphysik plauschern möchten, sich die Materie so fein, so überfein, daß sie selbst darüber schwindlig werden möchten, denken, und dann glauben, auf diese Art sich ein geistiges und doch ausgedehntes Wesen ergötzt zu haben. Wenn wir es, mit dem Epikur, bei der Tugend aufs bloße Vergnügen aussetzen, das sie verspricht, um den Willen zu bestimmen: so können wir ihn hernach nicht tadeln, daß er dieses mit denen der größten Sinne für ganz gleichartig hält; denn man hat gar nicht Grund, ihm aufzubürden, daß er die Vorstellungen, wodurch dieses Gefühl in uns erregt würde, bloß den körperlichen Sinne beigemessen hätte. Er hat von vielen derselben den Quell, so viel man wüsste kann, eben sowohl in dem Gebrauch des höheren Erkenntnisvermögens gesucht; aber das hinderte ihn nicht und konnte ihn auch nicht hindern, nach genanntem Prinzip das Vergnügen selbst, das uns jene allenfalls intellektuelle Vorstellungen gewähren, und wodurch sie allein Bestimmungsgründe des Willens sein können, gänzlich für gleichartig zu halten.

Konsequent zu sein, ist die größte Obliegenheit eines Philosophen, und wird doch am seltensten angetroffen. Die alten griechischen Schulen geben uns davon mehr Beispiele, als wir in unserem synkretistischen Zeitalter antreffen, wo ein gewisses Koalitionssystem widersprechender Grundsätze voll Unredlichkeit und Seichtigkeit erkünstelt wird, weil es sich einem Publikum besser empfiehlt, das zufrieden ist, von allem etwas, und im ganzen nichts zu wissen, und dabei in allen Sätzen gerecht zu sein. Das Prinzip der eigenen Glückseligkeit, so viel Verstand und Vernunft bei ihm auch gebraucht werden mag, würde doch für den Willen keine andere Bestimmungsgründe, als die dem unfertigen Begehungsvermögen angemessen sind, in sich fassen, und es gibt also entweder gar kein Begehungsvermögen1 oder reine Vernunft muß für sich allein praktisch sein, d.i. ohne Vor-

1 Akad.-Ausz.: oberes Begehungsvermögen.
determine the will by the mere form of the practical rule without presupposing any feeling or consequently any representation of the pleasant or the unpleasant as the matter of the faculty of desire and as the empirical condition of its principles. Then only is reason a truly higher faculty of desire, but still only in so far as it determines the will by itself and not in the service of the inclinations. Subordinate to reason as the higher faculty of desire is the pathologically determinable faculty of desire, the latter being really and in kind different from the former, so that even the slightest admixture of its impulses impairs the strength and superiority of reason, just as taking anything empirical as the condition of a mathematical demonstration would degrade and destroy its force and value. Reason determines the will in a practical law directly, not through an intervening feeling of pleasure or displeasure, even if this pleasure is taken in the law itself. Only because, as pure reason, it can be practical is it possible for it to give law.

REMARK II

To be happy is necessarily the desire of every rational but finite being, and thus it is an unavoidable determinant of its faculty of desire. Contentment with our existence is not, as it were, an inborn possession or bliss, which would presuppose a consciousness of our self-sufficiency; it is rather a problem imposed upon us by our own finite nature as a being of needs. These needs are directed to the material of the faculty of desire, i.e., to that which is related to a basic subjective feeling of pleasure or displeasure, determining what we require in order to be satisfied with our condition. But just because this material ground of determination [motives] can be known by the subject only empirically, it is impossible to regard this demand for happiness as a law, since the latter must contain exactly the same determining ground for the will of all rational beings and in all cases. Since, though, the concept of happiness always underlies the practical relation of objects to the faculty of desire, it is merely the general name for subjective grounds of determination [motives], and it determines nothing specific concerning

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Anmerkung II

Glücklich zu sein, ist notwendig das Verlangen jedes vernünftigen aber endlichen Wesens, und also ein unvermeidlicher Bestimmungsgrund seines Begehungsvermögens. Denn die Zufriedenheit mit seinem ganzen Dasein ist nicht etwa ein ursprünglicher Besitz, und eine Seligkeit, welche ein Bewußtsein seiner unabhängigen Selbstgenügsamkeit voraussetzen würde, sondern das, durch seine endliche Natur selbst ihm aufgedrungenes Problem, weil es bedürftig ist, und dieses Bedürfnis betrifft die Materie seines Begehungsvermögens, d. i. etwas, was sich auf ein subjektiv zum Grunde liegendes Gefühl der Lust oder Unlust bezieht, dadurch das, was es zur Zufriedenheit mit seinem Zustande bedarf, bestimmt wird. Aber eben darum, weil dieser materielle Bestimmungsgrund von dem Subjekte bloß empirisch erkannt werden kann, ist es unmöglich, diese Aufgabe als ein Gesetz zu betrachten, weil dieses als objektiv in allen Fällen und für alle vernünftigen Wesen eben denselben Bestimmungsgrund des Willens enthalten müßte. Denn obgleich der Begriff der Glückseligkeit der praktischen Beziehung der Objekte aufs Begehungsvermögen allerverwärts zum Grunde liegt, so ist er doch nur der allgemeine Titel der subjektiven Bestimmungsgründe, und bestimmt nichts spezifisch, darum
what is to be done in a given practical problem; but in a practical problem this is what is alone important, for without some specific determination the problem cannot be solved. Where one places one’s happiness is a question of the particular feeling of pleasure or displeasure in each person, and even of the differences in needs occasioned by changes of feeling in one and the same person. Thus a subjectively necessary law (as a law of nature) is objectively a very contingent practical principle which can and must be very different in different people. It therefore cannot yield any [practical] law, because in the desire for happiness it is not the form (accordance with law) but only the material which is decisive; it is a question only of whether I may expect pleasure from obedience to this law, and, if so, how much. Principles of self-love can indeed contain universal rules of skill (how to find means to some end), but [26] these are only theoretical principles* as, for example, how someone who wants bread should construct a mill. But practical precepts based on them can never be universal, for what determines the faculty of desire is based on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, which can never be assumed to be directed to the same objects by all people.

But suppose that finite rational beings were unanimous in the kind of objects their feelings of pleasure and pain had, and even in the means of obtaining the former and preventing the latter. Even then they could not set up the principle of self-love as a practical law, for the unanimity itself would be merely contingent. The determining ground would still be only subjectively valid and empirical, and it would not have the necessity which is conceived in every law, an objective necessity arising from a priori grounds, unless we hold this necessity to be not at all practical but only physical, maintaining that our action is as

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*Propositions called “practical” in mathematics or natural science should properly be called “technical,” for in these fields it is not a question of determining the will; they only indicate the manifold of a possible action which is adequate to bring about a certain effect, and are therefore just as theoretical as any proposition which asserts a connection between cause and effect. Whoever chooses the latter must also choose the former.
inevitably forced upon us by our inclination as yawn is by seeing others yawn. It would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws but merely counsels for the service of our desires than to elevate merely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws, which must have an objective and not just subjective necessity and which must be known a priori by reason instead of by experience, no matter how empirically universal. Even the rules of uniform phenomena are denominated natural laws (for example, mechanical laws) only if we really can understand them a priori or at least (as in the case of those of chemistry) suppose that they could be known in this way if our insight went deeper. Only in the case of subjective practical principles is it expressly made a condition that not objective but subjective conditions of choice must underlie them, and hence that they must be represented always as mere maxims and never as practical laws.

This remark may appear at first blush to be mere hairsplitting; actually, it defines the most important distinction which can be considered in practical investigations.

§4. Theorem III

If a rational being can think of his maxims as practical [27] universal laws, he can do so only by considering them as principles which contain the determining grounds of the will because of their form and not because of their matter.

The material of a practical principle is the object of the will. This object either is the determining ground of the will or it is not. If it is, the rule of the will is subject to an empirical condition (to the relation of the determining representation to feelings of pleasure or displeasure), and therefore the rule is not a practical law. If all material of a law, i.e., every object of the will considered as a ground of its determination, is taken from it, nothing remains except the mere form of giving universal law. Therefore, a rational being either cannot think of his subjectively practical principles (maxims) as at the same time universal laws, or he must suppose that their mere form, through which they are fitted for being given as universal laws, is alone that which makes them a practical law.

von den Grundsätzen

Die Handlung durch unsere Neigung uns eben so unabweiglich abgenützt würde, als das Gähnen, wenn wir andere gähnen sehen. Man würde eher behaupten können, daß es gar keine praktische Gesetze gebe, sondern nur Anrufungen zum Behuf unserer Begierden, als daß bloß subjektive Prinzipien zum Ralge praktischer Gesetze erhoben würden, die durchaus objektive und nicht bloß subjektive Notwendigkeit haben, und durch Vernunft a priori, nicht durch Erfahrung (so empirisch allgemein diese auch sein mag) erkannt sein müssen. Selbst die Regeln einstimmiger Erscheinungen werden nur Naturgesetze (z. B. die mechanischen) genannt, wenn man sie entweder wirklich a priori erkennt, oder doch (wie bei den chemischen) annimmt, sie würden a priori aus objektiven Gründen erkannt werden, wenn unsere Einsicht tiefer ginge. Allein bei bloß subjektiven praktischen Prinzipien wird das ausdrücklich zur Bedingung gemacht, daß ihnen nicht objektive, sondern subjektive Bedingungen der Willkür zum Grunde liegen müssen; mithin, daß sie jederzeit nur als bloße Maximen, niemals aber als praktische Gesetze, vorstellig gemacht werden dürfen.

Diese letztere Anmerkung scheint beim ersten Anblicke bloße Wortklamzer zu sein; allein die Wortbestimmung des allerwichtigsten Unterschiedes, der nur in praktischen Untersuchungen in Betracht kommen mag.

4. LEHRSATZ III

Wenn ein vernünftiges Wesen sich seine Maximen als praktische allgemeine Gesetze denken soll, so kann es sich dieselbe nur als solche Prinzipien denken, die, nicht der Materie, sondern bloß der Form nach, den Bestimmungsgrund des Willens enthalten.

Die Materie eines praktischen Prinzips ist der Gegenstand des Willens. Dieser ist entweder der Bestimmungsgrund des letzteren, oder nicht. Ist er der Bestimmungsgrund desselben, so würde die Regel des Willens einer empirischen Bedingung (dem Verhältnisse der bestimmenden Vorstellung zum Gefühle der Lust und Unlust) unterworfen, folglich kein praktisches Gesetz sein. Nun bleibt von einem Gesetze, wenn man alle Materie, d. i. jeden Gegenstand des Willens (als Bestimmungsgrund) davon abscheidet, nichts übrig, als die bloße Form einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung. Also kann ein vernünftiges Wesen sich seine subjektiv-praktischen Prinzipien, d. i. Maximen, entweder gar nicht zugleich als allgemeine Gesetze denken, oder es muß annehmen, daß die bloße Form derselben, nach der jene sich zur allgemeinen Gesetzgebung schicken, sie für sich allein zum praktischen Gesetze mache.

1 Akad.-Ausz.: allein sie ist dies.
Remark

What form in a maxim fits it for universal law-giving and what form does not do so can be distinguished without instruction by the most common understanding. I have, for example, made it my maxim to augment my property by every safe means. Now I have in my possession a deposit, the owner of which has died without leaving any record of it. Naturally, this case falls under my maxim. Now I want to know whether this maxim can hold as a universal practical law. I apply it, therefore, to the present case and ask if this maxim could take the form of a law, and consequently whether I could, by the maxim, make the law that every man is allowed to deny that a deposit has been made when no one can prove the contrary. I immediately realize that taking such a principle as a law would annihilate itself, because its result would be that no one would make a deposit. A practical law which I acknowledge as such must qualify for being universal law; this is an identical and therefore a self-evident proposition. Now, if I say that my will is subject to a practical law, I cannot put forward my inclination (in this case, my avarice) as fit to be a determining ground of a universal practical law. It is so far from being worthy of giving universal laws [28] that in the form of universal law it must destroy itself.

It is therefore astonishing how intelligent men have thought of proclaiming as a universal practical law the desire for happiness, and therewith to make this desire the determining ground of the will merely because this desire is universal. Though elsewhere natural laws make everything harmonious, if one here attributed the universality of law to this maxim, there would be the extreme opposite of harmony, the most ardent conflict, and the complete annihilation of the maxim itself and its purpose. For the wills of all do not have one and the same object, but each person has his own (his own welfare), which, to be sure, can accidentally agree with the purposes of others who are pursuing their own, though this agreement is far from sufficing for a law because the occasional exceptions which one is permitted to make are endless and cannot be definitely comprehended in a universal rule. In this way a harmony may result resembling that depicted in a certain satirical poem

Anmerkung

Welche Form in der Maxime sich zur allgemeinen Gesetzgebung schicke, welche nicht, das kann der gemeinste Verstand ohne Unterweisung unterscheiden. Ich habe z. B. es nur zur Maxime gemacht, mein Vermögen durch alle sichere Mittel zu vergrößern. Jetzt ist ein Deposito in meinen Händen, dessen Eigentümer verstorben ist und keine Handschrift darüber zurückgelassen hat.Natürlicherweise ist dies der Fall meiner Maxime. Jetzt will ich nur wissen, ob jene Maxime auch als allgemeines praktisches Gesetz gelten könne. Ich wende jene also auf gegenwärtigen Fall an, und frage, ob sie wohl die Form eines Gesetzes annehmen, mithin ich wohl durch meine Maxime zugleich ein solches Gesetz geben könnte: daß jedermann ein Deposito ableugnen dürfe, dessen Niederlegung ihm niemand beweisen kann. Ich werde sofort gewahr, daß ein solches Prinzip, als Gesetz, sich selbst vernichten würde, weil es machen würde, daß es gar kein Deposito gäbe. Ein praktisches Gesetz, was ich dafür erkenne, muß sich zur allgemeinen Gesetzgebung qualifizieren; dies ist ein identischer Satz und also für sich klar. Sage ich nun, mein Wille steht unter einem praktischen Gesetze, so kann ich nicht meine Neigung (z. B. im gegenwärtigen Falle meine Habgier) als den zu einem allgemeinen praktischen Gesetze schicklichen Bestimmungsgrund desselben anführen; denn diese, weit gefehlt, daß sie zu einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung tauglich sein sollte, so muß sie vielmehr in der Form eines allgemeinen Gesetzes sich selbst aufreifen.

Es ist daher wunderlich, wie, da die Begierde zur Glückseligkeit, mithin auch die Maxime, dadurch sich jeder diese letztere zum Bestimmungsgrunde seines Willens setzet, allgemein ist, es verständigen Männern habe in den Sinn kommen können, es darum für ein allgemein praktisches Gesetz auszugeben. Denn da sonst ein allgemeines Naturgesetze alles einstimmig macht, so würde hier, wenn man der Maxime die Allgemeinheit eines Gesetzes geben wollte, grade das äußerste Widerspiel der Einstimmung, der ärgerste Widerstreit und die gänzliche Vernichtung der Maxime selbst und ihrer Absicht erfolgen. Denn der Wille aller hat alsdann nicht ein und dasselbe Objekt, sondern ein jeder hat das seine (seines eigenen Wohlbefindens), welches sich zwar, zufälligerweise, auch mit anderer ihren Absichten, die sie gleichfalls auf sich selbst richten, vertragen kann, aber lange nicht zum Gesetze hinreichend ist, weil die Ausnahmen, die man gelegentlich zu machen befugt ist, endlos sind, und gar nicht bestimmt in eine allgemeine Regel befaßt werden können. Es kommt auf diese Art eine Harmonie heraus, die derjenigen ähnlich ist, welche ein gewisses Spott-
§5. Problem I

Granted that the mere legislative form of maxims is the sole sufficient determining ground of a will, find the character of the will which is determinable by it alone.

Since the mere form of a law can be thought only by reason and is consequently not an object of the senses and therefore does not belong among appearances, the conception of this form as the determining ground of the will is distinct from all determining grounds of events in nature according to the law of causality, for these grounds must themselves be appearances. Now, as no determining ground of the will except [29] the universal legislative form [of its maxim] can serve as a law for it, such a will must be conceived as wholly independent of the natural law of appearances in their mutual relations, i.e., the law of causality. Such independence is called freedom in the strictest, i.e., transcendental, sense. Therefore, a will to which only the law-giving form of the maxim can serve as a law is a free will.

§6. Problem II

Granted that a will is free, find the law which alone is competent to determine it necessarily.

Since the materials of the practical law, i.e., an object of the maxim, cannot be given except empirically, and since a free will must be independent of all empirical conditions (i.e.,
those belonging to the world of sense) and yet be determinable, a free will must find its ground of determination in the law, but independently of the material of the law. But besides the latter there is nothing in a law except the legislative form. Therefore, the legislative form, in so far as it is contained in the maxim, is the only thing which can constitute a determining ground of the [free] will.

REMARK

Thus freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other. I do not here ask whether they are actually different, instead of an unconditional law being merely the self-consciousness of pure practical reason, and thus identical with the positive concept of freedom. The question now is whether our knowledge of the unconditionally practical takes its inception from freedom or from the practical law. It cannot start from freedom, for this we can neither know immediately, since our first concept of it is negative, nor infer from experience, since experience reveals only the law of appearances and consequently the mechanism of nature, the direct opposite of freedom. It is therefore the moral law, of which we become immediately conscious as soon as we construct maxims for the will, which first presents itself to us; and, since reason exhibits it as a ground of determination which is completely independent of and not to be outweighed by any sensuous condition, it is the moral law which leads directly to the concept of freedom.

But how is the consciousness of that moral law possible? We can come to know pure practical laws in the same way we know pure theoretical principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us and to the elimination from them of all empirical conditions, which reason directs. The concept of a pure will arises from the former, as the consciousness of a pure understanding from the latter. That this is the correct organization of our concepts, and that morality first re-

1Reading *dieses*, with Paton, instead of *diese*. 

nenwelt gehörigen) Bedingungen unabhängig, dennoch bestimmbar sein muß: so muß ein freier Wille, unabhängig von der Materie des Gesetzes, dennoch einen Bestimmungsgrund in dem Gesetze antreffen. Es ist aber, außer der Materie des Gesetzes, nichts weiter in demselben, als die gesetzgebende Form enthalten. Also ist die gesetzgebende Form, so fern sie in der Maxime enthalten ist, das einzige, was einen Bestimmungsgrund des Willens ausmachen kann.

Anmerkung

Freiheit und unbedingtes praktisches Gesetz weisen also wechselseitig auf einander zurück. Ich frage hier nun nicht: ob sie auch in der Tat verschieden sein1, und nicht vielmehr ein unbedingtes Gesetz bloß das Selbstbewußtsein reinen praktischen Vernunft, diese aber ganz einerlei mit dem positiven Begriffe der Freiheit sei; sondern woron unsere Erkenntnis des unbedingt-Praktischen anhebe, ob von der Freiheit, oder dem praktischen Gesetze. Von der Freiheit kann es nicht anheben; denn deren können wir uns weder unmittelbar bewußt werden, weil sein erster Begriff negativ ist, noch darauf aus der Erfahrung schließen, denn Erfahrung gibt uns nur das Gesetz der Erscheinungen, mithin den Mechanismus der Natur, das gerade Widerspiel der Freiheit, zu erkennen. Also ist es das moralische Gesetze, dessen wir uns unmittelbar bewußt werden (so bald wir uns Maximen des Willens entwerfen), welches sich uns zuerst darbietet, und, indem die Vernunft jenes als einen durch keine sinnliche Bedingungen zu überwiegenden, ja davon gänzlich unabhängigen Bestimmungsgrund darstellt, gerade auf den Begriff der Freiheit führt. Wie ist aber auch das Bewußtsein jenes moralischen Gesetzes möglich? Wir können uns rein praktischer Gesetze bewußt werden, eben so, wie wir uns reinen theoretischer Grundsätze bewußt sind, indem wir auf die Notwendigkeit, womit sie uns die Vernunft vorschreibt, und auf Absonderung aller empirischen Bedingungen, dazu uns jene hinweiset, Acht haben. Der Begriff eines reinen Willens entspringt aus den ersten, wie das Bewußtsein eines reinen Verstandes aus dem letzteren. Daß dieses die wahre Unterordnung unserer Begriffe sei, und Sittlichkeit uns zuerst

veals the concept of freedom to us while practical reason deeply perplexes the speculative with this concept which poses the most insoluble of problems, is shown by the following considerations. First, nothing in appearances is explained by the concept of freedom, but there the mechanism of nature must be the only clue. Second, there is the antinomy of pure reason which arises when reason aspires to the unconditioned in a causal series and which involves it in inconceivabilities on both sides, since at least mechanism has a use in the explanation of appearances, while no one would dare introduce freedom into science had not the moral law and, with it, practical reason come and forced this concept upon us.

Experience also confirms this order of concepts in us. Suppose that someone says his lust is irresistible when the desired object and opportunity are present. Ask him whether he would not control his passion if, in front of the house where he has this opportunity, a gallows were erected on which he would be hanged immediately after gratifying his lust. We do not have to guess very long what his answer would be. But ask him whether he thinks it would be possible for him to overcome his love of life, however great it may be, if his sovereign threatened him with the same sudden death unless he made a false deposition against an honorable man whom the ruler wished to destroy under a plausible pretext. Whether he would or not he perhaps will not venture to say; but that it would be possible for him he would certainly admit without hesitation. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he knows that he ought, and he recognizes that he is free—a fact which, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him.

§7. Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason

So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as the principle giving universal law.

REMARK

Pure geometry has postulates as practical pro-positions, which, however, contain nothing more than the pre-
supposition that one can do something and that, when some result is needed, one should do it; these are the only propositions of pure geometry that deal with an existing thing. They are thus practical rules under a problematic condition of the will. Here, however, the rule says: One ought absolutely to act in a certain way. The practical rule is therefore unconditional and thus is thought of as a priori as a categorically practical proposition. The practical rule, which is thus here a law, absolutely and directly determines the will objectively, for pure reason, practical in itself, is here directly law-giving. The will is thought of as independent of empirical conditions and consequently as pure will, determined by the mere form of law, and this ground of determination is regarded as the supreme condition of all maxims.

The thing is strange enough and has no parallel in the remainder of practical knowledge. For the a priori thought of the possibility of giving universal law, which is thus merely problematic, is unconditionally commanded as a law without borrowing anything from experience or from any external will. It is, however, not a prescription according to which an act should occur in order to make a desired effect possible, for such a rule is always physically conditioned; it is, on the contrary, a rule which determines the will a priori only with respect to the form of its maxims. Therefore, it is at least not impossible to conceive of a law that alone serves the purpose of the subjective form of principles and yet is a ground of determination by virtue of the objective form of a law in general. The consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason, since one cannot ferret it out from antecedent data of reason, such as the consciousness of freedom (for this is not antecedently given), and since it forces itself upon us as a synthetic proposition a priori based on no pure or empirical intuition. It would be analytic if the freedom of the will were presupposed, but for this, as a positive concept, an intellectual intuition would be needed, and here we cannot assume it. In order to regard this law without any misinterpretation as given, one must note that it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason.
son, which by it proclaims itself as originating law (sic volo, sic iubeo).²

COROLLARY

Pure reason alone is practical of itself, and it gives (to man) a universal law, which we call the moral law.

REMARK

The fact just mentioned is undeniable. One need only analyze the sentence which men pass upon the lawfulness of their actions to see in every case that their reason, incorruptible and self-constrained, in every action holds up the maxim of the will to the pure will, i.e., to itself regarded as a priori practical; and this it does regardless of what inclination may say to the contrary. Now this principle of morality, on account of the universality of its legislation which makes it the formal supreme determining ground of the will regardless of any subjective differences among men, is declared by reason to be a law for all rational beings in so far as they have a will, i.e., faculty of determining their causality through the representation of a rule, and consequently in so far as they are competent to determine their actions according to principles and thus to act according to practical a priori principles, which alone have the necessity which reason demands in a principle. It is thus not limited to human beings but extends to all finite beings having reason and will; indeed, it includes the Infinite Being as the supreme intelligence. In the former case, however, the law has the form of an imperative. For though we can suppose that men as rational beings have a pure will, since they are affected by wants and sensuous motives we cannot suppose them to have a holy will, a will incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law. The moral law for them, therefore, is an imperative, commanding categorically because it is unconditioned. The relation of such a will to this law is one of dependence under the name of "obligation." This term implies a constraint to an ac-

²An allusion to Juvenal Satire vi: "What I will I decree as law."

reinen Vernunft sei, die sich dadurch als ursprünglich gesetzgebend (sic volo, sic iubeo) ankündigt.

Folgerung

Reine Vernunft ist für sich allein praktisch, und gibt (dem Menschen) ein allgemeines Gesetz, welches wir das Sitten- gesetz nennen.

Anmerkung

Das vorher genannte Faktum ist unleugbar. Man darf nur das Urteil zergliedern, welches die Menschen über die Gesetzmäßigkeit ihrer Handlungen fallen: so wird man jederzeit finden, daß, was auch die Neigung dazwischen sprechen mag, ihre Vernunft dennoch, unbestechlich und durch sich selbst gezwungen, die Maxime des Willens bei einer Handlung jederzeit an den reinen Willen halte, d. i. an sich selbst, indem sie sich als a priori praktisch betrachtet. Dieses Prinzip der Sittlichkeit nun, eben um der Allgemeinheit der Gesetzesgebung willen, die es zum formalen obersten Bestimmungsgrunde des Willens, unangesehen aller subjektiven Verschiedenheiten desselben, macht, erklärt die Vernunft zugleich zu einem Gesetze für alle vernünftigen Wesen, sofern sie überhaupt 'einen Willen, d. i. ein Vermögen haben, ihre Kausalität durch die Vorstellung von Regeln zu bestimmen, mithin so fern sie der Handlungen nach Grundsätzen, folglich auch nach praktischen Prinzipien a priori (denn diese haben allein diejenige Notwendigkeit, welche die Vernunft zum Grundsätze fordert), fähig sein. Es schränkt sich also nicht bloß auf Menschen ein, sondern geht auf alle endliche Wesen, die Vernunft und Willen haben, ja schließt sogar das unendliche Wesen, als oberste Intelligenz, mit ein. Im ersteren Falle aber hat das Gesetz die Form eines Imperativs, weil man an jenem nur, als vernünftigem Wesen, einen reinen, aber, als mit Bedürfnissen und sinnlichen Bewegursachen affiziertem Wesen, keinen heiligen Willen, d. i. einen solchen, der keiner dem moralischen Gesetze widerstrebenden Maximen fähig wäre, voraussetzen kann. Das moralische Gesetz ist daher bei jenen ein Imperativ, der kategorisch gebietet, weil das Gesetz unbedingt ist; das Verhältnis eines solchen Willens zu diesem Gesetze ist Abhängigkeit, unter dem Namen der Verbindlichkeit, welche eine Nötigung, obzwar durch bloße Vernunft und

¹ Übersetzung des Herausgebers: So will ich, so befehle ich.
² Akad.-Ausz.: sind.
tion, though this constraint is only that of reason and its objective law. Such an action is called a duty, because a pathologically affected (though not pathologically determined — and thus still free) choice involves a wish arising from subjective causes, and consequently such a choice often opposes pure objective grounds of determination. Such a will is therefore in need of the moral constraint of the resistance offered by practical reason, which may be called an inner but intellectual compulsion. In the supremely self-sufficing intelligence choice is correctly thought of as incapable of having any maxim that could not at the same time be objectively a law, and the concept of holiness, which is applied to it for this reason, elevates it not indeed above all practical laws but above all practically restrictive laws, and thus above obligation and duty. This holiness of will is, however, a practical idea which must necessarily serve as a model which all finite rational beings must strive toward even though they cannot reach it. The pure moral law, which is itself for this reason called holy, constantly and rightly holds it before their eyes. The utmost that finite practical reason can accomplish is to make sure of the unending progress of its maxims toward this model and of the constancy of the finite rational being in making continuous progress. This is virtue, and as a naturally acquired faculty, it can never be perfect, because assurance in such a case never becomes apodictic certainty, and as a mere pretense it is very dangerous.

§ 8. Theorem IV

The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them; heteronomy of choice, on the other hand, not only does not establish any obligation but is opposed to the principle of obligation and to the morality of the will.

The sole principle of morality consists in independence from all material of the law (i.e., a desired object) and in the accompanying determination of choice by the mere form of giving universal law which a maxim must be capable of having. That independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense.

Von den Grundsätzen

Die Autonomie des Willens ist das alleinige Prinzip aller moralischen Gesetze und der ihnen gemäßen Pflichten; alle Heteronomie der Willkür gründet dagegen nicht allein gar keine Verbindlichkeit, sondern ist vielmehr dem Prinzip derselben und der Sittlichkeit des Willens entgegen.

In der Unabhängigkeit nämlich von aller Materie des Gesetzes (nämlich einem begehren Objecte) und zugleich doch Bestimmung der Willkür durch die bloße allgemeine gesetzgebende Form, deren eine Maxime fähig sein muß, besteht das alleinige Prinzip der Sittlichkeit. Jene Unabhängigkeit aber ist Freiheit im negativen, diese eigene Ge-

1 Akad.-Ausg.: * deren * - V Akad.-Ausg.: * könnte *.
sense, while this intrinsic legislation of pure and thus practical reason is freedom in the positive sense. Therefore, the moral law expresses nothing else than the autonomy of pure practical reason, i.e., freedom. This autonomy or freedom is itself the formal condition of all maxims, under which alone they can all agree with the supreme practical law. If, therefore, the material of volition, which cannot be other than an object of desire which is connected to the law, comes into the practical law as a condition of its possibility, there results heteronomy of choice, or dependence on natural laws in following some impulse or inclination; it is heteronomy because the will does not give itself the law but only directions for a reasonable obedience to pathological laws. The maxim, however, which for this reason can never contain in itself the form of prescribing universal law, not only produces no obligation but is itself opposed to the principle of pure practical reason and thus also to the moral disposition, even though the action which comes from it may conform to the law.

REMARK 1

Thus a practical precept which presupposes a material [34] and therefore empirical condition must never be reckoned a practical law. For the law of pure will, which is free, puts the will in a sphere entirely different from the empirical, and the necessity which it expresses, not being a natural necessity, can consist only in the formal conditions of the possibility of a law in general. All the material of practical rules rests only on subjective conditions, which can afford the rules no universality for rational beings (except a merely conditioned one as in the case where I desire this or that, and then there is something which I must do in order to get it). Without exception, they all revolve about the principle of one's own happiness. Now it is certainly undeniable that every volition must have an object and therefore a material;3 but the material cannot be sup-

3The italics of this clause, which belies the most common misunderstanding of Kant's ethics, is justified by its importance, though in the German text it is in normal type.
posed, for this reason, to be the determining ground and condition of the maxim. If it were, the maxim could not be presented as giving universal law, because then the expectation of the existence of the object would be the determining cause of the choice, the dependence of the faculty of desire on the existence of some thing would have to be made basic to volition, and this dependence would have to be sought out in empirical conditions and therefore never could be a foundation of a necessary and universal rule. Thus the happiness of others may be the object of the will of a rational being, but if it were the determining ground of the maxim, not only would one have to presuppose that we find in the welfare of others a natural satisfac- tion but also one would have to find a want such as that which is occasioned in some men by a sympathetic disposition. This want, however, I cannot presuppose in every rational being, certainly not in God. The material of the maxim can indeed remain but cannot be its condition, for then it would not be fit for a law. The mere form of a law, which limits its material, must be a condition for adding this material to the will but not presuppose the material as the condition of the will. Let the material content be, for example, my own happiness. If I attribute this to everyone, as in fact I may attribute it to all finite beings, it can become an objective practical law only if I include within it the happiness of others. Therefore, the law that we should further the happiness of others arises not from the presupposition that this law is an object of everyone's choice but from the fact that the form of universality, which reason requires as condition for giving to the maxim of self-love the objective validity of law, is itself the determining ground of the will. Therefore not the object, i.e., the happiness of others, was the determining ground of the pure will but rather it was the lawful form alone. Through it I restricted my maxim, founded on inclination, by giving it the universality of a law, thus making it conformable [35] to pure practical reason. From this limitation alone, and not from the addition of any external drive, the concept of obligation arises to extend the maxim of self-love also to the happiness of others.
When one's own happiness is made the determining ground of the will, the result is the direct opposite of the principle of morality; and I have previously shown that, whenever the determining ground which is to serve as a law is located elsewhere than in the legislative form of the maxim, we have to reckon with this result. This conflict is not, however, merely logical, as is that between empirically conditioned rules which someone might nevertheless wish to erect into necessary principles of knowledge; it is rather a practical conflict, and, were the voice of reason with respect to the will not so distinct, so irrepressible, and so clearly audible to even the commonest man, it would drive morality to ruin. It can maintain itself only in the perplexing speculations of the schools which have temerity enough to close their ears to that heavenly voice in order to uphold a theory that costs no brainwork.

Suppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked were to attempt to justify himself before you for having borne false witness by appealing to what he regarded as the holy duty of consulting his own happiness and, then, by recounting all the advantages he had gained thereby, pointing out the prudence he had shown in securing himself against detection, even by yourself, to whom alone he now reveals the secret only in order that he may be able at any time to deny it. And suppose that he then affirmed, in all seriousness, that he had thereby fulfilled a true human duty—you would either laugh in his face or shrink from him in disgust, even though you would not have the least grounds for objecting to such measures if someone regulated his principles solely with a view to his own advantage. Or suppose someone recommends to you as steward a man to whom you could blindly trust your affairs and, in order to inspire you with confidence, further extols him as a prudent man who has a masterly understanding of his own interest and is so indefatigably active that he misses no opportunity to further it; furthermore, lest you should be afraid of finding a vulgar selfishness in him, he praises the good taste with which he

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Das gerade Widerspiel des Prinzips der Sittlichkeit ist: wenn das der eigenen Glückseligkeit zum Bestimmungsgrunde des Willens gemacht wird, wozu, wie ich oben gezeigt habe, alles überhaupt gezählt werden muß, was den Bestimmungsgrund, der zum Gesetze dienen soll, irgend wohin anders, als in der gesetzgebenden Form der Maxime setzt. Dieser | Widerstreit ist aber nicht bloß logisch, wie der zwischen empirisch bedingten Regeln, die man doch zu notwendigen Erkenntnissprinzipien erheben wollte, sondern praktisch, und würde, wäre nicht die Stimme der Vernunft in Beziehung auf den Willen so deutlich, so unüberschreibbar, selbst für den gemeinsten Menschen so vernehmlich, die Sittlichkeit gänzlich zu Grunde richten; so aber kann sie sich nur noch in den kopfverwirrenden Spekulationen der Schulen erhalten, die dreist genug sein1, sich gegen jene himmlische Stimme taub zu machen, um eine Theorie, die kein Kopfbrechen kostet, aufrecht zu erhalten.

Wenn ein dir sonst beliebter Umgangsbruder bei dir wegen eines falschen abgelegten Zeugnisses dadurch zu rechtferigen vermeinte, daß er zuerst, seinem Vorgeben nach, heilige Pflicht der eigenen Glückseligkeit verschätzte, alsdenn die Vorteile herzählte, die er sich alle dadurch erwob, die Klugheit namhaft machte, die er beobachtet, um wider alle Entdeckung sicher zu sein, selbst wider die von Seiten deiner selbst, dem er das Geheimnis darum allein offenbarte, damit er es zu aller Zeit ableugnen könne; dann aber im ganzen Ermüdgung, habe eine wahre Menschenpflicht ausgeführt: so würdest du ihm entweder gerade ins Gesicht lachen, oder mit Abscheu davon zurückgeben, ob du gleich, wenn jemand bloß auf eigene Vorteile seine Grundsätze gesteuert hat, wider diese Maßregeln nicht das mindeste einzuwenden hättest. Oder setzt es empfehle euch jemand einen Mann zum Haushalter, dem ihr alle eure Angelegenheiten blindlings anvertrauen könnt, und, um euch Zutrauen einzuflößen, rühmte ert ihn als einen klugen Menschen, der sich auf seinen eigenen Vorteil meisterhaft verstehe, auch als einen rastlos wirksamen, der keine Gelegenheit dazu ungenutzt vorbeigehen ließe, endlich, damit | auch ja nicht Besorgnisse wegen eines pöbelhaften Eigennutzes desselben im Wege stünden, rühmte er, wie er recht fein zu leben verstünde.

1 Akad.-Ausg.: *sind*.
lives, not seeking his pleasure in making money or in coarse wantonness, but in the increase of his knowledge, in instructive conversation with a select circle, and even in relieving the needy. But, he adds, he is not particular as to the means (which, of course, derive their value only from the end), being as willing to use another's money and property as his own, pro-vided only that he knows he can do so safely and without discovery. You would believe that the person making such a recommendation was either mocking you or had lost his mind. So distinct and sharp are the boundaries between morality and self-love that even the commonest eye cannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to the one or the other. The few remarks which follow may appear superfluous where the truth is so obvious, but they serve at least to furnish somewhat greater distinctness to the judgment of common sense.

The principle of happiness can indeed give maxims, but never maxims which are competent to be laws of the will, even if universal happiness were made the object. For, since the knowledge of this rests on mere data of experience, as each judgment concerning it depends very much on the very changeable opinion of each person, it can give general but never universal rules; that is, the rules it gives will on the average be most often the right ones for this purpose, but they will not be rules which must hold always and necessarily. Consequently, no practical laws can be based on this principle. Since here an object of choice is made the basis of the rule and therefore must precede it, the rule cannot be founded upon or related to anything other than what one approves; and thus it refers to and is based on experience. Hence the variety of judgment must be infinite. This principle, therefore, does not prescribe the same practical rules to all rational beings, even though all the rules go under the same name—that of happiness. The moral law, however, is thought of as objectively necessary only because it holds good for everyone having reason and will.

The maxim of self-love (prudence) merely advises; the law of morality commands. Now there is a great difference between
that which we are advised to do and that which we are obligated to do.

What is required in accordance with the principle of autonomy of choice is easily and without hesitation seen by the commonest intelligence; what is to be done under the presupposition of its heteronomy is hard to see and requires knowledge of the world. That is to say, what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone, but what is to bring true, lasting advantage to our whole existence is veiled in impenetrable obscurity, and much prudence is required to adapt the practical rule based upon it even tolerably to the ends of life by making suitable exceptions to it. But the moral law commands the most unhesitating obedience from everyone; consequently, the decision as to what is to be done in accordance with it must not be so difficult that even the commonest and most unpracticed understanding without any worldly prudence should go wrong in making it.

It is always in everyone's power to satisfy the commands of the categorical command of morality; this is but seldom [37] possible with respect to the empirically conditioned precept of happiness, and it is far from being possible, even in respect to a single purpose, for everyone. The reason is that in the former it is only a question of the maxim, which must be genuine and pure, but in the latter it is also a question of capacity and physical ability to realize a desired object. A command that everyone should seek to make himself happy would be foolish, for no one commands another to do what he already invariably wishes to do. One must only prescribe to him the rules for achieving his goal, or, better, provide him the means, for he is not able to do all that he wants to do. But to command morality under the name of duty is very reasonable, for its precept will not, for one thing, be willingly obeyed by everyone when it is in conflict with his inclinations. Then, regarding the means of obeying this law, there is no need to teach them, for in this respect whatever he wills to do he also can do.

He who has lost at play may be vexed at himself and his imprudence; but when he is conscious of having cheated at play, even though he has won, he must despise himself as soon as he

—Der Unterschied zwischen den, wozu man uns anrät, und dem, wozu wir verbindlich sind.

Was nach dem Prinzip der Autonomie der Willkür zu tun sei, ist für den gemeinen Verstand ganz leicht und ohne Bedenken einzusehen; was unter Voraussetzung der Heteronomie derselben zu tun sei, schwer, und erfordert Weltkenntnis; d. i. was Pflicht sei, bietet sich jedermann von selbst dar; was aber wahren dauerhaften Vorteil bringe, ist allemal, wenn dieser auf das ganze Dasein erstreckt werden soll, in undurchdringliches Dunkel eingehüllt, und erfordert viel Klugheit, um die praktische darauf gestimmte Regel durch geschickte Ausnahmen auch nur auf erträgliche Art den Zwecken des Lebens anzupassen. Gleichwohl gebietet das sittliche Gesetz jedermann, und zwar die pünktlichste Befolgung. Es muß also zu der Beurteilung dessen, was nach ihm zu tun sei, nicht so schwer sein, daß nicht der gemeinste und ungeübteste Verstand selbst ohne Weltklugheit damit umzugehen wüßte.

Dem kategorischen Gebote der Sittlichkeit Genüge zu leisten, ist in jedes Gewalt zu aller Zeit, der empirisch-bedingten | Vorschrift der Glückseligkeit nur selten, und bei weitem nicht, auch nur in Ansehung einer einzigen Absicht, für jedermann möglich. Die Ursache ist, weil es bei dem erstreten nur auf die Maxime ankommt, die echt und rein sein muß, bei der letzteren aber auch auf die Kräfte und das physische Vermögen, einen begehrten Gegenstand wirklich zu machen. Ein Gebot, daß jedermann sich glücklich zu machen suchen sollte, wäre töricht; denn man gebietet niemals jemanden das, was er schon unausbleiblich von selbst will. Man müßte ihm bloß die Maßregeln gebieten, oder viel mehr darreichen, weil er nicht alles das kann, was er will. Sittlichkeit aber gebieten, unter dem Namen der Pflicht, ist ganz vernünftig; denn deren Vorschrift will erstlich eben nicht jedermann gerne gehorchen, wenn sie mit Neigungen im Widerstreit ist, und was die Maßregeln betrifft, wie er dieses Gesetz befolgen könne, so dürfen diese hier nicht gelehrt werden; denn, was er in dieser Beziehung will, das kann er auch.

Der im Spiel verloren hat, kann sich wohl über sich selbst und seine Unklugheit ärgern, aber wenn er sich bewußt ist, im Spiel betrogen (obzwar dadurch gewonnen) zu haben, so muß er sich selbst verachten, so bald er sich
compares himself with the moral law. This must therefore be something other than the principle of one's own happiness. For to have to say to himself, "I am a worthless man, though I've filled my purse," he must have a criterion of judgment different from that by which he approves of himself and says, "I am a prudent man, for I've enriched my treasure."

Finally, there is something else in the idea of our practical reason which accompanies transgression of a moral law, namely, its culpability. Becoming a partner in happiness cannot be united with the concept of punishment as such. For even though he who punishes can do so with the benevolent intention of directing this punishment to this end, it must nevertheless be justified as punishment, i.e., as mere harm in itself, so that even the punished person, if it stopped there and he could see no glimpse of kindness behind the harshness, would yet have to admit that justice had been done and that his reward perfectly fitted his behavior. In every punishment as such there must first be justice, and this constitutes the essence of the concept. With it benevolence may, of course, be associated, but the person who deserves punishment has not the least reason to count on it. Punishment is physical harm which, even if not bound as a natural consequence to the morally bad, ought to be bound to it as a consequence according to principles of moral legislation. Now if every crime, without regard to the physical consequences to him who commits it, is punishable, i.e., involves a forfeiture of happiness at least in part, it is obviously absurd to say that the crime consists just in the fact that one has brought punishment upon himself and thus has injured his own happiness (which, according to the principle of [38] self-love, must be the correct concept of all crime). In this way, the punishment would be the reason for calling anything a crime, and justice would consist in withholding all punishment and even hindering natural punishment, for there would be no longer any evil in an action if the harm which would otherwise follow upon it and because of which alone the action was called evil would now be averted. To look upon all punishment and reward as machinery in the hand of a higher power, which
critique of practical reason

by this means sets rational beings in action toward their final purpose (happiness), so obviously reduces the will to a mechanism destructive of freedom that it need not detain us.

More refined, but equally untrue, is the pretense of those who assume a certain particular moral sense which, instead of reason, determines the moral law, and in accordance with which the consciousness of virtue is directly associated with satisfaction and enjoyment, while consciousness of vice is associated with mental restlessness and pain. Thus everything is reduced to the desire for one’s own happiness. Without repeating what has already been said, I will only indicate the fallacy they fall into. In order to imagine the vicious person as tormented with mortification by the consciousness of his transgressions, they must presuppose that he is, in the core of his character, at least to a certain degree morally good, just as they have to think of the person who is gladdened by the consciousness of doing dutiful acts as already virtuous. Therefore, the concept of morality and duty must precede all reference to this satisfaction and cannot be derived from it. One must already value the importance of what we call duty, the respect for the moral law, and the immediate worth which a person obtains in his own eyes through obedience to it, in order to feel satisfaction in the consciousness of his conformity to law or the bitter remorse which accompanies his awareness that he has transgressed it. Therefore, this satisfaction or spiritual unrest cannot be felt prior to the knowledge of obligation, nor can it be made the basis of the latter. One must be at least halfway honest even to be able to have an idea of these feelings. For the rest, as the human will by virtue of its freedom is directly determined by the moral law, I am far from denying that frequent practice in accordance with this determining ground can itself finally cause a subjective feeling of satisfaction. Indeed, it is a duty to establish and cultivate this feeling, which alone deserves to be called the moral feeling. But the concept of duty cannot be derived from it, for we would have to presuppose a feeling for law as such and regard as an object of sensation what can only be thought by reason. If this did not end up in the flattest

verunftige Wesen
dadurch zu ihrer Endabsicht (der Glückseligkeit) in Tätigkeit zu setzen allein dienen sollten, ist gar zu sichtbar ein alle Freiheit aufhebender Mechanism ihres Willens, als daß es nötig wäre, uns hiebei aufzuhalten.

Feiner noch, obgleich eben so unwahr, ist das Vorgehen derer, die einen gewissen moralischen besonderen Sinn annehmen, der, und nicht die Vernunft, das moralische Gesetz bestimmte, nach welchem das Bewußtsein der Tugend unmittelbar mit Zufriedenheit und Vergnügen, das des Lasters aber mit Seelenunruhe und Schmerz verbunden wäre, und so alles doch auf Verlangen nach eigener Glückseligkeit aussetze. Ohne das hieher zu ziehen, was oben gesagt worden, will ich nur die Täuschung bemerken, die hiebei vorgeht. Um den Lasterhaften als durch das Bewußtsein seiner Vergehen mit Gemütsumrue geplagt vorzustellen, müssen sie ihn, der vornehmsten Grundlage seines Charakters nach, schon zum voraus als, wenigstens in einigem Grade, moralisch gut, so wie den, welchen das Bewußtsein pflichtmäßiger Handlungen ergötzt, vorher schon als tugendhaft vorstellen. Also mußte doch der Begriff der Moralität und Pflicht vor aller Rücksicht auf diese Zufriedenheit vorhergehen und kann von dieser gar nicht abgeleitet werden. Nun muß man doch die Wichtigkeit dessen, was wir Pflichtennen, das Ansehen des moralischen Gesetzes und den unmittelbaren Wert, den die Befolgung desselben der Person in ihren eigenen Augen gibt, vorher schätzen, um jene Zufriedenheit in dem Bewußtsein seiner Angemessenheit zu derselben und den bitteren Verweis, wenn man sich dessen Übertretung vorwerfen kann, zu fühlen. Man kann also diese Zufriedenheit oder Seelenunruhe nicht vor der Erkenntnis der Verbindlichkeit fühlen und sie zum Grunde der letzteren machen. Man muß wenigstens auf dem halben Wege schon ein ehrlicher Mann sein, um sich von jenen Empfindungen auch nur eine Vorstellung machen zu können. Daß übrigens, so wie, vermöge der Freiheit, der menschliche Wille durchs moralische Gesetz unmittelbar bestimmbar ist, auch die öftere Ausübung, diesem Bestimmungsgrunde gemäß, subjektiv zuletzt ein Gefühl der Zufriedenheit mit sich selbst wirken könne, bin ich gar nicht in Abrede; vielmehr gehört es selbst zur Pflicht, dieses, welches eigentlich allein das moralische Gefühl genannt zu werden verdient, zu gründen und zu kultivieren; aber der Begriff der Pflicht kann davon nicht abgeleitet werden, sonst müßten wir uns ein Gefühl eines Gesetzes als eines solchen denken, und das zum Gegenstande der Empfindung machen, was nur durch Vernunft gedacht werden kann; welches, wenn es nicht ein platter Widerspruch werden soll, den Begriff der Pflicht ganz
contradiction, it would destroy every concept of duty and fill its place with a merely mechanical play of refined inclinations, sometimes contending with the coarser.

If we now compare our supreme formal principle of pure practical reason, that of the autonomy of will, with all previous material principles of morality, we can exhibit them in a table which exhausts all possible cases except the one formal principle; thus we can show visually that it is futile to look around for another principle than the one presented here. All possible determining grounds of the will are either merely subjective and therefore empirical or objective and rational; in either case they may be external or internal.

Practical material determining grounds in the principle of morality are:

### Objective

**Internal:**
- Perfection (Wolff and the Stoics)

**External:**
- Will of God (Crusius and other theological moralists)

### Subjective

**Internal:**
- Physical Feeling (Epictetus)
- Moral Feeling (Hutcheson)

**External:**
- Education (Montaigne)
- Civil Constitution (Mandeville)

Those in the first group are without exception empirical and are obviously unfit for being the supreme principle of morality. Those in the second, however, are based on reason, for

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4The authors referred to are: Michèle de Montaigne, Bernard de Mandeville (*Inquiry Into Moral Virtue*, 1723), Francis Hutcheson (*Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Goodness*, 1725), Christian Wolff (*Ontologia* §128), and Christian August Crusius (*Anweisung, Vernunftig zu Leben*, 1744).
perfection, as a character of things, and the highest perfection thought of in substance, i.e., God, can be thought of only through concepts of reason. The first concept, perfection, can be taken in either a theoretical or a practical sense. In the former, it means nothing more than the perfection of anything in its own kind (transcendental perfection), or the perfection of a thing merely as a thing generally (metaphysical perfection); and we need not discuss these here. The concept of perfection in its practical meaning, however, is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing to any kind of ends. This perfection, as a characteristic of man and thus as internal, is nothing else than talent, or skill, which strengthens or completes talent. The supreme perfection in substance, i.e., God (hence external), when regarded practically, is the sufficiency of this Being to all ends in general. Only if ends are already given can the concept of perfection in relation to them (either internal perfection in ourselves or external perfection of God) be the determining ground of the will. An end, however, as an object which precedes and contains the ground of determination of the will by a practical rule—that is, an end as the material of the will—is, if taken as a determining ground of the will, only empirical; it could thus serve for the Epicurean principle in the happiness theory but never as a pure rational principle of ethics and duty. Thus talents and their cultivation, because they contribute to the advantages of life, or the will of God, if agreement with it (without any practical principle independent of this Idea) be taken as an object of the will, can be motives only by reason of the happiness expected from them.

From these considerations, it follows, first, that all the principles exhibited here are material, and, second, that they include all possible material principles. Finally, since it was shown that all material principles were wholly unfit to be the supreme moral law, it follows that the formal practical principle of pure reason—according to which the mere form of a universal legislation, which is possible through our maxims, must constitute the supreme and direct determining ground of the will—is the only principle which can possibly furnish categorical impera-

(denn Vollkommenheit, als Beschaffenheit der Dinge, und die höchste Vollkommenheit, in Substanz vorgestellt, d. i. Gott, sind beide nur durch Vernunftbegriffe zu denken). Allein der ersterne Begriff, nämlich der Vollkommenheit, kann entweder in theoretischer Bedeutung genommen werden, und da bedeutet er nichts, als Vollständigkeit eines jeden Dinges in seiner Art (transzendentale), oder eines Dinges bloß als Dinges überhaupt (metaphysische), und davon kann hier nicht die Rede sein. Der Begriff der Vollkommenheit in praktischer Bedeutung aber ist die Tauglichkeit, oder Zulänglichkeit eines Dinges zu allerlei Zwecken. Diese Vollkommenheit, als Beschaffenheit des Menschen, folglichere innerliche, ist nichts anders, als Talent, und, was dieses stärkt oder ergänzt, Geschicklichkeit. Die höchste Vollkommenheit in Substanz, d.i. Gott, folglich äußerliche (in praktischer Absicht betrachtet), ist die Zulänglichkeit dieses Wesens zu allen Zwecken überhaupt. Wenn nun also uns Zwecke vorher gegeben werden müssen, in Beziehung auf welche der Begriff der Vollkommenheit (einer inneren, an uns selbst, oder einer äußeren, an Gott) allein Bestimmungsgrund des Willens werden kann, ein Zweck aber, als Objekt, welches vor der Willensbestimmung durch eine praktische Regel vorhergehen und den Grund der Möglichkeit einer solchen enthalten muß, mithin die Materie des Willens, als Bestimmungsgrund desselben genommen, jederzeit empirisch ist, mithin zum epitürischen Prinzip der Glückseligkeitslehre, niemals aber zum reinen Vernunftprinzip der Sittenlehre und der Pflicht dienen kann (wie denn Talente und ihre Beförderung nur, weil sie zu Vorteilen des Lebens beitragen, oder der Wille Gottes, wenn Einstimmung mit ihm, ohne vorhergehendes von dessen Idee unabhängiges praktisches Prinzip, zum Objekte des Willens genommen werden, nur durch die Glückseligkeit, die wir davon erwarten, Bewegursache desselben werden können), so folgt erstlich, daß alle hier ausgestellten Prinzipien material sind, zweitens, daß sie alle mögliche materiale Prinzipien befassen, und daraus endlich der Schluß: daß, weil materiale Prinzipien zum obersten Sittengesetz ganz untauglich sind (wie bewiesen worden), das formale praktische Prinzip der reinen Vernunft, nach welchem die bloße Form einer durch unsere Maximen möglichen allgemeinen Gesetzegebung den obersten und unmittelbaren Bestimmungsgrund des Willens ausmachen muß, das einzige mögliche sei, welches zu kategorischen Imperativen,
tives, i.e., practical laws which enjoin actions as duty. Only a so-defined principle can serve as a principle of morality, whether in judging conduct or in applying it to the human will in determining it.

I. OF THE DEDUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

This Analytic proves that pure reason can be prac-
tical, i.e., that of itself and independently of everything empirical it can determine the will. This it does through a fact wherein pure reason shows itself actually to be practical. This fact is autonomy in the principle of morality by which reason determines the will to action.

At the same time it shows this fact to be inextricably bound up with the consciousness of freedom of the will, and actually to be identical with it. By this freedom the will of a rational being, as belonging to the sensuous world, recognizes itself to be, like all other efficient causes, necessarily subject to the laws of causality, while in practical matters, in its other aspect as [a] being in itself, it is conscious of its existence as determinable in an intelligible order of things. It is conscious of this not by virtue of a particular intuition of itself but because of certain dynamic laws which determine its causality in the world of sense, for it has been sufficiently proved in another place[6] that if freedom is attributed to us, it transfers us into an intelligible order of things.

Now, if we compare the analytical part of the Critique of Pure (speculative) Reason with this Analytic, a noteworthy contrast between them appears. In that other Critique, not principles but pure sensible intuition (space and time) was the first datum which made a priori knowledge possible, though only of objects of the senses. Synthetic principles could not be derived from mere concepts without intuition; rather, these

principles could exist only in relation to sensible intuition and thus only in relation to objects of possible experience, since it is only the concepts of the understanding united with this intuition which can make that knowledge possible which we call experience. Beyond objects of experience, i.e., concerning things as noumena, all positive knowledge was correctly denied to speculative reason. This reason, however, was successful to the extent that it established with certainty the concept of noumena, i.e., it established the possibility—indeed, the necessity—of thinking of them. For example, it showed against all objections that the assumption of freedom, negatively considered, was entirely compatible with those principles and limitations of pure theoretical reason. But it could not give us anything definite to enlarge our knowledge of such objects; rather it cut off any such prospect altogether.

On the other hand, the moral law, although it gives no such prospect, does provide a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the world of sense or from the whole compass of the theoretical use of reason, and this fact points to a pure intelligible world—indeed, it defines it positively and enables us to know something of it, namely, a law.

This law gives to the world of the senses, as sensuous nature (which concerns rational beings), the form of an intelligible world, i.e., the form of supersensuous nature, without interfering with the mechanism of sensuous nature. Nature, in the widest sense of the word, is the existence of things under laws. The sensuous nature of rational beings in general is their existence under empirically conditioned laws, and therefore it is, from the point of view of reason, heteronomy. The supersensuous nature of the same beings, on the other hand, is their existence according to laws which are independent of all empirical conditions and which therefore belong to the autonomy of pure reason. And since the laws, according to which the existence of things depends on cognition, are practical laws, supersensuous nature, so far as we can form a concept of it, is nothing else than nature under the autonomy of the pure practical reason. The law of this autonomy is the moral law, and it, therefore, is the
fundamental law of supersensuous nature and of a pure world of the understanding, whose counterpart must exist in the world of sense without interfering with the laws of the latter. The former could be called the archetypal world (natura archetypa) which we know only by reason; the latter, on the other hand, could be called the cyclical world (natura ectypa), because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the former as the determining ground of the will. For, in fact, the moral law ideally transfers us into a nature in which reason would bring forth the highest good were it accompanied by sufficient physical capacities; and it determines our will to confer on the sensuous world the form of a system of rational beings. The least attention to ourself shows that this idea really stands as a model for the determination of our will.

When the maxim according to which I intend to give [44] testimony is tested by practical reason, I always inquire into what it should be if it were to hold as a universal law of nature. It is obvious that, in this way of looking at it, it would oblige everyone to truthfulness. For it cannot hold as a universal law of nature that an assertion should have the force of evidence and yet be intentionally false. Also the maxim which I adopt in respect to freely disposing of my life is at once determined when I inquire what it would have to be in order that a system of nature could maintain itself in accordance with such a law. Obviously in such a system of nature no one could choose to end his life, for such an arrangement could not constitute a permanent natural order. And so in all other cases.

Now, however, in actual nature as an object of experience, the free will is not of itself determined to follow such maxims as could of themselves establish a nature based on universal laws, or even such maxims as would fit into a system of nature so constituted; rather, its maxims are private inclinations, which form a natural whole according to pathological (physical) laws, but not a system of nature which is possible only through our will acting according to pure practical laws. However, through reason we are conscious of a law to which all our maxims are subject as though through our will a natural order...
must arise. Therefore, this law must be the Idea of a supersensuous nature, a nature not empirically given yet possible through freedom; to this nature we give objective reality, at least in a practical context, because we regard it as the object of our will as pure rational beings.

The difference, therefore, between the laws of a system of nature to which the will is subject and of a system of nature which is subject to a will (as far as the relation of the will to its free actions is concerned) rests on this: in the former, the objects must be the causes of the conceptions which determine the will, and in the latter, the will is the cause of the objects. Consequently, in the latter the causality of the objects has its determining ground solely in the pure faculty of reason, which therefore may be called pure practical reason.

There are, therefore, two very different problems. The first is: How can pure reason know objects a priori? The second is: How can pure reason be a directly determining ground of the will, i.e., of the causality of a rational being with respect to the reality of the objects, merely through the thought of the universal validity of its own maxims as a law?

The first of these questions belongs to the Critique of Pure (speculative) Reason; it requires that we first show how intuitions, without which no object can be given and without which none can be known synthetically, are possible a priori. Its answer lies in the fact that intuitions are without exception sensible, and therefore no speculative knowledge is possible which reaches further than possible experience; consequently, all principles of pure speculative reason avail only to make possible experience of objects which are actually given or of objects which though they may be given ad infinitum are never completely given.

The second question belongs to the Critique of Practical Reason. It requires no explanation of how objects of the faculty of desire are possible, for that, as a task of the theoretical knowledge of nature, is left to the Critique of Pure (speculative) Reason. It asks only how reason can determine the maxim of the will, whether this occurs only by means of empirical represen-
tations as determining grounds, or whether even pure reason might be practical and might be a law of a possible but not empirically knowable order of nature. The possibility of such a supersensuous nature, the concept of which can be the ground of its reality through our free will, requires no a priori intuition of an intelligible world, which even in this case would be impossible to us, since it is supersensuous. For it is only a question of the determining ground of volition in its own maxims: Is the determining ground empirical or is it a concept of pure reason (a concept of its lawfulness in general)? And how can it be the latter? The decision as to whether the causality of the will is sufficient to make its objects real is left up to the theoretical principles of reason, involving as it does an investigation of the possibility of objects of volition, the intuition of which is no component of the practical problem. The only concern here is with the determination of the will and with the determining ground of its maxims as a free will, not with its result. For if the will be only in lawful accord with pure reason, the will's power in execution may be what it may; and a system of nature [46] may or may not actually arise according to these maxims of the legislature of a possible nature— all this does not trouble us in this *Critique*, which concerns itself only with whether and how reason can be practical, i.e., whether and how it can directly determine the will.

In this inquiry no objection can be raised that the *Critique* begins with pure practical laws and their reality. Instead of intuition, it makes the concept of their existence in the intelligible world, i.e., freedom, its foundation. For this concept has no other meaning, and these laws are possible only in relation to the freedom of the will; but, if the will is presupposed as free, then they are necessary. Conversely, freedom is necessary because those laws are necessary, being practical postulates. How this consciousness of the moral laws or—what amounts to the same thing—how this consciousness of freedom is possible cannot be further explained; its permissibility, however, is established in the theoretical *Critique*.

The exposition of the supreme principle of practical reason as Bestimmungsgründe, geschehe, oder ob auch reine Vernunft praktisch und ein Gesetz einer möglichen, gar nicht empirisch erkennbaren, Naturordnung sein würde. Die Möglichkeit einer solchen übersinnlichen Natur, deren Begriff zugleich der Grund der Wirklichkeit derselben durch unseren freien Willen sein könne, bedarf keiner Anschauung a priori (einer intelligiblen Welt), die in diesem Falle, als übersinnlich, für uns auch unmöglich sein müßte. Denn es kommt nur auf den Bestimmungsgrund des Wollens in den Maximen desselben an, ob jener empirisch, oder ein Begriff der reinen Vernunft (von der Gesetzmäßigkeit derselben überhaupt) sei, und wie er letzteres sein könne. Ob die Kausalität des Willens zur Wirklichkeit der Objekte zulange, oder nicht, bleibt den theoretischen Prinzipien der Vernunft zu beurteilen überlassen, als Untersuchung der Möglichkeit der Objekte des Wollens, deren Anschauung also in der praktischen Aufgabe gar kein Moment derselben ausmacht. Nur auf die Willensbestimmung und den Bestimmungsgrund der Maxime desselben, als eines freien Willens, kommt es hier an, nicht auf den Erfolg. Denn wenn der Wille nur für die reine Vernunft gesetzmäßig ist, so mag es mit dem Vermögen desselben in der Ausführung stehen, wie es wolle, es mag nach diesen Maximen der Gesetzegebung einer möglichen Natur eine solche wirklich daraus entspringen, oder nicht, darum bekümmert sich die Kritik, die da untersucht, ob und wie reine Vernunft praktisch, d.i. unmittelbar willenbestimmend, sein könne, gar nicht.

In diesem Geschäft kann sie also ohne Tadel und muß sie von reinen praktischen Gesetzen und deren Wirklichkeit anfangen. Statt der Anschauung aber legt sie derselben den Begriff ihres Daseins in der intelligiblen Welt, nämlich der Freiheit, zum Grunde. Denn dieser bedeutet nichts anders, und jene Gesetze sind nur in Beziehung auf Freiheit des Willens möglich, unter Voraussetzung derselben aber notwendig, oder, umgekehrt, diese ist notwendig, weil jene Gesetze, als praktische Postulate, notwendig sind. Wie nun dieses Bewußtsein der moralischen Gesetze, oder, welches einerlei ist, das der Freiheit, möglich sei, läßt sich nicht weiter erklären, nur die Zulässigkeit derselben in der theoretischen Kritik gar wohl verteidigen.

* Die Exposition des obersten Grundsatzes der prak-
is now finished. It has shown, first, what it contains, and that it is of itself entirely a priori and independent of empirical principles; and then it has shown how it differs from all other practical principles. With the deduction, i.e., the justification of its objective and universal validity and the discernment of the possibility of such a synthetic a priori proposition, one cannot hope to have everything as easy as it was with the principles of pure theoretical understanding. For the latter referred to objects of possible experience, i.e., appearances, and it could be proved that they could be known as objects of experience and, consequently, that all possible experience must be conformable to these laws, only because these appearances, in accordance with these laws, could be brought under the categories. Such a procedure, however, I cannot follow in the deduction of the moral law. For the moral law does not concern knowledge of the properties of objects, which may be given to reason from some other source; rather, it concerns knowledge in so far as it can itself become the ground of the existence of objects, and in so far as reason, by virtue of this same knowledge, has causality in a rational being. The moral law is concerned with pure reason, regarded as a faculty directly determining the will.

But human insight is at an end as soon as we arrive [47] at fundamental powers or faculties, for their possibility can in no way be understood and yet should not be just arbitrarily imagined or assumed. Therefore in the theoretical use of reason only experience could justify their assumption. Such empirical proof, as a substitute for deduction from sources of knowledge a priori, is, however, denied with respect to the pure practical faculty of reason. For whatever needs to draw the evidence of its reality from experience must depend for the grounds of its possibility on principles of experience; by its very notion, however, pure yet practical reason cannot be held to be dependent in this way. Moreover, the moral law is given, as an apodictically certain fact, as it were, or pure reason, a fact of which we are a priori conscious, even if it be granted that no example could be found in which it has been followed exactly. Thus the objective reality of the moral law can be
proved through no deduction, through no exertion of the theoretical, speculative, or empirically supported reason; and, even if one were willing to renounce its apodictic certainty, it could not be confirmed by any experience and thus proved a posteriori. Nevertheless, it is firmly established of itself.

Instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle, however, something entirely different and unexpected appears: the moral principle itself serves as a principle of the deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience can prove but which speculative reason had to assume as at least possible (in order not to contradict itself in finding among its cosmological Ideas something unconditional in its causality). This is the faculty of freedom, which the moral law, itself needing no justifying grounds, shows to be not only possible but actual in beings who acknowledge the law as binding upon them. The moral law is, in fact, a law of causality through freedom and thus a law of the possibility of a supersensuous nature, just as the metaphysical law of events in the world of sense was a law of the causality of sensible nature; the moral law thus defines that which speculative philosophy had to leave undefined. That is, it defines the law for a causality the concept of which was only negative in speculative philosophy, and for the first time it gives objective reality to this concept.

This kind of credential for the moral law, namely, that it is itself demonstrated to be a principle of the deduction of freedom as a causality of pure reason, is a sufficient substitute for any a priori justification, since theoretical reason had to assume at least the possibility of freedom in order to fill one of its own needs. For the moral law sufficiently proves its reality even for the Critique of Pure (speculative) Reason by giving a positive definition to a causality thought merely negatively, the possibility of which was incomprehensible to speculative reason though this reason was compelled to assume it. The moral law adds to the negative concept a positive definition, that of a reason which determines the will directly through the condi-

6"Not" inserted by Vorländer.
tion of a universal lawful form of the maxims of the will. Thus reason, which with its Ideas always became transcendent when proceeding in a speculative manner, can be given for the first time an objective, although still only practical, reality; its transcendent use is changed into an immanent use, whereby reason becomes, in the field of experience, an efficient cause through Ideas.

The determination of the causality of beings in the world of sense as such can never be unconditioned, and yet for every series of conditions there must be something unconditioned, and consequently a causality which is entirely self-determining. Therefore, the Idea of freedom as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not just a desideratum but, as far as its possibility was concerned, an analytical principle of pure speculative reason. But because it is absolutely impossible to give an example of it from experience, since no absolutely unconditioned determination of causality can be found among the causes of things as appearances, we could defend the supposition of a freely acting cause when applied to a being in the world of sense only in so far as that being was regarded also as noumenon. This defense was made by showing that it was not self-contradictory to regard all its actions as physically conditioned so far as they are appearances, and yet at the same time to regard their causality as physically unconditioned so far as the acting being is regarded as a being of the understanding. Thus the concept of freedom is made the regulative principle of reason. I thereby do not indeed learn what the object may be to which this kind of causality is attributed. I do, however, remove the difficulty, since, on the one hand, in the explanation of natural occurrences, including the actions of rational beings, I leave to the mechanism of natural necessity the right to ascend from conditioned to condition ad infinitum, while, on [49] the other hand, I hold open for speculative reason the place which for it is vacant, i.e., the intelligible, in order to put the unconditioned in it. I could not, however, give content to this supposition, i.e., convert it into knowledge even of the possibility of a being acting in this way. Pure practical reason now

gung einer allgemeinen gesetzlichen Form seiner Maximen) bestimmenden Vernunft hinzufügt, und so der Vernunft, die mit ihren Ideen, wenn sie spekulativ verfahren wollte, immer überschwenglich wurde, zum erstemale objektive, obgleich nur praktische Realität zu geben vermag und ihren transzendenten Gebrauch in einen immanenten (im Felde der Erfahrung durch Ideen selbst wirkende Ursachen zu sein) verwandelt.

Die Bestimmung der Kausalität des Wesen in der Sinnenwelt, als einer solchen, konnte niemals unbedingt sein, und dennoch muß es zu aller Reihe der Bedingungen notwendig etwas Unbedingtes, mithin auch eine sich gänzlich von selbst bestimmende Kausalität geben. Daher war die Idee der Freiheit, als eines Vermögens absoluter Spontaneität, nicht ein Bedürfnis, sondern, was deren Möglichkeit betrifft, ein analytischer Grundzusatz der reinen spekulativen Vernunft. Allein, da es schlechterdings unmöglich ist, ihr gemäß ein Beispiel in irgend einer Erfahrung zu geben, weil unter den Ursachen der Dinge, als Erscheinungen, keine Bestimmung der Kausalität, die schlechterdings unbedingt wäre, angetroffen werden kann, so konnten wir nur die Gedanken von einer freihändelnden Ursache, wenn wir diesen auf ein Wesen in der Sinnenwelt, sofern es andererseits auch als Noumenon betrachtet wird, anwenden, verteidigen, indem wir zeigten, daß es sich nicht widerspreche, alle seine Handlungen als physisch bedingt, so fern sie Erscheinungen sind, und doch zugleich die Kausalität derselben, sofern das handelnde Wesen ein Verstandeswesen ist, als physisch unbedingt anzusehen, und den Begriff der Freiheit zum regulativen Prinzip der Vernunft machen, wodurch ich zwar den Gegenstand, dem dergleichen Kausalität beigelegt wird, gar nicht erkenne, was er sei, aber doch das Hindernis wegnahme, indem ich einerseits in der Erklärung der Weltbegebenheiten, mithin auch der Handlungen vernunftiger Wesen, dem Mechanismus der Naturnotwendigkeit, vom Bedingten zur Bedingung ins Endliche zurückgehen, Gerechtigkeit widerfahren lasse, andererseits aber der spekulativen Vernunft, den für sie leeren Platz offen erhalte, nämlich die Intelligible, um das Unbedingte dahin zu versetzen. Ich konnte aber diesen Gedanken nicht realisieren, d.i. ihn nicht in Erkenntnis eines so handelnden Wesens, auch nur bloß seiner Möglichkeit nach, verwandeln.
fills this vacant place with a definite law of causality in an intelligible world (causality through freedom). This is the moral law. Speculative reason does not herewith grow in insight but only in respect to the certitude of its problematic concept of freedom, to which objective, though only practical, reality is now indubitably given. Even the concept of causality, having its application and hence significance only in relation to appearances which it connects into experiences (as shown in the Critique of Pure Reason), is not enlarged by this reality so as to extend its employment beyond these boundaries. For if reason sought to go beyond them, it would have to show how the logical relation of ground and consequent could be synthetically used with another kind of intuition than the sensible, i.e., it would have to show how a *causa noumenon* is possible. This reason cannot do, but as practical reason it does not concern itself with this demand, since it only posits the determining ground of the causality of man as a sensuous being (this causality being given) in pure reason (which is therefore called practical); it does so not in order to know objects but only to define causality in respect to objects in general. It can abstract the concept of cause itself altogether from that application to objects which has theoretical knowledge as its purpose, since this concept can always be found a priori in the understanding, independently of any intuition. Thus reason uses this concept only for a practical purpose, transferring the determining ground of the will to the intelligible order of things, at the same time readily confessing that it does not understand how the concept of cause can be a condition of knowledge of these things. Causality with respect to the actions of the will in the world of sense must, of course, be known by reason in a definite way, for otherwise practical reason could produce no act. But the concept which reason makes of its own causality as noumenon does not need to be determined theoretically for the purpose of knowing its supersensible existence. Reason does not need to be able to give it [cognitive] significance. Despite this, it acquires significance through the moral law, although only for practical use.
Even regarded theoretically, the concept remains always a pure concept of the understanding, given a priori, and applicable to objects whether given by the senses or not. If they are not sensibly given, however, the concept has no definite theoretical significance and application but is only the understanding’s formal but nevertheless essential thought of an object in general. The significance which reason gives to it through the moral law is exclusively practical, since the idea of the law of a causality (of the will) has causality itself or is its determining ground.

II. OF THE RIGHT OF PURE REASON TO AN EXTENSION IN ITS PRACTICAL USE WHICH IS NOT POSSIBLE TO IT IN ITS SPECULATIVE USE

In the moral principle as we have presented it there is a law of causality which puts the determining ground of causality above all conditions of the world of sense. We have thought of the will as determinable inasmuch as it belongs to an intelligible world and of the subject of this will (man) as belonging to a pure intelligible world, though in this relation man is unknown to us. (How this relation can be thought and yet be unknowable has been shown in the *Critique of Pure* (speculative) *Reason.* We have, I say, thought of man and his will in this way and we have *defined* the will with respect to its causality by means of a law which cannot be counted among the natural laws of the world of sense; finally, we have thereby *widened* our knowledge beyond the boundaries of the world of sense. But this is a presumption which the *Critique of Pure Reason* declared to be void in all speculation. How, then, is the practical use of pure reason to be reconciled with its theoretical use in respect to determining the boundaries of their competence?

David Hume, who can be said to have begun the assault on the claims of pure reason which made a thorough examination of them necessary, argued as follows. The concept of [51] cause is one which involves the necessity of a connection between different existing things, in so far as they are different. Thus, when \( A \) is granted, I recognize that \( B \), something entirely

Auch theoretisch betrachtet bleibt er immer ein reiner a priori gegebener Verstands begriff, der auf Gegenstände angewandt werden kann, sie mögen sinnlich oder nicht sinnlich gegeben werden; wiewohl er im letzteren Falle keine bestimmte theoretische Bedeutung und Anwendung hat, sondern bloß ein formaler, aber doch wesentlicher Gedanke des Verstandes von einem Objekte überhaupt ist. Die Bedeutung, die ihm die Vernunft durchs moralische Gesetz verschafft, ist lediglich praktisch, da nämlich die Idee des Gesetzes einer Kausalität (des Willens) selbst Kausalität hat, oder ihr Bestimmungsgrund ist.

II. VON DEM BEFUGNISSE DER REIHNEN VERNUNFT, IM PRAKTISCHEN GEBAUCH, ZU EINER ERWEITERUNG, DIE IHR IM SPEKULATIVEN FÜR SICH NICHT MÖGLICH IST

An dem moralischen Prinzip haben wir ein Gesetz der Kausalität aufgestellt, welches den Bestimmungsgrund der letzteren über alle Bedingungen der Sinnenwelt wegsetzt, und den Willen, wie er als zu einer intelligenbien Welt gehörig bestimmbar sei, mithin das Subjekt dieses Willens (den Menschen) nicht bloß als zu einer reifen Verstandswege gehörig, obgleich in dieser Beziehung als uns unbekannt (wie es nach der Kritik, der reinen spekulativen Vernunft geschehen konnte) gedacht, sondern ihn auch in Ansehung seiner Kausalität, vermittelt eines Gesetzes, welches zu gar keinem Naturgesetze der Sinnenwelt gezählt werden kann, bestimmt, also unser Erkenntnisse über die Grenzen des letzteren erweitert, welche Anmaßung doch die Kritik der reinen Vernunft in aller Spekulation für nichtig erklärte. Wie ist nun hier praktischer Gebrauch der reinen Vernunft mit dem theoretischen eben derselben, in Ansehung der Grenzbestimmung ihres Vermögens zu vereinigen?

David Hume, von dem man sagen kann, daß er alle Anfechtung der Rechte einer reinen Vernunft, welche eine gänzliche Untersuchung derselben notwendig machten, eigentlich anfing, schloß so. Der Begriff der Ursache ist ein Begriff, der die Notwendigkeit der Verknüpfung der Existenz des Verschiedenen, und zwar, so fern es verschieden ist, enthält, so daß, wenn A gesetzt wird, ich erkenne, daß

\[ A \text{ and } A.\]
different from it, must necessarily exist also. Necessity, however, can be attributed to a connection only so far as the connection is known a priori, for experience of a connection would only give knowledge that it exists, not that it necessarily existed. Now it is impossible, he says, to know a priori and as necessary the connection which holds between one thing and another (or between one property and another entirely different from it) if this connection is not given in perception. Therefore, the concept of a cause is itself fraudulent and deceptive. To speak in the mildest way, it is an illusion which is excusable only since the custom (a subjective necessity) of frequently perceiving certain things or their properties along with or in succession to one another is insensibly taken for an objective necessity of placing such a connection in the objects themselves. Thus the concept of cause has been acquired surreptitiously and illegitimately—nay, it can never be acquired or certified, because it demands a connection in itself void, chimerical, and untenable before reason, a connection to which no object could ever correspond.

So first with reference to all knowledge which concerned the existence of things (thus excepting mathematics), empiricism was introduced as the exclusive source of principles; with it, however, came the most unyielding skepticism with respect to the whole science of nature (as philosophy). For on such principles we can never infer a consequence from the given properties of things as existing, for to such an inference there is needed a concept of cause, a concept implying necessity in such a connection; we can only expect, by the rule of imagination, similar cases, though this expectation is never certain no matter how often it is fulfilled. Indeed, of no occurrence could one say: something *must* have preceded it on which it necessarily followed, i.e., it must have had a *cause*. Thus, even if one knew of such frequent cases in which this antecedent was present that a rule could be derived from them, we could still not assume that it happens this way always and necessarily. Thus the rights of blind chance, with which all use of reason ceases, must be admitted; this firmly and irrefutably establishes skepticism toward all inferences from effects to causes. [52]
Mathematics at first escaped lightly because Hume thought that its propositions were analytical, i.e., proceeded from one property to another by virtue of identity and consequently according to the law of contradiction. This, however, is false; they are all synthetical. And though geometry, for example, has nothing to do with the existence of things but only with their a priori properties in a possible intuition, it nevertheless proceeds just as in the case of the causal concept, going from one property A to another entirely different property B necessarily connected with it. But even this science, so highly esteemed for its apodictic certainty, must finally succumb to empiricism with regard to its principles for the same reason that Hume substituted custom for objective necessity in the concept of cause. In spite of all its pride, it will have to acquiesce to this skepticism by lowering its bold claims demanding a priori assent, expecting approval of the universal validity of its theorems only because of the kindness of observers who, as witnesses, would not hesitate to admit that what the geometer propounds as axioms had always been perceived as facts, and that, consequently, they could be expected to be true in the future even though there was no necessity in them. In this way, Hume's empiricism leads inevitably to skepticism even with respect to mathematics and consequently in the entire theoretical scientific employment of reason (for this is either philosophy or mathematics). In view of the terrible overthrow of these chief branches of knowledge, whether ordinary reason will come through any better I leave to the judgment of each. It may be that it will rather become inextricably entangled in the same destruction of all knowledge, with the consequence that from the same principles there will result a universal skepticism, even though it concern only the learned.

My own labors in the Critique of Pure Reason were occasioned by Hume's skeptical teaching, but they went much further and covered the entire field of pure theoretical reason in its synthetic use, including what is generally called [53] metaphysics. I proceeded with reference to the doubts raised by the Scottish philosopher concerning the concept of causal-
ity as follows. I granted that, when Hume took the objects of experience as things in themselves (as is almost always done), he was entirely correct in declaring the concept of cause to be deceptive and an illusion; for it cannot be understood, with reference to things in themselves and their properties as such, why, if A is given, something else, B, must also necessarily be given. Thus he could not admit such a priori knowledge of things regarded as they are in themselves. This acute man could even less admit an empirical origin of the concept, for this would directly contradict the necessity of the connection which constitutes the essence of the concept of causality. Consequently, the concept was proscribed, and into its place stepped custom in observing the course of perceptions.

From my investigations, however, it resulted that the objects with which we have to do in experience are by no means things in themselves but only appearances. Furthermore, if we assume that they are things in themselves, it is impossible to see how, if A is granted, it would be contradictory not to grant B, which is altogether different from A. That is, it is impossible to see how it would be contradictory not to grant the necessity of the connection of A as cause with B as effect; but it is very understandable that A and B as appearances in one experience must necessarily be connected in a certain manner (e.g., with reference to their temporal relations) and that they cannot be separated without contradicting that connection by means of which experience is possible, in which experience they become objects and alone knowable to us. This was actually the case, so that I could not only prove the objective reality of the concept of cause with reference to objects of experience but also deduce it as an a priori concept because of the necessity of the connection it implies. That is, I could show its possibility from pure understanding without any empirical sources. So, after banishing empiricism from its origin, I was able to overthrow its inevitable consequence, skepticism, first, in natural science and, then, in mathematics, both of which sciences have reference to objects of possible experience, and in both of which skepticism has the same grounds. Thus I re-

[54] PRINCIPLES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON 55

auf folgende Art. Daß Hume, wenn er (wie es doch auch fast überall geschicht) die Gegenstände der Erfahrung für Dinge an sich selbst nahm, den Begriff der Ursache für trüglich und falsches Blendwerk erklärte, daran tat er ganz recht; denn von Dingen an sich selbst und deren Bestimmungen als solchen kann nicht eingesehen werden, wie darum, weil etwas A gesetzt wird, etwas anderes B auch notwendig gesetzt werden müsse, und also konnte er eine solche Erkenntnis a priori von Dingen an sich selbst gar nicht einräumen. Einen empirischen Ursprung dieses Begriffs konnte der scharfsinnige Mann noch weniger verstatten, weil dieser geradezu der Notwendigkeit der Verknüpfung widerspricht, welche das Wesentliche des Begriffs der Kausalität ausmacht; mithin ward der Begriff in die Acht erklärt, und in seine Stelle trat die Gewohnheit im Beobachten des Laufs der Wahrnehmungen.

[54] KRITIK DER PRAKTISCHEN VERNUNFT, ANALYTIK

Aus meinen Untersuchungen aber ergab es sich, daß die Gegenstände, mit denen wir es in der Erfahrung zu tun haben, keineswegs Dinge an sich selbst, sondern bloß Erscheinungen sind, und daß, obgleich bei Dingen an sich selbst gar nicht abzusehen ist, ja unmöglich ist einzusehen, wie, wenn A gesetzt wird, es widersprechend sein solle, B, welches von A ganz verschieden ist, nicht zu setzen (die Notwendigkeit der Verknüpfung zwischen A als Ursache und B als Wirkung), es sich doch ganz wohl denken lasse, daß sie als Erscheinungen in einer Erfahrung auf gewisse Weise (z. B. in Ansehung der Zeitverhältnisse) notwendig verbunden sein müssen und nicht getrennt werden können, ohne derjenige Verbindung zu widersprechen, vermittels deren diese Erfahrung möglich ist, in welcher sie Gegenstände und uns allein erkennbar sind. Und so fand es sich auch in der Tat: so, daß ich den Begriff der Ursache nicht allein nach seiner objektiven Realität in Ansehung der Gegenstände der Erfahrung beweisen, sondern ihn auch, als Begriff a priori, wegen der Notwendigkeit der Verknüpfung, die er bei sich führt, deduzieren, d.i. seine Möglichkeit aus reinem Verstande, ohne empirische Quellen, dartun, und so, nach Wegschaffung des Empirismus seines Ursprungs, die unvermeidliche Folge desselben, nämlich den Skeptizismus, zuerst in Ansehung der Naturwissenschaft, dann auch, wegen des ganz vollkommen aus denselben Gründen Folgenden in Ansehung der Mathematik, beider Wissenschaften, die auf Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung bezogen werden.
moved the radical doubt of whatever theoretical reason professes to discern.

But how lies it with reference to the application of this category of causality (and similarly of all the others, for without them there can be no knowledge of existing things) to things which are not objects of possible experience but lie beyond its boundaries? For it must be remembered that I could deduce the objective reality of these concepts only with reference to objects of possible experience. But the very fact that I have saved them only in this one case and that I have shown that by virtue of them objects may be thought though not determined a priori—this fact gives them a place in pure understanding from which they are referred to objects in general, whether sensible or not. If anything is lacking, it is the conditions for the application of these categories, and especially that of causality, to objects. This condition is intuition, and, where it is lacking, this application for the purpose of theoretical knowledge of the object as noumenon is rendered impossible. This knowledge is absolutely forbidden (even in the *Critique of Pure Reason*) to anyone who ventures upon it. Still, the objective reality of the concept remains and can even be used with reference to noumena, though the concept is not in the least theoretically determined, and no knowledge can be effected with it. That this concept, even in relation to a [supersensible] object, contains nothing impossible was proved by the fact that [even] in its application to objects of the senses its seat in the pure understanding remained assured. And if, when subsequently applied to things in themselves which cannot be objects of experience, it cannot be determined so as to represent a definite object for the purposes of theoretical cognition, it could nevertheless be determined for application to some other purpose, such as the practical. This would not be so if, as Hume asserted, the concept of causality contained something inconceivable.

In order to discover the condition for applying the concept in question to noumena, we need only to refer back to the reason why we are not satisfied with applying it to objects of experience but wish also to apply it to things in themselves. It soon

and hiermit den totalen Zweifel an allem, was theoretische Vernunft einzusehen behauptet, aus dem Grunde heben konnte.

Aber wie wird es mit der Anwendung dieser Kategorie der Kausalität (und so auch alle übrigen; denn ohne sie läßt sich kein Erkenntnis des Existierenden zu Stande bringen) auf Dinge, die nicht Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung sind, sondern über dieser ihre Grenze hinaus liegen? Denn ich habe die objektive Realität dieser Begriffe nur in Ansehung der Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung dezidieren können. Aber eben dieses, daß ich sie auch nur in diesem Falle gerettet habe, daß ich gewiesen habe, es lassen sich dadurch doch Objekte denken, obgleich nicht a priori bestimmen: dieses ist es, was ihnen einen Platz im reinen Verstände gibt, von dem sie auf Objekte überhaupt (sinnliche, oder nicht sinnliche) bezogen werden. Wenn etwas noch fehlt, so ist es die Bedingung der Anwendung dieser Kategorien, und namentlich der der Kausalität, auf Gegenstände, nämlich die Anschauung, welche, wo sie nicht gegeben ist, die Anwendung zum Behuf der theoretischen Erkenntnis des Gegenstandes, als Noumenon, unmöglich macht, die also, wenn es jemand darauf wagt (wie auch in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft geschehen), gänzlich verwehrt wird, indessen, daß doch immer die objektive Realität des Begriffs bleibt, auch von Noumenen gebräuchlich werden kann, aber ohne diesen Begriff theoretisch im mindesten bestimmen und dadurch ein Erkenntnis bewirken zu können. Denn, daß dieser Begriff auch in Beziehung auf ein Objekt nichts Unmögliches enthälte, war dadurch bewiesen, daß ihm sein Sitz im reinen Verstände bei aller Anwendung auf Gegenstände der Sinne gesichert war, und ob er gleich nach etwa, auf Dinge an sich selbst (die nicht Gegenstände der Erfahrung sein können) bezogen, keiner Bestimmung, zur Vorstellung eines bestimmten Gegenstandes, zum Behuf einer theoretischen Erkenntnis, fähig ist, so konnte er doch immer noch zu irgend einem anderen (vielleicht dem praktischen) Behuf einer Bestimmung zur Anwendung desselben fähig sein, welches nicht sein würde, wenn, nach Hume, dieser Begriff der Kausalität etwas, das überall zu denken unmöglich ist, enthielte.

Um nun diese Bedingung der Anwendung des gedachten Begriffs auf Noumenen ausfindig zu machen, dürfen wir nur zurücksehen, weshalb wir nicht mit der Anwendung desselben auf Erfahrungsgegenstände zufrieden sind, sondern ihn auch gern von Dingen an sich selbst brauchen möchten.
appears that it is not a theoretical but a practical purpose which makes it a necessity for us. In speculation, even if we were successful in this new application, we should still have made no true gain in the knowledge of nature or of any given objects; but we should have taken a long step from the sensibly conditioned (in which we have already enough to do to remain and industriously to follow the chain of causes) to the super-sensible in order to complete our knowledge of its foundations and to fix its boundaries. But there always remains an infinite unfilled chasm between that boundary and what we know, and in taking such a step we should have hearkened to a vain curiosity instead of acting from a sober desire for knowledge.

But besides the relationship which the understanding has to objects in theoretical knowledge, there is also the relationship in which it stands to the faculty of desire, which is therefore called the will, or the pure will in so far as the pure understanding (which in such a case is called reason) is practical through the mere representation of a law. The objective reality of a pure will or of a pure practical reason (they being the same) is given a priori in the moral law, as it were by a fact, for the latter term can be applied to a determination of the will which is inescapable, even though it does not rest on any empirical principles. In the concept of a will, however, the concept of causality is already contained; thus in that of a pure will there is the concept of causality with freedom, i.e., of a causality not determinable according to natural laws and consequently not susceptible to any empirical intuition as proof [of the reality of the free will]. Nevertheless, this concept completely justifies its objective reality in the pure practical law a priori, though it is easily seen that it is not for the purpose of the theoretical but solely for that of the practical use of reason. Now the concept of a being which has a free will is that of a caus a noumenon; and we are assured that this concept does not contradict itself, because the concept of a cause originates exclusively in pure understanding, and its objective reality with reference to objects in general is guaranteed by the Deduction (in the Critique of Pure Reason). As independent in origin from all sensible conditions, it is itself not to

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Denn da zeigt sich bald, daß es nicht eine theoretische, sondern praktische Absicht sei, welche uns dieses zur Notwendigkeit macht. Zur Spekulation würden wir, wenn es uns damit auch gelangen, doch keinen wahren Erwerb in Naturkenntnis und überhaupt in An- sehung der Gegenstände, die uns beglückt, geben wollen, machen, sondern allenfalls einen weiten Schritt vom Sinnlichbedingten (bei welchem zu bleiben und die Kette der Ursachen lebiglich durchzuwandern wir so schon genug zu tun haben) zum Übersinnlichen- und unse Erkenntnis von der Seite der Gründe zu vollenden und zu begrenzen, indessen daß immer eine unendliche Kluft zwischen jener Grenze und dem, was wir kennen, unangefüllt überdauert, und wir mehr einer eitlen Fragesucht, als einer gründlichen Weisbegierde, Hör er gegeben hätten.

Außer den Verhältnisse aber, darin der Verstand zu Gegenständen (im theoretischen Erkenntnisse) steht, hat er auch eines zum Begehrenvermögen, das darum der Wille heißt, und der reine Wille, so fern der reine Verstand (der in solchem Falle Vernunft heißt) durch die bloße Vorstellung eines Gesetzes praktisch ist. Die objektive Realität eines reinen Willens, oder, welches einerlei ist, einer reinen praktischen Vernunft ist im moralischen Gesetze a priori gleichsam durch ein Faktum gegeben; denn so kann man eine Willensbestimmung nennen, die unvermeidlich ist, ob sie gleich nicht auf empirischen Prinzipien beruht. Im Begriff eines Willens aber ist der Begriff der Kausalität schon enthalten, mithin in dem einen reinen Willens der Begriff einer Kausalität mit Freiheit, d. i. die nicht nach Natursgesetzen bestimmbar, folglich keiner empirischen Anschauung, als Beweise seiner Realität, fähig ist, dennoch aber, in dem reinen praktischen Gesetze a priori, seine objektive Realität, doch (wie leicht einzusehen) nicht zum Behufe des theoretischen, sondern bloß praktischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft vollkommen rechtfertigt. Nun ist der Begriff eines Wesens, das freien Willen hat, der Begriff einer causa noumenon und, daß sich dieser Begriff nicht selbst widerspreche, dafür ist man schon dadurch gesichert, daß der Begriff einer Ursache, als gänzlich vom reinen Verstehen entsprungen, zugleich auch seiner objektiven Realität in Ansehung der Gegenstände überhaupt durch die Deduktion gesichert, dabei seinem Ursprunge nach von allen sinnlichen Bedingungen un-
be restricted to phenomena; except when a definite theoretical use of it is to be made, it could certainly be applied to things as pure beings of the understanding. But because no intuition, which could only be sensible, can support this application, *causa noumenon* is, for the theoretical use of reason, an empty concept, although a possible and thinkable one. [56]

Through it I do not strive to know theoretically the characteristic of a being in so far as it has a pure will; it is enough for me to denote it as such by means of this concept and thus to couple the concept of causality with that of freedom (and with what is inseparable from it, i.e., the moral law as its determining ground). I have this right by virtue of the pure nonempirical origin of the concept of cause, since I [here] make no other use of the concept than in relation to the moral law which determines its reality; that is, I hold that I am justified only in making a practical use of it.

Had I, with Hume, denied objective reality in the theoretical use to the concept of causality, not only in its reference to things in themselves (the supersensuous) but also in reference to objects of the senses, this concept would have lost all meaning, and as a theoretically impossible concept it would have been declared entirely worthless; and since that which is nothing lends itself to no use, the practical use of a theoretically null concept would have been absurd. The concept of an empirically unconditioned causality is indeed theoretically empty, since it has no appropriate intuition, even though it is still possible and refers to an indeterminate object; in compensation for this, the concept gains significance [not from a given object but] in the moral law and consequently in a practical relation. Even though I have no intuition which would determine its objective theoretical reality, it nevertheless has a real application exhibited *in concreto* in dispositions or maxims; that is, its practical reality can be pointed out. All this is sufficient to justify the concept even with respect to noumena.

This objective reality of a pure concept of the understanding in the field of the supersensible, once ushered in, gives objective reality to all the other categories, though only in so far as

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1 Akad.-Ausg.: *theoretischen*.
they stand in a necessary connection with the determining ground of the pure will (the moral law). This objective reality, however, is of only practical application, since it has not the slightest effect in enlarging theoretical knowledge of these objects as insight into their nature by pure reason. As we shall find in the sequel, these categories have reference only to beings as intelligences, and in them only to the relation of the reason to the will, and consequently only to the practical, further than that they pretend to no knowledge of them. Other characteristics belonging to the theoretical mode of conceiving of such supersensible beings, and brought forward in connection with these categories, are not to be counted as knowledge but only as a right (for practical purposes, however, a necessity) to assume and presuppose them. This must be done even where one assumes a supersensible being (e.g., God) by analogy, i.e., by a purely rational relation of which we make practical use with reference to what is sensible. Thus the application of the categories to the supersensible, which occurs only from a practical point of view, gives to pure theoretical reason not the least encouragement to run riot into the transcendent.

CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF AN OBJECT OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

By a concept of an object of practical reason I understand the representation of an object as an effect possible through freedom. To be an object of practical knowledge as such signifies, therefore, only the relation of the will to the action whereby it or its opposite is brought into being. To decide whether or not something is an object of the pure practical reason is only to discern the possibility or impossibility of willing the action by which a certain object would be made actual, provided we had...
the ability to bring it about (the latter being a matter which experience must decide). If the object is taken as the determining ground of our faculty of desire, its physical possibility through the free use of our strength must precede the decision as to whether it is or is not an object of practical reason. But if, on the other hand, the a priori law can be regarded as the determining ground of action, which is accordingly seen as determined by pure practical reason, then the judgment as to whether or not something is an object of pure practical reason is wholly independent of any question of our physical ability; the only question is whether we should will an action directed to the existence of an object if it were within our power. Consequently, the moral possibility of the action takes precedence, for in this case it is not the object but the law of the will which is the motive of the action.

The sole objects of a practical reason are thus those of the good and the evil. By the former, one understands a necessary object of the faculty of desire, and by the latter, a necessary object of aversion, both according to a principle of reason.

If the concept of the good is not derived from a practical law but rather serves as the ground of the latter, it can only be the concept of something whose existence promises pleasure and thereby determines the causality of the subject (the faculty of desire) to produce it. Now, because it is impossible to see a priori which representation will be accompanied with pleasure and which with pain, it would be solely a matter of experience to discern what is immediately good or evil. The property of the subject, by virtue of which such experience could be had, is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure as a receptivity belonging to inner sense; thus the concept of that which is immediately good would only refer to that with which the sensation of gratification is immediately associated, and the concept of the absolutely evil would have to be related only to that which directly excites pain.

Even the usage of language is opposed to this, however, since it distinguishes the pleasant from the good and the unpleasant from the evil, and demands that good and evil be

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wenn wir das Vermögen dazu hätten (worüber die Erfahrung erteilen muß), ein gewisses Objekt wirklich wer'den würde. Wenn das Objekt als der Bestimmungsgrund unseres Begehungsvermögens angenommen wird, so muß die physische Möglichkeit desselben durch freien Gebrauch unserer Kräfte vor der Beurteilung, ob es ein Gegenstand der praktischen Vernunft sei oder nicht, vorangehen. Dahingegeben, wenn das Gesetz a priori als der Bestimmungsgrund der Handlung, mithin diese als durch reine praktische Vernunft bestimmt, betrachtet werden kann, so ist das Urteil, ob etwas ein Gegenstand der reinen praktischen Vernunft sei oder nicht, von der Vergleichung mit unserem physischen Vermögen ganz unabhängig, und die Frage ist nur, ob wir eine Handlung, die auf die Existenz eines Objekts gerichtet ist, wollen dürfen, wenn dieses in unserer Gewalt wäre, mithin muß die moralische Möglichkeit der Handlung vorangehen; denn da ist nicht der Gegenstand, sondern das Gesetz des Willens der Bestimmungsgrund desselben.

Die alleinigen Objekte einer praktischen Vernunft sind also die vom Guten und Bösen. Denn durch das erstere versteht man einen notwendigen Gegenstand des Begeh rungs-, durch das zweite des Verabscheuungsvermögens, beide aber nach einem Prinzip der Vernunft.

Wenn der Begriff des Guten nicht von einem vorhergehenden praktischen Gesetze abgeleitet werden, sondern diesem vielmehr zum Grunde dienen soll, so kann er nur der Begriff von etwas sein, dessen Existenz Lust verheißt und so die Kausalität des Subjekts zur Hervorbringung desselben, d. i. das Begeh rungsvermögen bestimmt. Weil es nun unmöglich ist, a priori einzusehen, welche Vorstellung mit Lust, welche hingegen mit Unlust werde begleitet sein, so käme es lediglich auf Erfahrung an, es auszumachen, was unmittelbar gut oder böse sei. Die Eigenschaft des Subjekts, worauf in Beziehung diese Erfahrung allein angestellt werden kann, ist das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, als eine dem inneren Sinne angehörende Rezepтивität und so würde der Begriff von dem, was unmittelbar gut ist, nur auf das gehen, womit die Empfindung des Vergnügens unmittelbar verbunden ist, und der von dem schlechtthin-Bösen auf das, was unmittelbar Schmerz erregt, allein bezogen werden müssen.

Weil aber das dem Sprachgebrauche schon zu wider ist, der das Angenehme vom Guten, das Unangenehme vom Bösen unterscheidet, und verlangt, daß Gutes und Böses jederzeit durch Vernunft, mithin durch
judged by reason and thus through concepts which alone can be universally communicated, and not by mere sensation which is limited to individual subjects and their susceptibilities. For this reason, and also because pleasure or displeasure cannot be immediately associated a priori with a representation of an object, the philosopher who felt obliged to make a feeling of pleasure basic to his practical judgment would have to denominate "good" that which is a means to the pleasant, and "evil" that which is the cause of unpleasantness and pain, for judgment of the relation of means to end certainly belongs to reason. Although reason alone is capable of discerning the connection of means and intentions (so that the will could be defined as the faculty of purposes, since they are al- [59] ways determining grounds of the faculty of desire according to principles), the practical maxims which follow merely as means from the concept of the good never contain anything good in itself as the object of the will but only something good for something else. In this way the good would be only the useful, and that for which it is useful must always lie outside the will, in feeling [Empfindung]. If the latter, as pleasant feeling, had to be distinguished from the concept of the good, there would be nothing immediately good, and the good would have to be sought in the means to something else, i.e., some pleasantness.

There is an old formula of the schools:¹ *Nobil appetimus, nisi sub ratione boni; nihil aversamur, nisi sub ratione mali.* It is often used correctly, but often also in a manner very injurious to philosophy, since the expressions *boni* and *mali* contain an ambiguity due to the poverty of the [Latin] language. These words are capable of a double meaning and therefore inevitably bring practical laws into a precarious position; and philosophy, in using these expressions, becomes aware of the divergence of concepts associated with the same word even though it can find no special expressions for them, and is forced to sub-

the distinctions about which later agreement cannot be obtained, since the difference cannot be directly stated by any suitable expression.

The German language has the good fortune to possess expressions which do not permit this difference to be overlooked. It has two very different concepts and equally different expressions for what the Latins named with the single word *bonum*. For *bonum*, it has *das Gute* [the good] and *das Wohl* [well-being]; for *malum*, *das böse* [the evil, wicked] and *das Übel* [the bad, ill] or *das Web* [woe]. Thus there are two very different judgments if in an action we have regard to its [60] goodness or wickedness or to our weal or woe. It follows just from this that the aforementioned psychological proposition is at least very doubtful if it is translated: "We desire nothing except with a view to our weal or woe." On the other hand, it is indubitably certain and at the same time clearly expressed when rendered: "We desire nothing, under the direction of reason, except in so far as we hold it to be good or evil."

"Well-being" or "woe" indicates only a relation to our state of pleasantness or unpleasantness, of enjoyment or pain; if for that reason we desire or avoid an object, we do so only in so far as it is related to our sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure which it produces. But good or evil always indicates a relation to the will so far as it is determined by the law of reason to make something its object, for the will is never determined directly by the object and our representation of it; rather, the will is a faculty for making a rule of reason the motive of an action that can make an object real. Thus good or evil is properly referred to actions and not to the sensory state of the
ten Distinktionen nötigen, über die man sich nachher nicht einigen kann, indem der Unterschied durch keinen angemessenen Ausdruck unmittelbar bezeichnet werden konnte.*

Die deutsche Sprache hat das Glück, die Ausdrücke zu besitzen, welche diese Unterschiedlichkeit nicht übersehen lassen. Für das, was die Lateiner mit einem einzigen Worte bonum benennen, hat sie zwei sehr verschiedene Begriffe, und auch eben so verschiedene Ausdrücke. Für bonum das Gute und das Wohl; für malum das Böse und das Übel (oder Weh): so daß es zwei ganz verschiedene Beurteilungen sind, ob wir bei einer Handlung das Gute und Böse derselben, oder unser Wohl und Weh (Übel) in Betrachtung ziehen. Hieraus folgt schön, daß obiger psychologischer Satz wenigstens noch sehr ungewiß sei, wenn er so übersetzt wird: wir begehen nichts, als in Rücksicht auf unser Wohl oder Weh; dagegen er, wenn man ihn so gibt: wir wollen, nach Anweisung der Vernunft, nichts, als nur sofern wir es für gut oder böse halten, unzweifelhaft gewiß und zugleich ganz klar ausgedrückt wird.

Das Wohl oder Übel bedeutet immer nur eine Beziehung auf unseren Zustand der Annehmlichkeit oder Unannahmlichkeit, des Vergnügens und Schmerzens, und wenn wir darum ein Objekt begehren, oder verabscheuen, so geschieht es, nur sofern es auf unsere Sinnlichkeit und das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, das es bewirkt, bezogen wird. Das Gute oder Böse bedeutet aber jederzeit eine Beziehung auf den Willen, so fern dieser durchs Vernunftgesetz bestimmt wird, sich etwas zu seinem Objekte zu machen; wie er denn durch das Objekt und dessen Vorstellung niemals unmittelbar bestimmt wird, sondern ein Vermögen ist, sich eine Regel der Vernunft zur Bewegung einer Handlung (dadurch ein Objekt wirklichwerden kann) zu machen. Das Gute oder Böse wird also eigentlich auf Handlungen, nicht auf den Empfindungszustand der Person be...* 

* Überdem ist der Ausdruck sub ratione boni auch zweideutig. Denn er kann so viel sagen: wir stellen uns etwas als gut vor, wenn und weil wir es begehren (wollen); aber auch: wir begehren etwas darum, weil wir es uns als gut vorstellen, so daß entweder die Be- 
gierde der Bestimmungsgrund des Begriffs des Objekts als eines Guten, oder der Begriff des Guten der Bestimmungsgrund des Begehrens (des Wollen) sei; da dann das: sub ratione boni, im ersteren Falle bedeutet würde, wir wollen etwas unter der Idee des Guten, im zweiten, zu Folge dieser Idee, welche vor dem Wollen als Bestimmungsgrund desselben vorhergehen muß.

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person. If something is to be, or is held to be, absolutely good or evil in all respects and without qualification, it could not be a thing but only the manner of acting, i.e., it could be only the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil person.

Though one may make fun of the Stoic who in the worst paroxysm of gout cried out, "Pain, however thou tormentest me, I will never admit that thou art anything evil (κακός, malum)" he was nevertheless right. He felt it was something bad, and he betrayed that in his cry; but that anything [morally] evil [ein Böses] attached to him he had no reason to concede, for the pain did not in the least diminish the worth of his person but only the worth of his condition. A single lie of which he was conscious would have struck down his pride, but pain served only as an occasion for raising it when he was conscious that he had not made himself liable to it by an unrighteous action and thus culpable.

What we call good must be, in the judgment of every reasonable man, an object of the faculty of desire, and evil [61] must be, in everyone's eyes, an object of aversion. Thus, in addition to sense, this judgment requires reason. So it is with truthfulness as opposed to a lie, with justice in contrast to violence, etc. But we can call something bad [übels], however, which everyone at the same time must acknowledge as good, either directly or indirectly. Whoever submits to a surgical operation feels it without doubt to be something bad, but by reason he and everyone else will declare it good. When, however, someone who delights in annoying and vexing peace-loving folk receives at last a right good beating, the beating is certainly a bad thing, but everyone approves of it and considers it as good in itself even if nothing further results from it; nay, even he who gets the beating must acknowledge, in his reason, that justice has been done to him, because he sees the connection between well-being and well-doing, which reason inevitably holds before him, here put into practice.

Certainly our weal and woe are very important in the estimation of our practical reason; and, as far as our nature as sensuous

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zogen, und, sollte etwas schlecht sein (und in aller Absicht und ohne weitere Bedingung) gut oder böse sein, oder dafür gehalten werden, so würde es nur die Handlungsart, die Maxime des Willens und mithin die handelnde Person selbst, als guter oder böser Mensch, nicht aber eine Sache sein, die so genannt werden könne.

Man mochte also immer den Stoiker auslassen, der in den heftigsten Gichtschmerzen ausrief: Schmerz, du magst mich noch so sehr foltern, ich werde doch nie gestehen, daß du etwas Böses (κακός, malum) seist! er hatte doch recht. Ein Übel war es, das fühlte er, und das verriet sein Geschehen; aber daß ihm dadurch ein Böses anginge, hatte der gen nicht. Ursache einzuräumen; denn der Schmerz vertrüger das Wert seiner Person nicht im mindesten, sondern nur den Wert seines Zustandes. Eine einzige Lage, deren er sich bewußt gewesen wäre, hätte seinen Mut niederschlagen müssen; aber der Schmerz diente nur zur Veranlassung, ihn zu erheben, wenn er sich bewußt war, daß er sie durch keine unrechte Handlung verschuldet und sich dadurch strafwürdig gemacht habe.

Was wir gut nennen sollen, muß in jedes vernünftigen Menschen Urteil ein Gegenstand des Begehungsvermögens sein, und das Böse in den Augen von jedermann ein Gegenstand des Abscheus; mithin bedarf es, anders als dem Sinne, zu dieser Beurteilung noch Vernunft. So ist es mit der Wahrhaftigkeit im Gegensatz mit der Lüge, so mit der Gerechtigkeit im Gegensatz der Gewalttätigkeit etc. bewandt. Wir können aber etwas ein Übel nennen, welches doch jeder
mann zugleich für gut, bisweilen mittelbar, bisweilen gar für unmittelbar erklären muß. Der eine chirurgische Operation an sich verrichten läßt, fühlt sie ohne Zweifel als ein Übel; aber durch Vernunft erklärt er, und jedermann, sie für gut. Wenn aber jemand, der friedliebende Leute gerne neckt und beunruhigt, endlich einmal anläßt und mit einer tüchtigen Tracht Schläge abgefeiert wird: so ist dieses allerdings ein Übel, aber jedermann gibt dazu seinen Beifall und hält es an sich für gut, wenn auch nichts weiter daraus entspränge; ja selbst der, der sie empfängt, muß in seiner Vernunft erkennen, daß ihm Recht geschehe, weil er die Proportion zwischen dem Wohlbefinden und Wohlerhalten, welche die Vernunft ihm unvermeidlich vorhält, hier genau in Aus

übung gebracht sieht.

Es kommt allerdings auf unser Wohl und Weh in der Be

urteilung unserer praktischen Vernunft gar sehr viel, und

was unsere Natur als sinnlicher Wesen betrifft, alles auf

1 Akad.-Ausz.: »ihn«. - 2 Akad.-Ausz.: »gar unmittelbar«.
beings is concerned, our happiness is the only thing of importance, provided this is judged, as reason especially requires, not according to transitory sensation but according to the influence which this contingency has on our whole existence and our satisfaction with it. But still not everything depends upon that. Man is a being of needs, so far as he belongs to the world of sense, and to this extent his reason certainly has an inescapable responsibility from the side of his sensuous nature to attend to its interest and to form practical maxims with a view to the happiness of this and, where possible, of a future life. But still he is not so completely animal as to be indifferent to everything that reason says on its own and to use it merely as a tool for satisfying his needs as a sensuous being. That he has reason does not in the least raise him in worth above mere animality if reason serves only the purposes which, among animals, are taken care of by instinct; if this were so, reason would be only a specific way nature had made use of to equip man for the same purpose for which animals are qualified, without fitting him for any higher purpose. No doubt, as a result of this unique [62] arrangement, he needs reason, to consider at all times his weal and woe. But he has reason for a yet higher purpose, namely, to consider also what is in itself good or evil, which pure and sensuously disinterested reason alone can judge, and furthermore, to distinguish this estimation from a sensuous estimation and to make the former the supreme condition of the latter.

In this estimation of the difference between the good and evil as such and that which can be so called only with respect to well-being or ill, it is a question of the following points. Either: a principle of reason is thought of as already the determining ground of the will without reference to possible objects of the faculty of desire (and thus as a determining ground only through the lawful form of the maxim); then that principle is a practical law a priori, and pure reason is assumed to be in itself practical; the law directly determines the will; action in accordance with it is in itself good; and a will whose maxims always accord with this law is absolutely and in every respect good and the supreme condition of all good. Or: a determining ground of
the faculty of desire precedes the maxim of the will, and this
determining ground presupposes an object of pleasure or dis-
pleasure and consequently something that pleases or pains; in
this case the maxim of reason, to pursue the former and to avoid
the latter, determines actions which are good only with refer-
ce to our inclination and consequently only mediately good,
being a means to a further purpose; and such maxims can never
be called laws but only reasonable practical precepts. In the
latter case, the end itself, the enjoyment we seek, is not a
[moral] good but only well-being, not a concept of reason but
an empirical concept of an object of sensation. Only the use of
the means to it, i.e., the action, is called good (because reason-
able deliberation is required for it). But, even so, the action is
not absolutely good but good only in relation to our sensuous
being and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The will whose
maxims are affected by it is not a pure will, for the latter con-
cerns itself only with that by which pure reason can of itself be
practical.

This is the place for an explanation of the paradox of method
in a critical examination of practical reason. The paradox is that
the concept of good and evil is not defined prior to the [63]
moral law, to which, it would seem, the former would have to
serve as foundation; rather the concept of good and evil must
be defined after and by means of the law. Even if we did not
know that the principle of morality was a pure law determining
the will a priori, we would nevertheless at the beginning have
to leave it undecided whether the will has merely empirical or
also pure determining grounds a priori. We would have to do
this in order not to assume principles quite arbitrarily, since it
is against all the basic rules of philosophical method to assume
as already decided that which is the point in question. Assume-
ing that we wished to begin with the concept of the good in
order to derive the laws of the will from it, this concept of an
object (as a good object) would designate this object as the sole
determining ground of the will. But because this concept had
no practical law a priori as its standard, the criterion of good or
evil could be placed only in the agreement of the object with
ground of the Begehrensvermögens vor der Maxime des Wil-

dens vorher, der ein Objekt der Lust und Unlust voraus-
setzt, mithin etwas, das vergnügt oder schmerzt, und
die Maxime der Vernunft, jene zu befördern, diese zu ver-
meiden, bestimmt die Handlungen, wie sie beziehungsweise
auf unsere Neigung, mithin nur mittelbar (in Rücksicht auf
einen anderweitigen Zweck, als Mittel zu demselben) gut
sind, und diese Maximen können alsdenn pietals Gesetze,
dennoch aber vernünftige, praktische Vorschriften heißen.
Der Zweck | selbst, das Vergnügen, das wir suchen, ist im
letzteren Falle nicht ein Gutes, sondern ein Wohl, nicht
ein Begriff der Vernunft, sondern ein empirischer Begriff
von einem Gegenstande der Empfindung; allein der Ge-
brauch des Mittels dazu, d. i. die Handlung (weil dazu ver-
nünftige Überlegung erfordert wird) heißt demnoch gut, aber
nicht schlechtthin, sondern nur in Beziehung auf unsere
Sinnlichkeit, in Ansehung ihres Gefühls der Lust und Un-
lust; der Wille aber, dessen Maxime dadurch abgesichert wird,
ist nicht ein reiner Wille, der nur auf das geht, wobei reine
Vernunft für sich selbst praktisch sein kann.

Hier ist nun der Ort, das Paradoxon der Methode in einer
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft zu erklären: daß nämlich
der Begriff des Guten und Bösen nicht vor dem
moralischen Gesetze (denn es dem Anschein nach
so gar zum Grunde gelegt werden müßte), son-
dern nur (wie hier auch geschieht) nach densel-
ben und durch dasselbe bestimmt werden müsse.
Wenn wir nämlich auch nicht wüßten, daß das Prinzip der
Sittlichkeit ein reines a priori den Willen bestimmendes Ge-
setz sei, so müßten wir doch, um nicht ganz unsonst (gratis)
Grundsätze anzunehmen, es anfänglich wenigstens unau-
gemäß lassen, ob der Wille bloß empirische, oder auch
neue Bestimmungsgründe a priori habe; denn es ist wider
alle Grundregeln des philosophischen Verfahrens, das, | wor-
über man allerselts entscheiden soll, schon zum voraus als
entschieden anzunehmen. Gesetzt, wir wollten nun vom
Begriffe des Guten anfangen, um davon die Gesetze des
Willens abzuleiten, so würde dieser Begriff von einem Ge-
genstande (als einem guten) zugleich diesen, als den einzigen
Bestimmungsgrund des Willens, angeben. Weil nun dieser
Begriff kein praktisches Gesetz a priori zu seiner Rich-
schnur hatte: so könnte der Probierstein des Guten oder
Bösen in nichts anders, als in der Übereinstimmung des Ge-

our feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and the use of reason could only consist in part in determining this pleasure or displeasure in connection with all the sensations of our existence and in part in determining the means of providing ourselves with the object of these feelings. Now, since only through experience can we find out what is in accordance with the feeling of pleasure, and since by hypothesis the practical law is to be based on it, the possibility of a priori practical laws is excluded because it was thought necessary first of all to find an object for the will the concept of which, as a good object, would have to constitute the universal though empirical determining ground of the will.

It was, on the contrary, necessary first to investigate whether there was not also an a priori determining ground of the will which could have been found nowhere except in a pure practical law (and indeed in this only in so far as its mere lawful form prescribed maxims without reference to an object). But because an object, according to concepts of good and evil, had been made the basis of every practical law, and because the object, in the absence of any prior law, could be thought only according to empirical concepts, the possibility was already removed even of conceiving a pure practical law. Had one previously analyzed the practical law, he would have found, on the contrary, not that the concept of the good as an object [64] of the moral law determines the latter and makes it possible, but rather the reverse, i.e., that the moral law is that which first defines the concept of the good—so far as it absolutely deserves this name—and makes it possible.

This remark, which refers only to the method of the deepest moral investigations, is important. It explains once and for all the reasons which occasion all the confusions of philosophers concerning the supreme principle of morals. For they sought an object of the will in order to make it into the material and the foundation of a law (which would then not be the directly determining ground of the will, but would be the determining ground of the will indirectly, only by means of that object referred to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure); instead, they

VOM GEGENSTANDE DER REINEN PRAKT. VERNUNFT

...
should have first looked for a law that a priori and directly determined the will, and only then determined the object conformable to it. Whether they placed this object of pleasure, which was to deliver the supreme concept of the good, in happiness, or in perfection, in moral feeling, or in the will of God — their fundamental principle was always heteronomy, and they came inevitably to empirical conditions for a moral law. This was because they could call their object, as the direct determining ground of the will, good or bad only according to its exclusively empirical relation to feeling. Only a formal law, i.e., one which prescribes to reason nothing more than the form of its giving universal law as the supreme condition of maxims, can be a priori a determining ground of practical reason. The ancients openly revealed this error by devoting their ethical investigation entirely to the definition of the concept of the highest good and thus posited an object which they intended subsequently to make the determining ground of the will in the moral law. But only much later, when the moral law has been established by itself and justified as the direct determining ground of the will, can this object be presented to the will whose form now is determined a priori. This we shall undertake in the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason. The moderns, among whom the concept of the highest good has fallen into disuse or seems at least to have become something secondary, hide the error (as they do many others) behind vague expressions; but one can nevertheless see this concept shine [65] through their systems since it always reveals heteronomy of practical reason, from which an a priori universally commanding moral law can never issue.

Now since the concepts of the good and evil, as consequences of the a priori determination of the will, presuppose also a pure practical principle and thus a causality of pure reason, they do not (as determinations of the synthetic unity of the manifold of given intuitions in one consciousness) refer originally to objects as do the pure concepts of the understanding or categories of the theoretically employed reason. Rather, they presuppose these objects as given, and they are without excep-

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\[\text{I sollte, anstatt dass sie zuerst nach einem Gesetze hättten \dots \dots \dots \dots \dots.} \]

\[\text{Nun mochten sie diesen Gegenstand der Lust, der den obersten} \]

\[\text{Begriff des Guten abgeben sollte, in der Glückseligkeit, in} \]

\[\text{der Vollkommenn, im moralischen Gesetze \dots, oder im Wil} \]

\[\text{len Gottes setzen, so war ihr Grundsatz allen Heteronomy,} \]

\[\text{die mußten unvermeidlich auf empirische Bedingungen} \]

\[\text{zu einem moralischen Gesetze stoßen: weil sie ihren Gegen} \]

\[\text{stand, als unmittelbaren Bestimmungsgrunds des Willens,} \]

\[\text{nur nach seinem unmittelbaren Verhalten zum Gefühl, wel} \]

\[\text{ches allem empirisch ist, gut oder böse nennen konnten.} \]

\[\text{Nur ein formales Gesetze, d. i. ein solches, welches der Ver} \]

\[\text{nunft nichts weiter als die Form ihrer allgemeinen Gesetz} \]

\[\text{gebung zur obersten Bedingung der Maximen vorschreibt,} \]

\[\text{kann a priori ein Bestimmungsgrund der praktischen Ver} \]

\[\text{nunft sein. Die Alten verrietten indessen diesen Fehler da} \]

\[\text{durch unverhohlen, daß sie ihre moralische Untersuchung} \]

\[\text{gänzlich auf die Bestimmung des Begriffs vom höchsten} \]

\[\text{Gut, mithin eines Gegenstandes setzten, welchen sie nach} \]

\[\text{her zum Bestimmungsgrunde des Willens im moralischen} \]

\[\text{Gesetze zu machen gedachten: ein Objekt, welches weit hin} \]

\[\text{terher, wenn das moralische Gesetze allererst für sich be} \]

\[\text{währt und als unmittelbarer Bestimmungsgrund des Wil} \]

\[\text{lens gerechtfertigt ist, dem nunmehr seiner Form nach a} \]

\[\text{priori bestimmten Willen als Gegenstand vorgestellt wer} \]

\[\text{den kann, welches wir in der Dialektik der reinen prakti} \]

\[\text{chen Vernunft uns unterfagen wollen. Die Neueren, bei} \]

\[\text{denen die Frage über das höchste Gut außer Gebrauch ge} \]

\[\text{komen, zum wenigsten nur Nebensache geworden zu sein} \]

\[\text{scheint, verstecken obigen Fehler (wie in vielen andern Fäl} \]

\[\text{len) hinter unbestimmten Wörtern, indessen, daß man ihn} \]

\[\text{gleichwohl aus ihren Systemen hervorblicken sieht, da er} \]

\[\text{alsdenn allenthalben Heteronomy der praktischen Vernunft} \]

\[\text{verrät, daraus nimmermehr ein a priori allgemein gebieten} \]

\[\text{des moralischen Gesetze entspringen kann.} \]

\[\text{Da nun die Begriffe des Guten und Bösen, als Folgen der} \]

\[\text{Willenbestimmung a priori, auch ein reines praktisches} \]

\[\text{Prinzip, mithin eine Kausalität der reinen Vernunft voraus} \]

\[\text{setzen; so beziehen sie sich, ursprünglich, nicht (etwa als Be} \]

\[\text{stimmungen der synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen} \]

\[\text{gegebener Anschauungen in einem Bewußtsein) auf Objek} \]

\[\text{te, wie die reinen Verstandesbegriffe, oder Kategorien der} \]

\[\text{theoretisch-gebrauchten Vernunft, sie setzen diese vielmehr} \]

\[\text{als gegeben voraus; sondern sie} \]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1 \text{Akud.-Ausz.: \_sollet}, anstatt \_bestimmtes, \_Gefühle.}} \]
tion modes of a single category, that of causality, so far as its determining ground consists in reason's representation of a law of causality which, as the law of freedom, reason gives itself, thereby showing itself a priori to be practical. On the one side the actions are under a law which is a law of freedom instead of a natural law and thus belong to the conduct of intelligible beings, and on the other side as events in the world of sense they belong to appearances; so that the rules of practical reason are possible only with respect to events in the world of sense and consequently in accordance with the categories of the understanding. These rules, however, contribute nothing to the theoretical use of the understanding in bringing the manifold of (sensible) intuitions under one consciousness a priori, but only to the a priori subjection of the manifold of desires to the unity of consciousness of practical reason commanding in the moral law, i.e., [to the consciousness] of a pure will.

These categories of freedom— for we wish to call them this in contrast to the theoretical concepts which are categories of nature— have a manifest advantage over the latter. The latter categories are only forms of thought which, through universal concepts, designate in an indefinite manner objects in general for every intuition possible for us. The categories of freedom, on the contrary, are elementary practical concepts which concern the decisions of the free faculty of choice; and though no intuition perfectly corresponding to the latter can be given, the categories of freedom have as their foundation a pure practical law a priori, and this cannot be said for any of the concepts of the theoretical use of our cognitive faculty. Instead of having as its given basis the form of intuition (space and time), which does not lie in reason itself but which rather has to be taken over from sensibility, the elementary practical concepts [66] have as their foundation the form of a pure will given in reason and thus in the faculty of thought itself [and do not have to borrow their foundation from another faculty]. Since in all precepts of pure practical reason it is only a question of the decision of the will and not of the natural conditions of (practical ability) for achieving its purpose, it thereby happens that the
practical concepts a priori in relation to the supreme principle of freedom immediately become cognitions, not needing to wait upon intuitions in order to acquire a meaning. This occurs for the noteworthy reason that they themselves produce the reality of that to which they refer (the disposition of the will) — an achievement which is in no way the business of theoretical concepts. One must carefully observe, however, that these categories concern only practical reason in general, and so they proceed in order from those which are as yet morally undetermined and sensuously conditioned to those which, being sensuously unconditioned, are determined only by the moral law.

One quickly perceives that in this table freedom may [67] be regarded as a kind of causality (not subject to empirical grounds of determination) with reference to actions possible through freedom. These actions are regarded as appearances in
the world of sense, and consequently one sees that freedom relates to the categories of the possibility of the actions in nature, even though each category is taken in so universal a sense that the determining ground of that causality can be assumed to lie also beyond the world of sense in freedom as the property of an intelligible being, until the categories of modality initiate the transition, though only in a problematical way, from practical principles in general to those of morality; and only later will it be possible to establish the principles of morality in a dogmatic form through the moral law.

I add nothing here to elucidate the table, for it is sufficiently understandable in itself. Such a division based on principles is very useful in any science, for the sake of both thoroughness and intelligibility. One knows immediately, for example, from the table and its first division where one must begin in practical considerations: with maxims which each person bases on his inclinations, with precepts which hold for a species of rational beings in so far as they agree in certain inclinations, and finally with law, which holds for all irrespective of their inclinations. And so on. In such a manner one surveys the whole plan of what has to be done, every question of practical philosophy which has to be answered, and also the order to be followed.

OF THE TYPIC OF THE PURE PRACTICAL FACULTY OF JUDGMENT

The concepts of good and evil first determine an object for the will. They themselves, however, stand under a practical rule of reason which, if the reason is pure, determines the will a priori in relation to its object. To decide whether an action which is possible for us in the sensible world is or is not a case under the rule requires the faculty of practical judgment, which applies what is asserted universally in the rule (in abstracto) to an action in concreto. A practical rule of pure reason, as practical, concerns the existence of an object, and, as practical rule of pure reason, implies necessity with reference to the occurrence of an action; hence it is a practical law, not a natural

Sinnenwelt, betrachtet werde, folglich sich auf die Kategorien ihrer Naturmöglichkeit beziehe, indessen daß doch jede Kategorie so allgemein genommen wird, daß der Bestimmungsgrund jener Kausalität auch außer der Sinnenwelt in der Freiheit als Eigenschaft eines intelligiblen Wesens angenommen werden kann, bis die Kategorien der Modalität den Übergang von praktischen Prinzipien überhaupt zu denen der Sittlichkeit, aber nur problematisch, einleiten, welche nachher durchs moralische Gesetz allererst dogmatisch dargestellt werden können.

Ich füge hier nichts weiter zur Erläuterung gegenwärtiger Tafel bei, weil sie für sich verständlich genug ist. Der gleichen nach Prinzipien abgefaßte Einteilung ist aller Wissenschaft, ihrer Gründlichkeit sowohl als Verständlichkeit halber, sehr zuträglich. So weiß man, z. B., aus obiger Tafel und der ersten Nummer derselben sogleich, wovon man in praktischen Erwägungen anfangen müsse: von den Maximen, die jeder auf seine Neigung gründet, den Vorschriften, die für eine Gattung vernünftiger Wesen, so fern sie in gewissen Neigungen übereinkommen, gelten, und endlich dem Gesetze, welches für alle, unangesehen ihrer Neigungen, gilt, u. s. w. Auf diese Weise übersehe man den ganzen Plan, von dem, was man zu leisten hat, so gar jede Frage der praktischen Philosophie, die zu beantworten, und zugleich die Ordnung, die zu befolgen ist.

VON DER TYPIK DER REINEN PRAKTISCHEN URTEILSKRAFT

Die Begriffe des Guten und Bösen bestimmen dem Willen zuerst ein Objekt. Sie stehen selbst aber unter einer praktischen Regel der Vernunft, welche, wenn sie reine Vernunft ist, den Willen a priori in Ansehung seines Gegenstandes bestimmt. Ob nun eine uns in der Simlichkeit mögliche Handlung der Fall sei, der unter der Regel stehe, oder nicht, dazu gehört praktische Urteilskraft, wodurch dasjenige, was in der Regel allgemein (in abstracto) gesagt wurde, auf eine Handlung in concreto angewandt wird. Weil aber eine praktische Regel der reinen Vernunft erstlich, als praktisch, die Existenz eines Objekts betrifft, und zweitens, als praktische Regel der reinen Vernunft, Notwendigkeit in Ansehung des Daseins der Handlung bei sich führt, mit hin praktisches Gesetz ist, und zwar nicht Naturgesetz,
law because of empirical motives but a law of freedom by which the will is determinable independently of everything empirical and merely through the conception of a law in general and its form. Because of this, and since all instances of possible actions are only empirical and can belong only to experience and nature, it seems absurd to wish to find a case in the world of sense, and thus as a case always standing under the law of nature, which admits the application of a law of freedom to it and to which the supersensuous Idea could be applied so that the latter could be exhibited in concreto.

The faculty of judgment of pure practical reason, therefore, is subject to the same difficulties as that of the pure theoretical, though the latter had a means of escape. It could escape because in its theoretical use everything depended upon intuitions to which pure concepts of the understanding could be applied, and such intuitions can be given a priori (though only of objects of the senses), and, in what concerns the connection of the manifold in these intuitions, they can be given in a priori conformity with pure concepts of the understanding, i.e., as schemata. The morally good, on the contrary, is something which, with respect to its object, is supersensuous; nothing corresponding to it can be found in sensible intuition; consequently, judgment under laws of pure practical reason seems to be subject to special difficulties, which result from the fact that a law of freedom is to be applied to actions which are events occurring in the world of sense and thus, to this extent, belonging to nature.

But here again a favorable prospect for the faculty of pure practical judgment opens up. The subsumption under a pure practical law of an action which is possible to me in the world of sense does not concern the possibility of the action as an event in the world of sense. This possibility is a matter to be decided by the theoretical use of reason according to the law of causality, a pure concept of the understanding for which reason has a schema in sensible intuition. The physical causality or the condition under which it occurs belongs among the concepts of nature, whose schema is sketched by the transcendental imagi-
nation. Here, however, we are concerned not with the schema of a case occurring according to laws but with the schema (if this word is suitable here) of a law itself, because the determination of the will through law alone and without any other determining ground (and not the action with reference to [69] its consequences) connects the concept of causality to conditions altogether different from those which constitute connection in nature.

A schema is a universal procedure of imagination in presenting a priori to the senses the pure concept of the understanding which is determined by the law; and a schema must correspond to a natural law as a law to which objects of sensible intuition as such are subject. But to the law of freedom (which is a causality not sensuously conditioned), and consequently to the concept of the absolutely good, no intuition and hence no schema can be supplied for the purpose of applying it in concreto. Thus the moral law has no other cognitive faculty to mediate its application to objects of nature than the understanding (not the imagination); and the understanding can supply to an Idea of reason not a schema of sensibility but a law. This law, as one which can be exhibited in concreto in objects of the senses, is a natural law, but only in its form. This law can serve the purpose of the faculty of judgment, and it may, therefore, be called the type of the moral law.

The rule of the faculty of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is: Ask yourself whether, if the action which you propose should take place by a law of a nature which you yourself were a part, you could regard it as possible through your will. Everyone does, in fact, decide by this rule whether actions are morally good or bad. Thus people ask: If one belonged to such an order of things that anyone would allow himself to deceive when he thought it to his advantage, or would feel justified in shortening his life as soon as he was thoroughly weary of it, or would look with complete indifference on the need of others, would he assert of his own will to being a member of such an order of things? Now everyone knows very well that if he secretly permits himself to deceive, it does not follow
that everyone else will do so, or that if, unobserved by others, he is lacking in compassion, it does not mean that everyone else will immediately take the same attitude toward him. This comparison of the maxims of his actions with a universal natural law, therefore, is not the motive of his will. But such a law is still a type for the estimation of maxims according to moral principles. If the maxim of action is not so constituted as to stand the test of being made the form of a natural law in general, it is morally impossible [though it may still be possible in nature]. Even common sense judges in this way, for its most ordinary judgments, even those of experience, are always based on natural law. Thus it is always at hand, but in cases where the causality from freedom is to be judged, natural law serves only as the type of a law of freedom, for if common sense did not have something to use in actual experience as an example, it could make no use of the law of pure practical reason in applying it to that experience.

We are therefore allowed to use nature, the sensible world, as the type of an intelligible nature, so long as we do not carry over to the latter intuitions and what depends on them but only apply to intelligible nature the form of lawfulness in general (the concept of which occurs in the most ordinary use of reason, though it cannot be known definitely a priori except with reference to the pure practical use of reason). For laws as such are all alike, regardless of whence they derive their determining grounds.

Furthermore, since of all intelligible objects absolutely nothing [is known] except freedom (through the moral law), and even this only in so far as it is a presupposition inseparable from the moral law; and since, moreover, all intelligible objects to which reason might eventually lead us under the guidance of the law can have no reality for us except for the purpose of this law and of the use of pure practical reason; and, finally, since reason has a right, and is even compelled, to use nature (in its pure intelligible form) as the type for the faculty of judgment—for all these reasons the present remark should serve to guard against counting among the concepts them-

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... jedermann es auch tue, oder wenn er unbemerkt lieblos ist, nicht sofort jedermann auch gegen ihn es sein würde; daher ist diese Vergleichung der Maxime seiner Handlungen mit einem allgemeinen Naturgesetze auch nicht der Bestimmungsgrund seines Willens.

Abas das letztere ist doch ein Typus der Beurteilung der ersteren nach sittlichen Prinzipien. Wenn die Maxime der Handlung nicht so beschaffen ist, daß sie an der Form eines Naturgesetzes überhaupt die Probe hält, so ist sie sittlich unmöglich. So urteilt selbst der gemeinste Verstand; denn das Naturgesetz liegt allen seinen gewöhnlichsten, selbst den Erfahrungsursachen immer zum Grunde. Er hat es also jederzeit bei der Hand, nur daß er in Fällen, wo die Kausalität aus Freiheit beurteilt werden soll, jenes Naturgesetz bloß zum Typus eines Gesetzes der Freiheit macht, weil er, ohne etwas, was er zum Beispiele im Erfahrungsfa]len machen könnte, bei Hand zu haben, dem Gesetze einer reinen praktischen Vernunft nicht den Gebrauch in der Anwendung verschenken könnte.

... Es ist also auch erlaubt, die Natur der Sinnenwelt als Typus einer intelligiblen Natur zu brauchen, solange ich nur nicht die Anschauungen, und was davon abhängig ist, auf diese übertrage, sondern bloß die Form der Gesetzmäßigkeit überhaupt (deren Begriff auch im reinsten Vernunftgebrauche stattfindet, aber in keiner anderen Absicht, als bloß zum reinen praktischen Gebrauche der Vernunft, a priori bestimmt erkannt werden kann) darauf beziehe. Denn Gesetze, als solche, sind so fern einerlei, sie mögen ihre Bestimmungsgründe hernehmen, woher sie wollen.

Übrigens, da von allem Intelligenzen schlechterdings nichts als (vermittelst des moralischen Gesetzes) die Freiheit, und auch diese nur, so fern sie eine von jegem unbeschränkten Voraussetzung ist, und ferner alle intelligiblen Gegenstände, auf welche uns die Vernunft, nach Anleitung des Gesetzes, etwa noch führen möchte, wiedem för uns keine Realität weiter haben, als zum Behuf desselben Gesetzes und des Gebrauches der reinen praktischen Vernunft, diese aber zum Typus der Urteilskraft die Natur (der reinen Verstandesform derselben nach) zu gebrauchen berechtigt und auch benötigt ist: so dient die gegenwärtige Anmerkung dazu, um zu verhüten, daß, was bloß zur Typik der Be-
selves what merely belongs to the typic of the concepts. This, as
the typic of the faculty judgment, guards against the empiricism
of practical reason, which bases the practical concepts of good
and evil merely on empirical consequences (on so-called hap-
piness). Happiness and the infinite useful consequences of a
will determined only by [the maxim of] helping itself could
Certainly, if this will made itself into a universal law of nature,
serve as a very adequate type for the morally good but still not
be identical with it.

The same typic guards also against the mysticism of practical
reason, which makes into a schema that which should serve
only as a symbol, i.e., proposes to supply real yet non-
sensible intuitions (of an invisible kingdom of God) for the
application of the moral law, and thus plunges into the transcen-
dent. Only rationalism of the faculty of judgment is suitable to
the use of moral laws, for rationalism takes no more from sensi-
bile nature than that which pure reason can also think for itself,
i.e., lawfulness, and conversely transfers into the supersensible
nothing more than can be actually exhibited by actions in the
world of sense according to a formal rule of natural law in gen-
eral. Thus the defense against empiricism of practical reason
is much more important and advisable, because mysticism is
compatible with the purity and sublimity of the moral law; and
as it is not natural to ordinary ways of thinking to stretch its
imagination to supersensible intuitions, the danger from this
side is not so general. On the other hand, empiricism uproots
the morality of dispositions, while the highest worth which
human beings can and should procure for themselves lies in
dispositions and not in actions only. It substitutes for duty
something entirely different, namely, an empirical interest,
with which inclinations generally are secretly in league. For
this reason empiricism is allied with the inclinations, which, no
matter what style they wear, always degrade humanity when
they are raised to the dignity of a supreme practical principle.
But these inclinations are so favorable to everyone’s feelings
that empiricism is far more dangerous than all mystical enthusi-
asiasm, which can never be a lasting condition for any great num-
ber of people.