CHAPTER III
OF THE DRIVES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral law should directly determine the will. If the determination of the will occurs in accordance with the moral law but only by means of a feeling of any kind whatsoever, which must be presupposed in order that the law may become a determining ground of the will, and if the action does not occur for the sake of the law, it has legality but not morality. Now, if [72] by drive (elater animi [driver of the soul]) we understand a subjective determining ground of a will whose reason does not by its nature necessarily conform to the objective law, it follows, first, that absolutely no drives can be attributed to the Divine will; and, second, that the [moral] drive of the human will (and that of every created rational being) can never be anything other than the moral law; and, third, that the objective determining ground must at the same time be the exclusive and subjectively sufficient motive of action if the latter is to fulfill not merely the letter of the law but also its spirit.*

For the sake of the moral law and for the purpose of giving it influence on the will, one should not seek any other drive because of which the drive of the moral law itself might be dispensed with, producing only hypocrisy without any substance; it is risky even to let any other drives (such as [a desire for] advantage) collaborate with the moral law. Thus there remains nothing to do except to determine in what way the moral law becomes the drive, and to see what happens to the human faculty of desire as a consequence of this motive. For how a law in itself can be the direct motive of the will (which is the essence of morality) is an insoluble problem for the human reason. It is identical with the problem of how a free will is possible. Therefore, we shall not have to show a priori the source from which

* Of every action which conforms to the law but does not occur for the sake of the law, one may say that it is morally good in letter but not in spirit (in disposition).
the moral law supplies a drive but rather what it effects (or better, must effect) in the mind, so far as it is a drive.

The essential point in all determination of the will through the moral law is this: as a free will, and thus not only without co-operating with sensuous impulses but even rejecting all of them and checking all inclinations so far as they could be antagonistic to the law, it is determined merely by the law. Thus far, the effect of the moral law as a drive is only negative, and as such this drive can be known a priori. For all inclination and every sensuous impulse is based on feeling, and the [73] negative effect on feeling (through the check on the inclinations) is itself feeling. Consequently, we can see a priori that the moral law as a ground of determination of the will, by thwarting all our inclinations, must produce a feeling which can be called pain. Here we have the first and perhaps the only case wherein we can determine from a priori concepts the relation of a cognition (here a cognition of pure practical reason) to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. All inclinations taken together (which can be brought into a fairly tolerable system, whereupon their satisfaction is called happiness) constitute self-regard (solipsismus). This consists either of self-love, which is a predominant benevolence toward one's self (philautia) or of self-satisfaction (arrogantia). The former is called, more particularly, selfishness; the latter, self-conceit. Pure practical reason merely checks selfishness, for selfishness, natural and active in us even prior to the moral law, is restricted by the moral law to agreement with the law; when this is done, selfishness is called rational self-love. But it strikes self-conceit down, since all claims of self-esteem which precede conformity to the moral law are null and void. For the certainty of a disposition which agrees with this law is the first condition of any worth of the person (as will soon be made clear), and any presumption [to worth] prior to this is false and opposed to the law. Now the propensity to self-esteem, so long as it rests only on the sensuous, is one of the inclinations which the moral law checks. Therefore, the moral law strikes down self-conceit.
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Since this law, however, is in itself positive, being the form of an intellectual causality, i.e., the form of freedom, it is at the same time an object of respect, since, in conflict with its subjective antagonists (our inclinations), it weakens self-conceit. And as striking down, i.e., humiliating, self-conceit, it is an object of the greatest respect and thus the ground of a positive feeling which is not of empirical origin. This feeling, then, is one which can be known a priori. Respect for the moral law, therefore, is a feeling produced by an intellectual cause, and this feeling is the only one which we can know completely a priori and the necessity of which we can discern.

In the preceding chapter we have seen that any [74] thing which presents itself as the object of the will prior to the moral law is excluded from the motives of the will (which is called unconditionally good) by the law itself as the supreme condition of practical reason. We have also seen that the mere practical form, which consists in the competency of the maxims to give universal laws, first determines what is of itself and absolutely good and is the ground of the maxims of a pure will, which alone is good in every respect. We find now, however, our nature as sensitive beings so characterized that the material of the faculty of desire (objects of the inclination, whether of hope or fear) first presses upon us; and we find our pathologically determinable self, although by its maxims it is wholly incapable of giving universal laws, striving to give its pretensions priority and to make them acceptable as first and original claims, just as if our pathologically determined self were our entire self. This propensity to make the subjective motives of one's choice into an objective motive of the will in general can be called self-love; when it makes itself legislative and an unconditional practical principle, it can be called self-conceit. The moral law, which alone is truly, i.e., in every respect, objective, completely excludes the influence of self-love from the highest practical principle and forever checks self-conceit, which decrees the subjective conditions of self-love as laws. If anything checks our self-conceit in our own judgment, it humiliates. Therefore, the moral law inevitably

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Da dieses Gesetz aber doch etwas an sich Positives ist, nämlich die Form einer intellektuellen Kausalität, d. i. der Freiheit, so ist es, indem es im Gegensatz mit dem subjektiven Widerspiegel, nämlich den Neigungen in uns, den Eigendünkeln schwächt, zugleich ein Gegenstand der Achtung, und, indem es ihn sogar niederdrückt, d.i. demütigt, ein Gegenstand der größten Achtung, mit dem wir eine Grund eines positiven Gefühl, das nicht empirischen Ursprungs ist, und der wir zum mindesten, das einzige, welches wir völlig a priori erkennen, und dessen Notwendigkeit wir einsehen können.

Wir haben im vorigen Hauptstücke gesehen: daß alles, was sich als Objekt des Willens vor dem moralischen Gesetzes darbietet, von den Bestimmungsgründen des Willens, unter dem Namen des unbedingt-Guten, durch dieses Gesetz selbst, als die oberste Bedingung der praktischen Vernunft, ausgeschlossen werde, und daß die bloße praktische Form, die in der Tauglichkeit der Maximen zur allgemeinen Gesetzgebung besteht, zuerst das, was an sich und schlechternicht, bestimmt, und die Maxime eines reinen Willens gründen, der allein in aller Absicht gut ist. Nun finden wir aber unsere Natur, als sinnlicher Wesen so beschaffen, daß die Materie des Begehrensvermögens (Gegenstände der Neigung, es sei der Hoffnung, oder Furcht) sich zuerst ausdringt, und unser pathologisch bestimmbar, Selbst, ob es gleich durch seine Maximen zur allgemeinen Gesetzgebung ganz untauglich ist, dennoch, gleich als ob es unser ganzes Selbst ausmachte, seine Ansprüche vorher und als die ersten und ursprünglichen geltend zu machen bestrebt sei. Man kann diesen Hang, sich selbst nach den subjekiven Bestimmungsgründen seiner Willkér zum objektiven Bestimmungsgrunde des Willens überhaupt zu machen, die Selbstliebe nennen, welche, wenn sie sich gesetzgebend und zum unbedingten praktischen Prinzip macht, Eigendünkeln können. Nun schließt das moralische Gesetz, welches allein wahrhaftig (nämlich in aller Absicht) objektiv ist, den Einfluß der Selbstliebe auf das erste praktische Prinzip gänzlich aus, und tut dem Eigendünkeln, der die subjektiven Bedingungen des ersteren als Gesetze verschreibt, unendlichen Abbruch. Was nun unserem Eigendünkeln in unserer eigenen Urteil Abbruch tut, das demütigt. Also demütigt das moralische Gesetz unvermeidlich

1 Akad.-Ausz.: der.
humbles every man when he compares the sensuous propensity of his nature with the law. Now if the idea of something as the motive of the will humiliates us in our self-consciousness, it awakens respect for itself so far as it is a positive motive. The moral law, therefore, is even subjectively a cause of respect.

Now everything in self-love belongs to inclination, and all inclination rests on feelings; therefore, whatever checks all inclinations in self-love necessarily has, by that fact, an influence on feeling. Thus we conceive how it is possible to understand a priori that the moral law can exercise an effect on feeling, since it blocks the inclinations and the propensity to make them the supreme practical condition (i.e., self-love) in the enunciation of supreme law. This effect is on the one side merely negative; but on the other, in respect to the restrictive practical ground of pure practical reason, it is positive. And to the latter, no kind of feeling, [even] under the name of a practical or moral feeling, may be assumed as prior to the moral law and as its basis.

The negative effect on feeling (unpleasantness) is, like all influence on feeling and every feeling itself, pathological.\(^1\) As the effect of the consciousness of the moral law, and consequently in relation to an intelligible cause, i.e., to the subject of the pure practical reason as the supreme legislator, this feeling of a rational subject affected with inclinations is called humiliation (intellectual contempt). But in relation to its positive ground, the law, it is at the same time respect for the law; for this law there is no feeling, but, as it removes a resistance, this dislodgment of an obstacle is, in the judgment of reason, equally esteemed as a positive assistance to its causality. Therefore, this feeling can also be called a feeling of respect for the moral law; on both grounds, it can be called a moral feeling.

Thus the moral law, as formal determining ground of action through practical pure reason, and moreover as a material

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\(^1\)By *pathological* Kant did not mean diseased or abnormal; *pathological* pertained to the emotions and passions.
though purely objective determining ground of the objects of
action (under the name of good and evil), is also a subjective
motive. That is, it is the drive to this action, since it has an in-
fluence on the sensuousness of the subject and effects a feeling
which promotes the influence of the law on the will. In the
subject there is no antecedent feeling tending to morality;
that is impossible, because all feeling is sensuous, and the
drives of the moral disposition must be free from every sens-
uous condition. Rather, sensuous feeling, which is the basis of
all our inclinations, is the condition of the particular feeling we
call respect, but the cause that determines this feeling lies in
pure practical reason; because of its origin, therefore, this par-
ticular feeling cannot be said to be pathologically effected;
rather, it is practically effected. Since the idea of the moral law
deprives self-love of its influence and self-conceit of its defu-
sion, it lessens the obstacle to pure practical reason and pro-
duces the idea of the superiority of its objective law to [76]
the impulses of sensuousness; it increases the weight of the
moral law by removing, in the judgment of reason, the counter-
weight to the moral law which bears on a will affected by the
sensuous. Thus respect for the law is not the drive to morality;
it is morality itself, regarded subjectively as a drive, inasmuch as
pure practical reason, by rejecting all the rival claims of self-
love, gives authority and absolute sovereignty to the law.
It should be noticed that, as respect is an effect on feeling and
thus on the sensuousness of a rational being, it presupposes the
sensuousness and hence the finitude of such beings on whom
respect for the moral law is imposed; thus respect for the law
cannot be attributed to a supreme being or even to one free
from all sensuousness, since in such a being there could be no
obstacle to practical reason.

This feeling, under the name of moral feeling, is therefore
produced solely by reason. It does not serve in estimating ac-
tions or as a basis of the objective moral law itself but only as a
drive to make this law itself its maxims. By what name better
than moral feeling could we call this singular feeling, which
cannot be compared with any pathological feeling? It is of such

Bestimmungsgrund der Gegenstände der Handlung, unter
dem Namen des Guten und Bosen, ist, so ist es auch subjek-
tiver Bestimmungsgrund, d. i. Triebfeder, zu dieser Hand-
lung, indem es auf die Sittlichkeit^ des Subjekts Einfluß
hat, und ein Gefühl bewirkt, welches dem Einflusse des Ge-
setzes auf den Willen beförderlich ist. Hier geht kein Ge-
fühl im Subjekt vorher, das auf Moralität gestimmt wäre.
Denn das ist unmöglich, weil alles Gefühl sinnlich ist; die
Triebfeder der sittlichen Gesinnung aber muß von aller sinn-
llichen Bedingung frei sein. Vielmehr ist das sinnliche Gefühl,
was allen unseren Neigungen zum Grunde liegt, zwar die
Bedingung derjenigen Empfindung, die wir Achtung nennen,
aber die Ursache der Bestimmung desselben liegt in der
reinen praktischen Vernunft, und diese Empfindung kann
daher, ihres Ursprungs wegen, nicht pathologisch, sondern
muß praktisch-gewirkt heissen; indem dadurch, daß die
Vorstellung des moralischen Gesetzes der Selbstliebe den
Einfluß, und dem Eigentünnchen den Wahn benimmt, das
Hindernis der reinen praktischen Vernunft vermindernd, und
die Vorstellung des Vorzuges ihres subjektiven Gesetzes vor
den Antrieben der Sittlichkeit, mithin das Gewicht des
ersteren relativ (in Ansehung eines durch die letztere affi-
zierten Willens) durch die Wegschaffung des Gegenbewegtes,
im Urteile der Vernunft, hervorgebracht wird. Und so ist
die Achtung fürs Gesetz nicht Triebfeder zur Sittlichkeit,
sondern sie ist die Sittlichkeit selbst, subjektiv als Trieb-
feder betrachtet, indem die reine praktische Vernunft da-
durch, daß sie der Selbstliebe, im Gegensatze mit ihr, alle
Ansprüche abschlägt, dem Gesetze, das jetzt allein Einfluß
hat, Ansehen verschafft. Hierbei ist nun zu bemerken: daß,
so wie die Achtung eine Wirkung aufs Gefühl, mithin auf
die Sittlichkeit eines vernünftigen Wesens ist, es diese
Sittlichkeit, mithin auch die Endlichkeit solcher Wesen, denen
das moralische Gesetz Achtung auferlegt, voraussetzt, und
daß einem höchsten, oder auch einem von aller Sittlichkeit
freien Wesen, welchem diese also auch kein Hindernis der
praktischen Vernunft sein kann, Achtung fürs Gesetz nicht
beigelegt werden könne.

Dieses Gefühl (unter dem Namen des moralischen) ist
also lediglich durch Vernunft bewirkt. Es dient nicht zu Be-
urteilung der Handlungen, oder wohl gar zur Gründung des
objektiven Sittengesetzes selbst, sondern bloß zur Trieb-
feder, um dieses in sich zu Maximae zu machen. Mit wel-
chem Namen aber könnte man dieses sonderbare Gefühl,
welches mit keinem pathologischen in Vergleich gezogen

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Note: The text is a translation of philosophical content from German to English, discussing the relationship between moral feeling and practical reason. The original context is analytical in nature, focusing on the philosophical underpinnings of moral actions and their cognizance.
a peculiar kind that it seems to be at the disposal only of reason, and indeed only of pure practical reason.

Respect always applies to persons only, never to things. The latter can awaken inclinations, and even love if they are animals (horses, dogs, etc.), or fear, as does the sea, a volcano, or a beast of prey; but they never arouse respect. Something which approaches this feeling is admiration, and this, as an emotion (wonder) can refer also to things, e.g., lofty mountains, the magnitude, number, and distance of the heavenly bodies, the strength and swiftness of many animals, etc. None of this, however, is respect. A man can also be an object of love, fear, or admiration even to wonderment, and yet not be an object of respect. His jocular humor, his courage and strength, and his power of rank may inspire me with such feelings, though inner respect for him is still lacking. Fontenelle\(^2\) says, "I bow to a great man, but my mind does not bow." I can add: to a humble plain man, in whom I perceive righteousness in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, my mind bows whether I choose or not, however high I carry my head that he may not forget my superior position. Why? His example holds a law before me which strikes down my self-conceit when I compare my own conduct with it; that it is a law which can be obeyed, and consequently is one that can actually be put into practice, is proved to my eyes by the act. I may even be conscious of a like degree of righteousness in myself, and yet respect remains. In men all good is defective, but the law made visible in an example always humbles my pride, since the man whom I see before me provides me with a standard by clearly appearing to me in a more favorable light in spite of his imperfections, which, though perhaps always with him, are not so well known to me as are my own. Respect is a tribute we cannot refuse to pay to merit whether we will or not; we can indeed outwardly withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly.

\(^2\)Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657–1757), a French popular philosopher.
Respect is so far from being a feeling of pleasure that one only reluctantly gives way to it when it is respect for a man. We seek to discover something in him that will lighten the burden of it for us, some fault in him to compensate us for the humiliation which we suffer from such an example. The dead themselves are not immune from this criticism, especially when their example appears inimical. Even the moral law itself in its solemn majesty is exposed to this endeavor to keep one's self from yielding respect to it. Can it be thought that there is any reason why we like to degrade it to the level of our familiar inclination and why we take so much trouble to make it the chosen precept of our well-understood interest, other than the fact that we want to be free of the awesome respect which so severely shows us our own unworthiness? Nevertheless, there is on the other hand so little displeasure in it that, when once we renounce our self-conceit and respect has established its practical influence, we cannot ever satisfy ourselves in contemplating the majesty of this law, and the soul believes itself to be elevated in proportion as it sees the holy law as elevated over it and its frail nature.

Certainly, great talents and activity proportionate to them can occasion respect or an analogous feeling, and it is [78] proper to accord it to them; then it seems that admiration is the same as this feeling of respect. But if one looks more closely it is noticed that it is always uncertain how great a part of the ability we admire must be ascribed to innate talent and how much to cultivation through the person's own diligence. Presumably reason represents it to us as a fruit of cultivation, and therefore as merit which perceptibly diminishes our self-conceit and therefore either reproaches us or imposes it upon us as an example to be followed. This respect which we have for a person (really for the law, which his example holds before us) is, therefore, not mere admiration. This is also confirmed by the way the common run of men give up their respect for a man (e.g., Voltaire) when they think they have in some manner found the badness of his character, while the true scholar still feels this respect at least for his talents, since he is himself in-

Die Achtung ist so wenig ein Gefühl der Lust, daß man sich ihr in Ansehung eines Menschen nur ungern überläßt. Man sucht etwas ausfindig zu machen, was man die Lust derselben erleichtern könne, irgend einen Tadel, um uns wegen der Demütigung, die uns durch ein solches Beispiel widerfährt, schadlos zu halten. Selbst Verstorbene sind, vornehmlich wenn ihr Beispiel unnachahmlich scheint, vor dieser Kritik nicht immer gesichert. So gar das moralische Gesetz selbst, in seiner feierlichen Majestät, ist diesem Bestreben, sich der Achtung dagegen zu erwehren, ausgesetzt. Meint man wohl, daß es einer anderen Ursache zuzu- schreiben sei, weswegen man es gern zu unserer vertraulichen Neigung herabwürdigen möchte, und sich aus anderen Ursachen alles so bemühe, um es zur beliebten Vorschrift unseres eigenen wohlverstandenen Vorteils zu machen, als daß man der abschreckenden Achtung, die uns unsere eigene Unwürdigkeit so strenge vorhält, loswerden möge? Gleichwohl ist darin doch auch wiederum so wenig Unlust: daß, wenn man einmal den Eigendünkel abgelegt, und jener Achtung praktischen Einfluß verdrängt hat, man sich wiederum an der Herrlichkeit dieses Gesetzes nicht satt sehen kann, und die Seele sich in dem Maße selbst zu erheben glaubt, als sie das heilige Gesetz über sich und ihre gebrechliche Natur erhärten sieht.

Zwar können große Talente und eine ihnen proportionierte Tätigkeit auch Achtung, oder ein mit derselben analogisches Gefühl, bewirken, es ist auch ganz anständig, es ihnen zu widmen, und da scheint es, als ob Bewunderung mit jener Empfindung einerlei sei. Allein, wenn man näher zusieht, so wird man bemerken, daß, da es immer ungewiß bleibt, wie viel das angeborene Talent und wie viel Kultur durch eigenen Fleiß an der Geschicklichkeit Teil habe, so stellt uns die Vernunft die letztere mutmaßlich als Frucht der Kultur, mithin als Verdienst vor, welches unseren Eigendünkel merklich herabstimmt, und uns darüber entweder Vorwürfe macht, oder uns die Befolgung eines solchen Beispiels, in der Art, wie es uns angemessen ist, auferlegt. Sie ist also nicht bloße Bewunderung, diese Achtung, die wir einer solchen Person (eigentlich dem Gesetze, was uns sein Beispiel vorhält) beweisen; welches sich auch damit durch bestätigt, daß der gemeine Haufe der Liebhaber, wenn er das Schlechte des Charakters eines solchen Mannes (wie etwa Voltaire) sonst so hervorhob, sich ihm gegenüber, der wahre Gelehrte aber sie noch immer wenigstens in Gesichtspunkte seiner Talente fühlt, weil er selbst in einem Geschäft und Berufe verwik-
volved in an activity and vocation which makes imitation of him to some extent a law.

Respect for the moral law is therefore the sole and undoubted moral drive, and this feeling is directed to no being except on this basis. First, the moral law determines the will directly and objectively in the judgment of reason. Freedom, the causality of which is determinable only through the law, consists, however, only in the fact that it limits all inclinations, including self-esteem, to the condition of obedience to its pure law. This limitation exerts an effect on feeling and produces the sensation of displeasure, which can be known a priori from the moral law. Since, however, it is so far a merely negative effect originating from the influence of pure practical reason, it checks the activity of the subject to the extent that inclinations are its motives, and consequently it checks also the pretensions to personal worth, which is nothing without accordance with the moral law. Thus the effect of this law on feeling is humiliation alone, which we thus see a priori, though we cannot know the force of the pure practical law as drive but only the resistance to the drives of our sensuous nature. This same law, however, is objectively, i.e., in the conception of pure reason, a direct determining ground of the will. Hence this humiliation occurs proportionately to the purity of the law; for that reason the lowering (humiliation) of the pretensions to moral self-esteem on the sensuous side is an elevation of the moral, i.e., practical, esteem for the law on the intellectual side. In a word, respect for the law is thus by virtue of its intellectual cause a positive feeling that can be known a priori, for any diminution of obstacles to an activity furthers this activity itself. The acknowledgment of the moral law is the consciousness of an activity of practical reason on objective grounds, and it fails to express its effect in actions simply because subjective (pathological) causes hinder it. Therefore, respect for the moral law must be regarded also as a positive but indirect effect of the law on feeling, in so far as the law weakens the hindering influence of the inclinations through humiliating self-conceit; consequently, we must see it as a subjective motive of activity, as a
drive to obey the law and as the ground of maxims of a course of life conformable to the law.

From the concept of drive there comes that of an interest, which can never be attributed to a being which lacks reason; it indicates a drive of the will so far as it is presented by reason. Since the law itself must be the drive in a morally good will, the moral interest must be a pure nonsensuous interest of practical reason alone. Now on the concept of an interest rests that of a maxim. A maxim is thus morally genuine only when it rests on exclusive interest in obedience to the law. All three concepts — of drive, interest, and maxim — can, however, be applied only to finite beings. For without exception they presuppose a limitation of the nature of the being, in that the subjective character of its choice does not of itself agree with the objective law of practical reason; they presuppose that the being must be impelled in some manner to action, since an internal obstacle stands against it. They cannot, therefore, be applied to the divine will.

In the boundless esteem for the pure moral law, removed from all advantage, as practical reason presents it to us for [80] obedience, whose voice makes even the boldest sinner tremble and forces him to hide himself from it, there is something so singular that we cannot wonder at finding this influence of a merely intellectual idea on feeling to be inexplicable to speculative reason, and at having to be satisfied with being able to see a prior that such a feeling is inseparably bound with the idea of the moral law in every finite rational being. If this feeling of respect were pathological and thus a feeling of pleasure grounded on the inner sense, it would be futile to try to discover a relation of the feeling to any representation a priori. But it is a feeling which is concerned only with the practical, and with the representation of a law simply as to its form and not on account of any object of the law; thus it cannot be reckoned either as enjoyment or as pain, yet it produces an interest in obedience to the law, and this we call moral interest. And the capacity of taking such an interest in the law (or of having respect for the moral law itself) is really moral feeling.
The consciousness of free submission of the will to the law, combined with an inevitable constraint imposed only by our own reason on all inclinations, is respect for the law. The law which commands and inspires this respect is, as we see, no other than the moral law, for no other law precludes all inclinations from having a direct influence on the will. The action which is objectively practical according to this law and excludes inclination from its determining grounds is called duty; and, because of this exclusion, in the concept of duty there is that of practical constraint, i.e., determination to actions however reluctantly they may be done. The feeling which arises from the consciousness of this constraint is not pathological, as are those caused by objects of the senses, but practical, i.e., possible through prior (objective) determination of the will and causality of reason. As submission to a law, i.e., as a command which constrains the sensuously affected subject, it contains, therefore, no pleasure but rather displeasure proportionate to this constraint. On the other hand, since this constraint is exercised only through the legislation of one’s own reason, it also contains something elevating, and the subjective effect on feeling, in so far as pure practical reason is its sole cause, can also be called self-approbation with reference to pure practical reason, for one knows himself to be determined thereto solely by the law and without any [sensuous] interest; he becomes conscious of an altogether different interest which is subjectively produced by the law and which is purely practical and free. Our taking this interest in a dutiful action is not prompted by inclination, but the practical law absolutely commands it and also actually produces it. Consequently, it has a very special name, viz., respect.

The concept of duty thus requires of action that it objectively agree with the law, while of the maxim of the action it demands subjective respect for the law as the sole mode of determining the will through itself. And thereon rests the distinction between consciousness of having acted according to duty and from duty, i.e., from respect for the law. The former, legality, is possible even if inclinations alone are the determining
grounds of the will, but the latter, morality or moral worth, can be conceded only where the action occurs from duty, i.e., merely for the sake of the law.*

It is of the utmost importance in all moral judging to pay strictest attention to the subjective principle of every maxim, so that all the morality of actions may be placed in their necessity from duty and from respect for the law, and not from love for or leaning toward that which the action is to produce. For men and all rational creatures, the moral necessity is a constraint, an obligation. Every action based on it is to be considered as duty, and not as a manner of acting which we naturally favor or which we sometime might favor. This would be tantamount to believing we could finally bring it about that, without respect for the law (which is always connected with fear or at least [82] apprehension that we might transgress it) we, like the independent deity, might come into possession of holiness of will through irrefragable agreement of the will with the pure moral law becoming, as it were, our very nature. This pure law, if we could never be tempted to be untrue to it, would finally cease altogether to be a command for us.

The moral law is, in fact, for the will of a perfect being a law of holiness. For the will of any finite rational being, however, it is a law of duty, of moral constraint, and of the determination of his actions through respect for the law and reverence for his duty. No other subjective principle must be assumed as the drive, for though it might happen that the action occurs as the law prescribes, and thus in accord with duty but not from duty, the disposition to do the action would not be moral, and it is the disposition which is precisely in question in this legislation.

*If one examines more accurately the concept of respect for persons, as this has been previously presented, one will perceive that it always rests on the consciousness of a duty which an example holds before us, and that consequently respect can never have other than a moral ground. It is also seen to be very good and, from the psychological point of view, very useful to our understanding of human nature, that wherever we use the term to pay attention to the mysterious and wonderful, but frequent, regard which human judgment does have for the moral law.

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mungsgründe des Willens gewesen wären, das zweite aber (die Moralität), der moralische Wert, lediglich darin gesetzt werden muß, daß die Handlung aus Pflicht, d.h. bloß vom Gesetzes willen geschehe.*

Es ist von der größten Wichtigkeit in allen moralischen Beurteilungen, auf das subjektive Prinzip aller Maximen mit der äußeren Genauigkeit Acht zu haben, damit alle Moralität der Handlungen in der Notwendigkeit derselben aus Pflicht und aus Achtung fürs Gesetz, nicht aus Liebe und Zuneigung zu dem, was die Handlungen hervorbringen sollen, gesetzt werde. Für Menschen und alle erschaffene vernünftige Wesen ist die moralische Notwendigkeit Nötigung, d.i. Verbindlichkeit, und jede darauf gegründete Handlung als Pflicht, nicht aber als eine uns von selbst schon beliebte, oder beliebt werden könne Verfahrungsart vorzustellen. Gleich als ob wir es dahin jemals bringen könnten, daß ohne Achtung fürs Gesetz, welche mit Pfrucht oder wenigstens Besorgnis vor Übertretung verbunden ist, wir, wie die über alle Abhängigkeit erhobene Gottheit, von selbst, gleichsam durch eine uns zur Natur gewordene, niemals zu verrüttende Übereinstimmung des Willens mit dem reinen Sittengesetze (welches also, daß wir niemals versucht werden können, ihm untreu zu werden, wohl endlich gar aufhören könnte, für uns Gebot zu sein), jemals in den Besitz einer Heiligkeit des Willens kommen könnten.


* Wenn man das Begriff der Achtung für Personen, so wie er vorher dargelegt worden, genau erügkt, so wird man gewahr, daß sie immer auf dem Bewußtsein einer Pflicht beruhe, die uns ein Beispiel vorhält, und, daß also Achtung niemals einen andern als moralischen Grund haben könne, und es sehr gut, so gut in psychologischer Beziehung zur Menschenkenntnis sehr nützlich sein, allerspärlich, wo wir diesen Ausdruck brauchen, auf die geheime und wunderswürdige, dabei aber oft vorkommende Rücksicht, die der Mensch in seinen Beurteilungen auf moralische Gesetze nimmt, Acht zu haben.

[A 145 Anm.: A 145]
It is a very beautiful thing to do good to human beings because of love and a sympathetic good will, or to do justice because of a love of order. But this is not yet the genuine moral maxim of conduct, the maxim befitting our position among rational beings as men, when we presume, like volunteers, to flout with proud conceit the thought of duty and, as independent of command, merely to will of our own good pleasure to do something to which we think we need no command. We stand under a discipline of reason, and in all our maxims we must not forget our subjection to it, or withdraw anything from it, or by an egotistical illusion detract from the authority of the law (even though it is one given by our own reason), so that we could place the motive of our will (even though it is in accordance with the law) elsewhere than in the law itself and in respect for it. Duty and obligation are the only names which we must give to our relation to the moral law. We are indeed legislative members of a moral realm which is possible through freedom and which is presented to us as an object of respect by practical reason; yet we are at the same time subjects in it, not sovereigns, and to mistake our inferior position as creatures and to deny, from self-conceit, respect to the holy law is, in spirit, a defection from it even if its letter be fulfilled.

The possibility of such a command as, "Love God above all and thy neighbor as thyself,"* agrees very well with this. For, as a command, it requires esteem for a law which orders love and does not leave it to arbitrary choice to make love the principle. But love to God as inclination (pathological love) is impossible, for He is not an object of the senses. The latter is indeed possible toward men, but it cannot be commanded, for it is not possible for a person to love someone merely on command. It is, therefore, only practical love which can be understood in that kernel of all laws. To love God means in this sense to do

*The principle of one's own happiness, which some wish to make the supreme principle of morality, is in striking contrast to this law. This principle would read: "Love thyself above all, but God and thy neighbor for thine own sake."

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Hiermit stimmt aber die Möglichkeit eines solchen Gebots, als: Liebe Gott über alles und deinen Nächsten als dich selbst,* ganz wohl zusammen. Denn es fügt doch, als Gebot, Achtung für ein Gesetz, das Liebe befielt, und überläßt es nicht der beliebigen Wahl, sich diese zum Prinzip zu machen. Aber Liebe zu Gott als Neigung (pathologische Liebe) ist unmöglich; denn er ist kein Gegenstand der Sinne. Eben dieselbe gegen Menschen ist zwar möglich, kann aber nicht geboten werden; denn es steht in keines Menschen Vermögen, jemanden bloß auf Befehl zu lieben. Also ist es bloß die praktische Liebe, die in jedem Kern aller Gesetze verstanden wird. Gott lieben, heißt in

His commandments gladly, and to love one's neighbor means to practice all duties toward him gladly. The command which makes this a rule cannot require that we have this disposition but only that we endeavor after it. To command that one do something gladly is self-contradictory. For a law would not be needed if we already knew of ourselves what we ought to do and moreover were conscious of liking to do it; and if we did it without liking but only out of respect for the law, a command which makes just this respect the drive of the maxim would counteract the disposition it commands. That law of all laws, like every moral prescription of the Gospel, thus presents the moral disposition in its complete perfection, and though as an ideal of holiness it is unattainable by any creature, it is yet an archetype which we should strive to approach and to imitate in an uninterrupted infinite progress. If a rational creature could ever reach the stage of thoroughly liking to do all that moral laws require, it would mean that there was no possibility of there being in him a desire which could tempt him to deviate from them, for overcoming such a desire always costs the subject some sacrifice and requires self-compulsion, i.e., an inner constraint to do that which one does not quite like to do. To such a level of moral disposition no creature can ever [84] attain. For since he is a creature, and consequently is always dependent with respect to what he needs for complete satisfaction with his condition, he can never be wholly free from desires and inclinations which, because they rest on physical causes, do not of themselves agree with the moral law, which has an entirely different source. Consequently, with reference to these desires it is always necessary to base the disposition of the creature's maxims on moral constraint and not on ready willingness, i.e., to base it on respect which demands obedience to the law even though the creature does not like to do it, and not on love, which apprehends no inward reluctance of the will to obey the law. This would be true even if mere love for the law (which would in this case cease to be a command, and morality, subjectively passing over into holiness, would cease to be virtue) were made the constant but unattainable
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goal of its striving. For in the case of what we esteem and yet dread because of our consciousness of our weaknesses, the most reverential awe would be changed into inclination, and respect into love, because of the greater ease in satisfying the latter. At least this would be the perfection of a disposition dedicated to the law, if it were ever possible for a creature to attain it.

This reflection is not intended so much to clarify by exact concepts the Gospel command just cited in order to prevent religious fanaticism with reference to the love of God as to define accurately the moral disposition directly with regard to our duties to others and to control and, if possible, to prevent a narrow moral fanaticism, which infects many persons. The stage of morality on which man (and, so far as we know, every rational creature) stands is respect for moral law. The disposition which obliges him to obey it is: to obey it from duty and not from a spontaneous inclination or from an endeavor unbidden, but gladly undertaken. The moral condition which he can always be in is virtue, i.e., moral disposition in conflict, and not holiness in the supposed possession of perfect purity of the dispositions of will. By exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, the mind is disposed to nothing but blatant moral fanaticism and exaggerated self-conceit. By such exhortation people are led into the illusion that the motive of their moral actions is not duty (i.e., respect for the law) whose yoke they must reluctantly bear even though it is a mild yoke imposed by reason. This law always humbles them when they follow (obey) it, but by this kind of exhortation they come to think that those actions are expected of them not because of duty but only because of their own bare merit. For not only do they not fulfill the spirit of the law when they imitate such acts on the basis of such a principle, since the spirit of the law lies in the submissive disposition and not in the merely lawful character of the act, leaving the principle to be what it may; and not only do they in this manner make the drives pathological (locating them in sympathy or self-love) and not moral (located in the law); but they produce in this way a shallow, high-flown,

dügen, obgleich unerreichtbaren Ziele seiner Bestrebung zu machen. Denn an dem, was wir hochschätzen, aber doch (wegen des Bewußtseins unserer Schwächen) scheuen, verwandelt sich, durch die mehrere Leichtigkeit, ihm Gnüge zu tun, die ehrfurchtsvolle Schau in Zuneigung, und Achtung in Liebe, wenigstens würde es die Vollendung einer dem Gesetz gewidmeten Gesinnung sein, wenn es jemals einem Geschöpf möglich wäre, sie zu erreichen.

Diese Betrachtung ist hier nicht so wohl dahin abgezweckt, das angeltüpfelte evangelische Gebot auf deutliche Begriffe zu bringen, um der Religionsschwärmerei in Ansehung der Liebe Gottes, sondern die sittliche Gesinnung, auch unmittelbar in Ansehung der Pfichten gegen Menschen, genau zu bestimmen, und einer bloß moralischen Schwärmerei, welche viele Köpfe ansteckt, zu steuern, oder, wo möglich, vorzubeugen. Die sittliche Stufe, worauf der Mensch (aller unserer Einsicht nach auch jedes vernünftige Geschöpf) steht, ist Achtung fürs moralische Gesetz. Die Gesinnung, die ihm, dieses zu befolgen, obliegt, ist es aus Pflicht, nicht aus freiwilliger Zuneigung und auch allenfalls unbefohlen von selbst gern unternommener Bestrebung zu befolgen, und sein moralischer Zustand, darin er jedesmal sein kann, ist Tugend, d.i. moralische Gesinnung im Kampfe, und nicht Heiligkeit im vermeinten Besitze einer völligen Reinigkeit der Gesinnungen des Willens. Es ist lauter moralische Schwärmerei und Steigerung des Eingendüngels, wozu man die Gemüter durch Aufmunterung zu Handlungen, als edler, erhabener und großmütiger, stimmt, dadurch man sich in den Wahn versetzt, als wäre es nicht Pflicht, d.i. Achtung fürs Gesetz, dessen Joch (das gleichwohl, weil es uns Vernunft selbst auferlegt, sanft ist) sie, wenn gleich ungern, tragen müßten, was den Bestimmungsgrund ihrer Handlungen ausmachte, und welches sie immer noch demütigt, indem es befolgen (ihm gehorchen), sondern als ob jene Handlungen nicht aus Pflicht, sondern als barer Verdienst von ihnen erwartet würde. Denn nicht allein, daß sie durch Nachahmung solcher Taten, nämlich aus solchem Prinzip, nicht im mindesten dem Geiste des Gesetzes ein Genüge getan hätten, welcher in der dem Gesetz sich unterwerfenden Gesinnung, nicht in der Gesetzmäßigkeit der Handlung (das Prinzip möge sein, welches auch wolle), besteht, und die Tiereleander pathologisch (in der Sympathie oder auch Philautie), nicht moralisch (im Gesetz) setzen, so bringen sie auf diese Art eine windige,

1 Akad.-Ausz.: *würden*.
fantastic way of thinking, flattering themselves with a spontaneous goodness of heart, needing neither spur nor bridle nor even command, and thereby forgetting their obligation, which they ought to think of rather than their merit. Certainly actions of others which have been done with great sacrifice and solely for the sake of duty may be praised as noble and sublime deeds, yet only in so far as there are clues which suggest that they were done wholly out of respect for duty and not from aroused feelings. But if anyone wishes to put them forward as examples for imitation, the drive to be employed must be only respect for duty, the sole genuine moral feeling, this earnest holy precept which does not leave it to our vain self-love to daily with pathological impulses (as far as they are analogous to morality) and to pride ourselves on our meritorious worth. For all actions which are praiseworthy, if we only search we shall find a law of duty which commands and does not leave us to choose what may be agreeable to our propensity. That is the only way of representing [morality] which morally educates the soul, because it is the only one which is capable of firm and accurately defined principles.

If fanaticism in its most general sense is a deliberate overstepping of the boundaries of human reason, moral fanaticism is this overstepping of boundaries which practical pure reason sets to mankind. Pure practical reason thereby forbids us [86] to place the subjective motive of dutiful actions, i.e., their moral incentive, anywhere else than in the law itself, and to place the disposition which is thereby brought into the maxims elsewhere than in the respect for this law; it commands that we make the thought of duty, which strikes down all arrogance as well as vain self-love, the supreme life-principle of all human morality.

If this is so, then not only novelists and sentimental educators (even though they may be zealously opposed to sentimentalism) but also philosophers and indeed the strictest of them, the Stoics, have instituted moral fanaticism instead of a sober but wise moral discipline, though the fanaticism of the latter was more heroic, while that of the former is of a more shallow
and pliable nature. And we may, without hypocrisy, truly say of the moral teaching of the Gospel that, through the purity of its moral principle and at the same time through the suitability of its principle to the limitations of finite beings, it first brought all good conduct of man under the discipline of duty clearly set before him, which does not permit him to indulge in fancies of moral perfections; and that it set limits of humility (i.e., self-knowledge) on self-conceit as well as on self-love, both of which readily mistake their boundaries.

Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating but requires submission and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror, but only holdeth forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience)—a law before which all inclinations are mute even though they secretly work against it: what origin is worthy of thee, and where is the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations and from which to be descended is the indispensable condition of the only worth which men alone can give themselves?

This root cannot be less than something that elevates man above himself as a part of the world of sense, something which connects him with an order of things which only the understanding can think and which has under it the entire world of sense, including the empirically determinable existence of man in time, and the whole system of all ends which is [87] alone suitable to such unconditional practical laws as the moral. It is nothing else than personality, i.e., the freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature regarded as a capacity of a being subject to special laws (pure practical laws given by its own reason), so that the person belonging to the world of sense is subject to his own personality so far as he belongs to the intelligible world. For it is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging to two worlds, must regard his own being in relation to his second and higher vocation with reverence, and the laws of this vocation with the deepest respect.

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schmelzender Beschaffenheit war, und man kann es, ohne zu heucheln, der moralischen Lehre des Evangelii mit aller Wahrheit nachsagen: daß es zuerst, durch die Reinigkeit des moralischen Prinzips, zugleich aber durch die Angemessenheit desselben mit den Schranken endlicher Wesen, alles Wohlverhalten des Menschen der Zucht einer ihnen vor Augen gelegten Pflicht, die sie nicht unter moralischen geträumten Vollkommenheiten schwärmen läßt, unterworfen und dem Eigendünkel sowohl als der Eigenliebe, die beide gerne ihre Grenzen verkennen, Schranken der Demut (d. i. der Selbstkenntnis) gesetzt habe.

Pflicht! du erhabener großer Name, der du nichts Be liebtes, was Einschmeichelung bei sich führt, in dir fassest, sondern Unterwerfung verlangst, doch auch nichts drohest, was natürliche Abneigung im Gemüte erregte und schreckte, um den Willen zu bewegen, sondern bloß ein Gesetz aufgestellt, welches von selbst im Gemüte Eingang findet, und doch sich selbst wider Willen Verehrung (wenn gleich nicht immer Befolgung) erwirbt, vor dem alle Neigungen verstummen, wenn sie gleich in Geheim ihm entgegen wirken, welches ist der deiner würdige Ursprung, und wo findet man die Wurzel deiner edlen Abkunft, welche alle Verwandtschaft mit Neigungen stolz ausschlägt, und von welcher Wurzel abzustammen die unnachahmbare Bedingung desjenigen Werts ist, den sich Menschen allein selbst geben können?

Es kann nichts Minderes sein, als was den Menschen über sich selbst (als einen Teil der Sinnenwelt) erhebt, was ihn an eine Ordnung der Dinge knüpft, die nur der Verstand denken kann, und die zugleich die ganze Sinnenwelt, mit ihr das empirisch-bestimmbare Dasein des Menschen in der Zeit und das Ganze aller Zwecke (welches allein solchen unbedingten praktischen Gesetzen, als das moralische, ange messen ist) unter sich hat. Es ist nichts anders als die Persönlichkeit, d. i. die Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit von dem Mechanism der ganzen Natur, doch zugleich als ein Vermögen eines Wesens betrachtet, welches eigentümlichen, nämlich von seiner eigenen Vernunft gegebenen reinen praktischen Gesetzen, die Person also, als zur Sinnenwelt gehö rig, ihrer eigenen Persönlichkeit unterworfen ist, so fern sie zugleich zur intelligiblen Welt gehört; da es denn nicht zu verwundern ist, wenn der Mensch, als zu beiden Welten gehö rig, sein eigenes Wesen, in Beziehung auf seine zweite und höchste Bestimmung, nicht anders, als mit Verehrung und die Gesetze derselben mit der höchsten Achtung betrachten muß.
Many expressions which indicate the worth of objects according to moral ideas have this origin. The moral law is holy (inviolable). Man is certainly unholy enough, but humanity in his person must be holy to him. Everything in creation which he wishes and over which he has power can be used merely as a means; only man, and, with him, every rational creature, is an end in himself. He is the subject of the moral law which is holy, because of the autonomy of his freedom. Because of the latter, every will, even the private will of each person directed to himself, is restricted to the condition of agreement with the autonomy of the rational being, namely, that it should be directed to no purpose which would not be possible by a law which could issue from the will of the subject who is the passive recipient of the action. This condition thus requires that the person never be used as a means except when he is at the same time treated as an end. We may rightly attribute this condition even to the divine will with respect to the rational beings in the world as its creatures, since the condition tests on the personality of these beings, whereby alone they are ends in themselves.

This idea of personality awakens respect; it places before our eyes the sublimity of our own nature (in its [higher] vocation), while it shows us at the same time the unsuitability of our conduct to it, thus striking down our self-conceit. This is naturally and easily observed by the most common human reason. Has not every even fairly honest man sometimes found that he departs from an otherwise harmless lie which would extricate him from a vexing affair or which would even be useful to a [88] beloved and deserving friend simply in order not to have to shame himself secretly in his own eyes? In the greatest misfortunes of his life which he could have avoided if he could have disregarded duty, does not a righteous man hold up his head thanks to the consciousness that he has honored and preserved humanity in his own person and in its dignity, so that he does not have to shame himself in his own eyes or have reason to fear the inner scrutiny of self-examination? This comfort is not happiness, not even the smallest part of happiness; for no one would wish to have occasion for it, not even once in his life, or

Auf diesen Ursprung gründen sich nun manche Ausdrücke, welche den Wert der Gegenstände nach moralischen Ideen bezeichnen. Das moralische Gesetz ist heilig (unverletzlich). Der Mensch ist zwar unheilig genug, aber die Menschheit in seiner Person muß ihm heilig sein. In der ganzen Schöpfung kann alles, was man will, und worüber man etwas vermag, auch bloß als Mittel gebraucht werden; nur der Mensch, und mit ihm jedes vernünftige Geschöpft, ist Zweck an sich selbst. Er ist nämlich das Subjekt des moralischen Gesetzes, welches heilig ist, vermöge der Autonomie seiner Freiheit. Eben um dieser willen ist jeder Wille, selbst jeder Person ihr eigener, auf sie selbst gerichteter Wille, auf die Bedingung der Einstimmung mit der Autonomie des vernünftigen Wesens eingeschränkt, es nämlich keiner Absicht zu unterwerfen, die nicht nach einem Gesetze, welches aus dem Willen des leidenden Subjekts selbst entspringen könnte, möglich ist; also dieses niemals bloß als Mittel, sondern zugleich selbst als Zweck zu gebrauchen. Diese Bedingung legen wir mit Recht sogar dem göttlichen Willen, in Ansehung der vernünftigen Wesen in der Welt, als seiner Geschöpfe, bei, indem sie auf der Persönlichkeit derselben beruht, dadurch allein sie Zwecke an sich selbst sind.

Diese Achtung erweckende Idee der Persönlichkeit, welche uns die Erhabenheit unserer Natur (ihrer Bestimmung nach) vor Augen stellt, indem sie uns zugleich den Mangel der Angemessenheit unseres Verhaltens in Ansehung derselben bemerken läßt, und dadurch den Eigendünkeln niederschlägt, ist selbst der gemeinen Menschenverumunft natürlich und leicht bemerklich. Hat nicht jeder auch nur mittelmäßig ehrlicher Mann bisweilen gefunden, daß er eine sonst unschädliche Lüge, dadurch er sich entweder selbst aus einem verdrieselten Handeln ziehen, oder wohl gar einen geliebten und verdienstvollen Freunden Nutzen schaffen konnte, bloß darum unterließ, um sich in Geheim in seinen eigenen Augen nicht verachten zu dürfen? Hält nicht einen rechtschaffenen Mann im größten Unglück des Lebens, das er vermeiden konnte, wenn er sich nur hätte über die Pflicht wegsitzen können, noch das Bewußtsein aufrecht, daß er die Menschheit in seiner Person doch in ihrer Würde erhalten und geehrt habe, daß er sich nicht vor sich selbst zu schämen und den inneren Anblick der Selbstprüfung zu scheuen Ursache habe? Dieser Trost ist nicht Glückseligkeit, auch nicht der mindesten Teil derselben. Denn niemand wird sich die Gelegenheit dazu, auch vielleicht nicht einmal ein Leben
perhaps would even desire life itself in such circumstances. But he lives and cannot tolerate seeing himself as unworthy of life. This inner satisfaction is therefore merely negative with reference to everything which might make life pleasant; it is the defense against the danger of sinking in personal worth after the value of his circumstances has been completely lost. It is the effect of a respect for something entirely different from life, in comparison and contrast to which life and its enjoyment have absolutely no worth. He yet lives only because it is his duty, not because he has the least taste for living.

Such is the nature of the genuine drive of pure practical reason. It is nothing else than the pure moral law itself, so far as it lets us perceive the sublimity of our own supersensuous existence and subjectively effects respect for the higher vocation in men who are conscious of their sensuous existence and of the accompanying dependence on their pathologically affected nature. Now let there be associated with this drive so many charms and pleasures of life that even for their sake alone the most skillful choice of a reasonable Epicurean, considering the highest welfare of life, would declare himself for moral conduct (and it may even be advisable to connect this prospect of a gladsome enjoyment of life with that supreme determining motive which is sufficient of itself); but this is only in order to hold a balance against the attractions which vice on the other side does not fail to offer and not in order to place in these prospects even the smallest part of the real moving force when duty is what we are concerned with. For the latter would simply destroy the purity of the moral disposition at its source. The majesty of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of life; [89] it has its own law, even its own tribunal, and however much one wishes to shake them together, in order to offer the mixture to the sick soul as though it were a medicine, they nevertheless soon separate of themselves; but, if they do not separate, the moral ingredient has no effect at all, and even if the physical life gained some strength in this way, the moral life would waste away beyond recovery.

Aber er lebt, und kann es nicht erdulden, in seinen eigenen Augen des Lebens unwürdig zu sein. Diese innere Berühmung ist also bloß negativ, in Ansehung alles dessen, was das Leben angenehm machen mag; nämlich sie ist die Abhaltung der Gefühle, im persönlichen Werte zu sinken, nachdem der seines Zustandes von ihm schon gänzlich aufgegeben worden. Sie ist die Wirkung von einer Achtung für etwas ganz anderes, als das Leben, womit in Vergleichung und Entgegensezung das Leben vielmehr, mit aller seiner Annehmlichkeit, gar keinen Wert hat. Er lebt nur noch aus Pflicht, nicht weil er am Leben den mindesten Geschmack findet. So ist die echte Triebfeder der reinen praktischen Vernunft beschaffen; sie ist keine andere, als das reine moralische Gesetz selber, so fern es uns die Erhabenheit unserer eigenen übersinnlichen Existenz spüren läßt, und subjektiv, in Menschen, die sich zugleich ihres sinnlichen Daseins und der damit verbundenen Abhängigkeit von ihrer so fern sehr pathologisch affizierten Natur bewußt sind, Achtung für ihre höhere Bestimmung wirkt. Nun lassen sich mit dieser Triebfeder gar wohl so viele Reize und Annehmlichkeiten des Lebens verbinden, daß auch um dieser willen allein schon die klügste Wahl eines vernünftigen und über das größte Wohl des Lebens nachdenkenden Epicureers sich für das sittliche Wohlbefinden erklären würde, und es kann auch ratsam sein, diese Aussicht auf einen fröhlichen Genuss des Lebens mit jener obersten und schon für sich alleinhinlänglich-bestimmenden Bewegursache zu verbinden; aber nur um die Anlockungen, die das Laster auf der Gegenseite vorzuspiegeln nicht ermagelt, das Gegengewicht zu halten, nicht um hierin die eigentliche bewegende Kraft, auch nicht dem mindesten Teile nach, zu setzen, wenn von Pflicht die Rede ist. Denn das würde so viel sein, als die moralische Gesinnung in ihrer Quelle verunreinigen wollen. Die Ehrwürdigkeit der Pflicht hat nichts mit Lebensgenuß zu schaffen; sie hat ihr eigentümliches Gesetz, auch ihr eigentümliches Gericht, und wenn man auch beide noch so sehr zusammenschütteln wollte, um sie vermischt, gleichsam als Arzeneimittel, der kranken Seele zuzureichen, so scheiden sie sich doch alsbald von selbst, und, tun sie es nicht, so wirkt das erste gar nicht, wenn aber auch das physische Leben hiebei einige Kraft gewonnen, so würde doch das moralische ohne Rettung dahn schwimmen.
By a critical elucidation of a science of one of its portions that is a system by itself, I understand the investigation and justification of the fact that it must have precisely the systematic form which it does have and no other when compared with another system which has as its basis a similar cognitive faculty. Now practical reason has the same cognitive faculty for its foundation as the speculative, so far as they are both pure reason. Thus the difference in their systematic form must be determined by a comparison between them, and the ground of this difference be given.

The Analytic of pure theoretical reason deals with knowledge of objects which may be given to the understanding. It therefore had to begin from intuition and consequently (since intuition is always sensible) from sensibility; only then could it progress to concepts (of objects of this intuition); it could end with principles only after these two had been dealt with. On the other hand, practical reason is concerned not with objects in order to know them but with their own capacity to make them real (which does require knowledge of them), i.e., it has to do with a will which is a causal agent so far as reason contains its determining ground. Consequently, it does not have to furnish an object of intuition, but as practical reason it has only to give a law for objects of intuition, because the concept of causality always contains a relation to a law which determines the existence of the many in their relation to one another. Thus a critique of the Analytic of reason, if it is to be practical reason (which is the real problem), must begin from the possibility of practical fundamental principles a priori. Only from these can it proceed to concepts of objects of a practical reason, i.e., to the concepts of the absolutely good and evil in order first to assign them in accordance with those principles, for prior to those principles there is no cognitive faculty by which they could be given as good and evil. Only then could the last chap-

**Kritisches Beleuchtung der Analytik der reinen praktischen Vernunft**

Ich verstehe unter der kritischen Beleuchtung einer Wissenschaft, oder eines Abschnitts derselben, der für sich ein System ausmacht, die Untersuchung und Rechtfertigung, warum sie gerade diese und keine andere systematische Form haben müsse, wenn man sie mit einem anderen System vergleicht, das ein ähnliches Erkenntnisvermögen zum Grunde hat. Nun hat praktische Vernunft mit der spekulativen sofern einerlei Erkenntnisvermögen zum Grunde, als beide reine Vernunft sind. Also wird der Unterschied der systematischen Form der einen, von der anderen, durch Vergleichung beider bestimmt und Grund davon angegeben werden müssen.

Die Analytik der reinen theoretischen Vernunft hatte es mit dem Erkenntnisse der Gegenstände, die dem Verstände gegeben werden mögen, zu tun, und mußte also von der Anschauung, mithin (weil diese jederzeit sinnlich ist) von der Sinnlichkeit anfangen, von der aber allernächst zu Begriffen (der Gegenstände dieser Anschauung) fortschreiten, und durfte, nur nach jeder Vorvorbereitung, mit Grundsätzen endigen. Dagegen, wie praktische Vernunft es nicht mit Gegenständen, die er kennt, sondern mit ihrem eigenen Erkenntnisse, jene (der Erkenntnisse derselben gemäß) wirklich zu machen, d. i. es mit einem Willen zu tun hat, welcher eine Kausalität ist, so fern Vernunft den Bestimmungsgrund derselben enthält, da sie folglich kein Objekt der Anschauung, sondern (weil der Begriff der Kausalität jederzeit die Beziehung auf ein Gesetz enthält, welches die Existenz des Mannigfaltigen im Verhältnisse zu einander bestimmt), als praktische Vernunft, nur ein Gesetz derselben anzugeben hat: so muß eine Kritik der Analytik derselben, so fern sie eine praktische Vernunft sein soll (welches die eigentliche Aufgabe ist), von der Möglichkeit praktischer Grundsätze a priori anfangen. Von da konnte sie allein zu Begriffen der Gegenstände einer praktischen Vernunft, nämlich denen des schlechtthin-Guten und Bösen fortgehen, um sie jenen Grundsätzen gemäß allererst zu geben (denn diese sind vor jenen Prinzipien als Gutes und Böses durch gar kein Erkenntnisvermögen zu geben möglich), und nur alsdann konnte allererst das letzte Haupt-

1 Akad.-Ausz.: "Kritik derselben, ... (welches die eigentliche Aufgabe der Analytik ist)."
ter, dealing with the relation of pure practical reason to the sensual and with its necessary influence on it, i.e., the moral feeling which is known a priori, close this part of the work. Thus the Analytic of practical pure reason distinguishes among the conditions of its use in a way analogous to that of the theoretical reason but in reverse order. The Analytic of theoretical pure reason was divided into Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Logic; that of practical reason is divided, conversely, into Logic and Aesthetic of pure practical reason, if I may be allowed to use, on the basis of analogy, these terms which are not entirely suitable. The Logic in turn was there divided into Analytic of Concepts and Analytic of Principles; here it is divided into that of principles and concepts. The Aesthetic had there two parts, because of the dual nature of sensible intuition; here the sensibility is regarded not as a faculty of intuition but merely as feeling (which can be a subjective ground of desire), and in this respect pure practical reason allows no further subdivision.

The reason this division into two parts together with their subdivision is not actually carried out is easily seen, even though in the beginning an attempt to do this might have been tempting because of the example of the first Critique. For since it is pure reason, which is here seen in its practical use and thus as commencing from a priori principles and not from empirical motives, the division of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason

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3 The analogy drawn is erroneous. The Critique of Pure Reason is actually divided as follows:

- Doctrine of Elements
  - Aesthetic
  - Logic

- Doctrine of Method
  - Analytic (of concepts)
  - Dialectic (of principles)

For a simpler statement of the relationship between the organization of the two Critiques, see above, p. 16.
must turn out to be similar to that of a syllogism, i.e., proceeding from the universal in the major premise (the moral principle), through a minor premise containing a subsumption of possible actions (as good or evil) under the major, to the conclusion, viz., the subjective determination of the will (an interest in the practically possible good and the maxim based on it). Whoever has been able to convince himself of the truth of the propositions in the Analytic will get a certain enjoyment out of such comparisons, for they correctly occasion the expectation of bringing some day into one view the unity of the entire pure rational faculty (both theoretical and practical) and of being able to derive everything from one principle. The latter is an unavoidable need of human reason, as it finds complete satisfaction only in a perfectly systematic unity of its cognitions.

But if we regard also the content of the knowledge which we can have of and through pure practical reason, as the Analytic presents this content, there is to be found, besides a remarkable analogy between it and the content of theoretical knowledge, no less remarkable differences. With reference to the theoretical, the faculty of pure rational a priori knowledge could be easily and obviously proved through examples from the sciences (in which one does not need so much to fear a secret admixture of empirical grounds of cognition as in ordinary knowledge, since the sciences put their principles to the test in so many ways by methodical use). But that pure reason is of itself alone practical, without any admixture of any kind of empirical motives—one had to show this from the commonest practical use of reason by producing evidence that the highest practical principle is a principle recognized by every natural human reason as the supreme law of its will, as a law completely a priori and independent of any sensuous data. It was necessary first to establish and justify it, by proof of the purity of its origin, in the judgment of common reason, before science could take it in hand to make use of it, so to speak, as a fact which precedes all disputation about its possibility and all consequences which may be drawn from it. But this circumstance is easily explained from what has previously been said: it is be-

ses ähnlich ausfallen müssen, nämlich vom Allgemeinen im Obersatze (dem moralischen Prinzip), durch eine im Untersatze vorgenommene Subsumtion möglicher Handlungen (als guter oder böser) unter jenen, zu dem Schlußsatz, nämlich der subjektiven Willensbestimmung (einem Interesse an dem praktisch-möglichen Guten und der darauf gegründeten Maxime) fortgehend. Demjenigen, der sich von den in der Analytik vorkommenden Sätzen hat überzeugen können, werden solche Vergleichungsgenügen machen; denn sie veranlassen mit Recht die Erwartung, es vielleicht dereinst bis zur Einsicht der Einheit des ganzen reinen Vernunftvermögens (des theoretischen sowohl als praktischen) bringen, und alles aus einem Prinzip ableiten zu können; welches das unvermeidliche Bedürfnis der menschlichen Vernunft ist, die nur in einer vollständig systematischen Einheit ihrer Erkenntnisse völlige Zufriedenheit findet.

Betrachten wir nun aber auch den Inhalt der Erkenntnis, die wir von einer reinen praktischen Vernunft, und durch dieselbe, haben können, so wie die Analytik derselben darlegt, so finden sich, bei einer merkwürdigen Analogie zwischen ihr und der theoretischen, nicht weniger merkwürdige Unterschiede. In Ansehung der theoretischen könnte das Vermögen eines reinen Vernunfterkennnisses a priori durch Beispiele aus Wissenschaften (bei denen man, da sie ihre Prinzipien auf so mancherlei Art durch methodischen Gebrauch auf die Probe stellen, nicht so leicht, wie im gemeinen Erkenntnisse, geheime Beimischung empirischer Erkenntnisgründe zu besorgen hat) ganz leicht und evident bewiesen werden. Aber daß reine Vernunft, ohne Beimischung irgend eines empirischen Bestimmungsgrundes, für sich allein auch praktisch sei, das müßte man aus dem gemeinen praktischen Vernunftgebrauche daran können, indem man den obersten praktischen Grundsatz, als einen solchen, den jede natürliche Menschenvernunft, als völlig a priori, von keinen sinnlichen Dats abhängend, für das obste Gesetz seines Willens erkennt, beglaubigte. Man müßte ihn zuerst, der Reinigkeit seines Ursprungs nach, selbst im Urteil dieser gemeinen Vernunft bewähren und rechtfertigen, ehe ihn noch die Wissenschaft in die Hände nehmen konnte, um Gebrauch von ihm zu machen, gleichsam als ein Faktum, das vor allem Vernünftigen über seine Möglichkeit und allen Folgerungen, die daraus zu ziehen sein möchten, vorhergeht. Aber dieser Umstand läßt sich auch aus dem kurz vorher Angeführten

1 Akad.-Ausz.: *konnte*.
cause practical pure reason necessarily must begin with fundamental principles, which thus, as the original data, must be made the basis of the whole science and not regarded as first originating from it. On this account, the justification of moral principles as principles of pure reason could be made with sufficient certainty through merely appealing to the judgment of common sense, since everything empirical which might insinuate itself into our maxims as a motive of the will immediately reveals itself through the feeling of enjoyment or [92] pain which necessarily attaches to it in so far as it arouses desire, and pure practical reason immediately refuses to take it as a condition into its principle. The dissimilarity of rational and empirical motives is made recognizable through the resistance of a practically legislating reason to all interfering inclinations, which is shown in a peculiar kind of feeling which does not precede the legislation of practical reason but which is, on the contrary, first effected by it, as a compulsion. That is, it is revealed through the feeling of respect of a kind that no man has for any inclinations whatever, but which he may feel for the law alone. It is shown so saliently and prominently that no one, not even the commonest mind, can fail in a moment to discover in an example that, though he can be urged by empirical grounds of volition to follow their attractions, he can be expected to obey nothing but the pure practical law of reason.

In the doctrine of happiness empirical principles constitute the entire foundation, but in the doctrine of morality they do not form even the smallest part of it. The differentiation between these two is the first and most important task charged to the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, and in it we must proceed as exactly and as punctiously as ever a geometer went about his job. But the philosopher here (as everywhere else in rational knowledge, having to use mere concepts without any constructions for them) must struggle with greater difficulties than the geometer, because he can take no intuition (of a pure noumenon) as a foundation. He has the advantage, however, that, almost like the chemist, he can at any time arrange an experiment with the practical reason of any man, in order to dis-
tistinguish the moral (pure) motive from the empirical; he does so when he adds the moral law (as a motive) to the empirically affected will (e.g., to the will of a person who would like to tell a lie so that he could thereby gain something). When the analyst adds alkali to a solution of calcareous earth in muriatic acid, the acid releases the lime and combines with the alkali, and the lime precipitates. Just in the same way, if a man who is otherwise honest (or who this one time puts himself only in thought in the place of an honest man) is confronted with the moral law, by which he recognizes the worthlessness of the [93] liar, his practical reason, in its judgment of what ought to be done, immediately forsakes the advantage and combines with that which maintains in him his respect for his own person (truthfulness), and the advantage is easily weighed by anyone after it is separated and washed of every particle of reason (which is wholly on the side of duty), so that it can enter into combination with reason in still other cases, though not in any case where it could be opposed to the moral law, for reason never forsakes this but rather combines most closely with it.

But this distinction of the principle of happiness from that of morality is not for this reason an opposition between them, and pure practical reason does not require that we should renounce the claims to happiness; it requires only that we take no account of them whenever duty is in question. It can even be a duty in certain respects to provide for one's happiness, in part because (since it includes skill, health, and riches) it contains means to the fulfilment of one's duty and in part because the lack of it (e.g., poverty) contains temptations to transgress against duty. But to further one's happiness can never be a direct duty, and even less can it be a principle of all duty. Since all motives of the will (except the one and only pure practical law of reason, i.e., the moral law) are empirical and as such belong to the principle of happiness, they must be separated from the supreme practical principle and never be incorporated with it as a condition, for this would destroy all moral worth just as surely as any admixture of anything empirical in geometrical axioms would destroy all mathematical certainty, which is, ac-

stellen kann, um den moralischen (reinen) Bestimmungsgrund vom empirischen zu unterscheiden; wenn er nämlich zu dem empirisch-affizierten Willen (z. B. desjenigen, der gerne lügen möchte, weil er sich dadurch was erwerben kann) das moralische Gesetz (als Bestimmungsgrund) zusetzt. Es ist, als ob der Scheidekünstler der Solution der Kalkerde in Salzgeist Alkali zusetzt; der Salzgeist verläuft so fort den Kalk, vereinigt sich mit dem Alkali, und jener wird zu Boden gestürzt. Eben so haltet dem, der sonst ein ehrlicher Mann ist (oder sich doch diesmal nur in Gedanken in die Stelle eines ehrlichen Mannes versetzt), das moralische Gesetz vor, an dem er die Nichtsüblichkeit eines Lügners erkennt, so fort verlässt seine praktische Vernunft (im Urteil über das, was von ihm geschehen sollte) den Vorteil, vereinigt sich mit dem, was ihm die Achtung für seine eigene Person erhält (der Wahrhaftigkeit), und der Vorteil wird nun von jeder Mann, nachdem er von allem Anhängsel der Vernunft (welche nur gänzlich auf der Seite der Pflicht ist) abgesondert und gewaschen worden, gewogen, um mit der Vernunft noch wohl in anderen Fällen in Verbindung zu treten, nur nicht, wo er dem moralischen Gesetze, welches die Vernunft niemals verlässt, sondern sich innig damit vereinigt, zuwider sein könnte.

Aber diese Unterscheidung des Glückseligkeitsprinzips von dem der Sittlichkeit ist darum nicht so fort Entgegensetzung beider, und die rein praktische Vernunft will nicht, man solle die Ansprüche auf Glückseligkeit aufgeben, sondern nur, so bald von Pflicht die Rede ist, darauf gar nicht Rücksicht nehmen. Es kann sogar in gewissem Betracht Pflicht sein, für seine Glückseligkeit zu sorgen; teils weil sie (wozu Geschicklichkeit, Gesundheit, Reichtum gehört) Mittel zu Erfüllung seiner Pflicht enthält, teils weil der Mangel derselben (z. B. Armut) Versuchungen enthält, seine Pflicht zu übertreten. Nur, seine Glückseligkeit zu befördern, kann unmittelbar niemals Pflicht, noch weniger ein Prinzip aller Pflicht sein. Da nun alle Bestimmungsgründe des Willens, außer dem einigen reinen praktischen Vernunftgesetze (dem moralischen), insgesamt empirisch sind, als solche also zum Glückseligkeitsprinzip gehören, so müssen sie insgesamt vom obersten sittlichen Grundsätze abgesondert, und ihm nie als Bedingung einverleibt werden, weil dieses eben so sehr allen sittlichem Wert, als empirische Bemischung zu geometrischen Grundsätzen alle mathematische Evidenz, das Vortrefflichste, was (nach Platos Urteile)

1 Akad.-Ausg. erwürgt: "von einem".
According to Plato's judgment, the highest excellence mathematics has, surpassing even its utility.

But instead of the deduction of the supreme principle of pure practical reason, i.e., the explanation of the possibility of such a cognition a priori, nothing more could be done than to show that, if we saw the possibility of freedom of an efficient cause, we would see not only the possibility but also the necessity of the moral law as the supreme practical law of rational beings, to whom freedom of the causality of their will is ascribed. This is because the two concepts are so inextricably bound together that practical freedom could be defined through the will's independence of everything except the [94] moral law. But the possibility of freedom of an efficient cause cannot be comprehended, especially in the world of sense; we are indeed fortunate if we can be sufficiently assured that no proof of its impossibility can be given and that the moral law postulates freedom and compels and authorizes us to assume it.

But there are many who believe they can explain this freedom with empirical principles, just as they can explain other natural abilities. They regard it as a psychological property, the explanation of which turns solely upon a more exact investigation of the nature of the soul and of the drives of the will and not as the transcendental predicate of the causality of a being which belongs to the world of sense; but it is this latter which is what really counts. Thus they deprive us of the great revelation which we experience through pure practical reason by means of the moral law—the revelation of an intelligible world through realization of the otherwise transcendent concept of freedom; they deprive us of moral law itself, which assumes absolutely no empirical motive. Therefore, it will be necessary to add something here as a protection against this delusion and to expose empiricism in its naked superficiality.

The concept of causality as natural necessity, unlike the concept of causality as freedom, concerns only the existence of things as far as it is determinable in time, and consequently as appearances in contrast to their causality as things in themselves.
selves. If one takes the attributes of the existence of things in time for attributes of things in themselves, which is the usual way of thinking, the necessity in the causal relation can in no way be united with freedom. They are contradictory to each other, for the former implies that every event, and consequently every action which occurs at a certain point of time, is necessary under the condition of what preceded it. Since the past is no longer in my power, every action which I perform is necessary because of determining grounds which are not in my power. That means that at the time I act I am never free. Indeed, if I assumed my entire existence were independent of any external cause (e.g., God), so that the determining grounds of my causality and even of my whole existence were not outside me, this would not in the least convert that natural necessity into freedom. For at every point of time I still stand under the necessity of being determined to act by what is not in my power, and the a parte priori infinite series of events which I can continue only by an already predetermined order would never commence of itself. It would be a continuous natural chain, and thus my causality would never be freedom.

Therefore, if one attributes freedom to a being whose existence is determined in time, its existence, including its actions, cannot be exempted from the law of natural necessity of all events in its existence, including also its actions. Making such an exception would be equivalent to delivering this being to blind chance. Since this law inevitably concerns all causality of things so far as their existence is determinable in time, freedom would have to be rejected as a void and impossible concept if this were the way in which we thought of the existence of these things as they are in themselves. Consequently, if we wish still to save it, no other course remains than to ascribe the existence of a thing so far as it is determinable in time, and accordingly its causality under the law of natural necessity, merely to appearance, and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in itself. This is absolutely unavoidable if one wishes to maintain both these mutually incompatible concepts; but in applying them, when one wishes to explain them

1 Akad.-Ausz.: *im.*  
2 Akad.-Ausz.: *sind*.
as united in one and the same action and thus explain this union itself, great difficulties turn up, which seem to make such a unification impossible.

Suppose I say of a man who has committed a theft that this act, by the natural law of causality, is a necessary result of the determining ground existing in the preceding time and that it was therefore impossible that it could have not been done. How, then, can judgment according to the moral law make any change in it? And how can it be supposed that it still could have been left undone because the law says that it ought to have been left undone? That is, how can he be called free at this point of time with reference to this action, when in this moment and in this action he stands under inexorable natural necessity? It is a wretched subterfuge to seek an escape in the supposition that the kind of determining grounds of his causality according to natural law agrees with a comparative concept of freedom. According to this concept, what is sometimes called "free effect" is that of which the determining natural cause is internal to the acting thing. For example, that which a projectile performs when it is in free motion is called by the name "freedom" because it is not pushed by anything external while it is in flight. Or, another example: we call the motion of a clock "free movement" because it moves the hands itself, which need not be pushed by an external force. So one might call the actions of man "free" because they are actions caused by ideas we have produced by our own powers, whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances and thus because they are actions brought about at our own pleasure; in this sense they are called free even though they are necessary because their determining grounds have preceded them in time. With this manner of argument many allow themselves to be put off and believe that with a little quibbling they have found the solution to the difficult problem which millennia have sought in vain and which could hardly be expected to be found so completely on the surface.

In the question of freedom which lies at the foundation of all moral laws and accountability to them, it is really not at all a question of whether the causality determined by a natural law

man sie als in einer und derselben Handlung vereinigt, und also diese Vereinigung selbst erklären will, tun sich doch große Schwierigkeiten hervor, die eine solche Vereinigung untunlich zu machen scheinen.

Wenn ich von einem Menschen, der einen Diebstahl verübt, sage: diese Tat sei nach dem Naturgesetze der Kausalität aus den Bestimmungsgründen der vorhergehenden Zeit ein notwendiger Erfolg, so war es unmöglich, daß sie hat unterbleiben können; wie kann denn die Beurteilung nach dem moralischen Gesetze hierin eine Änderung machen, und voraussetzen, daß sie doch habe unterlassen werden können, weil das Gesetz sagt, sie hätte unterlassen werden sollen, d. i. wie kann derjenige, in denselben Zeitpunkte, in Absicht auf dieselbe Handlung, ganz frei sein, in welchem, und in derselben Absicht, er doch unter einer unvermeidlichen Naturnotwendigkeit steht? Eine Ausflucht darin suchen, daß man bloß die Art der Bestimmungsgründe seiner Kausalität nach dem Naturgesetze einem komparativen Begriffe von Freiheit anpaßt (nach welchem das bisweilen freie Wirken heißt, davon der bestimmende Naturgrund innerlich im wirkenden Wesen liegt, z. B. das, was ein geworfer Körper verrichtet, wenn er in freier Bewegung ist, da man das Wort Freiheit braucht, weil er, während daß er im Fluge ist, nicht von außen wodurch getrieben wird, oder wie wir die Bewegung einer Uhr auch eine freie Bewegung nennen, weil sie ihren Zeiger selbst treibt, der also [nicht äußerlich geschoben werden darf, eben so die Handlungen des Menschen, ob sie gleich, durch ihre Bestimmungsgründe, die in der Zeit vorhergehen, notwendig sind, dennoch frei nennen, weil es doch innere durch unsere eigene Kräfte hervorgebrachte Vorstellungen, dadurch nach veranlassenden Umständen erzeugte Begierden und mithin nach unserem eigenen Belieben bewirkte Handlungen sind) ist ein elender Behelf, womit sich noch immer einige hinhalten lassen, und so jenes schwere Problem mit einer kleinen Wortklauberei aufgelöst zu haben meinen, an dessen Auflösung Jahrtausende vergeblich gearbeitet haben, die daher wohl schwerlich so ganz auf der Oberfläche gefunden werden dürfte.

Es kommt

nämlich bei der Frage nach derjenigen Freiheit, die allen moralischem Gesetzen und der ihnen gemäßen Zurechnung zum Grunde gelegt werden muß, darauf gar nicht an, ob die nach einem Naturgesetze bestimmte Kausalität durch Be-
is necessary through determining grounds lying within or without the subject, or whether, if they lie within him, they are in instinct or in motives thought by reason. If these determining representations themselves have the ground of their existence in time and, more particularly, in the antecedent state and these again in a preceding state, and so on (as these men themselves admit); and if they are without exception internal; and if they do not have mechanical causality but a psychological causality through representations instead of through bodily movements: they are nonetheless determining grounds of the causality of a being so far as his existence is determinable in time. As such, this being is under necessitating conditions of past time which are no longer in his power when he acts. Thus these conceptions do indeed imply psychological freedom (if one wishes to use this word for a merely internal concatenation of representations in the mind), but nonetheless they also imply natural necessity, leaving no room for transcendental freedom which must be thought of as independence from everything empirical and hence from nature generally, whether regarded as an object of inner sense merely in time or also as an object of outer sense in both space and time. Without transcendental freedom in its proper meaning, which is alone a priori practical, no moral law and no accountability to it are possible. For this reason, all necessity of events in time according to natural law can be called the “mechanism of nature,” even though it is not supposed that things which are subject to it must really be material machines. Here reference is made only to the necessity of the connection of events in a temporal series as they develop according to natural law, whether the subject in which this development occurs be called automaton materiale when the machinery is impelled by matter, or, with Leibniz, automaton spirituale when it is impelled by representations. And if the freedom of our will were nothing else than the latter, i.e., psychological and comparative and not at the same time also transcendental or absolute, it would in essence be no better than the freedom of a turnspit, which when once wound up also carries out its motions of itself.

Now in order to remove the apparent contradiction between

1 Akad. Ausg. »nun als«.
the mechanism of nature and freedom in the case under discussion, we must remember what was said in the Critique of Pure Reason or what it implies, viz., that natural necessity, which cannot coexist with the freedom of the subject, attaches merely to the determinations of a thing which stands under the conditions of time, and consequently applies only to the determination of the acting subject as appearance. As a consequence, [natural necessity pertains to the subject] only so far as the determining grounds of any action of the subject lie in what belongs to the past and is no longer in his power; in this must be counted also his already performed acts and his character as a phenomenon as this is determinable for him in his own eyes by those acts. But the same subject, which, on the other hand, is conscious also of his own existence as a thing in itself, also views his existence so far as it does not stand under temporal conditions, and himself as determinable only by laws which he gives to himself through reason. In this his existence nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will; every action and, in general, every changing determination of his existence conformable to inner sense, even the entire history of his existence as a sensuous being, is seen in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as nothing but a consequence, not as a determining ground, of his causality as a noumenon. From this point of view, a rational being can rightly say of any unlawful action that he has done that he could have left it undone, even if as an appearance it was sufficiently determined in the past and thus so far was inescapably necessary. For this action and everything in the past which determined it belong to a single phenomenon of his character, which he himself creates, and according to which he imputes to himself, as a cause independent of all sensuousness, the causality of those appearances.

The judicial sentences of that marvelous faculty in us called conscience are in complete agreement with this. A man may dissemble as much as he will in order to paint his remembered unlawful behavior as an unintentional error, as mere oversight, which can never be entirely avoided, and consequently as
something to which he was carried along by the stream of natural necessity, and in this way try to make himself out as innocent. But he finds that the advocate who speaks in his behalf cannot silence the accuser in him when he is conscious that at the time when he committed the wrong he was in his senses, i.e., he was in possession of his freedom. Nevertheless, he explains his misdeed by some bad habits which he has grown into by gradual neglect of attention to such a degree that he can regard the act as a natural consequence of them, but this cannot protect him from the blame and the reproach he casts upon himself. On this is based the repentance for an action long past, every time he remembers it. It is a painful feeling caused by the moral disposition, empty in a practical sense since it cannot undo that which has been done. Priestley, 4 as a true and consistent fatalist, even declares it to be absurd, and he deserves more applause for his candor than those who, asserting the mechanism of the will in acts but affirming its freedom in words, wish to have it thought that they include it in their syncretistic system, though they cannot render the possibility of such an imputation comprehensible. But as pain, repentance is entirely legitimate, because reason, when it is a question of the law of our intelligible existence (the moral law), acknowledges no temporal distinctions and only asks whether the event belongs to me as my act, and then morally connects with it the same feeling, whether the event occurs now or is long since past. For the life of the senses is but a single phenomenon in the eyes of an intelligible consciousness of its existence (the consciousness of freedom), and this phenomenon, so far as it contains merely appearances of the disposition which is of concern to the moral law (i.e., appearances of character), must be judged not according to natural necessity which pertains to it as appearance but according to the absolute spontaneity of freedom.

It may be admitted that if it were possible for us to have so deep an insight into a man's character as shown both in inner

4Joseph Priestley, The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated (1777).
and in outer actions, that every, even the least, drive to these actions and all external occasions which affect them were so known to us that his future conduct could be predicted with as great a certainty as the occurrence of a solar or lunar eclipse, we could nevertheless still assert that the man is free. For if we were capable of another view (which, however, is certainly not given us, but in place of which we have only the concept of reason), i.e., if we were capable of an intellectual intuition of the same subject, we would then discover that the entire chain of appearances, with reference to that which concerns only the moral law, depends upon the spontaneity of the subject as a thing in itself, for the determination of which no physical explanation can be given. Lacking this intuition, the moral law assures us of this difference between the relation of our actions as appearances to the sense-being of our subject and the relation by which this sensuous being is itself connected to the intelligible substrate in us.

From this point of view, which is natural although inexplicable to our reason, judgments may be justified which, though made in all conscientiousness, seem at first glance to conflict with equity. There are cases in which men, even with an education which was profitable to others, have shown while still children such depravity, which continues to grow during their adult years, that they are held to be born villains and incapable of any improvement of character; yet they are judged by [100] their acts, they are reproached as guilty of their crimes; and, indeed, they themselves (the children) find these reproaches as well grounded as if they, regardless of the hopeless quality ascribed to their minds, were just as responsible as any other men. This could not happen if we did not suppose that whatever arises from man’s choice (as every intentional act undoubtedly does) has a free causality as its ground, which from early youth expresses its character in its appearances (its actions). These actions, by the uniformity of conduct, exhibit a natural connection. But the latter does not render the vicious quality of the will necessary, for this quality is rather the conse-

sich durch innere sowohl als äußere Handlungen zeigt, so
tiefe Einsicht zu haben, daß jede, auch die mindeste Trieb-
feder dazu uns bekannt würde, ungleichen alle auf diese wirt-
kende äußere Veranlassungen, man eines Menschen Verhal-
ten auf die Zukunft mit Gewißheit, so wie eine Mond- oder
Sonnenfinsternis, ausrechnen könnte, und dennoch | dabei
behaupten, daß der Mensch frei sei. Wenn wir nämlich noch
eines andern Blicks (der uns aber freilich gar nicht verleihen
ist, sondern an dessen Statt wir nur den Vernunftbegriff
haben), nämlich einer intellektuellen Anschauung desselben
Subjekts fähig wären, so würden wir doch inne werden, daß
diese ganze Kette von Erscheinungen in Anschauung dessen,
was nur immer das moralische Gesetz angehen kann, von
der Spontaneität des Subjekts, als Ding an sich selbst, ab-
hängt, von deren Bestimmung sich gar keine physische Er-
klarung geben läßt. In Ermangelung dieser Anschauung
versichert uns das moralische Gesetz diesen Unterschied der
Beziehung unserer Handlungen, als Erscheinungen, auf das
Sinnenwesen unseres Subjekts, von derjenigen, dadurch die-
ses Sinnenwesen selbst auf das intelligible Substrat in uns
bezogen wird.

In dieser Rücksicht, die unserer Vernunft
natürlich, obgleich unerklärlich ist, lassen sich auch Be-
vortellungen rechtfertigen, die, mit aller Gewissenhaftigkeit
geläutert, dennoch dem ersten Ansehens nach aller Büßigkeit
ganz zu widerstreiten scheinen. Es gibt Fälle, wo Menschen
durch Gewissenheit, selbst unter einer Erziehung, die, mit der
ihren zugleich, andern ersprießlich war, dennoch so frühe
Bosheit zeigen, und so bis in ihre Mannejahre zu steigen
fortfuhren, daß man sie für geborne Bösewichter, und gänz-
lieh, was die Denkmaisart betrifft, für unbesserlich hält,
gleichwohl aber sie wegen ihres Tuns und Lassens eben so
ericht, ihnen ihre Verdienste eben so als Schuld verweisen,
ja sie (die Kinder) selbst, diese Verweise so ganz genehmen
finden, als ob sie, ungeachtet der ihnen beigemessenen Stoß-
nunglosen Naturbeschaffenheit ihres Gemüts, eben so ver-
antwortlich blieben, als jeder andere Mensch. Dieses würde
nicht geschehen können, wenn wir nicht voraussetzten, daß
alles, was aus seiner Willkür entspringt (wie ohne Zweifel
eine vorsätzlich verübte Handlung), eine freie Kausalität
dazu habe, welche von der frühen Jugend an ihren Charakter in ihren Erscheinungen (den Handlungen) aus-
drückt, die wegen der Gleichförmigkeit des Verhaltens einen
Naturzusammenhang kenntlich machen, der aber nicht die
tzuge Beschaffenheit des Willens notwendig macht, sondern
vielmehr die Folge der freiwillig angenommenen bösen und unveränderbaren Grundsätze ist, welche ihn nur noch um desto verwirrender und strafwürdiger machen.

Aber noch steht eine Schwierigkeit der Freiheit bevor, so fern sie mit dem Naturmechanismus, in einem Wesen, das zur Sinnenwelt gehört, vereinigt werden soll. Eine Schwierigkeit, die, selbst nachdem alles Bisherige eingewilligt worden, der Freiheit dennoch mit ihrem gänzlichen Untergange droht. Aber bei dieser Gefahr gibt ein Umstand doch zugleich Hoffnung zu einem für die Behauptung der Freiheit noch glücklichen Ausgang, nämlich daß dieselbe Schwierigkeit viel stärker (in der Tat, wie wir bald sehen werden, allein) das System drückt, in welchem die in Zeit und Raum bestimmbare Existenz für die Existenz der Dinge an sich selbst gehalten wird, sie uns also nicht nötigt, unsere vornehmste Voraussetzung von der Idealität der Zeit, als bloßer Form sinnlicher Anschauung, folglich als bloßer Vorstellungsart, die dem Subjekte als zur Sinnenwelt gehört eigen ist, abzugehen, und also nur erfordert, sie mit dieser Idee zu vereinigen.

Wenn man uns nämlich auch eindruck, daß das intelligible Subjekt in Ansehung einer gegebenen Handlung noch frei sein kann, obgleich es als Subjekt, das auch zur Sinnenwelt gehört, in Ansehung derselben mechanisch bedingt ist, so scheint es doch, man müsse, so bald man annimmt, Gott, als allgemeines Urwesen, sei die Ursache auch der Existenz der Substanz (einer Satz, der niemals aufgegeben werden darf, ohne den Begriff von Gott als Wesen aller Wesen und hiemit seine Allgenausamkeit, auf die alles in der Theologie ankommt, zugleich mit aufgegeben), auch einräumen: Die Handlungen des Menschen haben in demjenigen ihren bestimmden, was gänzlich außer ihrer Gewalt ist, nämlich in der Kausalität eines von ihnen unterschiedenen höchsten Wesens, von welchem das Da-sein des erster, und die ganze Bestimmung seiner Kausalität ganz und gar abhängt. In der Tat: wären die Handlungen des Menschen, so wie sie zu seinen Bestimmungen in der Zeit gehören, nicht bloße Bestimmungen desselben als Erscheinung, sondern als Dinges an sich selbst, so würde die Freiheit nicht zu retten sein. Der Mensch wäre Marionette, oder ein Vaucansonsches Automat, gezimmert und
ton like Vaucanson's, fabricated and wound up by the Supreme Artist; self-consciousness would indeed make him a thinking automaton, but the consciousness of his spontaneity, if this is held to be freedom, would be a mere illusion. It would deserve to be called so only comparatively, as the proximate determining causes of its movement and a long series of their determining causes would be internal, while the ultimate and highest would lie wholly in a foreign hand. Therefore, I cannot conceive how those who persist in seeing space and time as attributes belonging to the existence of things in themselves can avoid fatalism of actions. Or, when they (like the otherwise so acute Mendelssohn) concede both as necessarily belonging to the existence of finite and derived beings, but not that of the infinite First Being, I do not see how they justify themselves or where they get the right to make such a distinction. I do not see even how they can evade the contradiction into which they fall when they regard existence in time as an attribute necessarily pertaining to finite things in themselves. This contradiction is as follows. God is the cause of this existence, and yet He cannot be the cause of time (or space) itself (because, as the necessary condition a priori for the existence of things, it must be presupposed [by this hypothesis]); consequently, God's causation of the existence of these things would have to be conditioned—in fact, temporally conditioned. Thereby everything which contradicts the concept of His infinity and independence would be unavoidably brought in.

It is very easy for us, on the other hand, to differentiate between the attribute of divine existence as independent of all temporal conditions and that of a being in the world of sense, as this distinction is precisely that between the existence of a being in itself and that of a thing in appearance. Therefore, if the ideality of time and space is not assumed, only [102]

5A. von Vaucanson had exhibited automatic figures in Paris in 1738.
6Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786), a German philosopher much admired by Kant, in his Morgenstunden (1786).
Spinozism remains, which holds space and time to be essential attributes of the First Being itself and the things dependent upon it (ourselves included), to be not substances but merely accidents inhering in substance. For if these things exist only as its effects in time, which would then be the condition of their existence itself, the actions of these beings would have to be merely the actions of one substance which it performs anywhere and at any time. Spinozism, therefore, in spite of the absurdity of its basic idea, argues far more cogently than the creation theory can when the latter sees beings which have been presumed to be substances existing in themselves in time as effects of a supreme cause, yet not as belonging to it and to its action but as substances in themselves.

The difficulty mentioned above is resolved briefly and clearly as follows. If existence in time is merely a sensible mode of presentation belonging to thinking beings in the world, and consequently does not concern them as things in themselves, the creation of these beings is a creation of things in themselves, because the concept of creation does not belong to the sensible mode of conceiving of existence or causality but can be referred only to noumena. Consequently, if I say of beings in the world of sense that they are created, I regard them only as noumena. Just as it would therefore be contradictory to say God is the creator of appearances, it is also a contradiction to say that He, as the creator, is the cause of actions in the world of sense, as these are appearances; yet at the same time He is the cause of the existence of the acting beings (as noumena). Now, assuming existence in time to hold only of appearances and not of things in themselves, if it is possible to affirm freedom without detriment to the natural mechanism of actions as appearances, then the circumstance that the acting beings are creatures cannot make the least difference to the argument, because creation concerns their intelligible but not their sensible existence, and therefore creation cannot be regarded as the determining ground of appearances. It would turn out very differently if the beings in the world existed as things in themselves in time, since the creator of substance
would then be also the author of the entire mechanism of this substance.

Such is the importance of the separation of time (as [103] well as space) from the existence of things in themselves, as this was effected in the *Critique of Pure* (speculative) *Reason*.

The solution which is given here to the difficulty will be said to have so much difficulty in it, however, that it is hardly susceptible of a lucid presentation. But is any other solution, which anyone has attempted or may attempt, any easier or more comprehensible? Rather might we say that the dogmatic teachers of metaphysics have shown more shrewdness than frankness in removing this difficult point as far as possible from view in the hope that, if they did not speak of it, no one would be likely to think of it. But, if a science is to be advanced, all difficulties must be exposed, and those which lie hidden in its way must even be sought out, for each of them calls forth a remedy without which means cannot be found to advance the science, whether in scope or in accuracy. In this way even obstacles will be means for furthering the thoroughness of the science. But, if, on the contrary, difficulties are intentionally hidden or merely removed with palliatives, sooner or later they break out in incurable evils, which bring the science to ruin in complete skepticism.

Since among all the Ideas of pure speculative reason it is, properly speaking, only the concept of freedom which brings such a great extension in the field of the supersensible, though it is only practical knowledge which is enlarged, I ask myself: Why does it alone have such great fruitfulness, the others only indicating the empty place for merely possible beings of the understanding without being able in any way to define the concept of them? I soon see that, since I can think nothing without a category, I must first seek out the category in reason’s Idea of freedom. This is the category of causality. I also see that, although no corresponding intuition can be made the basis of *reason’s* concept of freedom, inasmuch as it is a transcendent concept, a sensible intuition must previously be given to the

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heber des ganzen Maschinenwesens an dieser Substanz sein würde.

Von so großer Wichtigkeit ist die in der Krit. der r. spek. V. verrichtete Absonderung der Zeit (so wie des Raums) von der Existenz der Dinge an sich selbst.

Die hier vorgetragene Auflösung der Schwierigkeit hat aber, wird man sagen, doch viel Schweres in sich, und ist einer hellen Darstellung kaum empfänglich. Allein, ist denn jede andere, die man versucht hat, oder versuchen mag, leichter und fasslicher? Eher möchte man sagen, die dogmatischen Lehrer der Metaphysik hätten mehr ihre Verschmitztheit als Aufrichtigkeit darin bewiesen, daß sie diesen schwierigen Punkt, so weit wie möglich, aus den Augen brachten, in der Hoffnung, daß, wenn sie davon gar nicht sprächen, auch wohl niemand leichtlich an ihn denken würde. Wenn einer Wissenschaft geholfen werden soll, so müssen alle Schwierigkeiten aufgedeckt und sogar diejenigen aufgesucht werden, die ihr noch so in geheim im Wege liegen; denn jede derselben ruft ein Hülfsmittel auf, welches, ohne der Wissenschaft einen Zuwachs, es sei an Umfang, oder an Bestimmtheit, zu verschaffen, nicht gefunden werden kann, wodurch also selbst die Hindernde Beförderungsmittel der Gründlichkeit der Wissenschaft werden. Dagegen, werden die Schwierigkeiten absichtlich verdeckt, oder bloß durch Palliativmittel gehoben, so brechen sie, über kurz oder lang, in unheilbare Übel aus, welche die Wissenschaft in einem gänzlichen Skeptizismus zu Grunde richten.

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Da es eigentlich der Begriff der Freiheit ist, der, unter allen Ideen der reinen spekulativen Vernunft, allein so große Erweiterung im Felde des Übersinnlichen, wenn gleich nur in Anschauung des praktischen Erkenntnisses verschafft, so fragte ich mich: woher denn ihm ausschließlichweise eine so große Fruchtbarkeit zu Teil geworden sei, indessen die übrigen zwar die leere Stelle für reine mögliche Verstandeswesen bezeichnen, den Begriff von ihnen aber durch nichts bestimmten können. Ich begreife bald, daß, daß ich nichts ohne Kategorie denken kann, diese auch in der Idee der Vernunft von der Freiheit, mit der ich mich beschäftige, zuerst müsse aufgesucht werden, welche hier die Kategorie der Kausalität ist, und daß ich, wenn¹ gleich dem Vernunftbegriffe der Freiheit, uns-
understanding's concept of causality (for the synthesis of which reason's concept of freedom requires the unconditioned), and only by sensible intuition is it assured objective reality.

Now all categories are divided into two classes: the mathematical, which deal with the unity of synthesis in the representation of objects, and the dynamical, which concern the synthetic unity in the representation of the existence of objects. The former (the categories of quantity and quality) always contain a synthesis of the homogeneous, in which the unconditioned for the sensibly conditioned cannot be found, since the unconditioned would itself be in space and time and thus would itself still be conditioned. Therefore, in the Dialectic of pure theoretical reason, the contrasted ways of finding the unconditioned and the totality of conditions for it were both false. The categories of the second class (those of causality and of the necessity of a thing) did in no way require this homogeneity of the conditioned and the condition in synthesis, because here it was not a question of how intuition is synthesized from a manifold within it but only of how existence of the conditioned object corresponding to the intuition is added to the existence of the condition (added in the understanding, as connected with it). In these categories it was permitted to add to the completely conditioned in the world of sense (to the causality and the contingent existence of things) the unconditioned in the intelligible world and to make the synthesis transcendent; this was permissible, even though the unconditioned was not further defined. Therefore, in the Dialectic of pure speculative reason it was found that the two apparently incompatible modes of finding the unconditioned for the conditioned (e.g., in the synthesis of causality, to find a causality which has no sensible condition for the conditioned in the series of causes and effects in the world of sense) do not in fact contradict each other; and that the same act, which as belonging to the world of sense is always sensibly conditioned, i.e., mechanically necessary, can at the same time, as belonging to the causality of the acting being in so far as it belongs to the intelligible world,

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tergelegt werden kann, dennoch dem Verstandesbegriffe (der Kausalität), für dessen Synthesis jener das Unbedingte fordert, zuvor eine sinnliche Anschauung gegeben werden müsse, dadurch ihm zuerst die objektive Realität gesichert wird.

Nun sind alle Kategorien in zwei Klassen, die mathematische, welche bloß auf die Einheit der Synthesis in der Vorstellung der Objekte, und die dynamische, welche auf die in der Vorstellung der Existenz der Objekte gehen, eingeteilt. Die erstere (die der Größe und der Qualität enthalten jederzeit eine Synthesis des Gleichartigen, in welcher das Unbedingte, zu dem in der sinnlichen Anschauung gegebenen Bedingten in Raum und Zeit, da es selbst wiederum zum Raume und der Zeit gehören, und also immer wieder unbedingt sein müßte, gar nicht kann gefunden werden; daher auch in der Dialektik der reinen theoretischen Vernunft die einander entgegengesetzten Arten, das Unbedingte und die Totalität der Bedingungen für sie zu finden, beide falsch waren. Die Kategorien der zweiten Klasse (die der Kausalität und der Notwendigkeit eines Dinges) erforderten diese Gleichartigkeit (des Bedingten und der Bedingung in der Synthesis) gar nicht, weil hier nicht die Anschauung, wie sie aus einem Mannigfaltigen in ihr zusammengesetzt, sondern nur, wie die Existenz des ihr korrespondierenden bedingten Gegenstandes zu der Existenz der Bedingung (im Verstande als damit verkümpft) hinzukomme, vorgestellt werden solle, und da war es erlaubt, zu dem durchgängig Bedingten in der Sinnenswelt (so wohl in Ansehung der Kausalität als des zufälligen Daseins der Dinge selbst) das Unbedingte, obwohl übrigens unbe-stimmt, in der intelligiblen Welt zu setzen, und die Synthesis transzendiert zu machen; daher denn auch in der Dialektik der r. spek. V. sich fand, daß beide, dem Scheine nach, einander entgegengesetzte Arten, das Unbedingte zum Bedingten zu finden, z. B. in der Synthesis der Kausalität zum Bedingten, in der Reihe der Ursachen und Wirkungen der Sinnenswelt, die Kausalität, die weiter nicht sinnlich bedingt ist, zu denken, sich in der Tat nicht widerspreche, und daß dieselbe Handlung, die, als zur Sinnenswelt gehörig, jederzeit sinnlich bedingt, d. i. mechanisch-notwendig ist, doch zugleich auch, als zur Kausalität des handelnden Wesens, so fern es zur intelligiblen Welt gehört ist, eine sinn-

1 Akad.-Ausz.: wiederum bedingt sein müßte. 2 Akad.-Ausz.: sollte.
have a sensibly unconditioned causality as its foundation. That is, it can be thought of as free.

Then it was only a question of whether this "can be" could be changed to an "is"; it was a question of whether in an actual case and, as it were, by a fact, one could prove that certain actions presupposed such an intellectual, sensibly unconditioned, causality, regardless of whether they are actual or only commanded, i.e., objectively and practically necessary. In actions actually given in experience as events in the world of sense we could not hope to meet with this connection, since causality through freedom must always be sought outside the world of sense in the intelligible, and things which are not sensible are not given to our perception and observation. Thus nothing remained but that perhaps an incontrovertible, objective principle of causality could be found which excluded every sensible condition from its determination, i.e., a principle in which reason does not call upon anything else as the determining ground of causality but rather by that principle itself contains it, thus being, as pure reason, practical of itself. This principle, however, needs no search and no invention, having long been in the reason of all men and embodied in their being. It is the principle of morality. Therefore, that unconditioned causality and its faculty, freedom, and therewith a being (myself) which belongs to the world of sense and at the same time to the intelligible world, are no longer thought merely indeterminately and problematically (which even speculative reason could admir as possible), but with respect to the law of its causality are determinately and assertorically known; thus is the reality of the intelligible world definitely established from a practical point of view, and this determinateness, which would be transcendent (extravagant) for theoretical purposes, is for practical purposes immanent.

We could not, however, take this step with the second dynamical Idea, i.e., that of a necessary being. Without the mediation of the first dynamical Idea we could not rise to it from the world of sense. For if we wish to try it, we should have to make the venture of leaving everything which is given to us and to

lich unbedingte Kausalität zum Grunde haben, mithin als frei gedacht werden könne.

Nun kam es bloß darauf an, daß dieses Können in ein Sein verwandelt würde, d. i., daß man in einem wahren Falle, gleichsam durch ein Faktum, beweisen könne: daß gewisse Handlungen eine solche Kausalität (die intellektuelle, sinnlich unbedingte) voraussetzen, sie mögen nun wirklich, oder auch nur geboten, d. i. objektiv praktisch notwendig sein. An wirklich in der Erfahrung gegebenen Handlungen, als Begebenheiten der Sinnenwelt, konnten wir diese Verknüpfung nicht anzutreffen hoffen, weil die Kausalität durch Freiheit immer außer der Sinnenwelt im Intelligiblen gesucht werden müß. Andere Dinge, außer den Sinnenwesen, sind uns aber zur Wahrnehmung und Beobachtung nicht gegeben. Also blieb nichts übrig, als daß etwa ein unwidersprechlicher und zwar objektiver Grundsatz der Kausalität, welcher alle sinnliche Bedingung von ihrer Bestimmung ausschließt, d. i. ein Grundsatz, in welchem die Vernunft sich nicht weiter auf etwas anderes als Bestimmungsgrund in Anschauung der Kausalität beruht, sondern die sie durch jenen Grundsatz schon selbst enthält, und wo sie also, als reine Vernunft, selbst praktisch ist, gefunden werde. Dieser Grundsatz aber bedarf keines Suchens und keiner Erfindung; er ist längst in aller Menschen Vernunft gewesen und ihrem Wesen einverleibt, und ist der Grundsatz der Sittlichkeit. Also ist jene unbedingte Kausalität und das Vermögen derselben, die Freiheit, mit dieser aber ein Wesen (ich selber), welches zur Sinnenwelt gehört, doch zugleich als zur intelligiblen gehörig nicht bloß unbestimmt und problematisch gedacht (welches schon die spekulative Vernunft als tunlich ausmitten konnte), sondern sogar in Anschauung des Gesetzes ihrer Kausalität bestimmt und assertorisch erkannt, und so uns die Wirklichkeit der intelligiblen Welt, und zwar in praktischer Rücksicht bestimmt, gegeben worden, und diese Bestimmung, die in theoretischer Absicht transzendent (überschwenglich) sein würde, ist in praktischer immanent.

Dergleichen Schritt aber konnten wir in Anschauung der zweiten dynamischen Idee, nämlich der eines notwendigen Wesens nicht tun. Wir konnten zu ihm aus der Sinnenwelt, ohne Vermittlung der ersteren dyn. Idee, nicht hinauf kommen. Denn, wollten wir es versuchen, so müßen wir den Sprung gewagt haben, alles das, was uns gegeben ist, zu
plunge into that of which nothing is given to us by which we could mediate the connection of such an intelligible being with the world of sense (because the necessary being would be known as given outside us). Nevertheless, with respect to our own subject so far as we know ourselves, on the one hand, as intelligible beings determined because of their freedom by the moral law, and, on the other, as acting according to this determination in the world of sense, it is obvious that all this is quite possible. Only the concept of freedom enables us to find the unconditioned for the conditioned and the intelligible for the sensible without going outside ourselves. For it is our [106] reason itself which through the supreme and unconditioned practical law recognizes itself, and the being which knows this law (our own person) as belonging to the pure world of the understanding and indeed defines the way in which it can be active as such a being. Thus it can be seen why in the entire faculty of reason only the practical can lift us above the world of sense and furnish cognitions of a supersensible order and connection, though these cognitions can be extended only as far as is needed for pure practical purposes.

Here I wish to call attention, if I may, to one thing, namely, that every step which one takes with pure reason, even in the practical field where one does not take subtle speculation into account, so neatly and naturally dovetails with all parts of the Critique of Pure (theoretical) Reason that it is as if each step had been carefully thought out merely to establish this confirmation. This agreement was by no means sought after. It is rather (as one can convince himself if he only follows moral considerations back to their principles) a self-evident agreement between the most important propositions of practical reason with the often seemingly too subtle and unnecessary remarks of the Critique of Pure (speculative) Reason—an accord that occasions surprise and astonishment, strengthening the maxim, already known and recommended by others, that in every scientific investigation we should unswervingly pursue our course with all possible accuracy and candor without attending to any extraneous difficulties it might involve, carrying

verlassen, und uns zu dem hinzuschwingen, wovon uns auch nichts gegeben ist, wodurch wir die Verknüpfung eines solchen intelligiblen Wesens mit der Sinnenwelt vermitteln könnten (weil das notwendige Wesen als äußer uns gegeben erkannt werden sollte); welches dagegen in Ansehung unseres eigenen Subjekts, so fern es sich durchs moralische Gesetz einerseits als intelligibles Wesen (vermögen der Freiheit) bestimmt, andererseits als nach dieser Bestimmung in der Sinnenwelt tätig, selbst erkennt, wie jetzt der Augenschein darunt, ganz wohl möglich ist. Der einzige Begriff der Freiheit verstattet es, daß wir nicht äußer uns hinausgehen dürfen, um das Unbedingte und Intelligible zu dem Bedingten und Sinnlichen zu finden. Denn es ist unsere Vernunft selber, die sich durchs höchste und unbedingte praktische Gesetz, und das Wesen, das sich dieses Gesetzes bewußt ist (unsere eigene Person), als zur reinen Verstandeswelt gehörig, und zwar sogar mit Bestimmung der Art, wie es als ein solches tätig sein könne, erkennt. So läßt sich begreifen, warum in dem ganzen Vernunftvermögen nur das Praktische dasjenige sein könne, welches uns über die Sinnenwelt hinaushilft, und Erkenntnisse von einer übersinnlichen Ordnung und Verknüpfung verschaffte, die aber eben darum freilich nur so weit, als es gerade für die reine praktische Absicht nötig ist, ausgedehnt werden können.

Nur auf eines sei es mir erlaubt bei dieser Gelegenheit noch aufmerksam zu machen, nämlich daß jeder Schritt, den man mit der reinen Vernunft tut, sogar im praktischen Felde, wo man auf subtile Spekulation gar nicht Rücksicht nimmt, dennoch sich so genau und zwar von selbst an alle Momente der Kritik der theoretischen Vernunft anschließt, als ob jeder mit überlegter Vorsicht, bloß um dieser Bestätigung zu verschafft, ausgedacht wäre. Eine solche auf keinerlei Weise gesuchte, sondern (wie man sich selbst davon überzeugt, wenn man nur die moralischen Nachforschungen bis zu ihren Prinzipien fortsetzen will) sich von selbst findende, genaue Eintreffung der wichtigsten Sätze der praktischen Vernunft, mit denen oft zu subtil und unnötig scheindenden Bemerkungen der Kritik der spekulativen, überrascht und setzt in Verwunderung, und bestärkt die schon von anderem erkannte und gepriesene Maxime, in jeder wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung mit aller möglichen Genauigkeit und Offenheit seinen Gang ungestört fortzusetzen, ohne sich an das zu kehren, wovunder sie außer ihrem Felde etwa verstoßen möchte, sondern sich für sich allein.
out as far as we can our investigation by itself honestly and completely. Frequent observation has convinced me that once one has seen through such business, that which, when half-finished, appeared very dubious in view of extraneous theories, is at last found to be in an unexpected way completely harmonious with that which had been discovered separately without the least regard for them, provided this dubiousness is left out of sight for a while and only the business at hand is attended to until it is finished. Writers would save themselves many errors and much labor lost (because spent on delusions) if they could only resolve to go to work with a little more ingenuousness.
BOOK II

DIALECTIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

CHAPTER I

OF A DIALECTIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON
IN GENERAL

In both its speculative and its practical employment, [107] pure reason always has its dialectic, for it demands the absolute totality of conditions for a given conditioned thing, and this can be reached only in things in themselves. Since, however, all concepts of things must be referred to intuitions which, for us human beings, can never be other than sensible, and which thus let objects be known not as things in themselves but only as appearances, appearances being a series of the conditioned and their conditions in which the unconditioned can never be found, it follows that an unavoidable illusion arises from the application of the rational Idea of the totality of conditions (and thus of the unconditioned) to appearances as if they were things in themselves (for this is the way in which they are considered in default of a warning critique). But the illusion would never be noticed as deceptive if it were not betrayed by a conflict of reason with itself in applying to appearances its principle of presupposing the unconditioned for every conditioned thing. Reason is thus forced to investigate this illusion, to find out how it arises and how it can be removed. This can be done only through a complete critical examination of the entire pure faculty of reason; the antinomy of pure reason, which becomes obvious in its dialectic, is, in fact, the most fortunate perplexity in which human reason could ever have become involved, since it finally compels us to seek the key to escape from this

[107]

Die reine Vernunft hat jederzeit ihre Dialektik, man mag sie in ihrem spekulativen oder praktischen Gebrauche betrachten; denn sie verlangt die absolute Totalität der Bedingungen zu einem gegebenen Bedingten, und diese kann schlechterdings nur in Dingen an sich selbst angetroffen werden. Da aber alle Begriffe der Dinge auf Anschauungen bezogen werden müssen, welche, bei uns Menschen, niemals anders als sinnlich sein können, mithin die Gegenstände nicht als Dinge an sich selbst, sondern bloß als Erscheinungen erkennen lassen, in deren Reihe des Bedingten und der Bedingungen das Unbedingte niemals angetroffen werden kann, so entspringt ein unvermeidlicher Schein aus der Anwendung dieser Vernunftidee der Totalität der Bedingungen (mithin des Unbedingten) auf Erscheinungen, als wären sie Sachen an sich selbst (denn dafür werden sie, in Ernennung einer warnenden Kritik, jederzeit gehalten), der aber niemals als trüglich bemerkt werden würde, wenn er sich nicht durch einen Widerstreit der Vernunft mit sich selbst, in der Anwendung ihres Grundsatzes, das Unbedingte zu allem Bedingten vorauszusetzen, auf Erscheinungen, selbst verriet'. Hiedurch wird aber die Vernunft genötigt, diesem Scheine nachzuspüren, woraus er entspringe, und wie er gehoben werden könne, welches nicht anders, als durch eine vollständige Kritik des ganzen reinen Vernunftvermögens, geschehen kann; so daß die Antinomie der reinen Vernunft, die in ihrer Dialektik offenbar wird, in der Tat die wohltätigste Verirrung ist, in die die menschliche Vernunft je hat geraten können, indem sie uns zuletzt antreibt, den Schlüssel zu suchen, aus diesem Labyrinth herauszukom-

' Akad.-Ausg.: »dieses«.
men, der, wenn er gefunden worden, noch das entdeckt, was man nicht suchte und doch bedarf, nämlich eine Aussicht in eine höhere, unveränderliche Ordnung der Dinge, in der wir schon jetzt sind, und in der unser Dasein der höchsten Vernunftbestimmung gemäß fortzusetzen wir durch bestimmte Vorschriften nunmehr angewiesen werden können.

Wie im spekulativen Gebrauche der reinen Vernunft jene natürliche Dialektik aufzulösen, und der Irrtum, aus einem übrigens natürlichen Scheine, zu verbüßen sei, kann man in der Kritik jenes Vermögens ausführlich antreffen. Aber der Vernunft in ihrem praktischen Gebrauche geht es um nichts besser. Sie sucht, als reine praktische Vernunft, zu dem praktisch-Bedingten (was auf Neigungen und Naturbedürfnis beruht) ebenfalls das Unbedingte, und zwar nicht als Bestimmungsgrund des Willens, sondern, wenn dieser auch (im moralischen Gesetze) gegeben worden, die unbedingte Totalität des Gegenstandes der reinen praktischen Vernunft, unter dem Namen des höchsten Guts.

Diese Idee praktisch-, d. i. für die Maxime unseres vernünftigen Verhaltens, hinreichend zu bestimmen, ist die Weisheitslehre, und diese wiederum, als Wissenschaft, ist Philosophie, in der Bedeutung, wie die Alten das Wort verstanden, bei denen sie eine Anweisung zu dem Begriffe war, worin das höchste Gut zu setzen, und zum Verhalten, durch welches es zu erwerben sei. Es wäre gut, wenn wir dieses Wort bei seiner alten Bedeutung ließen, als eine Lehre vom höchsten Gut, so fern die Vernunft bestrebt ist, es darin zur Wissenschaft zu bringen. Denn einstheils würde die angehängte einschränkende Bedingung dem griechischen Ausdrucke (welcher Liebe zur Weisheit bedeutet) angemessen und doch zugleich hinreichend sein, die Liebe zur Wissenschaft, mithin aller spekulativen Erkenntnis der Vernunft, so fern sie ihr, sowohl zu jenem Begriffe, als auch dem praktischen Bestimmungsgrunde dienlich ist, unter dem Namen der Philosophie, mit zu befassen, und doch den Haupteck, um dessenwillen sie allein Weisheitslehre genannt werden kann, nicht aus den Augen verlieren lassen. Anderen Teils würde es auch nicht übel sein, den Eigendünkel desjenigen, der es wagt, sich des Titels eines Philosophen selbst anzumaßen, abzuschrecken, wenn man ihm schon durch die Definition den Maßstab der Selbstschätzung vorhielte, der seine Ansprüche sehr herabstim-

1 Akad.-Ausz.: verriet es.
very much. For to be a teacher of wisdom would mean something more than to be a student, who has not yet progressed far enough to conduct himself, and even less anyone else, to so high an end; it would mean to be a master of the knowledge of wisdom, which says more than a modest man would himself presume to claim. Philosophy as well as wisdom itself would always remain an ideal, which objectively is represen ted completely only in reason and which subjectively is only the goal for the person's unceasing endeavors. No one would be justified in professing to be in possession of it, under the assumed name of philosopher, unless he could show its infallible effect (in self-mastery and the unquestioned interest which he pre-eminently takes in the general good) on his own person as an example. This the ancients required as a condition for deserving that honorable title.

We have to make only one more preliminary remark with respect to the dialectic of pure practical reason in its definition of the concept of the highest good; and, if the solution of this dialectic is attained, we may expect a result just as useful as that accruing from the dialectic of theoretical reason, since the self-contradictions of pure practical reason, if properly exposed and not concealed, impel us to an exhaustive critical examination of its capacities.

The moral law is the sole motive of the pure will. Since it is merely formal, requiring only that the form of the maxim be that of universal law, as a determining ground it abstracts from all material and thus from every object of volition. Consequently, though the highest good may be the entire object of pure practical reason, i.e., of a pure will, it is still not to be taken as the motive of the pure will; the moral law alone must be seen as the ground for making the highest good and its realization or promotion the object of the pure will. This reminder is of importance in a case as delicate as that of the definition of moral principles, where even the slightest mistake perverts the character. For one sees from the Analytic that when we assume any object, under the name of good, as the motive of the will prior to the moral law, and then derive the supreme practical princi-
ple from it, this always produces heteronomy and rules out the moral principle.

But it is self-evident not merely that, if the moral law is included as the supreme condition in the concept of the highest good, the highest good is then the object, but also that the concept of it and the representation of its existence as pos- sible through our practical reason are at the same time the motive of the pure will. This is because the moral law, included and thought in this concept, and no other object, determines the will as required by the principle of autonomy. This order of concepts of the determination of the will should not be lost sight of, for otherwise we misunderstand ourselves and believe we are contradicting ourselves when everything really stands in the most perfect harmony.

CHAPTER II

ON THE DIALECTIC OF PURE REASON IN DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF THE HIGHEST GOOD

The concept of “highest” contains an ambiguity which, if not attended to, can occasion unnecessary disputes. The “highest” can mean the “supreme” (supremum) or the “perfect” (consummatus). The former is the unconditional condition, i.e., the condition which is subordinate to no other (originarium); the latter is that whole which is no part of a yet larger whole of the same kind (perfectissimum). That virtue (as the worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of whatever appears to us to be desirable and thus of all our pursuit of happiness and, consequently, that it is the supreme good have been proved in the Analytic. But these truths do not imply that virtue is the entire and perfect good as the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings. For this, happiness is also required, and indeed not merely in the partial eyes of a person who makes

ableitet, diesalsdenn jederzeit Heteronomie herbeibringen und das moralische Prinzip verdrängen würde.

Es versteht sich aber von selbst, daß, wenn im Begriff des höchsten Guts das moralische Gesetz, als oberste Bedingung, schon mit eingeschlossen ist, alsdenn das höchste Gut nicht bloß Objekt, sondern auch sein Begriff, und die Vorstellung der durch unsere praktische Vernunft möglichen Existenz desselben zugleich der Bestimmungszweck des reinen Willens sei; weil alsdenn in der Tat das in diesem Begriffe schon eingeschlossene und mitgedachte moralische Gesetz und kein anderer Gegenstand, nach dem Prinzip der Autonomie, den Willen bestimmt. Diese Ordnung der Begriffe von der Willensbestimmung darf nicht aus den Augen gelassen werden; weil man sonst sich selbst mißversteht und sich zu widersprechen glaubt, wo doch alles in der vollkommensten Harmonie neben einander steht.

ZWEITES HAUPTSTÜCK

VON DER DIALEKTIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT IN BESTIMMUNG DES BEGRIFFS VOM HÖCHSTEN GUT

Der Begriff des Höchsten enthält schon eine Zweideutigkeit, die, wenn man darauf nicht Acht hat, unnötige Streitigkeiten veranlassen kann. Das Höchste kann das Oberste (supremum) oder auch das Vollendete (consummatum) bedeuten. Das erstere ist diejenige Bedingung, die selbst unbedingt, d. i. keiner andern untergeordnet ist (originarium); das zweite dasjenige Ganze, das kein Teil eines noch größeren Ganzen von derselben Art ist (perfectissimum). Daß Tugend (als die Würdigkeit glücklich zu sein) die oberste Bedingung alles dessen, was uns nur wünschenswert scheinen mag, mithin auch aller unserer Bewerbung um Glückseligkeit, mithin das oberste Gut sei, ist in der Analytik bewiesen worden. Darum ist sie aber noch nicht das ganze und vollendete Gut, als Gegenstand des Begehrensvermögens versäumter endlicher Wesen; denn, um das zu sein, wird auch Glückseligkeit dazu erfordert, und zwar nicht bloß in den | parteiischen Augen der
DIALECTIC IM BEKRIFT VOM HÖCHSTEN GUT

Person, die sich selbst zum Zwecke macht, sondern selbst im Urteile einer unparteiischen Vernunft, die jene überhaupt in der Welt als Zweck an sich betrachtet. Denn der Glückseligkeit bedürftig, ihrer auch würdig, dennoch aber der selben nicht teilhaftig zu sein, kann mit dem vollkommenen Wollen eines vernünftigen Wesens, welches zugleich alle Gewalt hätte, wenn wir aus nur ein solches zum Versuche denken, gar nicht zusammen bestehen. So fern nun Tugend und Glückseligkeit zusammen den Besitz des höchsten Gutes in einer Person, hiefi aber auch Glückseligkeit, ganz genau in Proportion der Sittlichkeit (als Wert der Person und deren Würdigkeit glücklich zu sein) ausgeteilt, das höchste Gut einer möglichen Welt ausmachen: so bedeutet dieses das Ganze, das vollendete Gute, worin doch Tugend immer, als Bedingung, das obere Gut ist, weil es weiter keine Bedingung über sich hat, Glückseligkeit immer etwas, was dem, der sie besitzt, zwar angenehm, aber nicht für sich allein schlechterdings und in aller Rücksicht gut ist, sondern jederzeit das moralische gesetzmäßige Verhalten als Bedingung voraussetzt.

Zwei in einem Begriffe notwendig verbundene Bestimmungen müssen als Grund und Folge verknüpft sein, und zwar entweder so, daß diese Einheit als analytisch (logische Verknüpfung) oder als synthetisch (reale Verbindung), jene nach dem Gesetze der Identität, diese der Kausalität betrachtet wird. Die Verknüpfung der Tugend mit der Glückseligkeit kann also entweder so verstanden werden, daß die Bestrebung tugendhaft zu sein und die vernünftige Bewerbung um Glückseligkeit nicht zwei verschiedene, sondern ganz identische Handlungen wären, da denn der ersteren keine andere Maxime, als zu der letzteren zum Grade gelegt zu werden brauchte; oder jene Verknüpfung wird darauf ausgesetzt, daß Tugend die Glückseligkeit als etwas von dem Bewußtsein der ersteren Unterschiedenes, wie die Ursache eine Wirkung, hervorbringe.

Von den alten griechischen Schulen waren eigentlich nur zwei, die in Bestimmung des Begriffs vom höchsten Gute so fern zwar einer Methode befolgten, daß sie Tugend und Glückseligkeit nicht als zwei verschiedene Elemente des höchsten Gutes gelten ließen, mithin die Einheit des Prinzips nach der Regel der Identität suchten; aber darin schieden sie sich wiederum, daß sie unter beiden den Grundbegriff verschiedentlich wählten. Der Ekikureer sagte: sich seiner auf Glückseligkeit führenden Maxime bewußt sein, das ist Tugend; der Stoiker:
conscious of one's virtue is happiness. To the former, prudence amounted to morality; to the latter, who chose a higher term for virtue, morality alone was true wisdom.

We cannot but regret that these men (whom we must nevertheless admire since they so early attempted all the conceivable ways of extending philosophy's conquest) unfortunately applied their acuteness to digging up an identity between such extremely heterogeneous concepts as those of happiness and virtue. But it fits the dialectical spirit of their times (and still sometimes leads subtle minds astray) to overcome essential differences in principle, which can never be united, by seeking to translate them into a conflict of words and thus to devise an apparent unity of the concepts with other terms. This commonly occurs in cases where the unification of heterogeneous principles lies either so high or so deep, or would require so thorough a revolution of doctrines otherwise accepted in a philosophical system, that men fear to go deeply into the real difference and prefer to treat it as a mere diversity in formulas.

While both schools tried to ferret out the sameness of the practical principles of virtue and happiness, they were not for that reason agreed as to the way in which to force out this identity; rather they became widely separated from each other, as the one sought its principle on the sensuous and the other on the logical side, one putting it in the consciousness of sensuous need and the other in the independence of practical reason from all sensuous motives. The concept of virtue, according to the Epicurean, lay already in the maxim of furthering one's own happiness; the feeling of happiness, for the Stoic, was, on the contrary, already contained in the consciousness of his virtue. Whatever is contained in another concept, however, is the same as one of its parts but not the same as the whole, and two wholes can, moreover, be specifically different from each other though they consist of the same content if their parts are combined in different ways. The Stoics asserted virtue to be the entire highest good, and happiness was only the consciousness of this possession as belonging to the state of the subject. The
Epicurean stated that happiness was the entire highest good and that virtue was only the form of the maxim by which it could be procured through the rational use of means to it.

But it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and those of one's own happiness are wholly heterogeneous and far removed from being at one in respect to their supreme practical principle; and even though they belong to a highest good, which they jointly make possible, they strongly limit and check each other in the same subject. Thus the question, "How is the highest good practically possible?" remains an unsolved problem in spite of all previous attempts at conciliation. That which makes it so difficult a problem is shown in the Analytic: happiness and morality are two specifically different elements of the highest good and therefore their combination cannot be known analytically (as if a person who sought his happiness [113] found himself virtuous merely through solving his problem, or one who followed virtue found himself ipso facto happy in the consciousness of this conduct). The highest good is a synthesis of concepts. Since, however, this combination is known as a priori and thus as practically necessary, and not derivable from experience, and since the possibility of the highest good therefore rests on no empirical principles, the deduction of this concept must be transcendent. It is a priori necessary to bring forth the highest good through the freedom of the will; the condition of its possibility, therefore, must rest solely on a priori grounds of knowledge.

I. THE ANTINOMY OF PRACTICAL REASON

In the highest good which is practical for us, i.e., one which is to be made real by our will, virtue and happiness are thought of as necessarily combined, so that the one cannot be assumed by a practical reason without the other belonging to it. Now this combination is, like every other, either analytic or synthetic. Since it cannot be analytic, as has been shown, it must be thought synthetically and, more particularly, as the connection of cause and effect, for it concerns a practical good, i.e., one
that is possible through action. Therefore, the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The first is absolutely impossible, because (as has been proved in the Analytic) maxims which put the determining ground of the will in the desire for one's happiness are not moral at all and can serve as ground for no virtue. The second is, however, also impossible, since every practical connection of causes and effects in the world, as a result of the determination of the will, is dependent not on the moral dispositions of the will but on knowledge of natural laws and the physical capacity of using them to its purposes; consequently, no necessary connection, sufficient to the highest good, between happiness and virtue in the world can be expected from the most meticulous observance of the moral law. Since, now, the furthering of the highest good, which contains this connection in its concept, is an a priori necessary object of our will and is inseparably related to the moral law, the impossibility of the highest good must prove the falsity of the moral law also. If, therefore, the highest good is impossible according to practical rules, then the moral law which commands that it be furthered must be fantastic, directed to empty imaginary ends, and consequently inherently false.

II. CRITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE ANTINOMY OF PRACTICAL REASON

In the antinomy of pure speculative reason there is a similar conflict between natural necessity and freedom in the causation of events in the world. It was resolved by showing that there is no true conflict if the events and even the world in which they occur are regarded as only appearances (as they should be). This is because one and the same acting being as appearance (even to his own inner sense) has a causality in the sensible world always in accord with the mechanism of nature; while with respect to the same event, as far as the acting person regards himself as noumenon (as pure intelligence, existing

II. KRITISCHE AUFGEBERUNG DER ANTINOMIE DER PRAXISCHEN VERNUNFT

In der Antinomie der reinen spekulativen Vernunft findet sich ein ähnlicher Widerstreit zwischen Naturnotwendigkeit und Freiheit, in der Kausalität der Begebenheiten in der Welt. Er wurde dadurch gehoben, daß bewiesen wurde, es sei kein wahrer Widerstreit, wenn man die Begebenheiten, und selbst die Welt, darin sie sich ereignen, (wie man auch soll) nur als Erscheinungen betrachtet; da ein und dasselbe handelnde Wesen, als Erscheinung (selbst vor seinem eigenen inneren Sinne) eine Kausalität in der Sinnenwelt, die jederzeit dem Naturmechanismus gemäß ist, in Ansehung derselben Begebenheit aber, so fern sich die handelnde Person zugleich als Noumenon betrachtet (als reine Intelligenz,
without temporal determination), he can contain a determining ground of that causality which holds under natural laws, and this determining ground of natural causality itself is free from every natural law.

It is just the same with the present antinomy of pure practical reason. The first of the two propositions, viz., that striving for happiness produces a ground for a virtuous disposition, is absolutely false; the second, viz., that a virtuous disposition necessarily produces happiness, is not, however, absolutely false but false only in so far as this disposition is regarded as the form of causality in the world of sense. Consequently, it is false only if I assume existence in this world to be the only mode of existence of a rational being, and therefore it is only conditionally false. But not only since I am justified in thinking of my existence as that of a noumenon in an intelligible world but also since I have in the moral law a pure intellectual determiner, mining ground of my causality (in the sensuous world), it is not impossible that the morality of disposition should have a necessary relation as cause to happiness as an effect in the sensuous world; but this relation is indirect, mediated by an intelligible Author of nature. This combination, however, can occur only contingently in a system of nature which is merely the object of the senses and as such not sufficient to the highest good.

Thus, in spite of this apparent conflict of a practical reason with itself, the highest good is the necessary highest end of a morally determined will and a true object thereof; for it is practically possible, and the maxims of this will, which refer to it by their material, have objective reality. At first this objective reality was called in question by the antinomy in the combination of morality with happiness according to a general law; but this difficulty arose only from a misconception, because the relationship between appearances was held to be a relationship of the things in themselves to these appearances.

When we see ourselves obliged to seek at such distance — namely, in the context of an intelligible world — the possibility of the highest good which reason presents to all rational beings as the goal of all their moral wishes, it must appear strange that

KRITISCHE AUFHEbung DER ANTINOMIE

in sofern nicht der Zeit nach bestimmmbaren Dasein, einen Bestimmungsgrund jener Kausalität nach Naturgesetzen, der selbst von allem Naturgesetze frei ist, enthalten könne.

Mit der vorliegenden Antinomie der reinen praktischen Vernunft ist es nun eben so bewandt. Der erste von den zwei Sätzen, daß das Bestreben nach Glückseligkeit einen Grund tugendhalter Gesinnung hervorbringe, ist schlechterdings falsch; der zweite aber, daß Tugendgesinnung notwendig Glückseligkeit hervorbringe, ist nicht schlechterdings, sondern nur, so fern sie als die Form der Kausalität in der Sinnenwelt betrachtet wird, und, mithin, wenn ich das Dasein in derselben für die einzige Art der Existenz des vernünftigen Wesens annehme, also nur bedeutender Weise falsch. Da ich aber nicht allein befugt bin, mein Dasein auch als Nomeneum in einer Verstandeswelt zu denken, sondern sogar am moralischen Gesetze einen rein intellektuellen Bestimmungsgrund meiner Kausalität (in der Sinnenwelt) habe, so ist es nicht unmöglich, daß die Sittlichkeit der Gesinnung einen, wo nicht unmittelbaren, doch mittelbaren (vermittelt eines intellektiven Urhebers der Natur) und zwar notwendigen Zusammenhang, als Ursache, mit der Glückseligkeit, als Wirkung in der Sinnenwelt habe, welche Verbindung in einer Natur, die bloß Objekt der Sinne ist, niemals anders als zufällig stattfinden, und zum höchsten Gute nicht zulangen kann.

Also ist, unerachtet dieses scheinbaren Widerspruchs einer praktischen Vernunft mit sich selbst, das höchste Gut, der notwendige höchste Zweck eines moralisch bestimmten Willens, ein wahres Objekt derselben; denn es ist praktisch möglich, und die Maximen des letzteren, die sich darauf ihrer Materie nach beziehen, haben objektive Realität, welche anfänglich durch jene Antinomie in Verbindung der Sittlichkeit mit Glückseligkeit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze getroffen wurde, aber aus bloßem Mißverständnis und Verhältnis der Erscheinungen für ein Verhältnis der Dinge an sich selbst zu diesen Erscheinungen hielten.

Wenn wir uns genötigt sehen, die Möglichkeit des höchsten Gutes, dieses durch die Vernunft allen vernünftigen Wesen ausgesteckten Ziels aller ihrer moralischen Wünsche, in solcher Weise, nämlich in der Verknüpfung mit einer intelligenzio wereld, zu suchen, so muß es befremden, daß gleich-

1 Akad.-Ausg.: *hielt*. 
philosophers of both ancient and modern times have been able
to find happiness in very just proportion to virtue in this life (in
the world of sense) or at least have been able to convince
themselves of it. For Epicurus as well as the Stoics extolled hap-
piness springing from the consciousness of virtuous living
above everything else, and the former was not so base in his
practical precepts as one might conclude from the principles
of his theory, which he used for explanation and not for action, or
from the principles as interpreted by many who were misled by
his use of the term "pleasure" for "contentment." He, on the
contrary, reckoned the most disinterested practice of the good
among the ways of experiencing the most intimate joy; and
moderation and control of the inclinations, as these might have
been required by the strictest moral philosopher, belonged in
his scheme for enjoyment, whereby he understood constant
cheerfulness. He diverged from the Stoics chiefly by placing
the motive in this enjoyment, which the Stoics correctly re-
fused to do. For the virtuous Epicurus, like even now [16]
many morally well-meaning persons who do not give deep
enough consideration to their principles, fell into the error of
presupposing the virtuous disposition to be already in the per-
sons to whom he wished to provide drives to virtue. It is true
that the upright man cannot be happy if he is not already con-
scious of his righteousness, since with such a character the
moral self-condemnation to which his own way of thinking
would force him in case of any transgression would rob him of
all enjoyment of the pleasantness which his condition might
otherwise entail. But the only question is, "How is such a char-
acter and turn of mind in estimating the worth of his existence
even possible?" For prior to this no feeling for any moral
worth can be found in a subject. However favorable fortune may be
to a man in the physical circumstances of his life, if he is virtuous
he will certainly not enjoy life without being conscious of his
righteousness in each action; but can one make him virtuous
before he has so high an estimation of the moral worth of his
existence merely by commending to him the contentment of
spirit which will arise from the consciousness of righteousness
for which he as yet has no sense?
But, on the other hand, there is always here an occasion for a subterfuge (vitium subterfugii) and, as it were, for an optical illusion in the self-consciousness of what one does in contradiction to what one feels, which even the most experienced person cannot entirely avoid. The moral disposition is necessarily connected with a consciousness of the determination of the will directly by a law. Now the consciousness of a determination of the faculty of desire is always a ground for satisfaction in the resulting action; but this pleasure, this satisfaction with one’s self, is not the motive of the action; on the contrary, the determination of the will directly by reason alone is the ground of the feeling of pleasure, and this remains a pure practical determination of the faculty of desire, not a sensuous one. Since this determination produces the same inward effect, i.e., an impulse to activity, as does a feeling of agreeableness which is expected from the desired action, we see that what we ourselves do may easily be looked upon as something which we merely passively feel, the moral motive being held to be a [117] sensuous impulse, as it always occurs in so-called illusions of the senses (and here we have such an illusion of the inner sense). It is a very sublime thing in human nature to be determined to actions directly by a pure law of reason, and even the illusion wherein the subjective element of this intellectual determination of the will is held to be sensuous and an effect of a particular sensuous feeling (“intellectual feeling” being self-contradictory) partakes of this sublimity. It is of great importance to point out this quality of our personality and to cultivate so far as possible the effect of reason on this feeling. But we must, nevertheless, be on guard against degrading and deforming the real and authentic drive, the law itself, by awarding spurious praise to the moral motive as the drive as though it were based on feelings of particular joys, thus setting it, as it were, against a false foil; for these joys are only its consequences. Respect, in contrast to the enjoyment or gratification of happiness, is something for which there can be no feeling basic and prior to reason, for such a feeling would always be sensuous and pathological. Respect as the consciousness of the direct constraint of the will through law is hardly analogous to

Anderserseits aber liegt hier immer der Grund zu einem Fehler des Erscheiungsz (vitium subterfugii) und gleichsam einer optischen Illusion in dem Selbstbewußtsein dessen, was man tut, zum Unterschiede dessen, was man empfindet, die auch der Versuchtestes nicht völlig vermeiden kann. Die moralische Gesinnung ist mit einem Bewußtsein der Bestimmung des Willens unmittelbar duch das Gesetz notwendig verbunden. Nun ist das Bewußtsein einer Bestimmung des Begehungsvermögens immer der Grund eines Wohlgefallens an der Handlung, die dadurch hervorgebracht wird; aber diese Lust, dieses Wohlgefallen an sich selbst, ist nicht der Bestimmungsgrund der Handlung, sondern die Bestimmung des Willens unmittelbar, bloß durch die Vernunft, ist der Grund des Gefühls der Lust, und jene bleibt eine reine praktische nicht ästhetische Bestimmung des Begehungsvermögens. Da diese Bestimmung nun innerlich gerade dieselbe Wirkung eines Antriebs zur Tätigkeit tut, als ein Gefühl der Annehmlichkeit, die aus der begehrten Handlung erwartet wird, würde getan haben, so sehen wir das, was wir selbst tun, leichtlich für etwas an, was wir bloßleiderlich fühlen, und nehmen die moralische Triebfeder für sinnlichen Antrieb, wie das allemal in der sogenannten Täuschung der Sinne (hier des innern) zu geschehen pflegt. Es ist etwas sehr Erhabenes in der menschlichen Natur, unmittelbar durch ein reines Vernunftgesetz zu Handlungen bestimmt zu werden, und sogar die Täuschung, das Subjekt dieser intellektuellen Bestimmbarkeit des Willens für etwas Ästhetisches und Wirkung eines besonderen sinnlichen Gefühls (denn ein intellektuelles wäre ein Widerspruch) zu halten. Es ist auch von großer Wichtigkeit, auf diese Eigenschaft unserer Persönlichkeit aufmerksam zu machen, und die Wirkung der Vernunft auf dieses Gefühl bestmöglichst zu kultivieren. Aber man muß sich auch in Acht nehmen, durch unechte Hochpreisungen dieses moralischen Bestimmungsgrundes, als Triebfeder, indem man ihm Gefühle besonderer Freuden, als Gründe (die doch nur Folgen sind) unterlegt, die eigentliche echte Triebfeder, das Gesetz selbst, gleichsam wie durch eine falsche Folie, herabzusetzen und zu verunstalten. Achtung und nicht Verzug, oder Genuß der Glückseligkeit, ist also etwas, wofür kein der Vernunft zum Grunde gelegtes, vorhergehendes Gefühl (weil dieses jederzeit ästhetisch und pathologisch sein würde) möglich ist, als Bewußtsein des unmittelbaren Nötigung des Willens durch Gesetz, ist kaum ein Analogon

1 Akad.-Ausz. ergibt: „Glückseligkeit als etwas“. 
the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to the faculty of desire it produces exactly the same effect, but from different sources. But only through this mode of conception can one achieve what is sought, namely, that actions be done not merely according to duty (as a consequence of pleasant feelings) but from duty, which must be the true goal of all moral cultivation.

Do we not have a word to denote a satisfaction with existence, an analogue of happiness which necessarily accompanies the consciousness of virtue, and which does not indicate a [sensuous] gratification, as “happiness” does? We do, and this word is “self-contentment,” which in its real meaning refers only to negative satisfaction with existence in which one is conscious of needing nothing. Freedom and the consciousness of freedom, as a capacity for following the moral law with an unyielding disposition, are independent from inclinations, at least as motives determining (though not as affecting) our desiring; and, so far as I am conscious of freedom in obeying my moral maxims, it is the exclusive source of an unchanging contentment necessarily connected with it and resting on no particular feeling. This may be called intellectual [118] contentment. Sensuous contentment (improperly so called) which rests on the satisfaction of inclinations, however refined they may be, can never be adequate to that which is conceived under contentment. For inclinations vary; they grow with the indulgence we allow them, and they leave behind a greater void than the one we intended to fill. They are consequently always burdensome to a rational being, and, though he cannot put them aside, they nevertheless elicit from him the wish to be free of them. Even an inclination to do that which accords with duty (e.g., to do beneficent acts) can at most facilitate the effectiveness of moral maxims but not produce any such maxims. For in such maxims, everything must be directed to the thought of the law as the motive if the action is to contain not mere legality but also morality. Inclination, be it good-natured or otherwise, is blind and slavish; reason, when it is a question of morality, must not play the part of mere guardian of the inclinations, but,
without regard to them, as pure practical reason it must care for
its own interest to the exclusion of all else. Even the feeling of
sympathy and warmhearted fellow-feeling, when preceding
the consideration of what is duty and serving as a determining
ground, is burdensome even to right-thinking persons, confusing
their considered maxims and creating the wish to be free
from them and subject only to law-giving reason.

Thus we can understand how the consciousness of this ca-
pacity of a pure practical reason through a deed (virtue) can
produce a consciousness of mastery over inclinations and thus
of independence from them and, from the discontentment
which always accompanies them, bring forth a negative satis-
faction with one's condition, i.e., contentment, whose source
is contentment with one's own person. Freedom itself thus be-
comes in this indirect way capable of being enjoyed. This can-
not be called happiness, since it does not depend upon a posi-
tive participation of feeling; nor can it be called bliss, because it
does not include complete independence from inclinations
and desires. It does nevertheless resemble the latter so far at
least as the determination of the will which it involves can be
held to be free from their influence, and thus, at least in its ori-
gin, it is analogous to the self-sufficiency which can be ascribed
only to the Supreme Being.

From this solution of the antinomy of practical pure [119]
reason, it follows that in practical principles a natural and nec-
essary connection between the consciousness of morality and
the expectation of proportionate happiness as its consequence
may be thought at least possible, though it is by no means
known or understood. On the other hand, it is seen that prin-
ciples for the pursuit of happiness cannot possibly produce mo-
rality and there therefore the supreme good (as the first condi-
tion of the highest good) is morality; and that happiness,
though it indeed constitutes the second element of the highest
good, does so only as the morally conditioned but necessary
consequence of the former. Only with this subordination is the
highest good the entire object of pure practical reason, which
pure practical reason must necessarily think as possible be-

stellen, sondern, ohne auf sie Rücksicht zu nehmen, als
reine praktische Vernunft ihr eigenes Interesse ganz allein
besorgen. Selbst dies Gefühl des Mitleids und der weich-
herzigen Teilnehmung, wenn es vor der Überlegung, was
Pflicht sei, vorhergeht und Bestimmungsgrund wird, ist
wohlendenkenden Personen selbst lästig, bringt ihre überlegte
Maximen in Verwirrung, und bewirkt den Wunsch, ihrer
entledigt und allein in der gesetzgebenden Vernunft unter-
worfen zu sein.

Hieraus läßt sich verstehen: wie das Bewußtsein dieses
Vermögens einer reinen praktischen Vernunft durch Tat (die
Tugend) ein Bewußtsein der Obermacht über seine Nei-
gungen, hiermit also der Unabhängigkeit von denselben, folg-
lieh auch der Unzufriedenheit, die diese immer begleitet,
und also ein negatives Wohlgefallen mit seinem Zustande.
d. i. Zufriedenheit, hervorbringen könne, welche in ihrer
Quelle Zufriedenheit mit seiner Person ist. Die Freiheit
selbst wird auf solche Weise (nämlich indirekt) eines Genus-
es fähig, welcher nicht Glückseligkeit heissen kann, weil
er nicht vom positiven Beitritt eines Gefühls abhängt, auch
gena zu reden nicht Seligkeit, weil er nicht gänzliche
Unabhängigkeit von Neigungen und Bedürfnissen enthält,
der aber doch der letztern ähnlich ist, so fern nämlich wenig-
stens seine Willensbestimmung sich von ihren Einflüsse
frei halten kann, und also, wenigstens seinem Ursprunge
nach, der Selbstgenussamkeit analogisch ist, die man nur
dem höchsten Wesen beilegen kann.

Aus dieser Auflösung der Antinomie der praktischen rei-
nen Vernunft folgt, daß sich in praktischen Grundsätzen
eine natürliche und notwendige Verbindung zwischen dem
Bewußtsein der Sittlichkeit, und der Erwartung einer ihr
proportionierten Glückseligkeit, als Folge derselben, wenig-
stens als möglich denken (darum aber freilich noch eben
nicht erkennen und einschen) lasse; dagegen, daß Grund-
sätze der Bewerbung um Glückseligkeit unmöglich Sittlich-
keit hervorbringen können: daß also das obere Gut (als
die erste Bedingung des höchsten Gutes) Sittlichkeit, Glück-
seligkeit dagegen zwar das zweite Element desselben aus-
mache, doch so, daß diese nur die moralisch-bedingte, aber
doch notwendige Folge der ersteren sei. In dieser Unter-
ordnung allein ist das höchste Gut das ganze Objekt der
reinen praktischen Vernunft, die es sich notwendig als mög-
lich vorstellen muß,
cause reason commands us to contribute everything possible to its realization. But the possibility of such a connection of the conditioned with its condition belongs wholly to the supersensible relations of things and cannot be given under the laws of the world of sense, even though the practical consequence of this idea, i.e., the actions which are devoted to realizing the highest good, do belong to this world. Therefore, we shall seek to establish the grounds of that possibility primarily with respect to what is immediately in our power, and secondarily in that which is beyond our power but which reason holds out to us as the supplement to our impotence to [realize] the possibility of the highest good, which is necessary according to practical principles.

III. ON THE PRIMACY OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON IN ITS ASSOCIATION WITH SPECULATIVE REASON

By primacy between two or more things connected by reason, I understand the prerogative of one by virtue of which it is the prime ground of determination of the combination with the others. In a narrower practical sense it refers to the prerogative of the interest of one so far as the interest of the others is subordinated to it and it is not itself inferior to any other. To every faculty of the mind an interest can be ascribed, i.e., a principle which contains the condition under which alone its exercise is advanced. Reason, as the faculty of principles, determines the interest of all the powers of the mind and its own. The in [120] interest of its speculative use consists in the knowledge of objects up to the highest a priori principles; that of its practical employment lies in the determination of the will with respect to the final and perfect end. That which is needed in general for the possibility of any employment of reason, i.e., that its principles and assertions not contradict one another, is not a part of its interest but is rather the condition of having any reason at all; only its extension, and not the mere agreement with itself, is reckoned as its interest.

If practical reason may not assume and think as given any.
thing further than what speculative reason affords from its own insight, the latter has primacy. But suppose that the former has for itself original a priori principles with which certain theoretical positions are inseparably bound but which are beyond any possible insight of speculative reason (although not contradictory to it). Then the question is: Which interest is superior? It is not a question of which must yield, for one does not necessarily conflict with the other. It is a question of whether speculative reason, which knows nothing of that which practical reason offers for its acceptance, must take up these principles and seek to integrate them, even though they transcend it, with its own concepts, as a foreign possession handed over to it; or whether it is justified in stubbornly following its own isolated interest, rejecting, according to the canon of Epicurus, everything as an empty sophism which does not certify its objective reality by manifest examples from experience, doing so however much of it is interwoven with the interest of the practical (pure) use of reason and however far removed from contradicting the theoretical, merely because it infringes upon the interest of speculative reason by removing the bounds which the latter has set itself, opening it to every nonsense and delusion of the imagination.

In fact, so long as practical reason is pathologically conditioned, i.e., as merely regulating the interest of the inclinations by the sensuous principle of happiness, this demand [that theoretical reason should yield primacy to practical reason] could not be made on speculative reason. Mohammed’s paradise or the fusion with the deity of the theosophists and mystics, according to the taste of each, would press their monstro. [121] sits on reason, and it would be as well to have no reason at all as to surrender it in such a manner to all sorts of dreams. But if pure reason of itself can be and really is practical, as the consciousness of the moral law shows it to be, it is only one and the same reason which judges a priori by principles, whether for theoretical or for practical purposes. Then it is clear that, if its capacity in the former is not sufficient to establish certain propositions positively (which however do not contradict it), it

als gegeben denken darf, als was spekulative Vernunft, für sich, ihr aus ihrer Einsicht darreichen konnte, so führt diese das Primat. Gesetzt aber, sie hätte für sich ursprüngliche Prinzipien a priori, mit denen gewisse theoretische Positionen unzertrennlich verbunden wären, die sich gleichwohl aller möglichen Einsicht der spekulativen Vernunft entzogen (ob sie zwar derselben auch nicht widersprechen müßten), so ist die Frage, welches Interesse das oberste sei (nicht, welches weichen müßte, denn eines widerstreitet dem andern nicht notwendig): ob spekulative Vernunft, die nicht von allem dem weiß, was praktische ihr anzunehmen darbietet, diese Sätze aufnehmen, und sie, ob sie gleich für sie überschwenglich sind, mit ihren Begriffen, als einen fremden auf sie übertragenen Besitz, zu vereinigen suchen müsse, oder ob sie berechtigt sei, ihrem eigenen abgesonderten Interesse hartnäckig zu folgen, und, nach der Kanonik des Epikurs, alles als leere Vernunftteile auszuschlagen, was seine objektive Realität nicht durch augenscheinliche in der Erfahrung aufzustellende Beispiele beglaubigen kann, wenn es gleich noch so sehr mit dem Interesse des praktischen (reinen) Gebrauchs verwebt, an sich auch der theoretischen nicht widersprechend wäre, bloß weil es wirklich so fern dem Interesse der spekulativen Vernunft Abbruch tut, daß es die Grenzen, die diese sich selbst gesetzt, aufhebt, und sie allem Unsinn oder Wahnssinn der Einbildungskraft preisgibt.

In der Tat, so fern praktische Vernunft als pathologisch bedingt, d. i. das Interesse der Neigungen unter dem sinnlichen Prinzip der Glückseligkeit bloß verwaltend, zum Grunde gelegt würde, so ließe sich diese Zumutung an die spekulative Vernunft gar nicht tun. Mahomet’s Paradies, oder der Theosophen und Mystiker schmelzende Vereinigung mit der Gottheit, so wie jedem sein Sinn steht, würden der Vernunft ihre | Ungeheuer aufdringen, und es wäre eben so gut, gar keine zu haben, als sie auf solche Weise allen Träumereien preiszugeben. Allein wenn reine Vernunft für sich praktisch sein kann und es wirklich ist, wie das Bewußtsein des moralischen Gesetzes es ausweist, so ist es doch immer nur eine und dieselbe Vernunft, die, es sei in theoretischer oder praktischer Absicht, nach Prinzipien a priori urteilt, und da ist es klar, daß, wenn ihr Vermögen in der ersteren gleich nicht zulangt, gewisse Sätze behauptend festzusetzen, indessen daß sie ihr auch eben nicht wider-

1 Akad.-Ausz.: "nichts".
must assume these propositions just as soon as they are sufficiently certified as belonging imprescriptibly to the practical interest of pure reason. It must assume them indeed as something offered from the outside and not grown in its own soil, and it must seek to compare and connect them with everything which it has in its power as speculative reason. It must remember that they are not its own insights but extensions of its use in some other respect, viz., the practical, and that this is not in the least opposed to its interest, which lies in the restriction of speculative folly.

Thus in the combination of pure speculative with pure practical reason in one cognition, the latter has primacy, provided that this combination is not contingent and arbitrary but a priori, based on reason itself and thus necessary. Without this subordination, a conflict of reason with itself would arise, since if the speculative and the practical reason were arranged merely side by side (co-ordinated), the first would close its borders and admit into its domain nothing from the latter, while the latter would extend its boundaries over everything and, when its needs required, would seek to comprehend the former within them. Nor could we reverse the order and expect practical reason to submit to speculative reason, because every interest is ultimately practical, even that of speculative reason being only conditional and reaching perfection only in practical use.

IV. THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL AS A POSTULATE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

The achievement of the highest good in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by moral law. In such a will, however, the complete fitness of dispositions to the moral law is the supreme condition of the highest good. This fitness, therefore, must be just as possible as its object, because it is contained in the command that requires us to promote the latter. But the perfect fit of the will to moral law is holiness, which is a perfection of which no rational being in the world of

sprechen, eben1 diese Sätze, so bald sie unabtrennlich zum praktischen Interesse der reinen Vernunft gehören, zwar als ein ihr fremdes Angebot, das nicht auf ihrem Boden erwachsen, aber doch hinreichend beglaubigt ist, annehmen, und sie, mit allem, was sie als spekulative Vernunft in ihrer Macht hat, zu vergleichen und zu verknüpfen suchen müsse; doch sich bescheidend, daß dieses nicht ihre Einsichten, aber doch Erweiterungen ihres Gebrauchs in irgendeiner anderen, nämlich praktischen, Absicht sind, welche ihrem Interesse, das in der Einschränkung des spekulativen Frevels besteht, ganz und gar nicht zuwider ist.

In der Verbindung also der reinen spekulative mit der reinen praktischen Vernunft zu einem Erkenntnisse führt die letztere das Primat, vorausgesetzt nämlich, daß diese Verbindung nicht etwa zufällig und beliebig, sondern a priori auf der Vernunft selbst gegründet, mithin notwendig sei. Denn es würde ohne diese Unterordnung ein Widerspruch der Vernunft mit ihr selbst entstehen; weil, wenn sie einander bloß beigeordnet (koordiniert) wären, die erstere für sich ihre Grenze enge verschließen und nichts von der letzteren in ihr Gebiet aufnehmen, diese aber ihre Grenzen dennoch über alles ausdehnen, und, wo es ihr Bedürfnis erheischt, jene innerhalb der ihres mit zu befassen suchen würde. Der spekulatorischen Vernunft aber untergeordnet zu sein, und also die Ordnung umzukehren, kann man der reinen praktischen gar nicht zumuten, weil alles Interesse zuletzt praktisch ist, und selbst das der spekulatorischen Vernunft nur bedingt und im praktischen Gebrauche allein vollständig ist.

IV. DIE UNSTERBLICHKEIT DER SEEBE, ALS EIN POSTULAT DER REINEN PRACTISCHEN VERNUNFT

Die Bewirkung des höchsten Guts in der Welt ist das notwendige Objekt eines durchs moralische Gesetz bestimmten Willens. In diesem aber ist die völlige Angemessenheit der Gesinnungen zum moralischen Gesetze die oberste Bedingung des höchsten Guts. Sie muß also ebenso wohl möglich sein, als ihr Objekt, weil sie in demselben Gebote dieses zu befördern enthalten ist. Die völlige Angemessenheit des Willens aber zum moralischen Gesetze ist Heiligkeit, eine Vollkommenheit, deren kein vernünftiges We-

1 Akad.-Ausg. erwägt: 'set eben'.

1 A 218, 219
of the existence of rational beings. All that can be granted to a creature with respect to hope for this share is consciousness of his tried character. And on the basis of his previous progress from the worse to the morally better, and of the immutability of disposition which thus becomes known to him, he may hope for a further uninterrupted continuance of this progress, however long his existence may last, even beyond this life.* But he cannot hope here or at any foreseeable point of his future existence to be fully adequate to God's will, without indulgence or remission which would not harmonize with justice. [124] This he can do only in the infinity of his duration which God alone can survey.

V. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AS A POSTULATE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

The moral law, in the foregoing analysis, to a practical task which is assigned solely by pure reason and without any concurrence of sensuous drives. It is the task of perfecting the first and principal part of the highest good, viz., morality; since this task can be executed only in eternity, it led to the postulate of immortality. The same law must also lead us to affirm the

*The conviction of the immutability of character in progress toward the good may appear to be impossible for a creature. For this reason, Christian doctrine lets it derive from the same Spirit which works sanctification, i.e., this firm disposition and therewith the consciousness of steadfastness in moral progress. But naturally one who is conscious of having persisted, from legitimate moral motives, to the end of a long life in a progress to the better may very well have the comforting hope, though not the certainty, that he will be steadfast in these principles in an existence continuing beyond this life. Though he can never be justified in his own eyes either here or in the hoped-for increase of natural perfection together with an increase of his duties, nevertheless in this progress toward a goal infinitely remote (a progress which in God's sight is regarded as equivalent to possession) he can have prospect of a 'blessed' future. For "blessed" is the word which reason uses to designate perfect well-being independent of all contingent causes in the world. Like holiness, it is an idea which can be contained only in an infinite progress and its totality and thus is never fully reached by any creature.

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Anschauung des Daseins vernünftiger Wesen ganz anzutreffen. Was dem Geschöpf allein in Ansehung der Hoffnung dieses Anteils zukommen kann, wäre das Bewußtsein seiner erprüften Gesinnung, um aus seinem bisherigen Fortschritte vom Schlechteren zum Moralischbesseren und dem dadurch ihm bekannt gewordenen unverwandelbaren Vorsatz eine fernere ununterbrochene Fortsetzung desselben, wie weit seine Existenz auch immer reichen mag, selbst über dieses Leben hinaus, zu hoffen,* und so, zwar niemals hier, oder in irgend einem abschließenden künftigen Zeitpunkte seines Daseins, sondern nur in der (Gott allein überschaubaren) Unendlichkeit seiner Fortdauer, dem Willen desselben (ohne Nachsicht oder Erlassung, welche sich mit der Gerechtigkeit nicht zusammenreimt) völlig adäquat zu sein.

V. DAS DASEIN GOTTES, ALS EIN POSTULAT DER KEINEN PRAKTISCHEN VERNUFT

Das moralische Gesetz führe in der vorhergehenden Zergliederung zur praktischen Aufgabe, welche, ohne einen Beitritt sinnlicher Triebfedern, bloß durch die Vernunft vorgeschrieben wird, nämlich der notwendigen Vollständigkeit des ersten und vornehmsten Teils des höchsten Guts, der Sittlichkeit, und, da diese nur in einer Ewigkeit völlig aufgelöst werden kann, zum Postulat der Unsterblichkeit. Eben dieses Gesetz muß auch zur Möglichkeit des

*Die Überzeugung von der Unverwandelbarkeit seiner Gesinnung, im Fortschritte zum Guten, scheint gleichwohl auch einem Geschöpf für sich unmöglich zu sein. Um derwillen läßt die christliche Religionslehre sie auch von denselben Geiste, der die Heiligung, d. i. diesen festen Vorsatz und mit ihm das Bewußtsein der Beharrlichkeit im moralischen Progressus, wirkt, allein abstammen. Aber auch natürlicher Weise darf derjenige, der sich bewußt ist, einen langen Teil seines Lebens bis zu Ende desselben, im Fortschritte zum Bessern, und zwar aus echten moralischen Bewegungsgründe, angehalten zu haben, sich wohl die tröstende Hoffnung, wenn gleich nicht Gewißheit, machen, daß er, auch in einer über dieses Leben hinaus fortgesetzten Existenz, bei diesen Grundsätzen beharren werde, und, wiewohl er in seinen eigenen Augen hier nie gerechtfertigt ist, noch, bei dem verhöhten künftigen Anwuchs seiner Naturvollkommenheit, mit ihr aber auch seiner Pflichten, es jemals hoffen darf, dennoch in diesem Fortschritte, der, ob er zwar ein ins Unendliche hinausgerücktes Ziel betrifft, dennoch für Gott als Besitz gilt, eine Aussicht in eine eigene Zukunft haben; denn dieses ist der Ausdruck, dessen sich die Vernunft bedient, um ein von allen zufälligen Ursachen der Welt unabhängiges vollständiges Wohl zu bezeichnen, welches eben so, wie Heiligkeit eine Idee ist, welche nur in einem unendlichen Progressus und dessen Totalität enthalten sein kann, mithin vom Geschöpf niemals völlig erreicht wird.
possibility of the second element of the highest good, i.e., happiness proportional to that morality; it must do so just as disinterestedly as heretofore, by a purely impartial reason. This it can do on the supposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect. It must postulate the existence of God as necessarily belonging to the possibility of the highest good (the object of our will which is necessarily connected with the moral legislation of pure reason). We proceed to exhibit this connection in a convincing manner.

Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world, in whose whole existence everything goes according to wish and will. It thus rests on the harmony of nature with his whole end and with the essential determining ground of his will. But the moral law as a law of freedom commands through motives wholly independent of nature and of its harmony with our faculty of desire (as drives). Still, the acting rational being in the world is not at the same time the cause of the world and of nature itself. Hence there is not the slightest ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between the morality and proportionate happiness of a being who belongs to the world as one of its parts and is thus dependent on it. Not being nature's cause, his will cannot by its own strength bring nature, as it touches on his happiness, into perfect harmony with his practical principles. Nevertheless, in the practical task of [125] pure reason, i.e., in the necessary endeavor after the highest good, such a connection is postulated as necessary: we ought to seek to farther the highest good (which therefore must be at least possible). Therefore also the existence is postulated of a cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature, which contains the ground of the exact coincidence of happiness with morality. This supreme cause, however, must contain the ground of the agreement of nature not merely with a law of the will of rational beings but with the representation of this law so far as they make it the supreme motive of the will. Thus it contains the ground of the agreement of nature not merely with actions moral in their form but also with their morality as the motives to such actions, i.e., with their moral disposition. Therefore, the highest good is possible in the world only on
the supposition of a supreme cause of nature which has a causality corresponding to the moral disposition. Now a being capable of actions by the representation of laws is an intelligence (a rational being), and the causality of such a being according to this representation of laws is his will. Therefore, the supreme cause of nature, so far as it must be presupposed for the highest good, is a being which is the cause (and consequently the author) of nature through understanding and will, i.e., God. As a consequence, the postulate of the possibility of a highest derivative good (the best world) is at the same time the postulate of the reality of a highest original good, namely, the postulate of the existence of God. Now it was our duty to promote the highest good; and it is not merely our privilege but a necessity connected with duty as a requisite to presuppose the possibility of this highest good. This presupposition is made only under the condition of the existence of God, and this condition inseparably connects this supposition with duty. Therefore, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.

It is well to notice here that this moral necessity is subjective, i.e., a need, and not objective, i.e., duty itself. For there cannot be any duty to assume the existence of a thing, because such a supposition concerns only the theoretical use of reason. It is also not to be understood that the assumption of the existence of God is necessary as a ground of all obligation in general (for this rests, as has been fully shown, solely on the auto- [126] nomy of reason itself). All that here belongs to duty is the endeavor to produce and to further the highest good in the world, the possibility of which may thus be postulated though our reason cannot conceive it except by presupposing a Highest Intelligence. To assume its existence is thus connected with the consciousness of our duty, though this assumption itself belongs to the realm of theoretical reason. Considered only in reference to the latter, it is an hypothesis, i.e., a ground of explanation. But in reference to the comprehensibility of an object (the highest good) placed before us by the moral law, and thus as a practical need, it can be called faith and even pure rational
faith, because pure reason alone (by its theoretical as well as practical employment) is the source from which it springs.

From this deduction it now becomes clear why the Greek schools could never succeed in solving their problem of the practical possibility of the highest good. It was because they made the rule of the use which the human will makes of its freedom the sole and self-sufficient ground of its possibility, thinking that they had no need of the existence of God for this purpose. They were certainly correct in establishing the principle of morals by itself, independently of this postulate and merely from the relation of reason to the will, thus making the principle of morality the supreme practical condition of the highest good; but this principle was not the entire condition of its possibility. The Epicureans had indeed raised a wholly false principle of morality, i.e., that of happiness, into the supreme one, and for law had substituted a maxim of free choice of each according to his inclination. But they proceeded consistently enough, in that they degraded their highest good in proportion to the baseness of their principle and expected no greater happiness than that which could be attained through human prudence (wherein both temperance and the moderation of inclinations belong), though everyone knows prudence to be scarce enough and to produce diverse results according to circumstances, not to mention the exceptions which their maxims continually had to admit and which made them worthless as laws. The Stoics, on the other hand, had chosen their supreme practical principle, virtue, quite correctly as the condition of the highest good. But as they imagined the degree of virtue which is required for its pure law as completely attainable in this life, they not only exaggerated the moral capacity of man, under the name of "sage," beyond all the limits of his nature, making it into something which is contradicted by all our knowledge of men; they also refused to accept the second component of the highest good, i.e., happiness, as a special object of human desire. Rather, they made their sage, like a god in the consciousness of the excellence of his person,
wholly independent of nature (as regards his own contentment), exposing him to the evils of life but not subjecting him to them. (They also represented him as free from everything morally evil.) Thus they really left out of the highest good the second element (personal happiness), since they placed the highest good only in acting and in contentment with one's own personal worth, including it in the consciousness of moral character. But the voice of their own nature could have sufficiently refuted this.

The doctrine of Christianity* even when not regarded as a

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*The view is commonly held that the Christian precept of morals has no advantage over the moral concept of the Stoics in respect to its purity; but the difference between them is nevertheless obvious. The Stoic system makes the consciousness of strength of mind the pivot around which all moral dispositions should turn; and, if the followers of this system spoke of duties and even defined them accurately, they nevertheless placed the drives and the real motive of the will in an elevation of character above the base drives of the senses which have their power only through weakness of the mind. Virtue was, therefore, for them a certain heroism of the sage who, raising himself above the animal nature of man, was sufficient to himself, subject to no temptation to transgress the moral law, and elevated above duties though he propounded duties to others. But all this they could not have done had they conceived this law in the same purity and rigor as does the precept of the Gospel. If I understand by Idea a perfection to which the senses can give nothing adequate, moral Ideas are not transcendent, i.e., of such a kind that we cannot even sufficiently define the concept or of which we are uncertain whether there is a corresponding object (as are the Ideas of speculative reason); rather, they serve as models of practical perfection, as an indispensable rule of moral conduct, and as a standard for comparison. If I now regard Christian morals from their philosophical side, it appears in comparison with the ideas of the Greek schools as follows: the ideas of the Cynics, Epicureans, Stoics, and Christians are, respectively, the simplicity of nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness. In respect to the way they achieve them, the Greek schools differ in that the Cynics found common sense sufficient, while the others found it in the path of science, and thus all held it to lie in the use of man's natural powers. Christian ethics, because it formulated its precept as pure and uncompromising (as being a moral precept), destroyed man's confidence of being wholly adequate to it, at least in this life; but it is established by enabling us to hope that, if we act as well as lies in our power, what is not in our power will come to our aid from another source, whether we know in what way or not. Aristotle and Plato differed only as to the origin of our moral concepts.

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von der Natur (in Absicht auf seine Zufriedenheit) ganz unabhängig gemacht, indem sie ihn zwar Übel des Lebens aussetzten, aber nicht unterwarfen (zugleich auch als frei vom Bösen darstellten), und so wirklich das zweite Element des höchsten Guts, eigene Glückseligkeit wegließen, indem sie es bloß im Handeln und der Zufriedenheit mit seinem persönlichen Werte setzten, und also im Bewußtsein der sittlichen Denkungsart mit einschlossen, worin sie aber durch die Stimmung ihrer eigenen Natur hinreichend hätten widerlegt werden können.

Die Lehre des Christentums*, wenn man sie auch noch

* Man hält gemeinhin dafür, die christliche Vorschrift der Sitten habe in Ansehung ihrer Reinigkeit vor dem moralischen Begriffe der Stoiker nichts vorzu; allein der Unterschied beider ist doch sehr sichtbar. Das stoische System machte das Bewußtsein der Selensprache zum Engel, um dem sich alle sittliche Gestimmungen wenden sollten, und, ob die Anhänger* zwar von Pflichten betet, auch sie ganz wohl bestimmten, so setzen sie doch die Triebfeder und den sittlichen Bestimmungsgrund des Willens in einer Erhebung der Denkungsart über die niedrige und nur durch Selensprache machthabende Triebfeder der Sinne. Tugend war also bei ihnen ein gewisser Handel des über tierische* Natur des Menschen sich erhebenden Weibes, der ihm selbst genug ist, andern zwar Pflichten vorträgt, selbst aber über sie erhoben* und keiner Versuchung zu | Übertretung des sittlichen Gesteis unterworfen ist. Dieses alles aber konnten sie nicht tun, wenn sie sich dieses Gesetz in der Reinigkeit und Strenge, als die Vorschrift des Evangeliums hat, vorgestellt hätten. Wenn ich unter einer Idee eine Vollkommenheit verstehe, der nichts in der Erfahrung äquivalent gegeben werden kann, so sind die moralischen Ideen darum nichts Überschwängliches, d. i. dergleichen, wovon wir auch nicht einmal den Be griff hinreichend bestimmen könnten, oder von dem es ungewiß ist, ob ihm überhaupt ein Gegenstand korrespondiere, wie die Ideen der spekulativen Vernunft, sondern dienen, als Uralter der praktischen Vollkommenseits, zur unentbehrlichen Richtschnur der sittlichen Verhaltens, und zugleich zum Maßstabe der Vergleichung. Wenn ich nun die christliche Moral von ihrer philosophischen Seite betrachte, so würde sie, mit den Ideen der griechischen Schulen verglichen, so erscheinen: Die Ideen der Kyniker, der Epikureer, der Stoiker und des* Christen sind: die Naturinfall, die Klugheit, die Weisheit und die Helligkeit. In Ansehung des Weges, dazu zu gelangen, unterscheiden sich die griechischen Philosophen so von einander, daß die Kyniker dazu den gemeinen Menschenverstand, die anderen den Weg der Wissenschaft, beide also doch bloße Gebrauch der natürlichen Kräfte dazu hinreichend fanden. Die christliche Moral, weil sie ihre Vorschrift (wie es auch sein muß) so rein und unerschütterlich ertieft, bemächtigt dem Menschen das Zutrauen, wenigstens das im Leben, ihr völlig äquivalent zu sein, richtet es aber doch auch dadurch wiederum auf, daß, wenn wir so gut handeln, als in unserem Vermögen ist, wir hoffen können, daß, was nicht in unserem Vermögen ist, uns anderweitig werde zu statten kommen, wir mögen nun wissen, auf welche Art, oder nicht. Aristoteles und Plato unterschieden sich nur in Ansehung des Ursprungs unserer sittlichen Begriffe.
religious doctrine, gives at this point a concept of the highest good (the Kingdom of God) which is alone sufficient to the strictest demand of practical reason. The moral law is holy (unyielding) and demands holiness of morals, although all moral perfection to which man can attain is only virtue, i.e., a law-abiding disposition resulting from respect for the law and thus implying consciousness of a continuous propensity to transgress it or at least to a defilement, i.e., to an admixture of many spurious (not moral) motives to obedience to the law; consequently, man can achieve only self-esteem combined with humility. And thus with respect to the holiness required by the Christian law, nothing remains to the creature but endless progress, though for the same reason hope for endless duration is justified. The worth of a character completely accordant with the moral law is infinite, because all possible happiness in the judgment of a wise and omnipotent dispenser of happiness has no other limitation than the lack of fitness of rational beings to their duty. But the moral law does not of itself promise happiness, for happiness is not, according to concepts of any order of nature, necessarily connected with obedience to the law. Christian ethics supplies this defect of the second indispensable component of the highest good by presenting a world wherein reasonable beings single-mindedly devote themselves to the moral law; this is the Kingdom of God, in which nature and morality come into a harmony, which is foreign to each as such, through a holy Author of the world, who makes possible the derived highest good. The holiness of morals is prescribed to them even in this life as a guide to conduct, but well-being proportionate to this, which is bliss, is thought of as attainable only in eternity. This is due to the fact that the former must always be the archetype of their conduct in every state, and progressing toward it is even in this life possible and necessary, whereas the latter, under the name of happiness, cannot (as far as our own capacity is concerned) be reached in this life and therefore is made only an object of hope. Nevertheless, the Christian principle of morality is not theological and thus heteronomous, being rather the auton-
mony of pure practical reason itself, because it does not make the knowledge of God and His will the basis of these laws but makes such knowledge the basis only of succeeding to the highest good on condition of obedience to these laws; it places the real incentive for obedience to the law not in the desired consequences of obedience but in the conception of duty alone, in true observance of which the worthiness to attain the latter alone consists.

In this manner, through the concept of the highest good as the object and final end of pure practical reason, the moral law leads to religion. Religion is the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions, i.e., arbitrary and contingent ordinances of a foreign will, but as essential laws of any free will as such. Even as such, they must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being because we can hope for the highest good (to strive for which is our duty under the moral law) only from a morally perfect (holy and beneficent) and omnipotent will; and, therefore, we can hope to attain it only through harmony with this will. But here again everything remains disinterested and based only on duty, without being based on fear or hope as drives, which, if they became principles, would destroy the entire moral worth of the actions. The moral law commands us to make the highest possible good in a world the final object of all our conduct. This I cannot hope to effect except through the agreement of my will with that of a holy and beneficent Author of the world. And although my own happiness is included in the concept of the highest good as a whole wherein the greatest happiness is thought of as connected in exact proportion to the greatest degree of moral perfection pos-

sible to creatures, still it is not happiness but the moral law (which, in fact, sternly places restricting conditions upon any boundless longing for happiness) which is proved to be the ground determining the will to further the highest good.

Therefore, morals is not really the doctrine of how to make ourselves happy but of how we are to be worthy of happiness. Only if religion is added to it can the hope arise of someday participating in happiness in proportion as we endeavored not to be unworthy of it.
One is worthy of possessing a thing or a state when his possession is harmonious with the highest good. We can easily see now that all worthiness is a matter of moral conduct, because this constitutes the condition of everything else (which belongs to one's state) in the concept of the highest good, i.e., participation in happiness. From this it follows that one must never consider morals itself as a doctrine of happiness, i.e., as an instruction in how to acquire happiness. For morals has to do only with the rational condition (conditio sine qua non) of happiness and not with means of achieving it. But when morals (which imposes only duties instead of providing rules for selfish wishes) is completely expounded, and a moral wish has been awakened to promote the highest good (to bring the Kingdom of God to us), which is a wish based on law and one to which no selfish mind could have aspired, and when for the sake of this wish the step to religion has been taken—then only can ethics be called a doctrine of happiness, because the hope for it first arises with religion.

From this it can also be seen that, if we inquire into God's final end in creating the world, we must name not the happiness of rational beings in the world but the highest good, which adds a further condition to the wish of rational beings to be happy, viz., the condition of being worthy of happiness, which is the morality of these beings, for this alone contains the standard by which they can hope to participate in happiness at the hand of a wise creator. For since wisdom, theoretically regarded, means the knowledge of the highest good and, practically, the conformability of the will to the highest good, one cannot ascribe to a supreme independent wisdom an end based merely on benevolence. For we cannot conceive the action of this benevolence (with respect to the happiness of rational beings) except as conformable to the restrictive conditions of harmony with the holiness* of His will as the highest origin.

*Incidentally, and in order to make the peculiarity of this concept clear, I make the following remark. Although we ascribe various attributes to God, whose quality we find suitable also to creatures (e.g., power, knowledge, presence, goodness, etc.), which in God are present in a higher degree under such names as omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and perfect goodness,
nal good. Then perhaps those who have placed the end of creation in the glory of God, provided this is not thought of anthropomorphically as an inclination to be esteemed, have found the best term. For nothing glorifies God more than what is the most estimable thing in the world, namely, reverence for His command, the observance of sacred duty which His law imposes on us, when there is added to this His glorious plan of crowning such an excellent order with corresponding happiness. If the latter, to speak in human terms, makes Him worthy of love, by the former He is an object of adoration. Human beings can win love by doing good, but by this alone even they never win respect; the greatest well-doing does them honor only by being exercised according to [their] worthiness.

It follows of itself that, in the order of ends, man (and every rational being) is an end in himself, i.e., he is never to be used merely as a means for someone (even for God) without at the same time being himself an end, and that humanity in our person must itself be holy to us, because man is subject to the moral law and therefore subject to that which is of itself holy, and it is only on account of this and in agreement with [132] this that anything can be called holy. For this moral law is founded on the autonomy of his will as a free will, which by its universal laws must necessarily be able to agree with that to which he ought to subject himself.

VI. ON THE POSTULATES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON IN GENERAL

The postulates of pure practical reason all proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a postulate but a law by etc., there are three which exclusively and without qualification of magnitude are ascribed to God, and they are all moral. He is the only holy, the only blessed, and the only wise being, because these concepts of themselves imply unlimitedness. By the arrangement of these He is thus the holy lawgiver (and creator), the beneficent ruler (and sustainer), and the just judge. These three attributes contain everything whereby God is the object of religion, and in conformity to them the metaphysical perfections of themselves arise in reason.

denken. Daher diejenige, welche den Zweck der Schöpfung in die Ehre Gottes (vorausgesetzt, daß man diese nicht anthropomorphistisch, als Neigung, gepriesen zu werden, denkt) setzten, wohl den besten Ausdruck getroffen haben. Denn nichts ehrt Gott mehr, als das, was das Schätzarzte in der Welt ist, die Achtung für sein Gebot, die Beobachtung der heiligen Pflicht, die uns sein Gesetz auferlegt, wenn seine herrliche Anstalt dazu kommt, eine solche schöne Ordnung mit angemessener Glückseligkeit zu krönen. Wenn ihn das letztere (auf menschliche Art zu reden) liebenswürdig macht, so ist er durch das erstere ein Gegenstand der Anbetung (Adoration). Selbst Menschen können sich durch Wohltun zwar Liebe, aber dadurch allein niemals Achtung erwerben, so daß die größte Wohltätigkeit ihnen nur dadurch Ehre macht, daß sie nach Würdigkeit ausgerührt wird.

Daß, in der Ordnung der Zwecke, der Mensch (mit ihm jedes vernünftige Wesen) Zweck an sich selbst sei, d.i. niemals bloß als Mittel von jemanden (selbst nicht von Gott), ohne zugleich hiebei selbst Zweck zu sein, könne gebräucht werden, daß also die Menschheit in unserer Person uns selbst heilig sein müsse, folgt nunmehr von selbst, weil er das Subjekt des moralischen Gesetzes, mithin dessen ist, was an sich heilig ist, um dessen willen und in Einstimmung mit welchem auch überhaupt nur etwas heilig genannt werden kann. Denn dieses moralische Gesetz gründet sich auf der Autonomie seines Willens, als eines freien Willens, der nach seinen allgemeinen Gesetzen notwendig zu demjenigen zugleich muß einstimmen können, welchem er sich unterwerfen soll.

| VI. ÜBER DIE POSTULATE
DER REINEN PRAKTISCHEN VERNUMFT ÖBERHaupt

Sie geben alle vom Grundsätze der Moralität aus, der kein Postulat, sondern ein Gesetz ist, durch welches Ver-

es doch drei gibt, die ausschließungsweise, und doch ohne Beisatz von Größe, Gott beileget werden, und die insgesamt moralisch sind. Er ist der allein Heilige, der allein Selige, der allein Weise; weil diese Begriffe schon die Uneingeschränktheit bei sich führen. Nach der Ordnung derselben ist er denn also auch der heilige Gesetzgeber (und Schöpfer), der gütige Regierer (und Erhalter) und der gerechte Richter. Drei Eigenschaften, die alles in sich enthalten, wodurch Gott der Gegenstand der Religion wird, und denen angemessen die metaphysischen Vollkommenheiten sich von selbst in der Vernunft hinzu fügen.
which reason directly determines the will. This will, by the fact that it is so determined, as a pure will requires these necessary conditions for obedience to its precept. These postulates are not theoretical dogmas but presuppositions of necessarily practical import; thus, while they do not extend speculative knowledge, they give objective reality to the Ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their relation to the practical sphere), and they justify speculative reason in holding to concepts even the possibility of which it could not otherwise venture to affirm.

These postulates are those of immortality, of freedom affirmatively regarded (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the intelligible world), and of the existence of God. The first derives from the practically necessary condition of a duration adequate to the perfect fulfilment of the moral law. The second comes from the necessary presupposition of independence from the world of sense and of the capacity of determining man's will by the law of an intelligible world, i.e., the law of freedom itself; the third arises from the necessary condition of such an intelligible world by which it may be the highest good, through the presupposition of the highest independent good, i.e., the existence of God.

The prospect of the highest good, necessary through respect for the moral law and the consequent supposition of its objective reality, thus leads through postulates of practical reason to concepts which speculative reason only exhibited as problems which it could not solve. It leads first to the problem of immortality, in the solution of which speculative reason [133] could only commit paralogisms, because the marks of permanence, by which the psychological concept of an ultimate subject necessarily ascribed to the soul in self-consciousness, were lacking though they were needed to complete the real conception of a substance. Practical reason, through the postulates of fitness to the moral law in the highest good as the whole end of practical reason, consigns to this subject the requisite duration. Secondly, it leads to the concept which speculative reason contained only as an antimony, and the solution of which it nunft mittelbar¹ den Willen bestimmt, welcher Wille eben dadurch, daß er so bestimmt ist, als reiner Wille, diese notwendige Bedingung der Befolgung seiner Vorschrift fordert. Diese Postulate sind nicht theoretische Dogmaten, sondern Voraussetzungen in notwendig praktischer Rücksicht, erweitern also zwar das² spekulative Erkenntnis, geben aber den Ideen der spekulativen Vernunft im allgemeinen (vermittelst ihrer Beziehung aufs Praktische) objektive Realität, und berechtigen sie zu Begriffen, deren Möglichkeit auch nur zu behaupten sie sich sonst nicht anmaßen könnte.

Diese Postulate sind die der Unsterblichkeit, der Freiheit, positiv betrachtet (als der Kausalität eines Wesens, sofern es zur intelligiblen Welt gehört), und des Daseins Gottes. Das erste fließt aus der praktisch notwendigen Bedingung der Angemessenheit der Dauer zur Vollständigkeit der Erfüllung des moralischen Gesetzes; das zweite aus der notwendigen Voraussetzung der Unabhängigkeit von der Sinnwelt und des Vermögens der Bestimmung seines Willens, nach dem Gesetze einer intelligiblen Welt, d.i. der Freiheit; das dritte aus der Notwendigkeit der Bedingung zu einer solchen intelligiblen Welt, um das höchste Gut zu sein, durch die Voraussetzung des höchsten selbständigen Guts, d.i. des Daseins Gottes.

Die durch die Achtung fürs moralische Gesetz notwendige Absicht aufs höchste Gut, und daraus fließende Voraussetzung der objektiven Realität desselben, führt also durch Postulate der praktischen Vernunft zu Begriffen, welche die spekulative Vernunft zwar als Aufgaben vortragen, sie aber nicht auflösen konnte. Also 1. zu derjenigen, in deren Auflösung die letztere nichts, als Paralogismen begehen konnte (nämlich der Unsterblichkeit), weil es ihm am Merkmal der Beharrlichkeit fehlte, um den psychologischen Begriff eines letzten Subjekts, welcher der Seele im Selbstbewußtsein notwendig beigelegt wird, zur realen Vorstellung einer Substanz zu ergänzen, welches die praktische Vernunft, durch das Postulat, einer zur Angemessenheit mit dem moralischen Gesetze im höchsten Gute, als dem ganzen Zwecke der praktischen Vernunft, erforderlichen Dauer, ausrichtet. 2. Führt sie zu dem, wovon die spekulative Vernunft nichts als Antinomie enthält, deren Auflösung sie


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could base only on a problematical, though thinkable, concept whose objective reality was not provable or determinable by speculative reason. This is the cosmological Idea of an intelligible world and the consciousness of our existence in it. It leads to this by means of the postulate of freedom (the reality of which practical reason exhibits in the moral law, at the same time exhibiting the law of an intelligible world, which speculative reason could only indicate but whose concept it could not define). Thirdly, it gives significance to what speculative reason could indeed think but had to leave indeterminate as a mere transcendental Ideal, i.e., to the theological concept of the First Being. This significance is given in a practical point of view, i.e., as a condition of the possibility of the object of a will determined by that law. It is that of a supreme principle of the highest good in an intelligible world having sovereign power in it by means of a moral legislation.

Is our knowledge really widened in such a way by pure practical reason, and is that which was transcendent for speculative reason immanent in practical reason? Certainly, but only from a practical point of view. For we thereby know neither the nature of our soul, nor the intelligible world, nor the Supreme Being as they are in themselves, but have only united the concepts of them in a practical concept of the highest good as the object of our will and have done so entirely a priori through pure reason. We have so united them only by means of the moral law and merely in relation to it, with respect to the object which it commands. But how freedom is possible, and how we should think theoretically and positively of this type of causality, is not thereby discovered. All that is comprehended is that such a causality is postulated through the moral law and for its sake. It is the same with the remaining Ideas, whose possibility cannot be fathomed by human understanding, though no sophistry will ever wrest from the conviction of even the most ordinary man an admission that they are not true.

Wird nun aber unser Erkenntnis auf solche Art durch reine praktische Vernunft wirklich erweitert, und ist das, was für die spekulative transzendent war, in der praktischen immanent? Allerdings, aber nur in praktischer Absicht. Denn wir erkennen zwar dadurch weder unserer Seele Natur, noch die intelligibele Welt, noch das höchste Wesen, nach dem, was sie an sich selbst sind, sondern haben nur die Begriffe von ihnen im praktischen Begriffe des höchsten Guts vereinigt, als dem Objekte unseres Willens, und völlig a priori, durch reine Vernunft, aber nur vermittelst des moralischen Gesetzes, und auch bloß in Beziehung auf dasselbe, in Ansehung des Objekts, das es gibt. | Wie aber auch nur die Freiheit möglich sei, und wie man sich diese Art von Kausalität theoretisch und positiv vorzustellen habe, wird dadurch nicht eingesehen, sondern nur, daß eine solche sei, durchs moralische Gesetz und zu dessen Behuf postuliert. So ist es auch mit den übrigen Ideen bewandt, die nach ihrer Möglichkeit kein menschlicher Verstand jemals ergründen, aber auch, daß sie nicht wahre Begriffe sind, keine Sophisterei der Überzeugung, selbst des gemeinsten Menschen, jemals entreißen wird.
VII. How is it Possible to Conceive of Extending Pure Reason in a Practical Respect Without Thereby Extending Its Knowledge as Speculative?

In order not to be too abstract, we shall answer this question by direct application to the present case. In order to extend pure knowledge practically, an a priori purpose must be given, i.e., an end as an object (of the will) which, independently of all theoretical principles, is thought of as practically necessary through a categorical imperative directly determining the will. In this case, the object is the highest good; but it is not possible unless three theoretical concepts are presupposed: freedom, immortality, and God. Since they are pure concepts of reason, however, no corresponding intuition can be given and consequently no objective reality for them can be found in a theoretical way. Therefore, through the practical law, which requires the existence of the highest good possible in the world, there is postulated the possibility of those objects of pure speculative reason whose objective reality could not be assured by speculative reason. By this, then, the theoretical knowledge of pure reason does obtain an accession, but it consists only in this — that those concepts which for it are otherwise problematical (merely thinkable) are now described assertorically as actually having objects, because practical reason inexorably requires the existence of these objects for the possibility of its practically and absolutely necessary object, the highest good. Theoretical reason is, therefore, justified in assuming them.

This extension of theoretical reason, however, is not an extension of speculation. That is, a positive use cannot be made of those objects for theoretical purposes. For nothing more has here been accomplished by practical reason than to show that those concepts are real and actually have (possible) objects, but no intuitions of them are thereby given (and indeed none can be demanded), and thus no synthetic proposition is made possible by conceding their reality. Consequently, this disclosure does not in the least help us in a speculative respect, but it does aid us with reference to the practical use of pure rea-
son in extending our knowledge in this field. The three aforementioned ideas of speculative reason are not themselves cognitions; they are, nevertheless, transcendent thoughts in which there is nothing impossible. Now through an apodictic practical law, as necessary conditions of the possibility of that which this law requires to be made an object, they acquire objective reality. That is to say, they show by this that they have objects, but we cannot indicate how their concept refers to an object; this, too, is not yet knowledge of these objects, for we can thereby neither make synthetic judgments about them nor theoretically determine their application. Consequently, we can make no theoretical rational use of them, and it is in this that all speculative knowledge of reason actually consists. Nevertheless, theoretical knowledge not of these objects but of reason in general was extended so far that, by the practical postulates, objects were given to those ideas, and a merely problematical thought thereby obtained objective reality. It was therefore no extension of knowledge of given supersensible objects, but still an extension of theoretical reason and of its knowledge with respect to the supersensible in general, inasmuch as knowledge is compelled to concede that there are such objects without more exactly defining them, and thus without being able to extend this knowledge of objects given to it only on practical grounds and only for practical use. For this accession, pure theoretical reason has thus to thank its pure practical faculty, for all these ideas are to it transcendent and without objects. Here they become immanent and constitutive, since they are the grounds of the possibility of realizing the necessary object of pure practical reason (the highest good); otherwise they are transcendent and merely regulative principles of speculative reason, which is charged with the task not of assuming a new object beyond experience but only of approaching perfection in its employment within experience. Once in possession of this accession, for the security of its practical employment it will set to work as speculative reason with these ideas in a negative manner, i.e., not broadening but purifying, in order to ward off anthropomorphism as the source
of superstition (apparent extension of those concepts [136] through alleged experience) and fanaticism which promises such an extension through supersensuous intuition or feelings. Both of these are obstacles to the practical use of pure reason, and the safeguard against them certainly belongs in the extension of our knowledge in a practical direction, without contradicting the admission that reason has not gained anything at all in a speculative direction.

To each employment of reason with respect to objects, pure concepts of the understanding (categories) are required, for without them no object can be thought. These can be applied to the theoretical employment of reason, i.e., to that kind of knowledge only in case intuition (which is always sensible) is supplied as their basis in order that through it an object of possible experience may be represented. Ideas of reason, which cannot be given in any experience, are that which I would have to think here through categories in order to know the object. But here we have not to do with theoretical knowledge of objects of these Ideas but only with whether they do have objects or not. This reality is supplied by pure practical reason, and in relation to them theoretical reason has nothing further to do than merely to think those objects by means of categories. This occurs very well, as we have elsewhere clearly shown, without need of intuition (either sensible or supersensible), because the categories have their seat and origin in pure understanding as the sole faculty of thinking independent of and prior to any intuition; and they always signify only an object in general, in whatever way it may be given to us. Now no object in intuition can be given to the categories so far as they are to be applied to these Ideas; but that such an object really exists and that here the category as a mere form of thought is not empty but has significance — this is sufficiently certified by an object which practical reason indisputably presents in the concept of the highest good, namely, by the reality of the concepts that are required for the possibility of the highest good. But even the least extension of our knowledge by theoretical principles is not effected by this accession.
When these Ideas of God, an intelligible world (the Kingdom of God), and immortality are further defined with predicates derived from our own nature, such definition cannot be regarded as making pure rational Ideas sensuous (which is equivalent to anthropomorphism) or as being transcendent knowledge of supersensible objects. For these predicates are nothing else than understanding and will, in their contrasting relationship to one another, as they must be thought in the moral law, i.e., as they must be thought only in so far as a pure practical use is made of them. Everything else which pertains psychologically to these concepts, i.e., everything known only as we empirically observe these faculties of ours in their exercise, is therefore removed from them. For example, it is disregarded that human understanding is discursive, that its representations are thoughts and not intuitions, that intuitions succeed each other in time, that the human will is always dependent for its contentment upon the existence of its object, etc., none of which can be the case with the Highest Being. Thus there remains nothing more in the concepts by which we think a pure rational being than what is directly required for thinking a moral law. There remains, then, a knowledge of God, but only in a practical context. And if we essay to extend it to a theoretical context, we get a divine understanding which does not think but intuits and a will which is directed to objects on the existence of which its contentment does not in the least depend. (I need not even mention the transcendent predicates, e.g., of magnitude of existence, duration, which is not in time even though this is the only means by which we can think of the magnitude of existence.) All of them are just qualities of which we can form no concept adequate to knowledge of objects. We learn in this way that they can never be used in a theory of supersensible beings and that therefore from the theoretical aspect they can never support speculative knowledge, their use being restricted solely to the practice of the moral law.

The latter is so obvious and can be so clearly proved by fact that one can confidently challenge all pretended natural theo-

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Wenn, nächstdem, diese Ideen von Gott, einer intelligen-
len Welt (dem Reiche Gottes) und der Unsterblichkeit durch
Prädikate bestimmt werden, die von unserer eigenen Na-
tur hergenommen sind, so darf man diese Bestimmung we-
der als Versinalichung jener reinen Vernunftideen (An-
thropomorphismen), noch als überschwängliches Erkenntnis
übersinnlicher Gegenstände ansehen; denn diese Prädik-
ate sind keine andere als | Verstand und Wille, und zwar so
im Verhältnisse gegen einander betrachtet, als sie im morali-
schen Gesetze gedacht werden müssen, also nur, so weit von
ihnen ein reiner praktischer Gebrauch gemacht wird. Von
allem übrigen, was diesen Begriffen psychologisch angehört,
d. i. so fern wir diese unsere Vermögen in ihrer Aus-
übungen empirisch beobachten (z. B., daß der Verstand des
Menschen diskursiv ist, seine Vorstellungen also Gedanken,
nicht Anschauungen sind, daß diese in der Zeit auf einander
folgen, daß sein Wille immer mit einer Abhängigkeit der
Zufriedenheit von der Existenz seines Gegenstande be-
haftet ist, u.s.w., welches im höchsten Wesen so nicht sein
kann), wird alsdenn abstrahiert, und so bleibt von den Be-
griiffen, durch die wir uns ein reines Verständenwesen den-
kennen, nichts mehr übrig, als gerade zur Möglichkeit erlö-
dlich ist, sich ein moralisch Gesetz zu denken, mithin zwar
ein Erkenntnis Gottes, aber nur in praktischer Beziehung,
wodurch, wenn wir den Versuch machen, es zu einem theo-
retischen zu erweitern, wir einen Verstand desselben be-
kommen, der nicht denkt, sondern anschaut, einen Wil-
len, der auf Gegenstände gerichtet ist, von deren Existenz
seine Zufriedenheit nicht im mindesten abhängt (ich will
nicht einmal der transcendenten Prädikate erwähnen, als
z. B. eine Größe der Existenz, d. i. Dauer, die aber nicht
in der Zeit, als dem einzigen uns möglichen Mittel, uns Da-
sein als Größe vorzustellen, stattfindet), lauter Eigen-
schaften, von denen wir uns gar keinen Begriff, zum Er-
kenntnisse des Gegenstandes tauglich, machen können,
und dadurch belehrt werden, daß sie niemals zu einer
Theorie von übersinnlichen Wesen gebraucht werden kön-
nen, und also, auf dieser Seite, ein spekulatives Erkenntnis zu
gründen gar nicht vermögen, sondern ihren Gebrauch ledig-
lich auf die Ausübung des moralischen Gesetzes einschränken.

Dieses letztere ist so augenscheinlich, und kann so klar
durch die Tat bewiesen werden, daß man getrost alle ver-
logians (a curious name)* to cite one single decisive [138] attribute (beyond the merely ontological predicates) of their object (say, of the understanding or the will), of which one could not irrefutably show that, when everything anthropomorphic is removed, only the word remains, without there being any possibility of connecting the least concept with it by which an extension of theoretical knowledge might be expected. But as to the practical, there still remains to us, of the attributes of an understanding and a will, the concept of a relation which is given objective reality by the practical law, which a priori determines precisely this relation of the understanding to the will. If this is once done, reality is given to the concept of the object of a morally determined will (i.e., to the highest good), and therewith the conditions of its possibility, the Ideas of God, freedom, and immortality. But this reality is still given only with reference to the practice of the moral law and not for any speculative use.

After this reminder it is easy to find the answer to the important question: Is the concept of God a concept belonging to physics (and thus also to metaphysics, as this only contains the pure a priori principles of physics in their universal import) or a concept belonging to morals? To have recourse to God as the Author of all things, in explaining the arrangements of nature and their changes is at any rate not a physical explanation but a complete confession that one has come to the end of his philosophy, since he is compelled to assume something of which in itself he otherwise has no concept in order to conceive of the possibility of something he sees before his very eyes. It is im-

**“Learning”** is a word properly applied only to the historical sciences. Consequently, only the teacher of revealed theology can be called a theologian. But if one wishes to call someone who is in possession of the rational sciences (mathematics and philosophy) a “learned” man, even though this would contradict the meaning of the word (which attributes to learning only that which must be taught and thus what one cannot of himself discover by reason), the philosopher with his knowledge of God as a positive science would certainly cut too poor a figure to deserve the name of a “learned” man.

*“Gottesgelehrter,” i.e., “one learned about God.”

*Gelehrsamkeit* is eigentlich nur der Inbegriff historischer Wissenschaften. Folglich kann nur der Lehrer der geoffenbarten Theologie ein Gottesgelehrter heissen. Wollte man aber noch den, der im Besitz von Vernunftwissenschaften (Mathematik und Philosophie) ist, einen Gelehrten nennen, obgleich dieses schon der Wortbedeutung (als die jederzeit nur dasjenige, was man durchaus gelehrt werden muß, und was man also nicht von selbst, durch Vernunft, erfinden kann, zur Gelehrsamkeit zählt) widerstreiten würde: so möchte wohl der Philosoph mit seiner Erkenntnis Gottes, als positiver Wissenschaft, seine zu schlechte Figur machen, um sich deshalb einen Gelehrten nennen zu lassen.
possible by means of metaphysics to progress from knowledge of this world to concepts of God and a proof of his existence through cogent inferences, because we should have to know this world as the most perfect possible whole, and to this end we should have to know all possible worlds in order to compare it to them—in short, we should have to be omniscient—in order to say that it is possible only through a God, [139] however we understand this concept. To know completely the existence of this Being from mere concepts is absolutely impossible, for any existential proposition which asserts the existence of a being of which I have a concept is a synthetic proposition; that is, it is such that I must go beyond the concept and assert more than was thought in it, namely, that outside the understanding there is an object corresponding to the concept within the understanding. This assertion obviously cannot be reached by any inference.

Thus there remains to reason only one single procedure by which it can arrive at this knowledge: as pure reason it must determine its object by starting from the supreme principle of its pure practical use (since this is directed in every case only to the existence of something as a consequence of reason). In the unavoidable task of directing the will to the highest good, there is not only shown the necessity of assuming such a First Being in relation to the possibility of this good in the world but—which is more remarkable—there is also shown an exactly defined concept of this Being, something completely lacking in the progress of reason in the path of nature. Since we know only a small part of this world and even less can compare it with all possible worlds, we can very well infer from its order, design, and magnitude to a wise, beneficent, and powerful Author of it, but not that He is all-knowing, all-good, and all-powerful. It may even be conceded that one is privileged to supplement this unavoidable lack by a permissible and wholly reasonable hypothesis to the effect that since wisdom, beneficence, etc., are displayed in all the parts offered to our more exact knowledge, it will be the same with all the rest, and that therefore it is reasonable to ascribe every possible perfection to the Author of
the world. But these are not inferences in which we can pride ourselves on our insight; they are only liberties which may be allowed but which need further recommendation before they can be used. On the path of empirical inquiry (physics), the concept of God always remains a concept of the perfection of the first Being which is not accurately enough defined to be held suitable to the concept of Deity. (And with metaphysics in its transcendental part nothing at all can be accomplished.) When I try now to test this concept by reference to the object of practical reason, I find that the moral principle admits this concept as possible only under the presupposition of an Author of the world having the highest perfection. This Being must be omniscient, in order to be able to know my conduct even to the most intimate parts of my disposition in all possible cases and in the entire future. In order to allot fitting consequences to it, He must be omnipotent, and similarly omnipresent, eternal, etc. Thus the moral law, by the concept of the highest good as the object of pure practical reason, defines the concept of the first Being as that of a Supreme Being. This cannot be accomplished by the physical (and its higher development, the metaphysical) or, consequently, by any speculative procedure of reason. Therefore, the concept of God is one which belongs originally not to physics, i.e., to speculative reason, but to morals. The same may be said of the other concepts of reason which we have previously treated as postulates of reason in its practical use.

In the history of Greek philosophy before Anaxagoras there is no definite trace of a pure rational theology. The reason for this is not that the earlier philosophers lacked the understanding and insight to raise themselves to it by way of speculation, at least with the aid of a very reasonable hypothesis. For what could be easier than the thought which of itself occurs to everyone, to assume a single rational world-cause possessing every perfection instead of several different causes or indeterminate degrees of perfection? But the evils in the world appeared to them to be too important an objection for them to hold such a hypothesis to be justified. Thus they showed their understanding; aber das sind keine Schlüsse, wodurch wir uns auf unsere Einsicht etwas dünken, sondern nur Befugnisse, die man uns nachsehen kann, und doch noch einer anderweitigen Empfehlung bedürfen, um davon Gebrauch zu machen. Der Begriff von Gott bleibt also auf dem empirischen Wege (der Physik) immer ein nicht genau bestimmter Begriff von der Vollkommenheit des ersten Wesens, um ihn dem Begriffe einer Gottheit für angemessen zu halten (mit der Metaphysik aber in ihrem transzendentalen Teile ist gar nichts auszurichten).

Ich versuche nun, diesen Begriff an das Objekt der praktischen Vernunft zu halten, und da finde ich, daß der moralische Grundsatz ihn nur als möglich, unter Voraussetzung eines Weltrührers von höchster Vollkommenheit, zulasse. Er muß allwissend sein, um mein Verhalten bis zum Innersten meiner Gesinnung in allen möglichen Fällen und in alle Zukunft zu erkennen; allmächtig, um ihm die angemessenen Folgen zu erteilen; ebenso allgegenwärtig, ewig, usw. Mithin bestimmt das moralische Gesetz durch den Begriff des höchsten Guts, als Gegenstande einer reinen praktischen Vernunft, den Begriff des Urwesens als höchsten Wesens, welches der physische (und höher fortgesetzter metaphysischer), mithin der ganze spekulative Gang der Vernunft nicht bewirken konnte. Also ist der Begriff von Gott ein ursprünglich nicht zur Physik, d. i. für die spekulative Vernunft, sondern zur Moral gehörtiger Begriff, und eben das kann man auch von den übrigen Vernunftbegriffen sagen, von denen wir, als Postulaten derselben in ihrem praktischen Gebrauche, oben gehandelt haben.

Wenn man in der Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie über den Anaxagoras hinaus keine deutliche Spuren einer reinen Vernunfttheologie antrifft, so ist der Grund nicht darin gelegen, daß es den älteren Philosophen an Verstand und Einsicht fehlte, um durch den Weg der Spekulation, wenigstens mit Beihilfe einer ganz vernünftigen Hypothese, sich dahin zu erheben; was konnte leichter, was natürlicher sein, als der sich von selbst jedermann darbietende Gedanke, statt unbestimmter Grade der Vollkommenheit verschiedener Weltursachen, eine einzige vernünftige anzunehmen, die alle Vollkommenheit hat? Aber die Übel in der Welt schienen ihnen viel zu wichtige Einwürfe zu sein, um zu einer solchen Hypothese sich für berechtigt zu halten. Mithin zeigten sie darin eben Verstand und Einsicht.
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

By this reminder, the reader of the Critique of Pure (speculative) Reason will be convinced how much that laborious deduction of the categories was needed for theology and morals and how fruitful it was for them. For if we place them in the pure understanding, it is only by this deduction that we are prevented from holding them, with Plato, to be inborn and from erecting on them transcendent presumptions and theories of the supersensible, the end of which we cannot see, making theology merely a magic lantern of phantoms. And if, on the other hand, they are held to be acquired, this deduction prevents us from limiting their use, with Epicurus, to sensible objects and motives even when their use is practical. But the Critique showed in that deduction, first, that they are not of empirical origin but have their source and place a priori in pure understanding; and, second, that since they are related to objects in general independently of an intuition of them, they produce theoretical knowledge only by application to empirical objects. Yet it showed, furthermore, that they enable us to think definite thoughts about the supersensible when applied to an object given by pure practical reason, but only so far as this ob-

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daß sie sich jene nicht erlaubten, und vielmehr in den Naturursachen herum suchten, ob sie unter ihnen nicht die zu Urvon erfornderliche Beschaffenheit und Vermögen antreffen möchten. Aber nachdem dieses scharfsinnige Volk so weit in Nachforschungen fortgerückt war, selbst sittliche Gegenständ, daruβer andere Völker niemals mehr als geschwacht haben, philosophisch zu behandeln, da fanden sie allererst ein neues Bedürfnis, nämlich ein praktisches, welches nicht erneutel, ihnen den Begriff des Urvolks bestimmt anzu-
geben, wobei die speculative Vernunft das Zusehen hatte, hochstens noch das Verstand, einen Begriff, der nicht auf ihrem Boden erworben war, auszuschüttel, und mit einem Gefolge von Bestätigungen aus der Naturbetrachtung, die nun allererst hervortreten, wohl nicht das Ansehen desselben (welches schon gegründet war), sondern vielmehr das Gepräge mit vermeinter theoretischer Vernunft-
einsicht zu befördern.

* * *

Aus diesen Erinnerungen wird der Leser der Krit. d. r. spek. Vernunft sich vollkommen überzeugen: wie höchsträchtig, wie ersprüßlich für Theologie und Moral, jene müh-same Deduktion der Kategorien war. Denn dadurch allein kann gehütet werden, sie, wenn man sie im reinen Verstän-
de setzt, mit Plato, für angeboren zu halten, und darauf überschwengliche Anmaβungen mit Theorien des Über-
sinnlichen, wovon man kein Ende absieht, zu gründen, dadurch aber die Theologie zur Zauberei von Hirngespenstern zu machen; wenn man sie aber für erworbem hält, zu verhüten, daß man nicht, mit Epikur, allen und jedem Gebrauch derselben, selbst den in praktischer Absicht, bloß auf Gegenstände und Bestimmungsgründe der Sinne einschränke. Nun aber, nachdem die Kritik in jener Deduktion erstlich bewies, daß sie nicht empirischen Ursprungs sein könnten, sondern a priori im reinen Verstande ihren Sitz und Quelle haben; zweitens auch, daß, da sie auf Gegenstände überhaupt, unabhängig von ihrer Anschauung, bezogen werden, sie zwar nur in Anwendung auf empirische Ge-
genstände theoretisches Erkenntnis zu Stande bringen, aber doch auch, auf einen durch reine praktische Ver-
nunft gegebenen Gegenstand angewandt, zum bestimm-
ten Denken des Übersinnlichen dienen, jedoch nur.

1 Akad.-Ausg.: » sind«.
ject is defined by predicates which necessarily belong to a pure practical purpose and its possibility, as given a priori. Speculative restriction and practical extension of pure reason bring pure reason into that relation of balance, wherein reason as such can be suitably used; and this example proves better than any other that the path to wisdom, if it is assured and not made impassable or misleading, must for us men unavoidably pass through science. But we can be sure that it leads to that goal only after the completion of the science.

VIII. ON ASSENT ARISING FROM A NEED OF PURE REASON

A need of pure reason in its speculative use leads only to hypotheses; that of pure practical reason, to postulates. For, in the first case, I may ascend from the result as far as I wish in the series of conditions, and I shall need an ultimate ground not in order to give objective reality to the result (e.g., the causal connection of things and changes in the world) but only in order completely to satisfy my inquiring reason with respect to them. Thus before me I see order and design in nature, and I do not need to go over to speculation in order to assure myself of their reality, though in order to explain them I need to presuppose a Deity as their cause; but since an inference from an effect to a definite cause, especially one so exactly and perfectly defined as we have to think God to be, is always uncertain and fallible, such a presupposition cannot be brought to a higher degree of certainty than the acknowledgement that it is the most reasonable opinion for us men.*

* But even here we could not allege a need of reason if there were not before us a problematical but inevitable concept of reason, that of an absolutely necessary being. This concept requires to be defined, and, when the tendency to extend [the capacity of reason] is added, it is the objective ground of a need of speculative reason, which is the need to define more accurately the concept of a necessary being which will serve as the ultimate ground of others and thus to characterize this necessary being by a distinctive mark. Without such prior necessary problems there are no needs, at least none of pure reason, the others being needs of inclination.

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so fern dieses bloß durch solche Prädikate bestimmt wird, die notwendig zur reinen a priori gegebenen praktischen Absicht und deren Möglichkeit gehören. Spekulative Einschränkung der reinen Vernunft und praktische Erweiterung derselben bringen dieselbe allererst in dasjenige Verhältnis der Gleichheit, wonin Vernunft überhaupt zweckmäßig gebraucht werden kann, und dieses Beispiel beweiset besser, als sonst eines, daß der Weg zur Weisheit, wenn er gesichert und nicht unangängbar oder irreleitend werden soll, bei uns Menschen unvermeidlich durch die Wissenschaft durchgehen müsse, wovon man aber, daß diese zu jenem Ziele führe, nur nach Vollendung derselben überzeugt werden kann.

VIII. VON WÜRFALLHALTEN AUS EINEM BEDÜRFNISSE DER REINEN VERNUNFT

Ein Bedürfnis der reinen Vernunft in ihrem spekulativen Gebrauche führt nur auf Hypothesen, das der reinen praktischen Vernunft aber zu Postulaten; denn im ersteren Fallesteige ich von Abgeleiteten so hoch hinauf in der Reihe der Gründe, wie ich will, und bedarf eines Unglückes', nicht um jenem Abgeleiteten (z. B. der Kausalverbindung der Dinge und Veränderungen in der Welt) objektive Realität zu geben, sondern nur um meine forschende Vernunft in Anschauung desselben vollständig zu befriedigen. So sehe ich Ordnung und Zweckmäßigkeit in der Natur vor mir, und bedarf nicht, um mich von deren Wirklichkeit zu versichern, zur Spekulation zu schreiten, sondern nur, um sie zu erklären, eine Gottheit, als deren Ursache, voraus zu setzen; da denn, weil von einer Wirkung der Schluß auf eine bestimmte, vornehmlich so genau und so vollständig bestimmte Ursache, als wir an Gott zu denken haben, immer unsicher und mißlich ist, eine solche Voraussetzung nicht weitergebracht werden kann, als zu dem Grade der, für uns Menschen, allervernünftigsten Meinung.*

* Aber selbst auch hier würden wir nicht ein Bedürfnis der Vernunft vorschreiben können, läge nicht ein problematischer, aber doch unvermeidlicher Begriff der Vernunft vor Augen, nämlich der eines schlechterdings notwendigen Wesens. Dieser Begriff will nun bestimmt sein, und das ist, wenn der Trieb zur Erweiterung dazu kommt, der objektive Grund eines Bedürfnisses der spekulativen Vernunft, nämlich den Begriff eines notwendigen Wesens, welches andern zum Ursunde dienen soll, näher zu bestimmen, und dieses letzte also wodurch kennlich zu machen. Ohne solche vorausgehende notwendige Probleme gibt es keine Bedürfnisse, wenigstens nicht der reinen Vernunft; die übrigen sind Bedürfnisse der Neigung.

1 Akad.-Ausg.: *Uhrgrundes*. 2 A 256, 257  Anm.: | A 257
A need of pure practical reason, on the other hand, is based on a duty to make something (the highest good) the object of my will so as to promote it with all my strength. In doing so, I must presuppose its possibility and also its conditions, which are God, freedom, and immortality; these conditions I am not in a position to prove by my speculative reason, though I cannot disprove them either. This duty is based on an apodictic law, the moral law, which is independent of these presuppositions, and thus needs no further support from theoretical [143] opinions on the inner character of things, on the secret final end of the world order, or on a ruler presiding over it in order to bind us completely to actions unconditionally conformable to the law. The disposition to promote the practically possible highest good is the subjective effect of the law, suitable to and necessary because of it. This subjective effect presupposes that the highest good is possible; otherwise it would be practically impossible to strive for the object of a concept, which, at bottom, would be empty and without an object. Now the aforementioned postulates concern only the physical or metaphysical conditions (that is, those lying in the nature of things) of the possibility of the highest good, though not for the sake of some arbitrary speculative design but only for the sake of a practically necessary end of the pure rational will, which does not here choose but rather obeys an inexorable command of reason. This command of reason has its ground objectively in the character of things as they must be universally judged by pure reason and is not based on inclination, which would by no means justify us in assuming the means to be possible or the object to be real for the sake of that which we wish on merely subjective grounds. This therefore is an absolutely necessary need and justifies its presupposition not merely as an allowable hypothesis but as a practical postulate. Granted that the pure moral law inexorably binds every man as a command (not as a rule of prudence), the righteous man may say: I will that there be a God, that my existence in this world be also an existence in a pure world of the understanding outside the system of natural connections, and finally that my duration be endless. I stand by this
and will not give up this belief, for this is the only case where my interest inevitably determines my judgment because I will not yield anything of this interest; I do so without any attention to sophistries, however little I may be able to answer them or oppose them with others more plausible.*

In order to avoid all misinterpretations of the use of [144] such an unusual concept as that of pure practical faith, I may add one more remark. It might almost seem as if this rational faith is here decreed as a command to assume as possible the highest good. But faith that is commanded is an absurdity. If one remembers from the preceding analysis what needs to be presupposed in the concept of the highest good, one will realize that to assume this possibility cannot be commanded, and that no practical disposition to grant it can be demanded, but that speculative reason must admit it without being asked for; no one can hope to affirm that it is impossible of itself that rational beings in the world should at the same time be worthy of

*In the Deutsches Museum for February, 1787, there is a dissertation by a very subtle and clear-headed man, the late Wizenmann, whose early death is to be lamented. In this he disputes the right to argue from a need to the objective reality of the object of the need, and he illustrates his point by the example of a man in love, who has fooled himself with an idea of beauty which is merely a chimera of his own brain and who now tries to argue that such an object really exists somewhere. I concede that he is right in all cases where the need is based on inclination, which cannot postulate the existence of its object even for him who is beset by it, which even less contains a demand valid for everyone, and which is therefore a merely subjective ground of wishes. Here we have to do, however, with a need of reason arising from an objective determining ground of the will, i.e., the moral law, which is necessarily binding on every rational being; this, therefore, justifies a priori the presupposition of suitable conditions in nature and makes them inseparable from the complete practical use of reason. It is a duty to realize the highest good as far as it lies within our power to do so; therefore, it must be possible to do so. Consequently, it is unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume whatever is necessary to its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary as the moral law, in relation to which alone it is valid.

*Thomas Wizenmann (1759–1877), an ally of F. H. Jacobi in his controversy with Mendelssohn about Lessing’s Spinozism. On the philosophical issue involved, see xvi, note 13.
happiness in conformity to the moral law and be in possession of happiness proportionate to this worthiness. Now with respect to the first component of the highest good, viz., morality, the moral law merely gives a command, and to doubt the possibility of that component would be the same as to call the moral law itself into question. But with respect to the second component of that object, viz., happiness perfectly proportionate to that worthiness, the assumption of its possibility is not at all in need of a command, for theoretical reason has nothing to say against it. It is only in the way in which we are to think of this harmony of natural laws with laws of freedom that there is anything about which we have a choice, because here theoretical reason does not decide with apodictic certainty, and in this respect there can be a moral interest which turns the scale.

I have said above that in the mere course of nature happiness exactly proportionate to moral worth is not to be expected and is indeed impossible and that therefore the possibility of the highest good from this side cannot be granted except under the presupposition of a moral Author of the world. I intentionally postponed restricting this judgment to the subjective conditions of our reason in order to make use of this restriction only when the manner of the assent had been more precisely defined. In fact, the impossibility mentioned is merely subjective, i.e., our reason finds it impossible to conceive, in the mere course of nature, a connection so exactly proportioned and so thoroughly adapted to an end between natural events which occur according to laws so heterogeneous. But, as with every other purposive thing in nature, it still cannot prove that it is impossible according to universal laws of nature, i.e., show this by objectively sufficient reasons.

But now a determining factor of another kind comes into play to turn the scale in this indecision of speculative reason. The command to further the highest good is objectively grounded (in practical reason), and its possibility itself is likewise objectively grounded (in theoretical reason, which has nothing to say against it). But as to the manner in which we are to think this possibility, reason cannot objectively decide
whether it is by universal laws of nature without a wise Author presiding over nature or only on the assumption of such an Author. Now a subjective condition or reason enters which is the only way in which it is theoretically possible for it to conceive of the exact harmony of the realm of nature with the realm of morals as the condition of the possibility of the highest good; and it is the only way which is conducive to morality (which is under an objective law of reason). Since the promotion of the highest good and thus the presupposition of its possibility are objectively necessary (though only as a consequence of practical reason), and since the manner in which we are to think of it as possible is subject to our own choice, in which a free interest of pure practical reason is decisive for the assumption [146] of a wise Author of the world, it follows that the principle which here determines our judgment, while subjectively a need, is the ground of a maxim or moral assent, as a means to promoting that which is objectively (practically) necessary; that is, it is a faith of pure practical reason. As a voluntary decision of our judgment to assume that existence and to make it the foundation of further employment of reason, conducing to the moral (commanded) purpose and agreeing moreover with the theoretical need of reason, it is itself not commanded. It rather springs from the moral disposition itself. It can therefore often waver even in the well disposed, but can never fall into unbelief.

IX. OF THE WISE ADAPTATION OF MAN'S COGNITIVE FACULTIES TO HIS PRACTICAL VOCATION

If human nature is called upon to strive for the highest good, the measure of its cognitive faculties and especially their relation to one another must be assumed to be suitable to this end. But the *Critique of Pure* (speculative) *Reason* demonstrates the utter insufficiency of speculative reason to solve the most weighty problems which are presented to it in a way satisfactory to its end; but that *Critique* did not ignore the natural and unmistakable hints of the same reason or the great steps that it

VON DER PROPORTION DER ERKENNTNISVERMÖGEN

len, ob nach allgemeinen Naturgesetzen, ohne einen der Natur vorstehenden weisen Urheber, oder nur unter dessen Voraussetzung, das kann die Vernunft objektiv nicht entscheiden. Hier tritt nun eine subjektive Bedingung der Vernunft ein: die einzige ihr theoretisch mögliche, zugleich der Moralität (die unter einem objektiven Gesetze der Vernunft steht) allein zutragliche Art, sich die genaue Zusammenstimmung des Reichs der Natur mit dem Reiche der Sitten, als Bedingung der Möglichkeit des höchsten Guts, zu denken. Da nun die Beförderung desselben, und also die Voraussetzung seiner Möglichkeit, objektiv (aber nur der praktischen Vernunft zu Folge) notwendig ist, zugleich aber die Art, auf welche wir es uns als möglich denken wollen, in unserer Wahl steht, in welcher aber ein freies Interesse der reinen praktischen Vernunft für die Annehmung eines weisen Weltwebers entscheidet: so ist das Prinzip, was unser Urteil hierin bestimmt, zwar subjektiv, als Bedürfnis, aber auch zugleich als Beförderungsmittel dessen, was objektiv (praktisch) notwendig ist, der Grund einer Maxime des Fürwahrhaltens in moralischer Absicht, d. i. ein reiner praktischer Vernunftglaube. Dieser ist also nicht geboten, sondern, als freiwillige, zur moralischen (gebotenen) Absicht zutragliche, überdem noch mit dem theoretischen Bedürfnisse der Vernunft einstimmige Bestimmung unseres Urteils, jene Existenz anzunehmen und dem Vernunftgebrauch ferner zum Grunde zu legen, selbst aus der moralischen Gesinnung entspringen; kann also äfters selbst bei Wohlgesinnten bisweilen in Schwanken niemals aber in Unglauben geraten.

IX. VON DER DER PRAKTISCHEN BESTIMMUNG

DES MENSCHEN WEISLICH ANGEMESSENEN PROPORTION

SEINER ERKENNTNISVERMÖGEN

Wenn die menschliche Natur zum höchsten Gute zu streben bestimmt ist, so muß auch das Maß ihrer Erkenntnisvermögen, vornehmlich ihr Verhältnis unter einander, als zu diesem Zwecke schicklich, angenommen werden. Nun beweist aber die Kritik der reinen spekulativen Vernunft die größte Unzulänglichkeit derselben, um die wichtigsten Aufgaben, die ihr vorgelegt werden, dem Zwecke angemessen aufzulösen, ob sie zwar die natürlichen und nicht zu überschreitenden Winke eben derselben Vernunft, ingleichen
can taken in approaching this great goal which is set before it but which it can never of itself reach even with the aid of the greatest knowledge of nature. Thus nature here seems to have provided us only in a stepmotherly fashion with a faculty needed for our end.

Now assuming that it had here indulged our wish and had provided us with that power of insight or enlightenment which we would like to possess or which some erroneously believe they do possess, what would be the consequence so far as we can discern it? In so far as our whole nature was not changed at the same time, the inclinations (which under any condition have the first word) would first strive for their satisfaction and, conjoined with reasonable consideration, for their [147] greatest possible and most lasting satisfaction under the name of happiness. The moral law would afterward speak in order to hold them within their proper limits and even to subject them all to a higher end which has no regard to inclination. But instead of the conflict which now the moral disposition has to wage with inclinations and in which, after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be gradually won, God and eternity in their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes (for that which we can completely prove is as certain as that which we can ascertain by sight). Transgression of the law would indeed be shunned, and the commanded would be performed. But because the disposition from which actions should be done cannot be instilled by any command, and because the spur to action would in this case be always present and external, reason would have no need to endeavor to gather its strength to resist the inclinations by a vivid idea of the dignity of the law. Thus most actions conforming to the law would be done from fear, few would be done from hope, none from duty. The moral worth of actions, on which alone the worth of the person and even of the world depends in the eyes of supreme wisdom, would not exist at all. The conduct of man, so long as his nature remained as it now is, would be changed into mere mechanism, where, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but no life would be found in the figures.
But it is quite otherwise with us. With all the exertion of our reason we have only a very obscure and ambiguous view into the future; the Governor of the world allows us only to conjecture His existence and majesty; not to behold or clearly prove them; the moral law in us, without promising or threatening us with anything certain, demands of us a disinterested respect; finally, only when this respect has become active and dominating, it allows us a view into the realm of the supersensible, though only a glimpse. Thus only can there be a truly moral character dedicated directly to the law and thus only can a rational creature become worthy of participating in the highest good corresponding to the moral worth of his person and not merely to his actions.

Thus what the study of nature and of man has sufficienctly shown elsewhere may well be true here, viz., that the inscrutable wisdom through which we exist is not less worthy of veneration in respect to what it denies us than in what it has granted.
PART II

METHODOLOGY OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

By the Methodology of pure practical reason we are [151] not to understand the manner of study or exposition which proceeds with pure practical principles for the purpose of a scientific knowledge of them, even though this procedure is the only one which is properly called "method" in theoretical reason. Popular knowledge requires a "manner," while science stands in need of a method, i.e., a procedure according to principles of reason, through which alone the manifold of knowledge can become a system. Here, on the contrary, we understand by methodology the way in which we can secure to the laws of pure practical reason access to the human mind and an influence on its maxims. That is to say, it is the way we can make objectively practical reason also subjectively practical.

Now it is clear that those motives of the will—the direct representation of the law and objective obedience to it as duty—which alone make the maxims really moral and give them a moral worth, must be thought of as the real drives of actions, for otherwise legality of actions but not morality of dispositions would result. But it is not so clear—in fact, it must appear highly improbable at first glance—that even subjectively the exhibition of pure virtue can have more power over the human mind, giving a far stronger drive to effectuate even that legality and to bring forward more powerful resolves to prefer the law to everything else merely out of respect for it, than all allurements arising from enjoyment and everything which may be counted as happiness or from all threats of pain and [152] harm. But it is really so, and if human nature were not so constituted, no way of presenting the law by circumlocutions and in-
direct recommendations could ever produce morality of dispositions. Everything would be mere cant; the law would be hated or even perhaps despised, though nevertheless followed for the sake of one's own advantage. The letter of the law (legality) would be met with in our actions, but the spirit of the law (morality) would not be found in our dispositions. Since with all our efforts we cannot completely free ourselves from reason in judging, we would inevitably appear to our own eyes as worthless and depraved men, even if we sought to compensate ourselves for this mortification before the inner tribunal by indulging in all the enjoyments which a supposed natural or divine law might be thought, in our delusion, to have connected with legality by means of a kind of police machinery regulating its operations by what we do without troubling itself about our motives for doing it.

Certainly it cannot be denied that in order to bring either an as yet uneducated or a degraded mind into the path of the morally good, some preparatory guidance is needed to attract it by a view to its own advantage or to frighten it by fear of harm. As soon as this machinery, these leading strings, have had some effect, the pure moral motive must be brought to mind. This is not only because it is the sole ground of character (a consistent practical habit of mind according to unchangeable maxims) but also because, in teaching a man to feel his own worth, it gives his mind a power, unexpected even by himself, to pull himself loose from all sensuous attachments (so far as they would fain dominate him) and, in the independence of his intelligible nature and in the greatness of soul to which he sees himself called, to find himself richly compensated for the sacrifice he makes. We should prove, by observations which anyone can make, that this property of our minds, this receptivity to a pure moral interest and the moving force in the pure thought of virtue when properly commended to the human heart, is the strongest drive to the good and indeed the only one when it is a question of continuous and meticulous obedience to moral maxims. It must be remembered, however, that if these observations show only the reality of such a feeling but not any
moral improvement resulting from it, this does no damage to the only method of making objectively practical laws of pure reason subjectively practical only through the pure thought of duty, nor does it prove that this method is a vain phantasy. For since this method has never yet been widely used, experience can tell us nothing of its results; one can ask only for proofs of the receptivity to such drives which I shall briefly present and then in few words outline the method of founding and cultivating genuine moral dispositions.

If we attend to the course of conversation in mixed companies consisting not merely of scholars and subtle reasoners but also of business people or women, we notice that besides storytelling and jesting they have another entertainment, namely, arguing; for storytelling, if it is to have novelty and interest, soon exhausts itself, while jesting easily becomes insipid. Now of all arguments there are none which excite more ready participation by those who are otherwise soon bored with all subtle thinking, or which are more likely to bring a certain liveliness into the company, than one about the moral worth of this or that action from which the character of some person is to be made out. Those who otherwise find everything which is subtle and minute in theoretical questions dry and vexing soon take part when it is a question of the moral import of a good or bad act that is recounted; and they are exacting, meticulous, and subtle in excogitating everything which lessens or even casts suspicion on the purity of intention and thus on the degree of virtue to an extent we do not expect of them on any other subject of speculation. One can often see the character of the person who judges others revealed in his judgments. Some of them appear to be chiefly inclined, as they exercise their judicial office especially upon the dead, to defend the good that is related of this or that deed against all injurious charges of insincerity, finally protecting the entire moral worth of the person against the reproach of dissimulation and secret wickedness. Others, on the contrary, incline more to attacking this worth by accusations and fault-finding. But we cannot always ascribe to the latter the wish to argue away [154]
virtue from all human examples in order to reduce it to an empty name; often it is a well-meaning strictness in the definition of genuine moral import according to an uncompromising law, in comparison with which (in contrast to comparison with examples) self-conceit in moral matters is very much reduced, and humility is not merely taught but is also felt by each in a penetrating self-examination. Nevertheless, we can often see, in the defenders of purity of intention in given examples, that where there is a presumption of righteousness they would gladly remove the least spot; and they do so lest, if all examples be disputed and all human virtue be denied its purity, virtue be held to be a mere phantom and all effort to attain it be deprecated as vain affectation and delusive conceit.

I do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made use of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon the most subtle examination of practical questions put to the young, and why, after laying the foundation in a purely moral catechism, they have not searched through biographies of ancient and modern times with the purpose of having examples at hand of the duties they lay down, so that, by comparing similar actions under various circumstances, they could begin to exercise the moral judgment of their pupils in marking the greater or lesser moral significance of the actions. They would find that even very young people, who are not yet ready for speculation of other kinds, would soon become very acute and not a little interested, since they would feel the progress of their power of judgment; what is most important, they could confidently hope that frequent practice of knowing and approving of good conduct in all its purity, and of noting even the least deviation from it with sorrow or contempt, would leave a lasting impression of esteem for the one and disgust for the other, even though this practice is pursued only as a game of judgment in which children could compete with one another. By the mere habit of frequently looking upon actions as praiseworthy or blameworthy, a good foundation would be laid for righteousness in the future course of life. But I wish they [155] would spare them examples of so-called noble (super-meritor-
Handlungen, mit welchen unsere empfindsame Schriften so viel um sich wer-fen, zu verschonen, und alles bloß auf Pflicht und den Wert, den ein Mensch sich in seinen eigenen Augen durch das Be-wußtsein, sie nicht übertreten zu haben, geben kann und muß, auszususetzen, weil, was auf leere Wünsche und Sehnsuchen nach unersteiglicher Vollkommenheit hinausläuft, lauter Romanhelden hervorbringt, die, indem sie sich auf ihr Gefühl für das überschwenglich-Große viel zu Gute tun, sich dafür von der Beobachtung der gemeinen und gang-baren Schuldigkeit, die alsdenn ihnen nur unbedeutend klein scheint, frei sprechen.*

Wenn man aber fragt: was denn eigentlich die reine Sittlichkeit ist, an der, als dem Probenettag, man jeder Handlung moralischen Gehalt prüfen müsse, so muß ich gestehen, daß nur Philosophen die Entscheidung dieser Frage zweifelhaft machen können; denn in der gemeinen Menschenverunft ist sie, zwar nicht durch abgezogene allgemeine Formeln, aber doch durch den gewöhnlichen Gebrauch, gleichsam als der Unterschied zwischen der rechten und linken Hand, längst entschieden. Wir wollen also vorerst das Prüfungsmerkmal der reinen Tugend an einem Beispiel zeigen, und indem wir uns vorstellen, daß es etwa einem zehnjährigen Knaben zur Beurteilung vorgelegt worden, sehen, ob er auch von selber, ohne durch den Lehrer dazu angewiesen zu sein, notwendig so urteilen müßte.


* It is entirely proper to exalt actions which display a great, unselfish, and sympathetic disposition and humanity. But in them we must attend not so much to the elevation of soul, which is very fleeting and ephemeral, as to the subjection of the heart to duty, from which a more lasting impression can be expected as it entails principles and not just ebullitions, as the former does. One need only to reflect a little to find an idea of how much the vaunted hero has in some way incurred to the human race (even if he be only that, by the inequality of men under the civil constitution, he enjoys advantages on account of which others must be lacking to just that extent), which will prevent the thought of duty from being repressed by the self-complacent imagination of merit.
come threats of loss. Among the slanderers there are his best friends who now renounce his friendship; near-relatives who threaten him (who is without fortune) with disinheritance; powerful persons who can persecute and harass him in all places and in every circumstance; a prince who threatens him with loss of freedom and even of life itself. But that the measure of his suffering may be full, so that he may feel the pain which only the morally good heart can very deeply feel, let his family, which is threatened with extreme need and want, entreat him to yield; think of the man himself, who, though righteous, has feelings which are not insensible or hardened to either sympathy or his own needs, at the moment when he wishes never to have lived to see the day which brings him such unutterable pain — think of him without any wavering or even a doubt remaining true to his resolution to be truthful — Thus one can lead the young listener step by step from mere approval to admiration, and from admiration to marveling, and finally to the greatest veneration and a lively wish that he himself could be such a man (though certainly not in his circumstances). Yet virtue is here worth so much only because it costs so much, not because it brings any advantage. All the admiration and even the endeavor to be like this character rest here solely on the purity of the moral principle, which can be clearly shown only by removing from the drive to the action everything which men might count as a part of happiness. Thus morality must have more power over the human heart the more purely it is presented. From this it follows that, if the law of morals and the image of holiness and virtue are to exert any influence at all on our minds, they can do so only in so far as they are laid to heart in their purity as drives unmixed with any view to welfare, because it is in suffering that they most notably show themselves. But a factor whose removal strengthens the effect of a moving force must have been a hindrance; consequently, all admixture of drives which derive from one's own happiness are a hindrance to the influence of the moral law on the human heart.

I assert further that, if in the admired action the motive from
which it was done was esteem for duty, this respect for [157] the law, and not any pretension to inner greatness of mind or noble and meritorious sentiment, is that which has the most power over the mind of the spectator. Consequently, duty, not merit, has not only the most definite influence but, when seen in the true light of its inviolability, also the most penetrating influence on the mind.

In our times, when men hope to have more effect on the mind through yielding, soft-hearted feelings or high-flying, puffed-up pretensions, which wither instead of strengthening the heart, than through the dry and earnest idea of duty which is more fitting to human imperfection and progress in goodness, attention to this method is more needed than ever. One defeats his purpose by setting actions called noble, magnanimous, and meritorious as models for children with the notion of captivating them by infusing an enthusiasm for these actions. For as they are considerably backward in the observance of the commonest duty and even in the correct estimation of it, this amounts to speedily making them fantastic romancers. Even among the instructed and experienced portion of mankind, this supposed drive has, if not an injurious, at least no genuine moral, effect on the heart, which is what one hoped to produce by its means.

All feelings, and especially those which produce unusual exertions, must produce their effect in the moment when they are at their height and before they subside, else they have no effect at all. This is due to the fact that the heart naturally returns to its natural and moderate behavior and soon falls back into its previous languor because it has been brought into contact with something that stimulated it, not with something that strengthened it. Principles must be erected on concepts; on any other foundation there are only passing moods which give the person no moral worth and not even confidence in himself, without which the consciousness of his moral disposition and character, the highest good in man, cannot arise. These concepts, if they are to become subjectively practical, must not remain objective laws of morality which we merely admire and esteem in

wunderten Handlung, wenn der Bewegungsgrund, daraus sie geschah, die Hochschätzung seiner Pflicht war, alsdenn eben diese Achtung fürs Gesetz, nicht etwa ein Anspruch auf die innere Meinung von Großmut und edler verdienstlicher Denkungsart, gerade auf das Gemüt des Zuschauers die größte Kraft habe, folglich Pflicht, nicht Verdienst, den nicht allein bestimmttesten, sondern, wenn sie im rechten Lichte — ihrer Unverletzlichkeit vorgestellt wird, auch den eindringendsten Einfluß aufs Gemüt haben müsse.

In unsern Zeiten, wo man mehr mit schmelzenden weichherzigen Gefühlen, oder hochfliegenden, aufblühenden und das Herz eher weck, als stark, machenden Anmaßungen über das Gemüt mehr auszurichten hofft, als durch die der menschlichen Unvollkommenheit und dem Fortschritte im Guten angemessene trockne und ernsthafte Vorstellung der Pflicht, ist die Hinweiszung auf diese Methode wütiger, als jemals. Kindern Handlungen als edele, großmütige, verdienstliche zum Muster aufzustellen, in der Meinung, sie durch Einfühlung eines Enthusiasmus für dieselbe einzunehmen, ist vollends zweckwidrig. Denn da sie noch in der Beobachtung der gemeinsten Pflicht und selbst in der richtigen Beurteilung derselben so weit zurück sind, so heißt das so viel, als sie bei Zeiten zu Phantasten zu machen. Aber auch bei dem belehrenden und erfahrenden Teil der Menschen ist diese vermeinte Triebfeder, wo nicht von nachteiliger, wenigstens von keiner echten moralischen Wirkung aufs Herz, die man dadurch doch zu zuwegebringen wollen.

Alle Gefühle, vornehmlich die, so ungewohnte Anstrengung bewirken sollen, müssen in dem Augenblicke, da sie in ihrer Heftigkeit sind, und ehe sie verbrausen, ihre Wirkung tun, sonst tun sie nichts; indem das Herz natürlicherweise zu seiner natürlichen gemäßigen Lebensbewegung zurückkehrt, und sonach in die Mattigkeit verfällt, die ihm vorher eigen war; weil zwar etwas, was es reizte, nichts aber, das es stärkte, an dasselbe gebracht war. Grundsätze müssen auf Begriffe errichtet werden, auf alle andere Grundlage können nur Anwendungen zu Stande kommen, die der Person keinen moralischen Wert, ja nicht einmal eine Zuvorsicht auf sich selbst verschaffen können, ohne die das Bewußtsein seiner moralischen Gesinnung und eines solchen Charakters, das höchste Gut im Menschen, gar nicht stattfinden kann. Diese Begriffe nun, wenn sie subjektiv praktisch werden sollen, müssen nicht bei den objektiven Gesetzen der Sittlichkeit stehen bleiben, um sie zu bewundern,
relation to mankind in general. Rather we must see the idea of them in relation to man as an individual, for then the law appears in a form which is indeed deserving of high respect, though not as pleasing as if it belonged to the element to which he is naturally accustomed; on the contrary, it often compels him to leave this element, not without self-denial, and to give himself over to a higher element in which he can maintain himself only with effort and with unceasing apprehension of falling back into the former. In a word, the moral law demands obedience from duty, not from a predilection which cannot and should not be presupposed at all.

Let us now see in an example whether there is more subjective moving force of a drive in the thought of an action as noble and magnanimous than when the action is thought of merely as duty in relation to the solemn moral law. The action by which someone with the greatest danger to his own life seeks to save others in a shipwreck and at last loses his own life will indeed be counted, on the one hand, as duty, but on the other hand, even more as a meritorious action; but [in the latter case] our esteem for it will be weakened very much by the concept of his duty to himself, which here seems to have been infringed. More decisive is the magnanimous sacrifice of his life for the preservation of his country, and yet there still remain some scruples as to whether it is so perfect a duty to devote oneself spontaneously and unbidden to this purpose, and the action itself does not have the full force of a model and impulse to imitation. But if it is an inexorable duty, transgression against which violates of itself the moral law without respect to human welfare and, as it were, tramples on its holiness (the kind of duties which one usually calls duties to God, because we think of Him as the ideal of holiness in a substance), we give our most perfect esteem to pursuing it and sacrificing to it everything that ever had value for our dearest inclinations; and we find our soul strengthened and elevated by such an example when we convince ourselves, by contemplating it, that human nature is capable of such an elevation above everything that nature can present as a drive in opposition to it. Juvenal describes

und in Beziehung auf die Menschheit hochzuschätzen, sondern ihre Vorstellung in Relation auf den Menschen und auf sein Individuum zu betrachten; da denn jenes Gesetz in einer zwar höchst achtungswürdigen, aber nicht so gefälligen Gestalt erscheint, als ob es zu dem Element gehöre, daran er natürlicher Weise gewohnt ist, sondern wie es ihn nötigt, dieses oft, nicht ohne Selbstverleugnung, zu verlassen, und sich in ein höheres zu begeben, darin er sich, mit unaufhörlicher Besorgnis des Rückfalls, nur mit Mühe erhalten kann. Mit einem Worte, das moralische Gesetz verlangt Befolgung aus Pflicht, nicht aus Vorliebe, die man gar nicht voraussetzen kann und soll.

| Laßt uns nun im Beispiel sehen, ob in der Vorstellung einer Handlung als edler und großmütiger Handlung mehr subjektiv bewegende Kraft einer Triebfeder liege, als wenn diese bloß als Pflicht in Verhältnis auf das ernste moralische Gesetz vorgestellt wird. Die Handlung, da jemand, mit der größten Gefahr des Lebens, Leute aus dem Schiffbruch zu retten sucht, wenn er zuletzt dabei selbst sein Leben einbüßt, wird zwar einerseits zur Pflicht, andererseits aber auch großenteils auch für verdienstliche Handlung angerechnet, aber unsere Hochschätzung selbigen wird gar sehr durch den Begriff von Pflicht gegen sich selbst, welche hier etwas Abbruch zu leiden scheint, geschwächt. Entscheidender ist die großmütige Aufopferung seines Lebens zur Erhaltung des Vaterlandes, und doch, ob es auch so vollkommenen Pflicht sei, sich von selbst und unbefohlen dieser Absicht zu weihen, darüber bleibt einiger Skrupel übrig, und die Handlung hat nicht die ganze Kraft eines Musters und Antriebes zur Nachahmung in sich. Ist es aber unerläßliche Pflicht, deren Übertretung das moralische Gesetz an sich und ohne Rücksicht auf Menschenwohl verleitet, und dessen Heiligkeit gleichsam mit Füßen tritt (dergleichen Pflichten man Pflichten gegen Gott zu nennen pflegt, weil wir uns in ihm das Ideal der Heiligkeit in Substanz denken), so widmen wir der Befolgung desselben, auf Aufopferung alles dessen, was für die innigste aller unserer Neigungen nur immer einen Wert haben mag, die allervollkommenste Hochachtung, und wir finden unsere Seele durch ein solches Beispiel gestärkt und erhoben, wenn wir an demselben uns überzeugen können, daß die menschliche Natur zu einer so großen Erhebung über alles, was Natur nur immer an Triebfedern zum Gegenteil aufbringen mag, fähig sei. Juvenal
such an example in a climax which makes the reader vividly feel the power of the drive which lies in the pure law of duty as duty: "Be a stout soldier, a faithful guardian, and an incorruptible judge; if summoned to bear witness in some dubious and uncertain cause, though Phalaris himself should bring up his bull and dictate to you a perjury, count it the greatest of all sins to prefer life to honor, and to lose, for the sake of living, all that makes life worth living."

Whenever we bring any flattering thought of merit into our actions, the drive is already mixed with self-love and thus has some assistance from the side of the sensuous. But to put everything else down below the holiness of duty and to know that we can do it because our own reason acknowledges it as its law and says that we ought to do it—that is, as it were, to lift ourselves altogether out of the world of sense; this elevation is inseparably present in the consciousness of the law as a drive of a faculty which rules over the sensuous, though not always effectively. But frequent concern with this drive and the at-first minor attempts at using it give hope of its effectiveness, so that gradually the greatest but still purely moral interest in it will be produced in us.

The method therefore takes the following course. The first step is to make judging according to moral laws a natural occupation which accompanies our own free actions as well as our observations of those of others, and to make it, as it were, a habit. We must sharpen these judgments by first asking whether the action is objectively in accordance with moral law, and if so, with which one; by this, heed to the law that gives only a principle of obligation is distinguished from one which is in fact obligatory (leges obligandi a legibus obligantibus). For instance, we distinguish between the law of that which the

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1Juvenal Satire viii. 79-84, trans. G. G. Ramsey ("Loeb Classical Library"). Phalaris was tyrant of Agrigentum who had a brass ox constructed in which his victims were burned to death.

2Laws of obligation (in general) distinguished from (specific) laws that actually oblige.
needs of men require of me from that which their rights demand, the latter prescribing essential duties while the former prescribes nonessential duties. This teaches how to distinguish between the different duties which come together in an action.

The second point to which attention must be directed is the question as to whether the action is done (subjectively) for the sake of the moral law, and thus not only is morally correct as a deed, but also has moral worth as a disposition because of the maxim from which it was done. Now there is no doubt that this exercise and the consciousness of cultivation of our reason which judges concerning the practical must gradually produce a certain interest in its own law and thus in morally [160] good actions. For we ultimately take a liking to that the observation of which makes us feel that our powers of knowledge are extended, and this extension is especially furthered by that wherein we find moral correctness, since reason, with its faculty of determining according to a priori principles what ought to occur, can find satisfaction only in such an order of things. Even an observer of nature finally likes objects which first offend his senses when he discovers in them the great design of their organization, so that his reason finds nourishment in observing them; Leibniz spared an insect which he had carefully examined under the microscope, and replaced it on its leaf, because he had been instructed by viewing it and, as it were, had received a benefit from it.

But this occupation of the faculty of judgment, which makes us feel our own powers of knowledge, is not yet interest in actions and their morality itself. It only enables one to entertain himself with such judging and gives virtue or a turn of mind based on moral laws a form of beauty which is admired but not yet sought ("Honesty is praised and starves"). It is the same with everything whose contemplation produces subjectively a consciousness of the harmony of our powers of representation by which we feel our entire cognitive faculty (understanding and imagination) strengthened; it produces a satisfaction that

3Laudatur et alget, an allusion to Juvenal Satire i. 74.
can be communicated to others, but the existence of its object remains indifferent to us, as it is seen only as the occasion for our becoming aware of our store of talents which are elevated above the mere animal level.

Now the second exercise begins its work. It lies in calling to notice the purity of will by a vivid exhibition of the moral disposition in examples. It is presented first only as negative perfection, i.e., indicating that no drives of inclination are motives influencing an action done as a duty. By this, the pupil's attention is held to the consciousness of his freedom; and, although this renunciation of the sensuous excites an initial feeling of pain, at the same time, by relieving him of the constraint even of his true needs it frees him from the manifold discontent in which all these needs involve him and makes his mind receptive to the feeling of contentment from other sources. [161] The heart is freed from a burden which has secretly pressed upon it; it is lightened when in instances of pure moral resolutions there is revealed to man, who previously has not correctly known it, a faculty of inner freedom to release himself from the impetuous impotence of the inclinations, to such an extent that not even the dearest of them has an influence on a resolution for which he now makes use of his reason. In a case where I alone know that injustice lies in what I do, and where an open confession of it and an offer to make restitution is in direct conflict with vanity, selfishness, and an otherwise not illegitimate antipathy to the man whose rights I have impaired, if I can set aside all these considerations, there is consciousness of an independence from inclinations and circumstances and of the possibility of being sufficient to myself, which is salutary for me in yet other respects. The law of duty, through the positive worth which obedience to it makes us feel, finds easier access through the respect for ourselves in the consciousness of our freedom. If it is well established, so that a man fears nothing more than to find himself on self-examination to be worthless and contemptible in his own eyes, every good moral disposition can be grafted on to this self-respect, for the consciousness of freedom is the best, indeed the only, guard that can keep...
noble and corrupting influences from bursting in upon the mind.

With these remarks I have intended only to point out the most general maxims of the methodology of moral cultivation and exercise. Since the manifold variety of duties requires specific definitions of each kind, and these would constitute a prolix affair, the reader will excuse me if in a work like this, which is only preliminary, I go no further than these outlines.
CONCLUSION

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not merely conjecture them and seek them as though obscured in darkness or in the transcendent region [162] beyond my horizon: I see them before me, and I associate them directly with the consciousness of my own existence. The heavens begin at the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and broaden the connection in which I stand into an unbounded multitude of worlds beyond worlds and systems of systems and into the limitless times of their periodic motion, their beginning and their duration. The latter begins at my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity but which is comprehensible only to the understanding — a world with which I recognize myself as existing in a universal and necessary (and not, as in the first case, merely contingent) connection, and thereby also in connection with all those visible worlds. The former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an animal creature, which must give back to the planet (a mere speck in the universe) the matter from which it came, the matter which is for a little time provided with vital force, we know not how. The latter, on the contrary, infinitely raises my worth as that of an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals a life independent of all animality and even of the whole world of sense — at least so far as it may be inferred from the final destination assigned to my existence by this law, a destination which is not restricted to the conditions and boundaries of this life but reaches into the infinite.

But though wonder and respect can indeed excite to inquiry, they cannot supply the want of it. What, then, is to be done in

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order to set inquiry on foot in a useful way appropriate to the
sublimity of its objects? Examples may serve for warnings here,
but also for imitation. The observation of the world began from
the noblest spectacle that was ever placed before the human
senses and that our understanding can undertake to follow in
its vast expanse, and it ended in — astrology. Morals began with
the noblest attribute of human nature, the development and
cultivation of which promised infinite utility, and it ended in
— fanaticism or superstition. So it goes with all crude attempts
in which the principal part of the business depends on the use
of reason, a use which does not come of itself, like that of the
feet, from frequent exercise, especially when it concerns attrib-
utes which cannot be so directly exhibited in common [163]
experience. Though late, when the maxim did come into
vogue of carefully examining every step which reason had to
take and not to let it proceed except on the path of a well-con-
sidered method, the study of the structure of the world took an
entirely different direction and therewith attained an incompar-
ably happier result. The fall of a stone and the motion of a
slingshot, resolved into their elements and the forces manifested in
them treated mathematically, finally brought that clear
and henceforth unchangeable insight into the structure of the
world which, as observations continue, we may hope to
broaden but need not fear having to retract.

This example recommends to us the same path in treating of
the moral capacities of our nature and gives hope of a similarly
good issue. We have at hand examples of the morally judging
reason. We may analyze them into their elementary concepts,
adopting, in default of mathematics, a process similar to that of
chemistry, i.e., we may, in repeated experiments on common
sense, separate the empirical from the rational, exhibit each of
them in a pure state, and show what each by itself can accom-
plish. Thus we shall avoid the error of a crude and unpracticed
judgment and (something far more important) the extrava-
gances of genius, by which, as by the adepts of the philoso-
pher’s stone, visionary treasures are promised and real trea-
sures are squandered for lack of methodical study and

BESCHLUSS

diese, auf nützliche und der
Erhabenheit des Gegenstandes angemessene Art, anzustel-
len? Beispiele mögen hiebei zur Warnung, aber auch zur
Nachahmung dienen. Die Weltbetrachtung fing von dem
herrlichsten Anblicke an, den menschliche Sinne nur immer
vorlegen, und unser Verstand, in ihrem weiten Umfange zu
verfolgen, nur immer vertragen kann, und endigte — mit der
Starrheit. Die Moral fing mit der edelsten Eigenschaft
in der menschlichen Natur an, deren Entwicklung und Kult-
ur auf unendlichen Nutzen hinaussieht, und endigte — mit
der Schwärmerei, oder dem Aberglauben. So geht es allen
noch rohen Versuchen, in denen der vornehmste Teil des
Geschäftes auf den Gebrauch der Vernunft ankommst, der
nicht, so wie der Gebrauch der Füße, sich von selbst, ver-
mittelst der äußern Ausbildung, findet, vornehmlich wenn er
Eigenschaften betrifft, die sich nicht so unmittelbar in der
gemeinen Erfahrung darstellen lassen. Nachdem aber,
wohl spät, die Maxime in Schwang gekommen war, alle
Schritte vorher wohl zu überlegen, die die Vernunft zu tun
vorhat, und sie nicht anders, als im Gneise einer vorher wohl
überdachten Methode, ihren Gang machen zu lassen, so
bewies die Beurteilung des Weltgebäudes eine ganz andere
Richtung, und, mit dieser, zugleich einen, ohne Verglei-
chung, glücklichern Ausgang. Der Fall eines Steins, die Be-
wegung einer Schleuder, in ihre Elemente und dabei sich
äußernde Kräfte aufgelöst, und mathematisch bearbeitet,
brachte zuletzt diejenige klare und für alle Zukunft unver-
änderliche Einsicht in den Weltbau hervor, die, bei fort-
gehender Beobachtung, hoffen kann, sich immer nur zu er-
weitern, niemals aber, zurückgehen zu müssen, fürchten darf.

Diesen Weg nun in Behandlung der moralischen Anlagen
unserer Natur gleichfalls einzuschlagen, kann uns jenes Bei-
spiel anrücken sein, und Hoffnung zu ähnlichem guten Erfolg
gewähren. Wir haben doch die Beispiele der moralisch-urtei-
enden Vernunft bei Hand. Diese nun in ihre Elementarbegriffe
zu zergliedern, in Ermangelung der Mathematik aber
an der Chemie ähnliches Verfahren, der Schiedung des
Empirischen vom Rationalen, das sich in ihnen vorfinden
mochte, in wiederholten Versuchen am gemeinsamen Menschen-
verstande vorzunehmen, kann uns beides rein, und, was
jedes für sich allein leisten könne, mit Gewißheit kennbar
machen, und so, teils der Verirrung einer noch tödlichen un-
geübten Beurteilung, teils (welches weit nötiger ist) den
Genieschwüren vorbeugen, durch welche, wie es von
Adepten des Steins der Weisen zu geschehen pflegt, ohne
alle methodische Nachforschung, und Kenntnis der Natur,
knowledge of nature. In a word, science (critically sought and methodically directed) is the narrow gate that leads to the doctrine of wisdom, when by this is understood not merely what one ought to do but what should serve as a guide to teachers in laying out plainly and well the path to wisdom which everyone should follow, and in keeping others from going astray. It is a science of which philosophy must always remain the guardian; and though the public takes no interest in its minute investigations, it may very well take an interest in the doctrines which such considerations first make clear to it.