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Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft

Erster Abschnitt
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Notes on the Creation of the Bilingual Text of IMMANUÅL KANT’S
CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT/ KRITIK DER URTEILSKRAFT

First of all, I dedicate this text to Adrian P. and Adrian J, two students/teachers of philosophy.

I consulted a number of students and teachers of the Critique of Judgment as to which English translation I should use. (Abbot? Bernard? Cerf? Guyer? Haden? Meredith? Pluhar?) Pluhar won, hands down. So, I decided to use Werner S. Pluhar’s English translation of the Krrik der Urteilskraft. For the original German version I have used the Werkausgabe edited by Wilhelm Weischedel and published by Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag.

This bilingual edition contains the entire Hackett Edition (from cover to cover) of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment. (The introductory notes at the beginning and the glossary at the end have been highly recommended as well).

Because this edition contains the Translator’s Supplement; First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, at the end of the book (pages 383-442), it may therefore seem a bit confusing, because in the German edition, it is at the very beginning of the book. So, the German page numbers in this bilingual run from pages 72-461 and after that, from pages 18-68 is the First Fassung der Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft (the First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment).

Even though there are slight imperfections in this bilingual edition, such as: occasionally the German text is not perfectly lined up next to the English text and may slant a bit; the German chapter titles, because they were enlarged to match the size of the English text’s titles, sometimes invade the space of the English side of the text; and sometimes I have placed the German footnotes in the margin on the very same line to which they refer and other times they are at the bottom of the page. Even with these slight imperfections, a lot is to be gained by having these two texts side by side and being able to see exactly how the German version reads. And after all, this bilingual edition which I have prepared, with its imperfections, is just a prototype of what I would like to see done more often and in a more perfect way for all important philosophical texts which are not originally written in English. Considering the frequency with which this text is being taught and studied, it is a bit shocking that some translation of this text has not already appeared in a bilingual form!
Fortunately this type of thing has been available for a very long time for Greek and Latin philosophical and literary texts. I am, of course, referring to the Loeb Classical Library Series which, even though are somewhat small, are excellent.

Recently I was happy to see that one text of Kant's, *The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God/Der einzige möglichen Beweisgrund* translated by Goen on Treach is in a bilingual form and is available through the University of Nebraska Press.

The following website (http://www.english.ccsu.barnetts/kant.htm) has been very helpful. Here is what Professor Barnett has written.

Kant considered the *Critique of Judgment*—the third work in a philosophical trilogy—to be a treatise on the principles structuring judgments in general. Having delineated reason in its pure and practical senses in the first two Critiques, Kant felt it necessary to outline what made possible the application of reason—the power to judge [Urteilskraft]. *The Critique of Judgment,* therefore, was to function as the bridge between the Critique of Pure Reason and the *Critique of Practical Reason.*

Kant broke judgment down into two distinct forms: determinate and reflective judgment. Determinate judgment was the application of an existing concept to a particular. Reflective judgment was the judgment of a particular for which no concept existed. As a result, judgment was thrown back upon itself and held back from completion. The *Critique of Judgment* is concerned with exploring reflective judgment in two intrinsically problematic domains—those of aesthetic and teleological judgment. Most discussions of the *Critique of Judgment*—especially those having anything to do with aesthetic or artistic issues—make virtually no mention of what amounts to half of Kant's treatise. One should note, however, that Kant considered both forms of judgment equally vexed and thus necessitating consideration. In the second half of the third Critique Kant was attempting to demonstrate that judgments about the purposiveness of nature were necessary but heuristic attempts to ascribe a teleology to nature. This ascription of teleology—which was derived necessarily from an idea of reason and not from a concept that could be in accord with nature—is what made these judgments reflective. The discussion of the teleology of nature, therefore, was to serve as a counterpart to the discussion of art, for the former dealt with reflective judgment in a supposedly objective realm, while the latter dealt with reflective judgment in a supposedly subjective realm.
The section of the *Critique of Judgment* that was to have a greater cultural impact dealt with questions of aesthetics. According to Kant, before the art work the imagination synthesized sense data into a coherent image for which the understanding could provide no concept. What fueled the search for a concept was the apparent purposiveness of the work of art that nonetheless served no purpose. As a result, the uncritical, was put into a state of free play with the imagination. It was in this state of free play that the mind was to become aware of its own constitutive role in the act of judgment and thus the production of knowledge. Because of the lack of a concept to apply in the instance of art, the mind was to come to realize that in determinant judgment the mind did not achieve a correspondence with an external reality, but, rather, the mind generated the concept to which the thing had to submit. What is disclosed in art thereby is the power and freedom of the mind.

Kant's claims about the function of aesthetic judgment, however, extended much further. For Kant argued that aesthetic judgment, far from being individual and idiosyncratic, was profoundly universal in nature. In order to make this claim, Kant argued that the pleasure in art was necessarily a disinterested pleasure, oriented only towards the forma. purposiveness of the art work. The disinterested nature of aesthetic judgment allowed it to make a universal claim for validity for it appealed not to specific aspects of the art work but to a sense held in common (sensus communis). In this way the formal properties of the art work would be isotropically linked to the form-generating properties of the mind. In the appeal to a sensus communis, moreover, the awareness of the legislative function of the mind in constituting perceived reality was linked to an awareness of the universally shared nature of this legislative function. The judgment employed in art could thereby serve as a praepaedeutic to ethics in that aesthetic judgment was but the purely formal version of the self-application of ethical norms that was to take place in exercise of practical reason.

Kant's *Critique of Judgment* is arguably one of the foundational texts of the aesthetics of Romanticism. It had both an overt and a subterranean impact on Romanticism. However, precise determinations of intellectual causation are difficult with Kant in that at each stage Kant's thought inspired heated debate and reformulation, all of which acquired a life of its own. Overtly, Kant's thought was carefully considered and addressed by such writers as Schiller, Novalis, and Schlegel. In more oblique ways, writers like Coleridge absorbed Kantian thought and served to disseminate it further so that one could plausibly argue, for instance, that there is a Kantian dimension to Wordsworth's poetry.
It is no exaggeration to claim that Kant not only founded aesthetic modernism but also enabled Romanticism to establish an aesthetic paradigm that continued on through the twentieth century. Kant brought the philosophical weight that was necessary to dismantle the centuries-old ideal of mimesis in European culture. The Copernican revolution that Kant sought to bring about in philosophy was something that he also brought about in aesthetic thought. Just as Kant excluded consideration of the thing-in-itself from epistemology, so did Kant exclude slavish fidelity to an external object from aesthetics. No longer was mimetic accuracy an aesthetic ideal; rather, art was to connect to the generative, world-making activity of the mind. This shift had enormous implications for art.

Henceforth art was not to display virtuosity in a rule-bound medium. Since the understanding was to have no concept to apply to the work of art, it was essential that it not correspond to any known instance of art. In other words, the work of art had to be truly original, and not be characterized by the application of artistic rules. It ideally did not fit any existing concept of art. Art was now to be created by a genius ab ovo. The only rule was to avoid rules and any existing, accepted forms of art. Such notions are now seen to be commonplaces of Romanticism and can indeed be found articulated in programmatic texts such as the Preface to Lyrical Ballads. It is in the context of the Critique of Judgment, however, that such notions of artistic autonomy and originality acquire their full philosophical import. Accordingly, Romanticism can be seen as a repudiation of a longstanding Platonic-Christian heritage that consigned art to a peripheral status at several removes from the realm of philosophical or theological truth. Instead, Romanticism presents art as part of an activity that is closer than anything else to the action the mind itself undertakes in the construction of the world as it is perceived. In this way, art is more central to human self-understanding than either philosophy or theology.

Finally, it can also be argued that Kant's work helps to make clear that Romanticism establishes an aesthetic paradigm that extends through the twentieth century. For, in its pursuit of formal purposiveness, art in the Kantian sense was to focus on the form and the mode of presentation as opposed to mimetic fidelity. This emphasis manifested itself
initially in the prominent role irony assumed in Romanticism. The concern with form, however, continued to be a central concern well beyond Romanticism. Indeed, the history of art subsequent to Romanticism could be said to be the story of the liberation of form from content. There is arguably a clear trajectory from Kant to Kandinsky, Schoenberg, and Joyce. While this increasing formalism is in a dialectical relationship with an increasing materialism in art--as is evident from Duchamp to Beuys and Hirst--the counterpart to formalism is likewise dependent upon Kantian aesthetics in its prioritization of originality and conceptuality over the very idea of art. The *Critique of Judgment* is thus in many ways foundational to diverse modes of artistic production and appreciation that remain very much in effect.

Richard G. Klein  
Jan 31 2006  
New York City
CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

Kritik der Urteilskraft
Immanuel Kant

Critique of Judgment

translated by Werner S. Pluhar

Immanuel Kant

Kritik der Urteilskraft

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FOREWORD

By calling three of his works “critiques,” Kant indicated their central role in the Critical Philosophy. The Critique of Pure Reason, which determines the limits of theoretical cognition for the human mind, is the foundation of Kant’s mature philosophical thought, and the ideal approach to his philosophy would, I suppose, begin with the Critique of Pure Reason and work forward systematically. That is to say, as we found various kinds of judgments, we would first analyze the sort of claim to universal assent being made and then attempt to justify that kind of claim by tracing it to the necessary principles of our mental activity. But our philosophical development may not parallel Kant’s. If we find ourselves drawn to Kant by an interest in, e.g., ethics or aesthetics, we can go only so far before we get into difficulties. For Kant’s interest in any problem has two aspects, the substantive and the critical. The sort of claim we are making can be analyzed in a way that is intelligible to a wide audience. But the status of that claim remains problematic until we have investigated our competence to make it. To justify the principle implicit in our moral judgments, we shall have to undertake a Critique of Practical Reason; to justify the principle implicit in our judgments about beauty, we must resort to a Critique of Judgment. And our investigation inevitably leads back to the Critique of Pure Reason.

To the extent that Kant keeps his substantive and his critical interests more or less separate, some of his writings, or parts of them, will be widely read. What Kant has to say on substantive issues has proved to be of perennial interest. But the student who becomes
interested in Kant’s analysis will be aware that he cannot stop short with the analytic phase: Kant will have warned him repeatedly that the validity of these claims is still very much in question. Two courses are open to the serious student. He can plunge into the Critique of Pure Reason and work his way forward. In the process he will probably become a Kant scholar, an affliction that generally proves incurable. Or he can be content with a more general understanding of Kant’s solution to the critical phase of the problem, which will leave him free to pursue his broader interests. One of the merits of Professor Pluhar’s work is that his translator’s introduction provides the sort of background for the Critique of Judgment that will guide the student interested in aesthetics and philosophy of science through the critical phases in Kant’s discussion of aesthetic and teleological judgments.

The combination of Kant’s critical and substantive concerns, in this highly complex work, may well account for the long-standing neglect of the Critique of Judgment as a whole and the interest recently shown in some of its parts. In his Introduction to the third Critique, Kant’s interest is primarily critical. On the basis of the first two Critiques he acknowledges a “chasm” between nature and freedom that is not to be bridged by way of theoretical cognition. For a post-Kantian philosopher bent on doing speculative metaphysics, this acknowledgment indicates the failure of the Critical Philosophy. Not until nineteenth century idealism had run its course would it seem worthwhile to consider the more modest task Kant had set himself: that of making the transition, by way of reflective judgment and its principle of teleology, from our way of thinking about nature to our way of thinking about freedom. But even then, the connection between the Introduction to the Critique and its two parts seemed so tenuous as to raise doubts about the unity and coherence of the work.

In the meantime, developments in art criticism and aesthetic theory focused attention on Kant’s accessible and tightly structured analysis of our judgments of beauty, the “Analytic of the Beautiful,” into which we are plunged after the Introduction’s prologue in heaven. The emergence of formalism in art, the collapse of “expressionism” as an aesthetic theory into a branch of psychology, and the perennial difficulties of assigning “objective” status to beauty suggest that Kant’s analysis of taste is relevant to contemporary problems. But, after the analytic, Kant’s critical concerns come to the foreground and the course of the argument becomes puzzling. Kant is somehow, here as in the subsequent treatment of teleological judgments, carrying out the project outlined in the Introduction. But how? The second merit of Pluhar’s introduction is that it attempts to explain how Kant is dealing with the problem posed in the Introduction to the Critique.

None of the periodic revivals of interest in Kant has, it seems to me, approached the magnitude of the present one. This is the appropriate time for an accurate translation into modern English of the work that has been called “the crowning phase of the critical philosophy.” By including in his translation the original Introduction to the Critique of Judgment (which Kant replaced by a shorter one), and by adding his own helpful analysis of Kant’s argument, Pluhar has taken an important step toward securing for the third Critique its rightful place in the Kantian corpus.

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Because there seems to be general agreement that an accurate and readable translation of the *Critique of Judgment*, including the First Introduction, is needed, I shall not argue that point.

The translator's introduction which follows (and, to some extent, the bracketed footnotes accompanying the text of the translation itself) serves two main purposes. One of these is to supply important background materials to readers with only limited prior exposure to Kant's "critical philosophy": above all, summaries of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*, including not only the views but also the terminology from these works which Kant presupposes in the *Critique of Judgment*; and summaries of other philosophers' views to which each of the three *Critiques*, but especially the *Critique of Judgment*, responds. The other main purpose is to explain the many difficult passages in the work. In particular, the translator's introduction offers a new interpretation of key elements in the foundation of both Kant's teleology and his aesthetics and uses that same interpretation to make new and better sense not only of the link between these two parts of the work, but especially of Kant's claims as to how the *Critique of Judgment* unites the three *Critiques* in a system. The translator's introduction makes no attempt, apart from an occasional remark, to trace the development of Kant's thought.

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1One excellent source of information on these views is Lewis White Beck's *Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1969).
Any reader should of course feel free to skip those sections in the translator’s introduction which contain material already familiar; and anyone who finds certain sections too difficult at first try should similarly feel free to set them aside for a while and return to them as needed to make sense of the Kantian passages they are intended to explain.

The translation of both the *Critique of Judgment* and the First Introduction is based on the standard edition of Kant’s works, commonly referred to as the *Akademie* edition: *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902–). The text of the *Akademie* edition of the *Critique of Judgment* comes from the work’s second edition, which was published in 1793 (the first edition appeared in 1790); it was edited by Wilhelm Windelband and is contained in volume 5 of the *Akademie* edition. The First Introduction appears in volume 20 (193–251) of the *Akademie* edition; it was edited by Gerhard Lehmann. I have considered variant readings throughout but have indicated them only where I either adopted them or found them of special interest.

The translation generally follows the *Akademie* text in the use of parentheses, quotation marks, typographical emphasis, and paragraphing; occasional changes, all but the most trivial of which have been noted, were made in the interest of clarity. All material in brackets, whether in the text or in footnotes, is my own. German terms inserted in brackets are given in their modern spelling and (usually) in their standard form (e.g., verbs are given in the infinitive), to facilitate finding them in a modern German dictionary. All translations given in footnotes are my own, and this fact is not indicated in each such footnote individually.

The pagination along the margin of the text refers to the *Akademie* edition; the unprimed numbers refer to volume 5, the primed numbers to volume 20. All references to the work itself and to the First Introduction are to the *Akademie* edition; they are given as ‘Ak.’ followed by the page number and, as applicable, by the number of Kant’s note (“n.”) or of my bracketed note (“br. n.”). (Because clarifying the text made it necessary to cut up Kant’s inordinately long sentences and to rearrange some of them, as well as some of the more convoluted paragraphs, the correspondence between the numbers on the margins and the pages in the original is only approximate.) References to the translator’s introduction are given in roman numerals.

References to works of Kant other than the *Critique of Judgment* and the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the *Akademie* edition and are given as ‘Ak.’ followed by the volume number and the page number. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the first two editions of the work and are given in standard form, as ‘A’ and ‘B’ followed by the page number.

At the end of this work will be found a selected bibliography, a glossary of the most important German terms in the work along with their English equivalents, and an index.

I have consulted Bernhard’s and Meredith’s translations of the *Critique of Judgment*, Cerf’s translation of a portion of the first part of the work, and Haden’s translation of the First Introduction. Where my renderings of key terms break with tradition, I have indicated this in footnotes at the beginning of major portions of this translation, explaining my reasons for the change.

I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Lewis White Beck for having suggested initially that I undertake this massive translation project and for having given me early guidance pertaining to translation as well as publication. I am heavily indebted to Professors Mary J. Gregor and James W. Ellington for their careful reading of drafts of the entire manuscript, for their detailed and highly valuable criticism, for information concerning both the Kantian and the further background, and for their encouragement. I am grateful to Hackett Publishing Company for their sophisticated and considerate handling of the project. My warmest and deepest gratitude goes to my wife and colleague, Professor Evelyn Begley Pluhar, who has done vastly more to make this project possible than I could hope to express.

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TRANSLATOR'S
INTRODUCTION

0.

Preliminary Note: The Scope of the Critique of Judgment

The Critique of Judgment contains Kant's mature views on aesthetics and teleology, and on their relation to each other as well as to the two earlier Critiques, the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. It has two parts, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and the Critique of Teleological Judgment. The term 'judgment,' in these headings, means the same as 'power (or "faculty") of judgment' (Urteilskraft), which is simply our ability to make (individual) judgments (Urteile).³

The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment deals mainly with two kinds of aesthetic judgments: judgments of taste, i.e., judgments about the beautiful in nature and in art, and judgments about the sublime. Kant's main concern is with judgments of taste. The problem with

³For my use of 'power,' rather than 'faculty,' see below, Ak. 167 br. n. 3. On Urteilskraft and Urteil, cf. below, Ak. 167 br. n. 4.

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these judgments is, roughly, the following. When we call something ‘beautiful’ we seem to do so on the basis of a certain liking, a certain feeling of pleasure; and pleasure is something very subjective. And yet it seems that in such a judgment we say more than ‘I like the thing.’ For in using the adjective ‘beautiful’ we talk as if beauty were some sort of property of the thing, and hence we imply that other people, too, should see that ‘property’ and hence should agree with our judgment; in other words, we imply that the judgment is valid not merely for the judging subject but universally.

Kant's solution to this problem hinges on how he analyzes the special kind of feeling involved in judgments of taste. Specifically, the solution hinges on how Kant relates this feeling to, on the one hand, theoretical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of what is the case, as distinguished from knowledge of what ought to be done), and, on the other hand, to morality. The key concept (to be explained below: hvi) in Kant's analysis of judgments of taste is the concept of nature's subjective ‘purposiveness’ (Zweckmäßigkeit), as judged aesthetically.

Kant analyzes this concept of nature's subjective purposiveness by reference to our mental powers, and much of Kant's theory of taste can indeed be understood in terms of that analysis. Yet Kant's main line of argument for the universal validity of judgments of taste brings in not only the concept of nature's subjective purposiveness but also the concept of something “sursensible” underlying that same purposiveness. In fact, as my new interpretation of abundant textual evidence will show, Kant equates (treats as equivalent) these two concepts. Because this equation seems very perplexing indeed, Kant should have made it thoroughly explicit and clear. Instead he just switches mysteriously from the one concept to the other, without informing the reader that the equivalence between them has been established, even if not nearly as explicitly and clearly as it should have been, in the Critique of Teleological Judgment.

Kant goes on to apply his theory of taste to fine art. When we judge fine art by taste, we judge it as we do nature, viz., in terms of its beauty. But since, unlike nature, works of fine art are something created by man, we can judge them also by how much genius they manifest. Kant's main contribution to the theory of fine art is his analysis of genius.

The Critique of Teleological Judgment deals with our judgments of things in nature in terms of final causes, i.e., ends or purposes.

A purpose, for Kant, is an object or state of affairs insofar as it is, or is regarded as, the effect brought about by some cause through a concept that this cause has of it (cf. Ak. 180 and 408); thus a nightingale is a purpose insofar as we at least regard it as having been produced by some cause through the concept that this cause had of a nightingale. If the object or state of affairs was in fact produced through a concept that the cause had of it, then it is an intentional purpose; if we merely regard it as having been produced in this way, then it is an unintentional purpose. An intention (Absicht), it seems, is simply the cause's concept of the purpose it pursues, i.e., the concept of the object or state of affairs it seeks to bring about. Sometimes Kant apparently forgets his definition of 'purpose' and uses the term, as indeed we often do in English, as synonymous with 'intention.'

The Critique of Teleological Judgment argues that, while natural science cannot explain things without appealing to mechanism and hence to efficient causes, some things in nature, viz., organisms, are such that we cannot even adequately investigate them unless we judge them not only in mechanical terms but also in terms of final causes, i.e., unless we judge them at the same time as purposes. However, judgments of natural products as purposes do not seem to share the firm status and justification enjoyed by mechanistic explanations. Worst of all, such “teleological” judgments (from Greek τέλος [télos], ‘end,’ ‘purpose’) seem to involve us in contradiction. For in judging the object as a purpose we judge it as contingent, viz., contingent on (‘conditioned by’) the concept of a purpose; and yet, insofar as we judge and try to explain the same object as an object of nature, we judge that same object, even the same causal connections in it, at the same time as necessary.

Kant's solution to this problem hinges again on his analysis of the concept of nature's purposiveness (the “subjective” purposiveness with an “objective” one based on it), this time as judged teleologically rather than aesthetically. Here again Kant equates this concept with

4 Although Kant does not define ‘Absicht,’ this is how he seems to use the term most of the time. See, e.g., Ak. 383, 396, and 400 (line 19).

5 See, e.g., Ak. 391, 393, and 397. Sometimes Kant seems to use ‘Absicht’ to mean an intentional purpose, rather than the concept of such a purpose; in those cases I have rendered the term by 'aim.' See, e.g., Ak. 484.
the concept of the supersensible basis of that same purposiveness. Even here Kant does not make this equation nearly explicit and clear enough but leaves us to assemble laboriously the various things he says in different places. But the textual evidence that he does in fact make this equation is overwhelming. The argument from this interpretation of mine will proceed by pointing to that evidence and tying the pieces together gradually; it will not be complete until the end of this introduction.

That argument will connect with a second one. This second argument has to do with the relation of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment to the Critique of Teleological Judgment and, above all, the relation of the entire work to Kant's critical philosophy as a systematic whole. Kant is greatly concerned to show that the Critique of Judgment is needed to complete the "critical system." Although this concern is not assigned a special part in the work, Kant brings it up again and again, especially in his two introductions. I shall devote the remainder of this preliminary note on the scope of the present (third) Critique to a rough sketch of that second argument of mine, the argument regarding the relation of the two parts of the Critique of Judgment to each other and to the critical system. Anyone not already familiar with the main views of the first two Critiques should, for now, feel free to skip the remainder of this note and proceed to the next section, with which this introduction actually begins.

The Critique of Pure Reason, as Section 2 of this introduction will explain, had argued that we need the concept of something supersensible as substrate of nature (of nature as it appears to us) if we are to solve four "antinomies" (seeming contradictions), into which our reason falls inevitably when it tries to make sense of nature. But this concept of the supersensible had to be left completely indeterminate, as merely the concept of "things as they may be in themselves" (rather than as they appear to us). In the Critique of Practical Reason, as will be explained in Section 3, another antinomy had arisen. This antinomy concerned the "final purpose" that the moral law of which we are conscious enjoins us to pursue, a purpose we must therefore regard as achievable although obstacles insuperable for us finite beings seem to stand in the way. Solving this antinomy required the assumption that we are immortal souls and that there is a "moral" God, a God the concept of whom (as, of course, something supersensible) is made determinate through attributes derived from the moral law (and from the final purpose that this law enjoins on us).

Now the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and the Critique of Teleological Judgment each gives rise to another antinomy and, as I shall interpret these antinomies and Kant's solution to them, resolving these antinomies requires that we equate the concept of nature's (subjective and objective) purposiveness with the (indeterminate) concept of some supersensible basis of that purposiveness. Kant holds that this last concept of the supersensible, i.e., as the basis of nature's purposiveness, "mediates" between the other two concepts of the supersensible (respectively, as nature in itself, and as required by the moral law) so that the three concepts of the supersensible can for the first time be thought of as applying to the same (i.e., a united) supersensible. It is through this unification of the supersensible that the three Critiques, which give rise to the three concepts of the supersensible, are themselves united to form a whole having the coherence of a system. What allows the concept of nature's purposiveness to play this mediating role is, as I shall show, precisely Kant's equation of that concept with the concept of the supersensible basis of that same purposiveness, combined with the analysis he gives of the concept of that basis.

1.

Kant's Life and Works

Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg, East Prussia, on April 22, 1724. His father was a master saddler of very modest means, his mother a woman without education but with considerable native intelligence. According to Kant's own account, his grandfather was an immigrant from Scotland. Kant was raised, both at home and at school (at the Collegium Fridericianum at Königsberg), in the tradition of Pietism, a Protestant movement with a strong ethical orientation and a de-emphasis of theological dogma.

Kant attended the University of Königsberg from 1740 to about
1746. After that he served as a tutor in several aristocratic families in different parts of East Prussia, earning a very modest income. Having kept up his studies in the meantime, he returned, in 1755, to the University of Königsberg, employed as an instructor. He continued in this position for fifteen years, lecturing in several natural sciences, in mathematics, and in philosophy. In 1770 he was appointed professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsberg. He remained active in this position until a few years before his death, at Königsberg, on February 12, 1804.

Kant’s first publication (on a topic in Leibnizian physics) appeared in 1747, when he was still a student. For the next fifteen years, most of his writings were in the natural sciences, but some were in philosophy. Two of these philosophical works were (roughly) in the philosophy of religion (the more important of these is The Only Possible Basis of Proof for Demonstrating the Existence of God, 1763); another was the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. 1764, Kant’s only publication, apart from the Critique of Judgment, that touches on aesthetics (it discusses the subject from the point of view of social psychology; not until a few years before publication of the third Critique did Kant believe that an aesthetic judgment about the beautiful or sublime had validity for persons other than the subject making it.) The Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 (which was written in Latin), On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World, marks the beginning of Kant’s so-called “critical period” (as distinguished from the “precritical period”), because here for the first time Kant treats space and time as he does in the first Critique: as forms of sensibility (forms of “intuition”), i.e., as something that the subject contributes to the world of experience, which is therefore only a phenomenal world. (Kant does not yet assign such a contributory role to any concepts.)

By then Kant’s publications had already won him a considerable reputation in learned circles in Germany; and the publication of Kant’s most important work, the Critique of Pure Reason, was eagerly anticipated. It took Kant about a decade to complete the work. When it finally appeared, in 1781, it was met with enthusiasm by some, by others with consternation. Kant rewrote portions of the work for the second edition, of 1787: but first he published, in 1783, the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, a greatly simplified and shortened restatement of the main positions and arguments of the first Critique. Kant reversed this procedure in publishing his practical philosophy: the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, a simplified introduction to the subject, appeared in 1785, the Critique of Practical Reason in 1788. Between the two, in 1786, appeared the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.

The third Critique, the Critique of Judgment, was published in 1790. An essay pertaining to teleology, On Using Teleological Principles in Philosophy, had appeared in 1788, but teleology as well as theology were of great concern to Kant throughout his life and are discussed in many of his works, in some extensively (see the bracketed footnotes in the text). While Kant was preparing the third Critique for publication, he wrote (late in 1789 or early in 1790) an introduction, which later he decided was too long. He replaced it with a shorter introduction, and this was published with the first edition, with the second edition of 1793, and with later editions as well as translations ever since. The First Introduction was not published in its entirety until 1914, when it appeared in the Cassirer edition (vol. 5) of Kant’s works.

In 1793 Kant published Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone. In the following year, the Prussian authorities informed Kant that the king, Frederick William II, had been displeased for some time with Kant’s teachings and writings on religion, which the authorities found too rationalistic and unorthodox. Kant was ordered to desist from disseminating his views on the subject, and he did not return to it until the king died in 1797. In 1795 appeared Perpetual Peace. In 1797 the Metaphysics of Morals, and in 1798 Kant’s last major work, the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.

Kant’s style in these many works varies greatly, from the easy flow and almost conversational tone in some of his early works to the ponderous and scholastic presentation, with its often artificial structure, in the works he saw as most scientific. But the breadth of Kant’s interests and learning, intellectual and cultural generally, is evident throughout his works.

As regards Kant’s personality, what is most familiar to the general public is the caricature of Kant as a pedantic and puritanical Prussian, by whose regular afternoon walks the housewives of Königsberg would set their clocks, and so on. But some persons, persons who knew him, described him as sprightly (even as an old man), as witty, cheerful, and entertaining, even in his lectures. He had a circle of
friends, with whom he dined regularly. Kant never married. Physically, he was never robust. Just over five feet tall and hollow-chested, he was able to avoid major illnesses until his final years. Although Kant was greatly interested in the rest of the world (he greeted the French Revolution with enthusiasm and listened to and read with eagerness the accounts of other people’s journeys), he himself never traveled outside East Prussia.

2. THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

The Critique of Pure Reason

‘Critique,’ in Kant's sense of the term, consists in examining the scope and limits of our cognitive powers ('reason,' in the broadest sense in which Kant uses this term) in order to decide to what extent, if any, metaphysics is possible for us human beings. Metaphysics consists in the discovery of truths (true propositions) about the world that are not empirical (dependent on experience), in which case they would be contingent, but are necessary and hence a priori (knowable independently of experience). If such propositions not only are a priori but do not involve even an empirical concept (e.g., the concept of change, or of matter), then Kant calls them "pure." Hence the Critique of Pure Reason tries to decide to what extent, if any, our cognitive powers permit us to discover a priori (and especially pure) truths about the world: about objects, space and time, the order in nature, ourselves, freedom of the will and the possibility of morality, and perhaps a God. (The first Critique discusses all of these to some extent.) Without such prior critique of our cognitive powers, Kant maintains, either affirming or denying the possibility of metaphysics is sheer dogmatism: dogmatic rationalism assumes that our reason is capable of metaphysics, and dogmatic empiricism assumes the opposite.

Kant himself had been trained in the rationalistic metaphysical tradition of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and his disciple, Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Leibniz (especially in his earlier years) and Wolff regarded the world as, in principle, knowable a priori. They held, moreover, that all a priori truths must, at least in principle, be "truths of reason," i.e., derivable from logic.

But Kant came to doubt that the assertions made a priori by these philosophers about the world could be justified. Worst of all, it seemed that the rationalistic principles of Leibniz and Wolff inevitably led reason into antinomies, i.e., pairs of propositions that seemed to contradict each other and yet were "provable": on these principles, Kant argues in the Critique of Pure Reason, one can "prove" that the world is limited in space and time and that it is not; that composites consist of simple (irreducible) parts and that they do not; that there are first causes (causes that initiate a causal series) and that there are not; that there is a necessary being and that there is not. Clearly, then, dogmatic rationalism had failed to secure metaphysics, and along with it whatever presupposes it: natural science, morality, and religion.

Kant's doubts about dogmatic rationalism arose in good part through his exposure to (German translations of) some of the works of the empiricist David Hume (1711-76), whom he credits with having awakened him from his "dogmatic slumber." Hume (in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which Kant read) agreed with the rationalists that a priori truths must be derivable from logic; they must be "analytic" truths, to use Kant's term. But logic, Hume went on, has to do only with the relations among our ideas (i.e., with analysis of our concepts) and can tell us nothing about the world. Our only access to the world is not a priori but a posteriori (empirical), i.e., through experience. It follows that whatever we discover about the world is contingent rather than necessary, and that even such modest metaphysical propositions about the world as 'Every event must have a cause,' or 'All properties must inhere in some substance,' cannot be justified in any way at all. Because in the strict sense of the term 'know' we can know only whatever is necessary, we do not (in this sense) know nature at all, let alone anything beyond nature. (Indeed, in view of the problem of induction, we do not even know it


7Prolegomena, Ak. IV, 260.

8Kant did not know Hume's Treatise of Human Nature.
in the weaker sense of the term, which implies mere probability rather than necessity.)

Although Kant agreed with Hume that dogmatic rationalism had failed to establish a metaphysics, Hume's skepticism (denial of knowledge) seemed to him equally dogmatic, and utterly implausible as well. Newton undeniably had discovered some basic laws of nature. These laws were clearly not analytic, not derived from reason alone, but were discovered through experience. On the other hand, if they were laws then they could not be wholly contingent but must imply something with necessity. But how, Kant asked, can there be propositions that are not analytic—Kant called such propositions “synthetic”—but that nevertheless imply something with necessity, and hence a priori? As Kant puts it: How are synthetic judgments possible a priori? 9 That they were possible a priori was suggested strongly by Newton's success in natural science. But the decisive evidence seemed to lie in mathematics, above all in geometry. Geometry, Kant argued, describes the space of nature and does not just spell out “relations of ideas,” as Hume assumed. For example, Kant argued that no analysis of the mere concept of a triangle can teach us that the angles of every triangle must add up to two right angles; hence this proposition must be synthetic. Yet no experience could possibly falsify this proposition; it is not contingent but necessary, and therefore a priori. Hence at least in geometry we have judgments that describe the world we experience but that are nevertheless a priori. How is that possible?

Kant's answer is that there is only one way in which we can have a priori knowledge of spatial relations that is nevertheless not knowledge of the relations of our mere concepts: it must be knowledge of relations involving something else that we have in the mind and that we use in experiencing the world: intuition (i.e., roughly, visualization), sensibility. In other words, space must be a form of our intuition: we experience the world in terms of space, we structure it in terms of space, by contributing space to experience. That is why the spatial relations asserted by the principles of geometry apply a priori and necessarily to whatever experience we can have of the world, and why we can intuit and know these relations a priori. On the other hand, by the same token, that spatial world is only phenomenal, is only appearance: the world as we experience it. Hence, in order to account for the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions we must deny that they tell us anything about the world as it is in itself. 10 Kant's treatment of time is roughly similar: time is also a form of intuition, and hence is present in any experience. Hence, like space, time can also be intuited and known a priori as a necessary feature of the world as appearance.

Kant goes on to offer comparable arguments that there are, similarly, a priori concepts (categories), forms of thought that we have in our understanding and that we "build," as it were, into the world. They are twelve in number and make up four groups (of three categories each) under the headings of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. For example, two of the three categories under the heading of "relation" are substance (and accident, i.e., roughly, property inhering in a substance) and causality, i.e., (efficient) cause and effect. These two categories, just like our forms of intuition, also allow us to make synthetic a priori judgments. They allow us to judge and know a priori, and hence with necessity, such universal principles as that all properties in nature (i.e., in the world as it appears to us) must inhere in substances, and that every event in nature must have its cause. These principles are "universally valid" (hold for everything) in the phenomenal world (the world as it appears), i.e., in nature, simply because our understanding makes it so. The remaining categories give rise to more such a priori principles of nature. Hence we can have a "metaphysics" in the sense of a science of the a priori principles of all possible objects of experience. On the other hand, as with space and time, no such synthetic a priori judgments are possible (i.e., justifiable) as regards the world as it may be in itself, i.e., the world considered as supersensible (or "intelligible" or "noumenal," i.e., merely thinkable).

However, only some of our synthetic judgments about nature are a priori; the rest are empirical. In order to make an empirical judgment we must have an empirical intuition. Whereas a priori intuition involves no sensation but consists in visualizing purely in terms of space and

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9 Critique of Pure Reason, B 19.

10 The distinction between a phenomenal world and a world in itself was already used by Leibniz and Wolff. But for them the phenomenal world was simply the world in itself as perceived through sensation, which they construed as being merely a confused, rather than distinct, kind of thought. Kant insists that sensibility is not reducible to thought at all but is different in kind, but this view does have the consequence that we have not even a confused perception of the world in itself.
time, empirical intuition does involve sensation. Through sensation we discover in an object what further features it may have beyond those imposed on it by our forms of intuition and our categories. Those features of an object of our intuition which are "given" to us (i.e., are "data") in sensation are what Kant calls the 'matter' of intuition. As these data are received, they are structured—automatically, as it were—in terms of space and time by the forms of intuition. The result is an empirical intuition, or "perception."

But making an empirical judgment about the world as we experience it involves more than merely an empirical intuition with its structure in terms of space and time: in making such a judgment we also connect that empirical intuition with the thought of a certain object. An empirical judgment consists in our awareness that an empirical intuition we are having matches a certain concept. (Kant uses the generic term 'presentation' [Vorstellung, traditionally rendered as 'representation': see below, Ak. 175 br. n. 17] to stand for both intuitions and concepts, as well as for still further objects of our direct awareness: see below, Ak. 203 br. n. 4.) For example, when we make the judgment, 'This is a dog,' this judgment consists in our being conscious that our empirical intuition matches a concept we already have in our understanding, viz., the concept of "dog." Our judgment thus makes our empirical intuition determinate, by turning it into the experience of a dog, or, which comes to the same, a dog as experienced (a dog as "appearance"). The judgment is therefore called 'determinative' (or 'constitutive'); for it determines (or "constitutes") the dog.

Now suppose that we are intuiting a dog but that we do not already have the concept of "dog" but have only the concept of "animal." In that case we can acquire the concept of "dog" by expanding the concept of "animal": we do this by matching the empirical intuition with the concept of "animal," so that we are experiencing an animal, while also taking note of whatever further particular features in this experienced animal distinguish it from other animals. (We can take note of such further features even if we do not already know the word 'dog.') Such a judgment will determine not only an animal, but, more specifically, a dog, because in taking note of those distinguishing features we abstract them from our experience of the animal and add them to the concept of "animal," thus expanding that concept. This newly acquired empirical concept ("dog") is more determinate, has more "determinations" (predicates describing attributes). Similarly, we acquired the (empirical) concept of "animal" by expanding some other concept we already had in our understanding; and so on. In this way all empirical concepts are the result of our expanding concepts already present in our understanding.

Now the only concepts present in our understanding before all experience (from which new empirical concepts are acquired by abstraction) are the categories. Hence the categories form part of (enter into) all empirical concepts. This holds not only for the concepts of individual objects but also for the concepts of causal relations. For example, in judging the swelling of some brook as caused by a heavy rain that preceded it, we may be matching the empirical intuition of this sequence of events with a concept we already have of a causal relation between events of this kind; but we may, alternatively, be expanding a more general concept which will in turn have resulted from our expanding a still earlier one, and so on, until we get to the category of causality, i.e., cause and effect.

If an empirical judgment consists in the awareness that an empirical intuition matches some concept, how did that match come about? The data we receive passively through sensation are structured in terms of space and time and thus become an empirical intuition. If this intuition is to match a concept, we must have an active power or ability to structure the particular features of that intuition in accordance with the structure of the concept; this power is what Kant calls our 'imagination.' The imagination "apprehends" (takes up) what is given in intuition and then puts together or "combines" this diversity (or "manifold") so that it matches the concept. In this way the imagination "exhibits" (darstellen, traditionally rendered as "to present") the concept, i.e., provides it with a matching or "corresponding" intuition.

Some concepts, e.g., those of geometry, can be exhibited in a priori intuition, i.e., in intuition that includes no sensation. A priori exhibition of a concept is called the concept's 'construction.' A priori exhibition, like exhibition in empirical intuition, can result in the expansion of the concept exhibited, viz., if we abstract from that

11My reasons for abandoning 'to present' as translating darstellen and for reusing it to render vorstellen are given at Ak. 175 br. n. 17.
12Cf. below, Ak. 232 br. n. 51.
exhibition, and add to the concept, whatever further features we
discover in intuiting the object (e.g., a triangle) a priori. When we are
aware that our imagination is exhibiting a concept by means of a
matching a priori intuition, this awareness is what constitutes a
(theoretical and synthetic) a priori judgment. (A theoretical judgment
is a judgment about what is the case, as distinguished from a judg-
ment about what ought to be done. This distinction will be discussed
more fully in the next section.)

However, something further is still needed to make it possible for
any intuition to match a concept. A concept groups together many
instances (of things or events) in terms of the attributes they share as
instances of the same kind. It does not include all the attributes of the
instances that fall (i.e., can be "subsumed") under it, but omits the
particular attributes with reference to which the instances may still
differ from one another. In other words, all concepts abstract from
some of the particular; the categories are the most abstract concepts
of all: they are universal and they abstract from everything particular.
An intuition, by contrast, is concrete in the sense that it contains the
particular omitted in the concept. How, then, can an intuition possibly
be turned into an image that will match a concept, let alone our a
priori concepts, the categories? Something is needed to mediate
between intuition in general and the categories, viz., a rule or "schema"
that stipulates what conditions the intuition must meet so that it can
match a category. In the case of causal relation, the schema is the rule
that the effect must follow the cause in time. Indeed, all schemata
connect the categories with time; the reason for this is that time is the
only form of intuition that applies to any intuition whatsoever, even to
the inner intuition we have of ourselves, whereas space applies merely
to all outer intuitions. Strictly speaking, the category of causality is
already a temporalized, "schematized," category; for if the time condi-
tion is removed, the relation of cause and effect is nothing but the
logical relation of ground and consequent. The same holds for the
category of substance, which is not merely the thought of a thing, but
the schematized thought of a thing that endures in time.

It is in fact these schematized categories which give rise to such
principles as 'Every event must have its cause' and 'All substances
have permanence.' Now since these principles, like the categories on
which they are based, apply to any experience we can have of the
world, they are universal laws of nature (of nature as appearance). As
such they form part of the mechanism studied by natural science,
insofar as that mechanism (which deals with efficient causes) is a
priori and hence necessary. Since these laws are based on the catego-
ries which our understanding contributes to nature, they are laws that
are "given" to nature, i.e., prescribed or legislated to nature, by our
understanding. These universal laws in turn have certain applications,
viz., the (also mechanistic) laws of motion discovered by Newton.
These laws are only "applications" of the former laws because, unlike
them, they are not pure: they involve some empirical concepts (e.g.,
the concept of matter); yet they too hold—to the extent to which they
are mathematical—for all possible experience and hence are them-
selves still a priori and universal.  

Any regularity or "lawfulness" in nature that is not based on the
categories or their universal applications must, consequently, pertain
to what is particular (rather than universal) in nature. Since such
lawfulness is not the result of our understanding's legislation to nature,
it can become known to us only empirically. Hence such lawfulness
must always be contingent, i.e., lacking the strict necessity ('apodeictic"
Necessity, as found in demonstration) that characterizes both the
categorial principles (the principles based on the categories themselves)
and the universal applications of these principles.

Kant calls the universal applications of the categorial principles
metaphysical principles. The categorial (and pure) principles them-
selves, which involve no empirical concept and hence are presupposed
by any experience whatsoever, he calls transcendental. On the other
hand, if we use these transcendental principles to make judgments
about something supersensible, something beyond all possible ex-
perience, then our use of them is transcendent; as so used, they cannot
give rise to knowledge, but remain nothing more than mere thought.
The distinction between the transcendental and the transcendent
marks the boundary between theoretical knowledge (i.e., knowledge
of what is the case) and mere thought, as the Critique of Pure Reason

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13 The distinction between these two kinds of universal laws is not drawn explicitly in
the Critique of Pure Reason (see, e.g., A 691 = B 719, A 273 = B 339); but we do find it
so drawn in the Critique of Judgment (Ak. 181), as well as in the Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science (Ak. IV, 469-70), and in the translation of the latter work,
in conjunction with the Prolegomena, as Immanuel Kant, Philosophy of Material Nature
draws it by deciding what our mental powers can and cannot do: our understanding is able to know a priori in nature whatever laws it prescribes to nature. Beyond all possible experience, we cannot have theoretical knowledge but can only think.

The concepts we use in thinking about what may lie beyond nature, beyond our understanding, are called by Kant 'rational ideas' or 'ideas of reason' (or simply 'ideas'). 'Reason' here no longer means our cognitive power as a whole, as it does in the title of the first Critique, but is used in a narrower sense. In this sense of the term, reason is the power that, using its ideas, to do more such structuring as understanding does by supplying the concepts that turn mere intuitions into experiences. Reason tries to combine these experiences themselves and the laws they contain into larger unified wholes, ultimately into a unity that includes everything, a totality. For example, reason seeks to unify various dog experiences by regarding them as appearances of some one thing underlying all these appearances, some (supersensible) thing in itself, whatever it may be, a thing that we cannot know because we cannot get beyond the appearance. In the same way, the general idea of a world in itself is the idea of something supersensible that unites all our experiences of nature. But since the structure that reason seeks to introduce by means of these ideas is a supersensible structure, a structure beyond all possible experience, reason can do no more than try: it can use these ideas only to regulate our experience of objects; it cannot use these ideas to constitute objects and so give rise to what would be a theoretical knowledge by reason. The world considered (theoretically) as it may be in itself, i.e., as supersensible rather than phenomenal, is for us a world of mere noumena, things we can only think. Our rational desire to unify our diverse experiences is so great that reason easily strays beyond the bounds within which theoretical knowledge is possible for us and consequently involves itself in seeming contradictions (the 'antinomies' mentioned above). If we are to avoid such straying by reason, we must let our own critique remind us of the limits of our cognitive powers. We must let it remind us that the transcendent metaphysics of dogmatic rationalism is impossible, and hence we must restrict ourselves to immanent metaphysics; in other words, we must settle for a metaphysics that confines itself to the synthetic a priori principles (along with their universal applications) that are presupposed by, and hence stay within the range of, what experience is possible for us.

Hence immanent metaphysics, which the Critique of Pure Reason shows us to be capable of, will be a metaphysics of nature. Such a metaphysics cannot tell us anything about the supersensible: about objects in themselves, about a God, or even about ourselves as subjects in themselves (souls), as distinguished from how we appear to ourselves through our "inner sense"; in particular, it cannot tell us whether, despite the necessity inherent in nature's universal laws (the mechanistic laws regarding efficient causes), our will has the kind of freedom that is needed for morality. All we can do, as far as the Critique of Pure Reason goes, is think a "nature in itself," a God, and such freedom. For by regarding all of these as supersensible, we eliminate not only the need to provide theoretical justification (e.g., in the case of God, by means of the alleged theoretical "proofs" for God's existence), but we eliminate the antinomy between freedom and the necessity in nature by attributing the necessity to nature as appearance while thinking of freedom as pertaining to a supersensible (noumenal) self, a self of which we can know only the appearance.

Thus the Critique of Pure Reason pays the price of renouncing claims to theoretical knowledge where it was sought most eagerly, but it does at least rescue immanent metaphysics, and with it natural science, from dogmatic rationalism with its unjustifiable and contradictory claims, and from the skepticism of dogmatic empiricism.

3.

The Critique of Practical Reason

The second Critique examines again what reason can do, this time not in relation to theoretical knowledge, but in relation to action, i.e., as practical reason. It argues that reason not only enables us to achieve some particular purpose we happen to be pursuing, or satisfy some natural inclination; rather, the Critique argues, reason can be
practical on its own, as completely independent from nature, i.e., as pure. In this role, reason is able to impose obligations (a moral law) on us, and to carry them out in freedom from natural necessity. Kant argues that we can “cognize” as well as “know” both this moral law and that freedom, although only “from a practical point of view.” Let us pause here for an explanation of this terminology.  

Knowledge (Wissen), for Kant, is assent (Fürwahrhalten) that is adequate not just subjectively but objectively, i.e., adequate to convince not just oneself but everyone. Theoretical knowledge, discussed in the preceding section, is knowledge of what is the case (rather than knowledge of what ought to be done). Such knowledge arises from “theoretical cognition.”

Theoretical cognition consists in determining (making determinate) an object in the sense of establishing what the object’s attributes are. If we take these attributes merely from the analysis of some concept, such cognition is conceptual, or analytic; otherwise it is synthetic. In synthetic cognition, the attributes determining the object are taken not from a concept but from intuition. If that intuition is a priori, then the cognition is a priori as well; if the intuition is empirical (i.e., if it is perception, which includes sensation), then the cognition too is empirical. Empirical cognition is the same thing as experience. As we saw in the preceding section, experience consists in turning empirical intuitions into determinate objects (as appearances) by means of concepts; if such experience results in our acquiring a new empirical concept by “expanding” some concept (or concept) we already had, then our cognition provides us with new knowledge.

Just as theoretical knowledge is knowledge of what is the case, the theoretical cognition yielding this knowledge is cognition of what is the case, as distinguished from cognition of what ought to be done, which is called “practical cognition.” Only theoretical cognition is “insight.” (Cf. the etymology of “theoretical.”) Kant also uses the term “cognition” in a second sense, according to which theoretical cognition is knowledge, rather than the process that yields it.

Let us turn now to practical cognition, i.e., cognition of what ought to be done. In practical cognition, or “cognition from a practical point of view,” we again determine an “object,” but here we do so by means of practical determinations taken from our moral consciousness. That is why practical cognition, like morality itself, involves “oughts,” i.e., commands or “imperatives.” As we shall see in a moment, one such “object” of our practical cognition is the moral law itself; another is the freedom of the will that this law presupposes. As we shall also see, our cognition of these “objects” holds for everyone; as such, it yields (or, in the second sense of ‘cognition,’) is objectively adequate assent, i.e., (practical) knowledge. But, because this cognition or knowledge is practical, it is not insight.

Our practical cognition is not limited to the moral law itself and what this law presupposes, viz., our freedom; we also recognize practically what this moral law commands. As I shall spell out more fully in a moment, the moral law commands that we try to achieve the “final purpose,” and achieving the final purpose presupposes two things that we must, therefore, assume as “postulates”: that there is a God and that we are immortal souls. According to Kant, we have practical cognition of the final purpose, of God, and of the immortality of the soul inasmuch as these three “objects” of our thought are made (practically) determinate by what the moral law commands. On the

14 For further details and references, see below, Ak. 467 incl. br. n. 75, and 475 incl. br. n. 96; and cf. Ak. 174-76.

15 Literally, “considering true.”

16 See the Critique of Pure Reason. A 822 = B 850.

17 Cf. ibid. A 320 = B 377-78.


19 Ibid. A 176 = B 218.


21 See the Logic, Ak. IX, 86.

22 Ibid., A 633 = B 661.
other hand, as these (supersensible) objects, unlike our freedom, are presupposed not by the moral law itself but only by what it commands, our practical cognition of them is not knowledge (as our practical cognition of the moral law itself and of freedom is). Rather, it is a rational faith, which is assent that is adequate not objectively but only subjectively, i.e., adequate only to convince oneself.25

With these distinctions in mind, we can now return to the task of the second Critique. The Critique of Pure Reason had indeed established that we can think the previously mentioned supersensible things, i.e., it had established that they are logically possible; but the Critique of Practical Reason argues that we can cognize them, even if only practically. Thus the second Critique rescues morality and religion, not only from the restrictive conclusions drawn by the first Critique, but above all—once again—from the much more damaging views that made the Critique necessary: dogmatic rationalism and dogmatic empiricism.

The dogmatic rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff had tried to derive moral obligation from our alleged knowledge of the supersensible: from God’s will as manifested in the perfection of the world, a perfection that we can know through reason although not through the senses. Moral obligation lies in working toward this perfection by striving away from the confusion (indistinctness) inherent in our senses and toward the distinct intellectual “knowledge” of the supersensible world as it not only ought to be but in fact is. To have the will to act in this way is, for Wolff, nothing more than a somewhat more distinct awareness of this perfection that our senses present to us only indistinctly. We already know Kant’s objection to these rationalistic claims to knowledge of the supersensible. But Kant, following (the Pietist) Christian August Crusius, also disagreed with the view that to know the good is the same as to will it. Above all, however, neither Leibniz nor Wolff could adequately explain how the world could already be perfect, through God’s choice, and yet have room for human freedom.

Dogmatic empiricism restricted itself to the observations of empirical psychology about human motivation. Accordingly, Hume construed ethical judgments as seeking merely to influence people’s motivation. One of Kant’s objections to this approach was that these empirical observations could yield only contingent judgments, whereas genuine moral obligation must be absolute, not conditioned by this or that particular purpose we happen to be pursuing. But his main objection was that empirical observations can tell us only what is the case, never (as Hume in fact acknowledged) what ought to be done, as a moral judgment must.

The key premise for Kant’s own position is that we do, as a fact of reason revealed to us a priori, have a moral consciousness.26 We are conscious of ourselves as obligated by an a priori moral law. That law commands us to fulfill our duty even where doing so requires that we struggle against circumstances in nature or against our natural inclinations. Hence the law commands absolutely or “categorically,” rather than hypothetically, i.e., rather than with an if-clause specifying the condition (“hypothesis”), such as this or that natural circumstance or inclination, under which we ought to act in a certain way. This moral law is thus a “categorical imperative.” The categorical imperative puts a restriction on the kind of “maxim,” i.e., subjective rule devised by ourselves, that we may follow in our acts. It says: “Act in such a way that the maxim of your will [could] always hold at the same time as a principle laying down universal law.”27 In other words, we ought to act only on maxims that are universalizable and as such do not cater to this or that inclination or excuse us from our duty when circumstances make it difficult for us to perform it. What we know practically, this fact of reason, is the moral law itself,28 a synthetic a priori proposition, and not merely that we are conscious of such a law: for if I think of this law as obligating me then it is obligating me.29 Hence what makes this synthetic proposition “possible” a priori is that it describes a fact of reason: it is not derived from experience, yet it applies to all experience, has “objective reality,”

25Critique of Pure Reason, A 822 = B 850.
27Ibid., Ak. V, 30.
28Cf. ibid., Ak. V, 31 and 42. Cf. also the Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. IV, 446n.
29This claim hinges on the fact that the moral law demands of our maxims only that they be universalizable, and hence is a purely formal law. In the case of a more specific rule, such as ‘Keep your promise to X,’ my mere consciousness of the rule would not establish that the rule obligates me, for I could be mistaken in believing that I had made such a promise.
as we can discover through our own acts as manifested in experience (below, Ak. 468).

This fact of reason presupposes another: that we have a will that is free in the sense that it can indeed act independently of natural influences. Hence, because we have both practical cognition and knowledge of the moral law, we also have practical cognition and knowledge of what this law presupposes: our supersensible freedom, the freedom that the first Critique had established only as logically possible. But the will’s freedom as presupposed by the moral law must be more than mere independence from the efficient causes of nature; for such mere independence would leave our “acts” random, not our acts at all. This freedom must be, rather, an ability of the will to give laws to itself (be “autonomous”) and to obey (or disobey) such laws independently of nature. The will considered as autonomous, as giving its own law, is called simply (pure) practical reason; the same will (practical reason) considered as the ability to choose freely between obeying or disobeying this law is called the power of choice. As free from nature’s efficient causes, this will can, through its choice, act “spontaneously”; i.e., it can initiate (be the “first cause” in) a new series of efficient causes in nature. Hence freedom, as we cognize and know it practically through the moral law, is itself a special causality.

Respect for the moral law, together with our awareness that we have the freedom to obey or disobey it, is what Kant calls ‘moral feeling’ (cf. below, Ak. 267).

We saw that the moral law commands us to act only on universalizable maxims. Hence in obeying that law our reason imposes on nature a universality, and this universality is a form that is supersensible inasmuch as nature as object of our sensibility (i.e., nature as appearance) does not already have it. But our reason imposes this form on nature not theoretically, as our understanding, by its legislation, imposes on nature the form of the categories, but imposes it practically, i.e., by prescribing a moral law and initiating in nature a causal series that will add that supersensible form to the categorical form through free action. In this way, once the moral law, when obeyed, has “determined” the will (i.e., has induced it to act as it does), the will’s action “determines” practically something in the world, i.e., gives it additional formal attributes.

How can the categorical imperative, which is a purely formal law (it commands only that our maxims be universalizable), have (practical) application in nature with all the particular that nature includes? Something like a schema is needed, as it was for the categories, that will “mediate” between the universal moral law and the particular effects which, in conformity with it, we produce in nature. This mediator cannot be a schema, for a schema mediates the imagination’s exhibition of a concept and the categorical imperative, which is a rational idea, cannot be exhibited, i.e., cannot structure a given intuition to make it match the idea. The only possible mediator between this moral law and those particular effects (which we bring about through reason as helped by understanding) is what Kant calls the typus of the moral law: the same law regarded as a law of nature.30 The only cognition we can have of the moral law is practical, but the typus can be cognized theoretically, can be understood; hence the typus mediates between reason and (not imagination but) understanding.

As free, i.e., as determinable by its own moral law, the will is our “higher power of desire” (the lower being merely the will’s ability to be influenced by incentives of sense, “inclinations”).31 Any object of such higher desire is a purpose, in the sense given above.32 Now if we consider together all the purposes we could pursue under all the maxims that would satisfy the categorical imperative, they will form a kind of hierarchy, some of them being pursued for other purposes, these for others still, and so on. At the very top of this hierarchy is the “final purpose”‘; this is the one purpose that is unconditioned, i.e., not a means to (or “condition” of) any further purpose. The final purpose at which, as the moral law commands, all our acts are to aim is the highest good in the world: our own virtue (which lies in the will’s obedience to the moral law), and happiness for everyone to the extent that he or she is virtuous and thus worthy of such happiness.

This final purpose, as enjoined on us by the moral law, is not something we can achieve in this life, because we are beings encumbered by sensibility, by certain obstacles which nature outside us and especially nature within us puts in our way and to which we too easily

31Cf. ibid., Ak. V, 9a and esp. 22-25.
32See above, xxv, and cf. the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. VI, 384-85.
succeed. Therefore the final purpose can never be manifested in experience, and hence cannot be known, even practically. Yet the final purpose can be cognized practically; for the concept of it does have “practical reality” (is not empty): the final purpose is achievable in principle, because the moral law commands it and the moral law is a matter of fact (fact of reason). Because, with our weak wills, we can only approach this final purpose by an infinite progression, while yet we must conceive of it as achievable because the moral law commands us to pursue it, we are forced to make two assumptions (“postulates”), which are thus also based on the moral law. One of these is that we are not temporally finite, but are immortal souls. The other assumption is that there is a God who has the infinite knowledge, power, and benevolence required to make nature cooperate with our infinite endeavor: for if the final purpose is to be achieved, nature within us must cooperate with our endeavor to be virtuous, and nature in general must cooperate with our endeavor to bring about happiness for everyone in proportion to his or her virtue. As prerequisites (“conditions”) of the final purpose, which the known moral law establishes as not illusory, the immortality of the soul and the existence of such a moral God can thus also be cognized practically; but, like the final purpose of which they are the conditions, they cannot be known, even practically; they are not matters of fact, but are matters of faith, of a rational faith that is justified a priori by the moral law.

Thus the Critique of Practical Reason establishes what neither dogmatic rationalism nor dogmatic empiricism had been able to establish: we can have rational cognition, although practical rather than theoretical, of all the important things that the Critique of Pure Reason had to relegate to the merely regulative ideas. It establishes that we can have practical knowledge of the moral law as obligating us a priori, from which we can then derive a “metaphysics of morals,” i.e., a system of all a priori maxims satisfying the categorical imperative, and establishes that we can have practical knowledge of our will as a supersensible causality free from the necessity of natural causation. It also establishes that we can have practical cognition of the final purpose with its presuppositions of immortality and God. The first Critique had established these features of the supersensible as logically possible, by construing the world of nature as mere appearance, but it had to leave the idea of this supersensible completely indeterminate. The second Critique, as Kant puts it, makes the idea of the supersensible determinate (and hence makes the supersensible cognizable practically): through the final purpose as enjoined on us by the known moral law, the concept of the supersensible is determined as the concept of a nature in itself, including ourselves as immortal souls, as created by a moral God in terms of the final purpose.

Kant restates much of this when, in the Critique of Teleological Judgment, he discusses how teleology relates to theology, and how the Critique of Judgment “mediates” between the first two Critiques and so unites the three in a system.

4.

The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment: Background

As did the first two Critiques, the Critique of Judgment again examines our cognitive powers, this time in order to decide what justification, if any, is possible for aesthetic judgments, above all judgments of taste, and for teleological judgments. As regards judgments of taste, the problem is this: How, if at all, is it possible to judge something in nature (or in art) as beautiful on the basis of something very subjective, a feeling of pleasure, and yet demand for our judgment a universal assent? That we do demand such assent is implicit in the very fact that we use the predicate ‘beautiful,’ as if beauty were a property of things (which everyone ought to see). If these judgments do have some kind of universal validity, they must “contain some necessity” (claim something with necessity) and hence must be to some extent a priori. And yet they are clearly not analytic but synthetic. How then, if at all, are these synthetic propositions possible a priori, despite their dependence on pleasure? Here again Kant’s answer can best be understood as a reaction against the views of the dogmatic rationalists and dogmatic empiricists. I have selected the key figures, and shall
now set out their views somewhat more elaborately than I did for the background to the first two Critiques.

Leibniz and Wolff maintained that we have two ways of knowing or cognizing the world, a lower and a higher cognitive power. (In Leibniz and Wolff 'cognize' means “know” or “come to know.”) The lower cognitive power is sense perception, the higher is thought. Yet the distinction they drew between thought and perception by the senses made the two different not in kind but only in degree. Using Descartes's terminology, as refined by Leibniz, of “clear” and “distinct” ideas, Leibniz and Wolff held that the sole difference between sensation and thought is that thought is distinct, while sensation is confused, though both can be clear (rather than obscure). An idea is clear if we can (without doubt) distinguish it from all other ideas, though we may not know by what characteristics we do so. An idea is distinct if it is clear in all its parts (characteristics) and their combination, so that it can be distinguished from all other ideas explicitly, by abstraction (from the sensible detail) and definition. Sense perception cannot be made distinct without turning it into thought; lower cognition is only a preliminary stage of the same knowledge. By the same token, sense perception can have no perfection of its own, and hence no rules of its own to govern such perfection. The rules that apply to it are simply the rules of all thought: the principle of contradiction, and the principle of sufficient reason (which is the principle that God followed in making this the best of all possible worlds).

Moreover, just as Wolff construed willing the good as mere knowledge of the good, Leibniz and Wolff construed beauty and the pleasure we take in it in cognitive terms: beauty is perfection as cognized through sense perception, and hence indistinctly; and the pleasure we take in it is, at bottom, identical with that perception of the perfection. Art too is construed in cognitive terms: Art presupposes this cognition and makes it possible through its creations; art “imitates nature” in the sense that it produces the best examples of perfection of which nature (the world as phenomenon, i.e., as perceived by the senses) is, ideally, capable. Art pleases to the extent that it teaches us through such examples.

The first major innovation in this view concerning beauty and art comes from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-62), the disciple of Wolff to whom we owe the term 'aesthetic' in a sense close to the current one. Baumgarten collaborated in his work with his former student, Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-77). Although the two differ on certain points, it is not always easy to determine which of the two contributed what to their published works. However, their views are similar enough to be left undistinguished here.

Baumgarten and Meier took over from Leibniz and Wolff the view that sense perception and thought are, respectively, lower and higher cognition, and the view that sense perception is confused while thought is distinct. But they denied that sense perception can be perfected only by making it distinct and thereby turning it into thought. Sense perception, they maintained, can have a perfection of its own, a perfection whose standard is not that of logic (although it is analogous to that standard). Moreover, it is this standard peculiar to sense perception which must be met if we are to perceive beauty. Hence there are two different kinds, rather than just stages, of cognition (knowledge), and two kinds of theory (or "science") of knowledge: logic and aesthetics. Aesthetics in the broad sense is the science of sense knowledge. (This is how Kant uses the term in the first Critique, when he speaks of the "transcendental aesthetic": A 19-49 = B 33-73.) Aesthetics in the narrow sense (the modern sense, which we find in Kant's third Critique) deals with the standards of perfection that sense perception must meet in order for us to perceive beauty; it is the science (or art) of the beautiful and of taste, i.e., of the power to cognize beauty.

Perfected sense perception in order to turn it into thought requires that we make it more distinct, which we do by abstracting from the individuality and singularity (i.e., from the detail and concreteness) it presents to us. On the other hand, giving sense perception the perfection peculiar to it involves emphasizing what individuality and singularity it presents to us in an example. The standard of this perfection is richness and vividness of detail in the singular perception; here the perception must be indistinct, confused (i.e., fused with others, rather than explicitly distinguished from them). This richness and vividness of an image or idea is called its "extensive" clarity, as distinguished

33The following sketch has been distilled mainly from Baumgarten's Aesthetica (Aesthetics) of 1750-58 (Hildesheim: Georg Holms Verlag, 1961) and Meier's Anfanggründe aller schönen Wissenschaften (Foundations of all Fine Sciences) of 1754 (Hildesheim and New York: Georg Holms Verlag, 1976).
from the clarity, now called “intensive” clarity, of Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff.

According to Baumgarten and Meier, when our sense perception has this perfection peculiar to it, this perfected perception allows us to perceive perfection in the world (all perfection is multiplicity in unity): the perfection of things, but above all the moral perfection of persons. To perceive beauty is to perceive such perfection by sense (as itself perfected by being made extensively clear); beauty is perfection insofar as we cognize this perfection not rationally and hence distinctly, but by taste, i.e., extensively clear sense perception. Aesthetic pleasure is the result of cognizing perfection by sense as perfected by being made extensively clear.

Because perfection (goodness) implies a standard, there are rules of perfection; hence, there are also rules of beauty, which can be derived from the rules of perfection in general. Thus we have two kinds of rules for “beautiful cognition” in general: rules about the cognition itself, and rules about the perfection of the objects we can cognize in this way.

In addition to these rules, there are the practical rules that apply those other rules to art. The aim of art is not simply to imitate nature, not even by selecting the most perfect examples of which nature is ideally capable, but to create a perfect whole out of indistinct images (or, in the case of poetry, indistinct ideas) made extensively clear, a whole that can then be judged in the same way as beauty in general can. Hence the fine arts, as informed by such rules, are at the same time “fine sciences”; and aesthetics, which is itself an art, similarly becomes a science, the science of the beautiful, to the extent that it offers higher-order rules (principles) for those other rules.

Kant accepted and defended the major innovation offered by Baumgarten and Meier: their insistence that sense perception is not the same as thought and can be perfected without turning it into thought. But Kant objected to the cognitive analysis that Baumgarten and Meier offered for our perception of beauty (Ak. 207–09). He objected to it because the analysis turns beauty into a property, viz., a perfection that something has by reference to a purpose as expressed by some concept, and because the analysis treats the perfection of the sense perception itself (“extensive clarity”) as merely a prerequisite for perceiving the perfection of something else by means of

sense. If judgments about beauty were conceptual, Kant argued, they could be proved by rules (just such rules as Baumgarten and Meier had tried to devise); yet this cannot be done (Ak. 284–85). By the same token, there can be no “fine science” but only fine art, and aesthetics cannot be a “science” of the beautiful but only critique.34

Hence, while the dogmatic rationalists had indeed offered an account of the universality of aesthetic judgments, viz., by construing them as conceptual and as cognitive judgments about a property, this very account assimilated judgments about beauty to judgments about the good (Ak. 346) and hence failed to explain their aesthetic and therefore subjective character. Some analysis of aesthetic judgments must be found that would preserve their universality without assimilating them to judgments of cognition, theoretical or practical. Such an analysis is just what the empiricists tried to provide.

Kant’s own Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime of 1764 were empirical, but they were not empiricist: they offered no theory, as Kant did not yet think that an aesthetic theory was possible. Instead the work consists of amateur social psychology; it discusses beauty and sublimity in relation to the differences between people, ages, sexes, nationalities, temperaments. Even in the Critique of Pure Reason (both first and second editions) Kant says that Baumgarten’s attempt to bring the rules for judging the beautiful under rational principles is futile, because these rules are merely empirical. (A 21n = B 35n.)

As for the theories of beauty and art of the British empiricists, a number of them were available in German translation by the time Kant wrote the third Critique. Kant was probably familiar with the Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725) of Francis Hutcheson (1694–1747);35 he was in general familiar with Hume’s views, although it is not clear that he had read “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757);36 and he was clearly familiar with the Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and

34See Ak. 304 and 355. That critique, on the other hand, can be scientific: Ak. 286.
36See, e.g., David Hume, Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
Beautiful (1757) of Edmund Burke (1729–97), to whom he responds by name. According to Hutcheson, beauty is not a quality of things; the term ‘beauty’ stands for the idea that certain qualities of things evoke in the mind. Our natural power to receive the idea of beauty when confronted by such qualities is analogous to perception: it is a “sense” of beauty. Perceiving such qualities by this sense produces an immediate (i.e., direct) delight. One such quality is formal: the compound ratio of uniformity in variety; if either of these is kept constant, “beauty” varies with the other. Art imitates, but its “beauty” is not that of the original; it is based on the unity found in the conformity of the work with the original. Another quality that arouses the idea of beauty is moral virtue. Moral virtue can be perceived by the moral “sense,” but it can also produce aesthetic delight. (Vice can be represented beautifully as well, but only insofar as the representation manifests unity in its conformity with the original.) The standard of taste, the standard for judging beauty, is empirical: it is our common human nature, the sensibility we have for appreciating uniformity in variety; if we do not find universal agreement regarding judgments of taste, it is only because we become prejudiced by making irrelevant associations.

Hume, treating judgments of taste as he does moral judgments, also denies that beauty is a quality of things, and speaks of a “sense” or “feeling” of beauty, an ability to receive pleasure from the perception of certain qualities of things, or from association with such qualities. Hume is not specific about what these qualities are; they involve structural relations between parts and whole, or a thing’s utility as it appears to us. The standard of taste is again human nature, but as subject to more qualifications than Hutcheson had spelled out. A qualified perceive must not only be impartial (unprejudiced): the perceive must be calm, as well as experienced in judging beauty, especially beauty in art. By abstracting the common features of objects that have pleased the sense of beauty of such qualified persons over the ages, we may be able to tell what qualities in general (e.g., what formal properties of objects) are capable of producing this pleasure. If we fail in this attempt, we can still use such persons (including ourselves, insofar as we fulfill the same criteria) as our standard for judging. Human nature does not vary so much that such persons would greatly disagree, even though perhaps some disagreement, e.g., that due to differences in temperament, cannot be resolved.

Burke again holds that all there is, as far as beauty is concerned, is our idea of it. We have a “feeling” of beauty, and we call an object beautiful if it evokes a certain idea, a certain feeling: love without interest. To this account Burke adds an explanation, in terms of the physiology of the day, as to how the object evokes this feeling (cf. Ak. 277 incl. br. n. 51). Burke does not say much as to what qualities in objects arouse the idea of beauty. As for a standard of taste, Burke seems to have assumed that taste is the same in all human beings.

The empiricist analysis of beauty by reference to a kind of “sense” or “feeling,” as combined with the denial that beauty is a property of things, accounted well for the aesthetic and subjective character of judgments of taste. Kant’s complaint against the empiricist analysis is that it fails to account for the fact that judgments of taste demand everyone’s assent and hence claim a universality and necessity (Ak. 237), which presupposes some necessary and hence a priori principle. “Scouting about for empirical laws about mental changes” cannot yield this necessity (Ak. 278), nor can “gathering votes and asking other people what kind of sensation they are having” when facing a beautiful object (Ak. 281), even if as a matter of empirical fact many people happen to agree on a judgment of taste because “there is a contingent uniformity in the organization of [different] subjects” (Ak. 345–46). Hence the empiricist analysis cannot adequately distinguish between judgments of taste and judgments about the merely agreeable (Ak. 346), which are also subjective but imply no universality.

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38 Ak. 277. The following sketch is distilled mainly from the works just mentioned.
5. Kant’s Account of Judgments of Taste as Aesthetic Judgments of Reflection

Kant’s main concern in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment is judgments of taste, i.e., judgments about the beautiful, above all about the beautiful in nature. A paradigm would be the judgment, ‘The rose at which I am looking is beautiful’ (cf. Ak. 215), provided that this judgment is made without using the concept (or “thought”) of the rose, but is made, rather, with the mere intuition, i.e., with the rose as “given” (Ak. 230). Although the fact that in such a judgment we use the adjective ‘beautiful’ suggests that beauty is a property, beauty is not a property: “apart from a relation to the subject’s feeling, beauty is nothing by itself” (Ak. 218). Hence it is this “feeling” that must be analyzed in such a way as to account for the judgment’s claim to universality (universal validity). Because even judgments of taste have reference to the understanding (Ak. 203 n.1), the categories play some role in them. Accordingly, Kant explicates these judgments by reference to four “moments,” which are based on the four category headings: quality, quantity, relation, and modality. (I shall not follow Kant’s order here.)

“Beautiful is what, without a concept [such as the concept of the good], is liked universally” (Ak. 219). This universality is the aesthetic quantity of a judgment of taste (second moment) and is what distinguishes it from judgments about the agreeable. (In logical quantity, a judgment of taste is singular: Ak. 215.) But this universality is only “subjective”: the judgment demands that all subjects give their assent to the judgment. By the same token, the judgment’s “necessity” (fourth moment, as to modality) is not apodeictic (as the necessity in a demonstration) but only “exemplary” (Ak. 237): we demand universal assent to a judgment that we make as an example of a certain unstatable universal rule (Ak. 237). To make this demand is to claim that we speak with a “universal voice” (Ak. 216) and to presuppose a priori that taste and the feeling by which it judges is common to everyone and hence is a sensus communis, a “common sense” (Ak. 238). To justify this claim and presupposition is therefore to justify the claim to subjective universality. Before we turn to this justification, we must complete the analysis of judgments of taste.

Judgments about the agreeable and judgments about the beautiful are both aesthetic judgments. But the former are aesthetic judgments of sense: the pleasure (or “liking”) we feel in a judgment about the agreeable is interested, viz., interested in the existence of some object as related to sense. In judgments of taste, on the other hand, the liking is “disinterested” (first moment, as to quality): “beautiful is what we like in merely judging it” (Ak. 306). Judgments of taste are aesthetic judgments not of sense but of “reflection.”

Reflective judgments in general, aesthetic as well as teleological, are judgments that are not “determinative,” i.e., they do not determine objects. We saw above (xxiv) that the judgment, ‘This is a dog,’ determines the dog (as appearance) by having the imagination structure a matching empirical intuition in terms of the concept of “dog,” i.e., by subsuming the intuition under that concept. Hence determinative judgments subsume a particular under some universal. We also saw (xliv) that judgments about the good (practical judgments) are determinative as well: they too use a concept to determine (give attributes to) experience; but here the determination is not performed simply by the understanding’s legislation, but instead practically, by the will and its action. (The concept may be empirical, as when we produce some object, or may be a priori, as in morality.) On the other hand, reflective judgments, including aesthetic ones, do not give attributes to objects and hence are not determinative. Though Kant will talk about judgments as being “determined” by a feeling or a concept (Ak. 221) and will even say such things as “a judgment of taste

39Judgments about the sublime will be discussed below. See Section 9.

40In sketching Kant’s account, I shall largely disregard his own artificial and unhelpful division of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment into an “Analytic” and a “Dialectic.”
determines the object... with regard to liking and the predicate of beauty” (Ak. 219), and so on, yet in the strict and relevant sense of ‘determinative’ judgments of taste are not determinative. For they do not determine an object in the sense of giving it an attribute, because beauty is not an attribute (not a property), even though grammatically the term ‘beauty’ functions as a predicate. Moreover, judgments of taste do not use a determinate concept, as do cognitive judgments, theoretical or practical. The reason for this is that reflective judgments, including aesthetic ones, have no determinate concept available to them, no universal under which to subsume the particular that is given to us in intuition; rather, they try to find such a universal.

If this search for a universal is to succeed, it must be pursued not haphazardly but on some principle; and since in this case the power of judgment has no determinate concept available that could serve it as such a principle, it must itself have a concept, though only an indeterminate one, that can serve it as such a principle (Ak. 180–81, and cf. Ak. 340–41).

This indeterminate concept is the concept of nature’s “subjective purposiveness,” i.e., nature’s purposiveness for our (the subject’s) power of judgment; and the principle of judgment to which this concept gives rise is simply the assumption that nature in its particular (as we find it in empirical intuition) is “subjectively purposive,” i.e., purposive for our power of judgment in the sense of lending itself to being judged by us (Ak. 193). (Since judgment is a function of understanding, Kant will also speak of nature’s purposiveness for our understanding or for our cognitive power: Ak. 187; 184, 186.)

The difference between the concept of such subjective purposiveness and the concept of a purpose (see above, xxv) is precisely that the first concept is indeterminate, the second determinate. In order for nature’s particular to be purposive for our power of judgment it must manifest a certain regularity (order, lawfulness). This regularity is not determinate, like the regularity that an intuition must have in order to match a determinate concept; rather, it is an indeterminate regularity, viz., the regularity that we need in general in order to match an empirical intuition with a concept so as to give rise to empirical cognition. Since the particular in nature is contingent (because not subject to our understanding’s legislation), nature’s subjective purposiveness consists in the regularity or “lawfulness” that the contingent must have (Ak. 404, 217) in order for us to cognize it. Accordingly, the principle of judgment is the assumption that nature manifests a recognizable order not only in its (transcendental and metaphysical) universal laws (which are based on the categories) but in terms of its particular (and contingent) laws as well: Nature makes its universal laws specific (Ak. 186) in such a way that the particular laws will not be too “heterogeneous” (Ak. 188) for us to have coherent experience even in terms of them (Ak. 180). Thus judgment assumes that nature forms a hierarchy (Ak. 213', 185) of genera and species (each genus and species representing a grouping and hence a “law”), and of empirical laws in general (including particular causal laws), and hence manifests simplicity and parsimony.43 On this assumption, it is “as if” nature’s order had been given it (legislated to it) “by some understanding, even if not ours” (Ak. 180). This assumed lawfulness, though indeterminate, is one that matches understanding as such, i.e., understanding considered indeterminately, apart from any specific concept. Hence it is also one that matches the form that imagination as such must have (as it apprehends, in general, something in empirical intuition) in order to harmonize with understanding as such so that cognition may arise. By the same token, the same assumed indeterminate lawfulness is one that matches the form of the power of judgment as such, i.e., it matches the harmony (which itself has that form) between imagination as such and understanding as such that is required for all (empirical: Ak. 190–91) judgment and cognition.

This principle of the power of judgment, that the power of judgment presupposes for its reflection, is itself a reflective judgment. Insofar as we only think this principle (rather than apply it directly to intuition), it is a logical judgment: the indeterminate principle of reflection as such. The two kinds of reflection, aesthetic and teleological, are both based on that principle.44 Teleological judgments are indeed reflective and presuppose judgment’s principle; yet in them the subjective purposiveness merely underlies an objective and “material” purposiveness, because teleological judgments are made

43Ak. 182. The Critique of Pure Reason discusses reflection in fairly similar terms (A 260–92 = B 316–49), but attributes the concept and search for this unity of the particular to reason (A 648–62 = B 676–90).

44The principle is not really a third kind of reflective judgment, as Paul Guyer seems to consider it: Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 61–64. It is simply judgment’s principle itself which underlies both aesthetic and teleological reflective judgments.
by reference to a determinate concept of a purpose (the “matter” of purposiveness), so that there the purposiveness is a purposiveness with a purpose. By contrast, in aesthetic reflective judgments the purposiveness is not based on a concept (Ak. 220) and hence also not on the concept of a purpose; so it is merely subjective, a “purposiveness without a purpose” (third moment, in terms of the relation “of the purposes we take into consideration”).

We saw that in aesthetic reflective judgments we judge the subjective purposiveness that nature displays in the empirical intuition (of something apprehended by the imagination) and that we judge this purposiveness without a determinate concept. Hence in such judgments, imagination and understanding harmonize without the constraint that a determinate concept would introduce and thus are in “free play.” Moreover, since the apprehended form is not compared (matched) with a determinate concept, its purposiveness is not cognized but can only be felt. This feeling of pleasure is nothing more than our nonconceptual awareness (awareness without a determinate concept) of the form’s purposiveness for our cognitive power as such, i.e., purposiveness for the harmony of imagination as such with understanding as such. (Ak. 222.) Anything in nature, as long as our imagination can apprehend it in an intuition, can be judged aesthetically: it could be a rose, or it might be some larger part of nature, such as a certain order among species and genera; but in the first case we must judge without the concept of a rose, in the second case without a (single determinate) concept of such order among species and genera. Judgment’s principle of nature’s purposiveness embodies a constant expectation in accordance with an “aim” we have (Ak. 187), viz., our aim (or “endeavor,” as at Ak. 187) to cognize nature in an experience that coheres even in the particular. Hence when we actually find such order in nature, whether in the rose or in some larger but still inimitable part, then we feel a pleasure, as equated by Kant with our nonconceptual awareness of that purposiveness for our cognitive power as such (Ak. 184). This is why the natural scientist will frequently feel such pleasure upon discovering, and when judging aesthetically (i.e., without as yet having and using a [single determinate] concept for this), an indeterminate (subjectively) purposive order in parts of nature that he had, until then, conceptualized only in terms of a multiplicity of determinate concepts of species and genera.

If the scientist ceases to notice the pleasure, this is only because he is concerned mainly with cognition of such purposive order and therefore tends to focus on that cognition and hence to make no attempt to distinguish from it his nonconceptual awareness of such order (Ak. 187). It is precisely this analysis of judgments of taste by reference to cognition as such (though not by reference to determinate cognitions, since then the judgments would be cognitive rather than aesthetic), which enables Kant to provide a “deduction,” i.e., a justification, for them and their claim to universality and hence for their presupposition of a “common sense” (sensus communis).

6.

The Deduction of Judgments of Taste

In a judgment of taste we connect a noncognitive “predicate,” a feeling, with the mere intuition of an object (Ak. 288), and to this extent the judgment is (singular and) empirical (Ak. 289). What needs a justification (“deduction”) is only the a priori claim of the judgment, the claim that the pleasure (and to this extent the judgment as well) has universal validity (Ak. 289). Since a judgment of taste obviously is not analytic but synthetic, what the deduction tries to show is that and how this kind of synthetic judgment is possible a priori (Ak. 289). It does this as follows (Ak. 289–90).

In a judgment of taste the liking is not connected with the sensation (through which the “matter” of intuition would be given us; see

46Cf. the connection Kant makes between beauty and “orienting” oneself in the immense diversity of nature at Ak. 193.

47We can readily see that judgments of taste are synthetic; for they go beyond the concept of the object, and even beyond the intuition of the object, and add as a predicate to this intuition something that is not even cognition: namely, [a] feeling of pleasure (or displeasure): Ak. 288.
above, xxxiv) as it is when we judge something (e.g., ice cream) to be agreeable; nor is it connected with a concept as it is in judgments about the good. In other words, in a judgment of taste the liking involves no interest in an object's existence, whether as related to sense (as in the case of something agreeable) or in terms of some purpose (as in the case of the good). Rather, in a judgment of taste the liking is disinterested: it is connected with the mere judging of the form of the object. Hence this liking can be nothing but (our awareness of) the form's purposiveness for the power of judgment. As the power of judgment is not directed to the sensation or to a concept, it can be directed only to the subjective conditions of (empirical) judgment as such: the harmony of imagination and understanding that is needed for all (empirical) cognition. These subjective conditions of (empirical) judgment as such, i.e., the harmony of the cognitive powers, can be assumed to be the same in everyone. Hence the liking is nothing but (our consciousness of) the form's purposiveness for that harmony, a harmony that can be assumed to be the same in everyone. Therefore the liking has universal subjective validity, i.e., it is indeed a sensus communis (a "common sense"); viz., taste, by which we can judge given forms as to whether they have such purposiveness without a purpose.

Kant's key premise in this deduction is that the subjective conditions of (empirical) judgment as such (the harmony of the cognitive powers) can be assumed to be the same in everyone. He does not argue for that premise in the deduction, because he has already done so elsewhere: provided merely that (in accordance with the first Critique) we reject skepticism, we can assume that our ordinary (empirical) cognitions and judgments are universally communicable (Ak. 238–39); in other words, we can assume that what we call 'common understanding' (not the sensus communis but what we ordinarily call 'common sense,' viz., sound judgment in everyday matters) is indeed "common," i.e., shared by everyone, and hence can assume that the cognitive powers presupposed by this common understanding are shared universally as well (Ak. 292–93).

What makes it possible for this harmony to serve as a standard of taste, i.e., a standard for judging form (as to its beauty), is that, although in any particular cognition the harmony varies (according to the concept and intuition involved), the same does not hold for the indeterminate harmony as such (which, like the purposiveness it matches, cannot be cognized but can only be felt [Ak. 219]): since understanding as such has whatever structure it has, and imagination can harmonize with that structure only by adopting it, there must be a harmony (having that same structure), an "attunement," that is optimal for empirical cognition as such (Ak. 238–39). On the other hand, we must still make sure that we use that standard correctly. We must be certain that our judgment is indeed disinterested, a judgment of reflection rather than a judgment based on a concept or on a mere sensation (cf. Ak. 216, 290–93). In other words, we must be certain that the pleasure is indeed based on nothing but the (indeterminate) subsumption of our imagination as such (as it apprehends a form in intuition) under our understanding as such (Ak. 287).

7.

Beyond the Deduction: Linking Beauty to Morality

Extensive debates have been carried on among scholars as to whether the deduction, as just sketched in accordance with Kant's presentation of it in §38 (Ak. 289–90), is complete: some (e.g., Crawford) have argued that linking beauty to morality is still part of the deduction, whereas others (e.g., Guyer) have argued that it is not.49

On the one hand, Kant's presentation certainly suggests that the deduction is completed in §38, even before the Comment that starts just after it. The section is entitled simply 'Deduction of Judgments of Taste'; the beginning of the Comment, 'What makes this deduction so easy . . . ' (Ak. 290), clearly implies that the deduction is finished; and

48I am inserting in parentheses what Kant often omits but regards as understood. He clearly does identify this pleasure with the consciousness of the purposiveness (of the form of an object) in the play of the cognitive powers: Ak. 222.

the explanation that the Comment offers for that remark, as to why the deduction is "so easy," is entirely in terms of the material in § 38. Moreover, the point of the deduction was to justify the demand of judgments of taste for universal assent; and establishing that we do have a "common sense" (sensus communis), a taste that all subjects must have (and can use correctly), is indeed sufficient to justify us in demanding that anyone else who judges the same object reflectively should agree with our judgment. This is why Kant says explicitly,

...[S]omeone who feels pleasure in the mere reflection on the form of an object...rightly lays claim to everyone's assent, even though this judgment is empirical and a singular judgment. For the basis of this pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflective judgments, namely, the purposive harmony of an object...with the mutual relation of the cognitive powers (imagination and understanding) that are required for every cognition (Ak. 191).

In other words, the conflict between the subjectivity of judgments of taste and their claim to universality is solved by means of the indeterminate concept of nature's purposiveness for our cognitive power.

On the other hand, when Kant presents the same conflict again, as the "antinomy concerning the principle of taste" (Ak. 338-39), he seems to have changed his mind. He now claims that the only way to solve the antinomy and "save [the] claim [of a judgment of taste] to universal validity" is by means of the indeterminate concept of the supersensible (Ak. 340). Similarly, Kant says that "our liking for [the beautiful] includes a claim to everyone else's assent...only because we refer the beautiful to...the intelligible" (Ak. 353), i.e., to the supersensible. Now, the concept of the supersensible which according to Kant will make the (seeming) contradiction in the antinomy "disappear" and which "makes the judgment of taste valid for everyone" is the indeterminate concept of the supersensible that underlies nature's purposiveness for our cognitive power (Ak. 340). Hence it seems that Kant, by switching to this indeterminate concept, is suddenly equating (treating as equivalent) the indeterminate concept of nature's purposiveness for our cognitive power with the indeterminate concept of the supersensible basis of that same (subjective) purposiveness. I shall argue, from textual evidence, that this is just what Kant is doing. Kant does not explain the equation at this point. The explanation can be found in the Critique of Teleological Judgment, where the same equation is made. Although Kant does not offer a clear explanation even there, the evidence that he is making the equation is overwhelming. I must delay my argument concerning this point until the last section of this introduction. I shall refer to this problem as 'Problem I.' In the meantime, I shall simply anticipate the conclusion and ask the reader to assume that, however perplexing it may seem, the two concepts are indeed equivalent.

However, the way in which Kant introduces the supersensible at this point raises a further difficulty. Just before he calls it the supersensible underlying nature's purposiveness for our cognitive power, he says that it is the supersensible "underlying the object (as well as underlying the judging subject) as an object of sense and hence as appearance" (Ak. 340). Moreover, Kant also says that the "intelligible" (i.e., supersensible) which "taste has in view" and by reference to which we demand universal assent to our judgments of taste is the "morally good" (Ak. 353), and "the pleasure that taste declares valid for mankind as such...must indeed derive from this [link to moral ideas] and from the resulting increase in our receptivity for the feeling that arises from moral ideas (and is called moral feeling)" (Ak. 356).

This last supersensible is the one that "the concept of freedom [and hence the moral law] contains practically" (Ak. 176), viz., "the final purpose...the appearance of which in the world of sense...ought to exist." In other words, it is our supersensible freedom and a supersensible substrate of nature that will make nature as appearance (especially the appearance of what nature we have within us: Ak. 196, 340), cooperate, through the agency of a moral God, with our endeavor to achieve the final purpose.

This difficulty, the fact that Kant seems to introduce, in order to solve the antinomy of taste, three supersensibles rather than just one, has an easy solution: what we have here are three ideas of the supersensible, but they are all ideas of the same supersensible. (Ak. 346.) The idea of the supersensible as required to solve the antinomy of taste is the idea of the supersensible as underlying nature's

50 Ak. 195-96. Actually, Kant says, 'the final purpose which (or the appearance of which in the world of sense), but in order for the morally good (the highest good) to be supersensible, we need the second disjunct, 'the appearance of which.'
purposiveness for our judgment; but the supersensible to which this idea refers is all of this: the substrate of objects and of ourselves as subjects, the substrate of nature's purposiveness for our judgment, and the supersensible that "the concept of freedom contains practically." What, however, justifies regarding the "three" supersensibles as one? Kant's answer is this: it is the way in which the supersensible as underlying nature's subjective purposiveness "mediates" the "transition" between the other "two" and hence between the domains of nature and of freedom (Ak. 176, 196-97). The idea of the supersensible as mere substrate of nature was left wholly indeterminate by the Critique of Pure Reason; the Critique of Practical Reason, on the other hand, made the idea of the supersensible as contained practically in the concept of freedom determinate (and hence made it possible for us to cognize this supersensible); and it is the idea that the Critique of Judgment provides of the supersensible underlying nature's subjective purposiveness which, although itself indeterminate and incapable of giving rise to cognition, nevertheless makes the idea of the supersensible determinable (Ak. 196). How the indeterminate idea of the supersensible basis of nature's subjective purposiveness can make the idea of the supersensible determinable (capable of being determined by practical reason) is a problem—I shall call it 'Problem II'—whose solution hinges on the solution of Problem I and hence must also wait until the last section of this introduction.

But while the indeterminate concept that unites the "three" supersensibles, and thus also unites the three Critiques in a system, is the concept of reflective judgment in general, i.e., aesthetic as well as teleological, Kant singles out aesthetic reflective judgment as special (even) for this mediation role: the concept of nature's subjective purposiveness is made "suitable" for that mediation role by the "spontaneity in the play of the cognitive powers, whose harmony with each other contains the basis of [the] pleasure [that we feel in judging the beautiful]" (Ak. 197). How the spontaneity makes the concept "suitable" for this is what I shall call 'Problem III,' and this problem too must be left for the last section of this introduction.

We are now in a position to resolve the seeming conflict between those of Kant's comments implying that the deduction is complete and those that suggest otherwise. First, a correct analysis of judgments of taste, i.e., an analysis of them that avoids the antinomy of taste, must indeed link beauty to the supersensible—to the supersensible as basis of the subjective purposiveness of nature. The concept of this supersensible is indeed needed to "save [the] claim [of judgments of taste] to universal validity," i.e., this link is needed for the justification of these judgments. But this link does not take us beyond the deduction; it is already implicit in the deduction, because—as the solution of Problem I will show—a fuller analysis of the concept of the subjective purposiveness of nature reveals it to be equivalent to the concept of the supersensible basis of that same purposiveness. Second, beauty is linked to the supersensible as substrate of objects and of ourselves only indirectly, viz., only insofar as the three ideas of the supersensible all refer to the same supersensible; the idea of the supersensible as mere substrate of objects and of ourselves is as yet utterly indeterminate and hence could not justify judgments of taste at all. The idea of the supersensible as underlying the subjective purposiveness of nature, although still indeterminate as well, is—as we shall see in the last section of this introduction—not utterly indeterminate but has just enough content to justify a claim to universal subjective validity, by the same token that it can make the concept of the supersensible determinable (by practical reason). Third, the link of beauty to the supersensible as thus determined, and hence cognized, by practical reason not only is again indirect but must be indirect. For otherwise, despite Kant's repeated and express insistence to the contrary, his account of judgments of taste would become cognitive after all and judgments of taste could be established a priori, viz., practically. It is because the link of beauty to this last supersensible is only indirect that Kant, in discussing the link between beauty and morality, no longer speaks of justification or deduction. Instead he speaks of "explanation" (Ak. 296) and "interpretation" (Ak. 301). Moreover, this explanation or interpretation comes about in a way in which justification of what these judgments claim would never be possible, viz., through the mere analogy between beauty and morality, i.e., through the mere fact that beauty is the "symbol" of morality (Ak. 353, cf. 301). This explanatory or interpretive link can at most provide our taste with "guidance" (Ak. 297-98). Hence beauty as such does not "gain" from morality, nor the other way round (Ak. 231). By the same token, although we do tend to take an interest in

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51 Sometimes Kant calls it simply 'the supersensible in us' (e.g., Ak. 341). I shall have more to say about this in n. 101 below.
the existence and judging of the beautiful, an interest which is moral "in terms of its kinship" (Ak. 300), our liking for the beautiful remains nonetheless independent of all interest (Ak. 300); and even the interest itself that we take in beauty is due not to the link between beauty and morality but to "beauty's own characteristic of qualifying for such a link, which therefore belongs to it intrinsically" (Ak. 302). Only in this limited sense do we "refer" the beautiful to "the intelligible" that "the concept of freedom contains practically," i.e., the supersensible as made determinate practically; and only in this limited sense is aesthetic reflective pleasure "derived" from the link of beauty to morality; hence it is still "not practical in any way" (Ak. 222), as of course it would be if the link were justificatory rather than merely explanatory or interpretive.

Therefore, while the link of beauty to an as yet indeterminate "supersensible" is part of, but is also already implicit in, the deduction of judgments of taste as given in § 38, the link of beauty to morality is not needed for the deduction and would in fact take the deduction too far by making beauty cognizable. Taste, according to Kant, is not based on the supersensible as determined (practically), but only "has it in view" (Ak. 353), viz., insofar as both nature's subjective purposiveness and the supersensible basis of that purposiveness are analogous to that supersensible and thus capable of making it determinable.

8.

Beauty and Fine Art

There is "free" or "vague" beauty, Kant says, and "accessory" or "fixed" beauty, beauty fixed by the concept of the thing's purpose, the concept of what the thing is (meant) to be (Ak. 229-32). Judgments of taste about free beauty are pure, those about fixed beauty are applied judgments of taste and are partly conceptual, partly "intellectual" (Ak. 229-32). For example, beauty of which there can be an "ideal" (Ak. 231-36) must involve a concept of the purpose of the beautiful thing; Kant argues that only man is capable of an ideal of beauty, and this ideal involves the concept of man's moral purpose.

Since all fine art52 (indeed, all art in general53) involves the concept of a purpose,54 all beauty in fine art is fixed beauty, and hence judgments about this beauty are "logically conditioned" (Ak. 312), because we are also judging how perfect the object is in terms of that purpose (Ak. 311). But although the artist is thus proceeding by an intention (the intention to produce an object in accordance with the concept he has of it), the intention must not show in the work: the work must look like nature even though we are aware that it is art (Ak. 306-07). In other words, beauty in art is the same beauty as beauty in nature, except that it is restricted to the concept of the thing's purpose. By the same token, nature is beautiful if it also looks like art; the beauty of nature is not fixed, however, because nature, as judged in aesthetic reflective judgments, only "looks like" art, and we do not judge that it is art.55

Producing fine art, as distinguished from merely judging it by means of taste, requires genius (Ak. 307), although taste is needed as well: taste is needed to discipline genius, make it civilized by holding it within determinate rules (which we need in order to achieve a purpose: Ak. 310), and so keep it from producing nonsense (Ak. 319). But genius is a talent that does not simply follow rules but is original (Ak. 307-08); i.e., genius gives its own rule to art and hence produces works that are models and therefore exemplary (Ak. 308). But even the artist himself does not know what this rule is by which he connects his ideas (Ak. 308), and by which he then hits on a way of expressing them that communicates the "mental attunement" produced by these ideas (Ak. 317). This latter talent (of hitting on the right expression) Kant calls 'spirit' (Ak. 317). Spirit in an aesthetic

52'Fine' in this sense and 'beautiful' are the same term in German (schein), which is used in both the classificatory and the laudatory senses.
53Kant distinguishes fine art from art in various other senses of the term at Ak. 303-04.
54Since "otherwise the product cannot be ascribed to any art at all, but would be a mere product of chance": Ak. 310.
55Crawford's "paradox" about this reciprocal relation between nature and art seems to arise mainly because, in both cases, he quotes Kant as saying 'is like' rather than 'looks like': Kant's Aesthetic Theory, 134.
sense of the term is the “animating principle of the mind” (Ak. 313), and is the ability to exhibit (darstellen, traditionally rendered as ‘to present’\(^{59}\)) aesthetic ideas (Ak. 313–14). An aesthetic idea is an intuition\(^{57}\) that “prompts much thought” (Ak. 314); it is the “counterpart” of a rational idea: Just as no intuition can be adequate to an idea of reason, so there is no (determinate) concept that would be adequate to an aesthetic idea (Ak. 314).

Kant goes on to offer a classification of the various fine arts, and to discuss their similarities, differences, interrelations, and relative “aesthetic value” (Ak. 320–36).

9.

Judgments about the Sublime

Judgments about the sublime are the other kind of aesthetic reflective judgments. In analyzing them, Kant focuses on the sublime in nature, “since the sublime in art is always confined to the conditions that [art] must meet to be in harmony with nature” (Ak. 245). All sublimity involves vast magnitude; and nature, Kant says, is most sublime in its “chaos,” in its “wildest and most ruleless disarray and devastation” (Ak. 246).

In Baumgarten and Meier, the notion that is closest to Kant’s “sublimity” is “aesthetic magnitude,” in a sense that includes largeness as well as greatness. But for Baumgarten and Meier this aesthetic magnitude is one of the necessary ingredients in beauty (another is aesthetic richness, and both of these are needed to convey “truth” aesthetically, i.e., needed for aesthetic “cognition”). A species of aesthetic magnitude is indeed called ‘sublimity,’ but in a rather older and narrower sense, as meaning ‘grandeur,’ ‘splendor,’ ‘loftiness.’ Hence both this “sublimity” and that “aesthetic magnitude” are treated cognitively, as beauty is. Kant rejects this cognitive analysis (Ak. 268) as he did in the case of beauty, offering instead an analysis of the sublime in terms of reflection and a universally valid feeling.

Kant had discussed the sublime, along with the beautiful, empirically in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime of 1764, but only, as I have already mentioned, in terms of amateur social psychology. The most important empiricist account of the sublime is that of Edmund Burke, with which Kant was familiar.\(^{58}\) Burke analyzes the sublime along the same lines as the beautiful. We merely call objects sublime; we do so if they evoke a certain idea, a certain feeling. Here the feeling is one of “astonishment,” a certain degree of “horror,” but a horror that we feel only as we contemplate, without being in any actual danger. To this psychological account Burke again adds a physiological explanation as to how objects evoke this feeling. Kant quotes parts of Burke’s analysis (see Ak. 277 incl. br. ns. 48 and 50), but rejects all such empiricist accounts of the sublime for the same reason he rejected empiricist accounts of the beautiful: judgments about the sublime claim universal validity and necessity, and this “lifts them out of [the reach of] empirical psychology” (Ak. 266), which can never provide us with more than contingent propositions about what is (rather than ought to be) the case.

According to Kant, the sublime, like the beautiful, is an object of our liking (feeling of pleasure), and a judgment about the sublime is again an aesthetic judgment that is reflective and disinterested (we like the sublime, too, for its own sake: Ak. 244) and claims universal validity and necessity. But in the case of the sublime the pleasure is indirect and negative (Ak. 245): it presupposes a displeasure (Ak. 260). In other words, the pleasure we take in the sublime is (an awareness of) a (subjective) purposiveness that presupposes (an awareness of) a (subjective) contrapurposiveness (Ak. 245) or “unpurposiveness” (Ak. 260).

Kant distinguishes two kinds of sublimity: mathematical and dynamical. In the mathematically sublime the vast magnitude is

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\(^{56}\)See above, xxxv.

\(^{57}\)Actually, Kant says ‘presentation’ (Vorstellung, traditionally rendered as ‘representation’: see below, Ak. 175 br. n. 17.)

\(^{58}\)He must also have known the account given by his friend, Moses Mendelssohn: Über das Erhabene und Naive in den schönen Wissenschaften (On the Sublime and Naive in the Fine Sciences), 1758; in Moses Mendelssohn, Ästhetische Schriften in Auswahl (Selected Writings on Aesthetics), ed. Otto F. Best (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974). Mendelssohn’s account has some similarity to Burke’s. Mendelssohn did in fact read Burke, but not until after his own theory had been formulated: see Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, 324–26.
above all one of size (largeness), as in the case of “shapeless mountain masses” (Ak. 256). (Greatness is also included, but I shall set it aside here.) In the dynamically sublime the vast magnitude is one of might, as in the case of the “boundless ocean heaved up” (Ak. 261).

The sublime is (subjectively) contrapurpose because our imagination tries to apprehend the object of vast magnitude (in size or might) but fails. When we judge such an object, “this judging strains the imagination [as it tries to exhibit the object] to its limits, whether of expansion (mathematically) or of its might over the mind (dynamically)” (Ak. 268). Any attempt to exhibit something vast brings in reason, and reason (in accordance with its idea of totality) demands that imagination exhibit the object as an absolute whole (Ak. 257), an absolute magnitude (Ak. 268), i.e., a magnitude beyond all comparison (Ak. 250). Yet nature as appearance can never have more than comparative magnitude (Ak. 250); in other words, imagination (which must structure empirical intuition so that it can become nature as appearance) can exhibit only comparative magnitude. Therefore, imagination cannot fulfill reason’s demand, and hence we feel a displeasure, i.e., we are aware of the object’s contrapurposefulness for the imagination and hence for our cognitive power.

On the other hand, this very failure makes the sublime (subjectively) purposive at the same time. For, “finding that every standard of sensibility [i.e., imagination] is inadequate to the ideas of reason is (subjectively) purposive and hence pleasurable” (Ak. 258), because this discovery “arouses in us the feeling of our supersensible [moral] vocation” (Ak. 258) and of a “supersensible power” we have (viz., freedom as causality) for pursuing it (Ak. 250), in other words, the feeling of our “superiority over nature” (Ak. 261), our ability to cross (with a moral aim) “the barriers of sensibility” (Ak. 255). Hence the sublime is judged subjectively purposive with regard to moral feeling.59

By the same token, “when we speak of the sublime in nature we speak improperly” (Ak. 280); properly speaking, only the mind is sublime (Ak. 245). More specifically, what is sublime is the mind’s “attunement” in judging the sublime (Ak. 256). In speaking of the sublime “in nature” we merely attribute this sublimity of the mind to certain objects in nature (Ak. 247), viz., those which make us aware of the mind’s sublimity (Ak. 280). The mind, insofar as it is superior to nature, is reason. Hence judgments about the beautiful and judgments about the sublime both refer the imagination to our “power [i.e., faculty] of concepts” (Ak. 244). In the case of the beautiful this power is understanding; in the case of the sublime, reason (Ak. 256).

Because in judgments about the sublime “it is not the object itself that is judged to be purposive but what is purposive is the relation of the cognitive powers” (Ak. 280), i.e., imagination in relation to reason and our moral vocation, the exposition (analysis) of these judgments is at the same time their deduction (Ak. 280). For the will (which we know a priori through our moral consciousness) presupposes a priori this harmonious relation (Ak. 280), because the will is our “power of [carrying out] purposes [in nature]” (Ak. 280). Hence in the case of the sublime the link to morality is not, as it is in the case of the beautiful, merely explanatory or interpretive. Here this link justifies the claim of judgments about the sublime to universal validity, on the (legitimate) presupposition that man does in fact have moral feeling (Ak. 266).

10.

The Critique of Teleological Judgment: Background

It was generally accepted in Kant’s time that natural science had to include, or be supplemented by, judgments in terms of purposes,61 “final causes,” i.e., teleological judgments; only then could natural science make sense of the striking order found in nature, above all in organisms. On the other hand, natural scientists since the Renaissance had come to de-emphasize teleology, partly because it did not seem empirical enough and partly because Aristotle’s physics, which

59 Ak. 268. For “moral feeling,” see above, xlv.

60 This fact “turns the theory of the sublime into a mere appendix to our judging of the purposiveness of nature”: Ak. 246.

61 For this term, as used by Kant, see above, xxv.
was teleological, had turned out to contain serious errors. They emphasized, instead, observation and experimentation, careful measurement and the search for discoverable regularities that would allow prediction and explanation in terms of mechanical laws governing the sizes and shapes of particles (ultimately, atoms) and the forces of these particles that made them move in certain ways. On the other hand, it was generally agreed that all attempts to explain the purposelike things in the world (above all, organisms) mechanistically had met with little success: mechanistic causal relations were indeed found in these things, but they were not nearly sufficient to explain such things as wholes. In addition, it was commonly held that even if the physical universe were entirely mechanistic, this universe as a whole still required explanation, which therefore had to be sought beyond nature. For both of these reasons, explanation in terms of final causes seemed indispensable.

Kant shared all of these concerns throughout his career. Even in his earliest works we find him stressing the importance of investigating nature in terms of mechanism but also the need to go beyond mechanism and to teleology. Hence the questions arose for Kant: How much can teleology do? Can it explain? Can it give us knowledge? Answering these questions requires a critique that will examine the scope and limits of our cognitive powers once again, this time in regard to teleological judgments. As happened in the case of all the critiques already discussed, Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgment again leads him to a position between dogmatic rationalism and dogmatic empiricism. Hence it will again be informative to discuss representative examples of these positions.

Leibniz and Wolff (and Baumgarten, too) used the Cartesian version of the ontological argument in an attempt to establish the existence of a God with all, and hence also the moral, perfections. This God then served as the basis of their teleology as well: such a God must have created the best possible world, a world of rich detail harmoniously ordered to form a unity. The order of the world is one in terms of final causes. The material world, as governed by efficient causes, is simply that same world as it appears to us, i.e., as it is cognized through the indistinct perception of our senses. Hence whatever order we find in the world, including the purposelike order in organisms, can be “explained” by saying that God must have had a “sufficient reason” for choosing this order.

Kant has various objections against this kind of teleology. First, we cannot explain the purposelike order in the world by reference to causes that act intentionally unless we have insight into (i.e., theoretical cognition of) such causes (Ak. 394). But we do not have such insight (Ak. 459–60). All the arguments that traditionally have been offered as bases for such insight are inadequate. For his refutation of the ontological argument in its Cartesian form and of the cosmological argument, Kant refers us (Ak. 476) to the Critique of Pure Reason. The teleological argument is criticized in the third Critique as well. For one thing, Kant says, this argument would establish, at best, the existence of an “artistic understanding” that could provide us with “sporadic purposes”; it cannot establish the existence of a wisdom that would order these and all of nature in terms of a final purpose (Ak. 441). Moreover, the argument can “establish” even that much only subjectively, for our limited power of judgment; it cannot do so objectively (“dogmatically”), because then it would have to prove what it cannot prove: that mechanism cannot account for the purposelike order in the world (Ak. 395). Such dogmatic claims have no place in physics (Ak. 383): not only will they make reason too slothful to try to explain this order in natural terms (Ak. 382), but, worst of all, reason moves in a vicious circle if it tries to explain this order in the world by reference to a God whose existence it tries to prove from this very order (Ak. 381).

Another rationalist, Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza (1632–77), construed God not as cause of the world but as the sole and simple substance (with its two attributes, thought and extension) in which everything in the universe (which this substance is), including organisms,

62 For some examples, see Andrew Woodfield, Teleology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 3–9.

63 See, e.g., Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766), Ak. II, 331. For a passage in the Critique of Pure Reason which emphasizes the purposiveness in the world, see A 622 = B 650.

64 I shall set aside here the views that expressly deny that there are in nature final causes distinct from matter and the efficient causes governing it (see Ak. 390–93).


66 In the Critique of Pure Reason, see A 620–30 = B 648–58.

“inheres” as accident. Hence Spinoza had no need to argue for the existence of a God apart from the universe, although he did argue for the necessary existence of the universe (i.e., God) by appealing to the nature of “substance.” Kant’s objection to this view (Ak. 393–94), as regards teleology, is that, though inherence in one substance does amount to a kind of unity (order), this sort of unity is not sufficient to account for the purposive unity found in organisms.

On the empiricist side, Kant was closer to Hume than to Locke. John Locke (1632–1704) argued for the existence of a perfect God on the ground that the self-evident existence of oneself, as a mind capable of perception and knowledge (which cannot arise from mere matter), presupposes such a God. For “whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist....” Moreover, because God made this mind, he made also the “less excellent pieces of the universe.”69 Locke compared some of these, organisms, to watches (although he regarded them as superior to watches in certain ways), whose organization allows them to serve a “certain end.”70

Kant agreed that one’s own existence, as given in self-consciousness, requires that something or other exists necessarily (Ak. 476), but he argued that the step from this something or other to a supreme being71 presupposes the (fallacious) ontological argument.72 Moreover, Kant added, it is inconsistent for Locke, as an empiricist, to argue to the existence of something beyond the bounds of all experience.73

Hume, on the other hand, rejected all arguments for the existence of God (as he rejected, in contrast to Locke, claims about the existence of substances in general, even in the case of objects and of oneself as subject), since existence is a matter of fact and hence is not derivable a priori from the relations among our ideas. Hume’s objections against the teleological argument, which is a posteriori, are similar to Kant’s own (Ak. 438 incl. br. ns. 32 and 33, and 455 br. n. 49). As for teleology in general, Hume held that there is no basis for distinguishing final causes from efficient causes: our idea of causal “efficacy” is derived from the constant conjunction of two objects, and hence it is already the idea of an efficient cause.74 Moreover, there is not even a (legitimate) basis for the idea of any causal efficacy or “power”: all (legitimate) ideas are derived from impressions and we have no impression of causal efficacy and hence no (legitimate) idea of causal efficacy.75 The idea of a necessary causal link between two objects (and similarly for causal necessity in general) comes from my mind’s habit of expecting an object because I have come to associate it with another object.76 On Hume’s view, then, our teleological judgments cannot give us genuine explanations of any kind.

Kant agrees that teleological judgments do not explain objectively. He argues, however, that they do explain “for us.” Although this view is largely compatible with Hume’s position, Kant seems to have thought that Hume denied it, and he criticizes Hume accordingly.77 On the other hand, Hume would have denied that teleological judgments involve any kind of a priori principle or that they could yield cognition.

68An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Bk. IV, ch. x.
69Ibid., 12.
70Ibid., Bk. II, ch. xxvii, 5.
71I am refraining from capitalizing this expression. For my reasons, see below. Ak. 273 br. n. 43.
75Ibid. The parenthetical insertions are my own. Hume does hold, as the other paraphrases show, that we have some sort of idea of causal efficacy, an idea that is based on a mere mental habit (and hence is not legitimate).
76Ibid.
77Ak. 420–21. Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion appeared in German translation in 1780. Evidence that Kant had read the work can be found in the Critique of Pure Reason (see, e.g., A 745–46 = B 773–74), but in the Prolegomena of 1783 Kant refers to the work explicitly: Ak. IV, 358. It is not clear, however, to what extent Kant was influenced by Hume in this area of philosophy.
11.

Kant’s Account of Teleological Judgments. Why They Are Needed

If our investigation of nature is to be scientific, and thus capable of providing explanation (i.e., “distinct and determinate derivation from a principle”: Ak. 412), then it must—so reason requires—consist of a system of cognitions, not a mere “rhapsody” of them; it must (ideally) be just as systematic as organisms are, e.g., an animal body.

Now the a priori concepts (categories) of the understanding do provide nature with its universal laws (Ak. 186, 187), transcendental as well as metaphysical, and thus with a certain (minimal) systematicity (Ak. 203', 208'). As these laws are universal, there can be no natural science without this systematicity. But the legislation of the understanding does not extend to nature’s particular (as particular: Ak. 404), which must be given empirically; hence in terms of nature’s universal laws, any order in the particular, as particular, is contingent, as far as we can see. For example, the universal principle of cause and effect tells us a priori that every event must have its cause, but it leaves contingent what causes what.

Yet the principles based on the categories, and the concept of nature we form by means of them, do imply that nature as a whole, which includes the particular, is systematic. For they imply that all of nature can be cognized and that, consequently, it has an order that permits us to acquire empirical concepts (Ak. 180, 359, 208'). On the other hand, those principles and the concept of nature tell us nothing further about the systematicity of nature as a whole.

Now a demand (of reason) for a cognizable order of nature as a whole (including the particular) is indeed embodied in the principle of the power of judgment (cf. Ak. 185). For this principle presupposes that nature is lawful even in the contingent (Ak. 404, 217') and hence is purposive subjectively, i.e., for our cognitive power: judgment’s principle presupposes that nature forms a hierarchy (Ak. 213', 185) of genera and species and of empirical laws in general (including particular causal laws).

But this principle is still not sufficient for natural science. It is reflective and based on an indeterminate concept (the concept of nature’s subjective purposiveness); hence it cannot itself provide cognition, much less explanation. It is a heuristic maxim by which we merely presuppose parsimony and simplicity in the particular in nature. Even if we do find such order in nature and form empirical concepts accordingly, the order in the particular (as particular) will still be contingent (as far as we can see: Ak. 184), and so will be the order of nature considered as a whole. Above all, the principle of judgment by itself does not allow us to cognize, let alone explain, an organism, even a mere blade of grass (Ak. 400, 409), any more than does the concept of nature (Ak. 194, 359), or the universal laws of nature. Rather, the principle of judgment permits and prepares us to make judgments that go beyond that principle (Ak. 218', 193-94): teleological judgments, which use the (determinate) concept of purposes (Ak. 193), “final causes” (Ak. 380).

12.

Teleological Judgments about Organisms

Teleological judgments use the determinate concept of a purpose. They are logical reflective judgments about a purposiveness that is objective and material; objective as opposed to subjective, as is the purposiveness in aesthetic reflective judgments as well as in the principle of judgment itself; material as opposed to objective and formal, as is the purposiveness of geometric objects (Ak. 362-66). In
other words, teleological judgments are logically reflective judgments about a purposiveness that is based on a purpose. Although the principle of judgment (of nature's subjective purposiveness) permits and prepares us to make teleological judgments, these judgments themselves do not use (but only presuppose) the power of judgment's own indeterminate concept of nature's subjective purposiveness but use only (reason's) determinate concept of a purpose (cf. Ak. 243'-44'). By the same token, the teleological power of judgment, unlike the aesthetic power of judgment, is not a special power but only the reflective power of judgment as such (Ak. 194). The Critique of Judgment includes it only in order to determine what the full range of the principle of judgment is (Ak. 244').

Natural science needs teleological judgments above all for organisms, beings that are "organized" in the sense that the idea of the whole is what allows us to judge and cognize all the parts in their systematic combination (Ak. 373), and hence to judge and cognize the "inner possibility" of this being. An organism has a purposiveness that is not only objective and material but also intrinsic, as distinguished from the extrinsic (or "relative") purposiveness (which is also objective and material) that a thing has insofar as it is a means to something else (Ak. 425, and cf. 366-69). Since organisms are judged as purposes but also as products of nature, Kant calls them natural purposes (Ak. 374), as distinguished from "purposes of nature," which implies an (intentional) final purpose for nature as a whole (Ak. 378).

These judgments, though reflective, are cognitive (Ak. 221'). In the first place, we cognize the organism, a material whole, in mechanical terms, as the product of its parts and their forces and powers for combining on their own (Ak. 408); this is ordinary theoretical cognition and involves only our understanding. But since the matter in an organism is organized (Ak. 378) and forms a whole that is a natural purpose (Ak. 408), its form is contingent in terms of mechanism and hence cannot be judged by understanding alone, on which mechanism is based: a concept of reason (the concept of a purpose) must come in as well (Ak. 370). The idea of reason restricts the object to a particular form for which "nature itself" (mechanism) contains no basis whatsoever (Ak. 422). This particular form is the form of a system: in an organism the parts produce one another (are cause and effect of one another) and thereby produce a whole the idea of which (as the idea of this whole as a purpose) could in turn, in a being capable of acting on ideas, be the cause of such a whole (Ak. 373). Only if we use reason's concept of a purpose can we judge and cognize, even empirically, the form of an organism in all its causal relations (Ak. 370), because only through elaborate observation, as guided by this concept, can we cognize the object's objective purposiveness (Ak. 194, and cf. 221', 192, 383, 398, 400). Hence teleological judgments are made by understanding and reason combined (Ak. 193, 233', 243', and cf. 386).

Our teleological judgments about organisms, then, use a determinate concept. However, they are reflective rather than determinative, for a determinative teleological judgment about organisms would construe natural purposes as purposes of nature, i.e., as intentional, and hence would be a transcendent judgment of reason (Ak. 236'). As a consequence, these judgments do not explain objectively, but explain only for us, subjectively, i.e., only according to the character of our understanding and reason (Ak. 413, and cf. 388). Hence they give us no insight into how organisms are produced (Ak. 418, and cf. 411); rather, they belong merely to the description of nature (Ak. 417). Teleological judgments are therefore mere maxims that reason imposes on judgment (Ak. 398, and cf. 379), maxims by which reason tells judgment how it must think about organisms (Ak. 389). Hence reason's idea of a purpose is used regulatively by the power of judgment in its concept of a natural purpose (Ak. 375, 237').

Although we think natural purposes by a remote analogy with technically practical reason (Ak. 383), i.e., our causality in terms of purposes (Ak. 375), teleological judgments of reflection must be distinguished from judgments about practical purposiveness (Ak. 243'). For natural purposes are products of nature (Ak. 376), and we

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81 Ak. 364. Sometimes Kant equates objective material purposiveness simply with purpose: Ak. 366.

82 Ak. 408. Even though 'intrinsic' renders the German term 'inner' better in most contexts dealing with natural purposes, it cannot be used to modify 'possibility' here, because 'intrinsic possibility' means something else, viz., 'possibility in principle.'

83 Ak. 379 and 413. Sometimes Kant omits the qualification 'subjective' and does speak simply of explanation: Ak. 383, 412, 414, 236'. Similarly, instead of saying that mechanism cannot explain organisms for us (cf. Ak. 413, and cf. 389), he sometimes says or implies that mechanism cannot account for them: Ak. 369, 411.
observe no intention as underlying them (Ak. 399); hence we must look for the purposive causality in nature itself (Ak. 382) rather than outside it, as we would if nature were more than remotely analogous to art (Ak. 374). On the other hand, even thinking of organisms by analogy (even by remote analogy) with practical reason involves the use of the concept of an intention (Ak. 398); but although we thus speak of nature as if the purposiveness in it were intentional (Ak. 383), we are not attributing an intention to nature (Ak. 2361). Similarly, when Kant calls nature's causality in terms of purposes an "intentional" technic and equates an "unintentional technic" with mechanism (Ak. 390-91), all he means is that, although in mechanism we do not even think an intention, in nature's causality in terms of purposes we do. But although teleological reflective judgments about organisms do not attribute an intention to nature, they also do not deny that the objective purposiveness in organisms is intentional. If these judgments either attributed or denied an intention to nature, they would be determinative and transcendent (Ak. 236' -37').

The only objective explanation of which we are capable is in terms of mechanical laws (Ak. 218'), above all the laws of motion (Ak. 390). If we are to have insight (theoretical cognition) into something, we must gain it through mechanism (Ak. 387, 410), because we ourselves use mechanism when we produce things and hence have complete insight only into mechanical production (Ak. 384). Now it may indeed be possible (noncontradictory) for organisms to be produced in terms of mechanism alone and hence possible for some understanding (a superhuman understanding) to explain organisms in terms of mechanism alone (Ak. 408). But for us, given the (unchangeable) character of our cognitive power, explaining organisms in terms of mechanism alone, or even getting to know them in terms of their inner possibility, is completely impossible and will forever remain so (Ak. 400), even though we should nevertheless try to explain all natural products mechanically as long as there is some probability of success (Ak. 418).

Hence objective explanation of organisms is impossible for us on mechanical as well as teleological principles, even though we do judge organisms in terms of both. Hence both principles are to this extent, i.e., as applied to organisms, mere maxims and hence merely regulative.84 We judge the connection among an organism's parts in terms of efficient causes and then judge this same connection as causation through final causes (Ak. 373), trying to gain as much insight as we can in terms of mechanism, while using the teleological principle heuristically in order to discover all the characteristics of the organism and what forms it has that (as far as we can see) go beyond mechanism (Ak. 389, 400). How it is possible to judge the same connections both in terms of the principle of mechanism (which implies necessity) and in terms of the principle of final causes (which implies a contingency) is the problem addressed by the Dialectic, which will be discussed in Section 15.

13.

Is Nature as a Whole a Teleological System?

Once we judge organisms teleologically, Kant says, the concept of a natural purpose leads us necessarily to the idea of all of nature as a system in terms of the rule of purposes (Ak. 378-79), a "teleological system" (Ak. 429). We then express that systematicity in the maxim: Everything in the world is good for something or other; nothing in it is gratuitous; [everything] is purposive in [relation to] the whole (Ak. 379). What prompts us (Ak. 414) to think nature as a whole as such a system is the "example" of organisms (Ak. 379), because this example shows that nature has the ability to produce organisms (Ak. 380). Hence the idea of nature as a system in terms of purposes is reasonable (Ak. 427) and justified (Ak. 380).

How systematic is nature as a whole? If nothing in nature were gratuitous and everything in it were purposive in relation to the whole, nature would have the same systematicity that an organism has. If nature had that degree of systematicity, we could judge it, too,

84 Ak. 386, 387. It is not mechanism as such that is regulative. I shall return to this point in the context of the antimony of teleological judgment: see Section 15.
as a natural purpose and look for the purposive causality within nature (although, as we shall see in the next section, the purpose of the existence of nature as a whole would still have to lie outside nature). But it is simply not true for nature as a whole, as it is for an organism, that its parts "produce one another." It seems that all we have (beyond the categories) for nature as a whole is the principle of judgment, the maxim according to which nature must be thought as purposive subjectively, i.e., purposive for our cognitive power, and that the higher degree of systematicity we find in organisms is not present in other parts of the universe.

Kant does in fact acknowledge that the products of nature do not all have the same degree of (objective) purposiveness (Ak. 415). Only organized matter must be judged by means of the concept of a purpose (Ak. 378); mechanical laws (and what can be accounted for in terms of them alone) do not. Hence, as applied to the whole of nature the teleological maxim of judgment is "not indispensable," as it is for organisms, because "nature as a whole is not given us as organized (in the strictest sense of organized... )" (Ak. 398).

What, then, entitles us to judge everything in nature as belonging to a teleological system, even those products that do not have to be judged in terms of purposes? (Ak. 380-81.) We are entitled to do this because nature's ability to produce organisms already leads us to the idea of the supersensible (Ak. 381); the mere thought of an intention, as an intention in some cause beyond nature, is implicit in the concept of a purpose even as that concept is used to cognize natural purposes as natural. (This point will be spelled out somewhat more fully below.) Moreover, we must judge nature as a whole as a system of purposes because this maxim "may well allow us to discover many further laws of nature that would otherwise remain hidden from us" (Ak. 398). In other words, we must do so because reason demands that our cognitions form, not a mere "rhapsody," but a system (see above, lxxxvi).

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14.

Moving Beyond Teleological Cognition of Nature

We have seen that there are two kinds of objective material purposiveness in nature: the intrinsic purposiveness of organisms, and the extrinsic or "relative" purposiveness that something has insofar as it is a means to something else. Now in order for us to judge some natural thing as a means, we must judge it as serving (at least medially, i.e., indirectly) an (intrinsic natural) purpose, an organized being (Ak. 425). Moreover, once we think of a natural product as a natural purpose (which involves the thought of an intention), we must also think of the natural product's existence as (having) a purpose (Ak. 426). For example, we may judge that plants (a kind of organized being) exist for the sake of herbivores, these for the sake of predators, and predators for the sake of man (Ak. 426), so that we arrive at a chain of purposes (Ak. 435). If this chain is not to go on forever but is to be complete (Ak. 435), then there must be some purpose that does not have yet another purpose as its condition, i.e., there must be a final purpose (Ak. 434). But this final purpose cannot be in nature, because everything in nature is always conditioned in turn (Ak. 435, 426). The last natural member in the chain of purposes Kant calls the "ultimate" purpose (Ak. 426). That ultimate purpose of nature, Kant argues, is man (Ak. 426-27). But man is this ultimate purpose subject to a condition: he must "have the understanding and the will" to pursue the final purpose (Ak. 431) enjoined by the moral law, i.e., the highest good in the world; this highest good is man's virtue, and man's happiness to the extent that he is virtuous (cf. above, xlv). Subject to the condition that we pursue this final purpose, nature's ultimate

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85 This move is the task of the "methodology" of teleological judgment (Ak. 416), as distinguished from the "elementology." Whereas the elementology (cf. Ak. 354) provides the materials for the edifice (system) of cognitions, the methodology provides the plan for it (Critique of Pure Reason, A 707-08 = B 375-76). Hence the methodology of teleological judgment has the task of deciding how the science of teleology relates to natural science and to theology. (There can be no methodology of aesthetic reflective judgment because there can be no science of the beautiful: Ak. 354-55.)
purpose is to cooperate and make it possible for man to pursue the
final purpose, viz., through the cultivation of man's nature, the cultiva-
tion (or "culture") of skill and discipline (Ak. 431-34).

Because all purposes in nature, including this ultimate purpose,
are thought of as intentional, they are thought of as purposes pursued
by an understanding as cause of that nature. Thus our teleological
cognition of the purposes in nature leads us to the thought of an
intelligent cause of the world (a cause of the world which has
understanding) and to the thought of a final purpose. It does not
enable us to cognize this cause, nor that final purpose (Ak. 378); it
does not even allow us to inquire into the final purpose (Ak. 437).

Teleology as taken beyond the cognition of nature becomes moral
teleology (Ak. 455), teleology from a practical point of view (Ak.
460). Indeed, once we think of an intelligent cause of all that objective
purposiveness, we cannot help asking what objective basis in this
cause determines it to create those purposes, and that basis would be
the (idea of) the final purpose (Ak. 434-35). Although natural pur-
poses prompt the idea of this final purpose (Ak. 485), only reason can
have and use this idea (Ak. 454-55). One use of this idea is as the
highest point in the chain of causes (Ak. 390). But the most important
use of the idea of the final purpose is the one already outlined in the
sketch of the Critique of Practical Reason (above, Section 3): since the
moral law (and freedom) is a matter of fact and is known practically,
the idea of the final purpose enjoined on us by the moral law is also
determinate, and hence we have practical cognition of this final
purpose and its achievability as a matter of rational faith. As a
consequence, we also have practical cognition of the two matters of
faith whose idea is in turn made determinate by the idea of the final
purpose: immortality of the soul and the existence of a God as moral
author of the world in itself, i.e., the world as substrate of objects and
of ourselves as free subjects. This "moral proof" of the existence of
God does not give us theoretical cognition, and knowledge, of God
as he is in himself (Ak. 456, 457). But what it does give us is fully
adequate for theology (Ak. 484-85) and for religion (Ak. 474, 481).
For it gives us practical cognition of God, as a matter of rational
faith, in terms of an idea of this supersensible being that the idea of
our own freedom (as a supersensible causality) can, by analogy (Ak.
484-85), make determinate: the idea of God as he relates (practically)
to the final purpose, the object of our practical reason (Ak. 457), in
other words, as a moral being who makes this final purpose achiev-
able (Ak. 457). Teleology alone, on the other hand, could establish
only the existence of some understanding as cause of the world but
would be unable to make this concept any more determinate, espe-
cially in moral terms (Ak. 477). Hence teleology can serve only as a
propaedeutic to theology proper (Ak. 485); and to base religion on
this indeterminate concept of God would be to pervert religion (Ak.
460, 481).

Yet teleology does help. For it shows that from a theoretical point
of view the idea of God has some determination, some "reality"
(more than the completely empty idea of the supersensible as mere
possible substrate of nature), viz., the attribute 'some understanding
as cause of the world.' By showing that the idea of God has some
theoretical reality, teleology supports the reality that the idea of God
has, through the analogy with our own practical reason, from a
practical point of view (Ak. 456) and thereby confirms the moral
argument (Ak. 479). (Teleology similarly confirms our practical cogni-
tion of the final purpose, by leading at least to the thought of such a
purpose.) As I have indicated before, it is the power of judgment that
mediates the transition from the completely indeterminate supersen-
sible as substrate of nature to the morally determined supersensible,
and hence from the realm of nature of the first Critique to the realm
of freedom of the second Critique (Problem II: see above, bxiv). The
power of judgment, especially the aesthetic power of judgment
(Problem III: bxiiv), performs this mediation by means of its indetermi-
nate concept of nature's subjective purposiveness, as equivalent to the
indeterminate concept of the supersensible basis of this purposiveness
(Problem I: bxi-bxiii). It thereby unites the three Critiques in a system. I
shall now address these three outstanding problems.

86 For this terminology, see above, xlv-xlvi.
87 Cf. above, n. 71.
How the Critique of Judgment Completes the Critical System

As regards aesthetic and teleological judgments (of reflection) as analyzed by the two parts of the Critique of Judgment, two points are beyond dispute: these judgments are indeed made, and they do make certain claims that call for such analysis. Kant can take these two points for granted and hence does not have to argue that the third Critique is in fact needed. On the other hand, the justification that Kant offers for these judgments involves assertions that he does not expect to be accepted so readily: assertions about specific mental powers and their interrelations, and, above all, assertions about at least our ideas of the "supersensible." Yet all of these assertions are to be as scientific as the subject matter permits. Hence Kant must establish that they are indeed far from arbitrary. He does so by showing that everything these assertions claim is required as part of a system and cannot be removed without destroying that system (cf. Ak. 168); and he shows that something is required as part of a system by pointing to already familiar parts of the system and showing how the less familiar part is required as a "mediator" between them. We have in fact already encountered, in the summaries of the first two Critiques (Sections 2 and 3 above), two examples of this sort of justification procedure. In the first Critique, Kant introduces the schema by arguing that it is needed to mediate between the pure concepts of the understanding and imagination (intuition). In the second Critique, Kant similarly introduces the typus as needed to mediate between reason's moral law and understanding.

In the Critique of Judgment, the same justification procedure appears again. Kant justifies his treatment of judgment as (to some extent) a cognitive power in its own right partly by showing how it mediates between the other two higher cognitive powers, understanding and reason (Ak. 168, 179): in a syllogism the power of judgment subsumes the particular under some universal (i.e., under some principle) supplied by understanding and thereby enables reason to make an inference from that universal to the particular (Ak. 201'). In the same way feeling must, according to Kant, be considered an independent member among the three general mental powers because it mediates between the cognitive power (in general) and the power of desire (Ak. 178); feeling mediates between the other two mental powers insofar as both the lower power of desire (the will as influenced by sense) and the higher (the will as determinable by its own moral law) connect a pleasure with nature: the lower connects this pleasure with nature cognized as it already is; the higher, with nature cognized as it (morally) ought to be (Ak. 178-79). Thus Kant establishes a twofold systematicity: among the higher cognitive powers and among the mental powers in general. Moreover, because understanding legislates in the domain of the concept of nature (i.e., in the domain of the [theoretical] cognitive power) and reason legislates in the domain of the concept of freedom (i.e., in the domain of the power of desire), Kant can enhance that twofold systematicity further if he can establish that judgment, the mediator of the higher cognitive powers, similarly legislates to feeling, the mediator of the mental powers in general (Ak. 168, 177-79).

Now Kant's "deduction" of judgments of taste (Section 6) established the universal subjective validity of the feeling of pleasure in these judgments, i.e., the universal subjective validity of the state of awareness in which we are when we are judging, without a determinate concept, nature's purposiveness for our power of judgment, for, Kant argued, this feeling cannot be directed to anything but the conditions of (empirical) judgment as such (harmony of imagination and understanding), and these conditions can be presupposed to be the same in everyone. To this extent, then, Kant has already established that the power of judgment, with its indeterminate concept of nature's subjective purposiveness, governs, or "legislates to," feeling; hence to this extent he has already enhanced the mentioned twofold systematicity among the mental powers. On the other hand, such systematicity among the mental powers, including the higher cognitive (and legislative) powers, would mean very little if there were no similar systematicity among the "worlds" with which these powers deal; and as Kant's account of aesthetic and teleological judgments (of reflection) involves claims about the supersensible, Kant cannot complete the (full) justification of that account by pointing to such.
systematicity unless he can show that there is such systematicity among those “worlds” even as they are in themselves, i.e., as supersensible. Now understanding and the (theoretical) cognitive power deal with the “world” of appearance as it is but tell us nothing about the “world” underlying it, the supersensible “world” in itself, except that it is logically possible. Reason and the (higher) power of desire deal with the “world” of appearance as it ought to be and also tell us about the supersensible conditions of making it so: supersensible freedom, immortality of the soul, and God. As Kant sees it, he has not (fully) justified his claims about the supersensible, and the three Critiques cannot form a system (and thus be scientific), unless not only the mental powers but also those “worlds,” especially as they are in themselves, are shown to form a system. That is why it is especially important for Kant to show not only that the power of judgment, just like understanding and reason, also points to a supersensible, viz., the supersensible basis of nature’s subjective purposiveness, but also that this supersensible mediates between the other “two” supersensibles and thus unites the “three” supersensibles in one.

The key to this mediation among the supersensibles lies in the solution to Problem I (see above, lxxii-lxxiii), concerning Kant’s equating (treating as equivalent) judgment’s indeterminate concept of nature’s subjective purposiveness and the indeterminate concept of the supersensible basis of that same purposiveness. I shall now show how, in the Dialectic of teleological judgment, this equation arises from the antinomy of teleological judgment, how this equation (as well as the antinomy itself) applies not only to teleological judgments but to judgments of taste as well, and hence to the principle of judgment as such.

As Kant presents the antinomy of teleological judgment initially, it is a (seeming) conflict between these two maxims: the thesis that all production of material things and their forms must be judged possible in terms of merely mechanical laws, and the antithesis that some products of material nature cannot be judged possible in terms of merely mechanical laws but that judging them requires a quite different causal law, that of final causes (Ak. 387). It then seems as if this “conflict,” which (as becomes clear from the way Kant addresses it throughout the remainder of the Dialectic) actually turns out to be a conflict between judging the same object in terms of both a necessary mechanism and a contingent purposiveness, is resolved by Kant’s pointing out that the two principles are indeed only maxims, i.e., only regulative: they regulate our judgments of reflection and do not assert, for determinative judgment, that all objects are, or that they are not, possible on mechanistic alone (Ak. 387–89). This has led a number of commentators to suppose that Kant solves the antinomy by construing both mechanism and the principle of final causes as regulative principles. But, first, Kant is by no means revoking the

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89 Kant seems to have thought that the conflict must be stated in a form that at least looks propositional. In the third antinomy of the first Critique (cf. also the second and fourth antinomies) he states the conflict between causal necessity and freedom in terms of propositions that are interestingly similar to the ones under consideration here. See A 444–45 = B 472–73.

90 For a list of such commentators and their works, along with the specific references, see John D. McFarland, Kant’s Concept of Teleology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), the n. on 120–21. More recently, this view has been defended by Robert E. Butts in his Kant and the Double Government Methodology (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984), 272–73. As Butts puts it, “regulative principles, . . . unlike . . . declarative sentences, . . . cannot logically oppose one another.” “They can conflict only . . . in the sense that it would be irrational to adopt both for the same purpose,” i.e., in the same “context.” (Ibid. 262, as applied to 272.) It is true that in the strict sense of ‘contradiction’ two principles can contradict each other only if they are declarative. It is also true that Kant must have this strict sense of ‘contradiction’ in mind when he says that the thesis and antithesis contradict each other only if taken as determinative but not if taken as regulative (§ 70, Ak. 387). Moreover, he presumably means such a contradiction again when, near the end of § 71 (Ak. 389), he says, roughly, that any semblance of an ‘antinomy’ arises only when we forget that the two principles are only maxims. That Kant’s use of the term ‘antinomy’ in this remark must be a slip is clear not only from what he does in the (sizeable) remainder of the Dialectic, but also from the fact that the remark is still part of the “preliminary” to the solution of the antinomy. Now the antinomy itself, i.e., the conflict between judging the same object in terms of both a necessary mechanism and a contingent purposiveness, does indeed not involve a contradiction in that strict sense; if it did, it could not be solved. What it does involve, however, as I am about to show, is the threat of a contradiction, even if not one involving declarative sentences, between our judging both mechanistically and teleologically in the very same “context.” Judging in contradictory terms would indeed be “irrational,” but in so serious a sense of this term that neither Kant nor we could accept such “irrationality”: our “judgments” would cancel each other; i.e., we would in fact not be judging at all. Hence we must reject, as McFarland does, the kind of interpretation put forward by Butts and by the commentators McFarland lists, according to which Kant “solves” the antinomy of teleological judgment by making both mechanism and the teleological principle regulative. As for McFarland’s own interpretation of how Kant “solves” the antinomy of teleological judgment, it also seems to me untenable, as I shall explain below: xiii—I. 
central doctrine of the first Critique, according to which the universal
dlaws of nature—in particular, the principle of necessary efficient
(mechanical) causality—are legislated to nature by our understanding
and hence are constitutive and determinative, not regulative. Rather,
the maxims involving mechanism that are here said to be regulative
concern merely the sufficiency or insufficiency of mechanism for
judging objects in general (including organisms). Second, the fact that
the section that comes after the presentation of the antinomy offers a
"preliminary" to its solution (Ak. 388) makes it clear that the solution
has not yet been given. Above all, third, the conflict between a
necessary mechanism and a contingent teleological principle, as I
shall now explain, cannot be resolved by turning the two into maxims,
and Kant will in fact come up with a quite different and rather
sophisticated solution.

When we judge an object (an organism) as a natural purpose, we
are judging it in terms of both mechanism and final causes: in terms
of mechanism insofar as the object is a product of nature, in terms of
final causes insofar as it is a purpose. Now mechanism involves the
necessity implicit in the principle of causality which is based on the
categories; on the other hand, we cannot think of an object as a
purpose without thinking of it as contingent, viz., contingent in terms
of the universal natural laws (Ak. 398). Hence it seems that we are
judging as both necessary and contingent "one and the same produc"
(Ak. 413), indeed, even the same causal connections within that
product (Ak. 373, and cf. 372-73). Hence we are contradicting ourselves
(Ak. 396) unless we can reconcile the two principles (Ak. 414). Only
if we reconcile the two principles can we actually judge an object in
terms of both of them, i.e., only then is the concept of a natural
purpose a possible concept (Ak. 405) rather than a contradiction in
terms. The fact that we are using these principles as mere maxims, as
merely regulative, does not resolve this conflict at all; if the concepts
that the two maxims use contradict each other, then we have not
even a concept of a natural purpose; for the concepts and maxims
will cancel each other, so that we shall not be "judging" at all. This is
precisely why Kant himself points out that in order for the "conflict"
between the two principles to be merely a seeming conflict we must
have assurance that the two principles can be reconciled objectively too.
(It is mechanism and the causality in terms of purposes that must be
reconcilable objectively; the determinative versions of the thesis and antithesis as Kant states them initially are not reconciled
by Kant's solution of the antinomy and could not be reconciled by
anything whatsoever, as Kant himself points out at Ak. 387.)

Kant solves the antinomy between the necessary mechanism and
the contingent teleological principle as he solves all his antinomies:
by invoking the supersensible (cf. Ak. 344-46). In the present case the
supersensible is introduced as follows. Our understanding, Kant argues
(see Section 2 above), has the peculiarity of being discursive, concep-
tual; and all concepts abstract (to some extent) from the particular:
hence our understanding does not determine (legislate) the particular
but determines only the universal, leaving the particular contingent
(Ak. 406). As for our a priori intuitions, they too cannot determine all the
particular that understanding leaves contingent. If they could, then
the form (or "unity") of mere space (our a priori intuition which applies
to all appearances in nature outside us) would be able, in
conjunction with the categories, to determine completely and thus
constitute (and in that sense give rise to) an organism; yet clearly the
form of space is not sufficient for this (Ak. 409). On the other hand,
the very awareness that our human understanding has the peculiarity
of determining the universal while leaving the particular contingent

91Butts argues that actually Kant does, even in the first Critique, revoke that doctrine
and construe the categories as regulative. I shall offer some brief comments on this
view below, n. 107.

92The single piece of counterevidence is a remark at the end of § 71 (Ak. 389) which I
just mentioned in n. 90. All the remainder of the evidence, including the title of that
section and everything else Kant does in the rest of the Dialectic, seems to me to
require that we discount this one remark rather than all that other evidence.

93The solution differs both from the one just rejected and from the one suggested by
McFarland: see below, xciv-c.

94Ak. 413. In other words, it must be at least possible that the "necessity" is not in fact
a necessity or that the "contingency" is not in fact a contingency. Kant says 'objectively,'
rather than 'determinatively,' because for the same object or the same causal connec-
tions to be determined as both necessary and contingent would imply that they in fact
are both necessary and contingent, which would indeed be contradictory and hence
would not be possible.

95As Kant puts it, space with its unity "is not a basis [responsible] for the reality of
products but is only their formal condition...." The determination being denied here
would not involve the concept of a purpose; this determination would be theoretical
rather than practical.
implies the idea of a possible different understanding (Ak. 405), viz., an understanding that is not discursive (i.e., does not omit the particular in its legislation) but is intuitive (Ak. 406). Such an understanding would legislate a "synthetic" universal, i.e., a universal in the sense of a whole that includes determination of the particular in that whole (Ak. 407). An intuitive understanding would thus be an understanding that simply determines, and hence would be an understanding "in the most general sense" (Ak. 406); for, while any understanding requires intuition (to supply the particular needed for cognition: Ak. 406), we are not entitled to assume that any understanding must have, as ours does, an intuition which is separate from it and through which the particular is merely given (empirically) rather than legislated along with the universal (Ak. 402-03).

Such an understanding's intuition would thus not be a mere receptivity (which is passive), and hence not a sensibility as our intuition is, but would be an intellectual intuition, a complete spontaneity (i.e., it would be completely active): it would determine objects completely. It would not require for this determination (and cognition) a harmony between itself and some other, separate cognitive power (an imagination dealing with a passive intuition), but would determine objects in terms of the harmony within this understanding itself.

Moreover, because an intuitive understanding would not require that the particular be supplied from elsewhere but would itself supply the particular along with the universal, it would constitute its objects as complete, as things in themselves, not as mere appearances. It would constitute these objects through its theoretical legislation rather than "produce" (or "create") them, for it would not bring objects about practically and hence as contingent, i.e., conditioned by the concept of a purpose (i.e., by an intention) (Ak. 407), but would bring them about without an idea as producing cause (Ak. 408): nature in itself would simply be the intellectual (supersensible) intuition of this intuitive understanding, just as our world of experience simply is the experience that consists of our empirical intuition as structured in harmony with our categories. By the same token, such a supersensible understanding with its supersensible intuitions cannot be called a God; rather, the idea of it is utterly indeterminate, negative, the mere idea of an understanding that "is not discursive" (Ak. 406).

With this mere idea of an "intuitive understanding," Kant can now solve the antimony of teleological judgment. As an intuitive understanding would necessitate even the particular, the mere idea of such an understanding permits us to think of the "contingency" of the particular as being only a seeming contingency, a "contingency for" our understanding with its peculiarity, but as in fact being a necessity. A merely seemingly contingency that is in fact a necessity does not conflict with the necessity implicit in mechanism. Hence "objectively too" it is at least possible to reconcile the mechanistic principle with the teleological (Ak. 413), for it is at least possible that the causal connections that we have to judge in terms of purposes and hence as contingent are in fact legislated theoretically and are therefore necessary. The laws covering those necessary but yet particular causal connections would then either have the same basis as mechanism (viz., the intellectual intuition of that intuitive understanding) or would perhaps even be identical with the mechanism familiar to us—identical in the sense of forming part, along with the mechanism familiar to us, of some broader, ideal mechanism (Ak. 390), in which case even organisms would be possible on this (ideal) mechanism alone. Since we human beings do not have insight into the basis of the mechanism familiar to us (Ak. 395, 398)—that basis might be such a supersensible intuition, or it might not—we cannot tell if it forms part of such an ideal mechanism, and hence we are incapable of establishing whether organisms (can or) cannot come about mechanically (Ak. 395); a higher understanding, on the other hand, might be able to account for organisms in mechanistic terms (Ak. 406, 418).

Now although this antimony is called the antimony of "teleological" judgment, both it and its solution (as just sketched) actually apply to reflection in general. Kant does indeed discuss the antimony mainly by reference to organisms, i.e., natural purposes, and hence by reference to objective purposiveness, i.e., purposiveness with a purpose. Yet the antimony of "teleological" judgment and its solution apply just as much to the subjective purposiveness of nature which is claimed in the principle of reflective judgment itself, for this purposiveness too is clearly contingent in terms of mechanism and yet is a purposiveness of nature and as such is subject to nature's necessity. Hence it too can be thought without contradiction only if we think of the "contingency" it implies as in fact being a necessity legislated by an intuitive understanding with its intellectual intuition. Indeed, when Kant introduces the antimony of teleological judgment, the purposiveness he first
mentions is the subjective purposiveness of nature (Ak. 386). Similarly, although Kant does of course apply the solution of this antinomy to organisms and the contingency we find in them, he does not confine it to organisms; rather, he clearly applies it (Ak. 406, 407) to all the contingency in all the particular in nature (even though nature as a whole does not have the same high degree of systematicity that organisms have and hence is not itself a natural purpose: cf. Section 13 above): "[S]ince universal natural laws have their basis in our understanding, . . . the particular empirical laws must . . . be viewed in terms of such a unity as they would have] if they too had been given by an understanding (even though not ours) so as to assist our cognitive powers . . . ." (Ak. 180, 181, and cf. 184). Moreover, Kant says (Ak. 345) that apart from the antinomies of the first and second Critiques, there is, in the Critique of Judgment, "an" (i.e., one) antinomy. In other words, he implies that the antinomy of aesthetic judgment and the antinomy of teleological judgment are merely two manifestations of the same antinomy.96

Furthermore, since the antinomy of teleological judgment, along with its solution, applies not only to objective but also to subjective purposiveness of nature, it clearly applies, a fortiori, to nature's subjective purposiveness as judged aesthetically, i.e., to nature's "purposiveness without a purpose."97 For, this purposiveness too implies a contingency, while yet, as a purposiveness of nature, it also implies necessity; hence it too can be thought without contradiction only if we have recourse to the idea of a supersensible intuition as necessitating the particular. Indeed, when Kant implies that the antinomy of aesthetic judgment and the antinomy of teleological judgment are merely manifestations of one antinomy, he calls that one antinomy an antinomy of reason concerning aesthetic judgment (Ak. 345).

We are now ready to solve Problem I (see above, lxii–lxiii), which concerns the mysterious switch that Kant, in solving the antinomy of aesthetic judgment, makes from the concept of nature's subjective purposiveness to the concept of the supersensible basis of that same purposiveness. Nature's subjective purposiveness is the indeterminate form (or "lawfulness," i.e., regularity or order: see lvi) that nature has in the particular; and the indeterminate concept of this purposiveness is the indeterminate concept of that form of the particular. But this concept is contradictory (because of the antinomy) unless we think of this purposive form as necessitated (a priori) by an intellectual intuition. Moreover, just as our a priori concepts and intuitions are the forms that we give to all objects of appearance, so the purposive form that would be necessitated by this intellectual intuition would simply be that intuition. (As this form already includes all the particular, the particular would not be attributable to any "matter," whereas in our intuition the particular is found in the matter that is given to us in sensation.) Hence, according to our indeterminate concept of this supersensible intuition, the world in itself would be the completely determinate form which that intellectual intuition is.98 (The intuitive understanding, which is merely the power of legislating the form that this intuition is, would not itself be but would only "have" that form, just as our understanding has, rather than is, the form consisting of all the categories taken together.) Because, then, in order to think of nature's subjective purposiveness without contradicting ourselves we must think of this form as being identical with the form that such an intellectual intuition would be, and because this intellectual intuition is thought of as the supersensible basis of nature's subjective purposiveness, we can see how the concept of nature's subjective purposiveness is indeed equivalent to the concept of the supersensible basis of that same purposiveness: although the two concepts are not synonymous, because the one refers to the purposiveness and the other to the "basis" of that purposiveness, the "two" forms to which the two concepts refer "are" strictly identical. Now this equiva-

96The four antinomies of the first Critique are similarly referred to collectively as 'the antinomy' of pure reason: A 405 = B 432. See also the headings of § 69 (Ak. 386) and § 70 (Ak. 386), which refer to the antinomy of teleological judgment simply as 'antinomy of judgment.'

97See also above, n. 45.
lence between the two concepts would already suffice to give some justification to Kant's switch from the one concept to the other; but the full justification lies in the fact that the concept of nature's subjectively purposive form is contradictory unless the switch is made.99 Thus Kant's solution of the antinomy of aesthetic judgment includes the solution of the antinomy of teleological judgment. Accordingly, in order for us to judge, without contradiction, an object as beautiful, this judgment must be taken to imply (now cognitively) that the object has the kind of form that only a supersensible understanding could have given it through its intellectual intuition.

Because the concept of nature's subjective purposiveness is indeterminate, it can be equated with the concept of the supersensible basis of that purposiveness only if the latter concept is indeterminate as well. Now in certain ways the concept that we human beings can form of such an intellectual intuition must indeed be indeterminate,100 despite the fact that we think of this intuition as one that would determine objects "completely." For we have no cognition of what all these determinations in their completeness are. (The concept of an intuitive understanding with its intellectual intuition is indeterminate in other ways as well: e.g., it tells us nothing whatsoever about a "being" that might "have" that understanding.) Hence our concept of the form that such an intellectual intuition would be and that an intuitive understanding would have is indeed indeterminate.101

99 We may well ask why Kant does not explain this equation in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, but simply takes it for granted when he mysteriously switches from the indeterminate concept of nature's subjective purposiveness to the indeterminate concept of the supersensible basis of that purposiveness. If he considered the explanation too long, he could at least have referred us to the antinomy of teleological judgment. Such a referral would not have made Kant's aesthetics dependent on his teleology; but perhaps it would somehow have offended against his idea of what the proper structure of the Critique of Judgment should be.

100 Even if not in all its details, as I shall explain in a moment.

101 As we have already seen in the context of Problem II (ixvi), for which I am about to offer a solution, Kant considers the supersensible basis of nature's subjective purposiveness to be the same supersensible as the supersensible substrate of both objects and subjects and the supersensible that "the concept of freedom contains practically"; this "same" supersensible is referred to in all these ways in the context of the solution to the antinomy of aesthetic judgment. Sometimes, however, still in that same context, Kant refers to it simply as the supersensible "within us" (see esp. Ak. 341). Now Kant does indeed identify this supersensible also with the "others." Does he emphasize "within us" because this is where "the" supersensible is somehow "closest" to us? Or does he do so because he considers the indeterminate harmony between imagination and understanding as such to be itself based on, and identical with, parts of that same intellectual intuition? If the form in a beautiful object of nature must be thought of as identical both with the form of that harmony and with the form that an intellectual intuition would be, it would indeed follow (even if our cognitive powers were not based on an intuitive understanding's intellectual intuition) that the form of the harmony between our imagination and understanding as such is (not in origin, but simply as that form) supersensible as well (despite the fact that these powers themselves are not supersensible any more than the beautiful object is).
The key to this mediation role of the concept of the supersensible basis of nature’s subjective purposiveness lies in the following three points: (1) by the solution of Problem I, this concept is equivalent to the concept of nature’s subjective purposiveness; (2) the concept of nature’s subjective purposiveness belongs to the power of judgment; and (3) the power of judgment is a function of understanding. From these three points it follows that our understanding must be able to think not only the concept of nature’s subjective purposiveness but also the concept of the supersensible basis of that purposiveness. Indeed, since even the concept of nature’s objective purposiveness must be thought as equivalent to (at least to certain details in) such a supersensible basis, our understanding must be able to think the concept of such a basis whenever it exercises its function of judging either kind of purposiveness in nature. Yet the concept of the supersensible basis we have been discussing, i.e., the concept of an intuitive understanding with its intellectual intuition, is a concept that only reason can think. For the very fact that our own understanding is not intuitive but discursive keeps it from being able to conceive of an intuitive understanding, i.e., an understanding that could legislate not merely the universal but the particular as well; in other words, our discursive understanding is incapable of conceiving of an understanding that legislates a “synthetic” universal, a whole that makes possible the character and combination of the parts (rather than the other way round, viz., a whole that is made possible by the character and combination of the parts, and hence made possible mechanically, as our understanding must conceive of wholes). (Ak. 407.) The best that our understanding can do in this regard is to conceive of the idea of a whole as making possible the character and combination of the parts (and hence the whole itself); in other words, the best our understanding can do is to conceive of this whole as produced, i.e., a purpose brought about by means of an intention, i.e., by means of an idea of the purpose (Ak. 407-08). Hence our understanding, because of its own peculiarity, can indeed think of another understanding as causing the particular (and its form), i.e., as determining it practically; but it cannot think of another understanding as legislating the particular, i.e., as determining it theoretically. Hence our understanding must think of the (subjectively or objectively) purposive form of the particular in nature by analogy with our own technically practical ability, i.e.,

our ability to produce objects through art102 (Ak. 397) by means of understanding and reason. Thus our understanding too thinks, in judgment’s concept of the (subjective or objective) purposiveness that nature has in its particular, a supersensible understanding; but it thinks this understanding as an intelligent cause of the world in terms of purposes. This (i.e., our understanding’s) concept of the supersensible basis of nature’s purposiveness is still indeterminate103 (and inadequate for cognition); yet, through the analogy with our technically practical ability, this concept is somewhat more determinate (has more content) than the concept of the intuitive understanding.

Because what enables our understanding to give some content (determination) to the concept of the supersensible basis of nature’s (subjective or objective) purposiveness is the analogy with our own technically practical ability, our understanding can go on to make further use of the same analogy. It can use this analogy to make some sense of the relation between mechanism and causation in terms of purposes, viz., by subordinating mechanism to that causality (Ak. 379, 422): once our understanding has conceived of the world with all its purposiveness as caused by some intelligence, it can go on to conceive of this intelligent cause as using mechanism, just as we human beings do, as the means to the purposes it pursues (Ak. 414, 390), “as an instrument, as it were” (Ak. 422). Moreover, our understanding can do this in different ways: in terms of occasionalism, in terms of the theory of preestablished harmony, and so on (Ak. 422-24).

It is important to realize, however, that in thus subordinating the principle of mechanism to the principle of (subjective or objective) purposiveness, understanding does not itself resolve the antinomy between mechanistic necessity and the contingency in the purposive form of the particular. When Kant says that no conflict arises if our power of judgment (and hence our understanding) uses both the mechanistic and the teleological principles because these two ways of explaining do not contradict each other (Ak. 409), he takes as under-

102In the broad sense of this term, which includes craft.
103E.g., the concept in no way implies that the “intelligent cause” has the properties, esp. the moral properties, that would qualify it as a “God.”
stood the addition: *subject to the solution of the antinomy* of teleological judgment by which the “contingency” in the form of the particular is thought of as merely a seeming contingency; Kant is not saying that merely *subordinating* the principle of mechanism to the principle of purposiveness would *itself* remove the conflict between the two, as plainly it would not. Hence this subordination cannot possibly be, as McFarland takes it to be, Kant’s solution to the antinomy of teleological judgment. Our understanding and power of judgment can without contradiction use the two principles (even in the very same contexts), not because the two principles can be subordinated to each other, nor because they are regulative (see above, lxxviii–xc), but because our understanding and power of judgment are *aware that reason* has solved the antinomy by means of the idea of an intuitive understanding with its intellectual intuition. Understanding and judgment themselves are incapable of thinking of the order in nature’s particular, which to them seems purposive, as in fact involving necessity; hence as far as they are concerned the particular laws covering that order *do not* have genuine (i.e., apodeictic) necessity, but are only “rules” (Ak. 391, 360). Such rules, though “lawful” (Ak. 359), are still contingent; the only necessity they can involve would be a *practical* necessity (cf. Ak. 172, 450).

Now, we saw a moment ago that our understanding’s concept of an intelligent cause of the world is somewhat more determinate than the concept of an intuitive understanding as legislator of the purposive form of nature. But it is *also* somewhat more determinate than the concept of the supersensible as it was left by the *Critique of Pure Reason*, viz., the concept of the supersensible as mere “basis” (substrate) of nature; for this latter concept says nothing whatsoever as to what this supersensible substrate includes. Does it include only a nature in itself, or also an “intelligence” (understanding) as “cause” of that nature in itself in terms of “purposes”? It is true that even the addition of these further predicates leaves the concept of the supersensible indeterminate: *How much* understanding should we conceive that cause of nature in itself as having? *How great* should we conceive its might to be (to affect that nature in itself)? Should we even conceive of this understanding as a *single* being rather than several? (Ak. 480.) Yet those further predicates do suffice to make that completely indeterminate concept of the “supersensible” determinable: the concept can now be determined *practically*, morally, by reason. For while we could not intelligibly have described a mere (utterly indeterminate) “supersensible basis of nature” in moral terms, viz., as being a “nature in itself created, in terms of the final purpose, by a God having all the divine perfections,” we certainly can intelligibly describe in such terms a nature in itself created, as an intentional purpose, by an intelligent cause. In other words, we can now think of this cause as *moral author* of the world by reference to the *final* purpose, and hence we can also think of nature as being forced by this moral author to cooperate with our attempt to achieve the final purpose. The moral argument for the existence of God was indeed sufficient to determine the concept of the supersensible in this way; but it is judgment’s concept, as thought by reason but then adapted by understanding, of the supersensible basis of nature’s purposive order which made that determination possible and thus prepared us for that moral argument.

The solution to Problem II is therefore this. The antinomy of teleological judgment (which applies to aesthetic judgment and its antinomy as well) gives rise, in its solution, to the concept of the supersensible basis of nature’s (subjective or objective) purposiveness. The concept of the supersensible basis of nature’s purposiveness is the concept of an intuitive understanding with its intellectual intuition; but our understanding, unable to think the concept of an intuitive understanding, instead thinks of the supersensible basis of nature’s purposiveness as an intelligent cause of the world in terms of purposes. The concept of an intelligent cause of the world in terms of purposes makes determinable the concept of the supersensible as mere basis of nature (as this latter concept arises from the antinomies of the *Critique of Pure Reason*), and thus “mediates” between this latter concept and the concept of the supersensible which is determined practically and

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104Kant’s *Concept of Teleology*: 127–29.

105And they can involve even a practical “necessity” only after the supersensible causality has been determined further as a *moral* cause that acts in terms of the moral law (which is a necessary law). Such a supersensible moral cause, a God, would have a “holy” will, a will incapable of acting on maxims that conflict with the moral law (*Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 32). Perhaps this is the necessity Kant has in mind when, occasionally (e.g., at Ak. 183), he speaks of particular laws as “necessary” even as a result of causation rather than theoretical legislation.
contained in the idea of freedom (this concept arises from the antinomy of the *Critique of Practical Reason*). Through this mediation judgment's concept of the supersensible basis of nature's (subjective as well as objective) purposiveness (as equivalent to the concept of that purposiveness itself) unites the "three" supersensibles in one. For the substrate of nature was merely made determinate enough to be nature in itself as the "purpose" brought about by an intelligent cause, and then to be nature in itself as caused by a moral author, a God. Hence, in this way, the *Critique of Judgment* mediates between the other two *Critiques* and thus unites the three *Critiques* in the critical system.

We are now in a position to solve Problem III (see above, lxiv). This problem was Kant's assertion that what makes the concept of nature's purposiveness "suitable" for its mediation role is "the spontaneity in the play of the cognitive powers, whose harmony with each other contains the basis of [the] pleasure [that we feel in judging the beautiful]" (Ak. 197). Kant also claims, similarly, that in the *Critique of Judgment* the "essential" part is the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* (Ak. 193). He makes this claim because, whereas teleological judgments go beyond the power of judgment and also bring in reason with its determinate concepts of purposes, judgments of taste are based solely on reflection and hence solely on the power of judgment (Ak. 193-94). By the same token, Kant says that only the power of aesthetic judgment is a "special" power (Ak. 194); this is why, when Kant says that apart from the antinomies of the first and second *Critiques* there is, in the *Critique of Judgment*, "an" (i.e., one) antinomy, he calls that one antinomy (as I have already indicated) an antinomy of reason "for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure," an antinomy "concerning the aesthetic use of judgment" (Ak. 345).

None of these claims imply that teleological judgment plays no role in the mediation. Not only are teleological judgments reflective and hence based, as judgments of taste are, on judgment's indeterminate concept of nature's subjective purposiveness, but—as we have seen—even the determinate concept used in a teleological judgment, viz., the concept of objective natural purposiveness (in natural purposes) must, if it is not to be contradictory, be equated with the concept of the supersensible basis of this purposiveness; and this latter concept can then be adapted by our understanding, as discussed above, and thus play its mediation role. Why, then, does the fact that teleological judgments bring in reason with its determinate concepts of purposes make them less "suitable" for the mediation than judgments of taste are?

First of all, although this mediation is a mediation among the "supersensibles," it is just as much—as we saw (lxxvi-bccxvi)—a mediation among our mental powers, including the higher cognitive (and legislative) powers. The mediation in its entirety is a mediation among these powers and among the "worlds" of appearance with which these powers deal along with the supersensible substrates of these "worlds." Specifically, the power of judgment is to mediate between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom. But judgment's concept of nature's subjective purposiveness is especially "suitable" for mediating between these two realms only if no objective purposiveness (purposiveness with a purpose) has been based on it, i.e., only if the subjective purposiveness is merely subjective, a purposiveness without a purpose, and hence a purposiveness as judged aesthetically. For only such purposiveness without a purpose is "analogous" to or "symbolic" of the supersensible form that the moral law enjoins us to impose on nature (see Ak. 353, 356, and above, xliii). What makes this purposiveness analogous to supersensible (moral) form is that, since it involves no determinate concept of a natural purpose with its objective (and material: see lxxvii) purposiveness, it is a purely formal and free purposiveness. It is formal, as the moral law is formal; it is free, as our will is free to obey or disobey the moral law (cf. Ak. 354). Moreover, the "play" in which our cognitive powers are when we judge subjective purposiveness aesthetically is "spontaneous"; i.e., this play is "active" inasmuch as it sustains itself (Ak. 313, 222, and cf. 220), and in this respect it is again similar to our will's freedom, which is active by being a special causality.

This same special mediation role of aesthetic reflective judgment manifests itself in our consciousness. In judgments of taste we are conscious nonconceptually (i.e., without a [determinate] concept) of the free harmonious play of imagination and understanding; this nonconceptual consciousness is the feeling of pleasure we have in a judgment of taste. Because of the link, just described, between this play and the moral law as well as our freedom, our nonconceptual consciousness of this play is linked to moral feeling (see xli), i.e., respect for the moral law together with our awareness that we have the freedom we need in order to carry it out. This is why the
spontaneity in the play of the cognitive powers, as accompanied by our awareness of it, can lead to moral feeling and thus can “promote” the mind’s “receptivity” for moral feeling (Ak. 197, 356).

In conclusion, then, it is indeed the power of judgment, but above all the aesthetic power of judgment, i.e., the power of judgment as unaided by reason, that is responsible for the mediation between the “world” of the first Critique and the “world” of the second Critique by which the three Critiques come to form a system.

In this introduction, on the whole, I have had to limit myself to an explanation of the Critique of Judgment and to leave aside criticism. I must now make an exception and raise one problem beyond the three already discussed. This is a problem for which I can see no solution that does not create other serious trouble for Kant’s doctrines. I must raise the problem because it concerns the key concept of the Critique of Judgment, viz., the concept of nature’s (subjective or objective) purposiveness, as we must think this concept in accordance with the solution to the antinomy of teleological judgment.

There is, I am afraid, a conflict between the antinomy of teleological judgment and the third antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason; the two give rise, as it were, to an “antinomy between antinomies.”

In order for the antinomy of teleological judgment to work, i.e., to be an antinomy at all, the necessity in nature must be so strict as to contradict the contingency in the form of nature’s particular unless we remove the contingency by solving the antinomy. For if the necessity were less strict than that, then we would not need, as solution of the antinomy, the idea of an intuitive understanding that legislates the form of the particular and thus makes it, too, strictly necessary; rather, we could then interpret the form of the particular (as our mere understanding with its “peculiarity” is forced to do: see xcix-ccix) in practical terms, and hence as having only the lawfulness of a “rule” that is still contingent (c).

Now the conflict that Kant presents in the third antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason is a very similar conflict, viz., a conflict between the necessity in nature and our freedom (which again implies contingency in terms of natural laws) to affect nature in alternative ways. Yet Kant does not solve that antinomy as he solves the antinomy of teleological judgment: he does not say that we must think of our practical freedom as being only a seeming freedom and as in fact being a theoretical necessity due to the legislation of some higher and intuitive understanding with its intellectual intuition. Instead, his solution of that antinomy consists in pointing out that we can attribute the necessity to nature as mere appearance and still also think of our freedom as a supersensible (noumenal) causality, although a supersensible causality that can nevertheless affect nature as appearance in alternative ways. If the necessity in nature is strict enough for the antinomy of teleological judgment to arise at all, and if our freedom with its contingency can be reconciled, as just described, with that strict necessity despite having to manifest itself in that nature as appearance with its necessity, why should the antinomy of teleological judgment require a solution that is so different? Why could we not solve it by thinking, not a supersensible understanding that is intuitive and hence removes the contingency in the particular, but a supersensible understanding that determines things only practically and hence leaves the contingency intact? We could then go on to claim, as Kant does in the case of freedom, that such a supersensible contingency, even as affecting the world as appearance, “does not conflict” with the mentioned strict necessity. The trouble with such an alternative “solution” to the antinomy of teleological judgment is, of course, that it does not seem to work; for if the world as appearance can be affected in alternative ways, how can it still involve strict necessity? By the same token, Kant’s solution to the third antinomy of the first Critique is in the same trouble if our freedom, as something to be manifested in the world as appearance, must indeed be reconciled with such a strict necessity.106 It seems, therefore, that if the third antinomy is to be capable of being solved, and if our freedom is not to be denied, then the necessity in nature cannot be allowed to be a strict necessity but must be weakened in some way.

One way to weaken the necessity in nature is to make regulative, rather than constitutive, not only the idea of freedom (which from the theoretical point of view taken by the first Critique is already regulative) but the categories as well, since it is on them that nature’s mechanism

with its necessity is based. One serious problem with such a move is that it would undermine the first Critique, which could no longer support any claim to propositions that are synthetic and yet a priori and necessary (cf. n. 107). But a far worse problem is that such a

This is how Beck proposes to remove the difficulty with Kant’s solution to the third antinomy. (Ibid., 192-94.) Beck’s suggestion has been developed further by Butts. Butts argues that Kant himself makes the categories regulative in the first Critique. (Kant and the Double Government Methodology, esp. 261-63.) It seems to me, however, that this view involves at least the following four major difficulties. First, it flies in the face of Kant’s entire immanent metaphysics as developed in the Analytic. (Butts emphasizes Kant’s epistemology, but acknowledges that it entails an immanent or “local” ontology: ibid., 243, 225.) Second, it undermines Kant’s epistemology, which tries to show that there are (theoretical) synthetic judgments that are indeed a priori and necessary, and are not merely considered to be so. Third, the evidence Butts offers for his view can easily be interpreted in a different way, one that does not involve any of the difficulties I am mentioning here: as far as I can see, none of the citations given by Butts show that Kant is making regulative anything but the ideas of reason. That holds even for the passage that Butts seems to consider (Ibid., 261) his most important piece of evidence (viz., A 586-82 = B 589-90): In discussing the fourth antinomy, Kant does indeed include, as the initial part of the regulative principle of reason, a brief characterization of the phenomenal world in categorial terms. Yet the principle then continues in nothing but the familiar regulative terms: it seeks to regulate our investigation of nature, by telling us (as Kant tells us so often), roughly, that we should try to account for things in mechanical terms as far as we can and not appeal too hastily to causes beyond nature.

Why, then, should we assume that the initial instruction to regard the phenomenal world first of all in categorial terms is more than a reminder not to forget that the phenomenal world is indeed mechanistic? After all, a methodology (“regulation”) can be based on an ontology, as Butts himself points out (Ibid., 226, and cf. 241). The fourth difficulty with Butts’ view strikes me as even more serious than the mentioned three: making the categories regulative does not in fact solve the third antinomy. For even if both the idea of freedom and the concept of causal necessity are regulative, I still cannot without contradiction think them together, i.e., in the same context. And yet I must think them together: for though I can study nature without thinking of freedom, I cannot think about freedom without bringing in nature, because it is in nature that my free will is to make a difference, as Kant points out again and again (e.g., in the Critique of Judgment, at Ak. 176 and 196). (We can of course choose to think of only one half of the antinomy at a time; but that holds even for all genuine contradictions and does not begin to remove the contradiction.) I find it interesting that after Butts construes Kant’s solution of the antinomy of teleological judgment along the same lines as he does the third antinomy of the first Critique (see above, n. 90), he himself attributes to Kant the view that adopting even the maxims of mechanism and teleology would not be “consistent” (Ibid., 279) unless we invoke the supersensible (which, like McFarland [see above, xcii-c], he takes to be an intelligent cause of the world). Yet all that Butts says about this remaining conflict between the two regulative principles, along with Kant’s alleged solution of it, is that it “does no harm” to Kant’s “essential position on teleology” (Ibid., 278), as Butts has interpreted that position.

sacrifice would not even help. For just as construing the principle of mechanism and the teleological principle as regulative does not resolve the conflict between them and hence cannot solve the antinomy of teleological judgment (see lxxxviii-xc), so making the categories regulative would still leave them in conflict with a regulative principle of freedom. For we cannot even think of (categorical) necessity together with the contingency implied in the concept of freedom (cf. n. 107), since the two thoughts still contradict and hence cancel each other.

A less radical way to weaken the necessity in nature’s mechanism would be the following. We might leave the categories constitutive, determinative, and strictly necessary, including the category on which mechanism is based above all, viz., the category of cause and effect; we might then go on to weaken just what the principle of causality, as based on that category, says with that strict necessity. According to that principle, every event must have “its” (efficient) cause (Ak. 183), though the principle does not determine what that cause is. We could weaken that principle to this: Every event has some (efficient) cause, and not only does the principle not determine what that cause is, but the cause need not even be the same in each otherwise similar event.

It is at least possible that Kant has in mind this weak version of the causal principle (rather than merely the denial that the causal principle determines what causes what) when he says such things as that understanding does not determine the particular (Ak. 179, 185, 407), or that “nature, considered as mere mechanism, could have structured itself differently in a thousand ways” (Ak. 360).108

Weakening the principle of causality in this way (or construing Kant as defending only this weaker principle) has a twofold major advantage: allowing individual links in (unbroken) chains of efficient causes to vary leaves some contingency; hence it leaves room for freedom as well as for nature’s purposiveness. It would allow us to think of nature’s purposiveness as produced by an intelligent cause of the world; and it would allow us to think of our will as a free causality. Indeed, this free causality could, in obedience to the moral law, produce purposive order in nature in precisely those contexts where

108Henry E. Allison has argued, on the basis of more such textual evidence, that Kant does indeed intend his causal principle to say no more than this: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983), 216-34, esp. 216 and 229. Cf. also Lewis White Beck’s “A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant,” in his Essays on Kant and Hume (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 111-29.
nature, including nature within ourselves, does not already have it but is seriously defective in ways that go against the moral law. Hence we could think of nature as governed practically in two ways: as governed by a moral God and as governed by human beings in those respects in which that God has chosen to leave the world imperfect and improvable by us. Moreover, even apart from such divine and human action directed toward making the world more "purposive" (orderly), the described variability that the weakened causal principle would permit would not make nature chaotic. For the variations among the efficient causes could still be (as, on Kant's view, particular causes already are) governed by particular laws; the variations would be regularities involving some contingency (Ak. 404). Hence we can still, on this view, predict eclipses, or human behavior, with a "certainty" proportionate to this "lawfulness." Where regularities are already present, we could ascribe them to God; we would do so especially in the case of organisms, less so in the case of nature as a whole, and least in the case of "contrapurpose" arrangements in nature, i.e., whatever manifests least order and is most in conflict with the idea of nature as a system of purposes subordinated to the final purpose. Where such regularities are absent but are required morally, our free will could "initiate" causal series in nature in the sense of determining what sort of efficient cause is to appear in this or that position in certain chains of efficient causes.

Unfortunately, weakening the causal principle in this way has at least three major disadvantages as well. First, it does more than "solve" Kant's third antimony: it destroys it. Kant could indeed suggest a seeming contradiction between categorial necessity and freedom and then point out that the causal principle is weak enough to allow for freedom; but he could no longer use the antimony to get to anything supersensible (he then would have to rely on other routes). Second, weakening the causal principle as described would also destroy the antinomy of teleological judgment and with it another route to the supersensible: to the supersensible as an intuitive understanding with its intellectual intuition (the contingency in the particular would remain rather than be considered as merely a "seeming" one); to the supersensible as an intelligent cause of the world; and to the supersensible basis of nature's purposiveness as mediator between other "supersensibles" (if indeed there would be any supersensibles left between which to mediate) and as "needed" to solve the antinomy of aesthetic judgment. By the same token, if we say that Kant already considers his causal principle to be of this weaker sort, we saddle him with the difficulty of having set up "antinomies" where none can arise and of having introduced supersensibles without any justification. Moreover, third, the "antinomy between antinomies," i.e., the conflict between the antinomy of teleological judgment and the third antinomy of the first Critique, as Kant presents and handles these antinomies, would also remain a problem.

\[109\text{Critique of Practical Reason, Ak. V, 99; and cf. the Critique of Pure Reason, A 549-50 = B 577-78.}\]
CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

Immanuel Kant

Kritik der Urteilskraft

Immanuel Kant
Our ability to cognize from a priori principles may be called pure reason, and the general inquiry into the possibility and bounds of such cognition may be called critique of pure reason. These terms are appropriate even if, as I did in my Critique of Pure Reason, we mean by this power [Vermögen] only reason in its theoretical use, without yet seeking to investigate what ability [Vermögen] and what special principles it may have as practical reason. A critique of pure reason, in this narrow sense, is concerned merely with our ability to

\[1\] This is the full title of the Preface as it appeared in the second edition (1793), on which the Akademie edition is based.

\[2\] Erkenntnis. In Kant's philosophy, 'cognition' most often refers to the process of acquiring knowledge or to the product of this process; but there is also a practical (as opposed to theoretical) cognition, and most practical cognition (e., that of the existence of God), is not (and does not yield) Wissen (knowledge). See Ak. 475. Cf. also Ak. 174-76. See also the Translator's Introduction, xl-xlxi.

\[3\] I am using 'power,' rather than 'faculty,' in order to disassociate Kant's theory (of cognition, desire, etc.) from the traditional faculty psychology: i.e., I am trying to avoid deifying the Kantian powers (which are mere abilities), in other words, avoid turning them into psychological entities such as compartments, sources, or agencies 'in' the mind. Hence, in this translation, expressions like 'the power of judgment,' 'the power of thought,' 'the power of concepts,' 'the power of desire,' and so on, always refer to an ability (a "faculty" in that sense). In such expressions, 'power' is never used to mean anything like strength or forcefulness (of concepts, desire, and so on).

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Man kann das Vermögen der Erkenntnis aus Prinzipien a priori die reine Vernunft, und die Untersuchung der Möglichkeit und Grenzen derselben überhaupt die Kritik der reinen Vernunft nennen; ob man gleich unter diesem Vermögen nur die Vernunft in ihrem theoretischen Gebrauche versteht, wie es auch in dem ersten Werke unter jener Benennung geschehen ist, ohne noch ihr Vermögen, als praktische Vernunft, nach ihren besonderen Prinzipien in Untersuchung ziehen zu wollen. Jene geht alsdann bloß auf unser Vermögen,

\[1\] Zusatz von B u. C. ~
cognize things a priori. Hence it deals only with the [theoretical] *cognitive power*, to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and of the power of desire; and among the cognitive powers it deals with the *understanding* as governed by its a priori principles, to the exclusion of *judgment* as well as *reason* (both of which are also powers involved in theoretical cognition). The understanding is singled out in this way because, as that critique discovers, it is the only one among the cognitive powers capable of providing principles of cognition that are constitutive [rather than merely regulative] a priori. The critique [discovers this as it] inspects every one of the cognitive powers to decide what each has [in fact] contributed from its own roots to the cognition we actually possess, [as distinguished from] whatever it might pretend to have contributed to it. Nothing, it turns out, [passes this inspection] except what the *understanding* [through its a priori concepts] prescribes a priori as a law to nature, as the sum total of appearances (whose form is also given a priori). All other pure concepts the critique relegates to the ideas, which are transcendent for our theoretical cognitive power, though that certainly does not make them useless or dispensable, since they serve as regulative principles: they serve, in part, to restrain the understanding's arrogant claims, namely, that (since it can state a priori the conditions for the possibility of all things it can cognize) it has thereby circumscribed the area within which all things in general are possible; in part, they serve to guide the understanding, in its contemplation of nature, by a principle of completeness—though the understanding cannot attain this completeness—and so further the final aim of all cognition.5

4 *Urteilskraft*, literally 'power of judgment.' Since this "power" is nothing more than our ability to judge (cf. Kant's translation of 'Urteilskraft' with Latin 'judicium': Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Ak. VII, 199). 'power of will be omitted where it may be regarded as understood and where there is no confusing reference to an individual judgment in the same context. ('Urteil' by itself, unlike 'judgment,' can refer only to an individual judgment.) This is one of several cases where I have revised the opinions on translation which I expressed in a paper whose main purpose was to defend my rendering of one key term: "How to Render Zweckmäßigkeit in Kant's Third Critique," in Interpreting Kant, ed. Moltke S. Gram (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1982).]

5[Concerning the "regulative use of the ideas of pure reason," see the Critique of Pure Reason. A 642-68 B 670-96.]

Dinge a priori zu erkennen; und beschäftigt sich also nur mit dem Erkenntnisvermögen, mit Ausschluss des Gefühls der Lust und Unlust und des Begehrensvermögens; und unter den Erkenntnisvermögen mit dem Verstande nach seinen Prinzipien a priori, mit Ausschluss der Urteilskraft || und der Vernunft (als zum theoretischen Erkenntnis gleichfalls gehörigen Vermögen), weil es sich in dem Fortgange findet, daß kein anderes Erkenntnisvermögen, als der Verstand, konstitutive Erkenntnisperspizien a priori an die Hand geben kann. Die Kritik also, welche sie insgesamt, nach dem Anteile, den jedes der anderen an dem baren Besitz der Erkenntnis aus eigener Wurzel zu haben vorgeben möchte, sichtet, läßt nichts übrig, als was der Verstand a priori als Gesetz für die Natur, als den Inbegriff von Erscheinungen (deren Form eben sowohl a priori gegeben ist), vorschreibt, verweiset aber alle andere reinen Begriffe unter die Ideen, die für unser theoretisches Erkenntnisvermögen überschwenglich, dabei aber doch nicht etwa unnütz oder entbehrlich sind, sondern als regulative Prinzipien dienen: teils die besorgten Anmaßungen des Verstandes, als ob er (indem er a priori die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit aller Dinge, die er erkennen kann, anzugeben vermag) dadurch auch die Möglichkeit aller Dinge überhaupt in diesen Grenzen beschlossen habe, zurück zu halten, teils um ihn selbst in der Betrachtung der Natur nach einem Prinzip der Vollständigkeit, wiewohl er sie nie | erfreilen kann, zu leiten, und dadurch die Endabsicht alles Erkenntnisses zu befördern.

* A: Hand geben kann: so daß die Kritik, welche ... sichtet, nichts übrig läßt, als was ... als Inbegriff ... vorschreibt, alle andere reinen Begriffe aber unter die Ideen verweist, die
die. 

[B III, IV | A III, IV]
So it was actually the understanding, which has its own domain as a cognitive power insofar as it contains principles of cognition that are constitutive a priori, which the critique that we all call the critique of pure reason was to make the secure and sole possessor [of that domain] against all other competitors. Similarly reason, which does not contain any constitutive a priori principles except [those] for the power of desire, was given possession [of its domain] by the critique of practical reason.

The present critique, the critique of judgment, will deal with the following questions: Does judgment, which in the order of our [specific] cognitive powers is a mediating link between understanding and reason, 6 also have a priori principles of its own? Are these principles constitutive, or are they merely regulative (in which case they would fail to prove [that judgment has] a domain of its own)? Does judgment give the rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, the mediating link between the cognitive power [in general] and the power of desire? (just as the understanding prescribes laws a priori to the cognitive power and reason to the power of desire)?

A critique of pure reason, i.e., of our ability to judge according to a priori principles, would be incomplete if it failed to include, as a special part, a treatment of judgment, which, since it is a cognitive power, also lays claim to a priori principles; judgment must be treated, in a special part of the critique, even if, in a system of pure philosophy, its principles are not such that they can form a special part between theoretical and practical philosophy, but may be annexed to one or the other as needed. For if a system of pure philosophy, under the general title metaphysics, is to be achieved some day (to accomplish this quite completely is both possible and of the utmost importance for our use of reason in all contexts), the critique must already have explored the terrain supporting this edifice, to the depth at which lies the first foundation of our power of principles independent of experience, so that no part of the edifice may give way, which would inevitably result in the collapse of the whole.

6(Cf. Ak. 177.)
7(Cf. Ak. 178.)

Es war also eigentlich der Verstand, der sein eigenes Gebiet und zwar im Erkenntnisvermögen hat, sofern er konstitutive Erkenntnisprinzipien a priori enthält, welcher durch die im allgemeinen so benannte Kritik der reinen Vernunft gegen alle übrige Kompetenten in sicheren aber einzigen 4 Besitz gesetzt werden sollte. Eben so ist der Verunft, welche zwingend als lediglich in Ansehung des Begriffsvermögens konstitutive Prinzipien a priori enthält, in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft ihr Besitz an- gewiesen worden.

Ob nun die Urteilskraft, die in der Ordnung unserer Erkenntnisvermögen zwischen dem Verstande und der Verunft ein Mittelglied ausmacht, auch für sich Prinzipien a priori habe; ob diese konstitutiv oder bloß regulativ sind (und also kein eigenes Gebiet beweisen), und ob sie dem Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, als dem Mittelgliede zwischen dem Erkenntnisvermögen und Begriffsvermögen (eben so, wie der Verstand dem ersteren, die Vernunft aber dem letzteren a priori Gesetze vor ihnen), a priori die Regel geben; das ist es, womit sich gegenwärtige Kritik der Urteilskraft beschäftigt.

Eine Kritik der reinen Vernunft, d. h. unseres Vermögens, nach Prinzipien a priori zu urteilen, würde unvollständig sein, wenn die der Urteilskraft, welche für sich als Erkenntnisvermögen darauf auch Anspruch macht, nicht als ein besonderer Teil derselben abgehandelt würde; obgleich ihre Prinzipien in einem System der reinen Philosophie keinen besonderen Teil derseits abgehandelt würde, sondern im Notfalle jedem von beiden gelegentlich angeschlossen werden können. Denn, wenn ein solches System, unter dem allgemeinen Namen der Metaphysik einmal zu Stande kommen soll (welches ganz vollständig zu bewerkstelligen möglich und für den Gebrauch der Vernunft in aller Beziehung höchst wichtig ist); so muß die Kritik die Bogen zu diesem Gebäude vorher so tief, als die erste Grundlage des Vermögens von der Erfahrung unabhängig Prinzipien liegt, erforscht haben, damit es nicht an irgend einem Teile sinkhe, welches den Eintritt des Ganzen unvermeidlich nach sich ziehen würde.

1 Akad.-Aug.: ,alleiniger e. = 2 A: ,vorschrift e.

B V, VI | A V, VI
On the other hand, the nature of the power of judgment (whose correct use is so necessary and universally required that this power is just what we mean by sound understanding) is such that an attempt to discover a principle of its own must plainly be accompanied by great difficulties (and it must contain some principle a priori, since otherwise, despite being a distinct cognitive power, it would not be subject even to the most ordinary critique): for this principle must, nevertheless, not be derived from a priori concepts, since these belong to the understanding and judgment only applies them. So judgment itself must provide a concept, a concept through which we do not actually cognize anything but which only serves as a rule for the power of judgment itself — but not as an objective rule, to which it could adapt its judgment, since then we would need another power of judgment in order to decide whether or not the judgment is a case of that rule.\[8\]

This perplexity about a principle (whether subjective or objective) arises mainly in those judgments [Beurteilungen],\[9\] called aesthetic, which concern the beautiful and the sublime in nature or in art. And yet a critical inquiry [in search] of a principle of judgment in them is the most important part of a critique of this power. For though these judgments do not by themselves contribute anything whatever to our cognition of things, they still belong to the cognitive power alone and prove a direct relation of this power to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure according to some a priori principle, without there being any confusion of this principle with the one that can be the basis determining the power of desire, since that power has its a priori principles in concepts of reason. [The fact that this

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\[8\] Cf. On the Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory but Is Inadequate for Practice (1795), Ak. VIII, 275, and the Anthropology, Ak. VII, 199.

\[9\] In one place (Ak. 211’), Kant makes a distinction between Beurteilung and Urteil (judgment), using the first term to stand for a reflective judgment. But he does not repeat this distinction anywhere else, nor does he consistently adhere to it. The reason for this seems to be that in German grammar adding 'be' to the intransitive 'urteilen' simply turns it into the transitive 'beurteilen'. By the same token, it is misleading to use 'to judge' (which is both transitive and intransitive) for 'beurteilen' but a different term for 'beurteilen', especially such a term as 'to estimate,' or 'to assess,' or 'to appraise,' all of which tend to imply evaluation rather than just reflection. (The context tells us when the judging is reflective.)
aesthetic judging is directly referred to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure distinguishes it from a certain kind of logical judging of nature: when experience manifests in things a lawfulness that understanding's concept of the sensible is no longer adequate to [help us] understand or explain, judgment can find within itself a principle that refers the natural thing to the unrecognizable super-sensible, though judgment must use this principle for cognizing nature only in relation to itself. In these cases such an a priori principle can and must indeed be employed if we are to cognize the beings in the world, and it also opens up prospects advantageous to practical reason. Yet here the principle has no direct relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, while it is precisely this relation which gives rise to that puzzle regarding judgment's principle, which necessitates a special division for this power in the critique: for the [mentioned kind of] logical judging according to concepts (from which no direct inference can ever be drawn to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure) could at most have formed an appendix, including a critical restriction on such judging, to the theoretical part of philosophy.

Since this inquiry into our power of taste, which is the aesthetic power of judgment, has a transcendental aim, rather than the aim to [help] form and cultivate taste (since this will continue to proceed, as it has in the past, even if no such investigations are made), I would like to think that it will be judged leniently as regards its deficiency for the latter purpose. As a transcendental inquiry, however, it must be prepared to face the strictest examination. Yet even here, given how difficult it is to solve a problem that nature has made so involved, I hope to be excused if my solution contains a certain amount of obscurity, not altogether avoidable, as long as I have established clearly enough that the principle has been stated correctly. [I say this because] the way in which I have derived from that principle this phenomenon, viz., judgment, may fall short of the clarity we are entitled to demand elsewhere, namely, where we deal with cognition according to concepts, and which I do believe I have achieved in the second part of this work. 10

With this, then, I conclude my entire critical enterprise. I shall

Was aber die logische 1 Beurteilung der Natur anbelangt, da, wo die Erfahrung eine Gesetzmaßigkeit an Dingen aufstellt, welche zu verstehen oder zu erklären der allgemeine Verstandesbegriff vom Sinnlichen nicht mehr zulässt, und die Urteilskraft aus sich selbst ein Prinzip der Beziehung des Naturdinges auf das vorwirkbare Übersinnliche nehmen kann, es auch in Absicht auf sich selbst zum Erkenntnis der Natur brauchen muß, da kann und muß ein solches Prinzip a priori zwar zum Erkenntnis der Weltwesen ange- wendet || werden, und eröffnet zugleich Aussichten, die für die praktische Vernunft vorteilhaft sind: aber es hat keine unmittelbare Beziehung auf das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, die gerade das Rätselhafte in dem Prinzip der Urteils- kraft ist, welches eine besondere Abteilung in der Kritik für dieses Vermögen notwendig macht, da die logische Beur- teilung nach Begriffen (aus welchen niemals eine unmittel- bare Folgerung auf das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust gezogen werden kann) allenfalls dem theoretischen Teile der Philo- sophie, samt einer kritischen Einschränkung derselben, hätte angehängt werden können.

Da die Untersuchung des Geschmacksvermögens, als ästhetischer Urteilskraft, hier nicht zur Bildung und Kultur des Geschmacks (denn diese wird auch ohne alle solche Nachforschungen, wie bisher, so fernerhin, ihren Gang nehmen), sondern bloß in transcendentaler Absicht angestellt wird: so wird sie, wie ich mir schmeichle, in Ansehung der Mangelhaftigkeit des Zwecks auch mit Nachsicht beurteilt werden. Was aber die letztere Absicht betrifft, so muß sie sich auf die strenge Prüfung gefaßt machen. Aber auch da kann die große Schwierigkeit, ein Problem, welches die Na- tur so verwickelt hat, aufzulösen, einiger nicht || ganz zu vermeidenden Dunkelheit in der Auflösung desselben, wie ich hoffe, zur Entschuldigung dienen, wenn nur, daß das Prinzip richtig angegeben worden, klar genug dargetan ist; gesetzt, die Art, das Phänomen der Urteilskraft davon ab- zuzeilen, habe nicht alle Deutlichkeit, die man anderer- wärts, nämlich von einem Erkenntnis nach Begriffen, mit Recht fordern kann, die ich auch im zweiten Teil dieses Werks er- reicht zu haben glaube.

Römisch endlich, ich also mein ganzes kritisches Geschäft.

10 That is, in the Critique of Teleological Judgment.
proceed without delay to the doctrinal one, in order to snatch from
my advancing years what time may yet be somewhat favorable to the
task. It goes without saying that judgment will have no special part in
doctrine, since in the case of this power critique takes the place of
theory. Rather, in accordance with the division of philosophy, and of
pure philosophy, into a theoretical and a practical part, the doctrinal
enterprise will consist of the metaphysics of nature and that of morals.¹¹

¹¹[The Metaphysics of Morals appeared in 1797. The case of the metaphysics of nature
is less clear. In 1786, four years before the publication of the Critique of Judgment,
Kant had already published the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. It is not
clear in what respect he considered that work, as conjoined with the Critique of Pure
Reason, as falling short of a metaphysics of nature. (Cf. the Critique of Pure Reason,
B xliii.) Perhaps the missing part was the projected Transition from the Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science to Physics, on which Kant worked until a year before
his death and which appeared (in unfinished form) in what is now called the Opus
Postumum (Ak. XXI and XXII). Cf. James W. Ellington, "The Unity of Kant's
Thought in His Philosophy of Corporal Nature." 135–219 (esp. 213–219) in Book II
of his translation of the Prolegomena and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science: Immanuel Kant, Philosophy of Material Nature (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1985).]