Overview of the Transference Neuroses

SIGMUND FREUD

The Edited Version

Übersicht der Übertragungsneurosen

SIGMUND FREUD

Facsimile and Transcription
Foreword

to the English-Language Edition

AXEL HOFFER AND PETER T. HOFFER

In 1983 Ilse Grubrich-Simitis came upon a previously unknown draft of Sigmund Freud’s twelfth metapsychological paper. The unexpected discovery, described in her preface to this volume, provides a unique opportunity to reexamine from an evolutionary perspective Freud’s thinking about the nature of man and of mental disorders. This occasion is of particular interest to students not only of psychoanalysis but also of the social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences. Psychoanalysis is built on the foundation of Freud’s simple yet profound method of obtaining data about the dynamic functioning of the individual human mind by means of free association in the context of a psychoanalytic relationship (Kris, 1982). The psychoanalytic approach has been used in areas as diverse as mind-body relationships (psychology-biology), child development, and cultural anthropology, to mention only a few. The purview of psychoanalysis ranges from a microscopic focus on the psychic reality of one individual in a psychoanalytic treatment hour to a macroscopic focus on human nature in groups or societies, and even—as in this draft—in the prehistory of mankind.

One of the oldest controversies about—even within—the field of psychoanalysis is whether it is a biological science or a psychology independent of biology. The literature is replete with heated arguments on both sides. Sulloway (1979), for one, argues that Freud was really a biologist. Others (for instance Klein, 1976) assert that psychoanalysis is really a discipline of meaning and interpretation alone, divorced from biology, and therefore not a natural science. We feel that attempts to categorize Freud’s distinctive method of investigation under one or another of the traditional disciplines are unnecessarily limiting. The uniqueness and value
of Freud's discovery of a new method of investigation—that of free association—lies in the unfettered freedom to explore human differences, conflicts, and dilemmas. We believe that psychoanalysis should not be categorized as belonging either to the natural sciences (the Naturwissenschaften) or to the humanities (the Geisteswissenschaften) alone, but to both. Freud's overview is an example of the way in which the inextricable theoretical bonds between psychology and biology provide fertile fields for new investigations leading to new points of view.

The discovery and identification of a draft of Freud's synthesis of the transference neuroses, the fair copy of which Freud subsequently destroyed, have aroused great interest. The paper itself is part of an intense correspondence between Freud and his colleague Sándor Ferenczi during the dark days early in World War I. Such a manuscript is like an archaeological discovery, perhaps hiding buried within it a key to deeper understanding—in this case, of Freud's earlier and later writings.

Grubrich-Simitis has attempted to present Freud's work in unmodified form exactly as she found it, leaving primarily to the reader the interpretation of its possible meanings and ultimate significance. In her essay, "Metapsychology and Metabiology," she writes on the place of the phylogenetic fantasy in Freud's life and work and in the history of science. She traces the context of the unearthed draft, saving evaluative and analytical comments for the third part of the essay.

What is the overview actually about? None of Freud's metapsychological papers is easy to read, and this one is no exception. To help orient the reader, we therefore attempt in this Foreword to highlight the major themes and transition points elaborated in Grubrich-Simitis' essay.

Freud wrote a draft of his nearly completed twelfth metapsychological paper in the form of a letter to Ferenczi, inviting his knowledgeable colleague's critical response. The draft has two distinct parts, the first of which utilizes a staccato, shorthand style in which Freud presents the characteristics of the three transference neuroses (anxiety hysteria, conversion hysteria, and obsessional neurosis). He compares and contrasts six factors in these three disorders: repression, anticathexis, substitutive- and symptom-formation, relation to the sexual function, regression, and disposition.

Freud's discussion of these mechanisms is entirely consistent with his published metapsychological papers in that he is working within his topo-

graphic theory based on the systems unconscious, preconscious, and conscious. He has yet to develop his structural theory based on conflict within and among three agencies (ego, id, and super-ego), which many psychoanalysts feel serves more as an addition to than as a replacement for the earlier topographic theory. As Grubrich-Simitis elaborates in her essay later in this volume, Freud was working within his first theory of anxiety (sometimes called his toxicological theory), based on "damned-up libido" as a "cause" of symptoms and illness. Only later, with Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d [1925]), did he fully articulate his second theory of anxiety, in which anxiety served a "signal" function to mobilize the ego's defense mechanisms.

Similarly, Freud's dual-instinct theory evolved after the overview was written from a theory based on the polarity between sexual instincts and ego- (self-preservative) instincts to one based on the polarity between life (sexual) instincts and death (aggressive) instincts. This paper may be seen, then, as a transitional document immediately preceding Freud's major theoretical shifts toward the end of the war. After World War I, when publication of this and the six other lost papers became feasible, Freud might have felt he had left this work far behind in his new theoretical advances.

Our translation of this work has been called "A Phylogenetic Fantasy" because it is in this area that Freud's contribution is new. His own title, "Overview of the Transference Neuroses," is actually a misnomer. Freud undoubtedly would have changed it had he published the paper, because he not only covers the transference neuroses (anxiety, conversion hysteria, and obsessional neurosis) but, with equal importance, brings in the narcissistic neuroses (dementia praecox, paranoia, and melancholia-mania). The crucial points hinge on the detailed comparisons between the way people with transference neuroses are able to establish and maintain relationships, and the way those with narcissistic neuroses have difficulty maintaining a firm grasp on their interpersonal relationships and on reality.

The first hint of the importance of this comparison occurs early in the draft. Freud says on the opening page (edited form of the manuscript), "Will hear that in the next group repression has a different topography; it then becomes extended to the concept of splitting."

1. For an explanation of the system of citation used throughout, see the note at the beginning of the References.
2. Emil Kraepelin's term dementia praecox would today, following Eugen Bleuler's terminology, become schizophrenia.
The essential link between the first part of the paper and the second lies
in Freud’s discussion of the sixth factor, disposition. Here he makes the
transition, believing that when constitutional factors come into considera-
tion “acquisition [is] not eliminated thereby; it only moves into still earlier
prehistory, because one can justifiably claim that the inherited dispositions
are residues of the acquisition of our ancestors” (p. 10). Having paved the
way for the importance of the “phylogenetic disposition,” he adds:

The most important distinguishing characteristic of the transference neuroses
could not be acknowledged in this overview anyway, because it is not striking
when they are compared with one another and would only become evident by
contrast when the narcissistic neuroses are brought in. With this widening of the
horizon (the)3 relation of ego to object would move [into the] foreground, and the
holding onto the object would turn out to be (the) common distinguishing
feature. (pp. 10–11)

The final introductory comments are crucial to following the thrust of
Freud’s argument, as we shall see.

We must ascribe a different development to the sexual strivings of man than to the
ego-strivings. The reason (is) essentially that the former can be satisfied autoerot-
ically for quite a while, whereas ego-strivings from the beginning are directed at
object and thereby at reality. (p. 11)

Thus, Freud organizes his conceptualization of the transference neuroses
around anxiety and sexuality, and his conceptualization of the narcissistic
neuroses around the loss of the object.

The second section of the draft, unlike the first, is written in complete
sentences. Freud himself referred to this second part as his “phylogenetic
fantasy,” a term that highlights the original and creative aspects of the
work. In a creative leap of imagination he brings together for the first time
not just the customary two (ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny) develop-
mental sequences, but rather three:

1. The development of the individual (ontogeny);
2. The development of the species (phylogeny);
3. The developmental sequence of the age of onset of the two groups of
mental disorders—first, the transference neuroses (anxiety hysteria, con-
version hysteria, and obsessionless neurosis) and second, the narcissistic
neuroses (dementia praecox, paranoia, and melancholia-mania).

3. Angle brackets, ( ), signify a translators’ addition.
can now see how in his phylogenetic fantasy Freud modifies and expands the reasoning he began in *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13).

Freud’s organization and sequences may be particularly difficult for the reader to follow because we are unaccustomed to thinking of anxiety and hysteria as earlier or more primitive than dementia praecox. Freud, of course, wrote about this paradoxical inversion of the developmental sequences of the sexual and the ego-instincts, but it sounds odd to modern ears. It may be helpful to keep in mind that his argument here is based on the premise that sexual instincts have an earlier (more purely biological) and entirely different development than the ego- (self-preservative) instincts. Freud also took as a premise for his series that narcissistic neuroses do not occur in childhood, an assumption not supported by present-day work with children.

In the relevant Freud-Ferenczi correspondence, published here for the first time, the interest of both men in Lamarckian concepts is explicitly discussed and documented. Freud in the phylogenetic fantasy extends his belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics as far as it will go. Grubrich-Simitis, in her essay, discusses the reasons for Freud’s insistence on the reality of the inheritance of past experience. She suggests that Freud felt that the intensity of the castration/murder complex in each generation can only be explained by such a hereditary transmission from one generation to the next.

Freud ultimately concludes that each individual contains somewhere within himself or herself the history of all mankind; further, that mental illness can usefully be understood as a vestige of responses once necessary and highly adaptive to the exigencies of each era. Accordingly, mental illness can be understood as a set of formerly adaptive responses that have become maladaptive as the climatic and sociological threats to the survival of mankind have changed.

Beyond the historical interest of this document with its outdated aspects, there is an unambiguous link to modern psychoanalysis in Freud’s emphasis on the theme of adaptation, in the development of both the individual and mankind. It is important to understand that what is involved is adaptation in a broad, psychoanalytic sense, not (as it has been so frequently misunderstood in the past) adaptation in the sense of conformity to society’s expectations. Contemporary psychoanalysts study in increasingly complex ways the adaptation of the individual and of groups to intrapsychic and interpersonal conflict. For example, psychoanalysts today have made significant advances in appreciating the priority of issues of safety—the perception of a threat to psychological survival—in the analytic setting (see for example Sandler, 1960; Shafer, 1983; Modell, 1984). They have a more sophisticated understanding of the ways in which conflicts arising (1) from drives and defenses against them, (2) from conflicting drives (Kris, 1984), and (3) as a result of specific affective states trigger unconscious and conscious defense mechanisms. These mechanisms are always adaptive for internal psychic reality and homeostasis, but often are maladaptive in terms of relationships and external reality. The concerns of psychoanalysts in attempting to understand human beings range from the microscopic view of an anxious moment in an analytic hour to cosmic issues raised by the threat of nuclear annihilation. Adapta-

tion to perceived danger and the maladaptive aspects of “too much” adaptation for the individual and society remain vital psychoanalytic issues.

No new translation of Freud can be attempted without taking into account the recent critiques by Mahoney (1982, 1984), Ornston (1982, 1985), Bettelheim (1983), and others of James Strachey’s *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. Malcolm Pines (1985) and the Publications Committee of the Institute of Psychoanalysis (London), representing the International Library of Psychoanalysis, are currently giving careful thought to the complex question of whether the *Standard Edition* should be revised or whether a completely new translation of Freud should be undertaken.

For a number of reasons we have chosen to translate this draft in a way that does not involve any significant new renderings which would conflict with the conventions established by Strachey in his translation of the metapsychology papers published in the *Standard Edition*. We hope that the reader will thereby find it easier to compare this paper with and integrate it into the existing corpus of Freud’s metapsychological writings. In addition to following Strachey, we have used the publication of the Glossary Committee (Jones, 1924) and Alix Strachey’s *Vocabulary* (1943) to help us with some of the technical terms.

Our translation of the draft of the twelfth metapsychological paper has led us to a better appreciation of the challenges faced by A. A. Brill, Anna Freud, Ernest Jones, John Rickman, Joan Riviere, James and Alix Strachey, Alan Tyson, and others in trying to render Freud’s precise
scientific writing into the English language with minimal loss of meaning, context, and style. We are brothers from a German-speaking background (Czechoslovakia), educated in the United States. Peter Hoffer, a professor of German, has played the primary role in the actual translation; Axel Hoffer, a practicing psychoanalyst and teacher, is principally responsible for this Foreword—but in all senses the work has been a collaborative effort.

In our translation of both the Freud draft and the Grubrich-Simitis essay, we have refrained insofar as possible from imposing our interpretations on the material. Particularly in the first half of the paper, we have retained the shorthand style of the draft, sacrificing ease of understanding to capture the flavor—and the ambiguity—of Freud’s writing. In general, we have favored a literal translation, which may at times have a Germanic tone, in order to be more faithful to the original.

We are deeply appreciative of the helpful criticism and encouragement provided by Otto Hoffer, Anton O. Kris, Arnold H. Modell, Ana-Maria Rizzuto, Angela von der Lippe, and Vivian Wheeler. We thank Arthur Rosenthal, director of Harvard University Press, for his steadfast support and for his commitment to this project. And we are grateful to Ilse Grubrich-Simitis for her invaluable and most generous assistance with the translation. She not only made available to us her remarkable command of the English language, but also shared her profound insight into Freud’s language and thought.

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Preface
to the Original Edition

ILSE GRUBRICH-SIMITIS

From November 1914 until the summer of 1915 Sigmund Freud worked on a series of papers that he originally intended to publish in book form under the title Zur Vorbereitung einer Metapsychologie (Preliminaries to a metapsychology). In a note to one of the texts, “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams” (1917d [1915]), which appeared in 1917, he stated their purpose: “The intention of the series is to clarify and carry deeper the theoretical assumptions on which a psycho-analytic system could be founded” (p. 222). Also belonging to this series and not published until 1917 is “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917e [1915]). By contrast, three other pieces written in the first months of the war year 1915 were published that same year in successive issues of the Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse (vol. 3, nos. 2–5). These three papers are the classic basic writings of psychoanalysis—“Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c), “Repression” (1915d), and “The Unconscious” (1915e). James Strachey (1957b, p. 161) has designated the five metapsychological papers as perhaps Freud’s most important theoretical works.

From his correspondence we know that, in addition to the five texts mentioned, Freud had by mid-1915 more or less completed seven other metapsychological studies, which were supposed to round off the series for a book of twelve chapters. The book was never published, however. Because the seven later manuscripts disappeared without a trace, it is assumed that Freud subsequently destroyed them. “It is difficult,” as Strachey wrote, “to exaggerate our loss from the disappearance of these

1. This was reconstructed by Ernest Jones (1955, pp. 185–186). In the course of writing his Freud biography, he was the first to see Freud’s correspondence, which at that time was largely unpublished.
papers. There was a unique conjunction of favourable factors at the time at which Freud wrote them. His previous major theoretical work (the seventh chapter of the Interpretation of Dreams [1900a]) had been written fifteen years before, at a relatively early stage of his psychological studies. Now, however, he had some twenty-five years of psycho-analytic experience behind him on which to base his theoretical constructions, while he remained at the summit of his intellectual powers" (1957a, p. 106).

Last year in London—in connection with preparations for the forthcoming publication of the correspondence between Freud and his Hungarian student and colleague, Sándor Ferenczi—I was looking through an old trunk of papers and other documents that had been given to the Hungarian-born psychoanalyst Michael Balint by his teacher and friend, Ferenczi. I came upon a manuscript in Freud’s handwriting which from its title and content I could not connect with any of his published works. With the help of a brief letter Freud had written on the back of the last page, I soon realized what the manuscript was: the draft\(^3\) of the lost twelfth metapsychological paper. The letter reads:\(^3\)

7/28/15

Dear friend,

I am sending you herewith the draft of the XII [paper], which will certainly interest you. You can throw it away or keep it. The fair copy follows it sentence for sentence, deviating from it only slightly. Pages 21–23 have been added since your letter, which I had waited for. Fortunately, I had anticipated your excellent criticism.\(^4\)

2. The discovery of this manuscript incidentally permits modification of my own observations (1977, p. 40) about Freud’s writing process in the facsimile edition of his essay “The Theme of the Three Caskets”—namely, that although he was accustomed to writing out the final version of his manuscripts immediately, he made only few corrections at any one time. These comments were based on information from Freud’s daughter Anna and on perusal of the manuscripts of Freud’s works that have been preserved since 1914. These manuscripts are always fair copies. Possibly the majority of them existed in drafts, which Freud did not save. In the end he would not have preserved the recently discovered draft; on the contrary, in the accompanying letter he left it up to Ferenczi to throw the manuscript away or to keep it. Because Ferenczi kept it, we now know that Freud wrote drafts and that, as the second part shows, these could take almost final form and did not contain many corrections.

3. The facsimile appears on p. 71. It has been transcribed in accordance with the rules applied to the manuscript as a whole, which are explained in the Note on the Edited Version.

4. For details see pp. 80–81.

Preface

I will take a break now, before I finally work out Cs. [consciousness] and anxiety. I am suffering greatly from Karlsbad [intestinal] ailments.

Warm regards,

Your Freud

The letter makes it possible to identify the manuscript with certainty.\(^5\) Freud corresponded regularly with Ferenczi in 1915 about his metapsychology project; furthermore, from this letter and other correspondence we can infer the themes of the seven lost chapters: among them consciousness, anxiety/anxiety hysteria (the work on both these texts is expressly mentioned in the letter above), conversion hysteria, obsessional neurosis—as well as, in fact, a synthesis of the transference neuroses. And now, in the draft overview, we obtain firsthand knowledge of the content of this synthesis.

I should like to thank Ingeborg Meyer-Palmedo for her indefatigable support in the publication of this work, particularly for her careful preparation of the transcription, which is totally faithful to the original. Enid Balint of London made it possible to copy the original manuscript and gave much invaluable help.

November 1984

5. Additional arguments appear on pp. 78ff.
Dear friend,

I am sending you herewith the draft of the XII [paper], which will certainly interest you. You can throw it away or keep it. The fair copy follows it sentence for sentence, deviating from it only slightly. Pages 21–23 have been added since your letter, which I had waited for. Fortunately, I had anticipated your excellent criticism.²

I will take a break now, before I finally work out Cs. [consciousness] and anxiety. I am suffering greatly from Karlsbad [intestinal] ailments.

Warm regards,

Your Freud

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On the back of the last page of the manuscript (the letter is translated in the Preface):

28. 7. 15

1 Lieber Freund
2 Ich schicke Ihnen hier den Entwurf der XII,
3 der Sie gewiß interessieren wird. Sie können
4 ihn wegschen oder behalten. Die
5 Reinschrift folgt ihm Satz für Satz
6 u weicht nur wenig von ihm ab.
7 Seite 21–23 sind nach Ihrem Brief hin-
8 zugefügt, auf den ich gewartet hatte.
9 Ihr ausgezeichnete Einwand war zum
10 Glück vorgesehen worden.
11 Ich werde nun eine Pause eintreten
12 lassen, ehe ich Bw u Angst endgültig
13 ausarbeiten. Ich leide viel an
14 Karlsbader Beschwerden.
15 Herzl Gruß Ihr Freud

Envelope (reduced) in which Freud sent the manuscript to Ferenczi
Note on the Edited Version

As both facsimile and literal transcription show, Freud’s manuscript contains a plethora of abbreviations, especially of word endings. In the interest of readability these have been silently expanded in this version of the draft. Where this could not be done with certainty, my additions have been indicated by square brackets, [ ]; those of the translators by angle brackets, ( ). The only abbreviations that have been retained are those especially characteristic of Freud, such as “Ucs.” (unconscious), “Pcs.” (preconscious), “Cs.” (conscious), “ΨA” (psychoanalysis).

On the other hand, the shorthand character of the original, especially in the systematic first part, ought not be obliterated by editorial amplifications; this is after all only a draft, not the fair copy. In only a very few places have I attempted to facilitate understanding by adding words. These are without exception flagged with square brackets, in part because I have not always been sure that they are correct. Orthography and punctuation have been silently aligned with modern usage. Editorial footnotes call attention to certain peculiarities of the original, so that the reader can locate them in the facsimile without undue difficulty.

I.G.-S.
XII Overview of the Transference Neuroses

Preliminaries

After detailed investigation, attempt to summarize characteristics, distinguishing from others, comparative survey of the individual factors. Factors are repression, anticathexis, substitutive- and symptom-formation, relation to the sexual function, regression, disposition. Restriction to the three types: anxiety hysteria, conversion hysteria, and obsessional neurosis.

(a) Repression takes place in all three at the border of the system Ucs. and Pcs., consists in the withdrawal or renunciation [of the] Pcs. cathectic, is secured by means of a kind of anticathexis. In later stages of obsessional neurosis displaces itself to the border between Pcs. and Cs.

Will hear that in the next group² repression has a different topography; it then becomes extended to the concept of splitting.

Topographical point of view should not be overestimated in the sense that perhaps all interchange between both systems is interrupted by it. It thus becomes more important at which elements this barrier is introduced.

Success and completeness are related insofar as failure necessitates further efforts. Success varies with the three neuroses and in their individual stages.

Least success with anxiety hysteria, is confined to the fact that no Pcs. (and Cs.) representative comes about. Later, that instead of the offensive (one), a substitutive [idea] becomes Pcs. and Cs. Finally, in the formation of phobias it achieves its aim, in inhibiting the affect of unpleasantness by

1. Originally, Gegenbesetzung (anticathexis) was the third item in this sequence; by means of an insertion line Freud moved the word to the second position. See facsimile p. 1, ll. 6–7.
2. Probably meant here are the psychoses (or, in Freud's usage, the narcissistic neuroses), referred to in the second part of the draft but admittedly not described in more detail in relation to the specific processes of defense. See pp. 233–235 of "A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams" (1917d [1915]).
means of great renunciation, extensive attempt at flight. Intent of repression is always avoidance of unpleasant. Fate of the representative is only a sign of the process. The apparent separation into idea and affect (representative and quantitative factor) of the process to be defended against results from the very fact that repression consists in the renunciation of the word-presentation, thus from [the] topographical character of the repression.

In obsessional neurosis success is at first complete but not lasting. Process still less complete. After first successful phase it continues through two additional ones, the first of which (secondary repression formation of the obsessional idea, struggle against obsessional idea) satisfies itself, as [in] anxiety hysteria, with substitution of the representative, [the] later [phase] (tertiary [repression]) produces renunciations and restriction[s] that correspond to the phobia, but in contrast operates by logical means.

In contradistinction to this, success of conversion hysteria is from the outset complete, but at the cost of strong substitutive formation. Process of the individual repression more complete.

(b) Anticathexis

In anxiety hysteria, missing at first, pure attempt at flight, then throws itself at substitutive idea and, especially in third phase, at its surroundings, in order from there to secure control of the release of unpleasant, as watchfulness, attentiveness. Represents the portion of the Pcs. [cathexis]; in other words, the expenditure that neurosis costs.

In obsessional neurosis, where from the outset it has to do with defense against an ambivalent instinct, it provides for the first successful repression, then achieves reaction-formation thanks to the ambivalence, then in the tertiary phase results in the attentiveness.

3. At this point the manuscript (p. 2) is hard to decipher. The words *deskriptiv statt syn[ematisch] (descriptive instead of systematic) have been added between II. 3 and 4, a formulation that Freud also uses in “The Unconscious” (1915e, p. 172).

4. The further items up to the closing parenthesis are located in the manuscript (p. 2) at the end of the section, just before (b); evidently added afterward, they were clearly transposed to the indicated position by means of a line.

5. In the manuscript (p. 2, 1. 20) there is an erroneous repetition of *ein instead of an.

6. Here in the manuscript (p. 2, 1. 24) is written, and crossed out, *Ersatz u Symptombildg. (substitutive- and symptom-formation). Apparently Freud decided at this point in the writing to treat anticathexis before substitutive- and symptom-formation. See the corresponding inversion in the series at the beginning of the paper.

7. This word cannot be deciphered with certainty. See p. 2, 1. 30 of the facsimile.
that characterizes the obsessional idea, and does the logical work. Thus, second and third phase just as in anxiety hysteria. Difference in first phase, where [the anticathexis] in anxiety hysteria accomplishes nothing, in obsessional neurosis everything.

Always it secures for repression [the corresponding] portion of the Pcs. In [conversion] hysteria, successful\(^8\) character is made possible by the fact that anticathexis seeks from the outset to join with instinctual cathexis and reaches a compromise with it, makes selective determination of representative.

(c) Substitutive- and Symptom-Formation
Corresponds to the return [of the] repressed, failure of repression. [Both can be] separated for a while, later [the substitute-formation] fuses with it [the symptom-formation].

Most complete in the case of conversion hysteria: substitute = symptom, nothing further to be separated.

Likewise in anxiety hysteria, substitutive-formation makes possible the first return of the repressed.

In obsessional neurosis [substitutive] separates sharply [from symptom-formation] in that first substitutive-formation is delivered from the repressing by means of anticathexis and is not counted among symptoms. Whereas [the] later symptoms of obsessional neurosis are often predominantly return of the repressed; role of the repressing in them smaller.

Symptom-formation, where our investigation starts, always coincides with return of the repressed and occurs with the aid of regression and the disposing fixations. A general law states that the regression goes back to the fixation and from there return of the repressed asserts itself.

(d) Relation to the Sexual Function
What remains constant here is that repressed instinctual impulse is always a libidinal one, belonging to sexual life,

\(^8\) Nor can this word be deciphered with certainty. See p. 3, l. 6 of the facsimile.
whereas repression proceeds from the ego out of various motives, which can be summed up as a not-being-able-to (because of excessive strength) or a not-wanting-to. The latter goes back to incompatibility with the ego-ideals or to other kinds of feared injury to the ego. The not-being-able-to also corresponds to an injury.

This fundamental fact is clouded by two considerations. First, it often seems as though repression is aroused by conflict between two impulses, both [of which] are libidinal. This is resolved by considering that one of them is ego-syntonic and in the conflict can enlist the aid of the repression that emanates from the ego. Second, by virtue of the fact that not only libidinal but also ego-strivings are encountered among the repressed, especially frequent and distinct with longer duration and more advanced development of the neurosis. [The] latter comes about in such a way that the repressed libidinal impulse seeks to assert itself in a roundabout way by means of an ego-striving to which it has lent a component, transfers energy to it, and now pulls this [ego-striving] along into repression, which can occur on a large scale. Nothing in the general validity of the former statement is thereby altered. Understandable requirement that one gather insights from the beginning stages of the neuroses.

(Lt is) evident in hysteria and obsessional neurosis that repression directs itself toward the\(^9\) sexual function in definitive form, in which it\(^{10}\) represents reproductive urge. Most distinct again in conversion hysteria, because without complications, in obsessional neurosis first regression.

\(^9\) *Das* (the neuter definite article in German) was originally written at this point (perhaps Freud wanted to write *das Sexualleben*); the word is crossed out and replaced with *die* (the feminine article, because the German word for sexual function is feminine). See p. 4, l. 33 of the facsimile.

\(^{10}\) The original (p. 4, l. 34) has *es* (the neuter pronoun). See note 9.
Meanwhile not exaggerate this connection, for instance, not assume that repression only goes into effect with this stage of the libido. On the contrary, it is precisely obsessional neurosis that shows that repression (is a) general process, not libidinally dependent, because here (it is) directed against preliminary stage. Likewise in development, that repression is also taken up against perverse impulses. Question: Why does repression succeed here, not elsewhere? In nature libidinal strivings very capable of representation, so that with repression of the normal, the perverse are strengthened, and vice versa. Repression has no relation to the sexual function other than to strive for its defense, like regression and other instinctual vicissitudes.

In anxiety hysteria the relation to the sexual function is less distinct, for reasons that have become apparent in the treatment of anxiety. Seems that anxiety hysteria encompasses those cases in which demands of sexual instinct [are] defended against as too great, like danger. No special condition from libido organization.

(c) Regression

The most interesting factor and instinctual vicissitude. No occasion to divine it from anxiety hysteria. Could say that [it] does not enter into consideration here, perhaps because every later anxiety hysteria so clearly regresses to an infantile one (the typical disposition of neurosis), and this latter one appears so early in life. On the other hand, both of the other [transference neuroses] (are the) most beautiful examples of regression, but in each it plays a different role in structure of the neurosis. In conversion hysteria it is a strong ego regression, return to phase without separation of Pcs. and Ucs., thus without speech and censorship. Regression, however, serves symptom-formation and return of the repressed. The instinctual impulse that
not accepted by the current ego returns to an earlier one, from which it finds discharge, naturally in another manner. That it virtually comes to a kind of libido regression in the process (has) already (been) mentioned. It is different in obsessional neurosis. The regression is a libido regression, does not serve the return [of the repressed], but rather repression, and is made possible by a strong constitutional fixation or incomplete development. In fact, here the first step of defense is assigned to regression, where it is more a case of regression than to inhibition of development,\textsuperscript{11} and the regressive libidinal organization is only subsequently subjected to a typical regression—which, however, remains unsuccessful. A piece of ego regression is forced upon [the] ego by the libido or is given in the incomplete development of the ego, which here is connected to libido phase. (Separation of ambivalences.)

(f) [Disposition]
Behind regression are hidden the problems of fixation and disposition. Regression, one can say in general, goes all the way back to a fixation point, in either ego or libido development, and it represents the disposition.\textsuperscript{12} This is thus the most decisive factor, the one that mediates the decision concerning [the] choice of neurosis. (It is) worthwhile, therefore, to stay with it. Fixation comes about through (a) phase of development that was too strongly pronounced or has perhaps persisted too long to pass over into the next without residue. (It) would be best if [one] did not

\textsuperscript{11} This obscure clause seems to make more sense by positioning its word elements differently: "where it is a case of more than [a] regression to [an] inhibition of development."

\textsuperscript{12} In "The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis" (1913, p. 318) Freud declares plainly, "Thus our dispositions are inhibitions in development."
demand [a] clearer idea of what, in what changes, fixation consists. But say something about (its) origin. The possibility exists as well that such fixation is brought along in pure form and that it [is] also produced by early impressions and, in the end, that both factors work together. All the more since one can claim that both kinds of elements are actually ubiquitous, inasmuch as, [on the one hand,] all dispositions are constitutionally present in the child and, on the other hand, the operative impressions are allotted to large numbers of children in like manner. Is thus a case of more or less, and an effective coincidence. Because no one is inclined to dispute constitutional factors, it devolves upon ΨA to represent forcefully the interests of early infantile acquisitions. In obsessional neurosis, by the way, the constitutional factor is admittedly far more clearly recognized than is the accidental in conversion hysteria. Detailed assessment still doubtful.

When the constitutional factor of fixation comes into consideration, acquisition [is] not eliminated thereby; it only moves into still earlier prehistory, because one can justifiably claim that the inherited dispositions are residues of the acquisition of our ancestors. With this one runs into (the) problem of the phylogenetic disposition behind the individual or ontogenetic, and should find no contradiction\(^\text{13}\) if the individual adds new dispositions from his own experience to his inherited disposition (acquired) on the basis of earlier experience. Why should

\(^\text{13}\) In the middle of the word (p. 7, l. 32) Freud first wrote "t" instead of "p," perhaps in the direction of "resistance" (\textit{Widerstand}, instead of \textit{Widerspruch} (contradiction), which appears in the manuscript), and then corrected himself.
the process that creates disposition on the basis or experience cease precisely at the individual whose neurosis one is investigating? Or (why should) this [individual] create [a] disposition for his progeny but not be able to acquire it for himself? Seems rather (to be) necessary complement.

How much the phylogenetic disposition can contribute to the understanding of the neuroses cannot yet be estimated. Part of it would also be that consideration goes beyond narrow field of the transference neuroses. The most important distinguishing characteristic of the transference neuroses could not be acknowledged in this overview anyway, because it is not striking when they are compared with one another and would only become evident by contrast when the narcissistic neuroses are brought in. With this widening of the horizon (the) relation of ego to object would move [into the] foreground, and the holding onto the object would turn out to be (the) common distinguishing feature. Certain preliminaries permitted here.

Hope the reader, who for no reason other than boredom over many sections has noticed how everything has been built on very careful and arduous observation, will be patient if once in a while criticism retreats in the face of fantasy and unconfirmed things are presented, merely because they are stimulating and open up distant vistas.

It is still legitimate to assume that the neuroses must also bear witness to the history of the mental development of

14. In the manuscript (p. 8, l. 9), das (the) is written, instead of zum (to the).
15. Two crossed-out sentence fragments follow in the manuscript (p. 8, ll. 18–20): Er liegt in der Festhaltung des Objekts. Verhältnis des Ich zum Objekt. (It lies in the holding onto the object. Relation of the ego to the object.)
mankind. Now I believe I have shown in (the) paper ("On Two Principles")\textsuperscript{16} that we must ascribe a different development to the sexual strivings of man than to the ego-strivings. The reason (is) essentially that the former can be satisfied autoerotically for quite a while, whereas ego-strivings from the beginning are directed at object and thereby at reality. [As for] the development of\textsuperscript{17} human sexual life, we believe we have learned to understand it in broad outline (Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality [1905d]).

That of the human ego, that is, of the functions of self-preservation and the formations, derived from them, is more difficult to fathom. I know only the single attempt of Ferenczi,\textsuperscript{18} who makes use of the experiences for this purpose. Our task would naturally be much easier if the developmental history of the ego were given to us somewhere else of understanding the neuroses, instead of our having to proceed in the opposite direction.\textsuperscript{19} One thereby gets the impression that the developmental history of the libidous recapitulates a much older piece of the phylogenetic development than that of the ego, the former perhaps recapitulates conditions of the phyllum of vertebrates, whereas the latter is dependent on the history of the human race.

Now there exists a series to which one can attach various far-reaching ideas. It originates when one arranges the neuroses (not the transference neuroses alone) according to the\textsuperscript{20} point in time at which they customarily appear in the life of the individual. Then anxiety hysteria,

\textsuperscript{16} "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (1911b).
\textsuperscript{17} In the manuscript (p. 9, l. 10), der (the genitive case, feminine form of the definite article, instead of the masculine das); Freud probably first intended to write der menschlichen Sexualität (of human sexuality) (which is feminine).
\textsuperscript{18} Sándor Ferenczi (1913).
\textsuperscript{19} This passage probably means, "Our task of understanding the neuroses would naturally be much easier if the developmental history of the ego were given to us somewhere else instead of our having to proceed in the opposite direction [that is, inferring the developmental history of the ego from the investigation of the neuroses]." Freud possibly added the phrase the Neurosen zu verstehen (of understanding the neuroses) in the continuing text afterward, as was customary for him, but forgot to insert an arrow.
\textsuperscript{20} The manuscript (p. 9, l. 35) reads der (the dative case of the feminine definite article), because Freud first wrote nach der Zeit (after the time), then added punkt (point) (which makes the word masculine), and neglected to change the article accordingly.

Menschen ablegen müssen. Ich glaube nun in Aufsatz (Über zwei Prinzipien) gezeigt zu haben, daß wir den Sexualstreben des Menschen eine andere Entwicklg zuschreiben dürfen als den Ichstreben. Der Grund wesentlich daß die ersteren ganze Weile autoerotisch befriedigt werden können, während Ichstreben von Anfang auf Objekt u damit auf Realität angewiesen sind. Welches die Entwicklg der menschlichen Sexuallebens glauben wir in großen Zügen gelernt zu haben (Drei Abhand]]g z. Sexualtheorie).


Es existirt nun eine Reihe, an welche man verschiedene weitgehende Gedanken anknüpfen kann. Sie erstrebt, wenn man die Ψneurosen (nicht die Übertragungsneurosen allein) nach der Zeit anordnet, zu punkt welchem sie im individ Leben aufzutreten pflegen. Dann ist die Angsthysterie
Sigmund Freud  Übersicht der Übertragungsneurosen

die fast voraussetzunglose die früheste, ihr
schließt die Konv. (vom 4. J. etwa) an,
och etwas später in der Vorpubertät (9-10)
tritt bei Kindern die Zw auf. Die narzist.
Neurosen fehlen der Kindheit. Von diesen
ist die Dem pr in klassischer Form Erkrankg
der Pubertätsjahre, die Par nähert sich
den Jahren der Reife, und Mel-Manie
auch dem. Zeitabschnitt, sonst unbestimbar
Die Reihe lautet also:
Angsth - Konv. Zw - Dem pr - Paranoia -
Die Fixirungsdispositionen - Mel-Manie
dieser Affektionen scheinen auch eine
Reihe zu ergeben, die aber gegenläufig
ist. Deutlich bes. wenn man libid. Disposition
in Betracht zieht. Es ergäbe sich also, je später
die Neurose auftritt, auf desto frühere
Libidophase muß sie regrediren. Dies gilt
indeß nur in großen Zügen. Unzweideutig
richtet sich Khy gegen Primat d. Genitalen
die Zw gegen die sadist. Vorstufe, alle 3
Übertragungsneurosen gegen vollzogene Libido-
entwicklung. Die narzist. Neuroser aber gehen
auf Phasen vor Objektfindg zurück,
die Dem pr regredirt bis zum Autoerotis
die Paranoia bis zur narzist. homosex.
Objektwahl, der Mel liegt narzist. Identif.
mit dem Objekt zu Grunde. Die Differenzen
liegen darin, daß die Dem unzweideutig
früher auftritt als die Par, obwohl ihre
lib. Disposition weiter zurückreicht
und daß MelManie keine sichere zeit-
liche Einreihg gestatten. Man kann es also
nicht festhalten, daß die sicher vorhanden

almost without precondition, is the earliest [neurosis], closely followed by conversion hysteria (from about the fourth year); somewhat later in prepuberty (9–10) obsessional neurosis appears in children. The narcissistic neuroses are absent in childhood. Of these, dementia praecox in classic form is [an] illness of the puberty years, paranoia approaches the mature years, and melancholia-mania the same time period, otherwise not specifiable.

The series is thus:

anxiety hysteria — conversion hysteria — obsessional neurosis — dementia praecox — paranoia — melancholia-mania.

The fixation dispositions of these disorders also appear to produce a series, which runs in the opposite direction, however, especially when one takes libidinal dispositions into consideration. The result would thus be that the later the neurosis appears, the earlier the phase of the libido to which it must regress. But this only holds true in general terms. Undoubtedly conversion hysteria is directed against primacy of the genitals, obsessional neurosis against the sadistic preliminary stage, all three transference neuroses against complete development of the libido. The narcissistic neuroses, however, go back to phases before the finding of object; dementia praecox regresses as far as auto-erotism; paranoia as far as narcissistic homosexual object-choice; melancholia is based on narcissistic identification with the object. The differences lie in the fact that dementia unquestionably appears earlier than paranoia, although its libidinal disposition extends farther back, and that melancholia-mania permit(s) no certain ranking with respect to time. One can therefore not maintain that

21. At this point in the manuscript (p. 10, l. 15) the word Deutlich (Clearly) is crossed out.
the time sequence of the neuroses, which certainly exists, was determined solely by the development of the libido. To the extent that this is the case, one would emphasize the inverse relationship between the two. It is also known that with advancing age hysteria or obsessional neurosis can turn into dementia; the opposite never occurs.

One can set up another phylogenetic series, however, which is really concurrent with the time sequence of the neuroses. Only in doing so, one must go far afield and allow some hypothetical intermediate link.

Dr. Wittels\textsuperscript{22} first expressed the idea that the primal human animal passed its existence in a thoroughly rich milieu that satisfied all needs, echoes of which we have retained in the myth of the primeval paradise. There it may have overcome the periodicity of the libido, which is still connected with mammals. Ferenczi,\textsuperscript{23} in the aforementioned thoughtful paper, then expressed the idea that the subsequent development of this primal human took place under the influence of the geological fate of the earth, and that the exigencies of the Ice Age\textsuperscript{24} in particular gave it the stimulus for the development of civilization. After all, it is generally conceded that the human race already existed at the time of the Ice Age and experienced its effects.

If we pursue Ferenczi’s idea, the temptation is very great to recognize\textsuperscript{25} in the three dispositions to anxiety hysteria, conversion hysteria, and obsessional neurosis regressions to phases that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Fritz Wittels (1912); see esp. pp. 1-19.
\item In the manuscript (p. 11, l. 22) Ferenczi’s name is underlined. In fair copies intended for publication, Freud habitually distinguished names for the printer by underscoring them.
\item (Here, as elsewhere, Freud uses the plural \textit{Eiszeiten} (Ice Ages) instead of the more usual singular form.)
\item In the manuscript (p. 11, l. 38), a crossed-out \textit{sehen} (see) precedes \textit{erkennen} (recognize).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the whole human race had to go through at some time from the beginning to the end of the Ice Age, so that at that time all human beings were the way only some of them are today, by virtue of their hereditary tendency and by means of new acquisition. The pictures naturally cannot coincide completely, because neurosis contains more than what regression brings with it. It is also the expression of the struggle against this regression and a compromise between the primeval old and the demands of the culturally new. This difference will have to be most strongly pronounced in obsessional neurosis, which like no other stands under the sign of inner conflict. But neurosis, insofar as the repressed has been victorious in it, must bring back the primeval picture.

[1.] Our first hypothesis would thus maintain that mankind, under the influence of the privations that the encroaching Ice Age imposed upon it, has become generally anxious. The hitherto predominantly friendly outside world, which bestowed every satisfaction, transformed itself into a mass of threatening perils. There had been good reason for realistic anxiety about everything new. The sexual libido, to be sure, did not at first lose its objects, which are certainly human; but it is conceivable that the ego, whose existence was threatened, to some extent abandoned the object-cathexis.

26. At this point in the manuscript (p. 13, l. 1) there is no comma, but rather a crossed-out und (and).
retained the libido in the ego, and thus transformed into realistic anxiety what had previously been object-libido. Now we see in infantile anxiety that, when satisfaction is denied, the child transforms the object-libido into realistic anxiety about strangers, but we also see that it is generally inclined to be fearful of anything new. We have carried on a long dispute over whether realistic anxiety or anxiety of longing\(^{27}\) is the earlier of the two; whether the child changes his libido into realistic anxiety because he regards [it] as too great, dangerous, and thus arrives at an idea of danger, or whether he rather yields to a general anxiousness and learns from this also to be afraid of his unsatisfied libido. We were inclined to assume the former, to give precedence to longing anxiety, but we were lacking a particular disposition. We had to explain it as a generally child-like inclination.

Now phylogenetic consideration seems to settle this dispute in favor of realistic anxiety and permits us to assume that a portion of the children bring along the anxiousness of the beginning of the Ice Age and are now induced by it to treat the unsatisfied libido as an external danger. The relative excess of libido would result from the same set of conditions, however, and make possible new acquisition of the disposed anxiousness. Still, the discussion of anxiety hysteria would support the preponderance

\(^{27}\) (This term **Sehnsuchtangst** appears only once in Freud’s published work, in *The Ego and the Id* (1923b, p. 58).)
Perverse satisfactions that did not lead to the propagation of children avoided this prohibition, which promoted a certain regression to the phase of the libido before the primacy of the genitals. The limitation must have affected \textsuperscript{20} women more severely than men, who were less concerned about the consequences of sexual intercourse. This whole situation obviously corresponds to the conditions of conversion hysteria. From its symptomatology we conclude that man was still speechless when, because of an emergency beyond his control, he imposed the prohibition of reproduction on himself, thus also had not yet built up the system of the Pcs. over his Ucs. Those who are disposed to conversion hysteria then also regress to it, especially women.

\textsuperscript{28} This word \textit{typischen} is written in the manuscript (p. 14, l. 7) after \textit{Fällen} (cases) but is then transposed to the correct place.

\textsuperscript{29} In the same way as described in the previous note \textit{narcisstischen} (narcissistic) is here inserted in the manuscript (p. 14, l. 15).

\textsuperscript{30} At this point in the manuscript (p. 14), the word \textit{Abstinenz} (abstinence) is visible between ll. 22 and 23.
under the influence of prohibitions that
want to eliminate the genital function, while intensely exciting early im-
pressions press for genital activity.
3. The subsequent evolution is easy to construct. It primarily affected the male. After he had learned to economize on his libido and by means of regression to degrade his sexual activity to an earlier phase, activating his intelligence became paramount for him. He learned how to investigate, how to understand the hostile world somewhat, and how by means of inventions to secure his first mastery over it. He developed himself under the sign of energy, formed the beginnings of language, and had to assign great significance to the new acquisitions. Language was magic to him, his thoughts seemed omnipotent to him, he understood the world according to his ego. It is the time of the animistic world view and its magical trappings.

As a reward for his power to safeguard the lives of so many other helpless ones he bestowed upon himself unrestrained dominance over them, and through his personality established the first two tenets that he was himself invulnerable and that his possession of women must not be challenged. At the end of this epoch the human race had disintegrated into individual hordes that were dominated by a strong and wise brutal man as father. It is possible that the egoistically jealous and inconsiderate nature that we from ethnopsychological considerations attribute to the primal father of the human horde

31. Here in the original (p. 15, ll. 11-12) is written Welt feindliche (world hostile); that is, as he was writing, Freud again inserted the adjective after the noun, but this time failed to transpose the two words.

32. In the manuscript (p. 15, l. 33) Freud added weisen (wise) in the margin and marked that this word should come before brutalen (brutal).
was not present from the beginning, but rather was developed in the course of the severe Ice Age as a result of adaptation to exigency.

Now obsessional neurosis recapitulates the characteristics of this phase of mankind, some in a negative way, because neurosis does after all [in the form of its] reaction formations,\textsuperscript{33} correspond to the struggle against this return. The overemphasis on thinking, the enormous energy that returns in\textsuperscript{34} the compulsion, the omnipotence of thoughts, the inclination to inviolable laws\textsuperscript{35} are unchanged features. But against the brutal impulses that want to replace love life, there arises the resistance of later developments, which from the libidinal conflict finally saps the life energy of the individual and leaves standing, leaves [over] as compulsion, only the impulses that have been displaced to trivialities. So this human type, so valuable for the development of civilization, perishes in its return from the demands of love life, just as the grandiose type of the primal father himself, who later returned as godhead, has perished in reality from the familial relationships he created for himself.

4. We might have come so far in completing a program envisioned by Ferenczi "to bring the neurotic types of regression into harmony with the stages of human phylogeny,"\textsuperscript{36} perhaps without straying into all-too-risky speculations. We would have no clue to the subsequent and later-

\textsuperscript{33} On p. 16, l. 9 Reaktionsbildungen (reaction formations), at the beginning of the line, is placed diagonally over diese Wiederkehr (this return). Freud did not indicate where the word should be inserted.

\textsuperscript{34} Freud first wrote als (as) (p. 16, l. 11), which he later crossed out and replaced with im (in).

\textsuperscript{35} The fourth element of the series, die Neigung zu unverbruchlichen Gesetzen (the inclination to inviolable laws), occurred to Freud somewhat later. As was his custom, he inserted it in the continuing text—here attached to Entwicklungen (developments)—circled it, and moved it to the correct location. See the facsimile, p. 16, ll. 12–17.

\textsuperscript{36} Ferenczi (1913, p. 236). The actual quotation reads somewhat differently: "It is to be assumed that we shall some day succeed in bringing the individual stages in the development of the ego, and the neurotic regression-types of these, into a parallel."
appearing narcissistic neuroses, however, if the assumption did not come to our aid that the disposition to them had been acquired by a second generation, whose development introduces a new phase of human civilization.

This second generation begins with the sons, to whom the jealous primal father does not allow full scope. We have indicated elsewhere (T and T) that he drives them out when they reach the age of puberty. We experience admonish us, however, to substitute another, more gruesome solution—namely, that he robs them of their manhood—after which they are able to stay in the horde as harmless laborers. We may imagine the effect of castration in that primeval time as an extinguishing of the libido and a standstill in individual development. Such a state seems to be re-capitulated by dementia praecox, which especially as hebephrenia leads to giving up every love-object, degeneration of all sublimations, and return to auto-eroticism.

The youthful individual behaves as though he had undergone castration. In fact, self-castrations are not uncommon with this disorder. One should not bring into the phylogenetic picture what otherwise characterizes this illness, the speech alterations and hallucinatory storms, because they represent restitutive attempts, the numerous efforts to regain the object, which in the clinical picture are [for a] while almost more noticeable than the phenomena of degeneration.

37. Totem and Taboo (1912–13).
38. The word Zeitlang is added in the margin of the original (p. 17, l. 37). From the way it is written it is not clear where Freud wanted to put it.

auftretenden narzisstischen Neurosen fehlte
uns aber jede Anknüpfung, wenn uns
nicht die Annahme zu Hilfe käme, daß
die Disposition zu ihnen von einer zweiten
Generation erworben worden ist, deren
Entwicklung in eine neue Phase menschlicher Kultur hinüberleitet.
Diese zweite Generation hebt mit den Söhnen
an welchen der eifersüchtige Urgatte
nicht gewähren läßt. Wir haben an anderer
Stelle (T u. T) eingesetzt, daß er sie vertreibt,
wen sie das Alter der Pubertät erreicht
haben. We Erfahrungen mahnen aber eine
andere u grausamere Lösung an die Stelle
zu setzen, nämlich daß sie ihrer Mannheit
beraubt, wonach sie als unschädliche Hilfsarbeiter
in der Horde bleiben können.

Den Effekt der Kastration in jener Urzeit dürfen
wir uns wol als Erlöschen der Libido und
Stehenbleiben in der indiv. Entwicklung vor-
stellen. Solchen Zustand scheint die Dem pr.
zu wiederholen, die zumal als Hebephrenie
zum Aufgeben jedes Liebesobjekts, Rück-
bild aller Sublimierungen und Rückkehr
dem Autoerotismus führt. Was das jugend-
liche Individ verhält sich so, als ob es die
Kastration erlitten hätte; ja, selbst wirk-
lliche Selbstkastrationen sind bei dieser
Affektion nicht selten. Was die Krankheit
sonst auszeichnet, die Sprachveränderungen,
uhalluziniert Stürme darf man in
das phylogenet. Bild nicht einbeziehen,
denn sie entsprechen den Heilungsver-
suchen, den vielfältigen Bemühungen,
als Objekt wiederzugewinnen, die
im Krankheitsbilde beinahe auffälliger

Zeitlang.
and replaced it with the victorious organization of brothers, provide the predisposition for the peculiar succession of moods that we acknowledge as a particular narcissistic disorder alongside the paraphrenias. The mourning about the primal father proceeds from identification with him, and such identification we have established as the prerequisite for the melancholic mechanism.

To summarize, we can say: If the dispositions to the three transference neuroses were acquired in the struggle with the exigencies of the Ice Age, then the fixations that underlie the narcissistic neuroses originate from the oppression by the father, who after the end of the Ice Age assumes, continues its role, as it were, against the second generation. As the first struggle leads to the patriarchal stage of civilization, the second (leads) to the social; but from both come the fixations which in their return after millennia become the disposition of the two groups of neuroses. Also in this sense neurosis is therefore a cultural acquisition. The parallel that has been sketched here may be no more than a playful comparison. The extent to which it may throw light on the still unsolved riddles of the neuroses should properly be left to further investigation, and illumination through new experiences.

44. Freud first wrote über (over), then um (about) (p. 20, l. 6).

45. This was in "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917c [1915]), one of the other metapsychological papers of 1915, which had already been completed when Freud was composing the present draft.

46. This gleichsam (as it were), evidently jotted down later, is located in the left margin of the manuscript (p. 20, l. 19). There is no clear indication of where Freud wanted to insert it.

47. At this point (p. 20, l. 35) is a fairly long horizontal line, Freud's sign for the end of the manuscript. What follows is the addition announced in the accompanying letter (pp. xvi-xvii above), a reaction to Ferenczi's letter. For additional details see pp. 80-81.
The assumption that the sons were treated in this way is related to a question that should be answered in passing. Where does replacement of and succession to the primal fathers come from when they get rid of the sons in such a way? 39 Atkinson [1903] already showed the way when he pointed out that only the older sons had to fear the full persecution of the father, but the youngest—schematically considered—thanks to the intercession of the mother, but mainly as a consequence of the father’s aging and his need to be helped, had the prospect of eluding this fate and becoming the father’s successor. This advantage of the youngest was totally eliminated in the subsequent social configuration and was replaced by the prerogative of the oldest. In myth and fairy tale, however, it remains highly recognizable.

5. The next change could only consist in the fact that the threatened sons avoided castration by means of flight and, allied with one another, learned to take upon themselves the struggle for survival. This living together had to bring social feelings to the fore and could have been built upon homosexual sexual satisfaction. It is very possible that the long-sought hereditary disposition of homosexuality can be glimpsed in the inheritance of this phase of the human condition. 40 The social feelings that originated here, sublimated from homosexuality, became mankind’s lasting possession, however, and the basis for every later society. This phase

39. In connection with this see Freud’s indication in the accompanying letter (above) that Ferenczi’s objection has been taken into consideration. For further details consult the essay “Metapsychology and Metabiology” later in this volume.

40. (The German word is Zustandsphase. In his letter to Ferenczi of July 12, 1915, translated by Ernest Jones (p. 79), Freud writes Zustandsphasen der Menschheit, which Jones translates as “phases in human conditions.”)
of the condition, however, manifestly brings back paranoia; more correctly, paranoia defends itself against its return. In (paranoia) secret alliances are not lacking, and the persecutor plays a tremendous role. Paranoia tries to ward off homosexuality, which was the basis for the organization of brothers, and in so doing must drive the victim out of society and destroy his social sublimations.

6. Ranking melancholia-mania in this context seems to encounter the difficulty that a normal time for the individual appearance of this neurotic illness cannot be determined with certainty. But it is definite that it belongs to the age of maturity rather than to that of childhood. If one looks at the characteristic alternation of depression and elation, it is difficult not to recall the very similar succession of triumph and mourning that forms a regular component of religious festivities: mourning over the death of the god, triumphal joy over his resurrection. This religious ceremony, however, as we have surmised from the statements of ethnopsychology, only recapitulates in reverse the attitude of the members of the brother clan after they have overpowered and killed the primal father: triumph over his death, then mourning over the fact that they all still revered him as a model. So might this great event of human history, which made an end of the primal horde

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41. In the manuscript (p. 19, l. 10) this und (and) is located at the end of the paragraph. Presumably Freud wanted to enter it at the above location, but there is no arrow.

42. “Neurotic” in this instance is used, obviously, in the sense of psychoneurosis, not of transference neurosis.

43. Here (p. 19, l. 32) Freud first wrote überfallen (attacked), then crossed out fallen and wrote wältigt (that is, überwältigt (overpowered)).
Now it is time to think [about a] series of objections, which caution us not
to overestimate the reconstructions we have arrived at. First, it [will be-
come] obvious to everyone that the second series of dispositions, those of
the second generation, can only be acquired by men (as sons), whereas
dementia praecox, paranoia, and melancholia can just as well be produced
by women. Women in primal times lived under even more diverse condi-
tions than they do today. Furthermore, there is attached to these disposi-
tions a difficulty of which those [of the] first series are free: they appear to
be acquired under conditions that exclude heredity. It is evident that the
castrated and intimidated sons do not procreate, therefore cannot pass on
their disposition (dementia praecox). Similarly, the ψ condition of the
banished sons, bound together in homosexuality, cannot influence the
next generations, for they die out as infertile branches of the family, as
long as they have not triumphed over the father. But if they do achieve
this triumph, then it is one generation’s experience that must be denied the
necessary unlimited reproduction.

As one can imagine, we need not be at a loss for particulars in such
obscure areas. The difficulty basically coincides with one that has been
posed earlier, namely, how the brutal father of the Ice Age, who was
certainly not immortal like his divine image, reproduced himself. Again
there appears the younger son, who later becomes a father—who, to be
sure, is not castrated himself, but knows the fate of his older

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Nun ist Zeit Reihe Einwendungen zu denken, die mahnen,
daß wir die erreichten Zurückführungen nicht überschätzen
sollen. Zunächst jedem aufdrängen, daß die zweite
Reihe der Dispositionen, die der zweiten Genera-
tion, nur von Männern (als Söhnen) erworb
werden konnten, während Dem pr, Paran
u Mel ebenso wohlf Frauen produzirt
werden. Frauen in Urzeit unter noch
mehr verschiedenen Bedingung gelebt
als heute. Sodann haftet an diesen Dispositionen
eine Schwierigkeit, von der die ersten
Reihe frei sind: Sie scheinen unter Bedingungen
erworben zu werden, die Vererbung aus-
schließen. Es ist evident, daß die kastrirten
u eingeschüchterten Söhne nicht zur Fortpflanzg
können, also ihre Disposition nicht fortsetzen
können (Dem pr): Aber ebensowenig
cann der ψ Zustand der ausgetriebenen
in Homosex verbundenen Söhne Einfluß
auf die nächsten Generationen nehmen
da sie als unfruchtbare Seitenzweige der
Familie erlöschen, so lange sie nicht über
den Vater triumphiert haben. Bringen
sie es aber zu diesem Triumph, so ist
es Erlebnis einer Generation, dem
man die notwendige unbegrenzte
Vervielfältigung absprechen muß. Wie
Wie sich denken läßt, braucht man
auf so dunklen Gebieten um Auskünfte
nicht verlegen zu sein. Die Schwierigkeit fällt
ja im Grunde mit einer früher aufgewor
zu-St zusammen, wie sich der brutale Vater
der Eiszeit, der ja nicht unsterblich war wie
sein göttliches Nachbild, fortgesetzt. Wieder
bietet sich der jüngere Sohn, der später zum
Vater wird, der zwar nicht selbst kastrirt
wird, aber das Schicksal seiner älteren
fears it for himself; he must have been tempted, like the more fortunate of them, to flee and to renounce women. So next to those men who fall by the wayside as infertile, there may remain a chain of others, who in their person go through the vicissitudes of the male sex and can propagate them as dispositions. The essential point of view remains firm, that for him [the younger son] the oppression of the father replaces the exigencies of the time.

The triumph over the father must have been planned and fantasized through countless generations before it was realized. How the dispositions produced by the father’s oppression spread to women seems in itself to create greater difficulties. The vicissitudes of women in these primeval times are especially obscure to us. Thus, conditions of life that we have not recognized may come into consideration. But we are spared the grossest difficulty by observing that we should not forget human bisexuality. Thus women can assume the dispositions acquired by men and bring them to light in themselves.

In the meantime let us make it clear that with these particulars we have basically done no more than save our scientific fantasies from being criticized as absurd. On the whole, they retain their value as a salutary rude awakening if we were perhaps on [the] way to placing the phylogenetic disposition above everything else. Thus, it does not come about that archaic
constitutions return in new individuals according to a predetermined ratio and force them into neurosis through conflict with the demands of the present. There remains room for new acquisition and for influences with which we are not acquainted. In sum, we are not at the end, but rather at the beginning, of an understanding of this phylogenetic factor.

48. This *nicht* (not) was perhaps subsequently placed at the beginning of p. 22, l. 37.