Einleitung

I. Transzendentale Elementarlehre
   Erster Teil. Transzendentale Ästhetik
   1. Abschnitt. Vom Raume
   2. Abschnitt. Von der Zeit

Zweiter Teil. Transzendentale Logik
   1. Abteilung. Transzendentale Analytik in zwei Büchern und deren verschiedenen Hauptstücken und Abschnitten
   2. Abteilung. Transzendentale Dialektik in zwei Büchern und deren verschiedenen Hauptstücken und Abschnitten

II. Transzendentale Methodenlehre
   1. Hauptstück. Die Disziplin der reinen Vernunft
   2. Hauptstück. Der Kanon der reinen Vernunft
   3. Hauptstück. Die Architektonik der reinen Vernunft
   4. Hauptstück. Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft
   4. Hauptstück. Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft
We have seen above that no objects can be represented through pure concepts of understanding, apart from the conditions of sensibility. For the conditions of the objective reality of the concepts are then absent, and nothing is to be found in them save the mere form of thought. If, however, they are applied to appearances, they can be exhibited in concreto, because in the appearances they obtain the appropriate material for concepts of experience—a concept of experience being nothing but a concept of understanding in concreto. But ideas are even further removed from objective reality than are categories, for no appearance can be found in which they can be represented in concreto. They contain a certain completeness to which no possible empirical knowledge ever attains. In them reason aims only at a systematic unity, to which it seeks to approximate the unity that is empirically possible, without ever completely reaching it.

But what I entitle the ideal seems to be further removed from objective reality even than the idea. By the ideal I understand the idea, not merely in concreto, but in individuo, that is, as an individual thing, determinable or even determined by the idea alone.

Humanity [as an idea] in its complete perfection contains not only all the essential qualities which belong to human nature and constitute our concept of it—and these so extended

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as to be in that complete conformity with their ends which would be our idea of perfect humanity—but also everything which, in addition to this concept, is required for the complete determination of the idea. For of all contradictory predicates one only [of each pair] can apply to the idea of the perfect man. What to us is an ideal was in Plato's view an idea of the divine understanding, an individual object of its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible being, and the archetype of all copies in the [field of] appearance.

Without soaring so high, we are yet bound to confess that human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals also, which although they do not have, like the Platonic ideas, creative power, yet have practical power (as regulative principles), and form the basis of the possible perfection of certain actions. Moral concepts, as resting on something empirical (pleasure or displeasure), are not completely pure concepts of reason. None the less, in respect of the principle whereby reason sets bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law, these concepts (when we attend merely to their form) may well serve as examples of pure concepts of reason. Virtue, and therewith human wisdom in its complete purity, are ideas. The wise man (of the Stoics) is, however, an ideal, that is, a man existing in thought only, but in complete conformity with the idea of wisdom. As the idea gives the rule, so the ideal in such a case serves as the archetype for the complete determination of the copy; and we have no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine man within us, with which we compare and judge ourselves, and so reform ourselves, although we can never attain to the perfection thereby prescribed. Although we cannot concede to these ideals objective reality (existence), they are not therefore to be regarded as figments of the brain; they supply reason with a standard which is indispensable to it, providing it, as they do, with a concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, and thereby enabling it to estimate and to measure the degree and the defects of the incomplete. But to attempt to realise the ideal in an example, that is, in the [field of] appearance, as, for instance, to depict the [character of the perfectly] wise man in a romance, is impracticable. There is indeed something absurd,

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\[\text{[Uegrund]}
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\[\text{Von dem Ideal überhaupt}
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von derselben ausmachen, bis zur vollständigen Kongruenz mit ihren Zwecken, welches unsere Idee der vollkommenen Menschheit sein würde, sondern auch alles, was außer diesem Begriffe zu der durchgängigen Bestimmung der Idee gehört; denn von allen entgegengesetzten Prädikaten kann sich doch nur ein einziges zu der Idee des vollkommensten Menschen schicken. Was uns ein Ideal ist, war dem Plato eine Idee des göttlichen Verstandes, ein einzeller Gegenstand in der reinen Anschauung desselben, das Vollkommenste einer jeden Art möglicher Wesen und der Urgrund aller Nachbilder in der Erscheinung. || Ohne uns aber so weit zu versteigen, müssen wir gestehen, daß die menschliche Vernunft nicht allein Ideen, sondern auch Ideale enthalte, die zwar nicht, wie die platonischen, schöpferische, aber doch praktische Kraft (als regulative Prinzipien) haben, und der Möglichkeit der Vollkommenheit gewisser Handlungen zum Grunde liegen. Moralische Begriffe sind nicht gänzlich reine Vernunftbegriffe, weil ihnen etwas Empirisches (Lust oder Unlust) zum Grunde liegt. Gleichwohl können sie in Anschauung des Prinzips, wodurch die Vernunft der an sich gesetzlosen Freiheit Schranken setzt (also wenn man bloß auf ihre Form Acht hat), gar wohl zum Beispiel reiner Vernunftbegriffe dienen. Tugend, und, mit ihr, menschliche Weisheit in ihrer ganzen Reimigkeit, sind Ideen. Aber der Weise (des Stoikers) ist ein Ideal, d. i. ein Mensch, der bloß in Gedanken existiert, der aber mit der Idee der Weisheit völlig kongruieret. So wie die Idee die Regel gibt, so dient das Ideal in solchem Falle zum Urilde der durchgängigen Bestimmung des Nachbildes, und wir haben kein anderes Richtmaß unserer Handlungen, als das Verhalten dieses göttlichen Menschen in uns, womit wir uns vergleichen, beurteilen, und dadurch uns bessern, obgleich es niemals erreichen können. Diese Ideale, ob man ihnen gleich nicht objektive Realität (Existenz) zugestehen möchte, sind doch um deswillen nicht für Hörngespinstes anzusehen, sondern geben ein unentbehrliches Richtmaß der Vernunft ab, die des Begriffs von dem, was || in seiner Art ganz vollständig ist, bedarf, um darnach den Grad und die Mängel des Unvollständigen zu schätzen und abzumessen: Das Ideal aber in einem Beispielen, d. i. in der Erscheinung, realisieren wollen, wie etwa die Wesen in einem Roman, ist unmöglich, und hat überdem etwas Widersinnisches und wenig Erbau
and far from edifying, in such an attempt, inasmuch as the natural limitations, which are constantly doing violence to the completeness of the idea, make the illusion that is aimed at altogether impossible, and so cast suspicion on the good itself—the good that has its source in the idea—by giving it the air of being a mere fiction.

Such is the nature of the ideal of reason, which must always rest on determinate concepts and serve as a rule and archetype, alike in our actions and in our critical judgments. The products of the imagination are of an entirely different nature; no one can explain or give an intelligible concept of them; each is a kind of monogram, a mere set of particular qualities, determined by no assignable rule, and forming rather a blurred sketch drawn from diverse experiences than a determinate image—a representation such as painters and physiognomists profess to carry in their heads, and which they treat as being an incommunicable shadowy image of their creations or even of their critical judgments. Such representations may be entitled, though improperly, ideals of sensibility, inasmuch as they are viewed as being models (not indeed realisable) of possible empirical intuitions, and yet furnish no rules that allow of being explained and examined.

Reason, in its ideal, aims, on the contrary, at complete determination in accordance with a priori rules. Accordingly it thinks for itself an object which it regards as being completely determinable in accordance with principles. The conditions that are required for such determination are not, however, to be found in experience, and the concept itself is therefore transcendent.

CHAPTER III

Section 2

THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAL

(Prototypon Transcendentale)

Every concept is, in respect of what is not contained in it, undetermined, and is subject to the principle of determin-

{l_Schattenbild.}
ability According to this principle, of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only one can belong to a concept. This principle is based on the law of contradiction, and is therefore a purely logical principle. As such, it abstracts from the entire content of knowledge and is concerned solely with its logical form.

But every thing, as regards its possibility, is likewise subject to the principle of complete determination, according to which if all the possible predicates of things be taken together with their contradictory opposites, then one of each pair of contradictory opposites must belong to it. This principle does not rest merely on the law of contradiction; for, besides considering each thing in its relation to the two contradictory predicates, it also considers it in its relation to the sum-total of all possibilities, that is, to the sum-total of all predicates of things. Presupposing this sum as being an a priori condition, it proceeds to represent everything as deriving its own possibility from the share which it possesses in this sum of all possibilities. The principle of complete determination concerns, therefore, the content, and not merely the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates which are intended to constitute the complete concept of a thing, and not simply a principle of analytic representation in reference merely to one of two contradictory predicates. It contains a transcendental presupposition, namely, that of the material for all possibility, which in turn is regarded as containing a priori the data for the particular possibility of each and every thing.

The proposition, everything which exists is completely determined, does not mean only that one of every pair of given contradictory predicates, but that one of every [pair of] possible...

Grundsätze der Bestimmbarkeit: daß nur eines von jedem zwei einander kontradiktoric-entgegengesetzten Prädikaten, ihm zukommen könne, welcher auf dem Satze des Widerspruchs beruht, und daher ein bloß logisches Prinzip ist, das von allem Inhalte der Erkenntnis abstrahiert, und nichts, als die logische Form derselben vor Augen hat.

Ein jedes Ding aber, seiner möglichkeit nach, steht noch unter dem Grundsatz der durchgängigen Bestimmung, nach welchem ihm von allen möglichen Prädikaten der "Dinge, so fern sie mit ihren Gegenteilen verglichen werden, eines zukommen muß. Dieses beruht nicht bloß auf dem Satze des Widerspruchs; denn es betrachtet, außer dem Verhältnis zweier einander-widerstehenden Prädikate, jedes Ding noch im Verhältniss auf die gesamte Möglichkeit, als den Inbegriff aller Prädikate der Dinge überhaupt, und, indem es solche als Bedingung a priori voraussetzt, so stellt es ein jedes Ding so vor, wie es von dem Anteil, den es an jener gesamten Möglichkeit hat, seine eigene Möglichkeit ableite. Das Principium der durchgängigen Bestimmung betrifft also den Inhalt und nicht bloß die logische Form. Es ist der Grundsatz der Synthesis aller Prädikate, die den vollständigen Begriff von einem Dinge machen sollen, und nicht bloß der analytischen Vorstellung, durch eines zweier entgegengesetzten Prädikaten, und enthält eine transzendentalen Voraussetzung, nämlich die der Materie zu aller Möglichkeit, welche a priori die Dinge zur besonderen Möglichkeit jedes Dinges enthalten soll.

Der Satz: alles Existirende ist durchgängig bestimmt, bedeutet nicht allein, daß von jedem Paare einander entgegengesetzter gegebenen, sondern auch von

* Es wird also durch diesen Grundsatz jedes Ding auf ein gemeinschaftliches Correlatum, nämlich die gesamte Möglichkeit, bezogen, welche, wenn sie (d. i. der Stoff zu allen möglichen Prädikaten) in der Idee eines einzigen Dinges angetroffen würde, eine Affinität alle Möglichen durch die Identität des Grundsatzes der durchgängigen Bestimmung dasselbe beweisen würde. Die Bestimmbarkeit jedes Begriffs ist der Allgemeinheit (universalitas) des Grundsatzes der Ausschließung eines Mittleren zwischen zwei entgegengesetzten Prädikaten, die Bestimmung aber eines Dinges der Allheit (universalitas) oder dem Inbegriffe aller möglichen Prädikate untergeordnet.
predicates, must always belong to it. In terms of this proposition the predicates are not merely compared with one another logically, but the thing itself is compared, in transcendental fashion, with the sum of all possible predicates. What the proposition therefore asserts is this: that to know a thing completely, we must know every possible predicate, and must determine it thereby, either affirmatively or negatively. The complete determination is thus a concept, which, in its totality, can never be exhibited in concreto. It is based upon an idea, which has its seat solely in the faculty of reason—the faculty which prescribes to the understanding the rule of its complete employment.

Although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility, in so far as it serves as the condition of the complete determination of each and every thing, is itself undetermined in respect of the predicates which may constitute it, and is thought by us as being nothing more than the sum-total of all possible predicates, we yet find, on closer scrutiny, that this idea, as a primordial concept, excludes a number of predicates which as derivative are already given through other predicates or which are incompatible with others; and that it does, indeed, define itself as a concept that is completely determinate a priori. It thus becomes the concept of an individual object which is completely determined through the mere idea, and must therefore be entitled an ideal of pure reason.

When we consider all possible predicates, not merely logically, but transcendently, that is, with reference to such content as can be thought a priori as belonging to them, we find that through some of them we represent a being, through others a mere not-being. Logical negation, which is indicated simply through the word not, does not properly refer to a concept, but only to its relation to another concept in a judgment, and is therefore quite insufficient to determine a concept in respect of its content. The expression non-mortal does not enable us to declare that we are thereby representing in the object a mere not-being; the expression leaves all content unaffected. A transcendental negation, on the other hand, signifies not-being in itself, and is opposed to transcendental affirmation, which is a something the very concept of which

\[ \text{IDEAL OF PURE REASON} \]

\[\text{489}\]

\[\text{516 TRANSZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK}\]

\[\text{Allen möglichen Prädikaten ihm immer eines zukomme; es werden durch diesen Satz nicht bloß Prädikate unter einander logisch, sondern das Ding selbst, mit dem Inbegriffe aller möglichen Prädikate, transzendenten Vergleichen. Er will so viel sagen, als: um ein Ding vollständig zu erkennen, muß man alles Mögliche erkennen, und es dadurch, es sei bejahend oder verneinend, bestimmen. Die durchgängige Bestimmung ist folglich ein Begriff, den wir niemals in concreto seiner Totalität nach darstellen können, und gründet sich also auf einer Idee, welche lediglich in der Vernunft ihren Sitz hat, die dem Verstande die Regel seines vollständigen Gebrauchs vorschreibt.}\]

\[\text{Ob nun zwar diese Idee von dem Inbegriffe aller Möglichkeit, so fern er als Bedingung der durchgängigen Bestimmung eines jeden Dinges zum Grunde liegt, in Ansehung der Prädikate, die denselben ausmachen mögen, selbst noch unbestimmt ist, und wir dadurch nichts weiter als einen Inbegriff aller möglichen Prädikate überhaupt denken, so finden wir doch bei näherer Untersuchung, daß diese Idee, als Urbegriff, eine Menge von Prädikaten ausstoße, die als abgeleitet durch andere schon gegeben sind, oder neben einander nicht stehen können, und daß sie sich bis zu einem durchgängig a priori bestimmten Begriffe läßt und der Begriff von einem einzelnen Genstande werde, der durch die bloße Idee durchgängig bestimmt ist, in einem Ideal der reinen Vernunft genannt werden muß.}\]

\[\text{Wenn wir alle möglichen Prädikate nicht bloß logisch, sondern transzendent, d. i. nach ihrem Inhalte, der an ihnen a priori gedacht werden kann, erwägen, so finden wir, daß durch einige derselben ein Sein, durch andere ein bloßes Nichtsein vorgestellt wird. Die logische Verneinung, die lediglich durch das Wörtchen: Nicht, angezeigt wird, hängt eigentlich niemals einem Begriffe, sondern nur dem Verhältnisse desselben zu einem andern im Urteile an, und kann also dazu bei weitem nicht hinreichend sein, einen Begriff in Ansehung seines Inhalts zu bezeichnen. Der Ausdruck: Nichtsterblich, kann gar nicht zu erkennen geben, daß dadurch ein bloßes Nichtsein am Gegenstande vorge stellt werde, sondern läßt allen Inhalt unberührt. Eine transzendentale Verneinung bedeutet: dagegen das Nicht sein an sich selbst, dem die transzendentale Bejahung entgegengesetzt wird, welche ein Etwas ist, dessen Begriff an}\]
in itself expresses a being. Transcendental affirmation is therefore entitled reality, because through it alone, and so far only as it reaches, are objects something (things), whereas its opposite, negation, signifies a mere want, and, so far as it alone is thought, represents the abrogation of all thinghood.

Now no one can think a negation determinately, save by basing it upon the opposed affirmation. Those born blind cannot have the least notion of darkness, since they have none of light. The savage knows nothing of poverty, since he has no acquaintance with wealth. The ignorant have no concept of their ignorance, because they have none of knowledge, etc. All concepts of negations are thus derivative; it is the realities which contain the data, and, so to speak, the material or transcendental content, for the possibility and complete determination of all things.

If, therefore, reason employs in the complete determination of things a transcendental substrate that contains, as it were, the whole store of material from which all possible predicates of things must be taken, this substrate cannot be anything else than the idea of an omnitudo realitatis. All true negations are nothing but limitations—a title which would be inapplicable, were they not thus based upon the unlimited, that is, upon "the All".

But the concept of what thus possesses all reality is just the concept of a thing in itself as completely determined; and since in all possible [pairs of] contradictory predicates one predicate, namely, that which belongs to being absolutely, is to be found in its determination, the concept of an ens realissimum is the concept of an individual being. It is therefore a transcendental ideal which serves as basis for the complete deter-

* The observations and calculations of astronomers have taught us much that is wonderful; but the most important lesson that they have taught us has been by revealing the abyss of our ignorance, which otherwise we could never have conceived to be so great. Reflection upon the ignorance thus disclosed must produce a great change in our estimate of the purposes for which our reason should be employed. [In both A and B this note is attached, presumably by inadvertence, to the preceding sentence.]

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VON DEM TRANSCENDENTALEN IDEAL

sich selbst schon ein Sein ausdrückt, und daher Realität (Sachheit) genannt wird, weil durch sie allein, und so weit sie reicht, Gegenstände Etwas (Dinge) sind, die entgegenstehende Negation hingegen einen bloßen Mangel bedeutet, und, wo diese allein gedacht wird, die Aufhebung alles Dinges vorgestellt wird.

Nun kann sich niemand eine Verneinung bestimmen denken, ohne daß er die entgegengesetzte Bejahung zum Grunde liegen habe. Der Blindgeborne kann sich nicht die mindeste Vorstellung von Finsternis machen, weil er keine Lichte hat; der Wilde nicht von der Armut, weil er den Wohlstand nicht kennt. Der Unwissende hat keinen Begriff von seiner Unwissenheit, weil er keinen von der Wissenschat u. s. w. Es sind also auch alle Begriffe der Negationen abgeleitet, und die Realitäten enthalten die Data und so zu sagen die Materie, oder den transcendentalen Inhalt, zu der Möglichkeit und durchgängigen Bestimmung aller Dinge.

Wenn also der durchgängigen Bestimmung in unserer Vernunft ein transzendentales Substratum zum Grunde gelegt wird, welches gleichsam den ganzen Vorrat des Stoffes, daher alle mögliche Prädikate der Dinge genommen werden können, enthält, so ist dieses Substratum nichts anders, als die Idee von einem All der Realität (omnitudo realitatis). Alle wahre Verneinungen sind alsdenn nichts als Schranken, welches sie nicht genannt werden könnten, wenn nicht das Unbeschränkte (das All) zum Grunde lage.

Es ist aber auch durch diesen Allbesitz der-Realität der Begriff eines Dinges an sich selbst, als durchgängig bestimmt, vorgestellt, und der Begriff eines entis realissimi ist der Begriff eines einzelnen Wesens, weil von allen möglichen entgegengesetzten Prädikaten eines, nämlich das was zum Sein schlechthin gehört, in seiner Bestimmung angetroffen wird. Also ist es ein transzendentales Ideal, welches der...
mination that necessarily belongs to all that exists. This ideal is the supreme and complete material condition of the possibility of all that exists—the condition to which all thought of objects, so far as their content is concerned, has to be traced back. It is also the only true ideal of which human reason is capable. For only in this one case is a concept of a thing—a concept which is in itself universal—completely determined in and through itself, and known as the representation of an individual.

The logical determination of a concept by reason is based upon a disjunctive syllogism, in which the major premise contains a logical division (the division of the sphere of a universal concept), the minor premise limiting this sphere to a certain part, and the conclusion determining the concept by means of this part. The universal concept of a reality in general cannot be divided a priori, because without experience we do not know any determinate kinds of reality which would be contained under that genus. The transcendental major premise which is presupposed in the complete determination of all things is therefore no other than the representation of the sum of all reality; it is not merely a concept which, as regards its transcendental content, comprehends all predicates under itself; it also contains them within itself; and the complete determination of any and every thing rests on the limitation of this total reality, inasmuch as part of it is ascribed to the thing, and the rest is excluded—a procedure which is in agreement with the 'either—or' of the disjunctive major premise and with the determination of the object, in the minor premise, through one of the members of the division. Accordingly, reason, in employing the transcendental ideal as that by reference to which it determines all possible things, is proceeding in a manner analogous with its procedure in disjunctive syllogisms—this, indeed, is the principle upon which I have based the systematic division of all transcendental ideas, as parallel with, and corresponding to, the three kinds of syllogism.

It is obvious that reason, in achieving its purpose, that namely, of representing the necessary complete determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being that corresponds to this ideal, but only the idea of such a being, and this only for the purpose of deriving from an unconditioned

\[\text{VON DEM TRANSCENDENTALEN IDEAL}\]

throughgängigen Bestimmung, die notwendig bei allem, was existiert, angetroffen wird, zum Grunde liegt, und die oberste und vollständige materiale Bedingung seiner Möglichkeit ausmacht, auf welcher alles Denken der Gegenstände überhaupt ihrem Inhalte nach zurückgeführt werden muß. Es ist aber auch das einzige eigentliche Ideal, dessen die menschliche Vernunft fähig ist; weil nur in diesem einzigen Falle ein an sich allgemeiner Begriß von einem Dinge durch sich selbst durchgängig bestimmt, und als die Vorstellung von einem Individuum erkannt wird.

Die logische Bestimmung eines Begrißes durch die Vernunft beruht auf einem disjunktiven Vernunftsschluß, in welchem der Obersatz eine logische Einteilung (die Teilung der Sphäre eines allgemeinen Begrißes) enthält, der Untersatz diese Sphäre bis auf einen Teil einschränkt und der Schlußsatz den Begriß durch diesen bestimmt. Der allgemeine Begriß einer Realität überhaupt kann a priori nicht eingeteilt werden, weil man ohne Erfahrung keine bestimmten Arten von Realität kennt, die unter jener Gattung enthalten wären. Also ist der transcendente Obersatz der durchgängigen Bestimmung aller Dinge nicht anders, als die Vorstellung des Inbegriffes aller Realität, nicht bloß ein Begriß, der alle Prädikate ihrem transcendentalen Inhalte nach unter sich, sondern der sie sich behagt und die durchgängige Bestimmung eines jeden Dinges beruht auf der Einschränkung dieses All der Realität, indem einiges derselben dem Dinge beigelegt, das übrige aber ausgeschlossen wird, welches mit dem Entweder und Oder des disjunktiven Obersatzes und der Bestimmung des Gegenstandes, durch eins der Glieder dieser Teilung im Untersatz, übereinkommt. Demnach ist der Gebrauch der Vernunft, durch den sie das transcendente Ideal zum Grunde ihrer Bestimmung aller möglichen Dinge legt, denjenigen analogisch, nach welchem sie in disjunktiven Vernunftsschluß verfährt, welches der Satz war, den ich oben zum Grunde der systematischen Einteilung aller transcendentalen Ideen legte, nach welchem sie den drei Arten von Vernunftsschluß parallel und korrespondierend erzeugt werden.

Es versteht sich von selbst, daß die Vernunft zu dieser ihrer Absicht, nämlich sich lediglich die notwendige durchgängige Bestimmung der Dinge vorzustellen, nicht die Existenz eines solchen Wesens, das dem Ideale gemäß ist, sondern nur die Idee desselben voraussetzen, um von einer
unbedingten Totalität der durchgängigen Bestimmung die bedingte, d. i. die des Eingeschränkten abzuleiten. Das Ideal ist ihr also das Urbild (prototypon) aller Dinge, welche insgesamt, als mangelhafte Kopeien (ectypa), den Stoff zu ihrer Möglichkeit daher nehmen, und, indem sie derselben mehr oder weniger nahe kommen, dennoch jederzeit unendlich weit daran fehlen; es zu erreichen.

So wird denn alle Möglichkeit der Dinge (der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen ihrem Inhalte nach) als abgeleitet und nur alle die desjenigen, was alle Realität in sich schließt, als ursprünglich angesehen. Denn alle Verneinungen (welche doch die einzigen Prädikate sind, wodurch sich alles andere vom realsten Wesen unterscheiden läßt) sind bloße Einschränkungen einer größeren und endlich der höchsten Realität, mithin setzen sie diese voraus; und sind dem Inhalte nach von ihr bloß abgeleitet. Alle Mannigfaltigkeit der Dinge ist nur eine ebene so vielärtige Art, den Begriff der höchsten Realität, der ihr gemeinschaftliches Substratum ist, einzuschranken, so wie alle Figuren nur als verschiedene Arten, den unendlichen Raum einzuschränken, möglich sind. Daher wird der bloß in der Vernunft befindliche Gegenstand ihres Ideals auch das Urwesen (ens originarium), so fern es keines übers sich hat, das höchste Wesen (ens summum), und, so fern alles, als bedingt, unter ihm steht, das Wesen aller Wesen (ens entium) genannt. Alles dieses aber bedeutet nicht das objektive Verhältnis eines wirklichen Gegenstandes zu andern Dingen, sondern der Idee zu Begriffen, und läßt uns wegen der Existenz eines Wesens von so ausnehmendem Vorzuge in völligem Unwissenheit.

Weil man auch nicht sagen kann, daß ein Urwesen aus viel abgeleiteten Wesen bestehe, indem ein jedes derselben jenes voraussetzt, mithin es nicht ausmachen kann, so wird das Ideal des Urwesens auch als einfach gedacht werden müssen.

Die Ableitung aller anderen Möglichkeit von diesem Urwesen wird daher, genau zu reden, auch nicht als eine Einschränkung seiner höchsten Realität und gleichsam als eine Teilung derselben angesehen werden können; denn alsdenn würde das Urwesen als ein bloßes Aggregat von abgeleiteten Wesen angesehen werden, welches nach dem Vorigen unmöglich ist, ob wir es gleich anfänglich im ersten rohen Schattenrisse so vorstellten. Vielmehr würde der
realities must condition the possibility of all things as their ground, not as their sum; and the manifoldness of things must therefore rest, not on the limitation of the primordial being itself, but on all that follows from it, including therein all our sensibility, and all reality in the [field of] appearance—existences of a kind which cannot, as ingredients, belong to the idea of the supreme being.

If, in following up this idea of ours, we proceed to hypothetise it, we shall be able to determine the primordial being through the mere concept of the highest reality, as a being that is one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, etc. In short, we shall be able to determine it, in its unconditioned completeness, through all predicaments. The concept of such a being is the concept of God, taken in the transcendental sense; and the ideal of pure reason, as above defined, is thus the object of a transcendental theology.

In any such use of the transcendental idea we should, however, be overstepping the limits of its purpose and validity. For reason, in employing it as a basis for the complete determination of things, has used it only as the concept of all reality, without requiring that all this reality be objectively given and be itself a thing. Such a thing is a mere fiction in which we combine and realise the manifold of our idea in an ideal, as an individual being. But we have no right to do this, nor even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis. Nor do any of the consequences which flow from such an ideal have any bearing upon the complete determination of things, or exercise in that regard the least influence; and it is solely as aiding in their determination that the idea has been shown to be necessary.

But merely to describe the procedure of our reason and its dialectic does not suffice; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this dialectic, that we may be able to explain, as a phenomenon of the understanding, the illusion to which it has given rise. For the ideal, of which we are speaking, is based on a natural, not on a merely arbitrary idea. The question to be raised is therefore this: how does it happen that reason regards all possibility of things as derived from one single fundamental possibility, namely, that of the highest

VON DEM TRANSZENDENTALEN IDEAL

Möglichkeit aller Dinge die höchste Realität als ein Grund und nichts als. Ein begriff zum Grunde liegen, und die Mannigfaltigkeit der ersteren nicht auf der Einschränkung des Urwesens selbst, sondern seiner vollständigen Folge beruhen, zu, welcher denn auch unsere ganze Sinnlichkeit, samt aller Realität in der Erscheinung, gehören würde, die zu der Idee des höchsten Wesens, als ein Ingrediens, nicht gehören kann.

Wenn wir nun dieser unserer Idee, indem wir sie hypothetisieren, so fernher nachgehen, so werden wir das Urwesen durch den bloßen Begriff der höchsten Realität als ein einiges, einfaches, allgenügsames, ewiges etc., mit einem Worte, es in seiner unbedingten Vollständigkeit durch alle Prädikamente bestimmen können. Der Begriff eines solchen Wesens ist der von Gott, in transzendentalem Verstande gedacht, und so ist das Ideal der reinen Vernunft der Gegenstand einer transzendentalen Theologie, so wie ich es auch oben angeführt habe.

Indessen würde dieser Gebrauch der transzendenten Idee doch schon die Grenzen ihrer bestimmung zu- lasigkeit überschreiten. Denn die Vernunft legte sie nur, als den Begriff von aller Realität, der durchgängige Bestimmung der Dinge überhaupt zum Grunde, ohne zu verlangen, daß alle diese Realität objektiv gegeben sei und selbst ein Ding ausmache. Dieses letztere ist eine bloße Er- dichtung, durch welche wir das Mannigfaltige unserer Idee in einem Ideale, als einem besonderen Wesen, zusammenfassen und realisieren, wozu wir keine Befugnis haben, so gar nicht einmal, die Möglichkeit einer solchen Hypothese geradezu anzunehmen, wie denn auch alle Folgerungen, die aus einem solchen Ideale abfließen, die durchgängige Be- stimmung der Dinge überhaupt, als zu deren Behuf die Idee allein nötig war, nichts angehen, und darauf nicht den mindesten Einfluß haben.

Es ist nicht genug, das Verfahren unserer Vernunft und ihre Dialektik zu beschreiben, man muß auch die Quellen derselben zu entdecken suchen, um diesen Schein selbst, wie ein Phänomen des Verstandes, erklären zu können, denn das Ideal, wovon wir reden, ist auf einer natürlichen und nicht bloß willkürlich Idee gegründet. Daher frage ich: wie kommt die Vernunft dazu, alle Möglichkeit der Dinge als abgeleitet von einer einzigen, die zum Grunde liegt, näm-
reality, and thereupon presupposes this to be contained in an individual primordial being?

The answer is obvious from the discussions in the Transcendental Analytic. The possibility of the objects of the senses is a relation of these objects to our thought, in which something (namely, the empirical form) can be thought a priori, while that which constitutes the matter, reality in the [field of] appearance (that which corresponds to sensation), must be given, since otherwise it could not even be thought, nor its possibility represented. Now an object of the senses can be completely determined only when it is compared with all the predicates that are possible in the [field of] appearance, and by means of them is represented either affirmatively or negatively. But since that which constitutes the thing itself, namely, the real in the [field of] appearance, must be given—otherwise the thing could not be conceived at all—and since that wherein the real of all appearances is given is experience, considered as single and all-embracing, the material for the possibility of all objects of the senses must be presupposed as given in one whole; and it is upon the limitation of this whole that all possibility of empirical objects, their distinction from each other and their complete determination, can alone be based. No other objects, besides those of the senses, can, as a matter of fact, be given to us, and nowhere save in the context of a possible experience; and consequently nothing is an object for us, unless it presupposes the sum of all empirical reality as the condition of its possibility. Now owing to a natural illusion we regard this principle, which applies only to those things which are given as objects of our senses, as being a principle which must be valid of things in general. Accordingly, omitting this limitation, we treat the empirical principle of our concepts of the possibility of things, viewed as appearances, as being a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general.

If we thereupon proceed to hypostatise this idea of the sum of all reality, that is because we substitute dialectically for the distributive unity of the empirical employment of the understanding, the collective unity of experience as a whole;

1 [besonderen.] 2 [Reading, with Hartenstein, dieselben für dieselbe.]

D 581

A 581

B 510

llich der der höchsten Realität, anzusehen, und diese sodann, als in einem besonderen Urwesen enthalten, vorauszusetzen?

Die Antwort bietet sich aus den Verhandlungen der transcendentalen Analytik von selbst dar. Die Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Sinne ist ein Verhältnis derselben zu unserm Denken; worin etwas (nämlich die empirische Form) a priori gedacht werden kann, dasjenige aber, was die Materie ausmacht, die Realität in der Erscheinung (was der Empfindung entspricht), gegeben sein muß, ohne welches es auch gar nicht gedacht und mithin seine Möglichkeit nicht vorgestellt werden könnte. Nun kann ein Gegenstand der Sinne nur durchgängig bestimmt werden, wenn er mit allen Prädikaten der Erscheinung verglichen und durch dieselbe bejahend oder verneinend vorgestellt wird. Weil aber darin dasjenige, was das Ding selbst (in der Erscheinung) ausmacht, nämlich das Reale, gegeben sein muß, ohne welches es auch gar nicht gedacht werden könnte; dasjenige aber, worin das Reale aller Erscheinungen gegeben ist, die einige allbefassende Erfahrung ist: so muß die Materie zur Möglichkeit aller Gegenstände der Sinne, als in einem Inbegriffe gegeben, vorausgesetzt werden, auf dessen Einschränkung allein alle Möglichkeit empirischer Gegenstände, ihr Unterschied von einander und ihre durchgängige Bestimmung, beruhen kann. Nun können uns in der Tat keine andere Gegenstände, als die der Sinne, und nirgend, als in dem Kontext einer möglichen Erfahrung gegeben werden, folglich ist nichts für uns ein Gegenstand, wenn es nicht den Inbegriff aller empirischen Realität als Bedingung seiner Möglichkeit voraussetzt. Nach einer natürlichen Illusion sehen wir nun das für einen Grundsatz an, der von allen Dingen überhaupt gelten müsse, welcher eigentlich nur von denen gilt, die als Gegenstände unserer Sinne gegeben werden. Folglich werden wir das empirische Prinzip unserer Begriffe der Möglichkeit der Dinge, als Erscheinungen, durch Weglassung dieser Einschränkung, für ein transcendentes Prinzip der Möglichkeit der Dinge überhaupt halten.

Daß wir aber hernach diese Idee vom Inbegriffe aller Realität hypostasieren, kommt daher: weil wir die distributive Einheit des Erfahrungsgebrauchs des Verstandes in die kollektive Einheit eines Erfahrungsganzen dialektisch
and then thinking this whole [realm] of appearance as one single thing that contains all empirical reality in itself; and then again, in turn, by means of the above-mentioned transcendental subreption, substituting for it the concept of a thing which stands at the source of the possibility of all things, and supplies the real conditions for their complete determination.  

CHAPTER III

Section 3

THE ARGUMENTS OF SPECULATIVE REASON IN PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING

Notwithstanding this pressing need of reason to presuppose something that may afford the understanding a sufficient foundation for the complete determination of its concepts, it is yet much too easily conscious of the ideal and merely fictitious character of such a presupposition to allow itself, on this ground alone, to be persuaded that a mere creature of its own thought is a real being—were it not that it is impelled from another direction to seek a resting-place in the regress from the conditioned, which is given, to the unconditioned. This unconditioned is not, indeed, given as being in itself real, nor as having a reality that follows from its mere concept; it is, however, what alone can complete the series of conditions when we proceed to trace these conditions to their grounds. This is the course which our human reason, by its very nature, leads all of us, even the least reflective, to adopt, though not everyone continues to pursue it. It begins not with concepts, but with common experience, and thus bases itself on some

This ideal of the ens realissimum, although it is indeed a mere representation, is first realised, that is, made into an object, then hypothesised, and finally, by the natural progress of reason towards the completion of unity, is, as we shall presently show, personified. For the regulative unity of experience is not based on the appearances themselves (on sensibility alone), but on the connection of the manifold through the understanding (in an apperception); and consequently the unity of the supreme reality and the complete determinability (possibility) of all things seems to lie in a supreme understanding, and therefore in an intelligence.

BEWEISGRÜNDE DER SPEKULATIVEN VERNUNFT

verwandeln, und an diesem Ganzen der Erscheinung uns ein einzelnes Ding denken, was alle empirische Realität in sich enthält, welches denn, vermittelt der | schon gedachten transcendentalen Subreption, mit dem Begriffe eines Dinges verwechselt wird, was an der Spitze der Möglichkeit aller Dinge steht, zu deren durchgängiger Bestimmung es die realen Bedingungen hergibt.  

DESER Dritten Hauptsckus

Dritter Abschnitt

VON DEN BEWEISGRÜNDE DER SPEKULATIVEN VERNUNFT, AUF DAS DASEIN EINES HÖCHSTEN WesENS ZU SCHLIESSEN

Ungesucht dieser dringend Bedürfnifs der Vernunft, etwas vorauszusetzen, was dem Verände zu der durchgängigen Bestimmung seiner Begriffe vollständig zum Grunde liegen könne, so bemerkt sie doch das Idealsche und bloß Gedichtete einer solchen Voraussetzung viel zu leicht, als daß sie darzufällen überführt werden sollte, ein | bloßes Selbstgeschöpf ihres Denkens sofort für ein wirkliches Wesen anzunehmen, wenn sie nicht wodurch anders gedrungen würde, irgendwo ihren Ruhestand, in dem Regressus vom Bedingten, das gegeben ist, zum Unbedingten, zu suchen, das zwar an sich und seinem bloßen Begriff nach nicht als wirklich gegeben ist, welches aber allein die Reihe der zu ihren Gründen hinausgeführten Bedingungen vollend kann. Dieses ist nun der natürliche Gang, den jede menschliche Vernunft, selbst die gemeinsteste, nimmt; obgleich nicht jede eine in demselben aushält. Sie fängt nicht von Begriffen, sondern von der gemeinen Erfahrung an, und legt also

* Dieses Ideal des allerehesten Wesens wird also, ob es zwar eine bloße Vorstellung ist, zuerst realisiert, d. i. zum Objekt gemacht, darauf hypothetisch, endlich, durch einen natürlichen Fortschritt der Vernunft zur Vollendung der Einheit, so gut personifiziert, wie wir bald anführen werden; weil die regulative Einheit der Erhärung nicht auf den Erscheinungen selbst (der Sinnlichkeit allein), sondern auf der Verknüpfung ihres Mannigfaltigen durch den Verstand (in einer Apperception) beruht, mithin die Einheit der höchsten Realität und die durchgängige Bestimmbarkeit (Möglichkeit) aller Dinge in einem höchsten Verstände, mithin in einer Intelligenz zu liegen scheint.
thing actually existing. But if this ground does not rest upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary, it yields beneath our feet. And this latter support is itself in turn without support, if there be any empty space beyond and under it, and if it does not itself so fill all things as to leave no room for any further question—unless, that is to say, it be infinite in its reality.

If we admit something as existing, no matter what this something may be, we must also admit that there is something which exists necessarily. For the contingent exists only under the condition of some other contingent existence as its cause, and from this again we must infer yet another cause, until we are brought to a cause which is not contingent, and which is therefore unconditionally necessary. This is the argument upon which reason bases its advance to the primordial being.

Now reason looks around for a concept that squares with so supreme a mode of existence as that of unconditioned necessity—not for the purpose of inferring a priori from the concept the existence of that for which it stands (for if that were what it claimed to do, it ought to limit its enquiries to mere concepts, and would not then require a given existence as its basis), but solely in order to find among its various concepts that concept which is in no respect incompatible with absolute necessity. For that there must be something that exists with absolute necessity, is regarded as having been established by the first step in the argument. If, then, in removing everything which is not compatible with this necessity, only one existence remains, this existence must be the absolutely necessary being, whether or not its necessity be comprehensible, that is to say, deducible from its concept alone.

Now that which in its concept contains a therefore for every wherefore, that which is in no respect defective, that which is in every way sufficient as a condition, seems to be precisely the being to which absolute necessity can fittingly be ascribed. For while it contains the conditions of all that is possible, it itself does not require and indeed does not allow of any condition, and therefore satisfies, at least in this one feature, the concept of unconditioned necessity. In this respect all other concepts must fall short of it; for since they are deficient and in need of completion, they cannot have as

524  TRANZSENDENTALE DIALEKT

etwas Existierendes zum Grunde. Dieser Boden aber sinkt, wenn er nicht auf dem unbeweglichen Felsen des Absolutnotwendigen ruht. Dieser aber schwebt ohne Stütze, wenn noch außer und unter ihm leerer Raum ist, und er nicht selbst alles erfüllt und dadurch keinen Platz zum Warum mehr übrig läßt, d. i. der Realität nach unendlich ist.

Wenn etwas, was es auch sei, existiert, so muß auch eingeraumt werden, daß irgend etwas notwendigerweise existiere. Denn das Zufällige existiert nur unter der Bedingung eines anderen, als seiner Ursache, und von dieser gilt der Schluß fernerhin, bis zu einer Ursache, die nicht zufällig und eben darum ohne Bedeutung notwendigerweise da ist. Das ist das Argument, worauf die Vernunft ihren Fortschritt zum Urwesen gründet.

| Nun sieht sich die Vernunft nach dem Begriffe eines Wesens um, das sich zu einem solchen Vorzeige der Existenz, als die unbedingte Notwendigkeit, schickte, nicht so wohl, um alsdenn von dem Begriffe desselben a priori auf sein Dasein zu schließen (denn, getraute sie sich dieses, so dürfte sie überhaupt nur unter bloßen Begriffen forschen, und hätte nicht nötig, ein gegebenes Dasein zum Grunde zu legen), sondern nur, um unter allen Begriffen möglicher Dinge denjenigen zu finden, der nichts der absoluten Notwendigkeit Widerstreitendes in sich hat. Denn, daß doch irgend etwas schlechtthin notwendig existieren müsse, hält sie nach dem ersteren Schlusse schon für ausgemacht. Wenn sie nun alles wegschaffen kann, was sich mit dieser Notwendigkeit nicht verträgt, außer einem: so ist dieses das schlechtthinnotwendige Wesen, man mag nun die Notwendigkeit desselben begreifen, d. i. aus seinen Begriffe allein ableiten können, oder nicht.

Nun scheint dasjenige, dessen Begriff zu allem Warum das Darum in sich enthält, das in keinem Stücke und in keiner Absicht defekt ist, welches allerwärts als Bedingung hinreicht, eben darum das zur absoluten Notwendigkeit schickliche Wesen zu sein, weil es, bei dem Selbstbesitz aller Bedingungen zu allem Möglichen, selbst keiner Bedingung bedarf, ja derselben nicht einmal fähig ist; folglich, wenigstens in einem Stücke, dem Begriff der unbedingten Notwendigkeit ein Genüge tut, darin es kein anderer Begriff ihm gleich tun kann, der, weil er mangelhaft und der Er-
their characteristic this independence of all further conditions. We are not indeed justified in arguing that what does not contain the highest and in all respects complete condition is therefore itself conditioned in its existence. But we are justified in saying that it does not possess that one feature through which alone reason is in a position, by means of an a priori concept, to know, in regard to any being, that it is unconditioned.

The concept of an ens realissimum is therefore, of all concepts of possible things, that which best squares with the concept of an unconditionally necessary being; and though it may not be completely adequate to it, we have no choice in the matter, but find ourselves constrained to hold to it. For we cannot afford to dispense with the existence of a necessary being; and once its existence is granted, we cannot, in the whole field of possibility, find anything that can make a better grounded claim [than the ens realissimum] to such pre-eminence in the mode of its existence.

Such, then, is the natural procedure of human reason. It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. This being it apprehends as having an existence that is unconditioned. It then looks around for the concept of that which is independent of any condition, and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition of all else, that is, in that which contains all reality. But that which is all-containing and without limits is absolute unity, and involves the concept of a single being that is likewise the supreme being. Accordingly, we conclude that the supreme being, as primordial ground of all things, must exist by absolute necessity.

If what we have in view is the coming to a decision—if, that is to say, the existence of some sort of necessary being is taken as granted, and if it be agreed further that we must come to a decision as to what it is—then the foregoing way of thinking must be allowed to have a certain cogency. For in that case no better choice can be made, or rather we have no choice at all, but find ourselves compelled to decide in favour of the absolute unity of complete reality, as the ultimate source of possibility. If, however, we are not required to come to any decision, and prefer to leave the issue open until the weight of the evidence is such as to compel assent; if, in other words, what we have to do is merely to estimate how much we really
know in the matter, and how much we merely flatter ourselves that we know, then the foregoing argument is far from appearing in so advantageous a light, and special favour is required to compensate for the defectiveness of its claims.

For if we take the issue as being that which is here stated, namely, first, that from any given existence (it may be, merely my own existence) we can correctly infer the existence of an unconditionally necessary being; secondly, that we must regard a being which contains all reality, and therefore every condition, as being absolutely unconditioned, and that in this concept of an ens realissimum we have therefore found the concept of a thing to which we can also ascribe absolute necessity—granting all this, it by no means follows that the concept of a limited being which does not have the highest reality is for that reason incompatible with absolute necessity. For although I do not find in its concept that unconditioned which is involved in the concept of the totality of conditions, we are not justified in concluding that its existence must for this reason be conditioned; just as I cannot say, in the case of a hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition (in the case under discussion, the condition of completeness in accordance with [pure] concepts) does not hold, the conditioned also does not hold. On the contrary, we are entirely free to hold that any limited beings whatsoever, notwithstanding their being limited, may also be unconditionally necessary, although we cannot infer their necessity from the universal concepts which we have of them. Thus the argument has failed to give us the least concept of the properties of a necessary being, and indeed is utterly ineffective.

But this argument continues to have a certain importance and to be endowed with an authority of which we cannot, simply on the ground of this objective insufficiency, at once proceed to divest it. For granting that there are in the idea of reason obligations which are completely valid, but which in their application to ourselves would be lacking in all reality—that is, obligations to which there would be no motives—save on the assumption that there exists a supreme being to give effect and confirmation to the practical laws, in such a situation we should be under an obligation to follow those concepts which, though they may not be objectively sufficient, are yet,
IDEAL OF PURE REASON

499

according to the standard of our reason, preponderant, and in comparison with which we know of nothing that is better and more convincing. The duty of deciding would thus, by a practical addition, incline the balance so delicately preserved by the indecisiveness of speculation. Reason would indeed stand condemned in its own judgment—and there is none more circumspect—if, when impelled by such urgent motives, it should fail, however incomplete its insight, to conform its judgment to those pleas which are at least of greater weight than any others known to us.

Though this argument, as resting on the inner insufficiency of the contingent, is in actual fact transcendental, it is yet so simple and natural that, immediately it is propounded, it commends itself to the commonest understanding. We see things alter, come into being, and pass away; and these, or at least their state, must therefore have a cause. But the same question can be raised in regard to every cause that can be given in experience. Where, therefore, can we more suitably locate the ultimate causality than where there also exists the highest causality, that is, in that being which contains primordially in itself the sufficient ground of every possible effect, and the concept of which we can also very easily entertain by means of the one attribute of an all-embracing perfection. This supreme cause we then proceed to regard as absolutely necessary, inasmuch as we find it absolutely necessary that we should ascend to it, and find no ground for passing beyond it. And thus, in all peoples, there shine amidst the most benighted polytheism some gleams of monotheism, to which they have been led, not by reflection and profound speculation, but simply by the natural bent of the common understanding, as step by step it has come to apprehend its own requirements.

There are only three possible ways of proving the existence of God by means of speculative reason.

All the paths leading to this goal begin either from determinate experience and the specific constitution of the world of sense as thereby known, and ascend from it, in accordance with laws of causality, to the supreme cause outside the

1 [Reading, with Erdmann, jeder for der.]
world; or they start from experience which is purely indeterminate, that is, from experience of existence in general; or finally they abstract from all experience, and argue completely *a priori*, from mere concepts, to the existence of a supreme cause. The first proof is the *physico-theological*, the second the *cosmological*, the third the *ontological*. There are, and there can be, no others.

I propose to show that reason is as little able to make progress on the one path, the empirical, as on the other path, the transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain in thus attempting to soar above the world of sense by the mere power of speculation. As regards the order in which these arguments should be dealt with, it will be exactly the reverse of that which reason takes in the progress of its own development, and therefore of that which we have ourselves followed in the above account. For it will be shown that, although experience is what first gives occasion to this enquiry, it is the *transcendental concept* which in all such endeavours marks out the goal that reason has set itself to attain, and which is indeed its sole guide in its efforts to achieve that goal. I shall therefore begin with the examination of the transcendental proof, and afterwards enquire what effect the addition of the empirical factor can have in enhancing the force of the argument.

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**Chapter III**

**Section 4**

**The Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God**

It is evident, from what has been said, that the concept of an absolutely necessary being is a concept of pure reason, that is, a mere idea the objective reality of which is very far from being proved by the fact that reason requires it. For the idea instructs us only in regard to a certain unattainable completeness, and so serves rather to limit the understanding than to extend it to new objects. But we are here faced by what is indeed strange and perplexing, namely, that while the infer-
ence from a given existence in general to some absolutely necessary being seems to be both imperative and legitimate; all those conditions under which alone the understanding can form a concept of such a necessity are so many obstacles in the way of our doing so.

In all ages men have spoken of an absolutely necessary being, and in so doing have endeavoured, not so much to understand whether and how a thing of this kind allows even of being thought, but rather to prove its existence. There is, of course, no difficulty in giving a verbal definition of the concept, namely, that it is something the non-existence of which is impossible. But this yields no insight into the conditions which make it necessary\(^3\) to regard the non-existence of a thing as absolutely unthinkable. It is precisely these conditions that we desire to know, in order that we may determine whether or not, in resorting to this concept, we are thinking anything at all. The expedient of removing all those conditions which the understanding indispensably requires in order to regard something as necessary, simply through the introduction of the word *unconditioned*, is very far from sufficing to show whether I am still thinking anything in the concept of the unconditionally necessary, or perhaps rather nothing at all.

Nay more, this concept, at first ventured upon blindly, and now become so completely familiar, has been supposed to have its meaning exhibited in a number of examples; and on this account all further enquiry into its intelligibility has seemed to be quite needless. Thus the fact that every geometrical proposition, as, for instance, that a triangle has three angles, is absolutely necessary, has been taken as justifying us in speaking of an object which lies entirely outside the sphere of our understanding as if we understood perfectly what it is that we intend to convey by the concept of that object.

All the alleged examples are, without exception, taken from judgments, not from things and their existence. But the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the same as an absolute necessity of things. The absolute necessity of the judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the predicate in the judgment. The above proposition does not

\(^3\) [Reading, with Noire, *notwendig* for *unmöglich*.]
declare that three angles are absolutely necessary, but that, under the condition that there is a triangle (that is, that a triangle is given), three angles will necessarily be found in it. So great, indeed, is the deluding influence exercised by this logical necessity that, by the simple device of forming an a priori concept of a thing in such a manner as to include existence within the scope of its meaning, we have supposed ourselves to have justified the conclusion that because existence necessarily belongs to the object of this concept—always under the condition that we posit the thing as given (as existing)—we are also of necessity, in accordance with the law of identity, required to posit the existence of its object, and that this being is therefore itself absolutely necessary—and this, to repeat, for the reason that the existence of this being has already been thought in a concept which is assumed arbitrarily and on condition that we posit its object.

If, in an identical proposition, I reject the predicate while retaining the subject, contradiction results; and I therefore say that the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if we reject subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction; for nothing is then left that can be contradicted. To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we reject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of contradiction can then arise. There is nothing outside it that would then be contradicted, since the necessity of the thing is not supposed to be derived from anything external; nor is there anything internal that would be contradicted, since in rejecting the thing itself we have at the same time rejected all its internal properties. 'God is omnipotent' is a necessary judgment. The omnipotence cannot be rejected if we posit a Deity, that is, an infinite being; for the two concepts are identical. But if we say, 'There is no God', neither the omnipotence nor any other of its predicates is given; they are one and all rejected together with the subject, and there is therefore not the least contradiction in such a judgment.

We have thus seen that if the predicate of a judgment is rejected together with the subject, no internal contradiction

530. TRANSZENDENDE FORM DIALEKTIK

schlechterdings notwendig sein, sondern, unter der Bedingung, daß ein Triangül da ist (gegeben ist), sind auch drei Winkel (in ihm) notwendiger Weise da. Gleichwohl hat diese logische Notwendigkeit eine so große Macht ihrer Illusion bewiesen, daß, indem man sich einen Begriff a priori von einem Dinge gemacht hatte, der so gestellte war, daß man seiner Meinung nach das Dasein mit in seinen Umfang begraf, man daraus glaubte sicher schließen zu können, daß, weil dem Objekt dieses Begriffs das Dasein notwendig zukommt, d. i. unter der Bedingung, daß ich dieses Ding als gegeben (existierend) setze, auch sein Dasein: notwendig (nach der Regel der Identität) gesetzt werde, und dieses Wesen daher selbst schlechterdings notwendig sei, weil sein Dasein in einem nach Belieben angenommenen Begriffe und unter der Bedingung, daß ich den Gegenstand desselben setze, mit gedacht wird.

Wenn ich das Prädikat in einem identischen Urteile aufhebe und behalte das Subjekt, so entspringt ein Widerspruch, und daher sage ich: jenes kommt diesem notwendiger Weise zu. Hebe ich aber das Subjekt, zumeist dem Prädikat auf, so entspringt kein Widerspruch; denn es ist nichts mehr, welchem widersprochen werden könnte. Einen Triangül setzen und doch die drei Winkel desselben aufheben, ist widersprechend; aber den Triangül selbst sein drei Winkeln aufheben, ist kein Widerspruch. Gerade eben so ist es mit dem Begriffe eines absoluten notwendigen Wesens behauptet. Wenn ihr das Dasein desselben aufhebt, so hebt ihr das Ding selbst, und mit allen seinen Prädikaten auf; wo soll altendem der Widerspruch herkommen? Außen ist nichts, dem widersprochen würde, denn das Ding soll nicht äußerlich notwendig sein; innerlich auch nichts, denn ihr habt, durch Aufhebung des Dinges selbst, alles Innere zugleich aufgehoben. Gott ist allmächtig; das ist es notwendiges Urteil. Die Allmacht kann nicht aufgehoben werden, wenn ihr eine Gottheit, d. i. ein unendliches Wesen, setzt, mit dessen Begriff jener identisch ist. Wenn ihr aber sagt: Gott ist nicht, so ist weder die Allmacht, noch irgend ein anderes seiner Prädikate gegeben; denn sie sind zusammt dem Subjekte aufgehoben, und es zeigt sich in diesem Gedanken nicht der mindeste Widerspruch.

Ihr habt also gesehen, daß, wenn ich das Prädikat eines Urteils zusammt dem Subjekte aufhebe, niemals ein innerer
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ONTOLOGICAL PROOF

can result, and that this holds no matter what the predicate may be. The only way of evading this conclusion is to argue that there are subjects which cannot be removed, and must always remain. That, however, would only be another way of saying that there are absolutely necessary subjects; and that is the very assumption which I have called in question, and the possibility of which the above argument professes to establish. For I cannot form the least concept of the thing, should it be rejected with all its predicates, leaves behind a contradiction; and in the absence of contradiction I have, through pure a priori concepts alone, no criterion of impossibility.

Notwithstanding all these general considerations, in which every one must concur, we may be challenged with a case which is brought forward as proof that in actual fact the contrary holds, namely, that there is one concept, and indeed only one, in reference to which the not-being or rejection of its object is in itself contradictory, namely, the concept of the ens realissimum. It is declared that it possesses all reality, and that we are justified in assuming that such a being is possible (the fact that a concept does not contradict itself by no means proves the possibility of its object: but the contrary assertion I am for the moment willing to allow). Now [the argument proceeds] 'all reality' includes existence; existence is therefore contained in the concept of a thing that is possible. If, then, this thing is rejected, the internal possibility of the thing is rejected—which is self-contradictory.

My answer is as follows. There is already a contradiction in introducing the concept of existence—no matter under what title it may be disguised—into the concept of a thing which we profess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility. If that be allowed as legitimate, a seeming victory has been

* A concept is always possible if it is not self-contradictory. This is the logical criterion of possibility, and by it the object of the concept is distinguishable from the nihil negativum. But it may none the less be an empty concept, unless the objective reality of the synthesis through which the concept is generated has been specifically proved; and such proof, as we have shown above, rests on principles of possible experience, and not on the principle of analysis (the law of contradiction). This is a warning against arguing directly from the logical possibility of concepts to the real possibility of things.


Wider alle diese allgemeine Schlüsse (deren sich kein Mensch weigern kann) fordert ihr mich durch einen Fall auf, den ihr, als einen Beweis durch die Tat, aufstellen; das es doch einen und zwar nur diesen Einen Begriff gebe, da das Nichtsein oder das Aufheben seines Gegenstandes in sich selbst widersprechend sei, und dieses ist der Begriff des allerrealesten Wesens. Es hat, sagt ihr, alle Realität, und ihr seid berechtigt, ein solches Wesen als möglich anzunehmen (welches ich vorzüglich einwillige, obgleich der sich nicht widersprechende Begriff noch lange nicht die Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes beweist). Nun ist unter aller Realität auch das Dasein mit begriffen: Also liegt das Dasein in dem Begriff von einem Möglichen. Wird dieses Ding nun aufgehoben, so wird die innere Möglichkeit des Dinges aufgehoben, welches widersprechend ist.

Ich antworte: Ihr habt schon einen Widerspruch begangen, wenn ihr in den Begriff eines Dinges, welches ihr lediglich seiner Möglichkeit nach denken wolltet, es sei unter welchem versteckten Namen, schon den Begriff seiner Existenz hinein gebracht. Räumt man euch dieses ein; so hebt

* Der Begriff ist allemal möglich, wenn er sich nicht widerspricht. Das ist das logische Merkmal der Möglichkeit, und dadurch wird sein Gegenstand vom nihil negativum unterschieden. Allein er kann nichts destoweniger ein derer Begriff sein, wenn die objektive Realität der Synthese, dadurch der Begriff erzeugt wird, nicht besonders dargestellt wird; welches aber jedesmal, wie oben gezeigt worden, auf Principien möglicher Erfahrung und nicht auf dem Grundsätze der Analyse (dem Satze des Widerspruchs) beruht. Das ist eine Warnung, von der Möglichkeit der Begriffe (logische) nicht sofort auf die Möglichkeit der Dinge (reale) zu schließen.
won; but in actual fact nothing at all is said: the assertion is a mere tautology. We must ask: Is the proposition that this or that thing (which, whatever it may be, is allowed as possible) exists, an analytic or a synthetic proposition? If it is analytic, the assertion of the existence of the thing adds nothing to the thought of the thing; but in that case either the thought, which is in us, is the thing itself, or we have presupposed an existence as belonging to the realm of the possible, and have then, on that pretext, inferred its existence from its internal possibility—which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The word 'reality', which in the concept of the thing sounds other than the word 'existence' in the concept of the predicate, is of no avail in meeting this objection. For if all positing (no matter what it may be that is posited) is entitled reality, the thing with all its predicates is already posited in the concept of the subject, and is assumed as actual; and in the predicate this is merely repeated. But if, on the other hand, we admit, as every reasonable person must, that all existential propositions are synthetic, how can we profess to maintain that the predicate of existence cannot be rejected without contradiction? This is a feature which is found only in analytic propositions, and is indeed precisely what constitutes their analytic character.

I should have hoped to put an end to these idle and fruitless disputations in a direct manner, by an accurate determination of the concept of existence, had I not found that the illusion which is caused by the confusion of a logical with a real predicate (that is, with a predicate which determines a thing) is almost beyond correction. Anything we please can be made to serve as a logical predicate; the subject can even be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content. But a determining predicate is a predicate which is added to the concept of the subject and enlarges it. Consequently, it must not be already contained in the concept.

'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, 'God is omnipotent',

* [Reading, with Erdmann, könnte for könne.]
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ONTOLOGICAL PROOF

contains two concepts, each of which has its object—God and omnipotence. The small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among which is omnipotence), and say 'God is', or 'there is a God', we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept. The content of both must be one and the same; nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses merely what is possible, by my thinking its object (through the expression 'is') as given absolutely. Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the latter signify the concept, and the former the object and the positing of the object, should the former contain more than the latter, my concept would not, in that case, express the whole object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it.

My financial position is, however, affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them (that is, of their possibility). For the object, as it actually exists, is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state) synthetically; and yet the conceived hundred thalers are not themselves in the least increased through thus acquiring existence outside my concept.

By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing—even if we completely determine it—we do not make the least addition to the thing when we further declare that this thing is. Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the concept; and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists. If we think in a thing every feature of reality except one, the missing reality is not added by my saying that this defective thing exists. On the contrary, it exists with the same defect with which I have thought it, since otherwise what exists would be something different from what I thought. When, therefore, I think a being as the supreme reality, without any defect, the question still remains whether

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Gott ist allmächtig, enthält zwei Begriffe, die ihre Objekte haben: Gott und Allmacht; das Wörtchen 'ist' ist nicht noch ein Prädikat, sondern das, was das Prädikat beziehungsweise aufs Subjekt setzt. Nehme ich nun das Subjekt (Gott) mit allen seinen Prädikaten (worumricht auch die Allmacht gehört) zusammen, und sage: Gott ist, oder es ist ein Gott, so setze ich kein neues Prädikat zum Begriffe von Gott, sondern nur das Subjekt an sich selbst mit allen seinen Prädikaten, und zwar der Gegenstand in Beziehung auf meinen Begriff: Beide müssen genau einerlei enthalten, und es kann daher zu dem Begriffe, der die Möglichkeit ausdrückt, darum, daß ich dessen Gegenstand als schlechtgegeben (durch den Ausdruck: er ist) denke, nichts weiter hinzukommen. Und so enthält das Wirkliche nichts mehr als das bloß Mögliche. Hundert wirkliche Taler enthalten nicht das mindeste mehr, als hundert mögliche. Denn, da diese den Begriff, jene aber den Gegenstand und dessen Position an sich selbst bedeuten, so würde, im Fall dieser mehr enthielte als jener, mein Begriff nicht den ganzen Gegenstand ausdrücken, und also auch nicht der angemessene Begriff von ihm sein. Aber in meinem Vermögenszustande ist mehr bei hundert wirklichen Tälern, als bei dem bloßen Begriffe derselben (d. i. ihrer Möglichkeit). Denn der Gegenstand ist bei der Wirklichkeit nicht bloß in meinem Begriffe analytisch enthalten, sondern kommt zu meinem Begriffe (der eine Bestimmung meines Zustandes ist) synthetisch hinzu, ohne daß, durch dieses Sein außerhalb meines Begriffes, diese gedachte hundert Taler selbst im mindesten vermehrt werden.

| Wenn ich also ein Ding, durch welche und wie viel Prädikate ich will (selbst in der durchgängigen Bestimmung), denke, so kommt dadurch, daß ich noch hinzusetze, dieses Ding ist, nicht das mindeste zu dem Ding hinzu. Denn sonst würde nicht eben dasselbe, sondern mehr existieren, als ich im Begriffe gedacht hatte, und ich könnte nicht sagen, daß gerade der Gegenstand meines Begriffs existiere. Denke ich mir auch sogar in einem Ding alle Realität außer einer, so kommt dadurch, daß ich sage: ein solches mangelhaftes Ding existiert, die fehlende Realität nicht hinzu, sondern es existiert gerade mit demselben Mangel behaftet, als ich es gedacht habe, sonst würde etwas anderes, als ich dachte, existieren. Denke ich mir nun ein Wesen als die höchste Realität (ohne Mangel), so bleibt noch immer die
it exists or not. For though, in my concept, nothing may be lacking of the possible real content of a thing in general, something is still lacking in its relation to my whole state of thought, namely, [in so far as I am unable to assert] that knowledge of this object is also possible \textit{a posteriori}. And here we find the source of our present difficulty. Were we dealing with an object of the senses, we could not confound the existence of the thing with the mere concept of it. For through the concept the object is thought only as conforming to the \textit{universal conditions} of possible empirical knowledge in general, whereas through its existence it is thought as belonging to the context of experience as a whole. In being thus connected with the \textit{content} of experience as a whole, the concept of the object is not, however, in the least enlarged; all that has happened is that our thought has thereby obtained an additional possible perception. It is not, therefore, surprising that, if we attempt to think existence through the pure category alone, we cannot specify a single mark distinguishing it from mere possibility.

Whatever, therefore, and however much, our concept of an object may contain, we must go outside it, if we are to ascribe existence to the object. In the case of objects of the senses, this takes place through their connection with some one of our perceptions, in accordance with empirical laws. But in dealing with objects of pure thought, we have no means whatsoever of knowing their existence, since it would have to be known in a completely \textit{a priori} manner. Our consciousness of all existence (whether immediately through perception, or mediating through inferences which connect something with perception) belongs exclusively to the unity of experience; any [alleged] existence outside this field, while not indeed such as we can declare to be absolutely impossible, is of the nature of an assumption which we can never be in a position to justify.

The concept of a supreme being is in many respects a very useful idea; but just because it is a mere idea, it is altogether incapable, by itself alone, of enlarging our knowledge in regard to what exists. It is not even competent to enlighten us as to the \textit{possibility} of any existence beyond that which is known in and through experience.\footnote{\emph{In Anschauung der Möglichkeit eines Mehreren.}} The analytic criterion of

\textit{Unmöglichkeit eines ontologischen Beweises.} 535

Frage, ob es existiere, oder nicht. Denn, obgleich an meinem Begriff, von dem möglichen realen Inhalte eines Dinges überhaupt, nichts fehlt, so fehlt doch noch etwas an dem Verhältnisse zu meinem ganzen Zustande des Denkens, nämlich daß die Erkenntnis jenes Objekts auch \textit{a posteriori} möglich sei. Und hier zeigt sich auch die Ursache der hiebei obwaltenden Schwierigkeit. Wäre von einem Gegenstande der Sinne die Rede, so würden ich die Existenz des Dinges mit dem bloßen Begriffe des Dinges nicht verwechseln können. Denn durch den Begriff wird der Gegenstand nur mit den allgemeinen Bedingungen einer möglichen empirischen Erkenntnis überhaupt als einstimmig, durch die Existenz aber als in dem Kontext der gesamten Erfahrung enthalten gedacht; da denn durch die Verknüpfung mit dem Inhalte der gesamten Erfahrung der Begriff vom Gegenstande nicht im mindesten vermehrt wird, unser Denken aber, durch den- selben eine mögliche Wahrnehmung mehr bekommt. Wollen wir dagegen die Existenz durch die reine Kategorie allein denken, so ist kein Wunder, daß wir kein Merkmal angaben können, sie von der bloßen Möglichkeit zu unterscheiden.

Unser Begriff von einem Gegenstande mag also enthalten, was und wie viel er wolle, so müssen wir doch aus ihm herausgeben, um diesem die Existenz zu erteilen. Bei Gegenständen der Sinne geschieht dieses durch den Zusammenhang mit irgend einer meiner Wahrnehmungen nach empirischen Gesetzen; aber für Objekte des reinen Denkens ist ganz und gar kein Mittel, ihr Dasein zu erkennen, weil es gänzlich a priori erkannt werden müßte, unser Bewußtsein aller Existenz aber (es sei durch Wahrnehmung unmittelbar, oder durch Schlüsse, die etwas mit der Wahrnehmung verwirknet) gehört ganz und gar zur Einheit der Erfahrung, und eine Existenz außer diesem Felde kann zwar nicht schlechterdings für unmöglich erklärt werden, sie ist aber eine Voraussetzung, die wir durch nichts rechtfertigen können.

Der Begriff eines höchsten Wesens ist eine in mancher Absicht sehr nützliche Idee; sie ist aber ebensolcher, weil sie bloß Idee ist, ganz unfähig, um vermittelst ihrer allein unsere Erkenntnis in Anschauung dessen, was existiert, || zu erweitern. Sie vermag nicht einmal so viel, daß sie uns in Anschauung der Möglichkeit eines Mehreren belehrt. Das
IMPOSSIBILITY OF COSMOLOGICAL PROOF 507

possibility, as consisting in the principle that bare positives (realities) give rise to no contradiction, cannot be denied to it. But since the realities are not given to us in their specific characters; since even if they were, we should still⁴ not be in a position to pass judgment; since the criterion of the possibility of synthetic knowledge is never to be looked for save in experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong;⁵ the connection of all real properties in a thing is a synthesis, the possibility of which we are unable to determine a priori. And thus the celebrated Leibniz is far from having succeeded in what he plumed himself on achieving—the comprehension a priori of the possibility of this sublime ideal being.

The attempt to establish the existence of a supreme being by means of the famous ontological argument of Descartes is therefore merely so much labour and effort lost; we can no more extend our stock of [theoretical] insight by mere ideas, than a merchant can better his position by adding a few noughts to his cash account.

CHAPTER III

Section 5

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A COSMOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

To attempt to extract from a purely arbitrary idea the existence of an object corresponding to it is a quite unnatural procedure and a mere innovation of scholastic subtlety. Such an attempt would never have been made if there had not been antecedently, on the part of our reason, the need to assume as a basis of existence in general something necessary (in which our regress may terminate); and if, since this necessity must be unconditioned and certain a priori, reason had not, in consequence, been forced to seek a concept which would satisfy, if possible, such a demand, and enable us to know an existence in a completely a priori manner. Such a concept was supposed to have been found in the idea of an ens realissimum; and that

4 [Reading, with B, da aber for weil aber.]
5 [Reading, with Wille, stattfände for stattfände.]
idea was therefore used only for the more definite knowledge of that necessary being, of the necessary existence of which we were already convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. This natural procedure of reason was, however, concealed from view, and instead of ending with this concept, the attempt was made to begin with it, and so to deduce from it that necessity of existence which it was only fitted to supplement. Thus arose the unfortunate ontological proof, which yields satisfaction neither to the natural and healthy understanding nor to the more academic demands of strict proof.

The cosmological proof, which we are now about to examine, retains the connection of absolute necessity with the highest reality, but instead of reasoning, like the former proof, from the highest reality to necessity of existence, it reasons from the previously given unconditioned necessity of some being to the unlimited reality of that being. It thus enters upon a course of reasoning which, whether rational or only pseudo-rational, is at any rate natural, and the most convincing not only for common sense but even for speculative understanding. It also sketches the first outline of all the proofs in natural theology, an outline which has always been and always will be followed, however much embellished and disguised by superfluous additions. This proof, termed by Leibniz the proof *a contingentia mundi*, we shall now proceed to expound and examine.

It runs thus: If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now 1, at least, exist. Therefore an absolutely necessary being exists. The minor premis contains an experience, the major premis the inference from there being an experience at all to the existence of the necessary. The proof therefore really begins with experience, and is not wholly *a priori* or ontological. For this reason, and because the object of all possible experience is called the world, it is entitled the cosmological proof. Since, in dealing with the objects

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*This inference is too well known to require detailed statement. It depends on the supposedly transcendental law of natural causality: that everything contingent has a cause, which, if itself contingent, must likewise have a cause, till the series of subordinate causes ends with an absolutely necessary cause, without which it would have no completeness.*

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**UNMÖGLICHKEIT EINES KOSMOLOGISCHEN BEWEISES**

* Diese mehrere, zum mindesten a priori, also existiert ein absolut unbedingtes Wesen. Der Untersatz enthält eine Erfahrung, der Obersatz die Schlußfolge aus einer Erfahrung überhaupt auf das Dasein des Notwendigen. Also hebt der Beweis eigentlich von der Erfahrung an, mithin ist es nicht gänzlich a priori geführt, oder ontologisch, und weil der Gegenstand aller möglichen Erfahrung hat, wird der Beweis der kosmologische Beweis genannt. Da er auch von aller besonderen Eigenschaft der Gegenstände der Erfahrung, da

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IMPOSSIBILITY OF COSMOLOGICAL PROOF

of experience, the proof abstracts from all special properties through which this world may differ from any other possible world, the title also serves to distinguish it from the physicotheological proof, which is based upon observations of the particular properties of the world disclosed to us by our senses.

The proof then proceeds as follows: The necessary being can be determined in one way only, that is, by one out of each possible pair of opposed predicates. It must therefore be completely determined through its own concept. Now there is only one possible concept which determines a thing completely a priori, namely, the concept of the ens realissimum. The concept of the ens realissimum is therefore the only concept through which a necessary being can be thought. In other words, a supreme being necessarily exists.

In this cosmological argument there are combined so many pseudo-rational principles that speculative reason seems in this case to have brought to bear all the resources of its dialectical skill to produce the greatest possible transcendental illusion. The testing of the argument may meantime be postponed while we detail in order the various devices whereby an old argument is disguised as a new one, and by which appeal is made to the agreement of two witnesses, the one with credentials of pure reason and the other with those of experience. In reality the only witness is that which speaks in the name of pure reason; in the endeavour to pass as a second witness it merely changes its dress and voice. In order to lay a secure foundation for itself, this proof takes its stand on experience, and thereby makes profession of being distinct from the ontological proof, which puts its entire trust in pure a priori concepts. But the cosmological proof uses this experience only for a single step in the argument, namely, to conclude the existence of a necessary being. What properties this being may have, the empirical premiss cannot tell us. Reason therefore abandons experience altogether, and endeavours to discover from mere concepts what properties an absolutely necessary being must have, that is, which among all possible things contains in itself the conditions (requisita) essential to absolute necessity. Now these, it is supposed, are nowhere to be found save in the concept of an ens realissimum; and the conclusion is therefore drawn, that the ens realissimum is the

TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK

durch sich diese Welt von jeder möglichen unterscheiden mag, abstrahiert: so wird er schon in seiner Benennung auch vom physikotheologischen Beweise unterschieden, welcher Beobachtungen der besonderen Beschaffenheit dieser unserer Sinnenwelt zu Beweisgründen braucht.

Nun schließt der Beweis weiter: das notwendige Wesen kann nur auf eine einzige Art, d. i. in Ansehung aller möglichen entgegengesetzten Prädikate nur durch eines derselben, bestimmt werden, folglich muß es durch seinen Begriff durchgängig bestimmt sein. Nun ist nur ein einziger Begriff von einem Ding möglich, der dasselbe a priori durchgängig bestimmt, nämlich der des entis realissimi:

Also ist der Begriff des allererleisten Wesens der || einzige, dadurch ein notwendiges Wesen werden kann, d. i. es existiert ein höchstes Wesen notwendiger Weise.

In diesem kosmologischen Argumente kommen so viel vernünftelnde Grundsätze zusammen, daß die spekulativen Vernunft hier alle ihre dialektische Kunst aufgeboten zu haben scheint, um den größtmöglichen transcendentalen Schein zu Stande zu bringen. Wir wollen ihre Prüfung indessen eine Weile bei Seite setzen, um nur eine Liste derselben offenbar zu machen, mit welcher sie ein altes Argument in verkleideter Gestalt für ein neues aufstellt und sich auf zweier Zeugen Einstimmung beruht, nämlich einen reinen Vernunftzeugen und einen anderen von empirischer Be- glaubigung, da es doch nur der erste allein ist, welcher bloß seinen Anzug und Stimme verändert, um für einen zweiten gehalten zu werden. Um seinen Grund recht sicher zu legen, füßt sich dieser Beweis auf Erfahrung und gibt sich dadurch das Ansehen, als sei er vom ontologischen Beweise unterschieden, der auf lauter reine Begriffe a priori sein ganzes Vertrauen setzt. Dieser Erfahrung aber bedient sich der kosmologische Beweis nur, um einen einzigen Schritt zu tun, nämlich zum Dasein eines notwendigen Wesens überhaupt. Was dieses für Eigenschaften habe: kann der empirische Beweisgrund nicht lehren, sondern da nimmt die Vernunft gänzlich von ihm Abschied und forscht hinter laut- ter Begriffen: was nämlich ein absolutnotwendiges Wesen überhaupt || für Eigenschaften haben müsse, d. i. welches unter allen möglichen Dingen die erforderlichen Bedingungen (requisita) zu einer absoluten Notwendigkeit in sich ent- halte. Nun glaubt sie im Begriffe eines allererleisten Wesens einzig und allein diese Requisite anzutreffen, und schließt sodann: das ist das schlechterdingsnotwendige Wesen. Es
absolutely necessary being. But it is evident that we are here presupposing that the concept of the highest reality is completely adequate to the concept of absolute necessity of existence; that is, that the latter can be inferred from the former. Now this is the proposition maintained by the ontological proof; it is here being assumed in the cosmological proof, and indeed made the basis of the proof; and yet it is an assertion with which this latter proof has professed to dispense. For absolute necessity is an existence determined from mere concepts. If I say, the concept of the ens realissimum is a concept, and indeed the only concept, which is appropriate and adequate to necessary existence, I must also admit that necessary existence can be inferred from this concept. Thus the so-called cosmological proof really owes any cogency which it may have to the ontological proof from mere concepts. The appeal to experience is quite superfluous; experience may perhaps lead us to the concept of absolute necessity, but is unable to demonstrate this necessity as belonging to any determinate thing. For immediately we endeavour to do so, we must abandon all experience and search among pure concepts to discover whether any one of them contains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary being. If in this way we can determine the possibility of a necessary being, we likewise establish its existence. For what we are then saying is this: that of all possible beings there is one which carries with it absolute necessity, that is, that this being exists with absolute necessity.

Fallacious and misleading arguments are most easily detected if set out in correct syllogistic form. This we now proceed to do in the instance under discussion.

If the proposition, that every absolutely necessary being is likewise the most real of all beings, is correct (and this is the nervus probandi of the cosmological proof), it must, like all affirmative judgments, be convertible, at least per accidens. It therefore follows that some entia realissima are likewise absolutely necessary beings. But one ens realissimum is in no respect different from another, and what is true of some under this concept is true also of all. In this case, therefore, I can convert the proposition simpliciter, not only per accidens, and say that every ens realissimum is a necessary being. But

UNMÖGLICHKEIT EINES KOSMOLÓGÍSCHEN BEWÍRSES 539

ist aber klar, daß man hierbei voraussetzt, der Begriff eines Wesens von der höchsten Realität die dem Begriff der absoluten Notwendigkeit im Dasein völlig genugend, d. i. es lasse sich aus jener auf diese schließen; ein Satz, den das ontologische Argument behauptete, welches man also im kosmologischen Beweise annimmt und zum Grunde legt, da man es doch hatte vermeiden wollen. Denn die absolute Notwendigkeit ist ein Dasein aus bloßen Begriffen. Sage ich nun: der Begriff des entis realissimi ist ein solcher Begriff, und zwar der einzige, der zu dem notwendigen Dasein passend und ihm adäquat ist: so muß ich euch einräumen, daß aus ihm das letztere geschlossen werden könne. Es ist also eigentlich nur der ontologische Beweis aus lauter Begriffen, der in dem sogenanneten kosmologischen alle Beweiskraft enthält, und die angebliche Erklärung ist ganz müßig, vielleicht, um uns nur auf den Begriff der absoluten Notwendigkeit zu führen, nicht aber, um diese an irgend einem bestimmten Dinge darzustellen. Denn sobald wir dieses zur Absicht haben, müssen wir sofort alle Erfahrungen verlassen, und unter reinen Begriffen suchen, welcher von ihnen wohl die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit eines absoluten Notwendigen Wesens enthalte. Ist aber auf solche Weise nur die Möglichkeit eines solchen Wesens eingesehen, so ist auch sein Dasein dargetan; denn es heißt so viel, als: unter allem Möglichen ist eines, das absolute Notwendigkeit bei sich führt, d. i. dieses Wesen existiert schlechthin notwendig.

Alle Blendwerke im Schluß en entdecken sich am leichtesten, wenn man sie auf schulgerechte Art vor Augen stellt. Hier ist eine solche Darstellung.

Wenn der Satz richtig ist: ein jedes schlechthinnotwendiges Wesen ist zugleich das allerrealste Wesen (als welches der nervus probandi des kosmologischen Beweises ist): so muß er sich, wie alle bejahende Urteile, wenigstens per accidens umkehren lassen; also: einige allerrealste Wesen sind zugleich schlechthinnotwendige Wesen. Nun ist aber ein ens realissimum von einem anderen in keinem Stücke unterschieden, und, was also von einigen unter diesem Begriffe enthaltenen gilt, das gilt auch von allen. Mithin werde ich (in diesem Falle) auch schlechthin umkehren können, d. i. ein jedes allerrealste Wesen ist ein notwen-

A: *ich*.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF COSMOLOGICAL PROOF 511

since this proposition is determined from its\(^1\) a priori concepts alone, the mere concept of the ens realissimum must carry with it the absolute necessity of that being; and this is precisely what the ontological proof has asserted and what the cosmological proof has refused to admit, although the conclusions of the latter are indeed covertly based on it.

Thus the second path upon which speculative reason enters in its attempt to prove the existence of a supreme being is not only as deceptive as the first, but has this additional defect, that it is guilty of an ignario elench. It professes to lead us by a new path, but after a short circuit brings us back to the very path which we had deserted at its bidding.

I have stated that in this cosmological argument there lies hidden a whole nest of dialectical assumptions, which the transcendental critique can easily detect and destroy. These deceptive principles I shall merely enumerate, leaving to the reader, who by this time will be sufficiently expert in these matters, the task of investigating them further, and of refuting them.

We find, for instance, (1) the transcendental principle whereby from the contingent we infer a cause. This principle is applicable only in the sensible world; outside that world it has no meaning whatsoever. For the mere intellectual concept of the contingent cannot give rise to any synthetic proposition, such as that of causality. The principle of causality has no meaning and no application for its application save only in the sensible world. But in the cosmological proof it is precisely in order to enable us to advance beyond the sensible world that it is employed. (2) The inference to a first cause, from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes, given one after the other, in the sensible world. The principles of the employment of reason do not justify this conclusion even within the world of experience, still less beyond this world in a realm into which this series can never be extended. (3) The unjustified self-satisfaction of reason in respect of the completion of this series. The removal of all the conditions without which no concept of necessity is possible is taken by reason to be a completion of the concept of the series, on the ground that we can then conceive nothing further. (4) The confusion between the

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\[^1\] Erdmann would read reisen in place of seinen.

TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK

diges Wesen. Weil nun dieser Satz bloß aus seinen Begriffen a priori bestimmt ist: so muß der bloße Begriff des realsten Wesens auch die absolute Notwendigkeit derselben bei sich führen; welches eben der ontologische Beweis behauptete, und der kosmologische nicht anerkennen wollte, gleichwohl aber seinen Schlüssen, obwohl versteckter Weise, unterlegte.

So ist denn der zweite Weg, den die spekulative Vernunft nimmt, um das Dasein des höchsten Wesens zu beweisen, nicht allein mit dem ersten gleich trüglich, sondern hat noch dieses Tadelhafte an sich, daß er eine ignario elench begeht, indem er uns verheißt, einen neuen Fußsteg zu führen, aber, nach einem kleinen Umschweif, uns wiederum auf den alten zurückbringt, den wir seinerseits verlassen hatten.

Ich habe kurz vorher gesagt, daß in diesem kosmologischen Argumente sich ein ganzes Nest von dialektischen Annahmen verborgen halte, welches die transzendentale Kritik leicht entdecken und zerstören kann. Ich will sie jetzt nur anführen und es dem schon geübten Leser überlassen, den trügerischen Grundsätzen weiter nachzuforschen und sie aufzuheben.

Da befindet sich denn z. B. 1) der transzendentale Grundsatz, vom Zufälligen auf eine Ursache zu schließen, welcher nur in der Sinne mit Bedeutung ist, außerhalb derselben aber auch nicht einmal einen Sinn hat. Denn der bloß intellektuelle Begriff des Zufälligen kann gar keinen synthetischen Satz, wie den der Kausalität, hervorrufen, und der Grundsatz der letzteren hat gar keine Bedeutung und kein Merkmal seines Gebrauchs, als nur in der Sinne mit, hier aber sollte er gerade dazu dienen, um über die Sinnewelt hinaus zu kommen. 2) Der Schluß, von der Unmöglichkeit einer unendlichen Reihe über einander gegebener Ursachen in der Sinne mit auf eine erste Ursache zu schließen, wozu uns die Prinzipien des Vernunftgebruchs selbst in der Erfahrung nicht berechtigen, viel weniger hier Grundsatz über dieselbe (wohin diese Kette gar nicht verlängert werden kann) ausdehnen können. 3) Die falsche Selbstbefriedigung der Vernunft, in Ansehung der Vollendung dieser Reihe, dadurch, daß man endlich alle Bedingung, ohne welche doch kein Begriff einer Notwendigkeit stattfinden kann, wegschafft, und, daß man alsdenn nichts weiter begreifen kann, dieses für eine Vollendung seines Begriffs annimmt. 4) Die Verwechslung der logischen

\[^1\] Akad.-Ausg.: »Grundsatz«.
Möglichkeit eines Begriffs von aller vereinigten Realität (ohne inneren Widerspruch) mit der transcendentalen, welche ein Principium der Tunlichkeit einer solchen Synthesis bedarf, das aber wiederum nur auf das Feld möglicher Erfahrungen gehen kann, u. s. w.

Das Kunststück des kosmologischen Beweises zielte bloß darauf ab, um dem Beweise des Daseins eines notwendigen Wesens a priori durch-$\bullet$blöse Begriiffe auszuweichen, der ontologisch geführt werden müße; worauf wir uns aber gänzlich unvermögend fühlen. In dieser Absicht schließen wir aus einem zum Grunde gelegten wirklichen Dasein (einer Erfahrung überhaupt), so gut es sich will tun lassen, auf irgend eine schlechterdingsnotwendige Bedingung desselben. Wir haben alsdenn dieser ihre Möglichkeit nicht nötig zu erklären. Denn, wenn ||| bewiesen ist, daß sie dasei, so ist die Frage wegen ihrer Möglichkeit ganz unnötig. Wollen wir nun dieses notwendige Wesen nach seiner Beschaffenheit näher bestimmen, so suchen wir nicht dasjenige, was hinreichend ist, aus seinem Begriffe die Notwendigkeit des Daseins zu begreifen; denn, könnten wir dieses, so hätten wir keine empirische Voraussetzung nötig; nein, wir suchen nur die negative Bedingung (conditio sine qua non), ohne welche ein Wesen nicht absolutnotwendig sein würde. Nun würde das in aller andern Art von Schlüssen, aus einer gegebenen Folge auf ihren Grund, wohl angehen; es trifft sich aber hier ungünstlicher Weise, daß die Bedingung, die man zur absoluten Notwendigkeit füdt, nur in einem einzigen Wesen angetroffen werden kann, welches daher in seinem Begriffe alles, was zur absoluten Notwendigkeit erforderlich ist, enthalten mußte, und also einen Schluß a priori auf dieselbe möglich macht; d. i. ich müßte auch umgekehrt schließen können: welchem Dinge dieser Begriff (der höchsten Realität) zukommt, das ist schlechterdings notwendig, und, kann ich so nicht schließen (wie ich denn dieses gestehen muß, wenn ich den ontologischen Beweis vermeiden will), so bin ich auch auf meinem neuen Wege verunglückt und behende mich wiederum da, von wo ich ausging. Der Begriff des höchsten Wesens tut wohl allen Fragen a priori ein Genügen, die wegen der inneren Bestimmungen eines Dinges können aufgeworfen werden, und ist darum auch ein Ideal ohne |||Gleiches', weil der allgemeine Begriff das-

1 A: »Gleiches«.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF COSMOLOGICAL PROOF

individual as being among the things that are possible. But it does not give satisfaction concerning the question of its own existence—though this is the real purpose of our enquiries—and if anyone adhered the existence of a necessary being but wanted to know which among all [existing] things is to be identified with that being, we could not answer: "This, not that, is the necessary being."

We may indeed be allowed to postulate the existence of an all-sufficient being, as the cause of all possible effects, with a view to lightening the task of reason in its search for the unity of the grounds of explanation. But in presuming so far as to say that such a being necessarily exists, we are no longer giving modest expression to an admissible hypothesis, but are confidently laying claim to apodeictic certainty. For the knowledge of what we profess to know as absolutely necessary must itself carry with it absolute necessity.

The whole problem of the transcendental ideal amounts to this: either, given absolute necessity, to find a concept which possesses it, or, given the concept of something, to find that something to be absolutely necessary. If either task be possible, so must the other; for reason recognises that only as absolutely necessary which follows of necessity from its concept. But both tasks are quite beyond our utmost efforts to satisfy our understanding in this matter; and equally unavailing are all attempts to induce it to acquiesce in its incapacity.

Unconditioned necessity, which we so indispensably require as the last bearer of all things, is for human reason the veritable abyss. Eternity itself, in all its terrible sublimity, as depicted by a Haller, is far from making the same overwhelming impression on the mind; for it only measures the duration of things, it does not support them. We cannot put aside, and yet also cannot endure the thought, that a being, which we represent to ourselves as supreme amongst all possible beings, should, as it were, say to itself: 'I am from eternity to eternity, and outside me there is nothing save what is through my will, but whence then am I?" All support here fails us; and the greatest perfection, no less than the least perfection, is unsubstantial and baseless for the merely speculative reason, which

1 [Albrecht von Haller (1708–1777), a writer on medical and kindred subjects, author of Die Alpen and other poems.]
makes not the least effort to retain either the one or the other, and feels indeed no loss in allowing them to vanish entirely.

Many forces in nature, which manifest their existence through certain effects, remain for us inscrutable; for we cannot track them sufficiently far by observation. Also, the transcendental object lying at the basis of appearances (and with it the reason why our sensibility is subject to certain supreme conditions rather than to others) is and remains for us inscrutable. The thing itself\(^1\) is indeed given, but we can have no insight into its nature: But it is quite otherwise with an ideal of pure reason; it can never be said to be inscrutable. For since it is not required to give any credentials of its reality save only the need on the part of reason to complete all synthetic unity by means of it; and since, therefore, it is in no wise given as thinkable object, it cannot be inscrutable in the manner in which an object is. On the contrary it\(^2\) must, as a mere idea, find its place and its solution in the nature of reason, and must therefore allow of investigation. For it is of the very essence of reason that we should be able to give an account of all our concepts, opinions, and assertions, either upon objective or, in the case of mere illusion, upon subjective grounds.

**DISCOVERY AND EXPLANATION**

_of the Dialectical Illusion in all Transcendental Proofs of the Existence of a Necessary Being_

Both the above proofs were transcendental, that is, were attempted independently of empirical principles. For although the cosmological proof presupposes an experience in general, it is not based on any particular property of this experience but on pure principles of reason, as applied to an existence given through empirical consciousness in general. Further, it soon abandons this guidance and relies on pure concepts alone. What, then, in these transcendental proofs is the cause of the dialectical but natural illusion which connects the concepts of necessity and supreme reality, and which realises and hypostatises what can be an idea only? Why are we constrained to assume that some one among existing things is in itself [die Sache selbst.]

\(^1\) [Reading, with Hartenstein, as for er.]

\(^2\) [die Sache selbst.]
necessary, and yet at the same time to shrink back from the existence of such a being as from an abyss? And how are we to secure that reason may come to an agreement with itself in this matter, and that from the wavering condition of a diffident approval, ever again withdrawn, it may arrive at settled insight?

There is something very strange in the fact, that once we assume something to exist we cannot avoid inferring that something exists necessarily. The cosmological argument rests on this quite natural (although not therefore certain) inference. On the other hand, if I take the concept of anything, no matter what, I find that the existence of this thing can never be represented by me as absolutely necessary, and that, whatever it may be that exists, nothing prevents me from thinking its non-existence. Thus while I may indeed be obliged to assume something necessary as a condition of the existent in general, I cannot think any particular thing as in itself necessary. In other words, I can never complete the regress to the conditions of existence save by assuming a necessary being, and yet am never in a position to begin with such a being.

If I am constrained to think something necessary as a condition of existing things, but am unable to think any particular thing as in itself necessary, it inevitably follows that necessity and contingency do not concern the things themselves; otherwise there would be a contradiction. Consequently, neither of these two principles can be objective. They may, however, be regarded as subjective principles of reason. The one calls upon us to seek something necessary as a condition of all that is given as existent, that is, to stop nowhere until we have arrived at an explanation which is complete a priori; the other forbids us ever to hope for this completion, that is, forbids us to treat anything empirical as unconditioned and to exempt ourselves thereby from the toil of its further derivation. Viewed in this manner, the two principles, as merely heuristic and regulative, and as concerning only the formal interest of reason, can very well stand side by side. The one prescribes that we are to philosophise about nature as if there were a necessary first ground for all that belongs to existence—solely, however, for the purpose of bringing systematic unity into our knowledge, by always pursuing such

dem Dasein eines solchen Wesens als einem Abgrunde zurückzubeben, und wie fängt man es an, daß sich die Vernunft hierüber selbst verstehe, und, aus dem schwankenden Zustande eines schüchternen, und immer wiederum zurückgenommenen Beifalls, zur ruhigen Einsicht gelange?


Wenn ich zu existierenden Dingen überhaupt etwas Notwendiges denken muß, kein Ding aber an sich selbst als notwendig zu denken befugt bin, so folgt daraus unvermeidlich, daß Notwendigkeit und Zufälligkeit nicht die Dinge selbst angehen und treffen müsse, weil sonst ein Widerspruch vorgehen würde; mithin keiner dieser beiden Grundsätze objektiv sei, sondern sie allenfalls nur subjektive Prinzipien der Vernunft sein können, nämlich einerseits zu allem, was als existierend gegeben ist, etwas zu suchen, das notwendig ist, d. i. niemals anderswo als bei einer a priori vollendeten Erklärung aufzuhören, andererseits aber auch diese Vollendung niemals zu hoffen, d. i. nichts-Empirisches als unbedingt anzunehmen, und sich dadurch ferner Ableitung zu überheben. In solcher Bedeutung können beide Grundsätze als bloß heuristisch und regulativ, die nichts als das formale Interesse der Vernunft besorgen, ganz wohl bei einander bestehen. Denn der eine sagt, ihr sollt so über die Natur philosophieren, als ob es zu allem, was zur Existenz gehört, einen notwendigen ersten Grund gebe, lediglich um systematische Einheit in eure Erkenntnis zu brin-
an idea, as an imagined ultimate ground. The other warns us not to regard any determination whatsoever of existing things as such an ultimate ground, that is, as absolutely necessary, but to keep the way always open for further derivation, and so to treat each and every determination as always conditioned by something else. But if everything which is perceived in things must necessarily be treated by us as conditioned, nothing that allows of being empirically given can be regarded as absolutely necessary.

Since, therefore, the absolutely necessary is only intended to serve as a principle for obtaining the greatest possible unity among appearances, as being their ultimate ground; and since—inasmuch as the second rule commands us always to regard all empirical causes of unity as themselves derived—we can never reach this unity within the world, it follows that we must regard the absolutely necessary as being outside the world.

While the philosophers of antiquity regard all form in nature as contingent, they follow the judgment of the common man in their view of matter as original and necessary. But if, instead of regarding matter relatively, as substratum of appearances, they had considered it in itself, and as regards its existence, the idea of absolute necessity would at once have disappeared. For there is nothing which absolutely binds reason to accept such an existence; on the contrary it can always annihilate it in thought, without contradiction; absolute necessity is a necessity that is to be found in thought alone.

This belief must therefore have been due to a certain regulative principle. In fact, extension and impenetrability (which between them make up the concept of matter) constitute the supreme empirical principle of the unity of appearances; and this principle, so far as it is empirically unconditioned, has the character of a regulative principle. Nevertheless, since every determination of the matter which constitutes what is real in appearances, including impenetrability, is an effect (action) which must have its cause and which is therefore always derivative in character, matter is not compatible with the idea of a necessary being as a principle of all derived unity. (For its real properties, being derivative, are one and all only

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1 [Principium. Kant's more usual term is Prinzip.]
conditionally necessary, and so allow of being removed—
wherewith the whole existence of matter would be removed.)
If this were not the case, we should have reached the ultimate
ground of unity by empirical means—which is for-
bidden by the second regulative principle. It therefore follows
that matter, and in general whatever belongs to the world,
is not compatible with the idea of a necessary original being,
even when the latter is regarded simply as a principle of the
greatest empirical unity. That being or principle must be set
outside the world, leaving us free to derive the appearances
of the world and their existence from other appearances, with
unfailing confidence, just as if there were no necessary being,
while yet we are also free to strive unceasingly towards the
completeness of that derivation, just as if such a being were
presupposed as an ultimate ground.

As follows from these considerations, the ideal of the
supreme being is nothing but a regulative principle of reason,
which directs us to look upon all connection in the world as if
it originated from an all-sufficient necessary cause. We can
base upon the ideal the rule of a systematic and, in accord-
ance with universal laws, necessary unity in the explanation
of that connection; but the ideal is not an assertion of an
existence necessary in itself. At the same time we cannot avoid
the transcendental subeeption, by which this formal principle
is represented as constitutive, and by which this unity is hypos-
tatised. We proceed here just as we do in the case of space.
Space is only a principle of sensibility, but since it is the
primary source and condition of all shapes, which are only so
many limitations of itself, it is taken as something absolutely
necessary, existing in its own right, and as an object given a
priori in itself. In the same way, since the systematic unity of
nature cannot be prescribed as a principle for the empirical
employment of our reason, except in so far as we presuppose
the idea of an ens realissimum as the supreme cause, it is
quite natural that this latter idea should be represented as an
actual object, which, in its character of supreme condition,
is also necessary—thus changing a regulative into a constitutive
principle. That such a substitution has been made becomes
evident, when we consider this supreme being, which relatively

[Principium.]
Chapter III

Section 6

The Impossibility of the Physico-Theological Proof

If, then, neither the concept of things in general nor the experience of any existence in general can supply what is required, it remains only to try whether a determinate experience, the experience of the things of the present world, and the constitution and order of these, does not provide the basis of a proof which may help us to attain to an assured conviction of a supreme being. Such proof we propose to entitle the physico-theological. Should this attempt also fail, it must follow that no satisfactory proof of the existence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea can be possible by pure speculative reason.

In view of what has already been said, it is evident that we can count upon a quite easy and conclusive answer to this enquiry. For how can any experience ever be adequate to an idea? The peculiar nature of the latter consists just in the fact that no experience can ever be equal to it. The transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient original being is so overwhelmingly great, so high above everything empirical, the latter being always conditioned, that it leaves us at a loss, partly because we can never find in experience material sufficient to satisfy such a concept, and partly because it is always in the sphere of the conditioned that we carry out our search, seeking there ever vainly for the unconditioned—no law of any empirical synthesis giving us an example of any such unconditioned or providing the least guidance in its pursuit.

If the supreme being should itself stand in this chain of

Welt schlechthin (unbedingt) notwendig war, als Ding für sich betrachtete, diese Notwendigkeit keines Begriffs fähig ist, und also nur als formale Bedingung des Denkens, nicht aber als materiale und hypostatische Bedingung des Daseins, in meiner Vernunft anzutreffen gewesen sein müsse.

Des Dritten Hauptstücks
Sechster Abschnitt:

Von der Unmöglichkeit des Physiktheologischen Beweises

Wenn denn weder der Begriff von Dingem überhaupt, noch die Erfahrung von irgend einem Dasein überhaupt, das, was gedacht wird, leisten kann, so bleibt noch ein Mittel übrig, zu versuchen, ob nicht eine bestimmte Erfahrung, mithin die der Dinge der gegenwärtigen Welt, ihrer Beschaffenheit und Anordnung, einen Beweisgrund abgebe, der uns sicher zur Überzeugung von dem Dasein eines höchsten Wesens verhelfen könne. Einen solchen Beweis würden wir den physiktheologischen nennen. Solte dieser auch unmöglich sein: so ist überall kein genugtuender Beweis aus bloß spekulativer Vernunft für das Dasein eines Wesens, welches unserer transcendentalen Idee entspräche, möglich.


Würde das höchste Wesen in dieser Kette der Bedingun-

1 A: niemanden.
PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL PROOF IMPOSSIBLE 519

conditions, it would be a member of the series, and like the lower members which it precedes, would call for further enquiry as to the still higher ground from which it follows. If, on the other hand, we propose to separate it from the chain, and to conceive it as a purely intelligible being, existing apart from the series of natural causes, by what bridge can reason contrive to pass over to it? For all laws governing the transition from effects to causes, all synthesis and extension of our knowledge, refer to nothing but possible experience, and therefore solely to objects of the sensible world, and apart from them can have no meaning whatsoever.

This world presents to us so immeasurable a stage of variety, order, purposiveness, and beauty, as displayed alike in its infinite extent and in the unlimited divisibility of its parts, that even with such knowledge as our weak understanding can acquire of it, we are brought face to face with so many marvels immeasurably great, that all speech loses its force, all numbers their power to measure, our thoughts themselves all definiteness, and that our judgment of the whole resolves itself into an amazement which is speechless, and only the more eloquent on that account. Everywhere we see a chain of effects and causes, of ends and means, a regularity in origination and dissolution. Nothing has of itself come into the condition in which we find it to exist, but always points to something else as its cause, while this in turn commits us to repetition of the same enquiry. The whole universe must thus sink into the abyss of nothingness, unless, over and above this infinite chain of contingencies, we assume something to support it—something which is original and independently self-subsistent, and which as the cause of the origin of the universe secures also at the same time its continuance. What magnitude are we to ascribe to this supreme cause—admitting that it is supreme in respect of all things in the world? We are not acquainted with the whole content of the world, still less do we know how to estimate its magnitude by comparison with all that is possible. But since we cannot, as regards causality, dispense with an ultimate and supreme being,1 what is there to prevent us ascribing to it a degree of perfection that sets it above everything else that is possible? This we can easily do—though

1 [ein ausseres und oberstes Wesen.]

UNMÖGLICHKEIT DES PHYSIKOTHEOLOGEN BEWEISES 549


Die gegenwärtige Welt eröffnet uns einen so unermesslichen Schauplatz von Mannigfaltigkeit, Ordnung, Zweckmäßigkei und Schönheit, man mag diese nun in der Unendlichkeit des Raumes, oder in der unbegrenzten Teilung desselben verfolgen, daß selbst nach den Kenntnissen, welche unser schwacher Verstand hierher zu werben können, alle Sprache, über so viele und unerschöpfliche Wunder, ihren Nachdruck, alle Zahlen ihre Kraft zu messen, und selbst unsere Gedanken alle Begrenzung vermissen, so, daß sich unser Urteil von Ganzen in ein sprachloses, aber desforderteres Erstaunen auflösen muß. Allerwärts sehen wir eine Kette von1 Wirkungen und Ursachen, von Zwecken und den Mitteln, Regelmäßigkeit im Entstehen oder Vergehen, und, indem nichts von selbst in den Zustand getreten ist, darin es sich befindet, so weisst es er immer weiter hin nach einem anderen Dinge, als seiner Ursache, welche gerade eben dieses eine weitere Nachfrage notwendig macht, so, daß auf solche Weise das ganze All im Grunde des Nichts versinken müßte, nähme man nicht etwas an, das außerhalb diesem unendlichen Zufälligen, für sich selbst ursprünglich und unabhängig bestehend, dasselbe hielte, und als die Ursache seines Ursprungs ihm zugleich seine Fortdauer sicherte. Diese höchste Ursache (in Anschauung aller Dinge der Welt), wie groß soll man sie sich denken? Die Welt kennst wir nicht ihrem ganzen Inhalt nach, noch weniger wissen wir ihre Größe durch die Vergleichung mit allem, was möglich ist, zu schätzen. Was hindert uns aber, daß, da wir einmal in Absicht auf Kausalität ein äußeres und oberstes Wesen bedürfen, wir es nicht zugleich dem Grade der Vollenommenheit nach über alles andere Mögliche setzen soll-

A 629
B 650

A 632
B 651

1 Akad.-Ausz.: sind. 2 A: -ders. 3 Akad.-Ausz.: eses. 3 Zusatz von B.
only through the slender outline of an abstract concept—by representing this being to ourselves as combining in itself all possible perfection, as in a single substance. This concept is in conformity with the demand of our reason for parsimony of principles; it is free from self-contradiction, and is never decisively contradicted by any experience; and it is likewise of such a character that it contributes to the extension of the employment of reason within experience, through the guidance which it yields in the discovery of order and purposiveness.

This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the common reason of mankind. It enlivens the study of nature, just as it itself derives its existence and gains its new vigour from that source. It suggests ends and purposes, where our observation would not have detected them by itself, and extends our knowledge of nature by means of the guiding-concept of a special unity, the principle of which is outside nature. This knowledge again reacts on its cause, namely, upon the idea which has led to it, and so strengthens the belief in a supreme Author [of nature] that the belief acquires the force of an irresistible conviction.

It would therefore not only be uncomforting but utterly vain to attempt to diminish in any way the authority of this argument. Reason, constantly upheld by this ever-increasing evidence, which, though empirical, is yet so powerful, cannot be so depressed through doubts suggested by subtle and abstruse speculation, that it is not at once aroused from the indecision of all melancholy reflection, as from a dream, by one glance at the wonders of nature and the majesty of the universe—descending from height to height up to the all-highest, from the conditioned to its conditions, up to the supreme and unconditioned Author [of all conditioned being].

But although we have nothing to bring against the rational-ity and utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend and to further it, we still cannot approve the claims, which this mode of argument would fain advance, to apodictic certainty and to an assent founded on no special favour or support from other quarters. It cannot hurt the good cause, if the dogmatic

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TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK

ten? welches wir leicht, obzwar freilich nur durch den zarten Umriß eines abstrakten Begriffs, bewerkstelligen können, wenn wir uns in ihm, als einer einigen Substanz, alle mögli-
liche Vollkommenheit vereinigt vorstellen; welcher Begriff

der Forderung unserer Vernunft in der Ersparrung der Prin-
zipien günstig, in sich selbst keinen Widersprüchen unter-
worfen und selbst der Erweiterung des Vernunftgebrauchs
mit in der Erfahrung, durch die Leitung, welche eine
solche Idee auf Ordnung und Zweckmaßigkeit gibt, zu-
träglich, nirgend aber einer Erfahrung auf entlehnte Art
zuvorder ist:

Dieser Beweis verdient jederzeit mit Achtung genannt zu
werden. Er ist der älteste, kläreste und der gemeinsen
Menschenvernunft am meisten angemessene. Er belebt das
Studium der Natur, so wie er selbst von diesem sein Dasein
hat und dadurch immer neue Kraft bekommt: Er bringt
Zwecke und Absichten dahin, wo sie unsere Beobachtung
nicht von selbst entdeckt hätte, und erweitert unsere Natur-
kenntnisse durch den Leitfaden einer besonderen Einheit,
deren Prinzip außer der Natur ist. Diese Kenntnisse wirken
aber wieder auf ihre Ursache, nämlich die || veranlassende
Idée, zurück, und vermehren den Glauben an einen höch-
sten Urheber bis zu einer unwiderstehlichen Überzeugung.

Es würde daher nicht allein trostlos, sondern auch ganz
umsonst sein, dem Ansehen dieses Beweises etwas entziehen
dozu wollen. Die Vernunft, durch die so mächtige und unter
ihren Händen immer wachsende, obzwar nur empirische
Beweisgründe unablässig gehoben wird, kann durch keine
Zweifel subtiler abgezogener Spekulation so niedergedrückt
werden, daß sie nicht aus jeder grüblerischen Unentschlos-
senheit, gleich als aus einem Traume, durch einen Blick,
den sie auf die Wunder der Natur und der Majestät des
Weltbaues wirft, gerissen werden sollte, um sich von Größe
der Größe zu Größe bis zur allerhöchsten, vom Bedingten zur Bedin-
gung, bis zum obersten und unbedingten Urheber zu er-
heben.

Ob wir aber gleich wider die Vernunftmäßigkeit und
Nützlichkeit dieses Verfahrens nichts einzuwenden, sondern
es vielmehr zu empfehlen und aufzumuntern haben, so
können wir darum doch die Ansprüche nicht billigen, welche
diese Beweisart auf apodiktische Gewißheit und auf einen
gar keiner Gunst oder fremden Unterstützung bedürftigen
Beifall machen möchte, und es kann der guten Sache kei-
The chief points of the physico-theological proof are as follows: (1) In the world we everywhere find clear signs of an order in accordance with a determinate purpose, carried out with great wisdom; and this in a universe which is indescribably varied in content and unlimited in extent. (2) This purposive order is quite alien to the things of the world, and only belongs to them contingently; that is to say, the diverse things could not of themselves have co-operated, by so great a combination of diverse means, to the fulfilment of determinate final purposes, had they not been chosen and designed for these purposes by an ordering rational principle in conformity with underlying ideas. (3) There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (or more than one), which must be the cause of the world not merely as a blindly working all-powerful nature, by secundity, but as intelligence, through freedom. (4) The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relations existing between the parts of the world, as members of an artfully arranged structure—inferred with certainty in so far as our observation suffices for its verification, and beyond these limits with probability, in accordance with the principles of analogy.

We need not here criticise natural reason too strictly in regard to its conclusion from the analogy between certain natural products and what our human art produces when we do violence to nature, and constrain it to proceed not according to its own ends but in conformity with ours—appealing to the similarity of these particular natural products with houses, ships, watches. Nor need we here question its conclusion that

1 [vorbeigehen.]
there lies at the basis of nature a causality similar to that responsible for artificial products, namely, an understanding and a will; and that the inner possibility of a self-acting\(^1\) nature (which is what makes all art, and even, it may be, reason itself, possible) is therefore derived from another, though superhuman, art—a mode of reasoning which could not perhaps withstand a searching transcendental criticism. But at any rate we must admit that, if we are to specify a cause at all, we cannot here proceed more securely than by analogy with those purposive productions of which alone the cause and mode of action are fully known to us. Reason could never be justified in abandoning the causality which it knows for grounds of explanation which are obscure, of which it does not have any knowledge, and which are incapable of proof.

On this method of argument, the purposiveness and harmonious adaptation of so much in nature can suffice to prove the contingency of the form merely, not of the matter, that is, not of the substance in the world. To prove the latter we should have to demonstrate that the things in the world would not of themselves be capable of such order and harmony, in accordance with universal laws, if they were not in their \textit{substance} the product of supreme wisdom. But to prove this we should require quite other grounds of proof than those which are derived from the analogy with human art. The utmost, therefore, that the argument can prove is an \textit{architect} of the world who is always very much hampered by the adaptability of the material in which he works, not a \textit{creator} of the world to whose idea everything is subject. This, however, is altogether inadequate to the lofty purpose which we have before our eyes, namely, the proof of an all-sufficient primordial being. To prove the contingency of matter itself, we should have to resort to a transcendental argument, and this is precisely what we have here set out to avoid.

The inference, therefore, is that the order and purposiveness everywhere observable throughout the world may be regarded as a completely contingent arrangement, and that we may argue to the existence of a cause \textit{proportioned} to it. But the concept of this cause must enable us to know some-

\[^1\] freundwirkenden.
thing quite determinate about it, and can therefore be no other than the concept of a being who possesses all might, wisdom, etc., in a word, all the perfection which is proper to an all-sufficient being. For the predicates—very great', astounding', immeasurable' in power and excellence—give no determinate concept at all, and do not really tell us what the thing is in itself. They are only relative representations of the magnitude of the object, which the observer, in contemplating the world, compares with himself and with his capacity of comprehension, and which are equally terms of eulogy whether we be magnifying the object or be depreciating the observing subject in relation to that object. Where we are concerned with the magnitude (of the perfection) of a thing, there is no determinate concept except that which comprehends all possible perfection; and in that concept only the allness (omnitude) of the reality is completely determined.

Now no one, I trust, will be so bold as to profess that he comprehends the relation of the magnitude of the world as he has observed it (alike as regards both extent and content) to omnipotence, of the world-order to supreme wisdom, of the world unity to the absolute unity of its Author, etc. Physico-theology is therefore unable to give any determinate concept of the supreme cause of the world, and cannot therefore serve as the foundation of a theology which is itself in turn to form the basis of religion.

To advance to absolute totality by the empirical road is utterly impossible. None the less this is what is attempted in the physico-theological proof. What, then, are the means which have been adopted to bridge this wide abyss?

The physico-theological argument can indeed lead us to the point of admiring the greatness, wisdom, power, etc., of the Author of the world, but can take us no further. Accordingly, we then abandon the argument from empirical grounds of proof, and fall back upon the contingency which, in the first steps of the argument, we had inferred from the order and purposiveness of the world. With this contingency as our sole premiss, we then advance, by means of transcendental concepts alone, to the existence of an absolutely necessary being, and [as a final step] from the concept of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the completely determinate or determin-

554 transzendentale dialectik
ggeben, und er kann also kein anderer sein, als der von einem Wesen, das alle Macht, Weisheit etc., mit einem Worte, alle Vollkommenheit, als ein allgenenormes Weisen, besitzt. Denn die Prädikate von sehr großer, von erstaunlicher, von unermeßlicher Macht und Trefflichkeit geben gar keinen bestimmten Begriff, und sagen eigentlich nicht, was das Ding an sich selbst sei, sondern sind nur Verhältnisvorsellungen von der Größe des Gegenstandes, den der Beobachter (der Welt) mit sich selbst und seiner Fassungskraft vergleicht, und die gleich hochpreisend ausfallen, man mag den Gegenstand vergrößern; oder das beobachtende Subjekt in Verhältnis auf ihn kleiner machen. Wo es auf Größe (der Vollkommenheit) eines Dinges überhaupt ankommt, da gibt es keinen bestimmten Begriff, als den, so die ganze mögliche Vollkommenheit begreift, und nur das All (omnitude) der Realität ist im Begriffe durchgängig bestimmt.

Nun will ich nicht hoffen, daß sich jemand unterwinden sollte, das Verhältnis der von ihm beobachteten Weltgröße (nach Umfang sowohl als Inhalt) zur Allmacht, der Weltonordnung zur höchsten Weisheit, der Weiteinheit zur absoluten Einheit des Urhebers etc. einzusehen. Also kann die Physikotheologie keinen bestimmten Begriff von der obersten Weltursache geben, und daher zu einem Prinzip der Theologie, welche wiederum die Grundlage der Religion ausmachen soll, nicht hinreichend sein.

Der Schritt zu der absoluten Totalität ist durch den empirischen Weg ganz und gar unmöglich. Nun tut man ihn doch aber im physischtheologischen Beweise. Welches Mittels bedient man sich also wohl, über eine so weite Kluft zu kommen?

Nachdem man bis zur Bewunderung der Größe der Weisheit, der Macht etc. des Welturhebers gelanget ist, und nicht weiter kommen kann, so verläuft man auf einmal dieses durch empirische Beweisgründe geführte Argument, und geht zu der gleich anfangs aus der Ordnung und Zweckmäßigkeit der Welt geschlossenen Zufälligkeit derselben. Von dieser Zufälligkeit allein geht man nun, lediglich durch transzendentale Begriffe, zum Dasein eines Schlechthinnotwendigen, und von dem Begriff der absoluten Notwendigkeit der ersten Ursache auf den durchgängig bestimmten

able concept of that necessary being, namely, to the concept of
an all-embracing reality. Thus the physico-theological proof,
falling in its undertaking, has in face of this difficulty suddenly
fallen back upon the cosmological proof; and since the latter
is only a disguised ontological proof, it has really achieved
its purpose by pure reason alone—although at the start it
disclaimed all kinship with pure reason and professed to
establish its conclusions on convincing evidence derived from
experience.

Those who propound the physico-theological argument
have therefore no ground for being so contemptuous in their
attitude to the transcendentalist mode of proof, positing as clear-
sighted students of nature, and complacently looking down
upon that proof as the artificial product of obscure speculative
refinements. For were they willing to scrutinise their own pro-
cedure, they would find that, after advancing some considerable
way on the solid ground of nature and experience, and finding
themselves just as far distant as ever from the object which disclos-
e itself to their reason, they suddenly leave this ground, and
pass over into the realm of mere possibilities, where they hope
upon the wings of ideas to draw near to the object—the object
that has refused itself to all their empirical enquiries. For after
this tremendous leap, when they have, as they think, found firm
ground, they extend their concept—the determinate concept,
into the possession of which they have now come, they know not
how—over the whole sphere of creation. And the ideal, [which
this reasoning thus involves, and] which is entirely a product
of pure reason, they then elucidate by reference to experience,
though inadequately enough, and in a manner far below the
dignity of its object; and throughout they persist in refusing to
admit that they have arrived at this knowledge or hypo-
thesis by a road quite other than that of experience.

Thus the physico-theological proof of the existence of an
original or supreme being rests upon the cosmological proof,
and the cosmological upon the ontological. And since, besides
these three, there is no other path open to speculative reason,
the ontological proof from pure concepts of reason is the only
possible one, if indeed any proof of a proposition so far exalted
above all empirical employment of the understanding is pos-
sible at all.
If I understand by theology knowledge of the original being, it is based either solely upon reason (theologia racionalis) or upon revelation (revelata). The former thinks its object either through pure reason, solely by means of transcendental concepts (ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium), in which case it is entitled transcendental theology, or through a concept borrowed from nature (from the nature of our soul)—a concept of the original being as a supreme intelligence—and it would then have to be called natural theology. Those who accept only a transcendental theology are called deists; those who also admit a natural theology are called theists. The former grant that we can know the existence of an original being solely through reason, but maintain that our concept of it is transcendental only, namely, the concept of a being which possesses all reality, but which we are unable to determine in any more specific fashion. The latter assert that reason is capable of determining its object more precisely through analogy with nature, namely, as a being which, through understanding and freedom, contains in itself the ultimate ground of everything else. Thus the deist represents this being merely as a cause of the world (whether by the necessity of its nature or through freedom, remains undecided), the theist as the Author of the world.

Transcendental theology, again, either proposes to deduce the existence of the original being from an experience in general (without determining in any more specific fashion the nature of the world to which the experience belongs), and is then entitled cosmo-theology; or it believes that it can know the existence of such a being through mere concepts, without the help of any experience whatsoever, and is then entitled onto-theology.

Natural theology infers the properties and the existence of...
an Author of the world from the constitution, the order and
unity, exhibited in the world—a world in which we have to
recognise two kinds of causality with their rules, namely,
nature and freedom. From this world natural theology ascends
to a supreme intelligence, as the principle either of all natural
or of all moral order and perfection. In the former case it is
titled physico-theology, in the latter moral theology.*

Since we are wont to understand by the concept of God not
merely an eternal nature that works blindly, as the root-source
of all things, but a supreme being who through understanding
and freedom is the Author of all things; and since it is in this
sense only that the concept interests us, we could, strictly
speaking, deny to the deist any belief in God, allowing him
only the assertion of an original being or supreme cause.
However, since no one ought to be accused of denying what he only
does not venture to assert, it is less harsh and more just to
say that the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God:
(summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to enquire what
are the possible sources of all these endeavours of reason.

For the purposes of this enquiry, theoretical knowledge
may be defined as knowledge of what is, practical knowledge
as the representation of what ought to be. On this definition, the
theoretical employment of reason is that by which I know a
priori (as necessary) that something is, and the practical that
by which it is known a priori what ought to happen. Now if it
is indubitably certain that something is or that something
ought to happen, but this certainty is at the same time only:
conditional, then a certain determine condition of it can be
absolutely necessary, or can be an optional and contingent
presupposition. In the former case the condition is postulated
(per thesis); in the latter case it is assumed (per hypothesein).
Now since there are practical laws which are absolutely neces-
sary, that is, the moral laws, it must follow that if these neces-
sarily presuppose the existence of any being as the condition of:

* Not theological ethics: for this contains moral laws, which pre-
suppose the existence of a supreme ruler of the world. Moral theology,
on the other hand, is a conviction of the existence of a supreme being
—a conviction which bases itself on moral laws.1

1 [welche sich auf sittliche Gesetze gründet] substituted in B for welches auf
sittliche Gesetze gegründet ist.]
THE CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY

the possibility of their obligatory power, this existence must be postulated; and this for the sufficient reason that the conditioned, from which the inference is drawn to this determinate condition, is itself known a priori to be absolutely necessary. At some future time we shall show that the moral laws do not merely presuppose the existence of a supreme being, but also, as themselves in a different connection absolutely necessary, justify us in postulating it, though, indeed, only from a practical point of view. For the present, however, we are leaving this mode of argument aside.

Where we are dealing merely with what is (not with what ought to be), the conditioned, which is given to us in experience, is always thought as being likewise contingent. That which conditions it is not, therefore, known as absolutely necessary, but serves only as something relatively necessary; or rather as needful; in itself and a priori it is an arbitrary presupposition, assumed by us in our attempt to know the conditioned by means of reason. If, therefore, in the field of theoretical knowledge, the absolute necessity of a thing were to be known, this could only be from a priori concepts, and never by positing it as a cause relative to an existence given in experience.

Theoretical knowledge is speculative if it concerns an object, or those concepts of an object, which cannot be reached in any experience. It is so named to distinguish it from the knowledge of nature, which concerns only those objects or predicates of objects which can be given in a possible experience.

The principle by which, from that which happens (the empirically contingent) [viewed as] an effect, we infer a cause, is a principle of the knowledge of nature, but not of speculative knowledge. For, if we abstract from what it is as a principle that contains the condition of all possible experience, and leaving aside all that is empirical attempt to assert it of the contingent in general, there remains not the least justification for any synthetic proposition such as might show us how to pass from that which is before us to something quite different (called its cause). In this merely speculative employment any meaning whose objective reality admits of being made intelligible in concreto, is taken away not only from the concept of the contingent but from the concept of a cause.

A 658

TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK

Bedingung der Möglichkeit ihrer verbindenden Kraft, notwendig voraussetzen, dieses Dasein postuliert werden, darum, weil das Bedingte, von welchem der Schluss auf diese bestimmte Bedingung geht, selbst a priori als schlechterdings notwendig erkannt wird. Wir werden künftig von den moralischen Gesetzen zeigen, daß sie das Dasein eines höchsten Wesens nicht bloß voraussetzen, sondern auch, da sie in anderweitiger Betrachtung schlechterdings notwendig sind, es mit Recht, aber heilich nur praktisch, postulieren; jetzt setzen wir diese Schlußart noch bei Seite.

Da, wenn bloß von dem, was da ist (nicht, was sein soll), die Rede ist, das Bedingte, welches uns in der Erfahrung gegeben wird, jederzeit auch als zufällig gedacht wird, so kann die zu ihm gehörige Bedingung daraus nicht als schlecht-

hinn conceptual erkannt werden, sondern dient nur als eine respektiv notwendige, oder vielmehr nötige, an sich selbst aber und a priori willkürliche Voraussetzung zum Vermunft-
erkenntnis des Bedingten. Soll also die absolute Notwendig-

heit eines Dinges im theoretischen Erkenntnisse erkannt

werden, so könnte dieses allein aus Begriffen a priori ge-

schehen, niemals aber als einer Ursache, in Beziehung auf

ein Dasein, das durch Erfahrung gegeben ist.

Eine theoretische Erkenntnis ist spekulativ, wenn sie auf einen Gegenstand, oder solche Begriffe von einem Ge-
genstande, geht, woselbst man in keiner Erfahrung ge-

lassen kann. Sie wird der Naturerkenntnis entgegengesetzt,

welche auf keine andere Gegenstände oder Prädikate der-

selben geht, als die in einer möglichen Erfahrung gegeben

werden können.

Der Grundsatz, von dem, was geschieht (dem Empirisch-

zufälligen), als Wirkung, auf eine Ursache zu schließen, ist
ein Prinzip der Naturerkenntnis, aber nicht der spekulati-

ven. Denn, wenn man von ihm, als einem Grundsätze, der
die Bedingung möglicher Erfahrung überhaupt enthält,

abstrahiert, und, indem man alles Empirische wegläßt, ihn
vom Zufälligen überhaupt aussagen will, so bleibt nicht die

mindeste Rechtfertigung eines solchen synthetischen Satzes

übrig, um daraus zu ersehen, wie ich von etwas, was da ist,
zu etwas davon ganz Verschiedenem (genannt Ursache)

übergehen könne; ja der Begriff einer Ursache verliert eben
so, wie des Zufälligen, in solchem bloß spekulativen Ge-

brauche, alle Bedeutung, deren objektive Realität sich in

concreto begreiflich machen lässe. 

1 A: »zu welchem«.
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

If we infer from the existence of things in the world the existence of their cause, we are employing reason, not in the knowledge of nature, but in speculation. For the former type of knowledge treats as empirically contingent, and refers to a cause, not the things themselves (substances), but only that which happens, that is, their states. That substance (matter) is itself contingent in its existence would have to be known in a purely speculative manner. Again, even if we were speaking only of the form of the world, the way in which things are connected and change, and sought to infer from this a cause entirely distinct from the world, this would again be a judgment of purely speculative reason, since the object which we are inferring is not an object of a possible experience. So employed, the principle of causality, which is only valid within the field of experience, and outside this field has no application, nay, is indeed meaningless, would be altogether diverted from its proper use.

Now I maintain that all attempts to employ reason in theology in any merely speculative manner are altogether fruitless and by their very nature null and void, and that the principles of its employment in the study of nature do not lead to any theology whatsoever. Consequently, the only theology of reason which is possible is that which is based upon moral laws or seeks guidance from them. All synthetic principles of reason allow only of an immanent employment; and in order to have knowledge of a supreme being we should have to put them to a transcendent use, for which our understanding is in no way fitted. If the empirically valid law of causality is to lead to the original being, the latter must belong to the chain of objects of experience, and in that case it would, like all appearances, be itself again conditioned. But even if the leap beyond the limits of experience, by means of the dynamical law of the relation of effects to their causes, be regarded as permissible, what sort of a concept could we obtain by this procedure? It is far from providing the concept of a supreme being, since experience never gives us the greatest of all possible effects, such as would be required to provide the evidence for a cause of that kind. Should we seek to make good this lack of determination in our concept, by means of a mere idea of [a being that possesses] the highest perfection and original necessity, this may indeed be granted...
as a favour; it cannot be demanded as a right on the strength of an incontrovertible proof. The physico-theological proof, as combining speculation and intuition, might therefore perhaps give additional weight to other proofs (if such there be); but taken alone, it serves only to prepare the understanding for theological knowledge, and to give it a natural leaning in this direction, not to complete the work in and by itself.

All this clearly points to the conclusion that transcendental questions allow only of transcendental answers, that is, answers exclusively based on concepts that are a priori, without the least empirical admixture. But the question under consideration is obviously synthetic, calling for an extension of our knowledge beyond all limits of experience, namely, to the existence of a being that is to correspond to a mere idea of ours, an idea that cannot be paralleled in any experience. Now as we have already proved, synthetic a priori knowledge is possible only in so far as it expresses the formal conditions of a possible experience; and all principles are therefore only of immanent validity, that is, they are applicable only to objects of empirical knowledge, to appearances. Thus all attempts to construct a theology through purely speculative reason, by means of a transcendental procedure, are without result.

But even if anyone prefers to call in question all those proofs which have been given in the Analytic, rather than allow himself to be robbed of his conviction of the conclusiveness of the arguments upon which he has so long relied, he still cannot refuse to meet my demand that he should at least give a satisfactory account how, and by what kind of inner illumination, he believes himself capable of soaring so far above all possible experience, on the wings of mere ideas. New proofs, or attempts to improve upon the old: ones, I would ask to be spared. There is not indeed, in this field, much room for choice, since all merely speculative proofs in the end bring us always back to one and the same proof, namely, the ontological; and I have therefore no real ground to fear the fertile ingenuity of the dogmatic champions of super-sensible reason. I shall not, however, decline the challenge to discover the fallacy in any attempt of this kind, and so to nullify its claims; and this I can indeed do without

\[A 639\]
\[B 667\]
considering myself a particularly combative person. But by such means I should never succeed in eradicating the hope of better fortune in those who have once become accustomed to dogmatic modes of persuasion; and I therefore confine myself to the moderate demand, that they give, in terms which are universal and which are based on the nature of the human understanding and of all our other sources of knowledge, a satisfactory answer to this one question: how we can so much as make a beginning in the proposed task of extending our knowledge entirely a priori, and of carrying it into a realm where no experience is possible to us, and in which there is therefore no means of establishing the objective reality of any concept that we have ourselves invented. In whatever manner the understanding may have arrived at a concept, the existence of its object is never, by any process of analysis, discoverable within it; for the knowledge of the existence of the object consists precisely in the fact that the object is posited in itself, beyond the [mere] thought of it.¹ Through concepts alone, it is quite impossible to advance to the discovery of new objects and supernatural² beings; and it is useless to appeal to experience, which in all cases yields only appearances.

But although reason, in its merely speculative employment, is very far from being equal to so great an undertaking, namely, to demonstrate the existence of a supreme being, it is yet of very great utility in correcting any knowledge of this being which may be derived from other sources, in making it consistent with itself and with every point of view from which intelligible objects may be regarded,³ and in freeing it from everything incompatible with the concept of an original being and from all admixture of empirical limitations.

Transcendental theology is still, therefore, in spite of all its disabilities, of great importance in its negative employment, and serves as a permanent censor of our reason, in so far as the latter deals merely with pure ideas which, as such, allow of no criterion that is not transcendental. For if, in some other relation, perhaps on practical grounds, the presupposition of a supreme and all-sufficient being, as highest intelli-

¹ [außer dem Gedanken.] ² [überschwenglicher.] ³ [sei sich selbst und jeder intelligiblen Absicht.]
CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY

gence, established its validity beyond all question, it would be of the greatest importance accurately to determine this concept on its transcendental side, as the concept of a necessary and supremely real being, to free it from whatever, as belonging to mere appearance (anthropomorphism in its wider sense), is out of keeping with the supreme reality, and at the same time to dispose of all counter-assertions, whether atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic. Such critical treatment is, indeed, far from being difficult, inasmuch as the same grounds which have enabled us to demonstrate the inability of human reason to maintain the existence of such a being must also suffice to prove the invalidity of all counter-assertions. For from what source could we, through a purely speculative employment of reason, derive the knowledge that there is no supreme being as ultimate ground of all things, or that it has none of the attributes which, arguing from their consequences, we represent to ourselves as analogous with the dynamical realities of a thinking being, or (as the anthropomorphists contend) that it must be subject to all the limitations which sensibility inevitably imposes on those intelligences which are known to us through experience.

Thus, while for the merely speculative employment of reason the supreme being remains a mere ideal, it is yet an ideal without a flaw, a concept which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge. Its objective reality cannot indeed be proved, but also cannot be disproved, by merely speculative reason. If, then, there should be a moral theology that can make good this deficiency, transcendental theology, which before was problematic only, will prove itself indispensable in determining the concept of this supreme being and in constantly testing reason, which is so often deceived by sensibility, and which is frequently out of harmony with its own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence outside the world (and not as world-soul), eternity as free from conditions of time, omnipresence as free from conditions of space, omnipotence, etc. are purely transcendental predicates, and for this reason the purified concepts of them, which every theology finds so indispensable, are only to be obtained from transcendental theology.

VON DEM REGULATIVEN GEBRAUCH DER IDEEN

hjre Gültigkeit ohne Widerrede behauptete: so wäre es von der größten Wichtigkeit, diesen Begriff auf seiner transzendentalen Seite, als den Begriff eines notwendigen und allerrealesten Wesens, genau zu bestimmen, und, was der höchsten Realität zuwider ist, was zur bloßen Erscheinung (dem Anthropomorphism im weiteren Verstande) gehört, weg- zuschaffen, und zugleich alle entgegengesetzten Behauptungen, sie mögen nun atheistisch, oder deistisch, oder anthropomorphistisch sein, aus dem Wege zu räumen; welches in einer solchen kritischen Behandlung sehr leicht ist, indem dieselben Gründe, durch welche das Unvermögen der menschlichen Vernunft, in Ansehung der Behauptung des Daseins eines dergleichen || Wesens, vor Augen gelegt wird, notwendig auch zurücksichtlich der eine jeden Gegenbehauptung zu beweisen. Denn, wo will jemand durch reine Spekulation der Vernunft die Einsicht hernehmen, daß es kein höchstes Wesen, als Urgrund von allem, gebe, oder daß ihm keine von den Eigenschaften zu- komme, welche wir, ihren Folgen nach, als analogisch mit den dynamischen Realitäten eines denkenden Wesens, uns vorstellen, oder daß sie, in dem letzteren Falle, auch allen Einschränkungen unterworfen sein müßten, welche die Sinnlichkeit den Intelligenzen, die wir durch Erfahrung kennen, unvermeidlich auferlegt.

Das höchste Wesen bleibt also für den bloß spekulativen Gebrauch der Vernunft ein bloßes, aber doch fehlerfreies Ideal, ein Begriff, welcher die ganze menschliche Erkenntnis schließt und krönt, dessen objektive Realität auf diesem Wege zwar nicht bewiesen, aber auch nicht widerlegt werden kann, und, wenn es eine Moraltheologie geben sollte, die diesen Mangel ergänzen kann, so beweiset alsdenn die vorher nur problematische transzendenteale Theologie ihre Unentbehrlichkeit, durch Bestimmung ihres Begriffs und unmissverständliche Zensur einer durch Sinnlichkeit oft genug getäuschten und mit ihren eigenen Ideen nicht immer ein- stimmigen Vernunft. Die Notwendigkeit, die Unendlichkeit, die Einheit, das Dasein außer der Welt (nicht als Welt- seele), die Ewigkeit, ohne Bedingungen der Zeit, die All- gegenwart, ohne Bedingungen || des Raumes, die Allmacht etc. sind lauter transzendenteale Prädikate, und daher kann der gereinigte Begriff derselben, den eine jede Theologie so sehr nötig hat, bloß aus der transzendentalen gezogen werden.
APPENDIX TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

THE REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS OF PURE REASON

The outcome of all dialectical attempts of pure reason does not merely confirm what we have already proved in the Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all those conclusions of ours which profess to lead us beyond the field of possible experience are deceptive and without foundation; it likewise teaches us this further lesson, that human reason has a natural tendency to transgress these limits, and that transcendental ideas are just as natural to it as the categories are to understanding—though with this difference, that while the categories lead to truth, that is, to the conformity of our concepts with the object, the ideas produce what, though a mere illusion, is none the less irresistible, and the harmful influence of which we can barely succeed in neutralising even by means of the severest criticism.

Everything that has its basis in the nature of our powers must be appropriate to, and consistent with, their right employment—if only we can guard against a certain misunderstanding and so can discover the proper direction of these powers. We are entitled, therefore, to suppose that transcendental ideas have their own good, proper, and therefore immanent use, although, when their meaning is misunderstood, and they are taken for concepts of real things, they become transcendent in their application and for that very reason can be delusive. For it is not the idea in itself, but its use only, that can be either transcendent or immanent (that is, either range beyond all possible experience or find employment within its limits), according as it is applied to an object which is supposed to correspond to it, or is directed solely to the use of understanding in general, in respect of those objects that fall to be dealt with by the understanding. All errors of subreation are to be ascribed to a defect of judgment, never to understanding or to reason.

Reason is never in immediate relation to an object, but

\[1\] [Urteilskraft]
only to the understanding; and it is only through the understanding that it has its own [specific] empirical employment. It does not, therefore, create concepts (of objects) but only orders them, and gives them that unity which they can have only if they are employed in their widest possible application, that is, with a view to obtaining totality in the various series. The understanding does not concern itself with this totality, but only with that connection through which, in accordance with concepts, such series come into being. Reason has, therefore, as its sole object, the understanding and its effective application. Just as the understanding unifies the manifold in the object by means of concepts, so reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding, which otherwise are concerned solely with distributive unity.

I accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas never allow of any constitutive employment. When regarded in that mistaken manner, and therefore as supplying concepts of certain objects, they are but pseudo-rational, merely dialectical concepts. On the other hand, they have an excellent, and indeed indispensably necessary, regulative employment, namely, that of directing the understanding towards a certain goal upon which the routes marked out by all its rules converge, as upon their point of intersection. This point is indeed a mere idea, a _focus imaginarius_, from which, since it lies quite outside the bounds of possible experience, the concepts of the understanding do not in reality proceed; none the less it serves to give to these concepts the greatest [possible] unity combined with the greatest [possible] extension. Hence arises the illusion that the lines have their source in a real object lying outside the field of empirically possible knowledge—just as objects reflected in a mirror are seen as behind it. Nevertheless this illusion (which need not, however, be allowed to deceive us) is indispensably necessary if we are to direct the understanding beyond every given experience (as part of the sum of possible experience), and thereby to secure its greatest possible extension, just as, in the case of mirror-vision, the illusion involved is indispensably necessary if,

1 [Reading, with Mellin, *gestossen für ausgeschlossen.*]
besides the objects which lie before our eyes, we are also to see those which lie at a distance behind our back.

If we consider in its whole range the knowledge obtained for us by the understanding, we find that what is peculiarly distinctive of reason in its attitude to this body of knowledge, is that it prescribes and seeks to achieve its systematication, that is, to exhibit the connection of its parts in conformity with a single principle. This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, namely, that of the form of a whole of knowledge—a whole which is prior to the determinate knowledge of the parts and which contains the conditions that determine a priori for every part its position and relation to the other parts. This idea accordingly postulates a complete unity in the knowledge obtained by the understanding, by which this knowledge is to be not a mere contingent aggregate, but a system connected according to necessary laws. We may not say that this idea is a concept of the object, but only of the thoroughgoing unity of such concepts, in so far as that unity serves as a rule for the understanding. These concepts of reason are not derived from nature; on the contrary, we interrogate nature in accordance with these ideas, and consider our knowledge as defective so long as it is not adequate to them. By general admission, pure earth, pure water, pure air, etc., are not to be found. We require, however, the concepts of them (though, in so far as their complete purity is concerned, they have their origin solely in reason) in order properly to determine the share which each of these natural causes has in producing appearances. Thus in order to explain the chemical interactions of bodies in accordance with the idea of a mechanism, every kind of matter is reduced to earths (qua mere weight), to salts and inflammable substances (qua force), and to water and air as vehicles (machines, as it were, by which the first two produce their effects). The modes of expression usually employed are, indeed, somewhat different, but the influence of reason on the classifications of the natural scientist is still easily detected.

If reason is a faculty of deducing the particular from the universal, and if the universal is already certain in itself and given, only judgment\(^1\) is required to execute the process of

\(^{1}\) [Urteilskraft.]

\(^{3}\) Teile der gesamten möglichen Erfahrung) hinaus, mithin auch zur größtmöglichen und äußersten Erweiterung abzischen wollen.

Übersehen wir unsere Verstandeskenntnisse in ihrem ganzen Umfange, so finden wir, daß dasjenige, was Vernunft ganz eigentümlich darüber verfügt und zu Stanze zu bringen sucht, das Systematische der Erkenntnis sei, d. i. der Zusammenhang derselben aus einem Prinzip. Diese Vernunftseinheit setzt jederzeit eine Idee voraus, nämlich die von der Form eines Ganzen der Erkenntnis, welches vor der bestimmten Erkenntnis der Teile vorhergeht und die Bedingungen enthält, jedem Teile seine Stelle und Verhältnis zu den übrigen a priori zu bestimmen. Diese Idee postuliert demnach vollständige Einheit der Verstandeskenntnis, wodurch dieselbe den übrigen ein zufälliges Aggregat, sondern nach notwendigen Gesetzen zusammenhangendes System wird. Man kann eigentlich nicht sagen, daß diese Idee ein Begriff vom Objekte sei, sondern von der durchgängigen Einheit dieser Begriffe, so fern dieselbe dem Verstande zur Regel dient. Dergleichen Vernunftbegriffe werden nicht aus der Natur geschöpft, vielmehr befragen wir die Natur nach diesen Ideen, und halten unsere Erkenntnis für mangelhaft, so lange sie || denselben nicht adäquat ist. Man gesteht: daß sich schwerlich eine Erde, eines Wassers, eine Luft etc. finde. Gleichwohl hat man die Begriffe davon doch nösig (die also, was die völlige Reinigkeit betrifft, nur in der Vernunft ihren Ursprung haben), um den Anteil, den jede dieser Naturursachen an der Erscheinung hat, gehört zu bestimmen, und so bringt man alle Materien auf die Erden (gleichsam die bloße Last), Salze und brennliche Wesen (als die Kraft), endlich auf Wasser und Luft als Vehikel (gleichsam Maschinen, vermögesth deren die vorigen wirken), zum nach der Idee eines Mechanismus die chemischen Wirkungen der Materien untereinander zu erklären. Denn, wiewohl man sich nicht wirklich so ausdrück, so ist doch ein solcher Einfluß der Vernunft auf die Einteilungen der Naturforscher sehr leicht zu entdecken.

Wenn die Vernunft ein Vermögen ist, das Besondere aus dem Allgemeinen abzuleiten, so ist entweder das Allgemeine schon an sich gewiß und gegeben, und alsdenn erfordert es nur Urteilskraft zur Subsumtion, und das Be-
subsumption, and the particular is thereby determined in a necessary manner. This I shall entitle the apodeictic use of reason. If, however, the universal is admitted as problematic only, and is a mere idea, the particular is certain, but the universality of the rule of which it is a consequence is still a problem. Several particular instances, which are one and all certain, are scrutinised in view of the rule, to see whether they follow from it. If it then appears that all particular instances which can be cited follow from the rule, we argue to its universality, and from this again to all particular instances, even to those which are not themselves given. This I shall entitle the hypothetical employment of reason.

The hypothetical employment of reason, based upon ideas viewed as problematic concepts, is not, properly speaking, constitutive, that is, it is not of such a character that, judging in all strictness, we can regard it as proving the truth of the universal rule which we have adopted as hypothesis. For how are we to know all the possible consequences which, as actually following from the adopted principle, prove its universality? The hypothetical employment of reason is regulative only; its sole aim is, so far as may be possible, to bring unity into the body of our detailed knowledge, and thereby to approximate the rule to universality.

The hypothetical employment of reason has, therefore, as its aim the systematic unity of the knowledge of understanding, and this unity is the criterion of the truth of its rules. The systematic unity (as a mere idea) is, however, only a projected unity, to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem only. This unity aids us in discovering a principle for the understanding in its manifold \(^1\) and special modes of employment, directing its attention to cases which are not given, and thus rendering it more coherent.\(^2\)

But the only conclusion which we are justified in drawing from these considerations is that the systematic unity of the manifold knowledge of understanding, as prescribed by reason, is a logical principle. Its function is to assist the understanding by means of ideas, in those cases in which the understanding cannot by itself establish rules, and at the same time to give

\(^1\) [Reading, with Valentinier, *mannigfaltigen* for *Mannigfaltigen.*]

\(^2\) [zusammenhängend.]
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

to the numerous and diverse rules of the understanding unity or system under a single principle, and thus to secure coherence in every possible way. But to say that the constitution of the objects or the nature of the understanding which knows them as such, is in itself determined to systematic unity, and that we can in a certain measure postulate this unity a priori, without reference to any such special interest of reason, and that we are therefore in a position to maintain that knowledge of the understanding in all its possible modes (including empirical knowledge) has the unity required by reason, and stands under common principles from which all its various modes can, in spite of their diversity, be deduced— that would be to assert a transcendental principle of reason, and would make the systematic unity necessary, not only subjectively and logically, as method, but objectively also.

We may illustrate this by an instance of the employment of reason. Among the various kinds of unity which conform to the concepts of the understanding, is that of the causality of a substance, which is called power.\(^1\) The various appearances of one and the same substance show at first sight so great a diversity, that at the start we have to assume just as many different powers as there are different effects. For instance, in the human mind we have sensation, consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, power of discrimination, pleasure, desire, etc. Now there is a logical maxim which requires that we should reduce, so far as may be possible, this seeming diversity, by comparing these with one another and detecting their hidden identity. We have to enquire whether imagination combined with consciousness may not be the same thing as memory, wit, power of discrimination, and perhaps even identical with understanding and reason. Though logic is not capable of deciding whether a fundamental power actually exists, the idea of such a power is the problem involved in a systematic representation of the multiplicity of powers. The logical principle of reason calls upon us to bring about such unity as completely as possible; and the more the appearances of this and that power are found to be identical with one another, the more probable it becomes that they are simply different manifestations of one and the same power,

\(^{1}\) [Kra]/\(^{1}\)

Wir wollen dieses durch einen Fall des Vernunftgebrauchs erläutern. Unter die verschiedenen Arten von Einheit nach Begriffen des Verstandes gehört auch die der Kausalität einer Substanz, welche Kraft genannt wird. Die verschiedenen Erscheinungen eben derselben Substanz zeigen beim ersten Anblicke so viel Ungleichartigkeit, daß man daher anfänglich beinahe so vielerlei Kräfte derselben annehmen muß, als Wirkungen sich hervortun, wie in dem menschlichen Gemüte die Empfindung, Bewußtsein, Erinnerung, Witz, Unterscheidungskraft, Lust, Begierde u. s. w. Anfänglich gebietet eine logische Maxime, diese anscheinende Verschiedenheit so viel als möglich dadurch zu vertrüge, daß man durch Vergleichung die versteckte Identität entdecke, und nachsähe, ob nicht Einbildung, mit Bewußtsein verbunden, Erinnerung, Witz Unterscheidungskraft, vielleicht gar Verstand und Vernunft sei. Die Idee einer Grundkraft, von welcher aber die Logik gar nicht ausmündet, ob es dergleichen gebe, ist wenigstens das Problem einer systematischen Vorstellung der Mannigfaltigkeit von Kräften. Das logische Vernunftprinzip erfordert, diese Einheit so weit als möglich zu Stande zu bringen, und je mehr die Erscheinungen der einen und anderen Kraft unter sich identisch gefunden werden, desto wahrscheinlicher wird es, daß sie nichts, als verschiedene Äußerungen einer und derselben Kraft sein.

\(^{1}\) Akad.-Ausg.: sind.
REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS 537

which may be entitled, relatively to the more specific powers, the fundamental power. The same is done with the other powers.

The relatively fundamental powers must in turn be compared with one another, with a view to discovering their harmony, and so to bring them nearer to a single radical, that is, absolutely fundamental, power. But this unity of reason is purely hypothetical. We do not assert that such a power must necessarily be met with, but that we must seek in it the interests of reason, that is, of establishing certain principles for the manifold rules which experience may supply to us. We must endeavour, wherever possible, to bring in this way systematic unity into our knowledge.

On passing, however, to the transcendental employment of understanding, we find that this idea of a fundamental power is not treated merely as a problem for the hypothetical use of reason, but claims to have objective reality, as postulating the systematic unity of the various powers of a substance, and as giving expression to an apodictic principle of reason. For without having made any attempt to show the harmony of these various powers, nay, even after all attempts to do so have failed, we yet presuppose that such a unity does actually exist, and this not only, as in the case cited, on account of the unity of the substance, but also in those cases in which, as with matter in general, we encounter powers which, though to a certain extent homogeneous, are likewise diverse. In all such cases reason presupposes the systematic unity of the various powers, on the ground that special natural laws fall under more general laws, and that parsimony in principles is not only an economical requirement of reason, but is one of nature's own laws.

It is, indeed, difficult to understand how there can be a logical principle by which reason prescribes the unity of rules, unless we also presuppose a transcendental principle whereby such a systematic unity is a priori assumed to be necessarily inherent in the objects. For with what right can reason, in its logical employment, call upon us to treat the multiplicity of powers exhibited in nature as simply a disguised unity, and to derive this unity, so far as may be possible, from a fundamental power—how can reason do this, if it be free to admit

VON DEM REGULATIVEN GEBRAUCH DER IDEEN 569

welche (komparativ) ihre Grundkraft heißen kann. Eben so verfährt man mit den übrigen.

Die komparativen Grundkräfte müssen wiederum untereinander verglichen werden, um sie dadurch, daß man ihre Einhelligkeit entdeckt, einer einzigen radikalen, d. i. absoluten Grundkraft nahe zu bringen. Diese Vernunftseinheit aber ist bloß hypothetisch. Man behauptet nicht, daß eine solche in der Tat angetroffen werden müsse, sondern, daß man sie zu Gunsten der Vernunft, nämlich zu Errichtung gewisser Prinzipien, für die mancherlei Regeln, die die Erfahrung an die Hand geben mag, suchen, und, wo es sich tun läßt, auf solche Weise systematische Einheit ins Erkenntnis bringen müsse.


In der Tat ist auch nicht abzusehen, wie ein logisches Prinzip der Vernunftseinheit der Regeln stattfinden könne, wenn nicht ein transcendentliches vorausgesetzt würde, durch welches eine solche systematische Einheit, als den Objekten selbst anhängend, a priori als notwendig angenommen wird. Denn mit welcher Befugnis kann die Vernunft im logischen Gebrauche verlangen, die Mannigfaltigkeit der Kräfte, welche uns die Natur zu erkennen gibt, als eine bloß versteckte Einheit zu behandeln, und sie aus irgend einer Grundkraft, so viel an ihr ist, abzuleiten, wenn es ihr frei-
as likewise possible that all powers may be heterogeneous, and that such systematic unity of derivation may not be in conformity with nature? Reason would then run counter to its own vocation, proposing as its aim an idea quite inconsistent with the constitution of nature. Nor can we say that reason, while proceeding in accordance with its own principles, has arrived at knowledge of this unity through observation of the accidental constitution of nature. The law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary law, since without it we should have no reason at all, and without reason no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this no sufficient criterion of empirical truth. In order, therefore, to secure an empirical criterion we have no option save to presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary.

Although philosophers have not always acknowledged this transcendental principle, even to themselves, or indeed been conscious of employing it, we none the less find it covertly implied, in remarkable fashion, in the principles upon which they proceed. That the manifold respects in which individual things differ do not exclude identity of species, that the various species must be regarded merely as different determinations of a few genera and, these, in turn, of still higher genera, and so on; in short, that we must seek for a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical concepts, in so far as they can be deduced from higher and more general concepts—this is a logical principle, a rule of the Schools, without which there could be no employment of reason. For we can conclude from the universal to the particular, only in so far as universal properties are ascribed to things as being the foundation upon which the particular properties rest.

That such unity is to be found in nature, is presupposed by philosophers in the well-known scholastic maxim, that rudiments\(^1\) or principles must not be unnecessarily multiplied (entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda). This maxim declares that things by their very nature supply material for the unity of reason, and that the seemingly infinite variety need not hinder us from assuming that behind this variety there is a unity of fundamental properties—properties from which the

\(^1\) Anfänge
REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS

Diversity can be derived through repeated determination. This unity, although it is a mere idea, has been at all times so eagerly sought, that there has been need to moderate the desire for it, not to encourage it. A great advance was made when chemists succeeded in reducing all salts to two main genera, acids and alkalies; and they endeavour to show that even this difference is merely a variety, or diverse manifestation, of one and the same fundamental material. Chemists have sought, step by step, to reduce the different kinds of earthly (the material of stones and even of metals) to three, and at last to two; but, not content with this, they are unable to banish the thought that behind these varieties there is but one genus, nay, that there may even be a common principle for the earths and the salts. It might be supposed that this is merely an economical contrivance whereby reason seeks to save itself all possible trouble, a hypothetical attempt, which, if it succeeds, will, through the unity thus attained, impart probability to the presumed principle of explanation. But such a selfish purpose can very easily be distinguished from the idea. For in conformity with the idea everyone presupposes that this unity of reason accords with nature itself, and that reason—although indeed unable to determine the limits of this unity—does not here beg but command.

If among the appearances which present themselves to us, there were so great a variety—I do not say in form, for in that respect the appearances might resemble one another; but in content, that is, in the manifoldness of the existing entities—that even the acutest human understanding could never by comparison of them detect the slightest similarity (a possibility which is quite conceivable), the logical law of genera would have no sort of standing; we should not even have the concept of a genus, or indeed any other universal concept; and the understanding itself, which has to do solely with such concepts, would be non-existent. If, therefore, the logical principle of genera is to be applied to nature (by which I here understand those objects only which are given to us), it presupposes a transcendental principle. And in accordance with this latter principle, homogeneity is necessarily presupposed in the manifold of possible experience (although we are not in a position to determine in a priori fashion its degree); for in the absence of more specific conditions, the idea of a general character is the most probable one for the mind.
of homogeneity, no empirical concepts, and therefore no experience, would be possible.

The logical principle of genera, which postulates identity, is balanced by another principle, namely, that of species, which calls for manifoldness and diversity in things, notwithstanding their agreement as coming under the same genus, and which prescribes to the understanding that it attend to the diversity no less than to the identity. This principle (of discriminative observation, that is, of the faculty of distinction) sets a limit to possible indiscernition in the former principle (of the faculty of wit); and reason thus exhibits a twofold, self-conflicting interest, on the one hand interest in extent (universal) in respect of genera, and on the other hand in content (determinateness) in respect of the multiplicity of the species. In the one case the understanding thinks more under its concepts, in the other more in them. This twofold interest manifests itself also among students of nature in the diversity of their ways of thinking. Those who are more especially speculative are, we may almost say, hostile to heterogeneity, and are always on the watch for the unity of the genus; those, on the other hand, who are more especially empirical, are constantly endeavouring to differentiate nature in such manifold fashion as almost to extinguish the hope of ever being able to determine its appearances in accordance with universal principles.

This latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical principle which aims at the systematic completeness of all knowledge—prescribing that, in beginning with the genus, we descend to the manifold which may be contained thereunder, in such fashion as to secure extension for the system, just as in the alternative procedure, that of ascending to the genus, we endeavour to secure the unity of the system. For if we limit our attention to the sphere of the concept which marks out a genus, we can no more determine how far it is possible to proceed in the [logical] division of it, than we can judge merely from the space which a body occupies how far it is possible to proceed in the [physical] division of its parts. Consequently,

[In his *Anthropologia*, i. § 42, Kant defines wit (ingenium) as the faculty by which we determine the universal appropriate to the particular, in contrast to the faculty of judgment, by which we determine the particular that accords with the universal.]
every genus requires diversity of species, and these in turn
diversity of subspecies; and since no one of these subspecies is
ever itself without a sphere (extent as conceptus communis),
reason, in being carried to completion, demands that no species
be regarded as being in itself the lowest. For since the
species is always a concept, containing only what is common
to different things, it is not completely determined. It cannot,
therefore, be directly related to an individual, and other con-
cepts, that is, subspecies, must always be contained under it.
This law of specification can be formulated as being the prin-
ciple: entium varietates non temere esse minuendas.

But it is easily seen that this logical law would be without
meaning and application if it did not rest upon a transcendent
law of specification, which does not indeed demand an actual
infinity of differences in the things which can be objects to us
—the logical principle, as affording only the indeterminateness
of the logical sphere in respect of possible division, gives no
occasion for any such assertion—but which none the less im-
poses upon the understanding the obligation of seeking under
every discoverable species for subspecies, and under every dif-
ference for yet smaller differences. For if there were no lower
concepts, there could not be higher concepts. Now the under-
standing can have knowledge only through concepts, and
therefore, however far it carries the process of division, never
through mere intuition, but always again through lower
concepts. The knowledge of appearances in their complete
determination, which is possible only through the under-
standing, demands an endless progress in the specification of
our concepts, and an advance to yet other remaining differ-
ences, from which we have made abstraction in the concept of
the species, and still more so in that of the genus.

This law of specification cannot be derived from experi-
ence, which can never open to our view any such extensive
prospects. Empirical specification soon comes to a stop in the
distinction of the manifold, if it be not guided by the ante-
cedent transcendental law of specification, which, as a prin-
ciple of reason, leads us to seek always for further differences,
and to suspect their existence even when the senses are unable
to disclose them. That absorbent earths are of different kinds
(chalk and muriatic earths), is a discovery that was possible
gehen könne. Daher jede Gattung verschiedene Arten,
diese aber verschiedene Unterarten erfordert, und, da
keine der letzteren stattfindet, die nicht immer wiederum
eine Sphäre (Umgang als conceptus communis) hätte, so
verlangt die Vernunft in ihrer ganzen Erweiterung, daß
keine Art als die unterste an sich selbst angesehen werde,
weiß, daß sie doch immer ein Begriff ist, der nur das, was ver-
schiedenen Dingen gemein ist, in sich enthält; dieser nicht
durchgängig bestimmt, mit hin auch nicht || zunächst auf
ein Individuum bezogen sein könne, folglich jederzeit an-
dere Begriffe, d. i. Unterarten, unter sich enthalten müsse.
Dieses Gesetz der Spezifikation könnte so ausgedrückt wer-
den: entium varietates non temere esse minuendas.

Man sieht aber leicht, daß auch dieses logische Gesetz
ohne Sinn und Anwendung sein würde, läge nicht ein tran-
szendentes Gesetz der Spezifikation zum Grunde, welches
zwar freilich nicht von den Dingen, die unsere Ge-
genstände werden können, eine wirkliche Unendlichkeit
in Ansehung der Verschiedenheiten fordert; denn dazu gibt
das logische Prinzip, als welches lediglich die Unbestimm-
theit der logischen Sphäre in Ansehung der möglichen Ein-
teilung behauptet, keinen Anlaß; aber dennoch dem Ver-
stande auferlegt, unter jeder Art, die uns vorkommt, Unter-
arten, und zu jeder Verschiedenheit kleinere Verschieden-
heiten zu suchen. Denn, würde er keine niedere Begriffe
geben, so gäbe es auch keine höhere. Nun erkennt der Ver-
stand alles nur durch Begriffe: folglich, so weit er in der Ein-
teilung reicht, niemals durch bloße Anschatung, sondern
immer wiederum durch niedere Begriffe. Die Erkenntnis
der Erscheinungen in ihrer durchgängigen Bestimmung
(welche nur durch Verstand möglich ist) fordert eine unsaf-
hörlich fortzusetzende Spezifikation seiner Begriffe, und
einen Fortgang zu immer noch bleibenden Verschiedenhei-
ten, wovon in dem Begriffe der Art, und noch mehr dem
der Gattung, abstrahiert worden.

|| Auch kann dieses Gesetz der Spezifikation nicht von
der Erfahrung entlehnt sein; denn diese kann keine so weit
gehende Eröffnungen geben. Die empirische Spezifikation
bleibt in der Unterscheidung des Mannigfaltigen bald stehen,
wonach sie nicht durch das schon vorhergehende transzendente
Gesetz der Spezifikation, als ein Prinzip der Vernunft,
geleitet worden, solches zu suchen, und sie noch immer zu
vermuten, wenn sie sich gleich nicht den Sinn entzäunt.
Daß absorbierende Erden nach verschiedener-Art (Kalk-
und muriatische Erden) sein, bedurfte zur Entdeckung
1 A: seiner. 2 Akad.-Ausz.: sinds.
only under the guidance of an antecedent rule of reason—reason proceeding on the assumption that nature is so richly diversified that we may presume the presence of such differences, and therefore prescribing to the understanding the task of searching for them. Indeed it is only on the assumption of differences in nature, just as it is also only under the condition that its objects exhibit homogeneity, that we can have any faculty of understanding whatsoever. For the diversity of that which is comprehended under a concept is precisely what gives occasion for the employment of the concept and the exercise of the understanding.

Reason thus prepares the field for the understanding: (1) through a principle of the homogeneity of the manifold under higher genera; (2) through a principle of the variety of the homogeneous under lower species; and (3) in order to complete the systematic unity, a further law, that of the affinity of all concepts—a law which prescribes that we proceed from each species to every other by gradual increase of the diversity. These we may entitle the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms. The last named arises from union of the other two, inasmuch as only through the processes of ascending to the higher genera and of descending to the lower species do we obtain the idea of systematic connection in its completeness. For all the manifold differences are then related to one another, inasmuch as they one and all spring from one highest genus, through all degrees of a more and more widely extended determination.

The systematic unity, prescribed by the three logical principles, can be illustrated in the following manner. Every concept may be regarded as a point which, as the station for an observer, has its own horizon, that is, a variety of things which can be represented, and, as it were, surveyed from that standpoint. This horizon must be capable of containing an infinite number of points, each of which has its own narrower horizon; that is, every species contains subspecies, according to the principle of specification, and the logical horizon consists exclusively of smaller horizons (subspecies), never of points which possess no extent (individuals). But for different horizons, that is, genera, each of which is determined by its own concept, there can be a common horizon, in reference to
REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS

which, as from a common centre, they can all be surveyed; and from this higher genus we can proceed until we arrive at the highest of all genera, and so at the universal and true horizon, which is determined from the standpoint of the highest concept, and which comprehends under itself all manifoldness—genera, species, and subspecies.

We are carried to this highest standpoint by the law of homogeneity, and to all lower standpoints, and their greatest possible variety, by the law of specification. And since there is thus no void in the whole sphere of all possible concepts, and since nothing can be met with outside this sphere, there arises from the presupposition of this universal horizon and of its complete division, the principle: *non datur vacuum formarum*, that is, that there are not different, original, first genera, which are isolated from one another, separated, as it were, by an empty intervening space; but that all the manifold genera are simply divisions of one single highest and universal genus. From this principle there follows, as its immediate consequence: *datur continuum formarum*, that is, that all differences of species border upon one another, admitting of no transition from one to another *per saltum*, but only through all the smaller degrees of difference that mediate between them. In short, there are no species or subspecies which (in the view of reason) are the nearest possible to each other; still other intermediate species are always possible, the difference of which from each of the former is always smaller than the difference between these.

The first law thus keeps us from resting satisfied with an excessive number of different original genera, and bids us pay due regard to homogeneity; the second, in turn, imposes a check upon this tendency towards unity, and insists that before we proceed to apply a universal concept to individuals we distinguish subspecies within it. The third law combines these two laws by prescribing that even amidst the utmost manifoldness we observe homogeneity in the gradual transition from one species to another, and thus recognize a relationship of the different branches, as all springing from the same stem.

This logical law of the *continuum specierum* (*formarum logicarum*) presupposes, however, a transcendental law (*lex*

\[\text{[Reading, with Hartenstein, et for \textit{es}]}\]

VON DEM REGULATIVEN GEBRAUCH DER IDEEN

insgesamt als aus einem Mittelpunkt überschauer, || ge-

zogen denken, welcher die höhere Gattung ist, bis endlich

die höchste Gattung der allgemeine und wahre Horizont ist,

die aus dem Standpunkte des höchsten Begriffs bestimmt

wird, und alle Mannigfaltigkeit, als Gattungen, Arten und

Unterarten, unter sich befaßt.

Zu diesem höchsten Standpunkte führt mich das Gesetz der Homogenität, zu allen niedrigeren und ihrer größten

Varietät das Gesetz der Spezifikation. Da aber auf solche

Weise in dem ganzen Umfang aller möglichen Begriffe

nie Leerer ist, und zu demselben nichts angetroffen

werden kann, so entspringt aus der Voraussetzung jenes

allgemeinen Gesichtskreises und der durchgängigen Eintei-

lung desselben der Grundsatz: *non datur vacuum forma-

rum, d. i. es gibt nicht verschiedene ursprüngliche und erste

Gattungen, die gleichsam isoliert und von einander (durch

einen leeren Zwischenraum) getrennt wären, sondern alle

mannigfaltige Gattungen sind nur Abteilungen einer ein-

zigen obersten und allgemeinen Gattung; und aus diesem

Grundsätze dessen unmittelbare Folge: *datur continuum

formarum, d. i. alle Verschiedenheiten der Arten grenzen an

einander und erlauben keinen Übergang zu einander durch

einen Sprung, sondern nur durch alle kleinere Grade des

Unterschiedes, dadurch man von einer zu der anderen ge-
langen kann; mit einem Worte, es gibt keine Arten oder

Unterarten, die einander (im Begriffe der Vernunft) die

nächsten wären, sondern es sind noch immer Zwischenarten

möglich, deren Unterschied von der ersten || und zweiten

kleiner ist, als dieser ihr Unterschied von einander.

Das erste Gesetz also verhütet die Ausschweifung in die

Mannigfaltigkeit verschiedener ursprünglicher Gattungen

und empfiehlt die Gleichartigkeit; das zweite schränkt da-
gegen diese Neigung zur Einhelligkeit wiederum ein, und

gebietet Unterscheidung der Unterarten, bevor man sich

mit seinem allgemeinen Begriffe zu den Individuen wende.

Das dritte vereinigt jene beide, indem sie † bei der höchsten

Mannigfaltigkeit dennoch die Gleichartigkeit durch den

stufenartigen Übergang von einer Spezies zur anderen vor-
schreibt, welches eine Art von Verwandtschaft der verschie-
denen Zweige anzeigt, in so fern sie insgesamt aus einem

Stamme entsprossen sind.

Dieses logische Gesetz des *continui specierum* (*formarum

logicarum*) setzt aber ein transcendentes voraus (*lex con-

† Akad.-Ausg.: sess.
544 KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

continui in natura), without which the former law would only lead the understanding astray, causing it\(^1\) to follow a path which is perhaps quite contrary to that prescribed by nature itself. This law must therefore rest upon pure transcendental, not on empirical, grounds. For if it rested on empirical grounds, it would come later than the systems, whereas in actual fact it has itself given rise to all that is systematic in our knowledge of nature. The formulation of these laws is not due to any secret design of making an experiment, by putting them forward as merely tentative suggestions. Such anticipations, when confirmed, yield strong evidence in support of the view that the hypothetically conceived unity is well-grounded; and such evidence has therefore in this respect a certain utility. But it is evident that the laws contemplate the parsimony of fundamental causes, the manifoldness of effects, and the consequent affinity of the parts of nature as being in themselves in accordance both with reason and with nature. Hence these principles carry their recommendation directly in themselves, and not merely as methodological devices.

But it is easily seen that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which no congruent object can be discovered in experience. For in the first place, the species in nature are actually divided, and must therefore constitute a quantum discretum. Were the advance in the tracing of their affinity continuous, there would be a true infinity of intermediate members between any two given species, which is impossible. And further, in the second place, we could not make any determinate empirical use of this law, since it instructs us only in quite general terms that we are to seek for grades of affinity, and yields no criterion whatsoever as to how far, and in what manner, we are to prosecute the search for them.

If we place these principles of systematic unity in the order appropriate to their empirical employment, they will stand thus: manifoldness, affinity, unity, each being taken, as an idea,\(^2\) in the highest degree of its completeness. Reason presupposes the knowledge which is obtained by the understanding and which stands in immediate relation to experience, and

\(^1\) [Reading, with Erdmann, or for su.

\(^2\) [Reading, with Erdmann, Idea for Ideas.]
REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS

seeks for the unity of this knowledge in accordance with ideas which go far beyond all possible experience. The affinity of the manifold (as, notwithstanding its diversity, coming under a principle of unity) refers indeed to things, but still more to their properties and powers. Thus, for instance, if at first our imperfect experience leads us to regard the orbits of the planets as circular, and if we subsequently detect deviations therefrom, we trace the deviations to that which can change the circle, in accordance with a fixed law, through all the infinite intermediate degrees, into one of these divergent orbits. That is to say, we assume that the movements of the planets which are not circular will more or less approximate to the properties of a circle; and thus we come upon the idea of an ellipse. Since the comets do not, so far as observation reaches, return in any such courses, their paths exhibit still greater deviations. What we then do is to suppose that they proceed in a parabolic course, which is akin to the ellipse, and which in all our observations is indistinguishable from an ellipse that has its major axis indefinitely extended. Thus, under the guidance of these principles, we discover a unity in the generic forms of the orbits, and thereby a unity in the cause of all the laws of planetary motion, namely, gravitation. And we then extend our conquests still further, endeavouring to explain by the same principle all variations and seeming departures from these rules; finally, we even go on to make additions such as experience can never confirm, namely, to conceive, in accordance with the rules of affinity, hyperbolic paths of comets, in the course of which these bodies entirely leave our solar system, and passing from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the universe—a universe which, though for us unlimited, is throughout held together by one and the same moving force.

The remarkable feature of these principles, and what in them alone concerns us, is that they seem to be transcendental, and that although they contain mere ideas for the guidance of the empirical employment of reason—ideas which reason follows only as it were asymptotically, i.e., ever more closely without ever reaching them—they yet possess, as synthetic a priori propositions, objective but indeterminate validity, and serve as rules for possible experience. They can also be employed with great advantage in the elaboration of experience,

nach Ideen, die viel weiter geht, als Erfahrung reichen kann. Die Verwandtschaft des Mannigfaltigen, unbeschadet seiner Verschiedenheit, unter einem Prinzip der Einheit, betrifft nicht bloß die Dinge, sondern weit mehr noch die bloßen Eigenschaften und Kräfte der Dinge. Daher, wenn uns z. B. durch eine (noch nicht völlig berichtigte) Erfahrung der Lauf der Planeten als kreisförmig gegeben ist, und wir finden Verschiedenheiten, so vermuten wir sie in demjenigen, was den Zirkel nach einem beständigen Gesetze durch alle unendliche Zwischengrade, zu einer dieser abweichenden Umläufe abändern kann, d. i. die Bewegungen der Planeten, die nicht Zirkel sind, werden etwa dessen Eigenschaften mehr oder weniger nahe kommen, und fallen auf die Ellipse. Die Kometen zeigen eine noch gröbere Verschiedenheit ihrer Bahnen, da sie (so weit Beobachtung reicht) nicht einmal im Kreise zurückkehren; allein wir raten auf einen parabolischen Lauf, der doch mit der Ellipsis verwandt ist, und, wenn die lange Achse der letzteren sehr weit gestreckt ist, in allen unseren Beobachtungen von ihr nicht unterschieden werden kann. So kommen wir, nach Anleitung jener Prinzipien, auf Einheit der Gattungen dieser Bahnen in ihrer Gestalt, dadurch aber weiter auf Einheit der Ursache aller Gesetze ihrer Bewegung (die Gravitation), von da wir nachher unsere Exoberungen ausdehnen, und auch alle Variationen und scheinbare Abweichungen von jenen Regeln aus demselben Prinzip zu erklären suchen, endlich gar mehr hinzufügen, als Erfahrung jemals bestätigen kann, nämlich, uns nach den Regeln der Verwandtschaft selbst hyperbolische Kometenbahnen zu denken, in welchen diese Körper ganz und gar unsere Sonnenwelt verlassen, und, indem sie von Sonne zu Sonne gehen, die entfernteren Teile eines für uns unbegrenzten Weltsystems, das durch eine und dieselbe bewegende Kraft zusammenhängt, in ihrem Laufe vereinigen.

Was bei diesen Prinzipien merkwürdig ist, und uns, auch allein beschäftigt, ist dieses: daß sie transzendental zu sein scheinen, und, ob sie gleich bloße Ideen zur Befolgung des empirischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft enthalten, denen der letztere nur gleichsam asymptotisch, d. i. bloß annähernd folgen kann, ohne sie jemals zu erreichen, sie gleichwohl, als synthetische Sätze a priori, objektive, aber unbestimmte Gültigkeit haben, und zur Regel möglicher Erfahrung dienen, auch wirklich in Bearbeitung derselben, als heuristi-

\[ \text{Akad.-Ausz.: } \text{seinem} \rightarrow \text{A: welcher} \]
as heuristic principles. A transcendental deduction of them cannot, however, be effected; in the case of ideas, as we have shown above, such a deduction is never possible.

In the Transcendental Analytic we have distinguished the dynamical principles of the understanding, as merely regulative principles of intuition, from the mathematical, which, as regards intuition, are constitutive. None the less these dynamical laws are constitutive in respect of experience, since they render the concepts, without which there can be no experience, possible a priori. But principles of pure reason can never be constitutive in respect of empirical concepts; for since no schema of sensibility corresponding to them can ever be given, they can never have an object in concreto. If, then, we disallow such empirical employment of them, as constitutive principles, how are we to secure for them a regulative employment, and therewith some sort of objective validity, and what can we mean by such regulative employment?

The understanding is an object for reason, just as sensibility is for the understanding. It is the business of reason to render the unity of all possible empirical acts of the understanding systematic; just as it is of the understanding to connect the manifold of the appearances by means of concepts, and to bring it under empirical laws. But the acts of the understanding are, without the schema of sensibility, undetermined; just as the unity of reason is in itself undetermined, as regards the conditions under which, and the extent to which, the understanding ought to combine its concepts in systematic fashion. But although we are unable to find in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of all concepts of the understanding, an analogon of such a schema must necessarily allow of being given. This analogon is the idea of the maximum in the division and unification of the knowledge of the understanding under one principle. For what is greatest and absolutely complete can be determinately thought, all restricting conditions, which give rise to an indeterminate manifoldness, being left aside. Thus the idea of reason is an analogon of a schema of sensibility; but with this difference, that the application of the concepts of the understanding to the schema of reason does not yield knowledge of the object itself (as is the case in the application of categories to their
sensible schemata), but only a rule or principle for the systematic unity of all employment of the understanding. Now since every principle which prescribes a priori to the understanding thoroughgoing unity in its employment, also holds, although only indirectly, of the object of experience, the principles of pure reason must also have objective reality in respect of that object, not, however, in order to determine anything in it, but only in order to indicate the procedure whereby the empirical and determinate employment of the understanding can be brought into complete harmony with itself. This is achieved by bringing its employment, so far as may be possible, into connection with the principle of thoroughgoing unity, and by determining its procedure in the light of this principle.

I entitle all subjective principles which are derived, not from the constitution of an object but from the interest of reason in respect of a certain possible perfection of the knowledge of the object, maxims of reason. There are therefore maxims of speculative reason, which rest entirely on its speculative interest, although they may seem to be objective principles.

When merely regulative principles are treated as constitutive, and are therefore employed as objective principles, they may come into conflict with one another. But when they are treated merely as maxims, there is no real conflict, but merely those differences in the interest of reason that give rise to differing modes of thought. In actual fact, reason has only one single interest, and the conflict of its maxims is only a difference in, and a mutual limitation of, the methods whereby this interest endeavours to obtain satisfaction.

Thus one thinker may be more particularly interested in manifoldness (in accordance with the principle of specification), another thinker in unity (in accordance with the principle of aggregation). Each believes that his judgment has been arrived at through insight into the object, whereas it really rests entirely on the greater or lesser attachment to one of the two principles. And since neither of these principles is based on objective grounds, but solely on the interest of reason, the

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580

TRANSZENTENTALE DIALEKTIK


Wenn bloß regulative Grundsätze als konstitutiv betrachtet werden, so können sie als objektive Prinzipien widersträfend sein; betrachtet man sie aber bloß als Maximen, so ist kein wahrer Widerstreit, sondern bloß ein verschiedenes Interesse der Vernunft, welches die Trennung der Denkungsart verursacht. In der Tat hat die Vernunft nur ein einziges Interesse und der Streit ihrer Maximen ist nur eine Verschiedenheit und wechselseitige Einschränkung der Methoden, diesem Interesse ein Genüge zu tun.

Auf solche Weise vermag bei diesem Vernunftler mehr das Interesse der Mannigfaltigkeit (nach dem Prinzip der Spezifikation), bei jenem aber das Interesse der Einheit (nach dem Prinzip der Aggregation). Ein jeder der'selben glaubt sein Urteil aus der Einsicht des Objekts zu haben, und gründet es doch lediglich auf der größeren oder kleineren Anhänglichkeit an einen von beiden Grundsätzen, deren keine auf objektiven Gründen beruht, sondern nur auf dem Vernunftinteresse,
title 'principles' is not strictly applicable; they may more fittingly be entitled 'maxima'. When we observe intelligent people disputing in regard to the characteristic properties of men, animals, or plants—even of bodies in the mineral realm—some assuming, for instance, that there are certain special hereditary characteristics in each nation, certain well-defined inherited differences in families, races, etc., whereas others are bent upon maintaining that in all such cases nature has made precisely the same provision for all, and that it is solely to external accidental conditions that the differences are due, we have only to consider what sort of an object it is about which they are making these assertions, to realise that it lies too deeply hidden to allow of their speaking from insight into its nature. The dispute is due simply to the twofold interest of reason, the one party setting its heart upon, or at least adopting, the one interest, and the other party the other. The differences between the maxims of manifoldness and of unity in nature thus easily allow of reconciliation. So long, however, as the maxims are taken as yielding objective insight, and until a way has been discovered of adjusting their conflicting claims, and of satisfying reason in that regard, they will not only give rise to disputes but will be a positive hindrance, and cause long delays in the discovery of truth.

Similar observations are relevant in regard to the assertion or denial of the widely discussed law of the continuous gradation of created beings, which was propounded by Leibniz, and admirably supported by Bonnet. It is simply the following out of that principle of affinity which rests on the interest of reason. For observation and insight into the constitution of nature could never justify us in the objective assertion of the law. The steps of this ladder, as they are presented to us in experience, stand much too far apart; and what may seem to us small differences are usually in nature itself such wide gaps, that from any such observations we can come to no decision in regard to nature's ultimate design—especially if we bear in mind that in so great a multiplicity of things there can never be much difficulty in finding similarities and approximations. On the other hand, the method of looking for order in nature

1 [Leibniz: Nouveaux Essais, Liv. iii. ch. 6.]

A 668} 
B 696

VON DEM REGULATIVEN GEBRAUCH DER IDEEN 581

und die daher besser Maximen als Prinzipien genannt werden könnten. Wenn ich eine sehende Männer miteinander wegen der Charakteristik der Menschen, der Tiere oder Pflanzen, ja selbst der Körper des Mineralreichs im Streite sehe, da die einen z. B. besondere und in der Abstammung gegründete Volkscharaktere, oder auch entschiedene und erbliche Unterschiede der Familien, Rassen u. s. w. annehmen, andere dagegen ihren Sinn darauf setzen, daß die Natur in diesem Stücke ganz und gar einerlei Anlagen gemacht habe, und aller Unterschied nur auf äußeren Zufälligkeiten beruhe, so darf ich nur die Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes in Betracht ziehen, um zu begreifen, daß er für beide viel zu tief verborgen liege, als daß sie aus Einsicht in die Natur des Objekts sprechen könnten. Es ist nichts anderes, als das zwiefache Interesse der Vernunft, davon dieser Teil das eine, jener das andere zu Herzen nimmt, oder auch affektiert, mithin die Verschiedenheit der Maximen der Naturmännfältigkeit, oder der Naturerlebnis, welche sich gar wohl vereinigen lassen, aber so lange sie für objektive Einsichten gehalten werden, nicht allein Streit, sondern auch Hindernisse veranlassen, welche die Wahrheit lange aufhalten, bis ein Mittel gefunden wird, das | streitige 1 Interesse zu vereinigen, und die Vernunft hierüber zufrieden zu stellen.

Eben so ist es mit der Behauptung oder Anfechtung des so berufenen, von Leibniz in Gang gebrachten und durch Bonnet trefflich aufgestützten Gesetzes der kontinuierlichen Stufenleiter der Geschöpfe bewandt, welche nichts als eine Befolgung des auf dem Interesse der Vernunft beruhenden Grundsatzes der Affinität ist; denn Beobachtung und Einsicht in die Einrichtung der Natur konnte es gar nicht als objektive Behauptung an die Hand geben. Die Sprossen einer solchen Leiter, so wie sie uns Erfahrung angeben kann, stehen viel zu weit aus einander, und unsere vermeintlich kleine Unterschiede sind gemeinhin in der Natur selbst so weite Klüfte, daß auf solche Beobachtungen (vornehmlich bei einer großen Mannigfaltigkeit von Dingen, da es immer leicht sein muß, gewisse Ähnlichkeiten und Annäherungen zu finden) als Absichten der Natur gar nichts zu rechnen ist. Dagegen ist die Methode, nach einem
in accordance with such a principle, and the maxim which prescribes that we regard such order—leaving, however, undetermined where and how far—as grounded in nature as such, is certainly a legitimate and excellent regulative principle of reason. In this regulative capacity it goes far beyond what experience or observation can verify; and though not itself determining anything, yet serves to mark out the path towards systematic unity.

THE FINAL PURPOSE OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON

The ideas of pure reason can never be dialectical in themselves; any deceptive illusion to which they give occasion must be due solely to their misemployment. For they arise from the very nature of our reason; and it is impossible that this highest tribunal of all the rights and claims of speculation should itself be the source of deceptions and illusions. Presumably, therefore, the ideas have their own good and appropriate vocation as determined by the natural disposition of our reason. The mob of sophists, however, raise against reason the usual cry of absurdities and contradictions, and though unable to penetrate to its innermost designs, they none the less inveigh against its prescriptions. Yet it is to the beneficent influences exercised by reason that they owe the possibility of their own self-assertiveness, and indeed that very culture 1 which enables them to blame and to condemn what reason requires of them.

We cannot employ an a priori concept with any certainty without having first given a transcendental deduction of it. The ideas of pure reason do not, indeed, admit of the kind of deduction that is possible in the case of the categories. But if they are to have the least objective validity, no matter how indeterminate that validity may be, and are not to be mere empty thought-entities (entia rationis ratiocinantis), a deduction of them must be possible, however greatly (as we admit) it may differ from that which we have been able to give of the categories. This will complete the critical work of pure reason, and is what we now propose to undertake.

1 [Kultur.]
2 [Gedankensänge.]
There is a great difference between something being given to my reason as an object absolutely, or merely as an object in the idea. In the former case our concepts are employed to determine the object; in the latter case there is in fact only a schema for which no object, not even a hypothetical one, is directly given, and which only enables us to represent to ourselves other objects in an indirect manner, namely in their systematic unity, by means of their relation to this idea. Thus I say that the concept of a highest intelligence is a mere idea, that is to say, its objective reality is not to be taken as consisting in its referring directly to an object (for in that sense we should not be able to justify its objective validity). It is only a schema constructed in accordance with the conditions of the greatest possible unity of reason—the schema of the concept of a thing in general, which serves only to secure the greatest possible systematic unity in the empirical employment of our reason. We then, as it were, derive the object of experience from the supposed object of this idea, viewed as the ground or cause of the object of experience. We declare, for instance, that the things of the world must be viewed as if they received their existence from a highest intelligence. The idea is thus really only a heuristic, not an ostensive concept. It does not show us how an object is constituted, but how, under its guidance, we should seek to determine the constitution and connection of the objects of experience. If, then, it can be shown that the three transcendent ideas (the psychological, the cosmological, and the theological), although they do not directly relate to, or determine, any object corresponding to them, none the less, as rules of the empirical employment of reason, lead us to systematic unity, under the presupposition of such an object in the idea; and that they thus contribute to the extension of empirical knowledge, without ever being in a position to run counter to it, we may conclude that it is a necessary maxim of reason to proceed always in accordance with such ideas. This, indeed, is the transcendental deduction of all ideas of speculative reason, not as constitutive principles for the extension of our knowledge to more objects than experience can give, but as regulative principles of the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical knowledge in general, whereby this empirical

1 [Reading, with Grillo, als für alle.]

VON DER ENDABSICHT DER NATÜRLICHEN DIALEKTIK

Es ist ein großer Unterschied, ob etwas meiner Vernunft als ein Gegenstand schlechthin, oder nur als ein Gegenstand in der Idee gegeben wird. In dem ersten Falle gehen meine Begriffe dahin, den Gegenstand zu bestimmen; im zweiten ist es wirklich nur ein Schema, dem direkt kein Gegenstand, auch nicht einmal hypothetisch zugegeben wird, sondern welches nur dazu dient, um andere Gegenstände, vermittelst der Beziehung auf diese Idee, nach ihrer systematischen Einheit, mithin indirekt uns vorzustellen. So sage ich, der Begriff einer höchsten Intelligenz ist eine bloße Idee, d. i. seine objektive Realität soll nicht darin bestehen, daß er sich geradezu auf einen Gegenstand bezieht (denn in solcher Betrachtung würden wir seine objektive Gültigkeit nicht rechtfertigen können), sondern er ist nur ein nach Bedingungen der größten Vernunftseinheit geordnetes Schema, von dem Begriffe eines Dinges überhaupt, welches nur dazu dient, um die größte systematische Einheit im empirischen Gebrauche unserer Vernunft zu erhalten, indem man den Gegenstand der Erfahrung gleichsam von dem eingebildeten Gegenstande dieser Idee, als seinem Gründe, oder Ursache, ableitet. Alsdessen heißt es z. B., die Dinge der Welt müssen || so betrachtet werden, als ob sie von einer höchsten Intelligenz ihr Dasein hätten: Auf solche Weise ist die Idee eigentlich nur ein heuristischer und nicht ostensiver Begriff, und zeigt an, nicht wie ein Gegenstand beschaffen ist, sondern wie wir, unter der Leitung desselben, die Beschaffenheit und Verknüpfung der Gegenstände der Erfahrung überhaupt suchen sollen. Wenn man nun zeigen kann, daß, obgleich die dreierlei transzendenten Ideen (psychologische, kosmologische, und theologische) direkt auf keinen ihnen entsprechenden Gegenstand und dessen Bestimmung bezogen werden, dennoch alle Regeln des empirischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft unter Voraussetzung eines solchen Gegenstandes in der Idee auf systematische Einheit führen und die Erfahrungserkenntnis jederzeit erweitern; niemals aber derselben zuwider sein können: so ist es eine notwendige Maxime der Vernunft, nach dergleichen Ideen zu verfahren. Und dieses ist die transzendentale Deduktion aller Ideen der spekulativen Vernunft, nicht als konstitutiver Prinzipien der Erweiterung unserer Erkenntnis über mehr Gegenstände, als Erfahrung geben kann, sondern als regulativer Prinzipien der systematischen Einheit des Manifoldigen der empirischen Erkenntnis überhaupt, welche dadurch in ihren
knowledge is more adequately secured within its own limits and more effectively improved than would be possible, in the absence of such ideas, through the employment merely of the principles of the understanding.

I shall endeavour to make this clearer. In conformity with these ideas as principles we shall, first, in psychology, under the guidance of inner experience, connect all the appearances, all the actions and receptivity of our mind, as if the mind were a simple substance which persists with personal identity (in this life at least), while its states, to which those of the body belong only as outer conditions, are in continual change. Secondly, in cosmology, we must follow up the conditions of both inner and outer natural appearances, in an enquiry which is to be regarded as never allowing of completion, just as if the series of appearances were in itself endless, without any first or supreme member. We need not, in so doing, deny that, outside all appearances, there are purely intelligible grounds of the appearances; but as we have no knowledge of these whatsoever, we must never attempt to make use of them in our explanations of nature. Thirdly, and finally, in the domain of theology, we must view everything that can belong to the context of possible experience as if this experience formed an absolute but at the same time completely dependent and sensibly conditioned unity, and yet also at the same time as if the sum of all appearances (the sensible world itself) had a single, highest and all-sufficient ground beyond itself, namely, a self-subsistent, original, creative reason. For it is in the light of this idea of a creative reason that we so guide the empirical employment of our reason as to secure its greatest possible extension—that is, by viewing all objects as if they drew their origin from such an archetype. In other words, we ought not to derive the inner appearances of the soul from a simple thinking substance but from one another, in accordance with the idea of a simple being; we ought not to derive the order and systematic unity of the world from a supreme intelligence, but to obtain from the idea of a supremely wise cause the rule according to which reason in connecting empirical causes and effects in the world may be employed to best advantage, and in such manner as to secure satisfaction of its own demands.

Now there is nothing whatsoever to hinder us from as-

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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

suming these ideas to be also objective, that is, from hypostatizing them—except in the case of the cosmological ideas, where reason, in so proceeding, falls into antimony. The psychological and theological ideas contain no antimony, and involve no contradiction. How, then, can anyone dispute their [possible] objective reality? He who denies their possibility must do so with just as little knowledge [of this possibility] as we can have in affirming it. It is not, however, a sufficient ground for assuming anything, that there is no positive hindrance to our so doing; we are not justified in introducing thought-entities¹ which transcend all our concepts, though without contradicting them, as being real and determinate objects, merely on the authority of a speculative reason that is bent upon completing the tasks which it has set itself. They ought not to be assumed as existing in themselves, but only as having the reality of a schema—the schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all knowledge of nature. They should be regarded only as analoga of real things, not as in themselves real things. We remove from the object of the idea the conditions which limit the concept provided by our understanding, but which also alone make it possible for us to have a determinate concept of anything. What we then think is a something of which, as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever, but which we none the less represent to ourselves as standing to the sum of appearances in a relation analogous to that in which appearances stand to one another.

If, in this manner, we assume such ideal beings, we do not really extend our knowledge beyond the objects of possible experience; we extend only the empirical unity of such experience, by means of the systematic unity for which the schema is provided by the idea—an idea which has therefore no claim to be a constitutive, but only a regulative principle. For to allow that we posit a thing, a something, a real being, corresponding to the idea, is not to say that we profess to extend our knowledge of things by means of transcendental² concepts. For this being is posited only in the idea and not in itself; and therefore only as expressing the systematic

¹ [Gedankenwesen.]
² [Reading, with the 4th edition, transcendentalen for transcendentalen.]
NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON 553

unity which is to serve as a rule for the empirical employment of reason. It decides nothing in regard to the ground of this unity or as to what may be the inner character of the being on which as cause the unity depends.

Thus the transcendental, and the only determinate, concept which the purely speculative reason gives us of God is, in the strictest sense, deistic; that is, reason does not determine the objective validity of such a concept, but yields only the idea of something which is the ground of the highest and necessary unity of all empirical reality. This something we cannot think otherwise than on the analogy of a real substance that, in conformity with laws of reason, is the cause of all things. This, indeed, is how we must think it, in so far as we venture to think it as a special object, and do not rather remain satisfied with the mere idea of the regulative principle of reason, leaving aside the completion of all conditions of thought as being too surpassingly great for the human understanding. The latter procedure is, however, inconsistent with the pursuit of that complete systematic unity in our knowledge to which reason at least sets no limits.

This, then, is how matters stand: if we assume a divine being, we have indeed no concept whatsoever of the inner possibility of its supreme perfection or of the necessity of its existence; but, on the other hand, we are in a position to give a satisfactory answer to all those questions which relate to the contingent, and to afford reason the most complete satisfaction in respect to that highest unity after which it is seeking in its empirical employment. The fact, however, that we are unable to satisfy reason in respect to the assumption itself, shows that it is the speculative interest of reason, not any insight, which justifies it in thus starting from a point that lies so far above its sphere; and in endeavouring, by this device, to survey its objects as constituting a complete whole.

We here come upon a distinction bearing on the procedure of thought in dealing with one and the same assumption, a distinction which is somewhat subtle, but of great importance in transcendental philosophy. I may have sufficient ground to assume something, in a relative sense (suppositio relativa), and yet have no right to assume it absolutely (suppositio absoluta).

VON DER ENDABSICHT DER NATÜRLICHEN DIALEKTIK 587
zur Richtschnur des empirischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft dienen soll, ohne doch etwas darüber auszumachen, was der Grund dieser Einheit, oder die innere Eigenschaft eines solchen Wesens sei, auf welchem, als Ursache, sie beruhe.

So ist der transzendentale und einzige bestimmte Begriff, den uns die bloß spekulative Vernunft von Gott gibt, im genauesten Verstande deistisch, d. i. die Vernunft gibt nicht einmal die objektive Gültigkeit eines solchen Begriffs, sondern nur die Idee von etwas an die Hand, worauf alle empirische Realität ihre höchste und notwendige Einheit gründet, und welches wir uns nicht anders, als nach der Analogie einer wirklichen Substanz, welche nach Vernunftgesetzen die Ursache aller Dinge sei, denken können, wohin wir es ja unternehmen, es überall als einen besonderen Gegenstand zu denken, und nicht lieber, mit der bloßen Idee des regulativen Prinzips der Vernunft zufrieden, die Vollendung aller Bedingungen des Denkens, als überschwenglich für den menschlichen Verstand, bei Seite setzen wollen, welches aber mit der Absicht einer vollkommenen systematischen Einheit in unserem Erkenntnis, der wenigstens die Vernunft keine Schranken setzt, nicht zusammentreffen kann.

Daher geschieht’s nun, daß, wenn ich ein göttliches Wesen annehme, ich zwar weder von der inneren Möglichkeit seiner höchsten Vollkommenheit, noch der Notwendigkeit seiner Existenz, den mindesten Begriff habe, || aber alle doch den anderen Fragen, die das Zufällige betreffen, ein Genüge tun kann, und der Vernunft die vollkommenste Befriedigung in Ansehung der nachzuforschenden größten Einheit in ihrem empirischen Gebrauche, aber nicht in Ansehung dieser Voraussetzung selbst, verschaffen kann; welches beweist, daß ihr spekulatives Interesse und nicht ihre Einsicht sie berechtige, von einem Punkte, der so weit über ihrer Sphäre liegt, auszugehen, um daraus ihre Gegenstände in einem vollständigen Ganzen zu betrachten.

Hier zeigt sich nun ein Unterschied der Denkungsart, bei einer und derselben Voraussetzung, der ziemlich subjektiv, aber gleichwohl in der Transzendentalphilosophie von großer Wichtigkeit ist. Ich kann genugsaßen Grund haben, etwas relativ anzunehmen (suppositio relativa), ohne doch befugt zu sein, es schlechtthin anzunehmen (suppositio absoluta).
This distinction has to be reckoned with in the case of a merely regulative principle. We recognize the necessity of the principle, but have no knowledge of the source of its necessity; and in assuming that it has a supreme ground, we do so solely in order to think its universality more determinately. Thus, for instance, when I think as existing a being that corresponds to a mere idea, indeed to a transcendental idea, I have no right to assume any such thing as in itself existing, since no concepts through which I am able to think any object as determined suffice for such a purpose—the conditions which are required for the objective validity of my concepts being excluded by the idea itself. The concepts of reality, substance, causality, even that of necessity in existence, apart from their use in making possible the empirical knowledge of an object, have no meaning whatsoever, such as might serve to determine any object. They can be employed, therefore, to explain the possibility of things in the world of sense, but not to explain the possibility of the universe itself. Such a ground of explanation would have to be outside the world, and could not therefore be an object of a possible experience. None the less, though I cannot assume such an inconceivable being [as existing] in itself, I may yet assume it as the object of a mere idea, relatively to the world of sense. For if the greatest possible empirical employment of my reason rests upon an idea (that of systematically complete unity, which I shall presently be defining more precisely), an idea which, although it can never itself be adequately exhibited in experience, is yet indispensably necessary in order that we may approximate to the highest possible degree of empirical unity, I shall not only be entitled, but shall also be constrained, to realise this idea, that is, to posit for it a real object. But I may posit it only as a something which I do not at all know in itself, and to which, as a ground of that systematic unity, I ascribe, in relation to this unity, such properties as are analogous to the concepts employed by the understanding in the empirical sphere. Accordingly, in analogy with realities in the world, that is, with substances, with causality and with necessity, I think a being which possesses all this in the highest perfection; and since this idea depends merely on my reason, I can think this being as self-subsistent reason,

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588

TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK
Diese Unterscheidung trifft zu, wenn es bloß um ein regulatives Prinzip zu tun ist, wovon wir zwar die Notwendigkeit an sich selbst, aber nicht den Quell derselben erkennen, und dazu wir einen obersten Grund bloß in der Absicht annehmen, um desto bestimmter die Allgemeinheit des Prinzips zu denken, als z. B. wenn ich mir ein Wesen als existirend denke, das einer der beiden und zwar transzendentalen Idee entspricht. Denn, da kann ich das Dasein dieses Dinges niemals an sich selbst annehmen, weil keine Begriffe, dadurch ich mir irgend eine Gegenstand bestimmt denken kann, dazu gelangen, und die Bedingungen der objektiven Gültigkeit meiner Begriffe durch die Idee selbst ausgeschlossen sind. Die Begriffe der Realität, der Substanz, der Kausalität, selbst die der Notwendigkeit im Dasein, haben, außer dem Gebrauche, da sie die empirische Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes möglich machen, gar keine Bedeutung, die irgend ein Objekt bestimmte. Sie können also zwar zu Erklärung der Möglichkeit der Dinge in der Sinnenwelt, aber nicht der Möglichkeit eines Weltganzen selbst gebraucht werden, weil dieser Erklärungsgrund außerhalb der Welt und mithin kein Gegenstand einer möglichen Erfahrung sein müßte. Nur kann ich gleichwohl ein solches unbegreifliches Wesen, den Gegenstand einer bloßen Idee, relativ auf die Sinnenwelt, obgleich nicht an sich selbst, annehmen. Denn, wenn dem größtmöglichen empirischen Gebrauche meiner Vernunft eine Idee (der systematisch-vollständigen Einheit, von der ich bald bestimmter reden werde) zum Grunde liegt, die an sich selbst niemals adäquat in der Erfahrung kann dargestellt werden, ob sie gleich, um die empirische Einheit dem höchstmöglichen Grade zu nähern, unumgänglich notwendig ist, so werde ich nicht allein befugt, sondern auch genötigt sein, diese Idee zu realisieren, d. i. ihr einen wirklichen Gegenstand zu setzen, aber nut als ein Etwas überhaupt, das ich an sich selbst gar nicht kenne, und dem ich nur, als einem Grunde jener systematischen Einheit, in Beziehung auf diese letztere solche Eigenschaften gebe, || als den Verstandesbegriffen im empirischen Gebrauche analogisch sind. Ich werde mir also nach der Analogie der Realitäten in der Welt, der Substanzen, der Kausalität und der Notwendigkeit, ein Wesen denken, das alles dieses in der höchsten Vollkommenheit besitzt, und, indem diese Idee bloß auf meiner Vernunft beruht, dieses Wesen als selbständige Vernunft, was durch Ideen der
which through ideas of the greatest harmony and unity is
the cause of the universe. I thus omit all conditions which
might limit the idea, solely in order, under countenance of
such an original ground, to make possible systematic unity
of the manifold in the universe, and thereby the greatest
possible empirical employment of reason. This I do by rep-
resenting all connections as if they were the ordinances of a
supreme reason, of which our reason is but a faint copy. I then
proceed to think this supreme being exclusively through con-
cepts which, properly, are applicable only in the world of
sense. But since I make none but a relative use of the trans-
cendental assumption, namely, as giving the substratum of
the greatest possible unity of experience, I am quite in order in
thinking a being which I distinguish from the world of sense,
through properties which belong solely to that world. For I
do not seek, nor am I justified in seeking, to know this object
of my idea according to what it may be in itself. There are no
concepts available for any such purpose; even the concepts of
reality, substance, causality, nay, even that of necessity in
existence, lose all meaning, and are empty titles for [possible]
concepts, themselves entirely without content, when we thus
venture with them outside the field of the senses. I think to
myself merely the relation of a being, in itself completely
unknown to me, to the greatest possible systematic unity of
the universe, solely for the purpose of using it as a schema of the
regulative principle of the greatest possible empirical em-
ployment of my reason.

If it be the transcendental object of our idea that we have
in view, it is obvious that we cannot thus, in terms of the
concepts of reality, substance, causality, etc., presuppose its
reality in itself, since these concepts have not the least appli-
cation to anything that is entirely distinct from the world of
sense. The supposition which reason makes of a supreme being, as
the highest cause, is, therefore relative only; it is devised solely
for the sake of systematic unity in the world of sense, and is a
mere something in idea, of which, as it may be in itself, we
have no concept. This explains why, in relation to what is
given to the senses as existing, we require the idea of a pri-
ordial being necessary in itself, and yet can never form the
 slightest concept of it or of its absolute necessity.

VON DER ENDABSICHT DER NATÜRLICHEN DIALEKTIK 589
größten Harmonie und Einheit, Ursache vom Weltganz
ist, denken können, so daß ich alle, die Idee einschränkende,
Bedingungen weglasse, lediglich um, unter dem Schutze
eines solchen Urgrundes, systematische Einheit des Mannig-
faltigen im Weltganz, und, vermittels derselben, den
größtmöglichen empirischen Vernunftgebrauch möglich zu
machen, indem ich alle Verbindungen so ansehe, als ob sie
Anordnungen einer höchsten Vernunft wären, von der die
unsrige ein schwaches Nachbild ist. Ich denke mir alsdenn
 dieses höchste Wesen durch lauter Begriffe, die eigentlich
nur in der Sinnenwelt ihre Anwendung haben; da ich aber
auch jene transzendentale Voraussetzung zu keinem andern
als relativen Gebrauch habe, nämlich, daß sie das Subst-
ratum der größtmöglichen Erfahrungseinheit abgeben solle,
so darf ich ein Wesen, das ich von der Welt unterscheide,
ganz wohl durch Eigenschaften denken, die lediglich zur
Sinnenwelt gehören. Denn ich verlange keinesweges, und bin
auch nicht befugt, es zu verlangen, diesen Gegenstand mei-
ner Idee, nach dem, was er an sich sein mag, zu erkennen;
denn dazu habe ich keine Be[griffe], und selbst die Begriffe
von Realität, Substanz, Kausalität, ja so gar der Notwen-
digkeit im Dasein, verlieren alle Bedeutung, und sind leere
Titel zu Begriffen, ohne allen Inhalt, wenn ich mich außer
dem Felde der Sinne damit hinauszage. Ich denke mir nur
die Relation eines mir an sich ganz unbekannten Wesen zur
großen systematischen Einheit des Weltganz, lediglich
um es zum Schema des regulativen Prinzips des größtmög-
lichen empirischen Gebrauchs meiner Vernunft zu machen.
Werfen wir unseren Blick nun auf den transzendentalen
Gegenstand unserer Idee, so sehen wir, daß wir seine Wirk-
llichkeit nach den Begriffen von Realität, Substanz, Kausal-
ität etc. an sich selbst nicht voraussetzen können, weil
diese Begriffe auf etwas, das von der Sinnenwelt ganz un-
terschieden ist, nicht die mindeste Anwendung haben. Also
ist die Supposition der Vernunft von einem höchsten Wesen,
as oberster Ursache, bloß relativ, zum Behuf der systema-
tischen Einheit der Sinnenwelt gedacht, und ein bloßes
Etwas in der Idee, wovon wir, was es an sich sei, keinen
Begriff haben. Hiedurch erklärt sich auch, wozu wir zwar
in Beziehung auf das, was existierend den Sinne gegeben
ist, der Idee eines an sich notwendigen Urwesens bedür-
fen, niemals aber von diesem und seiner absoluten Not-
wendigkeit den mindesten Begriff haben können.
We are now in a position to have a clear view of the outcome of the whole Transcendental Dialectic, and accurately to define the final purpose of the ideas of pure reason, which become dialectical only through heedlessness and misapprehension. Pure reason is in fact occupied with nothing but itself. It can have no other vocation. For what is given to it does not consist in objects that have to be brought to the unity of the empirical concept, but in those modes of knowledge supplied by the understanding that require to be brought to the unity of the concept of reason—that is, to unity of connection in conformity with a principle. The unity of reason is the unity of system; and this systematic unity does not serve objectively as a principle that extends the application of reason to objects, but subjectively as a maxim that extends its application to all possible empirical knowledge of objects. Nevertheless, since the systematic connection which reason can give to the empirical employment of the understanding not only furthers its extension, but also guarantees its correctness, the principle of such systematic unity is so far also objective, but in an indeterminate manner (principium vagum). It is not a constitutive principle that enables us to determine anything in respect of its direct object, but only a merely regulative principle and maxim, to further and strengthen in infinitum (indeterminately) the empirical employment of reason—never in any way proceeding counter to the laws of its empirical employment, and yet at the same time opening out new paths which are not within the cognisance of the understanding.

But reason cannot think this systematic unity otherwise than by giving to the idea of this unity an object; and since experience can never give an example of complete systematic unity, the object which we have to assign to the idea is not such as experience can ever supply. This object, as thus entertained by reason (ens rationis ratiocinatis), is a mere idea; it is not assumed as a something that is real absolutely and in itself, but is postulated only problematically (since we cannot reach it through any of the concepts of the understanding) in order that we may view all connection of the things of the world of sense as if they had their ground in such a being. In thus proceeding, our sole purpose is to secure that systematic unity which is indispensable to reason, and through it, the unity of the concepts of understanding.

Nunmehr können wir das Resultat der ganzen transcendentalen Dialektik deutlich vor Augen stellen, und die Endabsicht der Ideen der reinen Vernunft, die nur durch Mißerfolg und Unbehutsamkeit dialektisch werden, genau bestimmen. Die reine Vernunft ist in der Tat mit nichts als sich selbst beschäftigt, und kann auch kein anderes Geschäft haben, weil ihr nicht die Gegenstände zur Einheit des Erfahrungsbegriffs, sondern die Verstandeserkenntnisse zur Einheit des Vernunftbegriffs, d. i. des Zusammenhanges in einem Prinzip gegeben werden. Die Vernunftseinheit ist die Einheit des Systems, und diese systematische Einheit dient der Vernunft nicht objektiv zu einem Grundsatz, um sie über die Gegenstände, sondern subjektiv als Maxime, um sie über alles mögliche empirische Erkenntnis der Gegenstände zu verbreiten. Gleichwohl befördert der systematische Zusammenhang, den die Vernunft dem empirischen Verstandesgebrauch geben kann, nicht allein dessen Ausbreitung, sondern bewahrt auch zugleich die Richtigkeit desselben, und das Principium einer solchen systematischen Einheit ist auch subjektiv, aber auf unbestimmte Art (principium vagum), nicht als konstitutivem Prinzip, um etwas in Anspruch seines direkten Gegenstandes zu bestimmen, sondern um, als bloß regulativer Grundsatz und Maxime, den empirischen Gebrauch der Vernunft durch Eröffnung neuer Wege, die der Verstand nicht kennt, ins Unendliche (Unbestimmte) zu befördern und zu befestigen, ohne dabei jemals den Gesetzen des empirischen Gebrauchs zu widersprechen.

Die Vernunft kann aber diese systematische Einheit nicht anders denken, als daß sie ihrer Idee zugleich einen Gegenstand gibt, der aber durch keine Erfahrung gegeben werden kann; denn Erfahrung gibt niemals ein Beispiel vollkommener systematischer Einheit. Dieses Vernunftwesen (ens rationis ratiocinatis) ist nun zwar eine bloße Idee, und wird also nicht schlechthin und an sich selbst als etwas Wirkliches angenommen, sondern nur problematisch zum Grunde gelegt (weil wir es durch keine Verstandesbegriffe erreichend können), um alle Verknüpfung der Dinge der Sinnenwelt so anzusehen, als ob sie in diesem Vernunftwesen ihren Grund hätten, lediglich aber in der Absicht, um darauf die systematische Einheit zu gründen, die der Vernunft unentbehr-
which while furthing in every way the empirical knowledge obtainable by the understanding can never interfere to hinder or obstruct it.

We misapprehend the meaning of this idea if we regard it as the assertion or even as the assumption of a real thing, to which we may proceed to ascribe the ground of the systematic order of the world. On the contrary, what this ground which eludes our concepts may be in its own inherent constitution is left entirely undetermined; the idea is posited only as being the point of view from which alone that unity, which is so essential to reason and so beneficial to the understanding, can be further extended. In short, this transcendentental thing is only the schema of the regulative principle by which reason, so far as lies in its power, extends systematic unity over the whole field of experience.

The first object of such an idea is the 'I' itself, viewed simply as thinking nature or soul. If I am to investigate the properties with which a thinking being is in itself endowed, I must interrogate experience. For I cannot even apply any one of the categories to this object, except in so far as the schema of the category is given in sensible intuition. But I never thereby attain to a systematic unity of all appearances of inner sense. Instead, then, of the empirical concept (of that which the soul actually is), which cannot carry us far, reason takes the concept of the empirical unity of all thought; and by thinking this unity as unconditioned and original, it forms from it a concept of reason, that is, the idea of a simple substance, which, unchangeable in itself (personally identical), stands in association with other real things outside it; in a word, the idea of a simple self-subsisting intelligence. Yet in so doing it has nothing in view save principles of systematic unity in the explanation of the appearances of the soul. It is endeavouring to represent all determinations as existing in a single subject, all powers, so far as possible, as derived from a single fundamental power, all change as belonging to the states of one and the same permanent being, and all appearances in space as completely different from the actions of thought. The simplicity and other properties of substance are intended to be only the schema of this regulative principle, and are not presupposed as being the actual ground of the properties of the soul. For these may rest...
on altogether different grounds, of which we can know nothing. The soul in itself could not be known through these assumed predicates, not even if we regarded them as absolutely valid in respect of it. For they constitute a mere idea which cannot be represented in concreto. Nothing but advantage can result from the psychological idea thus conceived, if only we take heed that it is not viewed as more than a mere idea, and that it is therefore taken as valid only relatively to the systematic employment of reason in determining the appearances of our soul. For no empirical laws of bodily appearances, which are of a totally different kind, will then intervene in the explanation of what belongs exclusively to inner sense. No windy hypotheses of generation, extinction, and palingenesis of souls will be permitted. The consideration of this object of inner sense will thus be kept completely pure and will not be confused by the introduction of heterogeneous properties. Also, reason’s investigations will be directed to reducing the grounds of explanation in this field, so far as may be possible, to a single principle. All this will be best attained through such a schema, viewed as if it were a real being; indeed it is attainable in no other way. The psychological idea can signify nothing but the schema of a regulative concept. For were I to enquire whether the soul in itself is of spiritual nature, the question would have no meaning. In employing such a concept I not only abstract from corporeal nature, but from nature in general, that is, from all predicates of any possible experience, and therefore from all conditions requisite for thinking an object for such a concept; yet only as related to an object can the concept be said to have a meaning.

The second regulative idea of merely speculative reason is the concept of the world in general. For nature is properly the only given object in regard to which reason requires regulative principles. This nature is twofold, either thinking or corporeal. To think the latter, so far as regards its inner possibility, that is, to determine the application of the categories to it, we need no idea, that is, no representation which transcends experience. Nor, indeed, is any idea possible in this connection, since in dealing with corporeal nature we are guided solely by sensible intuition. The case is different from that of the fundamental psychological concept (‘I’), which

egenschaften. Denn diese können auch auf ganz anderen Gründen beruhen, die wir gar nicht kennen, wie wir denn die Seele auch durch diese angenommene Prädicate eigentlich nicht an sich selbst erkennen könnten, wenn wir sie gleich von ihr schlechtthin wollten gelten lassen, indem sie eine bloße Idee ausmachen, die in concreto gar nicht vorgestellt werden kann. Aus einer solchen psychologischen Idee kann nun nichts andres als Vorteil entspringen, wenn man sich nur hütet, sie für etwas mehr als bloße Idee, d. i. bloß relativisch auf den systematischen Vernunftsgebrauch in Ansehung der Erscheinungen unserer Seele, gelten zu lassen. Denn da mengen sich keine empirische Gesetze körperlicher Erscheinungen, die ganz von anderer Art sind, in die Erklärungen dessen, was bloß für den inneren Sinn gehört; da werden keine windige Hypothesen, von Erzeugung, Zerstörung und Palingenies der Seelen etc. zugelas- sen; also wird die Betrachtung dieses Gegenandes des inneren Sinnes ganz rein und unvermengt mit ungleichartigen Eigenschaften angestellt, überdem die Vernunftuntersuchung darauf gerichtet, die Erklärungsgründe in diesem Subjekte, so weit es möglich ist, auf ein einziges Prinzip hinaus zu führen; welches alles durch ein solches Schema, als ob es ein wirkliches Wesen wäre, am besten, ja so gar einzig und allein, bewirket wird. Die psychologische Idee kann auch nichts andres als das Schema eines regulativen Begriffs bedeuten. Denn, wollte ich auch nur fragen, ob die Seele nicht an sich geistiger Natur sei, so hatte diese Frage gar keinen Sinn. Denn durch einen solchen Begriff nehe me ich nicht bloß die körperliche Natur, sondern überhaupt alle Natur weg, d. i. alle Prädicate irgend einer möglichen Erfahrung, mithin alle Bedingungen, zu einem solchen Begriffe einen Gegenstand zu denken, als welches doch einzig und allein es macht, daß man sagt, er habe einen Sinn.

Die zweite regulative Idee der bloß spekulativen Vernunft ist der Weltbegriff überhaupt: Denn Natur ist eigentlich nur das einzige gegebene Objekt, in Ansehung dessen die Vernunft regulative Prinzipien bedarf. Diese Natur ist zweisech, entweder die denkende, oder die körperliche Natur. Allein zu der letzteren, um sie ihrer inneren Möglichkeit nach zu denken, d. i. die Anwendung der Kategorien auf dieselbe zu bestimmen, bedürfen wir keiner Idee, d. i. einer die Erfahrung übersteigenden Vorstellung; es ist auch keine in Ansehung derselben möglich, weil wir darin bloß durch sinnliche Anschauung geleitet werden, und nicht wie in dem psychologischen Grundbegriffe (Ich), welcher eine gewisse

Zusatz von B.
contains a priori a certain form of thought, namely, the unity of thought. There therefore remains for pure reason nothing but nature in general, and the completeness of the conditions in nature in accordance with some principle. The absolute totality of the series of these conditions, in the derivation of their members, is an idea which can never be completely realised in the empirical employment of reason, but which yet serves as a rule that prescribes how we ought to proceed in dealing with such series, namely, that in explaining appearances, whether in their regressive or in their ascending order, we ought to treat the series as if it were in itself infinite, that is, as if it proceeded in indefinitum. When, on the other hand, reason is itself regarded as the determining cause, as in [the sphere of] freedom, that is to say, in the case of practical principles, we have to proceed as if we had before us an object, not of the senses, but of the pure understanding. In this practical sphere the conditions are no longer in the series of appearances; they can be posited outside the series, and the series of states can therefore be regarded as if it had an absolute beginning, through an intelligible cause. All this shows that the cosmological ideas are nothing but simply regulative principles, and are very far from positing, in the manner of constitutive principles, an actual totality of such series. The fuller treatment of this subject will be found in the chapter on the antinomy of pure reason.

The third idea of pure reason, which contains a merely relative supposition of a being that is the sole and sufficient cause of all cosmological series, is the idea of God. We have not the slightest ground to assume in an absolute manner (to suppose in itself) the object of this idea; for what can enable us to believe in or assert a being of the highest perfection and one absolutely necessary by its very nature, merely on the basis of its concept, or if we did how could we justify our procedure? It is only by way of its relation to the world that we can attempt to establish the necessity of this supposition; and it then becomes evident that the idea of such a being, like all speculative ideas, seeks only to formulate the command of reason, that all connection in the world be viewed in accordance with the principles of a systematic unity—as if all such connection had its source in one single all-embracing being, as the supreme and

Die dritte Idee der reinen Vernunft, welche eine bloße relative Supposition eines Wesens enthält, als der einzigen und allgenügsamen Ursache aller kosmologischen Reihen, ist der Vernunftbegriff von Gott. Den Gegenstand dieser Idee haben wir nicht den mindesten Grund schlechthin anzunehmen (ansich zusupponieren); denn was kann uns wohl dazu vermögen, oder auch nur berechtigen, ein Wesen von der höchsten Vollkommenheit, und als seiner Natur nach schlechthin notwendig, aus dessen bloßem Begriffe an sich selbst zu glauben, oder zu behaupten, wäre es nicht die Welt, in Beziehung auf welche diese Supposition allein notwendig sein kann; und da zeigt es sich klar, daß die Idee desselben, so wie alle spekulative Ideen, nichts weiter sagen wolle, als daß die Vernunft gebiete, alle Verknüpfung der Welt nach Prinzipien einer systematischen Einheit zu betrachten, mithin als ob sie insgesamt aus einem einzigen allbefassenden Wesen, als oberster und allgenügsamer Ur-
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

all-sufficient cause. It is thus evident that reason has here no other purpose than to prescribe its own formal rule for the extension of its empirical employment, and not any extension beyond all limits of empirical employment. Consequently it is evident that this idea does not, in any concealed fashion, involve any principle that claims, in its application to possible experience, to be constitutive in character.

This highest formal unity, which rests solely on concepts of reason, is the purposed unity of things. The speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the purpose of a supreme reason. Such a principle opens out to our reason, as applied in the field of experience, altogether new views as to how the things of the world may be connected according to teleological laws, and so enables it to arrive at their greatest systematic unity. The assumption of a supreme intelligence, as the one and only cause of the universe, though in the idea alone, can therefore always benefit reason and can never injure it. Thus if, in studying the shape of the earth (which is round, but somewhat flattened), of the mountains, seas, etc., we assume it to be the outcome of wise purposes on the part of an Author of the world, we are enabled to make in this way a number of discoveries. And provided we restrict ourselves to a merely regulative use of this principle, even error cannot do us any serious harm. For the worst that can happen would be that we expected a teleological connection (nexus finalis), we find only a mechanical or physical connection (nexus effectivus). In such a case, we merely fail to find the additional unity; we do not destroy the unity upon which reason insists in its empirical

The advantage arising from the spherical shape of the earth is well known. But few are aware that its spheroidal flattening alone prevents the continental elevations, or even the smaller hills, thrown up perhaps by earthquakes, from continuously, and indeed quite appreciably in a comparatively short time, altering the position of the axis of the earth. The protuberance of the earth at the equator forms so vast a mountain that the impetus of all the other mountains can never produce any observable effect in changing the position of the earth's axis. And yet, wise as this arrangement is, we feel no scruples in explaining it from the equilibrium of the formerly fluid mass of the earth.

[zuweckmächtig.] [Absicht.] [teleologischen.]
employment. But even a disappointment of this sort cannot affect the teleological law itself, in its general bearing. For although an anatomist can be convicted of error, when he assigns to some member of an animal body an end which it can be clearly shown not to subserve, it is yet quite impossible to prove in any given case that an arrangement of nature, be it what it may, subserves no end whatsoever. Accordingly, medical physiology extends its very limited empirical knowledge of the ends served by the articulation of an organic body, by resorting to a principle for which pure reason has alone been responsible; and it carries this principle so far as to assume confidentially, and with general approval, that everything in an animal has its use, and subserves some good purpose. If this assumption be treated as constitutive it goes much further than observation has thus far been able to justify; and we must therefore conclude that it is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, to aid us in securing the highest possible systematic unity, by means of the idea of the purposive causality of the supreme cause of the world—as if this being, as supreme intelligence, acting in accordance with a supremely wise purpose, were the cause of all things.

If, however, we overlook this restriction of the idea to a merely regulative use, reason is led away into mistaken paths. For it then leaves the ground of experience, which alone can contain the signs that mark out its proper course, and ventures out beyond it to the incomprehensible and unsearchable, rising to dizzy heights where it finds itself entirely cut off from all possible action in conformity with experience.

The first error which arises from our using the idea of a supreme being in a manner contrary to the nature of an idea, that is, constitutively, and not regulatively only, is the error of ignava ratio. We may so entitle every principle which makes

* This was the title given by the ancient dialecticians to a sophistical argument, which ran thus: If it is your fate to recover from this illness, you will recover, whether you employ a physician or not. Cicero states that this mode of argument has been so named, because, if we conformed to it, reason would be left without any use in life. On the same ground I apply the name also to the sophistical argument of pure reason.

VON DER ENDABSICHT DER NATÜRLICHER DIALEKTIK 595

|| Gehen wir aber von dieser Restriktion der Idee auf den bloß regulativen Gebrauch ab, so wird die Vernunft auf so mancherlei Weise irre geführt, indem sie alsdenn den Boden der Erfahrung, der doch die Merkzeichen ihres Ganges enthalten muß, verläßt, und sich über denselben zu dem Unbegreiflichen und Unerforschlichen hinwagt, über dessen Höhe sie notwendig schwindlicht wird, weil sie sich aus dem Standpunkte desselben von allem mit der Erfahrung stimmigen Gebrauch gänzlich abgeschnitten sieht.

Der erste Fehler, der daraus entspringt, daß man die Idee eines höchsten Wesens nicht bloß regulativ, sondern (wel ches der Natur einer Idee zuwider ist) konstitutiv braucht, ist die faule Vernunft (ignava ratio*). Man kann jeden Grundsatz so nennen, welcher macht, daß man seine Natur

us regard our investigation into nature, on any subject, as absolutely complete, disposing reason to cease from further enquiry, as if it had entirely succeeded in the task which it had set itself. Thus the psychological idea, when it is employed as a constitutive principle to explain the appearances of our soul, and thereby to extend our knowledge of the self beyond the limits of experience (its state after death), does indeed simplify the task of reason; but it interferes with, and entirely ruins, our use of reason in dealing with nature under the guidance of our experiences. The dogmatic spiritualist explains the abiding and unchanging unity of a person throughout all change of state, by the unity of the thinking substance, of which, as he believes, he has immediate perception in the 'I'; or he explains the interest which we take in what can happen only after our death, by means of our consciousness of the immaterial nature of the thinking subject; and so forth. He thus dispenses with all empirical investigation of the cause of these inner appearances, so far as that cause is to be found in physical grounds of explanation; and to his own great convenience, though at the sacrifice of all real insight, he professes, in reliance upon the assumed authority of a transcendent reason, to have the right to ignore those sources of knowledge which are immanent in experience. These detrimental consequences are even more obvious in the dogmatic treatment of our idea of a supreme intelligence, and in the theological system of nature (physico-theology) which is falsely based upon it. For in this field of enquiry, if instead of looking for causes in the universal laws of material mechanism, we appeal directly to the unsearchable decree of supreme wisdom, all those ends which are exhibited in nature, together with the many ends which are only ascribed by us to nature, make our investigation of the causes a very easy task, and so enable us to regard the labour of reason as completed, when, as a matter of fact, we have merely dispensed with its employment—an employment which is wholly dependent for guidance upon the order of nature and the series of its alterations, in accordance with the universal laws which they are found to exhibit. This error can be avoided, if we consider from the teleological point of view not merely certain parts of nature, such as the distribu-

1 [nach ihreninneren und allgemeinen Gesetzen.]
tion of land, its structure, the constitution and location of the mountains, or only the organisation of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, but make this systematic unity of nature completely universal, in relation to the idea of a supreme intelligence. For we then treat nature as resting upon a purposiveness, in accordance with universal laws, from which no special arrangement is exempt, however difficult it may be to establish this in any given case. We then have a regulative principle of the systematic unity of teleological connection—a connection which we do not, however, predetermine. What we may presume to do is to follow out the physico-mechanical connection in accordance with universal laws, in the hope of discovering what the teleological connection actually is. In this way alone can the principle of purposive unity aid always in extending the employment of reason in reference to experience, without being in any instance prejudicial to it.

The second error arising from the misapprehension of the above principle of systematic unity is that of *perversa ratio* (ὑπερτηρον πρῶτον). The idea of systematic unity should be used only as a regulative principle to guide us in seeking for such unity in the connection of things, according to universal laws of nature; and we ought, therefore, to believe that we have approximated to completeness in the employment of the principle only in proportion as we are in a position to verify such unity in empirical fashion—a completeness which is never, of course, attainable. Instead of this the reverse procedure is adopted. The reality of a principle of purposive unity is not only presupposed but hypostatised; and since the concept of a supreme intelligence is in itself completely beyond our powers of comprehension, we proceed to determine it in an anthropomorphic manner, and so to impose ends upon nature, forcibly and dictatorially, instead of pursuing the more reasonable course of searching for them by the path of physical investigation. And thus teleology, which is intended to aid us merely in completing the unity of nature in accordance with universal laws, not only tends to abrogate such unity, but also prevents reason from carrying out its own professed purpose, that of proving from nature, in conformity with these laws, the existence of a supreme intelligent cause.

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1 [Reading, with Wills, nach diesem for nach diesem.]
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

564

For if the most complete purposiveness cannot be presupposed a priori in nature, that is, as belonging to its essence, how can we be required to search for it, and through all its gradations to approximate to the supreme perfection of an Author of all things, a perfection that, as absolutely necessary, must be knowable a priori? The regulative principle prescribes that systematic unity as a unity in nature, which is not known merely empirically but is presupposed a priori (although in an indeterminate manner), be presupposed absolutely, and consequently as following from the essence of things. If, however, I begin with a supreme purposive being as the ground of all things, the unity of nature is really surrendered, as being quite foreign and accidental to the nature of things, and as not capable of being known from its own universal laws. There then arises a vicious circle; we are assuming just that very point which is mainly in dispute.

To take the regulative principle of the systematic unity of nature as being a constitutive principle, and to hypostatise, and presuppose as a cause, that which serves, merely in idea, as the ground of the consistent employment of reason, is simply to confound reason. The investigation of nature takes its own independent course, keeping to the chain of natural causes in conformity with their universal laws. It does indeed, in so doing, proceed in accordance with the idea of an Author of the universe, but not in order to deduce therefrom the purposiveness for which it is ever on the watch, but in order to obtain knowledge of the existence of such an Author from this purposiveness. And by seeking this purposiveness in the essence of the things of nature, and so far as may be possible in the essence of things in general, it seeks to know the existence of this supreme being as absolutely necessary. Whether this latter enterprise succeed or not, the idea remains always true in itself, and justified in its use, provided it be restricted to the conditions of a merely regulative principle.

Complete purposive unity constitutes what is, in the absolute sense, perfection. If we do not find this unity in the essence of the things which go to constitute the entire object of experience, that is, of all our objectively valid knowledge, and therefore do not find it in the universal and necessary laws of nature, how can we profess to infer directly from this unity the

VON DER ENDABSICHT DER NATÜRLICHEN DIALEKTIK 599

man nicht die höchste Zweckmäßigkeit in der Natur a priori, d. i. als zum Wesen derselben gehörig, voraussetzen kann, wie will man denn angewiesen sein, sie zu suchen und auf der Stufenleiter derselben sich der höchsten Vollkommenheit eines Urhebers, als einer schlechterdings notwendigen, mithin a priori erkennbaren Vollkommenheit, zu nähern? Das regulative Prinzip verlangt, die systematische Einheit als Natureinheit, welche nicht bloß empirisch erkannt, sondern a priori, obzwar noch unbestimmt, vorausgesetzt wird, schlechterdings, mithin als aus dem Wesen der Dinge folgend, vorausgesetzt. Lege ich aber zuvor ein höchstes ordentliches Wesen zum Grunde, so wird die Natureinheit in der Tat aufgehoben. Denn sie ist der Natur der Dinge ganz fremd und zufällig, und kann auch nicht aus allgemeinen Gesetzen derselben erkannt werden. Daher entspringt ein fehlerhafter Zirkel im Beweisen, da man das voraussetzt, was eigentlich hat bewiesen werden sollen.

Das regulative Prinzip der systematischen Einheit der Natur für ein konstitutives nehmen, und, was nur in der Idee zum Grunde des einhellige Gebrauchs der Vernunft gelegt wird, als Ursache hypostatisch vorausgesetzt, heißt nur, die Vernunft verwirren. Die Naturforschung geht ihren Gang ganz allein an der Kette der Naturursachen nach allgemeinen Gesetzen derselben, zwar nach der Idee eines Urhebers, aber nicht um die Zweckmäßigkeit, der sie allerwärts nachgeht, von demselben abzuleiten, sondern sein Da- sein aus dieser Zweckmäßigkeit, die in den Wesen der Naturdinge gesucht wird, womöglich auch in den Wesen aller Dinge überhaupt, mithin als schlechtthin notwendig zu erkennen. Das letztere mag nun gelingen oder nicht, so bleibt die Idee immer richtig, und eben sowohl auch der Gebrauch, wenn er auf die Bedingungen eines bloß regulativen Prinzips restringiert worden.

Vollständige zweckmäßige Einheit ist Vollkommenheit (schlechtthin betrachtet). Wenn wir diese nicht in dem Wesen der Dinge, welche den ganzen Gegenstand der Erfahrung, d. i. aller unserer objektivgültigen Erkenntnis, ausmachen, mithin in allgemeinen und notwendigen Naturgesetzen finden: wie wollen wir daraus gerade auf die Idee

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idea of a supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of an original being, as the source of all causality? The greatest possible systematic unity, and consequently also purposive unity, is the training school for the use of reason, and is indeed the very foundation of the possibility of its greatest possible employment. The idea of such unity is, therefore, inseparably bound up with the very nature of our reason. This same idea is on that account legislative for us; and it is therefore very natural that we should assume a corresponding legislative reason (intellectus archetypus), from which, as the object of our reason, all systematic unity of nature is to be derived.

In discussing the antinomy of pure reason we have stated that the questions propounded by pure reason must in every case admit of an answer, and that in their regard it is not permissible to plead the limits of our knowledge (a plea which in many questions that concern nature is as unavoidable as it is relevant). For we are not here asking questions in regard to the nature of things, but only such questions as arise from the very nature of reason, and which concern solely its own inner constitution. We are now in a position to confirm this assertion—which at first sight may have appeared rash—so far as regards the two questions in which pure reason is most of all interested; and thus finally to complete our discussion of the dialectic of pure reason.

If, in connection with a transcendental theology, we ask, first, whether there is anything distinct from the world, which contains the ground of the order of the world and of its connection in accordance with universal laws, the answer is that there undoubtedly is. For the world is a sum of appearances; and there must therefore be some transcendental ground of the appearances, that is, a ground which is thinkable only by the pure understanding. If, secondly, the question be, whether this being is substance, of the greatest reality, necessary, etc.,

* After what I have already said regarding the psychological idea and its proper vocation, as a principle for the merely regulative employment of reason, I need not dwell at any length upon the transcendental illusion by which the systematic unity of all the manifoldness of inner sense is hypostatised. The procedure is very similar to that which is under discussion in our criticism of the theological ideal.

600  TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK


Frägt man denn also (in Absicht auf eine transzendentale Theologie) erstlich: ob es etwas von der Welt | Unterschiedenes gebe, was den Grund der Weltsordnung und ihres Zusammenhanges nach allgemeinen Gesetzen enthalte, so ist die Antwort: ohne Zweifel. Denn die Welt ist eine Summe von Erscheinungen, es muß also irgend ein transzendentaler, d. i. bloß dem reinen Verstande denkbare Grund derselben sein. Ist zweitens die Frage: ob dieses Wesen Substanz, von der größten Realität, notwendig etc.

* Dasjenige, was ich schon vorher von der psychologischen Idee und deren eigenständigen Bestimmung, als Prinzip zum bloß regulativen Vernunftgebrauch, gesagt habe, überhebt mich der Weltläufigkeit, die transzendentale Illusion, nach der jene systematische Einheit aller Mannigfaltigkeit des inneren Sinnes hypostatisch vorgestellt wird, noch besonders zu erörtern. Das Verfahren hiebei ist demjenigen sehr ähnlich, welches die Kritik in Ansehung des theologischen Ideals beobachtet.
we reply that this question is entirely without meaning. For all categories through which we can attempt to form a concept of such an object allow only of empirical employment, and have no meaning whatsoever when not applied to objects of possible experience, that is, to the world of sense. Outside this field they are merely titles of concepts, which we may admit, but through which [in and by themselves] we can understand nothing. If, thirdly, the question be, whether we may not at least think this being, which is distinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of experience, the answer is: certainly, but only as object in idea and not in reality, namely, only as being a substratum, to us unknown, of the systematic unity, order, and purposiveness of the arrangement of the world—an idea which reason is constrained to form as the regulative principle of its investigation of nature. Nay, more, we may freely, without laying ourselves open to censure, admit into this idea certain anthropomorphisms which are helpful to the principle in its regulative capacity. For it is always an idea only, which does not relate directly to a being distinct from the world, but to the regulative principle of the systematic unity of the world, and only by means of a schema of this unity, namely, through the schema of a supreme intelligence which, in originating the world, acts in accordance with wise purposes. What this primordial ground of the unity of the world may be in itself, we should not profess to have thereby decided, but only how we should use it, or rather its idea, in relation to the systematic employment of reason in respect of the things of the world.

But the question may still be pressed: Can we, on such grounds, assume a wise and omnipotent Author of the world? Undoubtedly we may; and we not only may, but must, do so. But do we then extend our knowledge beyond the field of possible experience? By no means. All that we have done is merely to presuppose a something, a merely transcendental object, of which, as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever. It is only in relation to the systematic and purposive ordering of the world, which, if we are to study nature, we are constrained to presuppose, that we have thought this unknown being by analogy with an intelligence (an empirical concept); that is, have endowed it, in respect of the ends and perfection

VON DER ENDABSICHT DER NATÜRLICHEN DIALEKTIK sei: so antworte ich: daß diese Frage gar keine Bedeutung habe. Denn alle Kategorien, durch welche ich mir einen Begriff von einem solchen Gegenstande zu machen versuche, sind von keinem anderen als empirischen Gebrauche, und haben gar keinen Sinn, wenn sie nicht auf Objekte möglicher Erfahrung, d. i. auf die Sinnenwelt angewandt werden. Außer diesem Felde sind sie bloß Titel zu Begriffen, die man einräumen, dadurch man aber auch nichts verstehen kann. Ist endlich drittens die Frage: ob wir nicht wenigstens dieses von der Welt unterschiedene Wesen nach einer Analogie mit den Gegenständen der Erfahrung denken dürfen? so ist die Antwort: allerdings, aber nur als Gegenstand in der Idee und nicht in der Realität, nämlich nur, so fern er ein uns unbekanntes Substrat der systematischen Einheit, Ordnung und Zweckmäßigkei
t der Welteinrichtung ist, welche sich die Verunft zum regulativen Prinzip ihrer Naturforschung machen muß. Noch mehr, wir können in dieser Ideegewisse Anthropomorphismen, die dem gedachten regulativen Prinzip beförd
den sind, ungescheut und ungetadelt erlauben. Denn es ist immer nur eine Idee, die gar nicht direkt auf ein von der Welt unterschiedenes Wesen, sondern auf das regulative Prinzip der systematischen Einheit der Welt, aber nur ver
tüllst eines Schema derselben, nämlich einer obersten Intelligenz, die nach weisen Absichten Urheber derselben sei, bezogen wird. Was dieser U Grund der Welteinheit an sich selbst sei, hat dadurch nicht gedacht werden sollen, sondern wie wir ihn, oder vielmehr seine Idee, relativ auf den systematischen Gebrauch der Verunft in Anschauung der Dinge der Welt, brauchen sollen.

Auf solche Weise aber können wir doch (wird man fort
thalten zu fragen) einen einigen weisen und allgewaltigen Welturheber annehmen? Ohne allen Zweifel; und nicht allein dies, sondern wir müssen einen solchen voraussetzen. Aber alsdenn erweitern wir doch unsere Kenntnis über das Feld möglicher Erfahrung? Keinesweges. Denn wir haben nur ein Etwas vorausgesetzt, worauf wir gar keinen Begriff haben, was es an sich selbst sei (einen bloß transzen
dentalen Gegenstand), aber, in Beziehung auf die systematische und zweckmäßige Ordnung des Weltbaues, welche wir, wenn wir die Natur studieren, voraussetzen müssen, haben wir jenes uns unbekannte Wesen nur nach der Analogie mit einer Intelligenz (einem empirischen Begriff) gedacht, d. i. es in Anschauung der Zwecke und der Vollkommenheit,

\[A: '\text{U Gr und}.\]
which are to be grounded upon it, with just those properties which, in conformity with the conditions of our reason, can be regarded as containing the ground of such systematic unity. This idea is thus valid only in respect of the employment of our reason in reference to the world. If we ascribed to it a validity that is absolute and objective, we should be forgetting that what we are thinking is a being in idea only; and in thus taking our start from a ground which is not determinable through observation of the world, we should no longer be in a position to apply the principle in a manner suited to the empirical employment of reason.

But, it will still be asked, can I make any such use of the concept and of the presupposition of a supreme being in the rational consideration of the world? Yes, it is precisely for this purpose that reason has resorted to this idea. But may I then proceed to regard seemingly purposive arrangements as purposes, and so derive them from the divine will, though, of course, mediatly through certain special natural means, themselves established in furtherance of that divine will? Yes, we can indeed do so; but only on condition that we regard it as a matter of indifference whether it be asserted that divine wisdom has disposed all things in accordance with its supreme ends, or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a regulative principle in the investigation of nature and a principle of its systematic and purposive unity, in accordance with universal laws, even in those cases in which we are unable to detect that unity. In other words, it must be a matter of complete indifference to us, when we perceive such unity, whether we say that God in his wisdom has willed it to be so, or that nature has wisely arranged it thus. For what has justified us in adopting the idea of a supreme intelligence as a schema of the regulative principle is precisely this greatest possible systematic and purposive unity—a unity which our reason has required as a regulative principle that must underlie all investigation of nature. The more, therefore, we discover purposiveness in the world, the more fully is the legitimacy of our idea confirmed. But since the sole aim of that principle was to guide us in seeking a necessary unity of nature, and that in the greatest possible degree, while we do indeed,

die sich auf demselben gründen, gerade mit denen Eigenschaften begabt, die nach den Bedingungen unserer Vernunft den Grund einer solchen systematischen Einheit enthalten können. Diese Idee ist also respektiv auf den Weltgebrauch unserer Vernunft ganz gegründet. Wollten wir ihr aber schlechthin objektive Gültigkeit erteilen, so würden wir vergessen, daß es lediglich ein Wesen in der Idee sei, das wir denken, und, indem wir alsdenn von einem durch die Weltbetrachtung gar nicht bestimmmbaren Grunde anfingen, würden wir dadurch außer Stand gesetzt, dieses Prinzip dem empirischen Vernunftgebrauch angemessen anzuwenden.

Aber (wird man ferner fragen) auf solche Weise kann ich doch von dem Begriffe und der Voraussetzung eines höchsten Wesens in der vernünftigen Weltbetrachtung Gebrauch machen? Ja, dazu war auch eigentlich diese Idee von der Vernunft zum Grunde gelegt. Allein darf ich nun zweckähnliche Anordnungen als Absichten ansehen, indem ich sie vom göttlichen Willen, obzw. vermittelst besonderer dazu in der Welt darauf gestellten Anlagen, ableite? Ja, das könnt ihr auch tun, aber so, daß es euch gleich viel gelten muß, ob jemand sage, die göttliche Weisheit hat alles so zu seinen obersten Zwecken geordnet, oder die Idee der höchsten Weisheit ist ein Regulativ in der Nachforschung der Natur und ein Prinzip der systematischen und zweckmäßigen Einheit derselben nach allgemeinen Naturgesetzen, auch selbst da, wo wir jene nicht gewahr werden, d. i. es muß euch dar, wo ihr sie wahrnehmt, völlig einerlei sein, zu sagen: Gott hat es weislich so gewollt, oder die Natur hat es also weislich geordnet. Denn die größte systematische und zweckmäßige Einheit, welche eure Vernunft aller Naturforschung als regulatives Prinzip zum Grunde zu legen verlangte, war eben das, was euch berechtigte, die Idee einer höchsten Intelligenz als ein Schema des regulativen Prinzips zum Grunde zu legen, und, so viel ihr nun, nach demselben, Zweckmäßigkeit in der Welt antreffst, so viel habt ihr Bestätigung der Rechtmäßigkeit eurer Idee; da aber gedachtetes Prinzip nichts andres zur Absicht hatte, als notwendige und größtmögliche Natureinheit zu suchen, so werden wir

1 [zweckähnliche Anordnungen als Absichten.]

1 Akad.-Ausz.: *ihren*.
in so far as we attain that unity, owe it to the idea of a supreme being, we cannot, without contradicting ourselves, ignore the universal laws of nature—with a view to discovering which the idea was alone adopted—and look upon this purposiveness of nature as contingent and hyperphysical in its origin. For we were not justified in assuming above nature a being with those qualities, but only in adopting the idea of such a being in order to view the appearances as systematically connected with one another in accordance with the principle of a causal determination.

For the same reasons, in thinking the cause of the world, we are justified in representing it in our idea not only in terms of a certain subtle anthropomorphism (without which we could not think anything whatsoever in regard to it), namely, as a being that has understanding, feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and desires and volitions corresponding to these, but also in ascribing to it a perfection which, as infinite, far transcends any perfection that our empirical knowledge of the order of the world can justify us in attributing to it. For the regulative law of systematic unity prescribes that we should study nature as if systematic and purposive unity, combined with the greatest possible manifoldness, were everywhere to be met with, in infinitum. For although we may succeed in discovering but little of this perfection of the world, it is nevertheless required by the legislation of our reason that we must always search for and surmise it; and it must always be beneficial, and can never be harmful, to direct our investigations into nature in accordance with this principle. But it is evident that in this way of representing the principle as involving the idea of a supreme Author, I do not base the principle upon the existence and upon the knowledge of such a being, but upon its idea only, and that I do not really derive anything from this being, but only from the idea of it—that is, from the nature of the things of the world, in accordance with such an idea. A certain, unformulated consciousness of the true use of this concept of reason seems indeed to have inspired the modest and reasonable language of the philosophers of all times, since they speak of the wisdom and providence of nature and of divine wisdom, just as if nature and divine wisdom were

\[ \text{[Reading, with Hartenstein, die for der.]} \]

\[ \text{\footnote{Akad.-Aug.: s'dies. - A: s'was.}} \]
equivalent expressions—indeed, so long as they are dealing solely with speculative reason, giving preference to the former mode of expression, on the ground that it enables us to avoid making profession of more than we are justified in asserting, and that it likewise directs reason to its own proper field, namely, nature.

Thus pure reason, which at first seemed to promise nothing less than the extension of knowledge beyond all limits of experience, contains, if properly understood, nothing but regulative principles, which, while indeed prescribing greater unity than the empirical employment of understanding can achieve, yet still, by the very fact that they place the goal of its endeavours at so great a distance, carry its agreement with itself, by means of systematic unity, to the highest possible degree. But if, on the other hand, they be misunderstood, and be treated as constitutive principles of transcendent knowledge, they give rise, by a dazzling and deceptive illusion, to persuasion and a merely fictitious knowledge, and therewith to contradictions and eternal disputes.

Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to concepts, and ends with ideas. Although in respect of all three it possesses a priori sources of knowledge, which on first consideration seem to scorn the limits of all experience, a thoroughgoing critique convinces us that reason, in its speculative employment, can never with these elements transcend the field of possible experience, and that the proper vocation of this supreme faculty of knowledge is to use all methods, and the principles of these methods, solely for the purpose of penetrating to the innermost secrets of nature, in accordance with every possible principle of unity—that of ends being the most important—but never to soar beyond its limits, outside which there is for us nothing but empty space. The critical examination, as carried out in the Transcendental Analytic, of all propositions which may seem to extend our knowledge beyond actual experience, has doubtless sufficed to convince us that they can never lead to anything more than a possible experience. Were it not that we are suspicious of abstract and general doctrines, however clear, drücken reden, ja den ersteren Ausdruck, so lange es um bloß spekulative Vernunft zu tun ist, vorziehen, weil er die Anmaßung einer größeren Behauptung, als die ist, wozu wir befugt sind, zurück hält, und zugleich die Vernunft auf ihr eigentümliches Feld, die Natur, zurück weiset.

So enthält die reine Vernunft, die uns anfangs nichts Geringeres, als Erweiterung der Kenntnisse über alle Grenzen der Erfahrung, zu versprechen schien1, wenn wir sie recht verstehen, nichts als regulative Prinzipien, die zwar größere Einheit gebieten, als der empirische Verstandesgebrauch erreichen kann, aber eben dadurch, daß sie das Ziel der Annäherung desselben so weit hinaus rücken,|| die Zusammenstimmung desselben mit sich selbst durch systematische Einheit zum höchsten Grade bringen, wenn man sie aber mißversteht, und sie für konstitutive Prinzipien transzendenter Erkenntnisse hält, durch einen zwar günstenden, aber trüglichen Schein, Überredung und eingebildetes Wissen, hiemit aber ewige Widersprüche und Streitigkeiten hervorbringen.

So fängt denn alle menschliche Erkenntnis mit Anschauungen an, geht von da zu Begriffen, und endigt mit Ideen. Ob sie zwar in Ansehung aller drei Elemente Erkenntnisquellen a priori hat, die beim ersten Anblicke die Grenzen aller Erfahrung zu verschmähen scheinen, so überzeugt doch eine vollendete Kritik, daß alle Vernunft im spekulativen Gebrauche mit diesen Elementen niemals über das Feld möglicher Erfahrung hinaus kommen könne, und daß die eigentliche Bestimmung dieses obersten Erkenntnisvermögens sei, sich aller Methoden und der Grundsätze derselben nur zu bedienen, um der Natur nach allen möglichen Prinzipien der Einheit, worunter die der Zwecke die vornehmste ist, bis in ihr Innerstes nachzugehen, niemals aber ihre Grenze zu übertreten, außerhalb welcher für uns nichts als leerer Raum ist. Zwar hat uns die kritische Untersuchung aller Sätze, welche unsere Erkenntnis über die wirkliche Erfahrung hinaus erweitern können, in der transcendentalen Analytik hinreichend überzeugt, daß sie niemals zu etwas mehr, als einer möglichen Erfahrung leiten können, und, wenn man nicht selbst gegen die klügsten abstrakten und allgemeinen Lehrsätzen2 mißtrauisch wäre, wenn nicht rei-

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2. t: klügere oder abstrakte und allgemeine Lehrsätze.
and were it not that specious and alluring prospects tempt us to escape from the compulsion which these doctrines impose, we might have been able to spare ourselves the laborious interrogation of all those dialectical witnesses that a transcendent reason brings forward in support of its pretensions. For we should from the start have known with complete certainty that all such pretensions, while perhaps honestly meant, must be absolutely groundless, inasmuch as they relate to a kind of knowledge to which man can never attain. But there is no end to such discussions, unless we can penetrate to the true cause of the illusion by which even the wisest are deceived. Moreover, the resolution of all our transcendent knowledge into its elements (as a study of our inner nature) is in itself of no slight value, and to the philosopher is indeed a matter of duty. Accordingly, fruitless as are all these endeavours of speculative reason, we have none the less found it necessary to follow them up to their primary sources. And since the dialectical illusion does not merely deceive us in our judgments, but also, because of the interest which we take in these judgments, has a certain natural attraction which it will always continue to possess, we have thought it advisable, with a view to the prevention of such errors in the future, to draw up in full detail what we may describe as being the records of this lawsuit, and to deposit them in the archives of human reason.

zende und scheinbare Aussichten uns locketen, den Zwang der ersteren abzuwerfen, so hätten wir allerdings der müh- samen Abhörung aller dialektischen Zeugen, die eine tran- ssendente Vernunft zum Behufe ihrer Anmaßungen auftre- ten läßt, überhoben sein können; denn wir wüßten es schon zum voraus mit völliger Gewißheit, daß alles Vorgehen der- selben zwar vielleicht ehrlich gemeint, aber schlechterdings nichtig sein müsse, weil es eine Kundschaft betraf, die kein Mensch jemals bekommen kann. Allein, weil doch des Re- dens kein Ende wird, wenn man nicht hinter die wahre Ursache des Scheins kommt, wodurch selbst der Vernünftigste hin- tergangen werden kann, und die Auflösung aller unserer tran- ssendenten Erkenntnis in ihre Elemente (als ein Studium un- serer inneren Natur) an sich selbst keinen geringen Wert hat, dem Philosophen aber sogar Pflicht ist, so war es nicht allein nötig, diese ganze, obzwar eitle Bearbeitung der spekulati- ven Vernunft bis zu ihren ersten Quellen ausführlich nach- zusuchen, sondern, da der dialektische Schein hier nicht allein dem Urteile nach täuschen, sondern | auch dem Interesse nach, das man hier am Urteile nimmt, anlockend, und jeder- zeit natürlich ist, und so in alle Zukunft bleiben wird, so war es ratsam, gleichsam die Akten dieses Prozesses ausführlich abzufassen, und sie im Archive der menschlichen Vernunft, zu Verhütung künftiger Irrungen ähnlicher Art, niederzulegen.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
SECOND DIVISION
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
INTRODUCTION

I

TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION

We have already entitled dialectic in general a logic of illusion.¹ This does not mean a doctrine of probability; for probability is truth, known however on insufficient grounds, and the knowledge of which, though thus imperfect, is not on that account deceptive; and such doctrine, accordingly, is not to be separated from the analytic part of logic. Still less justification have we for regarding appearance and illusion as being identical. For truth or illusion is not in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it, in so far as it is thought. It is therefore correct to say that the senses do not err—not because they always judge rightly but because they do not judge at all. Truth and error, therefore, and consequently also illusion as leading to error, are only to be found in the judgment, i.e. only in the relation of the object to our understanding. In any knowledge which completely accords with the laws of understanding there is no error. In a representation of the senses—as containing no judgment whatsoever—there is also no error. No natural force can of itself deviate from its own laws. Thus neither the understanding by itself (uninfluenced by another cause), nor the senses by themselves, would fall into error. The former would not, since, if it acts only according to its own laws, the effect (the judgment) must necessarily be in conformity with these laws; conformity with the laws

¹ [Schein.]
of the understanding is the formal element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgment whatsoever, neither a true nor a false judgment. Now since we have no source of knowledge besides these two, it follows that error is brought about solely by the unobserved influence of sensibility on the understanding, through which it happens that the subjective grounds of the judgment enter into union with the objective grounds and make these latter deviate from their true function, just as a body in motion would always of itself continue in a straight line in the same direction, but if influenced by another force acting in another direction starts off into curvilinear motion. In order to distinguish the specific action of understanding from the force which is intermixed with it, it is necessary to regard the erroneous judgment as the diagonal between two forces—forces which determine the judgment in different directions that enclose, as it were, an angle—and to resolve this composite action into the simple actions of the understanding and of the sensibility. In the case of pure *a priori* judgments this is a task which falls to be discharged by transcendental reflection, through which, as we have already shown, every representation is assigned its place in the corresponding faculty of knowledge, and by which the influence of the one upon the other is therefore likewise distinguished.

We are not here concerned with empirical (e.g. optical) illusion, which occurs in the empirical employment of rules of understanding that are otherwise correct, and through which the faculty of judgment is misled by the influence of imagination; we are concerned only with *transcendental illusion*, which exerts its influence on principles that are in no wise intended for use in experience, in which case we should at least have had a criterion of their correctness. In defiance of all the warnings of criticism, it carries us altogether beyond the empirical employment of categories and puts us off with a merely deceptive extension of *pure understanding*. We shall entitle the principles whose application is confined entirely within the limits of possible

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*Sensibility, when subordinated to understanding, as the object upon which the latter exercises its function, is the source of real modes of knowledge. But the same sensibility, in so far as it influences the operation of understanding, and determines it to make judgments, is the ground of error.*

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standes besteht aber das Formale aller Wahrheit. In den Sinnen ist gar kein Urteil, weder ein wahres, noch falsches. Weil wir nun außer diesen beiden Erkenntnisquellen keine andere haben, so folgt: daß der Irrtum nur durch den unbe- merkten Einfluß der Sinnlichkeit auf den Verstand bewirkt werde, wodurch es geschieht, daß die subjektiven Gründe des Urteils mit den objektiven zusammenziehen, und diese von ihrer Bestimmung abweichend machen, so wie ein be- wegter Körper zwar für sich jederzeit die gerade Linie in derselben Richtung halten würde, die aber, wenn eine an- dere Kraft nach einer andern Richtung zugleich auf ihn ein- fließt, in krummlinige Bewegung ausschlägt. Um die eigen- tümliche Handlung des Verstandes von der Kraft, die sich mit einmengt, zu unterscheiden, wird es daher nötig sein, das irrige Urteil als die Diagonale zwischen zwei Kräften anzusehen, die das Urteil nach zwei verschiedenen Rich- tungen bestimmen, die gleichsam einen Winkel einschließen, und jene zusammengesetzte Wirkung in die einfache des Verstandes und der Sinnlichkeit aufzulösen, welches in rei- nen Urteilen a priori durch transcendente Überlegung geschehen muß, wodurch (wie schon angezeigt worden) jeder Vorstellung ihre Stelle in der ihr angemessen Erkenntnis- kraft angewiesen, mithin auch der Einfluß der letzteren auf jene unterschieden wird.

Unser Geschäfte ist hier nicht, vom empirischen Scheine (z. B. dem optischen) zu handeln, der sich bei dem empirischen Gebrauche sonst richtiger Verstandesregeln vorfindet, und durch welchen die Urteilskraft, durch den Einfluß der Einbildung verleitet wird. sondern wir haben es mit dem tran- szendenten Scheine allein zu tun, der auf Grundsät- zung einfließt, deren Gebrauch nicht einmal auf Erfahrung angelegt ist, als in welchem Falle wir doch wenigstens einen Proberstein ihrer Richtigkeit haben würden, sondern der uns selbst, wider alle Warungen der Kritik, gänzlich über dem empirischen Gebrauch der Kategorien wegführt und uns mit der Blendwerke einer Erweiterung des reinen Verstandes hält. Wir wollen die Grundsätze, deren Anwendung sich ganz und gar in den Schranken möglicher Erfahrung hält, im manente, diejenigen aber, welche diese
experience, immanent; and those, on the other hand, which profess to pass beyond these limits, transcendent. In the case of these latter, I am not referring to the transcendental employment or misemployment of the categories, which is merely an error of the faculty of judgment when it is not duly curbed by criticism, and therefore does not pay sufficient attention to the bounds of the territory within which alone free play is allowed to pure understanding. I mean actual principles which incite us to tear down all those boundary-fences and to seize possession of an entirely new domain which recognises no limits of demarcation. Thus transcendental and transcendent are not interchangeable terms. The principles of pure understanding, which we have set out above, allow only of empirical and not of transcendental employment, that is, employment extending beyond the limits of experience. A principle, on the other hand, which takes away these limits, or even commands us actually to transgress them, is called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in disclosing the illusion in these alleged principles, then those principles which are of merely empirical employment may be called, in opposition to the others, immanent principles of pure understanding.

Logical illusion, which consists in the mere imitation of the form of reason (the illusion of formal fallacies), arises entirely from lack of attention to the logical rule. As soon as attention is brought to bear on the case that is before us, the illusion completely disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the other hand, does not cease even after it has been detected and its invalidity clearly revealed by transcendental criticism (e.g. the illusion in the proposition: the world must have a beginning in time). The cause of this is that there are fundamental rules and maxims for the employment of our reason (subjectively regarded as a faculty of human knowledge), and that these have all the appearance of being objective principles. We therefore take the subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts, which is to the advantage of the understanding, for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves. This is an illusion which can no more be prevented than we can prevent the sea appearing higher at the horizon than at the shore, since we see it through higher light rays; or to cite a still better example,
than the astronomer can prevent the moon from appearing larger at its rising, although he is not deceived by this illusion.

The transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the illusion of transcendent judgments, and at the same time taking precautions that we be not deceived by it. That the illusion should, like logical illusion, actually disappear and cease to be an illusion, is something which transcendental dialectic can never be in a position to achieve. For here we have to do with a natural and inevitable illusion, which rests on subjective principles, and foists them upon us as objective; whereas logical dialectic in its exposure of deceptive inferences has to do merely with an error in the following out of principles, or with an illusion artificially created in imitation of such inferences. There exists, then, a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason—not one in which a bungler might entangle himself through lack of knowledge, or one which some sophist has artificially invented to confuse thinking people, but one inseparable from human reason, and which, even after its deceptiveness has been exposed, will not cease to play tricks with reason and continually entrap it into momentary aberrations ever again calling for correction.

II

PURE REASON AS THE SEAT OF TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION

A

Reason in general

All our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuitions and bringing it under the highest unity of thought. Now that I have to give an explanation of this highest faculty of knowledge, I find myself in some difficulty. Reason, like understanding, can be employed in a merely formal, that is, logical manner, wherein it abstracts from all content of knowledge. But it is also capable of a real use, since it contains within itself the source of certain concepts and principles,

mehr, so wenig selbst der Astronom verhindern kann, daß ihm der Mond im Aufgange nicht größer scheinet, ob er gleich durch diesen Schein nicht betrogen wird.

Die transzendente Dialektik wird also sich damit beugen, den Schein transzendenter Urteile aufzudecken, und zugleich zu verhüten, daß er nicht betriebe; daß er aber auch (wie der logische Schein) sogar verschwirte, und ein Schein zu sein aufhöre, das kann sie niemals bekräftigen. Denn wir haben es mit einer natürlichen und unvermeidlichen Illusion zu tun, die selbst auf subjektiven Grundsätzen beruht, und sie als objektive unterscheidet, anstatt daß die logische Dialektik in Auflösung der Trugschlüsse es nur mit einem Fehler in Befolgung der Grundsätze, oder mit einem gekünstelten Scheine, in Nachahmung derselben, zu tun hat. Es gibt also eine natürliche und unvermeidliche Dialektik der reinen Vernunft, nicht eine, in die sich etwa ein Stümper, durch Mangel an Kenntnissen, selbst verwickelt, oder die irgend ein Sophist, um vernünftige Leute zu verwirren, künstlich eronnen hat, sondern die der menschlichen Vernunft unhinterzüglich anhängt, und selbst, nachdem wir ihr Blendwerk aufgedeckt haben, dennoch nicht aufhören wird, ihr vorzugeben, und sie unablängig in augenblickliche Verirrungen zu stoßen, die jederzeit gehoben zu werden bedürfen.

II. VON DER REINERN VERNUNFT ALS DEM SITZE DES TRANSCENDENTALEN SCHEINS

A. VON DER VERUNFT ÜBERHAUPT

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

which it does not borrow either from the senses or from the understanding. The former faculty has long since been defined by logicians as the faculty of making mediate inferences (in distinction from immediate inferences, consequentis immediatis); but the nature of the other faculty, which itself gives birth to concepts, is not to be understood from this definition. Now since we are here presented with a division of reason into a logical and a transcendental faculty, we are constrained to seek for a higher concept of this source of knowledge which includes both concepts as subordinate to itself. Following the analogy of concepts of understanding, we may expect that the logical concept will provide the key to the transcendental, and that the table of the functions of the former will at once give us the genealogical tree of the concepts of reason.

In the first part of our transcendental logic we treated the understanding as being the faculty of rules; reason we shall here distinguish from understanding by entitling it the faculty of principles.

The term 'principle' is ambiguous, and commonly signifies any knowledge which can be used as a principle, although in itself, and as regards its proper origin, it is no principle. Every universal proposition, even one derived from experience, through induction, can serve as major premiss in a syllogism; but it is not therefore itself a principle. The mathematical axioms (e.g. that there can only be one straight line between two points) are instances of universal a priori knowledge, and are therefore rightly called principles, relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot therefore say that I apprehend this property of straight lines in general and in itself, from principles; I apprehend it only in pure intuition.

Knowledge from principles is, therefore, that knowledge alone in which I apprehend the particular in the universal through concepts. Thus every syllogism is a mode of deducing knowledge from a principle. For the major premiss always gives a concept through which everything that is subsumed under the concept as under a condition is known from the concept according to a principle. Now since any universal knowledge can serve as major premiss in a syllogism, and since the understanding presents us with universal a priori propositions

VON DER VERUNFT OBERHAUPT

die sie weder von den Sinnen, noch vom Verstande entlehnt. Das erstere Vermögen ist nun freilich vorläufig ein Logikon durch das Vermögen mittelbar zu schließen (zum Unterschiede von den unmittelbaren Schlüssen, consequentis immediatis) erklärt worden; das zweite aber, welches selbst Begriffe erzeugt, wird dadurch noch nicht eingeschlossen. Da nun hier eine Eintheilung der Vernunft in ein logisches und | transcendentes Vermögen vorkommt, so muß ein höherer Begriff von dieser Erkenntnisquelle gesucht werden, welcher beide Begriffe unter sich befaßt, indessen wir nach der Analogie mit den Verstandesbegriffen erwarten können, daß der logische Begriff zugleich den Schlüssel zum transcendentalen, und die Tafel der Funktionen der ersteren zugleich die Stammleiter der Vernunftbegriffe an die Hand geben werde.

Wir erklärten, im erstem Teile unserer transcendentalen Logik, den Verstand durch das Vermögen der Regeln, hier unterscheiden wir die Vernunft von demselben dadurch, daß wir sie das Vermögen der Prinzipien nennen wollen.

| Der Ausdruck eines Prinzips ist zweideutig, und bedeutet gemeinhin nur ein Erkenntnis, das als Prinzip gebraucht werden kann, ob es zwar an sich selbst und seinem eigenen Ursprunge nach kein Principium ist. Ein jeder allgemeiner Satz, er mag auch sogar aus Erfahrung (durch Induktion) hergekommen sein, kann zurn Obersatz in einem Vernunftschlusse dienen; er ist darum aber nicht selbst ein Principium. Die mathematischen Axiomen (z. B. zwischen zwei Punkten kann nur eine gerade Linie sein) sind sogar allgemeine Erkenntnisse a priori, und werden daher mit Recht, relativisch auf die Fälle, die unter ihnen subsumiert werden können, Prinzipien genannt. Aber ich kann darum doch nicht sagen, daß ich diese Eigenschaft der geraden Linien, überhaupt und an sich, aus Prinzipien erkenne, sondern nur in der reinen Anschnauung.

Ich würde daher Erkenntnis aus Prinzipien diejenigen nennen, da ich das Besondere im Allgemeinen durch Begriffe erkenne. So ist denn ein jeder Vernunftschluß eine Form der Ableitung einer Erkenntnis aus einem Prinzip. Denn der Obersatz gibt jederzeit einen Begriff, der da macht, daß alles, was unter der Bedingung desselben subsumiert wird, aus ihm nach einem Prinzip erkannt wird. Da nun jede allgemeine Erkenntnis zum Obersatze in einem Vernunftschlusse dienen kann, und der Verstand dergleichen allgemeine Sätze a priori darbietet,
of this kind, they can also be called principles in respect of their possible employment.

But if we consider them in themselves in relation to their origin, these fundamental propositions of pure understanding are anything rather than knowledge based on concepts. For they would not even be possible *a priori*, if we were not supported by pure intuition (in mathematics), or by conditions of a possible experience in general. That everything that happens has a cause cannot be inferred merely from the concept of happening in general; on the contrary, it is this fundamental proposition which shows how in regard to that which happens we are in a position to obtain in experience any concept whatsoever that is really determinate.

The understanding can, then, never supply any synthetic modes of knowledge derived from concepts; and it is such modes of knowledge that are properly, without qualification, to be entitled ‘principles’. All universal propositions, however, may be spoken of as ‘principles’ in a comparative sense.

It has long been wished—and perhaps sometimes (who knows when?) may be fulfilled—that instead of the endless multiplicity of civil laws we should be able to fall back on their general principles. For it is in these alone that we can hope to find the secret of what we are wont to call the simplifying of legislation. In this domain, however, the laws are only limitations imposed upon our freedom in order that such freedom may completely harmonise with itself; hence they are directed to something which is entirely our own work, and of which we ourselves, through these concepts, can be the cause. But that objects in themselves, the very nature of things, should stand under principles, and should be determined according to mere concepts, is a demand which, if not impossible, is at least quite contrary to common sense. But however that may be (it is a question which we still have to discuss), it is now at least evident that knowledge derived from principles which are genuinely such is something quite different from knowledge obtained merely through the understanding. The latter may, indeed, also take the form of a principle, and thus be prior to some other knowledge, but in itself, in so far as it is syn-

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1 [schlechthin.]
2 [sehr Widersinnliches.]
thetic, it does not depend on thought alone, nor contain in itself a universal obtained from concepts.

Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles. Accordingly, reason never applies itself directly to experience or to any object, but to understanding, in order to give to the manifold knowledge of the latter an a priori unity by means of concepts, a unity which may be called the unity of reason, and which is quite different in kind from any unity that can be accomplished by the understanding.

This is the universal concept of the faculty of reason in so far as it has been possible to make it clear in the total absence of examples. These will be given in the course of our argument.

\[ \text{B} \]

The Logical Employment of Reason

A distinction is commonly made between what is immediately known and what is merely inferred. That in a figure which is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles, is known immediately; but that the sum of these angles is equal to two right angles, is merely inferred. Since we have constantly to make use of inference, and so end by becoming completely accusmomed to it, we no longer take notice of this distinction, and frequently, as in the so-called deceptions of the senses, treat as being immediately perceived what has really only been inferred. In every process of reasoning there is a fundamental proposition, and another, namely the conclusion, which is drawn from it, and finally, the inference (logical sequence) by which the truth of the latter is inseparably connected with the truth of the former. If the inferred judgment is already so contained in the earlier judgment that it may be derived from it without the mediation of a third representation, the inference is called immediate (consequentia immediata)—I should prefer to entitle it inference of the understanding. But if besides the knowledge contained in the primary proposition still another judg-

\[ \text{A} \] 303

\[ \text{B} \] 359

\[ \text{B} \] 360

\[ \text{B} \] Zusatz von B.
ment is needed to yield the conclusion, it is to be entitled an inference of the reason. In the proposition: "All men are mortal", there are already contained the propositions: "some men are mortal", "some mortal beings are men", "nothing that is not mortal is a man"; and these are therefore immediate conclusions from it. On the other hand, the proposition: "All learned beings are mortal", is not contained in the fundamental judgment (for the concept of learned beings does not occur in it at all), and it can only be inferred from it by means of a mediating judgment.

In every syllogism I first think a rule (the major premis) through the understanding. Secondly, I subsume something known under the condition of the rule by means of judgment (the minor premis). Finally, what is thereby known I determine through the predicate of the rule, and so a priori through reason (the conclusion). The relation, therefore, which the major premis, as the rule, represents between what is known and its condition is the ground of the different kinds of syllogism. Consequently, syllogisms, like judgments, are of three kinds, according to the different ways in which, in the understanding, they express the relation of what is known; they are either categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive.

If, as generally happens, the judgment that forms the conclusion is set as a problem—to see whether it does not follow from judgments already given, and through which a quite different object is thought—I look in the understanding for the assertion of this conclusion, to discover whether it is not there found to stand under certain conditions according to a universal rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object of the conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, then the conclusion is deduced from the rule, which is also valid for other objects of knowledge. From this we see that in inference reason endeavours to reduce the varied and manifold knowledge obtained through the understanding to the smallest number of principles (universal conditions) and thereby to achieve in it the highest possible unity.

1 [Vernunftschluss, here distinguished from Verstandesschluss, is Kant's usual term for 'syllogism', and is so translated in other passages as, e.g., in the next paragraph.]

8 [Urteilskraft]

8 [des Erkenntnisses.]
The Pure Employment of Reason

Can we isolate reason, and is it, so regarded, an independent source of concepts and judgments which spring from it alone, and by means of which it relates to objects; or is it a merely subordinate faculty, for imposing on given modes of knowledge a certain form, called logical—a faculty through which what is known by means of the understanding is determined in its interrelations, lower rules being brought under higher (namely, those the condition of which includes in its own sphere the condition of the lower), as far as this can be done through [processes of] comparison? This is the question with which we are now provisionally occupying ourselves. As a matter of fact, multiplicity of rules and unity of principles is a demand of reason, for the purpose of bringing the understanding into thoroughgoing accordance with itself, just as the understanding brings the manifold of intuition under concepts and thereby connects the manifold. But such a principle does not prescribe any law for objects, and does not contain any general ground of the possibility of knowing or of determining objects as such; it is merely a subjective law for the orderly management of the possessions of our understanding, that by comparison of its concepts it may reduce them to the smallest possible number; it does not justify us in demanding from the objects such uniformity as will minister to the convenience and extension of our understanding; and we may not, therefore, ascribe to the maxim any objective validity. In a word, the question is, does reason in itself, that is, does pure reason, contain \textit{a priori} synthetic principles and rules, and in what may these principles consist?

The formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives us sufficient guidance as to the ground on which the transcendental principle of pure reason in its synthetic knowledge will rest.

In the first place, reason in the syllogism does not concern itself with intuitions, with a view to bringing them under rules (as the understanding does with its categories), but with con-

\[1 \text{[Reading, with Erdmann, \textit{jens for jens.}]}\]
cepts and judgments. Accordingly, even if pure reason does concern itself with objects, it has no immediate relation to these and the intuitions of them, but only to the understanding and its judgments—which deal at first hand with the senses and their intuitions for the purpose of determining their object. The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from such unity, which is that of understanding. That everything which happens has a cause, is not a principle known and prescribed by reason. That principle makes the unity of experience possible, and borrows nothing from reason, which, apart from this relation to possible experience, could never, from mere concepts, have imposed any such synthetic unity.

Secondly, reason, in its logical employment, seeks to discover the universal condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and the syllogism is itself nothing but a judgment made by means of the subsumption of its condition under a universal rule (the major premiss). Now since this rule is itself subject to the same requirement of reason, and the condition of the condition must therefore be sought (by means of a prosthologism) whenever practicable, obviously the principle peculiar to reason in general, in its logical employment, is:—to find for the conditioned knowledge obtained through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion.

But this logical maxim can only become a principle of pure reason through our assuming that if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another—a series which is therefore itself unconditioned—is likewise given, that is, is contained in the object and its connection.

Such a principle of pure reason is obviously synthetic; the conditioned is analytically related to some condition but not to the unconditioned. From the principle there must also follow various synthetic propositions, of which pure understanding—inasmuch as it has to deal only with objects of a possible experience, the knowledge and synthesis of which is always conditioned—knows nothing. The unconditioned, if its actuality be granted, is especially to be considered in respect of all the determinations which distinguish it from whatever

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1. [Reading, with 4th edition, wird for kann.]

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**Transzendentale Dialektik**

teile. Wenn also reine Vernunft auch auf Gegenstände geht, so hat sie doch auf diese 1 und deren Anschauung keine unmittelbare Beziehung, sondern nur auf den Verstand und dessen Urteile, welche sich zunächst an die Sinne und deren Anschauung wenden, um diesen ihren Gegenstand zu bestimmen. Vernunftseinheit ist also nicht Einheit einer möglichen Erfahrung, sondern von dieser, als der Verstandseinheit, wesentlich unterschieden. Daß alles, was geschieht, eine Ursache habe, ist gar kein durch Vernunft erkannter und vorgeschriebener Grundsatz. Er macht die Einheit der Erfahrung möglich und entlehnt nichts von der Vernunft, welche, ohne diese Beziehung auf mögliche Erfahrung, aus bloßen Begriffen keine solche synthetische Einheit hätte gebieten können.

Zweitens sucht die Vernunft in ihrem logischen Gebrauche die allgemeine Bedingung ihres Urteils (des Schlußsatzes), und der Vernunftschluß ist selbst nichts andres als ein Urteil, vermittelt der Subsumtion seiner Bedingung unter eine allgemeine Regel (Obersatz). Da nun diese Regel wiederum eben demselben Versuch der Vernunft ausgesetzt ist, und dadurch die Bedingung der Bedingung (vermittels eines Prostholismus) gesucht werden muß, so lange es angeht, so sieht man wohl, der eigentümliche Grundsatz der Vernunft überhaupt (im logischen Gebrauche) sei: zu dem bedingten Erkenntnisse des Verstandes das Unbedingte zu finden, womit die Einheit desselben vollendet wird.

Diese logische Maxime kann aber nicht anders ein Principium der reinen Vernunft werden, als dadurch, daß man annimmt: wenn das Bedingte gegeben ist, so sei auch die ganze Reihe einander untergeordneter Bedingungen, die mithin selbst unbedingt ist, gegeben (d. i. in dem Gegenstande und seiner Verknüpfung enthalten).

Ein solcher Grundsatz der reinen Vernunft ist aber offenbar synthetisch; denn das Bedingte bezieht sich analytisch zwar auf irgende eine Bedingung, aber nicht aufs Unbedingte. Es müssen aus demselben auch verschiedene synthetische Sätze entspringen, wovon der reine Verstand nichts weiß, als der nur mit Gegenständen einer möglichen Erfahrung zu tun hat, deren Erkenntnis und Synthesis jederzeit bedingt ist. Das Unbedingte aber, wenn es wirklich Statt hat, kann besonders erwogen werden, nach allen den Bestimmungen, die es von jedem Bedingten unterscheiden,
is conditioned, and thereby must yield material for many synthetic a priori propositions.

The principles\(^1\) arising from this supreme principle\(^2\) of pure reason will, however, be transcendental in relation to all appearances, i.e. there can never be any adequate empirical employment of the principle. It will therefore be entirely different from all principles of understanding, the employment of which is wholly immanent, inasmuch as they have as their theme\(^3\) only the possibility of experience. Take the principle, that the series of conditions (whether in the synthesis of appearances, or even in the thinking of things in general) extends to the unconditioned. Does it, or does it not, have objective applicability? What are its implications as regards the empirical employment of understanding? Or is there no such objectively valid principle of reason, but only a logical precept, to advance towards completeness by an ascent to ever higher conditions and so to give to our knowledge the greatest possible unity of reason? Can it be that this requirement of reason has been wrongly treated in being viewed as a transcendental principle of pure reason, and that we have been overhasty in postulating such an unbounded completeness of the series of conditions in the objects themselves? In that case, what other misunderstandings and delusions may have crept into the syllogisms, whose major premises (perhaps rather an assumption than a postulate) is derived from pure reason, and which proceed from experience upwards to its conditions? To answer these questions will be our task in the Transcendental Dialectic, which we shall now endeavour to develop from its deeply concealed sources in human reason. We shall divide the Dialectic into two books, the first on the transcendental concepts of pure reason, the second on its transcendental and dialectical inferences:

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\(^1\) [Grundätze.] \(^2\) [Prinzip.] \(^3\) [zu ihrem Thema.]

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**Von den Begriffen der reinen Vernunft**

and must dadurch Stoff zu manchen synthetischen Sätzen a priori geben.

Die aus diesem obersten Prinzip der reinen Vernunft entspringende Grundsätze werden aber in Ansehung aller Er- scheinungen transzendent sein, d. i. es wird kein ihm adäquater empirischer Gebrauch von demselben jemals gemacht werden können. Er wird sich also von allen Grund- sätzen des Verstandes (deren Gebrauch völlig immanent ist, indem sie nur die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung zu ihrem Thema haben) gänzlich unterscheiden. Ob nun jener Grundsatz: daß sich die Reihe der Bedingungen (in der Synthesis der Er- scheinungen, oder auch des Denkens der Dinge überhaupt) bis zum Unbedingten erstrecke, seine objektive Richtigkeit habe, oder nicht; welche Folgerungen daraus auf den empirischen Verstandesgebrauch fließen, oder ob es vielmehr überall keinen dergleichen objektivgültigen Vernunftssatz gebe, sondern eine bloß logische Vorschrift, sich, im Aufsteigen zu immer höheren Bedingungen, der Vollständigkeit derselben zu nähern und dadurch die höchste uns mögliche Vernunfteinhheit in unsere Erkenntnis zu bringen; ob, sagt ich, dieses Bedürfnis der Vernunft durch einen Mißverstand für einen transcendentalen Grundsatz der reinen Vernunft gehalten worden, der eine solche unbeschränkte Vollständigkeit überreiter Weise von der Reihe der Bedingungen in den Gegenständen selbst postuliert; was aber auch in diesem Falle für Mißdeutungen und Verblendungen in die Vernunft- schlüsse, deren Obersatz aus reiner Vernunft genommen worden (und der vielleicht mehr Petition als Postulat ist), und die von der Erfahrung aufwärts zu ihren Bedingungen steigen, einschließen mögen: das wird unser Geschäfte in der transcendentalen Dialektik sein, welche wir jetzt aus ihren Quellen, die tief in der menschlichen Vernunft ver- borgen sind, entwickeln wollen. Wir werden sie in zwei Hauptstücke teilen, deren ersteres\(^1\) von den transzenden- ten Begriffen der reinen Vernunft, das zweite\(^2\) von transzenden- ten und dialektischen Vernunftsschlüssen derselben handeln soll.

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\(^1\) A: ersteres.  
\(^2\) A: oder zweites.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

BOOK I

THE CONCEPTS OF PURE REASON

Whatever we may have to decide as to the possibility of the concepts derived from pure reason, it is at least true that they are not to be obtained by mere reflection but only by inference. Concepts of understanding are also thought a priori antecedently to experience and for the sake of experience, but they contain nothing more than the unity of reflection upon appearances, in so far as these appearances must necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness. Through them alone is knowledge and the determination of an object possible. They first provide the material required for making inferences, and they are not preceded by any a priori concepts of objects from which they could be inferred. On the other hand, their objective reality is founded solely on the fact that, since they constitute the intellectual form of all experience, it must always be possible to show their application in experience.

The title 'concept of reason' already gives a preliminary indication that we are dealing with something which does not allow of being confined within experience, since it concerns a knowledge of which any empirical knowledge (perhaps even the whole of possible experience or of its empirical synthesis) is only a part. No actual experience has ever been completely adequate to it, yet to it every actual experience belongs. Concepts of reason enable us to conceive, concepts of understanding to understand—in (as employed in reference to) perceptions. If the concepts of reason contain the unconditioned, they are concerned with something to which all experience is subor-

DER TRANSCENDENTALEN DIALEKTIK

ERSTES BUCH

VON DEN BEGRIFFEN DER REINEN VERNUNFT

Was es auch mit der Möglichkeit der Begriffe aus reiner Vernunft für eine Bewandtnis haben mag; so sind sie doch nicht bloß reflektierte, sondern geschlossene Begriffe. Verstandesbegriffe werden auch a priori vor der Erfahrung und zum Behuf derselben gedacht; aber sie enthalten nichts weiter, als die Einheit der Reflexion über die Erscheinungen, in so fern sie notwendig zu einem möglichen empirischen Bewusstein gehören sollen. Durch sie allein wird Erkenntnis und Bestimmung eines Gegenstandes möglich. Sie geben also zuerst Stoff zum Schließen, und vor ihnen gehen keine Begriffe a priori von Gegenständen vorher, aus denen sie könnten geschlossen werden. Dagegen gründet sich ihre objektive Realität doch lediglich darauf: daß, weil sie die intellektuelle Form aller Erfahrung ausmachen, ihre Anwendung jederzeit in der Erfahrung muß gezeigt werden können.

Die Benennung eines Vernunftbegriffs aber zeigt schon vorläufig: daß er sich nicht innerhalb der Erfahrung wolle beschränken lassen, weil er eine Erkenntnis betrifft, von der jede empirische nur ein Teil ist (vielleicht das Ganze der möglichen Erfahrung oder ihrer empirischen Synthese), bis dahin zwar keine wirkliche Erfahrung je also völlig zureicht, aber doch jederzeit dazu gehörig ist. Vernunftbegriffe dienen zum Begreifen, wie Verstandesbegriffe zum Verstehen (der Wahrnehmungen). Wenn sie das Unbedingte enthalten, so betreffen sie etwas, worunter alle Erfahrung
dinate, but which is never itself an object of experience—something to which reason leads in its inferences from experience, and in accordance with which it estimates and gauges the degree of its empirical employment, but which is never itself a member of the empirical synthesis. If, none the less, these concepts possess objective validity, they may be called conceptus ratiocinati (rightly inferred concepts); if, however, they have no such validity, they have surreptitiously obtained recognition through having at least an illusory appearance of being inferences, and may be called conceptus ratiocinantis (pseudo-rational concepts). But since this can be established only in the chapter on the dialectical inferences of pure reason, we are not yet in a position to deal with it. Meantime, just as we have entitled the pure concepts of understanding categories, so we shall give a new name to the concepts of pure reason, calling them transcendental ideas. This title we shall now explain and justify.

FIRST BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL
DIALECTIC

THE IDEAS IN GENERAL

Despite the great wealth of our languages, the thinker often finds himself at a loss for the expression which exactly fits his concept, and for want of which he is unable to be really intelligible to others or even to himself. To coin new words is to advance a claim to legislation in language that seldom succeeds; and before we have recourse to this desperate expedient it is advisable to look about in a dead and learned language, to see whether the concept and its appropriate expression are not already there provided. Even if the old-time usage of a term should have become somewhat uncertain through the carelessness of those who introduced it, it is always better to hold fast to the meaning which distinctively belongs to it (even though it remain doubtful whether it was originally used in precisely this sense) than to defeat our purpose by making ourselves unintelligible.
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

For this reason, if there be only a single word the established meaning of which exactly agrees with a certain concept, then, since it is of great importance that this concept be distinguished from related concepts, it is advisable to economise in the use of the word and not to employ it, merely for the sake of variety, as a synonym for some other expression, but carefully to keep to its own proper meaning. Otherwise it may easily happen that the expression ceasing to engage the attention in one specific sense, and being lost in the multitude of other words of very different meaning, the thought also is lost which it alone could have preserved.

Plato made use of the expression ‘idea’ in such a way as quite evidently to have meant by it something which not only can never be borrowed from the senses but far surpasses even the concepts of understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself), inasmuch as in experience nothing is ever to be met with that is coincident with it. For Plato ideas are archetype of the things themselves, and not, in the manner of the categories, merely keys to possible experiences. In his view they have issued from highest reason, and from that source have come to be shared in by human reason, which, however, is now no longer in its original state, but is constrained laboriously to recall, by a process of reminiscence (which is named philosophy), the old ideas, now very much obscured. I shall not engage here in any literary enquiry into the meaning which this illustrious philosopher attached to the expression. I need only remark that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention.

Plato very well realised that our faculty of knowledge feels a much higher need than merely to spell out appearances according to a synthetic unity, in order to be able to read them as experience. He knew that our reason naturally exalts itself to modes of knowledge which so far transcend the bounds of experience that no given empirical object can ever coincide

*damit Kongruierendes.*

* Kongruieren.

TRANZENTDENTALE DIALEKTIK

Um deswillen, wenn sich etwa zu einem gewissen Begriffe nur ein einziges Wort vorfand, das in schon eingeführter Bedeutung diesem Begriffe genau anpaßt, dessen Unterscheidung von andern verwandten Begriffen von großer Wichtigkeit ist, so ist es ratsam, damit nicht verschwendemisch umzugehen, oder es bloß zur Abwechslung, synonymisch, statt anderer zu gebrauchen, sondern ihm seine eigentümliche Bedeutung sorgfältig aufzubehalten; weil es sonst leichtlich geschieht, daß, nachdem der Ausdruck die Aufmerksamkeit nicht besonders beschäftigt, sondern sich unter dem Haufen anderer von sehr abweichender Bedeutung verliert, auch der Gedanke verloren gehe, den er allein hätte aufbehalten können.

Plato bediente sich des Ausdrucks Idee so, daß man wohl sieht, er habe darunter etwas verstanden, was nicht allein niemals von den Sinnen entlehnt wird, sondern welches so gar die Begriffe des Verstandes, mit denen sich Aristoteles beschäftigte, weit übersteigt, indem in der Erfahrung niemals etwas damit Kongruierendes angetroffen wird. Die Ideen sind bei ihm Urbilder der Dinge selbst, und nicht bloß Schlüssel zu möglichen Erfahrungen, wie die Kategorien. Nach seiner Meinung flossen sie aus der höchsten Vernunft aus, von da sie der menschlichen zu Teil geworden, die sich aber jetzt nicht mehr in ihrem ursprünglichen Zustande befindet, sondern mit Mühle die alten, jetzt sehr verdunkelten, Ideen durch Erinnerung (die Philosophie heißt) zurückrufen muß. Ich will mich hier in keine literarische Untersuchung einlassen, um den Sinn auszumachen, der der erhabene Philosoph mit seinem Ausdrucke verband. Ich merke nur an, daß es gar nichts Ungewöhnliches sei, sowohl im gemeinen Gespräche, als in Schriften, durch die Vergleichung der Gedanken, welche ein Verfasser über seinen Gegenstand äußert, ihn so gar besser zu verstehen, als er sich selbst verstand, indem er seinen Begriff nicht genugsam bestimmte, und dadurch bisweilen seiner eigenen Absicht entgegen redete, oder auch dachte.

Plato bemerkte sehr wohl, daß unsere Erkenntniskraft ein weit höheres Bedürfnis fände, als bloß Erscheinungen nachsynthetischer Einheit buchstabieren, um sie als Erfahrung lesen zu können, und daß unsere Vernunft natürlicher Weise sich zu Erkenntnissen aufschwingen, die viel weiter gehen, als daß irgend ein Gegenstand, den Erfahrung geben kann, jemals mit
IDEAS IN GENERAL

with them, but which must none the less be recognised as having their own reality, and which are by no means mere fictions of the brain.

Plato found the chief instances of his ideas in the field of the practical, that is, in what rests upon freedom, which in its turn rests upon modes of knowledge that are a peculiar product of reason. Whoever would derive the concepts of virtue from experience and make (as many have actually done) what at best can only serve as an example in an imperfect kind of exposition, into a pattern from which to derive knowledge, would make of virtue something which changes according to time and circumstance, an ambiguous monstrosity not admitting of the formation of any rule. On the contrary, as we are well aware, if anyone is held up as a pattern of virtue, the true original with which we compare the alleged pattern and by which alone we judge of its value is to be found only in our minds. This original is the idea of virtue, in respect of which the possible objects of experience may serve as examples (proofs that the concept of reason commands is in a certain degree practicable), but not as archetype. That no one of us will ever act in a way which is adequate to what is contained in the pure idea of virtue is far from proving this thought to be in any respect chimerical. For it is only by means of this idea that any judgment as to moral worth or its opposite is possible; and it therefore serves as an indispensable foundation for every approach to moral perfection—however the obstacles in human nature, to the degree of which there are no assignable limits, may keep us far removed from its complete achievement.

The Republic of Plato has become proverbial as a striking example of a supposedly visionary perfection, such as can exist

A 315

* He also, indeed, extended his concept so as to cover speculative knowledge, provided only the latter was pure and given completely a priori. He even extended it to mathematics, although the object of that science is to be found nowhere except in possible experience. In this I cannot follow him, any more than in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or in the extravagances whereby he, so to speak, hypothetised them—although, as must be allowed, the exalted language, which he employed in this sphere, is quite capable of a milder interpretation that accords with the nature of things.

B 372

VON DEN IDEEN ÜBERHaupt

ihnen kongruieren könne, die aber nichtsdestoweniger ihre Realität haben und keineswegs bloße Hirnspinsse sein*.

Plato fand seine Ideen vorzüglich in allem was praktisch ist,* d. i. auf Freiheit beruht, welche ihrerseits | unter Erkenntnissen steht, die ein eigentümliches Produkt der Vernunft sind: Wer die Begriffe der Tugend aus Erfahrung schöpfte wollte, der das, was nur allenfalls als Beispiel zur unvollkommenen Erläuterung dienen kann, als Muster zum Erkenntnisquell machen wollte (wie es wirklich viele getan haben), der würde aus der Tugend ein nach Zeit und Umständen wandelbares, zu keiner Regel brauchbares zweiseitiges Unding machen. Dagegen wird ein jeder inne, daß, wenn ihm jemand | als Muster der Tugend vorgestellt wird, er doch immer das wahre Original bloß in seinem eigenen Kopfe habe, womit er dieses angebliche Muster vergleicht, und es bloß daran schätzt. Dieses ist aber die Idee der Tugend, in Ansehung deren alle möglichen Gegenstände der Erfahrung zwar als Beispiele (Beweise der Tunlichkeit dessen im gewissen Grade, was der Begriff der Vernunft heischt), aber nicht als Urbilder Dienste tun. Daß niemals ein Mensch demjenigen adäquat handeln werde, was die reine Idee der Tugend enthält, beweiset gar nicht etwas Chimärisches in diesem Gedanken. Denn es ist gleichwohl alles Urteil, über den moralischen Wert oder Unwert, nur vermittelst dieser Idee möglich; mithin liegt sie jeder Annäherung zur moralischen Vollkommenheit notwendig zum Grunde, so weit auch die ihrem Grade nach nicht zu bestimmende Hindernisse in der menschlichen Natur uns davon entfernt halten mögen.

* Die platonische Republik ist, als ein vermeintlich auffallendes Beispiel von erträumter Vollkommenheit, die

A 316

* Er dehnte seinen Begriff freilich auch auf spekulative Erkenntnisse aus, wenn sie nur rein und völlig a priori gegeben waren, so gar über die Mathematik, ob diese gleich ihren Gegenstand nirgend anders, als in der möglichen Erfahrung hat. Hierin kann ich ihm nun nicht folgen, so wenig als in der mythischen Deduktion dieser Ideen, oder den Überbreitungen, dadurch er sie gleichsam hypostasierte; wiewohl die hohe Sprache, deren er sich in diesem Felde bediente, einer milderen und der Natur der Dinge angemessenen Auslegung ganz wohl fähig ist.
only in the brain of the idle thinker; and Brucker\(^1\) has ridiculed the philosopher for asserting that a prince can rule well only in so far as he participates in the ideas. We should, however, be better advised to follow up this thought, and, where the great philosopher leaves us without help, to place it, through fresh efforts, in a proper light, rather than to set it aside as useless on the very sorry and harmful pretext of impracticability.

A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others—I do not speak of the greatest happiness, for this will follow of itself—is at any rate a necessary idea, which must be taken as fundamental not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws. For at the start we are required to abstract from the actually existing hindrances, which, it may be, do not arise unavoidably out of human nature, but rather are due to a quite remediable cause, the neglect of the pure ideas in the making of the laws. Nothing, indeed, can be more injurious, or more unworthy of a philosopher, than the vulgar appeal to so-called adverse experience. Such experience would never have existed at all, if at the proper time those institutions had been established in accordance with ideas, and if ideas had not been displaced by crude conceptions which, just because they have been derived from experience, have nullified all good intentions. The more legislation and government are brought into harmony with the above idea, the rarer would punishments become, and it is therefore quite rational to maintain, as Plato does, that in a perfect state no punishments whatsoever would be required. This perfect state may never, indeed, come into being; none the less this does not affect the rightfulness of the idea, which, in order to bring the legal organisation of mankind ever nearer to its greatest possible perfection, advances this maximum as an archetype. For what the highest degree may be at which mankind may have to come to a stand, and how great a gulf may still have to be left between the idea and its realisation, are questions which no one can, or ought to, answer. For the issue depends on freedom; and it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any and every specified limit.

\(^{1}\) Johann Jakob Brucker (1696–1770). The reference is probably to vol. I pp. 726-7 of his Historia Critica Philosophica (pub. 1743-4).

torious task, namely, to level the ground, and to render it sufficiently secure for moral edifices of these majestic dimensions. For this ground has been honeycombed by subterranean workings which reason, in its confident but fruitless search for hidden treasures, has carried out in all directions, and which threaten the security of the superstructures. Our present duty is to obtain insight into the transcendental employment of pure reason, its principles and ideas, that we may be in a position to determine and estimate its influence and true value. Yet, before closing these introductory remarks, I beseech those who have the interests of philosophy at heart (which is more than is the case with most people) that, if they find themselves convinced by these and the following considerations, they be careful to preserve the expression ‘idea’ in its original meaning, that it may not become one of those expressions which are commonly used to indicate any and every species of representation, in a happy-go-lucky confusion, to the consequent detriment of science. There is no lack of terms suitable for each kind of representation, that we should thus needlessly encroach upon the province of any one of them. Their serial arrangement is as follows. The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). Subordinate to it stands representation with consciousness (perception). A perception which relates solely to the subject as the modification of its state in sensation, an objective perception is knowledge (cognition). This is either intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former relates immediately to the object and is single, the latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common. The concept is either an empirical or a pure concept. The pure concept, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone (not in the pure image of sensibility), is called a notion. A concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience is an idea or concept of reason. Anyone who has familiarised himself with these distinctions must find it intolerable to hear the representation of the colour, red, called an idea. It ought not even to be called a concept of understanding, a notion.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

FIRST BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL
DIALLECTIC

Section 2

THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

The Transcendental Analytic has shown us how the mere logical form of our knowledge may in itself contain original pure a priori concepts, which represent objects prior to all experience, or, speaking more correctly, indicate the synthetic unity which alone makes possible an empirical knowledge of objects. The form of judgments (converted into a concept of the synthesis of intuitions) yielded categories which direct all employment of understanding in experience. Similarly, we may presume that the form of syllogisms, when applied to the synthetic unity of intuitions under the direction of the categories, will contain the origin of special a priori concepts, which we may call pure concepts of reason, or transcendental ideas, and which will determine according to principles how understanding is to be employed in dealing with experience in its totality.

The function of reason in its inferences consists in the universality of knowledge [which it yields] according to concepts, the syllogism being itself a judgment which is determined a priori in the whole extent of its conditions. The proposition, 'Caius is mortal', I could indeed derive from experience by means of the understanding alone. But I am in pursuit of a concept (in this case, the concept 'man') that contains the condition under which the predicate (general term for what is asserted) of this judgment is given; and after I have subsumed the predicate under this condition taken in its whole extension ('All men are mortal'), I proceed, in accordance therewith, to determine the knowledge of my object ('Caius is mortal').

Accordingly, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a

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1 [The reader will bear in mind that the German term here translated 'syllogism' is Vernunftschluss.]
2 [im Ganzen der gesamten Erfahrung].
3 [Reading, with Adickes, besteht für bestand.]
predicate to a certain object, after having first thought it in
the major premis in its whole extension under a given con-
dition. This complete quantity of the extension in relation to
such a condition is called universality (universalitas). In the
synthesis of intuitions we have corresponding to this the al-
lessness (universalitas) or totality of the conditions. The transcendent-
concept of reason is, therefore, none other than the concept of
the totality of the conditions for any given conditioned. Now
since it is the unconditioned alone which makes possible the
totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of conditions
is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of reason can
in general be explained by the concept of the unconditioned,
conceived as containing a ground of the synthesis of the con-
ditioned.

The number of pure concepts of reason will be equal to the
number of kinds of relation which the understanding repre-
sents to itself by means of the categories. We have therefore
to seek for an unconditioned, first, of the categorical synthesis
in a subject; secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of the
members of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of the
parts in a system.

There is thus precisely the same number of kinds of syl-
logism, each of which advances through prosyllogisms to the
unconditioned: first, to the subject which is never itself a pre-
dicate; secondly, to the presupposition which itself presup-
poses nothing further; thirdly, to such an aggregate of the
members of the division of a concept as requires nothing
further to complete the division. The pure concepts of reason
—of totality in the synthesis of conditions—are thus at least
necessary as setting us the task of extending the unity of
understanding, where possible, up to the unconditioned, and
are grounded in the nature of human reason. These trans-
cendent concepts may, however, be without any suitable

But while we are here speaking of the totality of con-
ditions and of the unconditioned, as being equivalent titles
for all concepts of reason, we again come upon an expression
nunfenchlusses ein Prädikat auf einen gewissen Gegenstand,
nachdem wir es vorher in dem Obersatz in seinem ganzen
Umfange unter einer gewissen Bedingung gedacht haben.
Diese vollendete Größe des Umfanges, in Beziehung auf eine
solche Bedingung, heißt die Allgemeinheit (universalitas).
Dieser entspricht in der Synthese der Anschauungen die
Allheit (universalitas) oder Totalität der Bedingungen.
Also ist der transzendentale Vernunftbegriff kein anderer,
as der von der Totalität der Bedingungen zu einem
egebenen Bedingten. Da nun das Unbedingte allein die
Totalität der Bedingungen möglich macht, und umgekehrt
die Totalität der Bedingungen jederzeit selbst unbedingt ist:
sog kann ein reiner Vernunftbegriff überhaupt durch den Be-
griß des Unbedingten, sofern er einen Grund der Synthese
des Bedingten enthält, erklärt werden.

| So viel Arten des Verhältnisses es nun gibt, die der Ver-
| stand vermittelest der Kategorien sich vorstellt, so vielerlei
| reine Vernunftbegriffe wird es auch geben, und es wird also
| erstlich ein Unbedingtes der kategorischen Synthesis
| in einem Subjekt, zweitens der hypothetischen Syn-
| thesis der Glieder einer Reihe, drittens der disjunkt-
| tiven Synthesis der Teile in einem System zu suchen sein.

| Es gibt nämlich eben so viel Arten von Vernunftschlü-
| sen, deren jede durch Prosyllogismen zum Unbedingten
| fortschreitet, die eine zum Subjekt, welches selbst nicht
| mehr Prädikat ist, die andre zur Voraussetzung, die nichts
| weiter voraussetzt, und die dritte zu einem Aggregat der
| Glieder der Einteilung, zu welchen nichts weiter erforder-
| lich ist, um die Einteilung eines Begriffs zu vollenden. Da-
| her sind die reinen Vernunftbegriffe von der Totalität in
| der Synthese der Bedingungen wenigstens als Aufgaben,
| um die Einheit des Verstandes, wo möglich, bis zum Un-
| bedingten fortzusetzen, notwendig und in der Natur der
| menschlichen Vernunft gegründet, es mag auch übrigens
| diesen transzendentalen Begriffen an einem ihnen angemess-
| senen Gebrauch in concreto fehlen, und sie mithin keinen
| andern Nutzen haben, als den Verstand in die Richtung zu
| bringen, darin sein Gebrauch, indem er aufs äußerste er-
| weitert, zugleich mit sich selbst durchgehends einstimmig
| gemacht wird.

| Indem wir aber hier von der Totalität der Bedingungen
| und dem Unbedingten, als dem gemeinschaftlichen Titel
| aller Vernunftbegriffe reden, so stoßen wir wiederum auf
THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

with which we cannot dispense, and which yet, owing to an ambiguity that attaches to it through long-standing misuse, we also cannot with safety employ. The word 'absolute' is one of the few words which in their original meaning were adapted to a concept that no other word in the same language exactly suits. Consequently its loss, or what amounts to the same thing, looseness in its employment, must carry with it the loss of the concept itself. And since, in this case, the concept is one to which reason devotes much of its attention, it cannot be relinquished without greatly harming all transcendental philosophy. The word 'absolute' is now often used merely to indicate that something is true of a thing considered in itself, and therefore of its inward nature. In this sense the absolutely possible would mean that which in itself (interne) is possible—which is, in fact, the least that can be said of an object. On the other hand, the word is also sometimes used to indicate that something is valid in all respects, without limitation, e.g. absolute despotism, and in this sense the absolutely possible would mean what is in every relation (in all respects) possible—which is the most that can be said of the possibility of a thing. Now frequently we find these two meanings combined. For example, what is internally impossible is impossible in any relation, and therefore absolutely impossible. But in most cases the two meanings are infinitely far apart, and I can in no wise conclude that because something is in itself possible, it is therefore also possible in every relation, and so absolutely possible. Indeed, as I shall subsequently show, absolute necessity is by no means always dependent on inner necessity, and must not, therefore, be treated as synonymous with it. If the opposite of something is internally impossible, this opposite is, of course, impossible in all respects, and the thing itself is therefore absolutely necessary. But I cannot reverse the reasoning so as to conclude that if something is absolutely necessary its opposite is internally impossible, i.e. that the absolute necessity of things is an inner necessity. For this inner necessity is in certain cases a quite empty expression to which we cannot attach any concept whatsoever, whereas the concept of the necessity of a thing in all relations (to everything possible) involves certain quite special determinations.

[With Erdmann, bracketing in aller Absicht.]

A 325

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oneAusdruck, den wir nicht entbehren und gleichwohl, nach einer ihm durch langen Mißbrauch anhängende Zweideutigkeit, nicht sicher brauchen können. Das Wort absolut ist eines von den wenigen Wörtern, die in ihrer un-anfänglichen Bedeutung einem Begriffe angemessen worden, welchem nach der Hand gar kein anderes Wort der selben Sprache genau anpaßt, und dessen Verlust, oder, welches eben so viel ist, sein schwankender Gebrauch daher auch den Verlust das Begriffs selbst nach sich ziehen muß, und zwar eines Begriffs, der, weil er die Vernunft gar sehr beschäftigt, ohne großen Nachteil aller transcendentalen Beurteilungen nicht entbehrt werden kann. Das Wort absolut wird jetzt öfters gebraucht, um bloß anzuzeigen, daß etwas von einer Sache an sich selbst betrachtet und also innerlich gelte. In dieser Bedeutung würde absolutmöglich das bedeuten, was an sich selbst (interne) möglich ist, welches in der Tat das wenigste ist, was man von einem Gegenstande sagen kann. Dagegen wird es auch bisweilen gebraucht, um anzuzeigen, daß etwas in aller Beziehung (uneingeschränkt) gültig ist (z.B. die absolute Herrschaft), und absolutmöglich würde in dieser Bedeutung dasjenige bedeuten, was in aller Absicht in aller Beziehung möglich ist, welches wiederum das meiste ist, was ich über die Möglichkeit eines Dinges sagen kann. Nun treffen zwar diese Bedeutungen mannigfaltig zusammen. So ist z. E., was innerlich unmöglich ist, auch in aller Beziehung, mithin absolut, unmöglich. Aber in den meisten Fällen sind sie unendlich weit auseinander, und ich kann auf keine Weise schließen, daß, weil etwas an sich selbst möglich ist, es darum auch in aller Beziehung, mithin absolut möglich sei. Ja von der absoluten Notwendigkeit werde ich in der Folge zeigen, daß sie keinesweges in allen Fällen von der inneren abhängt, und also mit dieser nicht als gleichbedeutend angesehen werden müsse. Dessen/Gegenteil innerlich unmöglich ist, dessen Gegenteil ist freilich auch in aller Absicht unmöglich, mithin ist es selbst absolut notwendig; aber ich kann nicht umgekehrt schließen, was absolut notwendig ist, dessen Gegenteil sei innerlich unmöglich, d. i. die absolute Notwendigkeit der Dinge sei eine innere Notwendigkeit; denn diese innere Notwendigkeit ist in gewissen Fällen ein ganz leerer Ausdruck, mit welchem wir nicht den mindesten Begriff verbinden können; dagegen der von der Notwendigkeit eines Dinges in aller Beziehung (auf alles Mögliche) ganz besondere Bestimmungen bei sich führt. 1 A: •

1 [With Erdmann, bracketing in aller Absicht.]
Since the loss of a concept that is of great importance for speculative science can never be a matter of indifference to the philosopher, I trust that the fixing and careful preservation of the expression, on which the concept depends, will likewise be not indifferent to him.

A 326 It is, then, in this wider sense that I shall use the word 'absolute', opposing it to what is valid only comparatively, that is, in some particular respect. For while the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is valid without restriction.

Now the transcendental concept of reason is directed always solely towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and never terminates save in what is absolutely, that is, in all relations, unconditioned. For pure reason leaves everything to the understanding—the understanding [alone] applying immediately to the objects of intuition, or rather to their synthesis in the imagination. Reason concerns itself exclusively with absolute totality in the employment of the concepts of the understanding, and endeavours to carry the synthetic unity, which is thought in the category, up to the completely unconditioned. We may call this unity of appearances the unity of reason, and that expressed by the category the unity of understanding. Reason accordingly occupies itself solely with the employment of understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the concept of the absolute totality of conditions is not applicable in any experience, since no experience is unconditioned), but solely in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction towards a certain unity of which it has itself no concept, and in such manner as to unite all the acts of the understanding, in respect of every object, into an absolute whole. The objective employment of the pure concepts of reason is, therefore, always transcendental, while that of the pure concepts of understanding must, in accordance with their nature, and inasmuch as their application is solely to possible experience, be always immanent.

I understand by idea a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience. Thus the pure concepts of reason, now under consideration, are transcendental ideas. They are concepts of pure

B 384 [kontruiender,] 8 [in den Sininen.]

Weil nun der Verlust eines Begriffs von großer Anwendung in der spekulativen Weltweisheit dem Philosophen niemals gleichgültig sein kann, so hoffe ich, es werde ihm die Bestimmung und sorgfältige Aufbewahrung des Ausdrucks, an dem der Begriff hängt, auch nicht gleichgültig sein.

In dieser erweiterten Bedeutung werde ich mich denn des Worts: absolut, bedienen, und es dem bloß komparativ oder in besonderer Rücksicht Gültigen entgegen setzen; denn dieses letztere ist auf Bedingungen restringiert, jenes aber gilt ohne Restriktion.

Nun geht der transcendente Vernunftbegriff jederzeit nur auf die absolute Totalität in der Synthesis der Bedingungen, und endigt niemals, als bei dem schlechthin, d. i. in jeder Beziehung, Unbedingten. Denn die reine Vernunft überläßt alles dem Verstande, der sich zunächst auf die Gegenstände der Anschauung oder vielmehr deren Synthese in der Einbildungskraft bezieht. Jene behält sich allein die absolute Totalität im Gebrauche der Verstandesbegriffe vor, und sucht die synthetische Einheit, welche in der Kategorie gedacht wird, bis zum Schlechthinunbedingten hinauszuführen. Man kann daher diese die Vernunft einheit der Erscheinungen, so wie jene, welche die Kategorie ausdrückt, Verstandeseinheit nennen. So bezieht sich dennoch die Vernunft nur auf den Verstandesgebrauch, und zwar nicht so fern dieser den Grund möglicher Erfahrung enthält (denn die absolute Totalität der Bedingungen ist kein in einer Erfahrung brauchbarer Begriff, weil keine Erfahrung unbedingt ist), sondern um ihm die Richtung auf eine gewisse Einheit vorzuschreiben, von der der Verstand keinen Begriff hat, und die darauf hinaus geht, alle Verstandeshandlungen, in Ansehung eines jeden Gegenstandes, in ein absolutes Ganze zusammen zu fassen. Daher ist der objektive Gebrauch der reinen Vernunftbegriffe jederzeit transcendental, indessen daß der von den reinen Verstandesbegriffen, seiner Natur nach, jederzeit immmanent sein muß, indem er sich bloß auf mögliche Erfahrung einschränkt.

Ich verstehe unter der Idee einen notwendigen Vernunftbegriff, dem kein kontruiender Gegenstand in den Sinnen gegeben werden kann. Also sind unsere jetzt erwogenen reinen Vernunftbegriffe transcendentalen Ideen. Sie sind Be-
reason, in that they view all knowledge gained in experience as being determined through an absolute totality of conditions. They are not arbitrarily invented; they are imposed by the very nature of reason itself, and therefore stand in necessary relation to the whole employment of understanding. Finally, they are transcendent and overstep the limits of all experience; no object adequate to the transcendental idea can ever be found within experience. If I speak of an idea, then as regards its object, viewed as an object of pure understanding, I am saying a great deal, but as regards its relation to the subject, that is, in respect of its actuality under empirical conditions, I am for the same reason saying very little, in that, as being the concept of a maximum, it can never be correspondingly given in concreto. Since in the merely speculative employment of reason the latter [namely, to determine the actuality of the idea under empirical conditions] is indeed our whole purpose, and since the approximation to a concept, which yet is never actually reached, puts us no better position than if the concept were entirely abortive, we say of such a concept—it is only an idea. The absolute whole of all appearances—we might thus say—is only an idea; since we can never represent it in image, it remains a problem to which there is no solution. But since, on the other hand, in the practical employment of understanding, our sole concern is with the carrying out of rules, the idea of practical reason can always be given actually in concreto, although only in part; it is, indeed, the indispensable condition of all practical employment of reason. The practice of it is always limited and defective, but is not confined within determinable boundaries, and is therefore always under the influence of the concept of an absolute completeness. The practical idea is, therefore, always in the highest degree fruitful, and in its relation to our actual activities is indispensably necessary. Reason is here, indeed, exercising causality, as actually bringing about that which its concept contains; and of such wisdom we cannot, therefore, say disparagingly it is only an idea. On the contrary, just because it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible ends, it must as an original, and at least restrictive condition, serve as standard in all that bears on the practical.

Although we must say of the transcendental concepts of
reason that they are only ideas, this is not by any means to be
taken as signifying that they are superfluous and void. For
evem if they cannot determine any object, they may yet, in a
fundamental and unobserved fashion, be of service to the
understanding as a canon for its extended and consistent em-
ployment. The understanding does not thereby obtain more
knowledge of any object than it would have by means of its
own concepts, but for the acquiring of such knowledge it
receives better and more extensive guidance. Further—what
we need here no more than mention—concepts of reason may
perhaps make possible a transition from the concepts of
nature to the practical concepts, and in that way may give
support to the moral ideas themselves, bringing them into
connection with the speculative knowledge of reason. As to
all this, we must await explanation in the sequel.

In accordance with our plan we leave aside the practical
ideas, and consider reason only in its speculative, or rather,
restricting ourselves still further, only in its transcendental
employment. Here we must follow the path that we have
taken in the deduction of the categories; we must consider
the logical form of knowledge through reason, to see whether
perhaps reason may not thereby be likewise a source of con-
cepts which enable us to regard objects in themselves as deter-
dined synthetically a priori, in relation to one or other of the
functions of reason.

Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form
of knowledge, is the faculty of inferring, i.e. judging medi-
ately (by the subsumption of the condition of a possible judg-
ment under the condition of a given judgment). The given
judgment is the universal rule (major premise). The subsum-
ption of the condition of another possible judgment under
the condition of the rule is the minor premise. The actual judg-
ment which applies the assertion of the rule to the subsumed
case is the conclusion. The rule states something universally,
subject to a certain condition. The condition of the rule is
found to be fulfilled in an actual case. What has been asserted
to be universally valid under that condition is therefore to be
regarded as valid also in the actual case, which involves that
condition. It is very evident, therefore, that reason arrives at

Unserer Absicht gemäß setzen wir aber hier die prakti-
tischen Ideen bei Seite, und betrachten daher die Vernunft
nur im spekulativen, und in diesem noch enger, nämlich nur
im transzendentalen Gebrauch. Hier müssen wir nun den-
selben Weg einschlagen, den wir oben bei der Deduktion der
Kategorien nahmen; nämlich, die logische Form der Vernunft-
erkenntnis erwägen, und sehen, ob nicht etwa die Vernunft
dadurch auch ein Quell von Begriffen werde, Objekte an sich
selbst, als synthetisch a priori bestimmt, in Ansehung einer
oder der andern Funktion der Vernunft, anzusehen.

1 [Reading, with 4th edition, su for in.]
knowledge by means of acts of the understanding which constitute a series of conditions. Thus if I arrive at the proposition that all bodies are alterable, only by beginning with the more remote knowledge (in which the concept of body does not occur, but which nevertheless contains the condition of that concept), namely, that everything composite is alterable; if I then proceed from this to a proposition which is less remote and stands under the condition of the last-named proposition, namely, that bodies are composite; and if from this I finally pass to a third proposition, which connects the more remote knowledge (alterable) with the knowledge actually before me, and so conclude that bodies are alterable—by this procedure I have arrived at knowledge (a conclusion) by means of a series of conditions (the premises). Now every series the exponent of which is given (in categorical or hypothetical judgment) can be continued; consequently this same activity of reason leads to *ratiocinatio polysyllogistica*, which is a series of inferences that can be prolonged indefinitely on the side either of the conditions (*per polysyllogismos*) or of the conditioned (*per episyllogismos*).

But we soon become aware that the chain or series of prosyllogisms, that is, of inferred knowledge on the side of the grounds or conditions of a given knowledge, in other words, of the ascending series of syllogisms, must stand in a different relation to the faculty of reason from that of the descending series, that is, of the advance of reason in the direction of the conditioned, by means of episyllogisms. For since in the former case the knowledge (*conclusio*) is given only as conditioned, we cannot arrive at it by means of reason otherwise than on the assumption that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series of the premises); only on this assumption is the judgment before us possible *a priori*; whereas on the side of the conditioned, in respect of consequences, we only think a series *in process of becoming*, not one already presupposed or given *in its completeness*, and therefore an advance that is merely potential. If, therefore, knowledge be viewed as conditioned, reason is constrained to regard the series of conditions in the ascending line as completed and as given in their totality. But if the same knowledge

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1 [Reading, with Erdmann, *welche* for *welches*.]
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

is viewed as a condition of yet other knowledge, and this knowledge as constituting a series of consequences in a descending line, reason can be quite indifferent as to how far this advance extends a parte posteriori, and whether a totality of the series is possible at all. For it does not need such a series in order to be able to draw its conclusion, this being already sufficiently determined and secured by its grounds a parte priori. The series of premises on the side of the conditions may have a first member, as its highest condition, or it may have no such member, in which case it is without limits a parte priori. But however this may be, and even admitting that we can never succeed in comprehending a totality of conditions, the series must none the less contain such a totality, and the entire series must be unconditionally true if the conditioned, which is regarded as a consequence resulting from it, is to be counted as true. This is a requirement of reason, which announces its knowledge as being determined a priori and as necessary, either in itself, in which case it needs no grounds, or, if it be derivative, as a member of a series of grounds, which itself, as a series, is unconditionally true.

FIRST BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

Section 3

SYSTEM OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

We are not at present concerned with logical dialectic, which abstracts from all the content of knowledge and confines itself to exposing the fallacies concealed in the form of syllogisms, but with a transcendental dialectic which has to contain, completely a priori, the origin of certain modes of knowledge derived from pure reason as well as of certain inferred concepts, the object of which can never be given empirically and which therefore lie entirely outside [the sphere of] the faculty of pure understanding. From the natural relation which the transcendental employment of our knowledge, alike in inferences and in judgments, must bear to its logical

1. [Reading, with Erdmann, Bedingungen füw Bedingung.]

SYSTEM DER TRANSCENDENTAL EN IDEEN

züglich als Bedingung anderer Erkenntnisse ange|sehen wird, die unter einander eine Reihe von Folgerungen in absteigender Linie aus|machen, so kann die Vernunft ganz gleichgültig sein, wie weit dieser Fortgang sich a parte posteriori erstrecke, und ob gar überall Totalität dieser Reihe möglich sei; weil sie einer dergleichen Reihe zu der vor ihr liegenden Konklusion nicht bedarf, indem diese durch ihre Gründe a parte priori schon hinreichend bestimmt und gesichert ist. Es mag nun sein, daß auf der Seite der Bedingungen die Reihe der Prä|missen ein Erstes habe, als oberste Bedingung, oder nicht, und also a parte priori ohne Grenzen: so muß sie doch Totalität der Bedingung enthalten, gesetzt, daß wir niemals dahin gelangen könnten, sie zu fassen, und die ganze Reihe muß unbedingt wahr sein, wenn das Bedingte, welches als eine daraus entspringende Folgerung angesehen wird, als wahr gelten soll. Dieses ist eine Forderung der Vernunft; die ihr Erkenntnis als a priori bestimmt und als notwendig an|kündigt, entweder an sich selbst, und dann bedarf es keiner Gründe, oder, wenn es abgeleitet ist, als ein Glied einer Reihe von Gründen, die selbst unbedingter Weise wahr ist.

|| DES ERSTEN BUCHS
DER TRANSCENDENTALEN DIALEKTIK

DRII TER ABSC NHTT

SYSTEM DER TRANSCENDENTALEN IDEEN

Wir haben es hier nicht mit einer logischen Dialektik zu tun, welche von allem Inhalte der Erkenntnis abstrahiert, und lediglich den falschen Schein in der Form der Vernunft|schlûssen aufdeckt, sondern mit einer transcendentalen, welche, völlig a priori, den Ursprung gewisser Erkenntnisse aus reiner Vernunft, und geschlossener Begriffe, deren Gegenstand empirisch gar nicht gegeben werden kann, die also gänzlich äußerer dem Vermögen des reinen Verstandes liegen, enthalten soll. Wir haben aus der natürlichen Beziehung, die der trans|zendentale Gebrauch unserer Erkenntnis, sowohl in Schlûs|sen, als Urteilen, auf den logischen haben muß, abgenommen:

1. Akad.-Ausg.: *Grenzen sei; 30x.
employment, we have gathered that there can be only three kinds of dialectical inference, corresponding to the three kinds of inference through which reason can arrive at knowledge by means of principles, and that in all of these its business is to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, to which understanding always remains restricted, to the unconditioned, which understanding can never reach.

The relations which are to be universally found in all our representations are (1) relation to the subject; (2) relation to objects, either as appearances or as objects of thought in general. If we combine the subdivision with the main division, all relation of representations, of which we can form either a concept or an idea, is then threefold: (1) the relation to the subject; (2) the relation to the manifold of the object in the [field of] appearance; (3) the relation to all things in general.

Now all pure concepts in general are concerned with the synthetic unity of representations, but [those of them which are] concepts of pure reason (transcendental ideas) are concerned with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions in general. All transcendental ideas can therefore be arranged in three classes, the first containing the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance, the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general.*

The thinking subject is the object of psychology, the sum-total of all appearances (the world) is the object of cosmology, and the thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the being of all beings) the object of theology. Pure reason thus furnishes the idea for a transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia rationalis), for a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia), and, finally, for a transcendental knowledge of God (theologia transcendentalis). The understanding is not in a position to yield even the mere project of any one of these sciences, not even though it be supported by the highest logical employment of reason, that is, by all the conceivable inferences through which we seek to advance from one of its objects (appearance) to all others, up to the most remote

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1 [Following Erdmann, in italicising überhaupt.]
2 [der Gegenstand.]
3 [das Ding.]

1 A: entweder | ordlich wäre.
members of the empirical synthesis; each of these sciences is an altogether pure and genuine product, or problem, of pure reason.

In what precise modes the pure concepts of reason come under these three headings of all transcendental ideas will be fully explained in the next chapter. They follow the guiding-thread of the categories. For pure reason never relates directly to objects, but to the concepts which understanding frames in regard to objects. Similarly it is only by the process of completing our argument that it can be shown how reason, simply by the synthetic employment of that very function of which it makes use in categorical syllogisms, is necessarily brought to the concept of the absolute unity of the thinking subject, how the logical procedure used in hypothetical syllogisms leads to the idea\(^1\) of the completely unconditioned in a series of given conditions, and finally how the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism must necessarily involve the highest concept of reason, that of a being of all beings—a thought which, at first sight, seems utterly paradoxical.

No objective deduction, such as we have been able to give of the categories, is, strictly speaking, possible in the case of these transcendental ideas. Just because they are only ideas they have, in fact, no relation to any object that could be given as coinciding with them. We can, indeed, undertake a subjective derivation\(^2\) of them from the nature of our reason; and this has been provided in the present chapter.

As is easily seen, what pure reason alone has in view is the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions (whether of inherence, of dependence, or of concurrence); it is not concerned with absolute completeness on the side of the conditioned. For the former alone is required in order to presuppose the whole series of the conditions, and to present it a priori to the understanding. Once we are given a complete (and unconditioned) condition, no concept of reason is required for the continuation of the series; for every step in the forward direction from the condition to the conditioned is carried through by the understanding itself. The

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\(^1\) [Reading, with Erdmann, *Vernunftschlüsse die Idee vom für Ideen die sein.*]

\(^2\) [Reading, with Meier, *Ableitung für Anleitung.*]
THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

transcendental ideas thus serve only for ascending, in the series of conditions, to the unconditioned, that is, to principles. As regards the descending to the conditioned, reason does, indeed, make a very extensive logical employment of the laws of understanding, but no kind of transcendental employment; and if we form an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis (of the progressus), as, for instance, of the whole series of all future alterations in the world, this is a creation of the mind (ens rationis) which is only arbitrarily thought, and not a necessary presupposition of reason. For the possibility of the conditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions, but not of its consequences. Such a concept is not, therefore, one of the transcendental ideas; and it is with these alone that we have here to deal.

Finally, we also discern that a certain connection and unity is evident among the transcendental ideas themselves, and that by means of them pure reason combines all its modes of knowledge into a system. The advance from the knowledge of oneself (the soul) to the knowledge of the world, and by means of this to the original being, is so natural that it seems to resemble the logical advance of reason from premises to conclusion. Whether this is due to a concealed relationship of the same kind as subsists between the logical and the transcendental procedure, is one of the questions that await answer.

[Note added in and edition.] Metaphysics has as the proper object of its enquiries three ideas only: God, freedom, and immortality —so related that the second concept, when combined with the first, should lead to the third as a necessary conclusion. Any other matters with which this science may deal serve merely as a means of arriving at these ideas and of establishing their reality. It does not need the ideas for the purposes of natural science, but in order to pass beyond nature. Insight into them would render theology and morals, and, through the union of these two, likewise religion, and therewith the highest ends of our existence, entirely and exclusively dependent on the faculty of speculative reason. In a systematic representation of the ideas, the order cited, the synthetic, would be the most suitable; but in the investigation which must necessarily precede it the analytic, or reverse order, is better adapted to the purpose of completing our great project, as enabling us to start from what is immediately given us in experience—advancing from the doctrine of the soul, to the doctrine of the world, and thence to the knowledge of God.
A. 338 in the course of these enquiries. Indeed, we have already, in a preliminary manner, obtained an answer to the question, B. 396 since in treating of the transcendental concepts of reason, which, in philosophical theory, are commonly confused with others, and not properly distinguished even from concepts of understanding, we have been able to rescue them from their ambiguous position, to determine their origin, and at the same time, in so doing, to fix their precise number (to which we can never add), presenting them in a systematic connection, and so marking out and enclosing a special field for pure reason.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

BOOK II

THE DIALECTICAL INFERENCES OF PURE REASON

Although a purely transcendental idea is, in accordance with the original laws of reason, a quite necessary product of reason, its object, it may yet be said, is something of which we have no concept. For in respect of an object which is adequate to the demands of reason, it is not, in fact, possible that we should ever be able to form a concept of the understanding, that is, a concept that allows of being exhibited and intuited in a possible experience. But we should be better advised and less likely to be misunderstood if we said that although we cannot have any knowledge of the object which corresponds to an idea, we yet have a problematic concept of it.

The transcendental (subjective) reality of the pure concepts of reason depends on our having been led to such ideas by a necessary syllogism. There will therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical premises, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable illusion, we yet ascribe objective reality. These conclusions are, then, rather to be called pseudo-rational than rational, although in view of their origin they may well lay claim to the latter title, since they are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very nature of reason. They are sophistications not of men but of pure reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against...

\[\text{\cite{Vernunftschluss}}\]

DER TRANSCENDENTALEN DIALEKTIK

ZWEITES BUCH
VON DEN DIALEKTISCHEN SCHLÜSSEN
DER REINEN VERNUNFT


Nun beruht wenigstens die transzendentele (subjektive) Realität der reinen Vernunftsbegriffe darauf, daß wir durch einen notwendigen Vernunftschluß auf solche Ideen gebracht werden. Also wird es Vernunftschlüsse geben, die keine empirische Prämisse enthalten, und vermittelst deren wir von etwas, das wir kennen, auf etwas anderes schließen, wovon wir doch keinen Begriff haben, und dem wir gleichwohl, durch einen unvermeidlichen Schein, objektive Realität geben. Dergleichen Schlüsse sind in Anbezug ihres Resultats also eher vernünftelde, als Vernunftschlüsse zu nennen; wiewohl sie, ihrer Veranlassung wegen, wohl den letzteren Namen führen können, weil sie doch nicht erdacht, oder zufällig entstanden, sondern aus der Natur der Vernunft entsprungen sind. Es sind Sophistikationen, nicht der Menschen, sondern der reinen Vernunft selbst, von denen selbst der Weiseste unter allen Menschen sich nicht losmachen, und vielleicht zwar nach vieler Bemühung den Irr-
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him.

There are, then, only three kinds of dialectical syllogisms—just so many as there are ideas in which their conclusions result. In the first kind of syllogism I conclude from the transcendental concept of the subject, which contains nothing manifold, the absolute unity of this subject itself, of which, however, even in so doing, I possess no concept whatsoever. This dialectical inference I shall entitle the transcendental paralogism. The second kind of pseudo-rational inference is directed to the transcendental concept of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for any given appearance. From the fact that my concept of the unconditioned synthetic unity of the series, as thought in a certain way, is always self-contradictory, I conclude that there is really a unity of the opposite kind, although of it also I have no concept. The position of reason in these dialectical inferences I shall entitle the antinomy of pure reason. Finally, in the third kind of pseudo-rational inference, from the totality of the conditions under which objects in general, in so far as they can be given me, have to be thought, I conclude to the absolute synthetic unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general, i.e., from things which I do not know through the merely transcendental concept of them I infer an ens entium, which I know even less through any transcendental\(^1\) concept, and of the unconditioned necessity of which I can form no concept whatsoever. This dialectical syllogism I shall entitle the ideal of pure reason.

\[^1\) Reading, with the 4th edition, transcendental for transcendent.]
therefore grounded in the nature of human reason, and gives rise to an illusion which cannot be avoided, although it may, indeed, be rendered harmless.

We now come to a concept which was not included in the general list of transcendental concepts but which must yet be counted as belonging to that list, without, however, in the least altering it or declaring it defective. This is the concept or, if the term be preferred, the judgment, 'I think'. As is easily seen, this is the vehicle of all concepts, and therefore also of transcendental concepts, and so is always included in the conceiving of these latter, and is itself transcendental. But it can have no special designation, because it serves only to introduce all our thought, as belonging to consciousness. Meanwhile, however free it be of empirical admixture (impressions of the senses), it yet enables us to distinguish, through the nature of our faculty of representation, two kinds of objects. 'I', as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called 'soul'. That which is an object of the outer senses is called 'body'. Accordingly the expression 'I', as a thinking being, signifies the object of that psychology which may be entitled the 'rational doctrine of the soul', inasmuch as I am not here seeking to learn in regard to the soul anything more than can be inferred, independently of all experience (which determines me more specifically and in concreto), from this concept 'I', so far as it is present in all thought.

The rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of this kind; for if in this science the least empirical element of my thought, or any special perception of my inner state, were intermingled with the grounds of knowledge, it would no longer be a rational but an empirical doctrine of the soul. Thus we have here what professes to be a science built upon the single proposition 'I think'. Whether this claim be well or ill grounded, we may, very fittingly, in accordance with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, proceed to investigate. The reader must not object that this proposition, which expresses the perception of the self, contains an inner experience, and that the rational doctrine of the soul founded upon it is never pure and is therefore to that extent based upon an empirical principle. For this inner perception is nothing more than the mere apperception 'I think', by which even tran-

Fehlschluß in der Natur der Menschenvermunft seinen Grund haben, und eine unvermeidliche, obzwar nicht unauflosliche, Illusion bei sich führen.

Jetzt kommen wir auf einen Begriff, der oben, in der allgemeinen Liste der transzendentalen Begriffe, nicht verzeichnet worden, und dennoch dazu gezählt werden muß, ohne doch darum jene Tafel im mindesten zu verändern und für mangelhaft zu erklären. Dieses ist der Begriff, oder, wenn man lieber will, das Urteil: Ich denke. Man sieht aber leicht, daß er das Vehikel aller Begriffe überhaupt, und mithin auch der transzendentalen sei, und also unter diesen jederzeit mit begriffen werde, und daher eben sowohl transzendental sei, aber keinen besonderen Titel haben könne, weil er nur dazu | dient, alles Denken, als zum Bewußtsein gehörig, aufzuführen. Indessen, so | rein er auch vom Empirischen (dem Eindrucke der Sinne) ist, so dient er doch dazu, zweierlei Gegenstände aus der Natur unserer Vorstellungskraft zu unterscheiden. Ich, als denkend, bin ein Gegenstand des innern Sinnes, und heiße Seele. Dasjenige, was ein Gegenstand äußerer Sinne ist, heißt Körper. Demnach bedeutet der Ausdruck Ich, als ein denkend Wesen, schon den Gegenstand der Psychologie, welche die rationale Seelenlehre heißen kann, wenn ich von der Seele nichts weiter zu wissen verlange, als was unabhängig von aller Erfahrung (welche mich näher und in concreto bestimmt) aus diesem Begriffe Ich, so fern er bei allem Denken vorkommt, geschlossen werden kann.

Die rationale Seelenlehre ist nun wirklich ein Unterfangen von dieser Art; denn, wenn das mindeste Empirische meines Denkens, irgend eine besondere Wahrnehmung meines inneren Zustandes, noch unter die Erkenntnissgründe dieser Wissenschaft gemischt würde, so wäre sie nicht mehr rationale, sondern empirische Seelenlehre. Wir haben also schon eine angebliche Wissenschaft vor uns, welche auf dem einzigen Satze: Ich denke, erbaut worden, und deren Grund oder Ungrund wir hier ganz schicklich, und der Natur einer Transzendentalphilosophie gemäß, untersuchen können. Man darf sich daran nicht stoßen, daß ich doch an diesem Satze, der die Wahrnehmung seiner selbst ausdrückt, eine innere Erfahrung habe, und mithin die rationale Seelenlehre, welche darauf erbaut wird, niemals rein, sondern zum Teil auf ein empirisches Principium gegründet sei. Denn diese innere Wahrnehmung ist nichts weiter, als die bloße Apperzeption: Ich denke; welche sogar alle tran-
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

transcendental concepts are made possible; what we assert in them is 'I think substance, cause', etc. For inner experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general and its relation to other perception, in which no special distinction or empirical determination is given, is not to be regarded as empirical knowledge but as knowledge of the empirical in general, and has to be reckoned with the investigation of the possibility of any and every experience, which is certainly a transcendental enquiry. The least object of perception (for example, even pleasure or displeasure), if added to the universal representation of self-consciousness, would at once transform rational psychology into empirical psychology.

'I think' is, therefore, the sole text of rational psychology, and from it the whole of its teaching has to be developed. Obviously, if this thought is to be related to an object (myself), it can contain none but transcendental predicates of that object, since the least empirical predicate would destroy the rational purity of the science and its independence of all experience.

A 344 | B 403

All that is here required is that we follow the guidance of the categories, with this difference only, that since our starting-point is a given thing, 'I as thinking being, we begin with the category of substance, whereby a thing in itself is represented, and so proceed backwards through the series, without, however, otherwise changing the order adopted in the table of the categories. The topic of the rational doctrine of the soul, from which everything else that it contains must be derived, is accordingly as follows:

1.
The soul is substance.

2. As regards its quality it is simple.

3. As regards the different times in which it exists, it is numerically identical, that is, unity (not plurality).

[Note: "Unlust." [Reading, with Erdmann, welches for welche.] [In his private copy of the Critique [Nachträge, No. CLXI] Kant has changed this to: The soul exists as substance.]

VON DEN PARALOGISMEN

s zendentale Begriffe möglich macht, in welchen es heißt: Ich denke die Substanz, die Ursache etc. Denn innere Erfahrung überhaupt und deren Möglichkeit, oder Wahrnehmung überhaupt und deren Verhältnis zu anderer Wahrnehmung, ohne daß irgend ein besonderer Unterschied derselben und Bestimmung empirisch gegeben ist, kann nicht als empirische Erkenntnis, sondern muß als Erkenntnis des Empirischen überhaupt angesehen werden, und gehört zur Untersuchung der Möglichkeit einer jeden Erfahrung, welche allerdings transzendential ist. Das mindeste Objekt der Wahrnehmung (z.B. nur Lust oder Unlust), welche zu der allgemeinen Vorstellung des Selbstbewußtseins hinzu käme, würde die rationale Psychologie sogleich in eine empirische verwandeln.

Ich denke, ist also der alleinige Text der rationalen Psychologie, aus welchem sie ihre ganze Weisheit auswickeln soll. Man sieht leicht, daß dieser Gedanke, wenn er auf einen Gegenstand (mich selbst) bezogen werden soll, nichts anders, als transzendentale Prädikate desselben, enthalten könne; weil das mindeste empirische Prädikat die rationale Reinigkeit, und Unabhängigkeit der Wissenschaft von aller Erfahrung, verderben würde.

Wir werden aber hier bloß dem Leitfaden der Kategorien zu folgen haben, nur, da hier zuerst ein Ding, Ich, als denkendes Wesen, gegeben worden, so werden wir zwar die obige Ordnung der Kategorien unter einander, wie sie in ihrer Tafel vorgestellt ist, nicht verändern, aber doch hier von der Kategorie der Substanz anfangen, dadurch ein Ding an sich selbst vorgestellt wird, und so ihrer Reihe rückwärts nachgehen. Die Topik der rationalen Seelenlehre, woraus alles übrige, was sie nur enthalten mag, abgeleitet werden muß, ist demnach folgende:

1.
Die Seele ist Substanz

2. Ihrer Qualität nach einfach

3. Den verschiedenen Zeiten nach, in welchen sie da ist, numerisch-identisch, d.i. Einheit (nicht Vielheit)
PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON

4.
It is in relation to possible objects in space.*

All the concepts of pure psychology arise from these elements, simply by way of combination, without admission of any other principle. This substance, merely as object of inner sense, gives the concept of immateriality; as simple substance, that of incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, personality; all these three together, spirituality; while the relation to objects in space gives commercium with bodies, and so leads us to represent the thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as soul (anima), and as the ground of animality. This last, in turn, as limited by spirituality, gives the concept of immortality.

In connection with these concepts we have four paralogisms of a transcendental psychology—which is wrongly regarded as a science of pure reason—concerning the nature of our thinking being. We can assign no other basis for this teaching than the simple, and in itself completely empty, representation "I"; and we cannot even say that this is a concept, but only that it is a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts. Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X. It is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept whatsoever, but can only revolve in a perpetual circle, since any judgment upon it has always already made use of its representation. And the reason why this inconvenience is inseparably bound up with it, is that consciousness in itself is not a representation distinguishing a particular object, but a form

* The reader who has difficulty in guessing the psychological meaning of these expressions taken in their transcendental abstractness, and in discovering why the last-mentioned attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will find the terms sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. Further, I have to apologise for the Latin expressions which, contrary to good taste, have usurped the place of their German equivalents, both in this section and in the work as a whole. My excuse is that I have preferred to lose somewhat in elegance of language rather than to increase, in however minor a degree, the reader's difficulties.

4.
Im Verhältnisse zu möglichen Gegenständen im Raume*

|| Aus diesen Elementen entspringen alle Begriffe der rei nen Seelenlehre, lediglich durch die Zusammensetzung, ohne im mindesten ein anderes Principium zu erkennen. Diese Substanz, bloß als Gegenstand des inneren Sinnes, gibt den Begriff der Immaterialität; als einfache Substanz, der Inkorr uptibilität; die Identität derselben, als intellektueller Substanz, gibt die Personalität; alle diese drei Stücke zusammen die Spiritualität; das Verhältnis zu den Gegenständen im Raume gibt das Commercium mit Kör pern; mithin stellet sie die denkende Substanz, als das Principium des Lebens in der Materie, d. i. sie als Seele (anima) und als den Grund der Animalität vor; diese durch die Spiritualität eingeschränkt, Immortalität.

Hierauf beziehen sich nun vier Paralogismen einer trans zendentalen Seelenlehre, welche fälschlich fü r eine Wissen schaft der reinen Vernunft, von der Natur unseres denken den Wesens, gehalten wird. Zum Grunde derselben können wir aber nichts anderes legen, als die einfache und für sich selbst an Inhalt gänzlich leere Vorstellung: Ich, von der man nicht einmal sagen kann, daß sie ein Begriff sei, sondern ein bloßes Bewußtsein, das alle Begriffe begleitet. Durch dieses Ich, oder Er, oder Es (das Ding), welches denkt, wird nun nichts weiter, als ein transzendentes Subjekt der Gedanken vorgestellt = x, welches nur durch die Gedanken, die seine Prädikate sind, erkannt wird, und wovon wir, abgesondert, niemals den mindesten Begriff haben können; um welches wir uns daher in einem beständigen Zirkel herumdrehen, indem wir uns seiner Vorstellung jederzeit schon bedienen müssen, um irgend etwas von ihm zu ernteilen; eine Unbequemlichkeit, die davon nicht zu trennen ist, weil das Bewußtsein an sich nicht sowohl eine Vorstellung ist, die ein besonderes Objekt unterscheidet, sondern eine Form

* Der Leser, der aus diesen Ausdrücken, in ihrer transzendentalen Abgesessenheit, nicht so leicht den psychologischen Sinn derselben, und warum das letzte Attribut der Seele zur Kategorie der Existenz gehört, erraten will, wird sie in dem Folgenden hinreichend erklärt und gerechtfertigt finden. Übrigens habe ich wegen der lateinischen Ausdrücke, die nicht der gleichbedeutenden deutschen, wider den Geschmack der guten Schreibart, eingefügt sind, sowohl bei diesem Abschnitt, als auch in Anzeichen des ganzen Werks, zur Entschuldigung zu aufstellen, daß ich lieber etwas der Zierlichkeit der Sprache habe entziehen, als den Schulgebrauch durch die mindeste Unverständlichkeit erschweren wollen.
of representation in general, that is, of representation in so far as it is to be entitled knowledge; for it is only of knowledge that I can say that I am thereby thinking something.

It must, on first thoughts, seem strange that the condition under which alone I think, and which is therefore merely a property of myself as subject, should likewise be valid for everything that thinks, and that on a seemingly empirical proposition we can presume to base an apodeictic and universal judgment, namely, that that which thinks must, in all cases, be constituted as the voice of self-consciousness declares it to be constituted in my own self. The reason is this: we must assign to things, necessarily and *a priori*, all the properties that constitute the conditions under which alone we think them. Now I cannot have any representation whatsoever of a thinking being, through any outer experience, but only through self-consciousness. Objects of this kind are, therefore, nothing more than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things, which in this way alone can be represented as thinking beings. The proposition, 'I think', is, however, here taken only problematically, not in so far as it may contain perception of an existent (the Cartesian *cogito, ergo sum*), but in respect of its mere possibility, in order to see what properties applicable to its subject (be that subject actually existent or not) may follow from so simple a proposition.

If our knowledge of thinking beings in general, by means of pure reason, were based on more than the *cogito*, if we likewise made use of observations concerning the play of our thoughts and the natural laws of the thinking self to be derived from these thoughts, there would arise an empirical psychology, which would be a kind of physiology of inner sense, capable perhaps of explaining the appearances of inner sense, but never of revealing such properties as do not in any way belong to possible experience (e.g. the properties of the simple), nor of yielding any apodeictic knowledge regarding the nature of thinking beings in general. It would not, therefore, be a rational psychology.

Since the proposition 'I think' (taken problematically) contains the form of each and every judgment of the understanding and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evident that the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental derselben überhaupt, so fern sie Erkenntnis genannt werden soll; denn von der allein kann ich sagen, daß ich dadurch irgend etwas denke.

Es muß aber gleich anfangs befremdlich scheinen, daß die Bedingung, unter der ich überhaupt denke, und die mit hin bloß eine Beschaffenheit meines Subjekts ist, zugleich für alles, was denkt, gültig sein solle, und daß wir auf einen empirisch scheinenden Satz ein apodiktisches und allgemeines Urteil zu gründen uns anmaßen können, nämlich: daß alles, was denkt, so beschaffen sei, als der Ausspruch des Selbstbewußtseins es an mir aussagt. Die Ursache aber hie von liegt darin: daß wir den Dingen *a priori* alle die Eigenschaften notwendig beilegen müssen, die die Bedingungen ausmachen, unter welchen wir sie allein denken. Nun kann ich von einem denkenden Wesen durch keine äußere Erfahrung, sondern bloß durch das Selbstbewußtsein die mindeste Vorstellung haben. Also sind dergleichen Gegenstände nichts weiter, als die Übertragung dieses meines Bewußtseins auf andere Dinge, welche nur dadurch als denkende Wesen vorgestellt werden. Der Satz: Ich denke, wird aber hierbei nur problematisch genommen; nicht so fern er eine Wahrnehmung von einem Dasein enthalten mag (das kartesianische cogito, ergo sum), sondern seiner bloßen Möglichkeit nach, um zu sehen, welche Eigenschaften aus diesem so einfachen Satze auf das Subjekt desselben (es mag dergleichen nun existieren oder nicht) fließen mögen.

Läge unserer reinen Vernunfterkennnis von denkenden Wesen überhaupt mehr, als das Cogito, zum Grunde; würden wir die Beobachtungen, über das Spiel unserer Gedanken und die daraus zu schöpfende Naturgesetze des denkenden Selbst, auch zu Hülfe nehmen: so würde eine empirische Psychologie entspringen, welche eine Art der Physiologie des inneren Sinnes sein würde, und vielleicht die Erscheinungen desselben zu erklären, niemals aber dazu dienen könnte, solche Eigenschaften, die gar nicht zur möglichen Erfahrung gehören (als die des Einfachen), zu eröffnen, noch von denkenden Wesen überhaupt etwas, das ihre Natur betrifft, apodiktisch zu lehren; sie wäre also keine rationale Psychologie.

| Da nun der Satz: Ich denke (problematisch genom men), die Form eines jeden Verstandesurteils überhaupt enthält, und alle Kategorien als ihr Vehikel begleitet: so ist klar, daß die Schlüsse aus demselben einen bloß transzen- |
employment of the understanding. And since this employment excludes any admixture of experience, we cannot, after what has been shown above, entertain any favourable anticipations in regard to its methods of procedure. We therefore propose to follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments of pure psychology.

[The Paralogisms of Pure Reason: as in 1st edition.]

FIRST PARALOGISM: OF SUBSTANTIALLY

That, the representation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments and cannot therefore be employed as determination of another thing, is substance.

I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself cannot be employed as predicate of any other thing.

Therefore I, as thinking being (soul), am substance.

Critique of the First Paralogism of Pure Psychology

In the analytical part of the Transcendental Logic we have shown that pure categories, and among them that of substance, have in themselves no objective meaning, save in so far as they rest upon an intuition, and are applied to the manifold of this intuition, as functions of synthetic unity. In the absence of this manifold, they are merely functions of a judgment, without content. I can say of any and every thing that it is substance, in the sense that I distinguish it from mere predicates and determinations of things. Now in all our thought the 'I' is the subject, in which thoughts inhere only as determinations; and this 'I' cannot be employed as the determination of another thing. Everyone must, therefore, necessarily regard himself as substance, and thought as consisting only in accidents of his being, determinations of his state.

But what use am I to make of this concept of a substance? That I, as a thinking being, persist for myself, and do not in any natural manner either arise or perish, can by no means be

\[\text{362} \quad \text{TRANSZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK}\]


dentalen Gebrauch des Verstandes enthalten können, welcher alle Beimischung der Erfahrung ausschließt, und von dessen Fortgang wir, nach dem, was wir oben gezeigt haben, uns schon zum voraus keinen vorteilhaften Begriff machen können. Wir wollen ihn also durch alle Prädikamente der reinen Seelenlehre mit einem kritischen Auge verfolgen, doch um der Kürze willen ihre Prüfung in einem ununterbrochenen Zusammenhange fortgehen lassen.

\text{ERSTER PARALOGISM DER SUBSTANZIALITÄT}

Dasjenige, dessen Vorstellung das absolute Subjekt unserer Urteile ist und daher nicht als Bestimmung eines andern Dinges gebraucht werden kann, ist Substanz.

Ich, als ein denkendes Wesen, bin das absolute Subjekt aller meiner möglichen Urteile, und diese Vorstellung von mir selbst kann nicht zum Prädikat irgendeines andern Dinges gebraucht werden.

Also bin ich, als denkendes Wesen (Seelensubstanz).

\text{KRITIK DES ERSTEN PARALOGISM}

\text{DER REINEN PSYCHOLOGIE}


Was soll ich aber nun von diesem Begriffe einer Substanz vor einem Gebrauch machen. Daß ich, als ein denkendes Wesen, vor mich selbst fortdauern, natürlicher Weise weder entziehe noch vergehe, das kann ich daraus keinesweges schlie-
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

deduced from it. Yet there is no other use to which I can put the concept of the substantiality of my thinking subject, and apart from such use I could very well dispense with it.

So far from being able to deduce these properties merely from the pure category of substance, we must, on the contrary, take our start from the permanence of an object given in experience as permanent. For only to such an object can the concept of *substance* be applied in a manner that is empirically serviceable. In the above proposition, however, we have not taken as our basis any experience; the inference is merely from the concept of the relation which all thought has to the 'I' as the common subject in which it inheres. Nor should we, in resting it upon experience, be able, by any sure observation, to demonstrate such permanence. The 'I' is indeed in all thoughts, but there is not in this representation the least trace of intuition, distinguishing the 'I' from other objects of intuition. Thus we can indeed perceive that this representation is invariably present in all thought, but not that it is an abiding and continuing intuition, wherein the thoughts, as being transitory, give place to one another.

It follows, therefore, that the first syllogism of transcendental psychology, when it puts forward the constant logical subject of thought as being knowledge of the real subject in which the thought inheres, is palming off upon us what is a mere pretense of new insight. We do not have, and cannot have, any knowledge whatsoever of any such subject. Consciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found; but beyond this logical meaning of the 'I', we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which as substrate underlies this 'I', as it does all thoughts. The proposition, 'The soul is substance', may, however, quite well be allowed to stand, if only it be recognised that this concept [of the soul as substance] does not carry us a single step further, and so cannot yield us any of the usual deductions of the pseudo-rational doctrine of the soul, as, for instance, the everlasting duration of the human soul in all changes and even in death—if, that is to say, we recognise that this concept signifies a substance only in idea, not in reality.

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1 [Reading, with Hartenstein, *aus* for *unser*.]
SECOND PARALOGISM: OF SIMPLICITY

That, the action of which can never be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting, is simple.

Now the soul, or the thinking 'I', is such a being. Therefore, etc.

Critique of the Second Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology

This is the Achilles of all dialectical inferences in the pure doctrine of the soul. It is no mere sophistical play, contrived by a dogmatist in order to impart to his assertions a superficial plausibility, but an inference which appears to withstand even the keenest scrutiny and the most scrupulously exact investigation. It is as follows.

Every composite substance is an aggregate of several substances, and the action of a composite, or whatever inheres in it as thus composite, is an aggregate of several actions or accidents, distributed among the plurality of the substances. Now an effect which arises from the concurrence of many acting substances is indeed possible, namely, when this effect is external only (as, for instance, the motion of a body is the combined motion of all its parts). But with thoughts, as internal accidents belonging to a thinking being, it is different. For suppose it be the composite that thinks: then every part of it would be a part of the thought, and only all of them taken together would contain the whole thought. But this cannot consistently be maintained. For representations (for instance, the single words of a verse), distributed among different beings, never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore impossible that a thought should inhere in what is essentially composite. It is therefore possible only in a single substance, which, not being an aggregate of many, is absolutely simple.

The so-called nervus probandi of this argument lies in the proposition, that if a multiplicity of representations are to form a single representation, they must be contained in the

* This proof can very easily be given the customary syllogistic correctness of form. But for my purpose it is sufficient to have made clear, though in popular fashion, the bare ground of proof.
absolute unity of the thinking subject. No one, however, can prove this proposition from concepts. For how should he set about the task of achieving this? The proposition, 'A thought can only be the effect of the absolute unity of the thinking being', cannot be treated as analytic. For the unity of the thought, which consists of many representations, is collective, and as far as mere concepts can show, may relate just as well to the collective unity of different substances acting together (as the motion of a body is the composite motion of all its parts) as to the absolute unity of the subject. Consequently, the necessity of presupposing, in the case of a composite thought, a simple substance, cannot be demonstrated in accordance with the principle of identity. Nor will anyone venture to assert that the proposition allows of being known synthetically and completely a priori from mere concepts—not, at least, if he understands the ground of the possibility of a priori synthetic propositions, as above explained.

It is likewise impossible to derive this necessary unity of the subject, as a condition of the possibility of every thought, from experience. For experience yields us no knowledge of necessity, apart even from the fact that the concept of absolute unity is quite outside its province. Whence then are we to derive this proposition upon which the whole psychological syllogism depends?

It is obvious that, if I wish to represent to myself a thinking being, I must put myself in his place, and thus substitute, as it were, my own subject for the object I am seeking to consider (which does not occur in any other kind of investigation), and that we demand the absolute unity of the subject of a thought, only because otherwise we could not say, 'I think' (the manifold in one representation). For although the whole of the thought could be divided and distributed among many subjects, the subjective 'I' can never be thus divided and distributed, and it is this 'I' that we presuppose in all thinking.

Here again, as in the former paralogism, the formal proposition of apperception, 'I think', remains the sole ground to which rational psychology can appeal when it thus ventures upon an extension of its knowledge. This proposition, however, is not itself an experience, but the form of apperception,
PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON (A) 337
which belongs to and precedes every experience; and as such it must always be taken only in relation to some possible knowledge, as a merely subjective condition of that knowledge. We have no right to transform it into a condition of the possibility of a knowledge of objects, that is, into a concept of thinking being in general. For we are not in a position to represent such being to ourselves save by putting ourselves, with the formula of our consciousness, in the place of every other intelligent being.

Nor is the simplicity of myself (as soul) really inferred from the proposition, 'I think'; it is already involved in every thought. The proposition, 'I am simple', must be regarded as an immediate expression of apperception, just as what is referred to as the Cartesian inference, cogito, ergo sum, is really a tautology, since the cogito (sum cogitans) asserts my existence immediately. 'I am simple' means nothing more than that this representation, 'I', does not contain in itself the least manifoldness and that it is absolute (although merely logical) unity.

Thus the renowned psychological proof is founded merely on the indivisible unity of a representation, which governs only the verb in its relation to a person. It is obvious that in attaching 'I' to our thoughts we designate the subject of inherence only transcendentally, without noting in it any quality whatsoever—in fact, without knowing anything of it either by direct acquaintance or otherwise. It means a something in general (transcendental subject), the representation of which must, no doubt, be simple, if only for the reason that there is nothing determinate in it. Nothing, indeed, can be represented that is simpler than that which is represented through the concept of a mere something. But the simplicity of the representation of a subject is not eo ipso knowledge of the simplicity of the subject itself, for we abstract altogether from its properties when we designate it solely by the entirely empty expression 'I', an expression which I can apply to every thinking subject.

This much, then, is certain, that through the 'I', I always A 336

1 [Reading, with Erdmann, die for der.]
2 [Reading, with Erdmann, den for dem.]
3 [etwas von ihm zu kennen, oder zu wissen.]

366 TRANZENDENTALE DIALETIK

anhängt und ihr vorgeht, gleichwohl aber nur immer in Ansehung einer möglich Erkenntnis überhaupt, als bloß subjektive Bedingung derselben, angesehen werden muß, die wir mit Unrecht zur Bedingung der Möglichkeit einer Erkenntnis der Gegenstände, nämlich zu einem Begriffe vom denkenden Wesen überhaupt machen, weil wir dieses uns nicht vorstellen können, ohne uns selbst mit der Formel unseres Bewußtseins an die Stelle jedes andern intelligenten Wesens zu setzen.

Aber die Einfachheit meiner selbst (als Seele) wird auch wirklich nicht aus dem Satze: Ich denke, geschlossen, sondern der erstere liegt schon in jedem Gedanken selbst. Der Satz: Ich bin einfach, muß als ein unmittelbarer Ausdruck der Apperception angesehen werden, so wie der vermeintliche kartesianische Schluss, cogito, ergo sum, in der Tat tautologisch ist, indem das cogito (sum cogitans) die Wirklichkeit unmittelbar aussagt. Ich bin einfach, bedeutet aber nichts mehr, als daß diese Vorstellung: Ich, nicht die mindeste Mannigfaltigkeit in sich fasse, und daß sie absolute (obwohl bloß logische) Einheit sey.


1 So viel ist gewiß: daß ich mir durch das Ich jedesmal eine

1 Akad.-Ausz.: »dies.«

A 335
entertain the thought of an absolute, but logical, unity of the subject (simplicity). It does not, however, follow that I thereby know the actual simplicity of my subject. The proposition, 'I am substance', signifies, as we have found, nothing but the pure category, of which I can make no use (empirically) in concreto; and I may therefore legitimately say: 'I am a simple substance', that is, a substance the representation of which never contains a synthesis of the manifold. But this concept, as also the proposition, tells us nothing whatsoever in regard to myself as an object of experience, since the concept of substance is itself used only as a function of synthesis, without any underlying intuition, and therefore without an object. It concerns only the condition of our knowledge; it does not apply to any assignable object. We will test the supposed usefulness of the proposition by an experiment.

Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of value only in so far as I can thereby distinguish this subject from all matter, and so can exempt it from the dissolution to which matter is always liable. This is indeed, strictly speaking, the only use for which the above proposition is intended, and is therefore generally expressed as 'The soul is not corporeal'. If, then, I can show that, although we allow full objective validity—the validity appropriate to a judgment of pure reason derived solely from pure categories—to this cardinal proposition of the rational doctrine of the soul (that is, that everything which thinks is a simple substance), we still cannot make the least use of this proposition in regard to the question of its dissimilarity from or relation to matter, this will be the same as if I had relegated this supposed psychological insight to the field of mere ideas, without any real objective use.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic we have proved, beyond all question, that bodies are mere appearances of our outer sense and not things in themselves. We are therefore justified in saying that our thinking subject is not corporeal; in other words, that, inasmuch as it is represented by us as object of inner sense, it cannot, in so far as it thinks, be an object of outer sense, that is, an appearance in space. This is equivalent to saying that thinking beings, as such, can never be found by us among outer appearances, and that their thoughts, con-
PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON (A) 339

sciousness, desires, etc., cannot be outwardly intuited. All these belong to inner sense. This argument does, in fact, seem to be so natural and so popular that even the commonest understanding appears to have always relied upon it, and thus already, from the earliest times, to have regarded souls as quite different entities from their bodies.

But although extension, impenetrability, cohesion, and motion—in short, everything which outer senses can give us—neither are not nor contain thoughts, feeling, desire, or resolution, these never being objects of outer intuition, nevertheless the something which underlies the outer appearances and which so affects our sense that it obtains the representations of space, matter, shape, etc., may yet, when viewed as noumenon (or better, as transcendental object), be at the same time the subject of our thoughts. That the mode in which our outer sense is thereby affected gives us no intuition of representations, will, etc., but only of space and its determinations, proves nothing to the contrary. For this something is not extended, nor is it impenetrable or composite, since all these predicates concern only sensibility and its intuition, in so far as we are affected by certain (to us otherwise unknown) objects. By such statements we are not, however, enabled to know what kind of an object it is, but only to recognize that if it be considered in itself, and therefore apart from any relation to the outer senses, these predicates of outer appearances cannot be assigned to it. On the other hand, the predicates of inner sense, representations and thought, are not inconsistent with its nature. Accordingly, even granting the human soul to be simple in nature, such simplicity by no means suffices to distinguish it from matter, in respect of the substratum of the latter—if, that is to say, we consider matter, as indeed we ought to, as mere appearance.

If matter were a thing in itself, it would, as a composite being, be entirely different from the soul, as a simple being. But matter is mere outer appearance, the substratum of which cannot be known through any predicate that we can assign to it. I can therefore very well admit the possibility that it is in itself simple, although owing to the manner in which it affects our senses it produces in us the intuition of the extended and so of

1 [Reading, with Erdmann, sind for sein.]

ZWEITER PARALOGUSMUS (A) 369

Bewußtsein, ihre Begierden etc. nicht äußerlich anschauen; denn dieses gehört alles vor den innern Sinn. In der Tat scheint dieses Argument auch das natürliche und populäre, worauf selbst der gemeinte Verstand von jemer gefallen zu sein scheint, und dadurch schon sehr früh Seelen, als von den Körperm ganz unterschiedene Wesen, zu betrachten angefangen hat.

Ob nun aber gleich die Ausdehnung, die Undurchdringlichkeit, Zusammenhang und Bewegung, kurz alles, was uns äußere Sinne nur liefern können, nicht Gedanken, Gefühl, Neigung oder Entschließung sein, oder solche enthalten werden, als die überall keine Gegenstände äußerer Anschauung sind, so könnte doch wohl dasjenige Etwas, welches den äußeren Erscheinungen im Grunde liegt, was unseren Sinn so affiziert, daß er die Vorstellung von Raum, Materie, Gestalt etc. bekommt, dieses Etwas, als Noomenon (oder besser, als transzendentaler Gegenstand) betrachtet, könnte doch auch zugleich das Subjekt der Gedanken sein, wie wohl wir durch die Art, wie unser äußere Sinn dadurch affiziert wird, keine Anschauung von Vorstellungen, Willen etc., sondern bloß vom Raum und dessen Bestimmungen bekommen. Dieses Etwas aber ist nicht ausgehend, nicht unverdurchdringlich, nicht zusammengesetzt, weil alle diese Prädikate nur die Sinnlichkeit und deren Anschauung angehen, so fern wir von dergleichen (uns übrigens unbekannten) Objekten affizieren werden. Diese Ausdrücke aber geben gar nicht zu erkennen, was vor einem Gegenstand es sei, sondern nur: daß ihm, als einem solchen, der ohne Beziehung auf äußere Sinne an sich selbst betrachtet wird, diese Prädikate äußerer Erscheinungen nicht beigelegt werden können. Allein die Prädikate des innern Sinnes, Vorstellungen und Denken, widersprechen ihm nicht. Dennoch ist selbst durch die eingebautete Einfachheit der Natur die menschliche Seele von der Materie, wenn man sie (wie man soll) bloß als Erscheinung betrachtet, in Anschauung des Substrats derselben gar nicht hinreichend unterscheiden.

Wäre Materie ein Ding an sich selbst, so würde sie als ein zusammengesetztes Wesen von der Seele, als einem einfachen, sich gänzlich und gar unterscheiden. Num ist sie aber bloß äußere Erscheinung, deren Substratum durch gar keine ansugehende Prädikate erkannt wird; mit dem kann ich von diesem wohl annehmen, daß es an sich einfach sei, ob es zwar in der Art, wie es unsere Sinne affiziert, in uns die Anschauung des Ausge-

1 Akad. Ausg.: sind.
the composite. I may further assume that the substance which
in relation to our outer sense possesses extension is in itself the
possessor of thoughts, and that these thoughts can by means of
its own inner sense be consciously represented. In this way,
what in one relation is entitled corporeal would in another
relation be at the same time a thinking being, whose thoughts
we cannot intuit, though we can indeed intuit their signs in the
[field of] appearance. Accordingly, the thesis that only
souls (as particular kinds of substances) think, would have
to be given up; and we should have to fall back on the
common expression that men think, that is, that the very
same being which, as outer appearance, is extended, is (in
itself) internally a subject, and is not composite, but is simple
and thinks.

But, without committing ourselves in regard to such hypo-
theses, we can make this general remark. If I understand by
soul a thinking being in itself, the question whether or not it is
the same in kind as matter—matter not being a thing in itself,
but merely a species of representations in us—is by its very
terms illegitimate. For it is obvious that a thing in itself is of a
different nature from the determinations which constitute only
its state.

If, on the other hand, we compare the thinking 'I' not with
matter but with the intelligible\(^1\) that lies at the basis of the
outer appearance which we call matter, we have no knowledge
whatsoever of the intelligible, and therefore are in no position
to say that the soul is in any inward respect different from it.

The simple consciousness is not, therefore, knowledge of
the simple nature of the self as subject, such as might enable us
to distinguish it from matter, as from a composite being.

If, therefore, in the only case\(^2\) in which this concept can be
of service, namely, in the comparison of myself with objects of
outer experience, it does not suffice for determining what is
pecific and distinct in the nature of the self, then though
we may still profess to know that the thinking 'I', the soul (a
name for the transcendental object of inner sense), is simple,
such a way of speaking has no sort of application to real ob-
jects, and therefore cannot in the least extend our knowledge.

1 [mit dem Intelligiblen.]
2 [Following Erdmman, in omitting \(\text{eben dasselbe.}\) ]
PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON (A) 341

Thus the whole of rational psychology is involved in the collapse of its main support. Here as little as elsewhere can we hope to extend our knowledge through mere concepts—still less by means of the merely subjective form of all our concepts, consciousness—in the absence of any relation to possible experience. For [as we have thus found], even the fundamental concept of a simple nature is such that it can never be met with in any experience, and such, therefore, that there is no way of attaining to it, as an objectively valid concept.

THIRD PARALOGISM: OF PERSONALITY

That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times is in so far a person.

Now the soul is conscious, etc.

Therefore it is a person.

Critique of the Third Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology

If I want to know through experience, the numerical identity of an external object, I shall pay heed to that permanent element in the appearance to which as subject everything else is related as determination, and note its identity throughout the time in which the determinations change. Now I am an object of inner sense, and all time is merely the form of inner sense. Consequently, I refer each and all of my successive determinations to the numerically identical self, and do so throughout time, that is, in the form of the inner intuition of myself. This being so, the personality of the soul has to be regarded not as inferred but as a completely identical proposition of self-consciousness in time; and this, indeed, is why it is valid a priori. For it really says nothing more than that in the whole time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of myself, and it comes to the same whether I say that this whole time is in me, as individual unity, or that I am to be found as numerically identical in all this time.

In my own consciousness, therefore, identity of person is unfailingly met with. But if I view myself from the standpoint of another person (as object of his outer intuition), it is this...

[^1] [die Ursache, weisen.]
outer observer who first represents me in time, for in the apperception time is represented, strictly speaking, only in me. Although he admits, therefore, the ‘I’, which accompanies, and indeed with complete identity, all representations at all times in my consciousness, he will draw no inference from this to the objective permanence of myself. For just as the time in which the observer sets me is not the time of my own but of his sensibility, so the identity which is necessarily bound up with my consciousness is not therefore bound up with his, that is, with the consciousness which contains the outer intuition of my subject.

The identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence, and in no way proves the numerical identity of my subject. Despite the logical identity of the ‘I’, such a change may have occurred in it as does not allow of the retention of its identity, and yet we may ascribe to it the same-sounding ‘I’, which in every different state, even in one involving change of the [thinking] subject, might still retain the thought of the preceding subject and so hand it over to the subsequent subject.*

Although the dictum of certain ancient schools, that everything in the world is in a flux and nothing is permanent and abiding, cannot be reconciled with the admission of substances, it is not refuted by the unity of self-consciousness.

* An elastic ball which impinges on another similar ball in a straight line communicates to the latter its whole motion, and therefore its whole state (that is, if we take account only of the positions in space). If, then, in analogy with such bodies, we postulate substances such that the one communicates to the other representations together with the consciousness of them, we can conceive a whole series of substances of which the first transmits its state together with its consciousness to the second, the second its own state with that of the preceding substance to the third, and this in turn the states of all the preceding substances together with its own consciousness and with their consciousness to another. The last substance would then be conscious of all the states of the previously changed substances, as being its own states, because they would have been transferred to it together with the consciousness of them. And yet it would not have been one and the same person in all these states.

* [geischlaufende]
For we are unable from our own consciousness to determine whether, as souls, we are permanent or not. Since we reckon as belonging to our identical self only that of which we are conscious, we must necessarily judge that we are one and the same throughout the whole time of which we are conscious. We cannot, however, claim that this judgment would be valid from the standpoint of an outside observer. For since the only permanent appearance which we encounter in the soul is the representation 'I' that accompanies and connects them all, we are unable to prove that this 'I', a mere thought, may not be in the same state of flux as the other thoughts which, by means of it, are linked up with one another.

It is indeed strange that personality, and its presupposition, permanence, and therefore the substantiality of the soul, should have to be proved at this stage and not earlier. For could we have presupposed these latter [permanence and substantiality], there would follow, not indeed the continuance of consciousness, yet at least the possibility of a continuing consciousness in an abiding subject, and that is already sufficient for personality. For personality does not itself at once cease because its activity is for a time interrupted. This permanence, however, is in no way given prior to that numerical identity of our self which we infer from identical apperception, but on the contrary is inferred first from the numerical identity. (If the argument proceeded aright, the concept of substance, which is applicable only empirically, would first be brought in after such proof of numerical identity.) Now, since this identity of person [presupposing, as it does, numerical identity] in nowise follows from the identity of the 'I' in the consciousness of all the time in which I know myself, we could not, earlier in the argument, have founded upon it the substantiality of the soul.

Meanwhile we may still retain the concept of personality—just as we have retained the concept of substance and of the simple—in so far as it is merely transcendental, that is, concerns1 the unity of the subject, otherwise unknown to us, in the determinations of which there is a thoroughgoing connection through apperception. Taken in this way, the concept is necessary for practical employment and is sufficient for

1 [Reading, with Adickens, d., Einheit des Subjekts betrifft.]
such use; but we can never parade it as an extension of our self-knowledge through pure reason, and as exhibiting to us from the mere concept of the identical self an unbroken continuance of the subject. For this concept revolves perpetually in a circle, and does not help us in respect to any question which aims at synthetic knowledge. What matter may be as a thing in itself (transcendental object) is completely unknown to us, though, owing to its being represented as something external, its permanence as appearance can indeed be observed. But if I want to observe the mere 'I' in the change of all representations, I have no other correlative to use in my comparisons except again myself, with the universal conditions of my consciousness. Consequently, I can give none but tautological answers to all questions, in that I substitute my concept and its unity for the properties which belong to myself as object, and so take for granted that which the questioner has desired to know.

Fourth Paralogism: Of Ideality

(IN REGARD TO OUTER RELATION)

That, the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause of given perceptions, has a merely doubtful existence.

Now all outer appearances are of such a nature that their existence is not immediately perceived, and that we can only infer them as the cause of given perceptions.

Therefore the existence of all objects of the outer senses is doubtful. This uncertainty I entitle the ideality of outer appearances, and the doctrine of this ideality is called idealism, as distinguished from the counter-assertion of a possible certainty in regard to objects of outer sense, which is called dualism.

Critique of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology

Let us first examine the premises. We are justified, [it is argued], in maintaining that only what is in ourselves can be perceived immediately, and that my own existence is the sole object of a mere perception. The existence, therefore, of an actual object outside me (if this word 'me' be taken in the
intellectual [not in the empirical sense] is never given directly in perception. Perception is a modification of inner sense, and the existence of the outer object can be added to it only in thought, as being its outer cause, and accordingly as being inferred. For the same reason, Descartes was justified in limiting all perception, in the narrowest sense of that term, to the proposition, 'I, as a thinking being, exist.' Obviously, since what is without is not in me, I cannot encounter it in my apperception, nor therefore in any perception, which, properly regarded, is merely the determination of apperception.

I am not, therefore, in a position to perceive external things, but can only infer their existence from my inner perception, taking the inner perception as the effect of which something external is the proximate cause. Now the inference from a given effect to a determinate cause is always uncertain, since the effect may be due to more than one cause. Accordingly, as regards the relation of the perception to its cause, it always remains doubtful whether the cause be internal or external; whether, that is to say, all the so-called outer perceptions are not a mere play of our inner sense, or whether they stand in relation to actual external objects as their cause. At all events, the existence of the latter is only inferred, and is open to all the dangers of inference, whereas the object of inner sense (I myself with all my representations) is immediately perceived, and its existence does not allow of being doubted.

The term 'idealistic' is not, therefore, to be understood as applying to those who deny the existence of external objects of the senses, but only to those who do not admit that their existence is known through immediate perception, and who therefore conclude that we can never, by way of any possible experience, be completely certain as to their reality.

Before exhibiting our paralogism in all its deceptive illusion, I have first to remark that we must necessarily distinguish two types of idealism, the transcendental and the empirical. By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves. To this ideal-
ism there is opposed a transcendental realism which regards
time and space as something given in themselves, indepen-
dently of our sensibility. The transcendental realist thus inter-
prets outer appearances (their reality being taken as granted)
as things-in-themselves, which exist independently of us and of
our sensibility, and which are therefore outside us—the phrase
'outside us' being interpreted in conformity with pure con-
cepts of understanding. It is, in fact, this transcendental realist
who afterwards plays the part of empirical idealist. After
wrongly supposing that objects of the senses, if they are to be
external, must have an existence by themselves, and inde-
pendently of the senses, he finds that, judged from this point
of view, all our sensuous representations are inadequate to
establish their reality.

The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, may be an
empirical realist or, as he is called, a dualist; that is, he may
admit the existence of matter without going outside his mere
self-consciousness, or assuming anything more than the cer-
tainty of his representations, that is, the cogito, ergo sum. For
he considers this matter and even its inner possibility to be
appearance merely; and appearance, if separated from our
sensibility, is nothing. Matter is with him, therefore, only a
species of representations (intuition), which are called external,
not as standing in relation to objects in themselves external,
but because they relate perceptions to the space in which all
things are external to one another, while yet the space itself is
in us.

From the start, we have declared ourselves in favour of
this transcendental idealism; and our doctrine thus removes
all difficulty in the way of accepting the existence of matter
on the unaided testimony of our mere self-consciousness, or of
declaring it to be thereby proved in the same manner as the
existence of myself as a thinking being is proved. There can
be no question that I am conscious of my representations;
these representations and I myself, who have the representa-
tions, therefore exist. External objects (bodies), however, are
mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of
my representations, the objects of which are something only
through these representations. Apart from them they are
nothing. Thus external things exist as well as I myself, and

Idealism ist ein transcendentaler Realismus entgegengesetzt,
der Zeit und Raum als etwas an sich (unabhängig von unserer
Sinnlichkeit) Gegebenes ansieht. Der transcendente, Realist
stellt sich also äußere Erscheinungen (wenn man ihre Wirk-
lichkeit einzürtm) als Dinge an sich selbst vor, die unabhängig
von uns und unserer Sinnlichkeit existieren, also auch nach
reinen Verstandesbegriffen außer uns wären. Dieser transzendental-
ende Realist ist es eigentlich, welcher nachher dem empirischen
Idealisten spielt, und nachdem er fälschlich von Gegenständen
der Sinne vorausgesetzt hat, daß, wenn sie äußere sein sollen, sie
an sich selbst auch ohne Sinne ihre Existenz haben müßten, in
diesem Gesichtspunkte alle unsere Vorstellungen der Sinne un-
südreichend findet, die Wirklichkeit derselben gewiß zu machen.

Der transcendente Idealist kann hingegen ein empiri-
ischer Realist, mithin, wie man ihn nennt, ein Dualist sein,
and. i. die Existenz der Materie einräumen, ohne aus dem bloßen
Selbstbewußtsein hinauszugehen, und etwas mehr, als die Ge-
wölbheit der Vorstellungen in mir, mithin das cogito, ergo sum,
anzunehmen. Denn weil er diese Materie und sogar deren
innere Möglichkeit bloß vor Erscheinung gelten läßt, die, von
unserer Sinnlichkeit abgetrennt, nichts ist: so ist sie bei ihm
nur eine Art Vorstellungen (Anschauung), welche äußerlich
heißen, nicht, als ob sie sich auf an sich selbst äußere
Gegenstände bezügen, sondern weil sie Wahrnehmungen auf
den Raum beziehen, in welchem alles außer einander, er selbst
der Raum aber in uns ist.

Vor diesen transcendentalen Idealismen haben wir uns nun
schon im Anfange erklärt. Also fällt bei unserem Lehrgriß
alle Bedenklichkeit weg, das Dasein der Materie sogar so auf
das Zeugnis: unseres bloßen Selbstbewußtseins annehmen
und dadurch vor bewiesen zu erklären, wie das Dasein meiner
selbst als eines denkenden Wesens. Denn ich bin mir doch
meiner Vorstellungen bewußt; also existieren diese und ich
selbst, der ich diese Vorstellungen habe. Nun sind aber äußere
Gegenstände (die Körper) bloß Erscheinungen, mithin auch
nichts anders, als eine Art meiner Vorstellungen, deren Gegen-
stände nur durch diese Vorstellungen etwas sind, von ihnen
abgesondert aber nichts sein. Also existieren eben sowohl
dißere Ginge, als ich selbst existiere, und zwar beid auf das

1 Akad.-Ausz.: »sind.«
both, indeed, upon the immediate witness of my self-consciousness. The only difference is that the representation of myself, as the thinking subject, belongs to inner sense only, while the representations which mark extended beings belong also to outer sense. In order to arrive at the reality of outer objects I have just as little need to resort to inference as I have in regard to the reality of the object of my inner sense, that is, in regard to the reality of my thoughts. For in both cases alike the objects are nothing but representations, the immediate perception (consciousness) of which is at the same time a sufficient proof of their reality.

The transcendental idealist is, therefore, an empirical idealist, and allows to matter, as appearance, a reality which does not permit of being inferred, but is immediately perceived. Transcendental realism, on the other hand, inevitably falls into difficulties, and finds itself obliged to give way to empirical idealism, in that it regards the objects of outer sense as something distinct from the senses themselves, treating mere appearances as self-subsistent beings, existing outside us. On such a view as this, however clearly we may be conscious of our representation of these things, it is still far from certain that, if the representation exists, there exists also the object corresponding to it. In our system, on the other hand, these external things, namely matter, are in all their configurations and alterations nothing but mere appearances, that is, representations in us, of the reality of which we are immediately conscious.

Since, so far as I know, all psychologists who adopt empirical idealism are transcendental realists, they have certainly proceeded quite consistently in ascribing great importance to empirical idealism, as one of the problems in regard to which the human mind is quite at a loss how to proceed. For if we regard outer appearances as representations produced in us by their objects, and if these objects be things existing in themselves outside us, it is indeed impossible to see how we can come to know the existence of the objects otherwise than by inference from the effect to the cause; and this being so, it must always remain doubtful whether the cause in question be in us or outside us. We can indeed admit that something, which

unmittelbare Zeugnis meines Selbstbewußtseins, nur mit dem Unterschiede: daß die Vorstellung meiner selbst, als des denkenden Subjekts, bloß auf den innern, die Vorstellungen aber, welche ausgedehnte Wesen bezeichnen, auch auf den äußern Sinn besessen werden. Ich habe in Absicht auf die Wirklichkeit äußerer Gegenstände eben so wenigstens zu schließen, als in Anzeckung der Wirklichkeit des Gegenstandes meines inneren Sinnes (meiner Gedanken), denn sie sind beiderseits nicht als Vorstellungen, deren unmittelbare Wahrnehmung (Bewußtsein) zugleich ein genugsmater Beweis ihrer Wirklichkeit ist.

Auch der transcendente Idealismus ein empirischer Realismus und gestehet der Materie, als Erscheinung, eine Wirklichkeit zu, die nicht geschlossen werden darf, sondern unmittelbar wahrgenommen wird. Dagegen kommt der transcendente Idealismus notwendig in Verlegenheit, und sieht sich genötigt, dem empirischen Idealismus Platz einzuräumen, weil er die Gegenstände äußerer Sinne vor etwas von den Sinnen selbst Unterschiedenes, und bloße Erscheinungen vor selbständige Wesen ansieht; die sich äußer uns befinden; da denn freilich, bei unserem besten Bewußtsein unserer Vorstellung von diesen Dingen, noch lange nicht gewiß ist, daß, wenn die Vorstellung existiert, auch der ihr korrespondierende Gegenstand existiere; dahingegen in unserem System diese äußere Dinge, die Materie nämlich, in allen ihren Gestalten und Veränderungen, nichts als bloße Erscheinungen, d. i. Vorstellungen in uns sind, deren Wirklichkeit wir uns unmittelbar bewußt werden.

Da nun, so viel ich weiß, alle dem empirischen Idealismus anhängende Psychologen transcendente Realisten seien, so haben sie freilich ganz konsequent verfahren, dem empirischen Idealismus große Wichtigkeit zugestehen, als einem von den Problemen, daraus die menschliche Vernunft sich schließlich zu helfen wisse. Denn in der Tat, wenn man äußere Erscheinungen als Vorstellungen ansieht, die von ihren Gegenständen, als an sich außer uns befindlichen Dingen, in uns gewirkt werden, so ist nicht abzusehen, wie man dieser ihr. Dessen anders, als durch den Schluß von der Wirkung auf die Ursache, erkennen könne, bei welchem es immer zweifelhaft bleiben muß, ob die letztere in uns, oder außer uns sei. Nun kann man zwar...

[A 372]
may be (in the transcendental sense) outside us, is the cause of our outer intuitions, but this is not the object of which we are thinking in the representations of matter and of corporeal things; for these are merely appearances, that is, mere kinds of representation, which are never to be met with save in us, and the reality of which depends on immediate consciousness, just as does the consciousness of my own thoughts. The transcendental object is equally unknown in respect to inner and to outer intuition. But it is not of this that we are speaking, but of the empirical object, which is called an external object if it is represented in space, and an inner object if it is represented only in its time-relations. Neither space nor time, however, is to be found save in us.

The expression 'outside us' is thus unavoidably ambiguous in meaning, sometimes signifying what as thing in itself exists apart from us, and sometimes what belongs solely to outer appearance. In order, therefore, to make this concept, in the latter sense—the sense in which the psychological question as to the reality of our outer intuition has to be understood—quite unambiguous, we shall distinguish empirically external objects from those which may be said to be external in the transcendental sense, by explicitly entitling the former 'things which are to be found in space'.

Space and time are indeed a priori representations, which dwell in us as forms of our sensible intuition, before any real object, determining our sense through sensation, has enabled us to represent the object under those sensible relations. But the material or real element, the something which is to be intuited in space, necessarily presupposes perception. Perception exhibits the reality of something in space; and in the absence of perception no power of imagination can invent and produce something. It is sensation, therefore, that indicates a reality in space or in time, according as it is related to the one or to the other mode of sensible intuition. (Once sensation is given—if referred to an object in general, though not as determining that object, it is entitled perception—thanks to its manifoldness we can picture in imagination many objects which have no empirical place in space or time outside the imagination.)

1. [Reading, with Erdmann, oder for und.]
2. [Brackets not in text.]
PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON (A) 349

This admits of no doubt; whether we take pleasure and pain, or the sensations of the outer senses, colours, heat, etc., perception is that whereby the material required to enable us to think objects of sensible intuition—must first be given. This perception, therefore (to consider, for the moment, only outer intuitions), represents something real irspace. For, in the first place, while space is the representation of a mere possibility of coexistence, perception is the representation of a reality. Secondly, this reality is represented in outer sense, that is, in space. Thirdly, space is itself nothing but mere representation, and therefore nothing in it can count as real save only what is represented in it, and conversely, what is given in it, that is, represented through perception, is also real in it. For if it were not real, that is, immediately given through empirical intuition, it could not be pictured in imagination, since what is real in intuitions cannot be invented a priori.

All outer perception, therefore, yields immediate proof of something real in space, or rather is the real itself. In this sense empirical realism is beyond question; that is, there corresponds to our outer intuitions something real in space. Space itself, with all its appearances, as representations, is, indeed, only in me, but nevertheless the real, that is, the material of all objects of outer intuition, is actually given in this space, independently of all imaginative invention. Also, it is impossible that in this space anything outside us (in the transcendental sense) should be given, space itself being nothing outside our sensibility. Even the most rigid idealist cannot, therefore, require a proof that the object outside us (taking ‘outside’ in the strict [transcendental] sense) corresponds to our perception. For if there be any such object, it could not be

* We must give full credence to this paradoxical but correct proposition, that there is nothing in space save what is represented in it. For space is itself nothing but representation, and whatever is in it must therefore be contained in the representation. Nothing whatsoever is in space, save in so far as it is actually represented in it. It is a proposition which must indeed sound strange, that a thing can exist only in the representation of it, but in this case the objection falls, inasmuch as the things with which we are here concerned are not things in themselves, but appearances only, that is, representations.

1 [wirklichs. In this section, as elsewhere, Kant uses Wirklichkeit and Realität as synonymous terms.]
represented and intuited as outside us, because such representation and intuition presuppose space, and reality in space, being the reality of a mere representation, is nothing other than perception itself. The real of outer appearances is therefore real in perception only, and can be real in no other way.

From perceptions knowledge of objects can be generated, either by mere play of imagination or by way of experience; and in the process there may, no doubt, arise illusory representations to which the objects do not correspond, the deception being attributable sometimes to a delusion of imagination (in dreams) and sometimes to an error of judgment (in so-called sense-deception). To avoid such deceptive illusion, we have to proceed according to the rule: Whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws, is actual. But such deception, as well as the provision against it, affects idealism quite as much as dualism, inasmuch as we are concerned only with the form of experience. Empirical idealism, and its mistaken questionings as to the objective reality of our outer perceptions, is already sufficiently refuted, when it has been shown that outer perception yields immediate proof of something actual in space, and that this space, although in itself only a mere form of representations, has objective reality in relation to all outer appearances, which also are nothing else than mere representations; and when it has likewise been shown that in the absence of perception even imagining and dreaming are not possible, and that our outer senses, as regards the data from which experience can arise, have therefore their actual corresponding objects in space.

The dogmatic idealist would be one who denies the existence of matter, the sceptical idealist one who doubts its existence, because holding it to be incapable of proof. The former must base his view on supposed contradictions in the possibility of there being such a thing as matter at all—a view with which we have not yet been called upon to deal. The following section on dialectical inferences, which represents reason as in strife with itself in regard to the concepts which it makes for itself the possibility of what belongs to the

\[\text{A 377}\]

\[\text{VIERTER PARALOGISMUS (A)}\] 384 as außer uns vorgestellt und angeschaut werden können, weil dieses den Raum voraussetzt, und die Wirklichkeit im Raume, als einer bloßen Vorstellung, nichts anders als die Wahrnehmung selbst ist. Das Reale äußerer Erscheinungen ist also wirklich nur in der Wahrnehmung und kann auf keine andere Weise wirklich sein.

Aus Wahrnehmungen kann nun, entwiderr durch ein bloßes Spiel der Einbildung, oder auch vermittels der Erfahrung, Erkennnis der Gegenstände erzielt werden. Und da können allerdings trügliche Vorstellungen entspringen, denen die Gegenstände nicht entsprechen und woher die Täuschung bald einem Blendwerk der Einbildung (im Traume), bald einem Fehltritt der Urteilskraft (beim sogenannten Betrugs der Sinne) beisumesset ist. Um nun hierin dem falschen Scheine zu entgehen, verfährt man nach der Regel: Was mit einer Wahrnehmung nach empirischen Gesetzen zusammenhängt, ist wirklich. Allein diese Täuschung sowohl, als die Verwahrung wider dieselbe, trifft eben sowohl den Idealismus als den Dualismus, indem es dabei nur um die Form der Erfahrung zu tun ist. Den empirischen Idealismus, als eine falsche Bedenklichkeit wegen der objektiven Realität unserer äußeren Wahrnehmungen, zu widerlegen, ist schon hinreichend: daß äußere Wahrnehmung eine Wirklichkeit im Raume unmittelbar beweise, welcher Raum, ob er zwar an sich nur bloße Form der Vorstellungen ist, dennoch in Ansehung aller äußeren Erscheinungen (dah auch nichts anders als bloße Vorstellungen sind) objektive Reallität hat; imgleichen: daß ohne Wahrnehmung selbst die Erdsichtung und der Träum nicht möglich sein, unsere äußere Sinne also, den Dats nach, woraus Erfahrung entspringen kann, ihre wirkliche entsprechende Gegenstände im Raume haben.

Der dogmatische Idealist würde derjenige sein, der das Dasein der Materie leugnet, der skeptische, der sie be
deutet, weil er sie vor unwesentlich hält. Der erstere kann es nur darum sein, weil er in der Möglichkeit einer Materie überhaupt Widersprüche zu finden glaubt, und mit diesem haben wir es jetzt nicht zu tun. Der folgende Abschnitt von dialektischen Schlüssen, der die Vernunft in ihrem inneren Streit in Ansehung der Begriffe, die sich von der Möglichkeit dessen,

\[\text{Akad.-Ausz.:} \text{Begriffe von der Möglichkeit.}\]
\[\text{Akad.-Ausz.:} \text{seiets.}\]

\[\text{A 376, 377}\]
PARALOGISM OF PURE REASON (A) 351
connection of experience, will remove this difficulty. The sceptical idealist, however, who merely challenges the ground of our assertion and denounces as insufficiently justified our conviction of the existence of matter, which we thought to base on immediate perception, is a benefactor of human reason in so far as he compels us, even in the smallest advances of ordinary experience, to keep on the watch, lest we consider a well-earned possession what we perhaps obtain only illegitimately. We are now in a position to appreciate the value of these idealist objections. Unless we mean to contradict ourselves in our commonest assertions, they drive us by main force to view all our perceptions, whether we call them inner or outer, as a consciousness only of what is dependent on our sensibility. They also compel us to view the outer objects of these perceptions not as things in themselves, but only as presentations, of which, as of every other representation, we can become immediately conscious, and which are entitled outer because they depend on what we call 'outer sense', whose intuition is space. Space itself, however, is nothing but an inner mode of representation in which certain perceptions are connected with one another.

If we treat outer objects as things in themselves, it is quite impossible to understand how we could arrive at a knowledge of their reality outside us, since we have to rely merely on the representation which is in us. For we cannot be sentient [of what is] outside ourselves, but only [of what is] in us, and the whole of our self-consciousness therefore yields nothing save merely our own determinations. Sceptical idealism thus constrains us to have recourse to the only refuge still open, namely, the ideality of all appearances, a doctrine which has already been established in the Transcendental Aesthetic independently of these consequences, which we could not at that stage foresee. If then we ask, whether it follows that in the doctrine of the soul dualism alone is tenable, we must answer: 'Yes, certainly; but dualism only in the empirical sense'. That is to say, in the connection of experience matter, as substance in the [field of] appearance, is really given to outer sense, just as the thinking 'I', also as substance in the [field of] appearance, is given to inner sense. Further, appearances in both fields

A 378
was in den Zusammenhang der Erfahrung gehört, vorstellt, wird auch dieser Schwierigkeit abhelfen. Der skeptische Idealist aber, der bloß den Grund unserer Behauptung ansicht und unsere Überredung von dem Dasein der Materie, die wir auf unmittelbare Wahrnehmung zu gründen glauben, vor unsrechends erklärt, ist so fern ein Wohltäter der menschlichen Vernunft, als er uns nötigt, selbst bei dem kleinsten Schritte der gemachten Erfahrung, die Augen wohl aufzutun, und, was wir vielleicht nur erscheinen, nicht sogleich als wohlerworben in unseren Besitz aufzunehmen. Der Nutzen, den diese idealistische Einwürfe hier schaffen, fällt jetzt klar in die Augen. Sie treiben uns mit Gewalt dahin, wenn wir uns nicht in unseren gemeinsamen Behauptungen verweichen wollen, alle Wahrnehmungen, sie mögen nun innere, oder äußere heißen, bloß als ein Bewußtsein dessen, was unserer Sinnlichkeit anhängt, und die äußeren Gegenstände derselben nicht vor Dinge an sich selbst, sondern nur vor Vorstellungen ansuziehen, deren wir uns, wie jeder anderen Vorstellung, unmittelbar bewußt werden können, die aber darum äußere heißen, weil sie demjenigen Sinne anhängen, den wir den äußeren Sinn nennen, dessen Anschauung der Raum ist, der aber doch selbst nichts anders, als eine innere Vorstellungsart ist, in welcher sich gewisse Wahrnehmungen mit einander verknüpfen.

Wenn wir äußere Gegenstände vor Dinge an sich gelten lassen, so ist schlechthin unmöglich zu begreifen, wie wir nur Erkenntnis ihrer Wirklichkeit äußer uns kommen sollen, indem wir uns bloß auf die Vorstellung stützen, die in uns ist. Denn man kann doch außer sich nicht empfinden, sondern nur in sich selbst, und das ganze Selbstbewußtsein liefert daher nichts, als lediglich unsere eigene Bestimmungen. Also nötigt uns der skeptische Idealismus, die einsige Zuflucht, die uns übrig bleibt, nämlicu au der Idealität aller Erscheinungen zu ergreifen, welche wir in der transzendentalen Ästhetik unabhängig von diesen Folgen, die wir damals nicht vorausschicken konnten, dargetan haben. Frägt man nun: ob denn diesem su Folge der Dualismus allein in der Seelenlehre statt finde, so ist die Antwort: Allerdings! aber nur im empirischen Verstände, d. i. in dem Zusammenhange der Erfahrung ist wirklich Materie, als Substans in der Erscheinung, dem äußeren Sinne, so wie das denkende Ich, gleichfalls als Substans in der Erscheinung, vor dem inneren Sinne gegeben und nach den Regeln, welche diese

A 379
[beiderseits.]
must be connected with each other according to the rules which this category introduces into that connection of our outer as well as of our inner perceptions whereby they constitute one experience. If, however, as commonly happens, we seek to extend the concept of dualism, and take it in the transcendental sense, neither it nor the two counter-alternatives—pneumatism on the one hand, materialism on the other—would have any sort of basis, since we should then have misapplied our concepts, taking the difference in the mode of representing objects, which, as regards what they are in themselves, still remain unknown to us, as a difference in the things themselves. Though the 'I', as represented through inner sense in time, and objects in space outside me, are specifically quite distinct appearances, they are not for that reason thought as being different things. Neither the transcendental object which underlies outer appearances nor that which underlies inner intuition, is in itself either matter or a thinking being, but a ground (to us unknown) of the appearances which supply to us the empirical concept of the former as well as of the latter mode of existence.

If then, as this critical argument obviously compels us to do, we hold fast to the rule above established, and do not push our questions beyond the limits within which possible experience can present us with its object, we shall never dream of seeking to inform ourselves about the objects of our senses as they are in themselves, that is, out of all relation to the senses. But if the psychologist takes appearances for things in themselves, and as existing in and by themselves, then whether he be a materialist who admits into his system nothing but matter alone, or a spiritualist who admits only thinking beings (that is, beings with the form of our inner sense), or a dualist who accepts both, he will always, owing to this misunderstanding, be entangled in pseudo-rational speculations as to how that which is not a thing in itself, but only the appearance of a thing in general, can exist by itself.

A 380

Consideration of Pure Psychology as a whole, in view of these Paralogisms

If we compare the doctrine of the soul as the physiology of inner sense, with the doctrine of the body as a physiology of
PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON (A) 353

de the object of the outer senses, we find that while in both much
can be learnt empirically, there is yet this notable difference.
In the latter science much that is a priori can be synthetically
known from the mere concept of an extended impenetrable
being, but in the former nothing whatsoever that is a priori
can be known synthetically from the concept of a thinking
being. The cause is this. Although both are appearances,
the appearance to outer sense has something fixed or abiding
which supplies a substratum as the basis of its transitory
determinations and therefore a synthetic concept, namely,
that of space and of an appearance in space; whereas time,
which is the sole form of our inner intuition, has nothing
abiding, and therefore yields knowledge only of the change
of determinations, not of any object that can be thereby deter-
dined. For in what we entitle 'soul', everything is in con-
tinual flux and there is nothing abiding except (if we must so
express ourselves) the 'I', which is simple solely because its
representation has no content, and therefore no manifold, and
for this reason seems to represent, or (to use a more correct
term) denote, a simple object. In order that it should be possible,
by pure reason, to obtain knowledge of the nature of a thinking
being in general, this 'I' would have to be an intuition which,
in being presupposed in all thought (prior to all experience),
might as intuition yield a priori synthetic propositions. This
'I' is, however, as little an intuition as it is a concept of any
object; it is the mere form of consciousness, which can accom-
pany the two kinds of representation and which is in a position
to elevate them to the rank of knowledge only so far as some-
thing else is given in intuition which provides material for a
representation of an object. Thus the whole of rational psy-
chology, as a science surpassing all powers of human reason,
proves abortive, and nothing is left for us but to study our soul
under the guidance of experience, and to confine ourselves
to those questions which do not go beyond the limits within
which a content can be provided for them by possible inner
experience.

But although rational psychology cannot be used to extend
knowledge, and when so employed is entirely made up of
paralogisms, still we cannot deny it a considerable negative
value, if it is taken as nothing more than a critical treatment

Gegenstände äußerer Sinne vergleichen: so finden wir, außer
dem, daß in beiden vieles empirisch erkannt werden kann, doch
diesen merkwürdigen Unterschied, daß in der letzteren Wissen-
schaft vieles a priori, aus dem bloßen Begriffe eines aus-
gedehnten undurchdringlichen Wesens, in der ersteren aber,
aus dem Begriffe eines denkenden Wesens, gar nichts a priori
synthetisch erkannt werden kann. Die Ursache ist diese. Ob-
gleich beider Erscheinungen sind, so hat doch die Erscheinung
vor dem äußeren Sinne etwas Stehendes, oder Bleibendes, wel-
ches ein, den wandelbaren Bestimmungen zum Grunde liegen-
des Substratum und mithin einen synthetischen Begriff, näm-
lch den vom Raume und einer Erscheinung in demselben, an
die Hand gibt, anstatt daß die Zeit, welche die einzige Form
unserer inneren Anschauung ist, nichts Bleibendes hat, mithin
nur den Wechsel der Bestimmungen, nicht aber den bestimm-
baren Gegenstand zu erkennen gibt. Denn, in dem, was wir
S susceptible nennen, ist alles im kontinuierlichen Flusse und nichts
Bleibendes, außer etwas (wohn man es durchaus will) das darum
so einfache Ich, weil diese Vorstellung keinen Inhalt, mithin
kein Meinungsgesetz, hat, weswegen sie auch scheint, ein ein-
faches Objekt vorzustellen, oder, besser gesagt, zu bezeichnen.
Dieses Ich müßte eine Anschauung sein, welche, da sie beim
Denken überhaupt (vor aller Erfahrung) vorausgesetzt würde,
as Anschauung a priori synthetische Sätze lieferte, wenn es
möglich sein sollte, eine reine Vernunfterkennnis von der
Natur eines denkenden Wesens überhaupt zu Stände zu brin-
gen. Allein dieses Ich ist so wenig Anschauung, als Begriff von
irgend einem Gegenstande, sondern die bloße Form des Be-
wußtseins, welches beiderlei Vorstellungen begleitet, und sie
dadurch zu Erkenntnissen erheben kann, so fern nämlich dazu
noch irgend etwas anders in der Anschauung gegeben wird,
welches zu einer Vorstellung von einem Gegenstande Stoff
darreichet. Also fällt die ganze rationale Psychologie, als eine, alle
Kräfte der menschlichen Vernunft übersteigende Wissenschaft,
nicht uns nichts übrig, als unsere Seele an dem Leit-
faden der Erfahrung zu studieren und uns in den Schranken
der Fragen zu halten, die nicht weiter gehen, als möglich innere
Erfahrung ihren Inhalt darlegen kann.

Ob sie nun aber gleich als erweiterte Erkenntnis keinen
Nutzten hat, sondern als solche aus lauter Paralogismen zusam-
mengesetzt ist, so kann man ihr doch, wenn sie vor nichts mehr,
eine kritische Behandlung unserer dialektischen Schlüsse,
of our dialectical inferences, those that arise from the common and natural reason of men.

Why do we have resort to a doctrine of the soul founded exclusively on pure principles of reason? Beyond all doubt, chiefly in order to secure our thinking self against the danger of materialism. This is achieved by means of the pure concept\(^3\) of our thinking self which we have just given. For by this teaching so completely are we freed from the fear that on the removal of matter all thought, and even the very existence of thinking beings, would be destroyed, that on the contrary it is clearly shown, that if I remove the thinking subject the whole corporeal world must at once vanish; it is nothing save an appearance in the sensibility of our subject and a mode of its representations.

I admit that this does not give me any further knowledge of the properties of this thinking self, nor does it enable me to determine its permanence or even that it exists independently of what we may conjecture to be the transcendental substratum of outer appearances; for the latter is just as unknown to me as is the thinking self. But it is nevertheless possible that I may find cause, on other than merely speculative grounds, to hope for an independent and continuing existence of my thinking nature, throughout all possible change of my state. In that case much will already have been gained if, while freely confessing my own ignorance, I am yet in a position to repel the dogmatic assaults of a speculative opponent, and to show him that he can never know more of the nature of the self\(^4\) in denying the possibility of my expectations than I can know in clinging to them.

Three other dialectical questions, constituting the real goal of rational psychology, are grounded on this transcendental illusion in our psychological concepts, and cannot be decided except by means of the above enquiries: namely (1) of the possibility of the communion\(^3\) of the soul with an organised body, i.e. concerning animality and the state of the soul in the life of man; (2) of the beginning of this communion, that is, of the soul in and before birth; (3) of the end of this communion, that is, of the soul in and after death (the question of immortality).

\(^3\) [Vernunftbegriff]  \(^4\) [meines Subjekts]  \(^3\) [Gemeinschaft]
PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON (A) 355

Now I maintain that all the difficulties commonly found in these questions, and by means of which, as dogmatic objections, men seek to gain credit for a deeper insight into the nature of things than any to which the ordinary understanding can properly lay claim, rest on a mere delusion by which they hypostatize what exists merely in thought, and take it as a real object existing, in the same character, outside the thinking subject. In other words, they regard extension, which is nothing but appearance, as a property of outer things that subsists even apart from our sensibility, and hold that motion is due to these things and really occurs in and by itself, apart from our senses. For matter, the communion of which with the soul arouses so much questioning, is nothing but a mere form, or a particular way of representing an unknown object by means of that intuition which is called outer sense. There may well be something outside us to which this appearance, which we call matter, corresponds; in its character of appearance it is not, however, outside us, but is only a thought in us, although this thought, through the above-mentioned outer sense, represents it as existing outside us. Matter, therefore, does not mean a kind of substance quite distinct and heterogeneous from the object of inner sense (the soul), but only the distinctive nature of those appearances of objects—in themselves unknown to us—the representations of which we call outer as compared with those which we count as belonging to inner sense, although like all other thoughts these outer representations belong only to the thinking subject. They have, indeed, this deceptive property that, representing objects in space, they detach themselves as it were from the soul and appear to hover outside it. Yet the very space in which they are intuited is nothing but a representation, and no counterpart of the same quality is to be found outside the soul. Consequently, the question is no longer of the communion of the soul with other known substances of a different kind outside us, but only of the connection of the representations of inner sense with the modifications of our outer sensibility—as to how these can be so connected with each other according to settled laws that they exhibit the unity of a coherent experience.

As long as we take inner and outer appearances together as mere representations in experience, we find nothing absurd

Ich behaupte nun, daß alle Schwierigkeiten, die man bei diesen Fragen vorzufinden glaubt, und mit denen, als dogmatischen Einwürfen, man sich das Ansehen einer tieferen Einsicht in die Natur der Dinge, als der gemeine Verstand wohl haben kann, zu geben sucht, auf einem bloßen Blendswerke beruht1, nach welchem man das, was bloß in Gedanken existiert, hypostasiers, und in dieser derselben Qualität, als einem wirklichem Gegenstand außerhalb dem denkenden Subjekte an- nimmt, nämlich Ausdehnung, die nichts als Erscheinung ist, vor eine, auch ohne unsere Sinnlichkeit, subsistierende Eigenschaft äußrer Dinge, und Bewegung vor deren Wirkung, welche auch außer unseren Sinne an sich wirklich vorgeht, zu halten. Denn die Materie, deren Gemeinschaft mit der Seele so großes Bedenken erregt, ist nichts anders als eine bloße Form, oder eine gewisse Vorstellung art eines unbekannten Gegenstandes, durch diejenige Anschauung, welche man den äußeren Sinn nennt. Es mag also wohl etwas außer uns sein, dem diese Erscheinung, welche wir Materie nennen, korrespon- diert; aber, in derselben Qualität als Erscheinung ist es nicht außer uns, sondern lediglich als ein Gedanke in uns, wie wohl dieser Gedanke, durch genanntem Sinn, es als außer uns befindlich-vorstell. Materie bedeutet also nicht eine von dem Gegen- stande des inneren Sinnes (Seele) so ganz unterschiedene und heterogene Art von Substanzen, sondern nur die Ungeleistetig- heit der Erscheinungen von Gegenständen (die uns an sich selbst unbekannt sind), deren Vorstellungen wir äußere nennen, in Vergleichung mit denen, die wir dem innern Sinne zählen, ob sie gleich eben soviel bloß dem denkenden Subjekte, als alle übrige Gedanken, gehören, nur daß sie dieses Täuschen an sich haben: daß, da sie Gegenstände im Raume vorstellen, sich1 gleichsam von der Seele ablösen und außer ihr zu schweben scheinen, da doch selbst der Raum, darin sie angeschaut werden, nichts als eine Vorstellung ist, deren Gegenbild in derselben Qualität außer der Seele gar nicht angetroffen werden kann. Nun ist die Frage nicht mehr: von der Gemeinschaft der Seele mit anderen bekannten und fremdartigen Substanzen außer uns, sondern bloß von der Verknüpfung der Vorstellungen des inneren Sinnes mit den Modifikationen unserer äußeren Sinnlichkeit, und wie diese unter einander nach beständigem Gesetzen verküpfen sein mögen, so daß sie in einer Erfah- rungs zusammenhängen.

So lange wir unsere und äußere Erscheinungen, als bloße Vorstellungen in der Erfahrung, mit einander zusammen hal-

1 Akad.-Aug.: »beruhent«. 1 Akad.-Aug.: »vorfellen, sie sich.«
and strange in the association\(^1\) of the two kinds of senses. But as soon as we hypostatise outer appearances and come to regard them not as representations but as "things existing by themselves outside us, with the same quality as that with which they exist in us," and as bringing to bear on our thinking subject the activities which they exhibit as appearances in relation to each other, then the efficient causes outside us assume a character which is irreconcilable with their effects in us. For the cause relates only to outer sense, the effect to inner sense—senses which, although combined in one subject, are extremely unlike each other. In outer sense we find no other outer effects save changes of place, and no forces except mere tendencies which issue in spatial relations as their effects. Within us, on the other hand, the effects are thoughts, among which is not to be found any relation of place, motion, shape, or other spatial determination, and we altogether lose the thread of the causes in the effects to which they are supposed to have given rise in inner sense. We ought, however, to bear in mind that bodies are not objects in themselves which are present to us, but a mere appearance of what we know not what unknown object; that motion is not the effect of this unknown cause, but only the appearance of its influence on our senses. Neither bodies nor motions are anything outside us; both alike are mere representations in us; and it is not, therefore, the motion of matter that produces representations in us; the motion itself is representation only, as also is the matter which makes itself known in this way. Thus in the end the whole difficulty which we have made for ourselves comes to this, how and why the representations of our sensibility are so interconnected that those which we entitle outer intuitions can be represented according to empirical laws as objects outside us—a question which is not in any way bound up with the supposed difficulty of explaining the origin of our representations from quite heterogeneous efficient causes outside us. That difficulty has arisen from our taking the appearances of an unknown cause as being the cause itself outside us, a view which can result in nothing but confusion. In the case of judgments in which a misapprehension has taken deep root through long custom, it is impossible at once to give to their correction that clarity

\(^1\) [Gemeinschaft.]
which can be achieved in other cases where no such inevitable illusion confuses the concept. Our freeing of reason from sophistical theories can hardly, therefore, at this stage have the clearness which is necessary for its complete success.

The following comments will, I think, be helpful as contributing towards this ultimate clarity.

All objections can be divided into dogmatic, critical, and sceptical. A dogmatic objection is directed against a proposition, a critical objection against the proof of a proposition. The former requires an insight into the nature of the object such that we can maintain the opposite of what the proposition has alleged in regard to this object. It is therefore itself dogmatic, claiming acquaintance with the constitution of the object fuller than that of the counter-assertion. A critical objection, since it leaves the validity or invalidity of the proposition unchallenged, and assails only the proof, does not presuppose fuller acquaintance with the object or oblige us to claim superior knowledge of its nature; it shows only that the assertion is unsupported, not that it is wrong. A sceptical objection sets assertion and counter-assertion in mutual opposition to each other as having equal weight, treating each in turn as dogma and the other as the objection thereto. And the conflict, as the being thus seemingly dogmatic on both the opposing sides, is taken as showing that all judgment in regard to the object is completely null and void. Thus dogmatic and sceptical objections alike lay claim to such insight into their object as is required to assert or to deny something in regard to it. A critical objection, on the other hand, confines itself to pointing out that in the making of the assertion something has been presupposed that is void and merely fictitious; and it thus overthrows the theory by removing its alleged foundation without claiming to establish anything that bears directly upon the constitution of the object.

So long as we hold to the ordinary concepts of our reason with regard to the communion in which our thinking subject stands with the things outside us, we are dogmatic, looking upon them as real objects existing independently of us, in accordance with a certain transcendental dualism which does not assign these outer appearances to the subject as representations, but sets them, just as they are given us in

derjenigen Fasslichkeit zu bringen, welche in anderen Fallen gefordert werden kann, wo keine dergleichen unmerkliche Illusion den Begriff verwirrt. Daher wird diese unsere Befreiung der Vernunft von sophistischen Theorien schwerlich schon die Deutlichkeit haben, die ihr zur vollen Befriedigung nötig ist.

Ich glaube diese auf folgende Weise befördern zu können.

Alle Einwürfe können in dogmatische, kritische und skeptische eingeordnet werden. Der dogmatische Einwurf ist, der wider einen Satz, der kritische, der wider den Beweis eines Satzes gerichtet ist. Der erstere bedarf einer Einsicht in die Beschaffenheit der Natur des Gegenstandes, um das Gegen teil von demjenigen behaupten zu können, was der Satz von diesem Gegenstande vorgibt, er ist daher selbst dogmatisch und gibt vor, die Beschaffenheit, von der die Rede ist, besser zu kennen, als der Gegenteil. Der kritische Einwurf, weil er den Satz in seinem Werte oder Unwerte unangetastet läßt, und nur den Beweis ansehrt, bedarf gar nicht, den Gegenstand besser zu kennen, oder sich einer besseren Kenntnis desselben anmaßen; er zeigt nur, daß die Behauptung grundlos, nicht, daß sie unwricht sei. Der skeptische stellt Sats und Gegensats wechselseitig gegen einander, als Einwürfe von gleicher Erheblichkeit, einen jeden derselben wechselsweise als Dogma und den andern als dessen Einwurf, ist also auf zwei entgegengesetzten Seiten dem Scheine nach dogmatisch, um alles Urteil über den Gegenstand gänzlich zu vernichten. Der dogmatische also so wohl, als skeptische Einwurf, müssen beide so viel Einsicht ihres Gegenstandes vorgeben, als nötig ist, etwas von ihm bejahend oder verneinend zu behaupten. Der kritische ist allein von der Art, daß, indem er bloß zeigt, man nehme zum Behuf seiner Behauptung etwas an, was richtig und bloß eingebildet ist, die Theorie stört, dadurch, daß sie 'ihr die angemachte Grundlage entzieht, ohne sonst etwas über die Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes auszumachen zu wollen.

Nun sind wir nach den gemeinen Begriffen unserer Vernunft in Ansehung der Gemeinschaft, darin unser denkendes Sub jekt mit den Dingen außer uns steht, dogmatisch und sehen diese als wahrhafte unabhängig von uns bestehende Gegenstände an, nach einem gewissen transzendentalen Dualismus, der jene äußere Erscheinungen nicht als Vorstellungen zum Subjekte zieht, sondern sie, so wie sinnliche Anschauung sie uns heifert, außer

1 Akad.-Ausz.: ver.
sensible intuition, as objects outside us, completely separating them from the thinking subject. This subreption is the basis of all theories in regard to the communion between soul and body. The objective reality thus assigned to appearances is never brought into question. On the contrary, it is taken for granted; the theorising is merely as to the mode in which it has to be explained and understood. There are three usual systems devised on these lines, and they are indeed the only possible systems: that of physical influence, that of predetermined harmony, and that of supernatural intervention.

The two last methods of explaining the communion between the soul and matter are based on objections to the first view, which is that of common sense. It is argued, namely, that what appears as matter cannot by its immediate influence be the cause of representations, these being effects which are quite different in kind from matter. Now those who take this line cannot attach to what they understand by 'object of outer senses' the concept of a matter which is nothing but appearance, and so itself a mere representation produced by some sort of outer objects. For in that case they would be saying that the representations of outer objects (appearances) cannot be outer causes of the representations in our mind; and this would be a quite meaningless objection, since no one could dream of holding that what he has once come to recognise as mere representation, is an outer cause. On our principles they can establish their theory only by showing that that is the true (transcendental) object of our outer senses cannot be the cause of those representations (appearances) which we comprehend under the title 'matter'. No one, however, can have the right to claim that he knows anything in regard to the transcendental cause of our representations of the outer senses; and their assertion is therefore entirely groundless. If, on the other hand, those who profess to improve upon the doctrine of physical influence keep to the ordinary outlook of transcendental dualism, and suppose matter, as such, to be a thing-in-itself (not the mere appearance of an unknown thing), they will direct their objection to showing that such an outer object, which in itself exhibits no causality save that of movements, can never be the efficient cause of representations, but that a

was als Objekte versetzt und sie von dem denkenden Subjekte gänzlich abtrennt. Diese Subreption ist nun die Grundlage aller Theorien über die Gemeinschaft zwischen Seele und Körper, und es wird niemals gefragt: ob denn diese objektive Realität der Erscheinungen so ganz richtig sei, sondern diese wird als zugestanden vorausgesetzt und nur über die Art verfeinert, wie sie erklärt und begriffen werden müssen. Die gewöhnliche drei hierüber erdachte und wirklich einzig mögliche Systeme sind die des physischen Einflusses, der vorher bestimmten Harmonie und der übernatürlichen Assistens.

Die zwei letztens Erklärungsarten der Gemeinschaft der Seele und der Materie sind auf Einwürfe gegen die erstere, welche die Vorstellung des gemeinsamen Verstandes ist, gegründet, daß nämlich dasjenige, was als Materie erscheint, durch seinen unmittelbaren Einfluß nicht die Ursache von Vorstellungen, als einer ganz heterogenen Art von Wirkungen, sein könne. Sie können aber abgesehen von dem, was sie unter dem Gegenstand äußerer Sinne verstehen, nicht den Begriff einer Materie verbinden, welche nichts als Erscheinung, mithin schon an sich selbst bloße Vorstellung, die durch irgend welche äußere Gegenstände gewirkt worden, denn sonst würden sie sagen: daß die Vorstellungen äußerer Gegenstände (die Erscheinungen) nicht äußere Ursachen der Vorstellungen in unserem Gemüte sein können, welches ein ganz sinnreicher Einwurf sein würde, weil es niemanden einfallen wird, das, was er einmal als bloße Vorstellung anerkannt hat, vor eine äußere Ursache zu halten. Sie müssen also nach unseren Grundsätzen ihre Theorie darauf richten: daß dasjenige, was der wahre (transcendente) Gegenstand unserer äußeren Sinne ist, nicht die Ursache ihrerjenigen Vorstellungen (Erscheinungen) sein könne, die wir unter dem Namen Materie verstehen. Da nun niemand mit Grunde geben kann, etwas von der transcendentalen Ursache unserer Vorstellungen äußerer Sinne zu kennen, so ist ihre Behauptung ganz grundlos. Wollten aber die vermeinte Verbesserer der Lehre vom physischen Einflusse, nach der gemeinen Vorstellungsart eines transcendentalen Dualismus, die Materie, als solche, vor ein Ding an sich selbst (und nicht als bloße Erscheinung eines unbekannten Dinges) anzusehen und ihren Einwurf dahin richten, zu zeigen: daß ein solcher äußerer Gegenstand, welcher keine andere Kausalität als die der Bewegungen an sich zeigt, minnemehr die wirkende Ursache von Vorstel-

Über die Summe der reinen Sellenlehre (A) 399

1 Akad.-Ausg.: Vorstellung ist, dies.
third entity must intervene to establish, if not reciprocal interaction, at least correspondence and harmony between the two. But in arguing in this way, they begin their refutation by admitting into their dualism the ἐπιτηκός ψεύδος of [a doctrine of] physical influence, and consequently their objection is not so much a disproof of natural influence as of their own dualistic presupposition. For the difficulties in regard to the connection of our thinking nature with matter have their origin, one and all, in the illicitly assumed dualistic view, that matter as such is not appearance, that is, a mere representation of the mind to which an unknown object corresponds, but is the object in itself as it exists outside us independently of all sensibility.

As against the commonly accepted doctrine of physical influence, an objection of the dogmatic type is not, therefore, practicable. For if the opponent of the doctrine accepts the view that matter and its motion are mere appearances and so themselves mere representations, his difficulty is then simply this, that it is impossible that the unknown object of our sensibility should be the cause of the representations in us. He cannot, however, have the least justification for any such contention, since no one is in a position to decide what an unknown object may or may not be able to do. And this transcendental idealism, as we have just proved, he cannot but concede. His only way of escape would be frankly to hypostatise representations, and to set them outside himself as real things.

The doctrine of physical influence, in its ordinary form, is, however, subject to a well-founded critical objection. The alleged communion between two kinds of substances, the thinking and the extended, rests on a crude dualism, and treats the extended substances, which are really nothing but mere representations of the thinking subject, as existing by themselves. This mistaken interpretation of physical influence can thus be effectively disposed of: we have shown that the proof of it is void and illicit.

The much-discussed question of the communion between the thinking and the extended, if we leave aside all that is merely fictitious, comes then simply to this: How in a thinking subject outer intuition, namely, that of space, with its filling-in of shape and motion, is possible. And this is a question which no man can possibly answer. This gap in our knowledge

lungen sein könnte, sondern daß sich ein drittes Wesen deshalb ins Mittel schlagen müsse, um, wo nicht Wechselwirkung, doch wenigstens Korrespondenz und Harmonie zwischen beiden zu stiften: so würden sie ihre Widerlegung davon anfangen, das πράγμα παράδοσ des physischen Einflusses in ihrem Dualismus annehmen, und also durch ihren Einwurf nicht sowohl den natürlichen Einfluß, sondern ihre eigene dualistische Vor- aussetzung widerlegen. Denn alle Schwierigkeiten, welche die Verbindung der denkenden Natur mit der Materie treffen, entspringen ohne Ausnahme lediglich aus jener erschrecklichen dualistischen Vorstellung: daß Materie, als solche, nicht Erscheinung, d. i. bloße Vorstellung des Gemüts, der ein unbekannter Gegenstand entspricht, sondern der Gegenstand an sich selbst sei, so wie er außer uns und unabhängig von aller Sinnlichkeit existiert.

Es kann also wider den gemein angenommenen physischen Einfluß kein dogmatischer Einwurf gemacht werden. Denn nimmt der Gegner an: daß Materie und ihre Bewegung bloße Erscheinungen und also selbst nur Vorstellungen sein, so kann er nur darin die Schwierigkeit setzen: daß der unbekannte Gegenstand unserer Sinnlichkeit nicht die Ursache der Vorstellungen in uns sein könne, welches aber vorausgehen ihm nicht das mindeste berechtigt, weil niemand von einem unbekannten Gegenstande ausmachen kann, was er tun oder nicht tun könne. Er muß aber, nach unseren obigen Beweisen, diesen transzendentalen Idealismus notwendig einräumen, wofern er nicht offenbar Vorstellungen hypostasieren will, wie wahre Dinge, außer sich versetzen will.

Gleichwohl kann wider die gemeine Lehrmeinung des physischen Einflusses ein genehmeter kritischer Einwurf gemacht werden. Eine solche vorgegebene Gemeinschaft zwischen zwei Arten von Substanzen, der denkenden und der ausge- dehnten, legt einen großen Dualismus zum Grundes und macht die letztere, die doch nichts als bloße Vorstellungen des denkenden Subjekts sind, zu Dingen, die vor sich bestehen. Also kann der mißverstandene physische Einfluß dadurch völlig vereitelt werden, daß man den Beweisgrund desselben als nichtig und erschicklich aufdeckt.

can never be filled; all that can be done is to indicate it through the ascription of outer appearances to that transcendental object which is the cause of this species of representations, but of which we can have no knowledge whatsoever and of which we shall never acquire any concept. In all problems which may arise in the field of experience we treat these appearances as objects in themselves, without troubling ourselves about the primary ground of their possibility (as appearances). But to advance beyond these limits the concept of a transcendental object would be indispensably required.

The settlement of all disputes or objections which concern the state of the thinking nature prior to this communion (prior to life), or after the cessation of such communion (in death), rests upon these considerations regarding the communion between thinking beings and extended beings. The opinion that the thinking subject has been capable of thought prior to any communion with bodies would now appear as an assertion that, prior to the beginning of the species of sensibility in virtue of which something appears to us in space, those transcendental objects, which in our present state appear as bodies, could have been intuited in an entirely different manner. The opinion that the soul after the cessation of all communion with the corporeal world could still continue to think, would be formulated as the view that, if that species of sensibility, in virtue of which transcendental objects, at present quite unknown to us, appear as a material world, should cease, all intuition of the transcendental objects would not for that reason be removed, and it would still be quite possible that those same unknown objects should continue to be known by the thinking subject, though no longer, indeed, in the quality of bodies.

Now on speculative principles no one can give the least ground for any such assertion. Even the possibility of what is asserted cannot be established; it can only be assumed. But it is equally impossible for anyone to bring any valid dogmatic objection against it. For whoever he may be, he knows just as little as I or anybody else of the absolute inner cause of outer corporeal appearances. Since he cannot, therefore, offer any justification for claiming to know on what the outer appearances in our present state (that of life) really rest, neither can he know that the condition of all outer intui-
tion, or the thinking subject itself, will cease with this state (in death). Thus all controversy in regard to the nature of the thinking being and its connection with the corporeal world is merely a result of filling the gap where knowledge is wholly lacking to us with paralogisms of reason, treating our thoughts as things and hypothesizing them. Hence originates an imaginary science, imaginary both in the case of him who affirms and of him who denies, since all parties either suppose some knowledge of objects of which no human being has any concept, or treat their own representations as objects, and so revolve in a perpetual circle of ambiguities and contradictions. Nothing but the sobriety of a critique, at once strict and just, can free us from this dogmatic delusion, which through the lure of an imagined felicity keeps so many in bondage to theories and systems. Such a critique confines all our speculative claims rigidly to the field of possible experience; and it does this not by shallow scoffing at ever-repeated failures or pious sighs over the limits of our reason, but by an effective determining of these limits in accordance with established principles, inscribing its nihil ulterior on those Pillars of Hercules which nature herself has erected in order that the voyage of our reason may be extended no further than the continuous coastline of experience itself reaches—a coast we cannot leave without venturing upon a shoreless ocean which, after alluring us with ever-deceptive prospects, compels us in the end to abandon as hopeless all this vexatious and tedious endeavour.

We still owe the reader a clear general exposition of the transcendental and yet natural illusion in the paralogisms of pure reason, and also a justification of the systematic ordering of them which runs parallel with the table of the categories. We could not have attempted to do so at the beginning of this section without running the risk of becoming obscure or of clumsily anticipating the course of our argument. We shall now try to fulfil this obligation.

All illusion may be said to consist in treating the subjective condition of thinking as being knowledge of the object. Further in the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic we have

oder auch das denkende Subjekt selbst, nach demselben (im Tode) aufhören werde.

So ist denn also aller Streit über die Natur unseres denkenden Wesens und der Verknüpfung desselben mit der Körpervelt lediglich eine Folge davon, daß man in Ansehung dessen, wonon man nichts weiß, die Lücke durch Paralogismen der Vernunft ausfüllt, da man seine Gedanken zu Sachen macht und sie hypostasiert, woraus eingebildete Wissenschaft, sowohl in Ansehung dessen, der bejahend, als dessen, der verneinend behauptet, entspringt, indem ein jeder unter zwei Gegenständen etwas zu wissen vermeint, davon kein Mensch einigen Begriff hat, oder seine eigene Vorstellungen zu Gegenständen macht, und sich so in einem ewigen Zirkel von Zweideutigkeiten und Widersprüchen herum dreht. Nichts, als die Nüchternheit einer strengen, aber gerechten Kritik, kann von diesem dogmatischen Blendswerke, der so viele durch eingebildete Glückseligkeit, unter Theorien und Systemen, hinküllt, befreien, und alle unsere spekulativen Ansprüche bloß auf das Feld möglicher Erfahrung einschränken, nicht etwa durch schalen Spott über so oft fehlgeschlagene Versuche, oder frömme Seufzer über die Schranken unserer Vernunft, sondern vermittelst einer nach sicheren Grundsätzen vollzogenen Grenzbestimmung derselben, welche ihr nihil ulterior mit größter Zuverlässigkeit an die herkulesischen Säulen heftet, die die Natur selbst aufgestellt hat, um die Fahrt unserer Vernunft nur so weit, als die stetig fortlaufende Küsten der Erfahrung reichen, fortzusetzen, die wir nicht verlassen können, ohne uns auf einen uferlosen Ozean zu wagen, der uns, unter immer trügerischen Aussichten, am Ende nötigt, alle beschwerliche und langwierige Bemühung, als hoffnungslos aufzugeben.

Wir sind noch eine deutliche und allgemeine Erörterung des transcendentalen und doch natürlichen Scheins in den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft, umgleichen die Rechtfertigung der systematischen und der Tafel der Kategorien parallel laufenden Anordnungen derselben, bisher schuldig geblieben. Wir hätten sie im Anfange dieses Abschnitts nicht übernehmen können, ohne in Gefahr der Dunkelheit zu geraten, oder uns unschicklicher Weise selbst vorzutragen. Jetzt wollen wir diese Obliegenheit zu erfüllen suchen.

Man kann allem Schein darin setzen: daß die subjektive Bedingung des Denkens vor die Erkenntnis des Objekts gehalten wird. Ferner haben wir in der Einleitung in die tran-
shown that pure reason concerns itself solely with the totality of the synthesis of the conditions, for a given conditioned. Now since the dialectical illusion of pure reason cannot be an empirical illusion, such as occurs in certain specific instances of empirical knowledge, it will relate to what is universal in the conditions of thinking, and there will therefore be only three cases of the dialectical employment of pure reason.

1. The synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general.
2. The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking.
3. The synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking.

In all these three cases pure reason occupies itself only with the absolute totality of this synthesis, that is, with that condition which is itself unconditioned. On this division is founded the threefold transcendental illusion which gives occasion for the three main sections of the Dialectic, and for the three pretended sciences of pure reason—transcendental psychology, cosmology, and theology. Here we are concerned only with the first.

Since, in thinking in general, we abstract from all relation of the thought to any object (whether of the senses or of the pure understanding), the synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general (No. 1) is not objective at all, but merely a synthesis of the thought with the subject, which is mistaken for a synthetic representation of an object.

It follows from this that the dialectical inference to the condition of all thought in general, which is itself unconditioned, does not commit a material error (for it abstracts from all content or objects), but is defective in form alone, and must therefore be called a paralogism.

Further, since the one condition which accompanies all thought is the 'I' in the universal proposition 'I think', reason has to deal with this condition in so far as it is itself unconditioned. It is only the formal condition, namely, the logical unity of every thought, in which I abstract from all objects; but nevertheless it is represented as an object which I think, namely, I myself and its unconditioned unity.

If anyone propounds to me the question, 'What is the con-

1 [bros eine Synthesis des Gedankens mit dem Subjekt.]
2 [Reading Bedingung for Bedingungen.]  
3 [im Inhalle.]
PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON (A) 363

stition of a thing which thinks, I have no a priori knowledge wherewith to reply. For the answer has to be synthetic—an analytic answer will perhaps explain what is meant by thought, but beyond this cannot yield any knowledge of that upon which this thought depends for its possibility. For a synthetic solution, however, intuition is always required; and owing to the highly general character of the problem, intuition has been left entirely out of account. Similarly no one can answer in all its generality the question, 'What must a thing be, to be movable?' For the question contains no trace of the answer, viz. impenetrable extension (matter). But although I have no general answer to the former question, it still seems as if I could reply in the special case of the proposition which expresses self-consciousness—'I think'. For this 'I' is the primary subject, that is, substance; it is simple, etc. But these would then have to be propositions derived from experience, and in the absence of a universal rule which expresses the conditions of the possibility of thought in general and a priori, they could not contain any such non-empirical predicates. Suspicion is thus thrown on the view, which at first seemed to me so plausible, that we can form judgments about the nature of a thinking being, and can do so from concepts alone. But the error in this way of thinking has not yet been detected.

Further investigation into the origin of the attributes which I ascribe to myself as a thinking being in general can, however, show in what the error consists. These attributes are nothing but pure categories, by which I do not think a determinate object but only the unity of the representations—in order to determine an object for them. In the absence of an underlying intuition the category cannot by itself yield a concept of an object; for by intuition alone is the object given, which thereupon is thought in accordance with the category. If I am to declare a thing to be a substance in the [field of] appearance, predicates of its intuition must first be given me, and I must be able to distinguish in these the permanent from the transitory and the substratum (the thing itself) from what is merely inherent in it. If I call a thing in the [field of] appearance simple, I mean by this that the intuition of it, although a part of the appearance, is not

1 [Beschaffenheit.]
2 [Reading, with Wille, können for könne.]
itself capable of being divided into parts, etc. But if I know something as simple in concept only and not in the [field of] appearance, I have really no knowledge whatsoever of the object, but only of the concept which I make for myself of a something in general that does not allow of being intuited. I say that I think something as completely simple, only because I have really nothing more to say of it than merely that it is something.

Now the bare apperception, 'I', is in concept substance, in concept simple, etc.; and in this sense all those psychological doctrines are unquestionably true. Yet this does not give us that knowledge of the soul for which we are seeking. For since none of these predicates are valid of intuition, they cannot have any consequences which are applicable to objects of experience, and are therefore entirely void. The concept of substance does not teach me that the soul endures by itself, nor that it is a part of outer intuitions which cannot itself be divided into parts, and cannot therefore arise or perish by any natural alterations. These are properties which would make the soul known to me in the context of experience and might reveal something concerning its origin and future state. But if I say, in terms of the\(^1\) mere category, 'The soul is a simple substance', it is obvious that since the bare concept of substance (supplied by the understanding) contains nothing beyond the requirement that a thing be represented as being subject in itself, and not in turn predicate of anything else, nothing follows from this as regards the permanence of the 'I', and the attribute 'simple' certainly does not aid in adding this permanence. Thus, from this source, we learn nothing whatsoever as to what may happen to the soul in the changes of the natural world. If we could be assured that the soul is a simple part of matter, we could use this knowledge, with the further assistance of what experience teaches in this regard, to deduce the permanence, and, as involved in its simple nature, the indestructibility of the soul. But of all this, the concept of the 'I', in the psychological principle 'I think', tells us nothing.

That the being which thinks in us is under the impression that it knows itself through pure categories, and precisely

\(^1\) [Reading, with Rosenkrantz, *die gross* for *blasse.*]
through those categories which in each type of category express absolute unity, is due to the following reason. Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories, which on their part represent nothing but the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, in so far as the manifold has unity in apperception. Self-consciousness in general is therefore the representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and itself is unconditioned. We can thus say of the thinking ‘I’ (the soul) which regards itself as substance, as simple, as numerically identical at all times, and as the correlate of all existence, from which all other existence must be inferred, that it does not know itself through the categories, but knows the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself. Now it is, indeed, very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know any object, and that the determining self (the thought) is distinguished from the self that is to be determined (the thinking subject) in the same way as knowledge is distinguished from its object. Nevertheless there is nothing more natural and more misleading than the illusion which leads us to regard the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts. We might call it the subjection of the hypostatised consciousness (apperceptionis substantiae).

If we desire to give a logical title to the paralogism contained in the dialectical syllogisms of the rational doctrine of the soul, then in view of the fact that their premises are correct, we may call it a sophisma figureae dictionis. Whereas the major premise, in dealing with the condition, makes a merely transcendental use of the category, the minor premise and the conclusion, in dealing with the soul which has been subsumed under this condition, use the same category empirically. Thus, for instance, in the paralogism of substantiality, the concept of substance is a pure intellectual concept, which in the absence of the conditions of sensible intuition admits only of transcendental use, that is, admits of no use whatsoever. But in the minor premiss the very same concept is applied to the object

1 [Harterstein, apperceptionis for apperceptiones.
2 [i.e. of ambiguous middle.

VON DEN PARALOGISMEN (A) 397

dem Titel derselben ausdrücken, sich selbst zu erkennen vomeine, ruhrt daher. Die Apperception ist selbst der Grund der Möglichkeit der Kategorien, welche von ihrer Seite nichts anders vorstellen, als die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung, so fern dasselbe in der Apperception Einheit hat. Daher ist das Selbstbewußtsein überhaupt die Vorstellung dasjenigen, was die Bedingung aller Einheit, und doch selbst unbedingt ist. Man kann daher von dem denkenden Ich (Seelen), das sich als Substanz, ein- fach, numerisch identisch in aller Zeit, und das Correlatum alles Daseins, aus welchem alles andere Dasein geschlossen werden muß; sagen: daß es nicht sowohl sich selbst durch die Kategorien, sondern die Kategorien, und durch sie alle Ge- genstände, in der absoluten Einheit der Apperception, mithin durch sich selbst erkennt. Nun ist zwar sehr einleuchtend: daß ich dasjenige, was ich voraussetzen muß, um überhaupt ein Objekt zu erkennen, nicht selbst als Objekt erkennen könnte, und daß das bestimmende Selbst (das Denken) von dem bestimmenden Selbst (dem denkenden Subjekt) ein Erkenntnis vom Gegen- stände unterschieden sei. Gleichwohl ist nichts natürlicher und verführerischer, als der Schein, die Einheit in der Synthesis der Gedanken vor eine wahrgenommene Einheit im Subjekte dieser Gedanken zu halten. Man könnte ihn die Subreption des hypostasierten Bewußtseins (apperceptiones substantiae) nennen.

Wenn man den Paralogism in den dialektischen Vernunft- schlüssen der rationalen Seelenlehre, so fern sie gleichwohl richtige Prämisse haben, logisch beteihen will: so kann er vor ein sophisma figureae dictionis gelten, in welchem der Obersats von der Kategorie, in Ansehung ihrer Bedingung, einen bloß transzendentenalen Gebrauch, der Untersats aber und der Schluß- sats in Ansehung der Seele, die unter diese Bedingung sub- summirt worden, von eben der Kategorie einen empirischen Gebrauch macht. So ist s. B. |der Begriff der Substans in dem Para- logismus der Simplizität ein reiner intellektueller Begriff, der ohne Bedingungen der sinnlichen Anschauung bloß von tran- szendentenal, d. i. von gar keinem Gebrauch ist. Im Untersats aber ist eben derselbe Begriff auf den Gegenstand aller inneren
of all inner experience without our having first ascertained and established the condition of such employment in concreto, namely, the permanence of this object. We are thus making an empirical, but in this case inadmissible, employment of the category.\(^1\)

Finally, in order to show the systematic interconnection of all these dialectical assertions of a pseudo-rational doctrine of the soul in an order determined by pure reason, and so to show that we have them in their completeness, we may note that apperception has been carried through all the classes of the categories but only in reference to those concepts of understanding which in each class form the basis of the unity of the others in a possible perception, namely, subsistence, reality, unity (not plurality), and existence. Reason here represents all of these as conditions, which are themselves unconditioned, of the possibility of a thinking being. Thus the soul knows in itself—

\(^1\) the unconditioned unity of relation, i.e. that it itself is not inherent [in something else] but self-subsistent.

\(^2\) the unconditioned unity of quality, that is, that it is not a real whole but simple.*

\(^3\) the unconditioned unity in the plurality in time, i.e. that it is not numerically different at different times but one and the very same subject.

\(^4\) the unconditioned unity of existence in space, i.e. that it is not the consciousness of many things outside it, but the consciousness of the existence of itself only, and of other subjects merely as its representations.

Reason is the faculty of principles. The assertions of pure psychology do not contain empirical predicates of the soul but those predicates, if there be any such, which are meant to determine the object in itself independently of experience, and so by mere reason. They ought, therefore, to be founded on principles and universal concepts bearing on the nature of reality I am not yet in a position to explain. This will be shown in the next chapter on the occasion of this same concept being put by reason to yet another use.

\(^*\) How the simple here again corresponds to the category of reality I am not yet in a position to explain. This will be shown in the next chapter on the occasion of this same concept being put by reason to yet another use.

\(^{1}\) For a more consistent account of the nature of paralogism cf. B 410-411.]
thinking beings in general. But instead we find that the single representation, 'I am', governs them all. This representation just because it expresses the pure formula of all my experience in general\(^1\) announces itself as a universal proposition valid for all thinking beings; and since it is at the same time in all respects unitary, it carries with it the illusion of an absolute unity of the conditions of thought in general, and so extends itself further than possible experience can reach.

\(^1\) [unbestimmt]
THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON

[AS RESTATLED IN SECOND EDITION]

Since the proposition 'I think' (taken problematically) contains the form of each and every judgment of understanding and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evident that the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental employment of the understanding. And since this employment excludes any admixture of experience, we cannot, after what has been shown above, entertain any favourable anticipations in regard to its methods of procedure. We therefore propose to follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments of pure psychology. But for the sake of brevity the examination had best proceed in an unbroken continuity.

The following general remark may, at the outset, aid us in our scrutiny of this kind of argument. I do not know an object merely in that I think, but only in so far as I determine a given intuition with respect to the unity of consciousness in which all thought consists. Consequently, I do not know myself through being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined with respect to the function of thought. Modi of self-consciousness in thought are not by themselves concepts of objects (categories), but are mere functions which do not give thought an object to be known, and accordingly do not give even myself as object. The object is not the consciousness of the determining self, but only that of the determinable self, that is, of my inner intuition (in so far as its manifold can be combined in accordance with the universal condition of the unity of apperception in thought).

Da nun der Satz: Ich denke (problematisch genommen), die Form eines jeden Verstandesurteils überhaupt enthält, und alle Kategorien als ihr Vehikel begleitet: so ist klar, daß die Schlüsse aus derselben einen bloß transzendentalen Gebrauch des Verstandes enthalten können, welcher alle Beimischungen der Erfahrung ausschlägt, und von dessen Fortgang wir, nach dem, was wir oben gezeigt haben, uns schon zum voraus keinen vorteilhaften Begriff machen können. Wir wollen ihn also durch alle Prädikate der reinen Seelenlehre mit einem kritischen Auge verfolgen, doch um der Kürze willen ihre Prüfung in einem ununterbrochenen Zusammenhange fortgehen lassen.


A: s m. 1. Akad. Ausg.: das.
(1) In all judgments I am the determining subject of that relation which constitutes the judgment. That the 'I', the 'I' that thinks, can be regarded always as subject, and as something which does not belong to thought as a mere predicate, must be granted. It is an apodictic and indeed identical proposition; but it does not mean that I, as object, am for myself a self-substantive being or substance. The latter statement goes very far beyond the former, and demands for its proof data which are not to be met with in thought, and perhaps (in so far as I have regard to the thinking self merely as such) are more than I shall ever find in it.

(2) That the 'I' of apperception, and therefore the 'I' in every act of thought, is one,¹ and cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and consequently signifies a logically simple subject, is something already contained in the very concept of thought, and is therefore an analytic proposition. But this does not mean that the thinking 'I' is a simple substance. That proposition would be synthetic. The concept of substance always relates to intuitions which cannot in me be other than sensible, and which therefore lie entirely outside the field of the understanding and its thought. But it is of this thought that we are speaking when we say that the 'I' in thought is simple. It would, indeed, be surprising if what in other cases requires so much labour to determine—namely, what, of all that is presented in intuition, is substance, and further, whether this substance can be simple (e.g. in the parts of matter)—should be thus given me directly, as if by revelation, in the poorest of all representations.

(3) The proposition, that in all the manifold of which I am conscious I am identical with myself, is likewise implied in the concepts themselves, and is therefore an analytic proposition. But this identity of the subject, of which I can be conscious in all my representations, does not concern any intuition of the subject, whereby it is given as object, and cannot therefore signify the identity of the person, if by that is understood the consciousness of the identity of one's own substance, as a thinking being, in all change of its states. No mere analysis of the proposition 'I think' will suffice to prove such a proposi-

1 [ein Singular.]
² [Reading, with Erdmann, meinen for seinen.]

1 Akad.-Ausz.: anhängend betrachtet.
tion; for that we should require various synthetic judgments, based upon given intuition.

(4) That I distinguish my own existence as that of a thinking being, from other things outside me—among them my body—is likewise an analytic proposition; for other things are such as I think to be distinct from myself. But I do not thereby learn whether this consciousness of myself would be even possible apart from things outside me through which representations are given to me, and whether, therefore, I could exist merely as thinking being (i.e. without existing in human form).

The analysis, then, of the consciousness of myself in thought in general, yields nothing whatsoever towards the knowledge of myself as object. The logical exposition of thought in general has been mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object.

Indeed, it would be a great stumbling-block, or rather would be the one unanswerable objection, to our whole critique, if there were a possibility of proving a priori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and that consequently (as follows from this same mode of proof) personality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as separate and distinct from all matter.

For by such procedure we should have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have entered into the field of noumena; and no one could then deny our right of advancing yet further in this domain, indeed of settling in it, and should our star prove suspicious, of establishing claims to permanent possession. The proposition, 'Every thinking being is, as such, a simple substance', is a synthetic a priori proposition; it is synthetic in that it goes beyond the concept from which it starts, and adds to the thought in general [i.e. to the concept of a thinking being] the mode of [its] existence: it is a priori, in that it adds to the concept a predicate (that of simplicity) which cannot be given in any experience. It would then follow that a priori synthetic propositions are possible and admissible, not only, as we have asserted, in relation to objects of possible experience, and indeed as principles of the possibility of this experience, but that they are applicable to things in general and to things in themselves—a result that would make

...
PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON (B) 371

an end of our whole critique, and would constrain us to acquiesce in the old-time procedure. Upon closer consideration we find, however, that there is no such serious danger.

The whole procedure of rational psychology is determined by a paralogism, which is exhibited in the following syllogism:

That which cannot be thought otherwise than as subject
does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore
substance.

A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject.

Therefore it exists also only as subject, that is, as substance.

In the major premiss we speak of a being that can be thought in general, in every relation, and therefore also as it may be given in intuition. But in the minor premiss we speak of it only in so far as it regards itself, as subject, simply in relation to thought and the unity of consciousness, and not as likewise in relation to the intuition through which it is given as object to thought. Thus the conclusion is arrived at fallaciously, per sophisma figuralis dictiorum.\footnote{Reading, with Vorländer, et for sis.}

That we are entirely right in resolving this famous argument into a paralogism will be clearly seen, if we call to mind what has been said in the General Note to the Systematic Representation of the Principles and in the Section on Noumena. For it has there been proved that the concept of a thing

\footnote{Das Denken wird in beiden Prämissen in ganz verschiedener Bedeutung genommen: im Obersatz, wie es auf ein Objekt überhaupt (mithin wie es in der Anschauung gegeben werden mag) geht im Untersatz aber nur, wie es in der Beziehung auf Selbstbewußtsein bestehet, wobei also an gar kein Objekt gedacht wird, sondern nur die Beziehung auf sich, als Subjekt (als die Form des Denkens), vorgestellt wird. Im erstenen wird von Dingen geredet, die nicht anders als Subjekte gedacht werden können; im zweiten aber nicht von Dingen, sondern von \textit{Denken} (dem man von allem Objekte abstrahiert), in welchem das Ich immer zum Subjekt des Bewußtseins dient; daher im Schlussesatz nicht folgen kann: ich kann nicht anders als Subjekt existieren, sondern nur: ich kann im Denken meiner Existenz mich nur zum \textit{Subjekt des Urteils} brachten, welches ein identischer Sein ist, der schließlich nichts über die Art meines Daseins erhöfft.

1 Akad.-Ausz.: sinds.

1 Akad.-Ausz.: sines. - 2 Akad.-Ausz.: sines.}

VON DEN PARALOGISMEN (B) 349

Ende macht und gebietet würde, es beim Allen bewenden zu lassen. Allein die Gefahr ist hier nicht so groß, wenn man der Sache näher tritt.

In dem Verfahren der rationalen Psychologie herrscht ein Paralogism, der durch folgenden Vermutungsschluß dargestellt wird.

Was nicht anders als Subjekt gedacht werden kann, existiert auch nicht anders als Subjekt, und ist also Substanz.

[Nun kann ein denkendes Wesen, bloß als ein solches betrachtet, nicht anders als Subjekt gedacht werden.

Also existiert es auch nur als ein solches, d. i. als Substanz.

Im Obersatz wird von einem Wesen geredet, das überhaupt in jeder Absicht, folglich auch so, wie es in der Anschauung gegeben werden mag, gedacht werden kann. Im Untersatz aber ist nur von demselben die Rede, so fern es sich selbst, als Subjekt, nur relativ auf das Denken und die Einheit des Bewußtseins, nicht aber zugleich in Beziehung auf die Anschauung, wodurch sie als Objekt zum Denken gegeben wird, betrachtet. Also wird per sophisma figuralis dictiorum, mithin durch einen Trugschluß die Konklusion gefolgt.

[Daß diese Auflösung des berühmten Arguments in einem Paralogism so ganz richtig sei, erhebt deutlich, wenn man die allgemeine Anmerkung zur systematischen Vorstellung der Grundsätze und den Abschnitt von den Noumenen hiebei nacheinander will, da bewiesen worden, daß der Begriff eines Dinges,
which can exist by itself as subject and never as mere predicate, carries with it no objective reality; in other words, that we cannot know whether there is any object to which the concept is applicable—as to the possibility of such a mode of existence we have no means of deciding—and that the concept therefore yields no knowledge whatsoever. If by the term 'substance' be meant an object which can be given, and if it is to yield knowledge, it must be made to rest on a permanent intuition, as being that through which alone the object of our concept can be given, and as being, therefore, the indispensable condition of the objective reality of the concept. Now in inner intuition there is nothing permanent, for the 'I' is merely the consciousness of my thought. So long, therefore, as we do not go beyond mere thinking, we are without the necessary condition for applying the concept of substance, that is, of a self-subsistent subject, to the self as a thinking being. And with the objective reality of the concept of substance, the allied concept of simplicity likewise vanishes; it is transformed into a merely logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought in general, which has to be present whether the subject be composite or not.

Refutation of Mendelssohn's Proof of the Permanence of the Soul

This acute philosopher soon noticed that the usual argument by which it is sought to prove that the soul—if it be admitted to be a simple being—cannot cease to be through dissolution, is insufficient for its purpose, that of proving the necessary continuance of the soul, since it may be supposed to pass out of existence through simply vanishing. In his Phaedo he endeavoured to prove that the soul cannot be subject to such a process of vanishing, which would be a true annihilation, by showing that a simple being cannot cease to exist. His argument is that since the soul cannot be diminished, and so gradually lose something of its existence, being by degrees changed into nothing (for since it has no parts, it has no multiplicity in itself), there would be

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1 [Reading, with Erdmann, er for es.]
2 [Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86): Phaeton (1767) (Gesammelte Schriften, 1843, ii. p. 151 ff.).]
PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON (B) 373

do time between a moment in which it is and another in which it is not—which is impossible. He failed, however, to observe that even if we admit the simple nature of the soul, namely, that it contains no manifold of constituents external to one another, and therefore no extensive quantity, we yet cannot deny to it, any more than to any other existence, intensive quantity, that is, a degree of reality in respect of all its faculties, nay, in respect of all that constitutes its existence, and that this degree of reality may diminish through all the infinitely many smaller degrees. In this manner the supposed substance—the thing, the permanence of which has not yet been proved—may be changed into nothing, not indeed by dissolution, but by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers, and so, if I may be permitted the use of the term, by elanguescence. For consciousness itself has always a degree, which always allows of diminution, and the same must also hold of the faculty of being conscious of the self, and likewise of all the other faculties. Thus the permanence of the soul, regarded merely as object of inner sense, remains undemonstrated, and indeed indemonstrable. Its permanence during life is, of course, evident per se, since the thinking being (as man) is itself likewise an object of the outer senses. But this is very far from satisfying the rational psychologist who undertakes to prove from mere concepts its absolute permanence beyond this life.5

A Clearness is not, as the logicians assert, the consciousness of a representation. A certain degree of consciousness, though it be insufficient for recollection, must be met with even in many obscure representations, since in the absence of all consciousness we should make no distinction between different combinations of obscure representations, which yet we are able to do in respect of the characters of many concepts, such as those of right or equity, or as when the musician in improvising strikes several keys at once. But a representation is clear, when the consciousness suffices for the consciousness of the distinction of this representation from others. If it suffices for distinguishing, but not for consciousness of the distinction, the representation must still be entitled obscure. There are therefore infinitely many degrees of consciousness, down to its complete vanishing.

Some philosophers, in making out a case for a new possibility, consider that they have done enough if they can defy others to show

1 [für sich klar ist.]

WIDERLEGUNG DES MENDELSOHN'SCHEN BEWEISES (B) 351
darin es ist, und dem andern, darin es nicht mehr ist, gar keine Zeit angetroffen werden würde, welches unmöglich ist. — Allein er bedachte nicht, daß, wenn wir gleich der Seele diese einfache Natur einräumen, da sie nämlich kein Mannigfaltiges aus einander, mithin keine extensive Größe enthält, man ihr doch, so wenig wie irgend einem Existerenden, intensive Größe, d. i. einen Grad der Realität in Ansehung aller ihrer Ver mögen, ja überhaupt alles dessen, was das Dasein aushmacht, ableugnen könne, welcher durch alle unendlich viele kleinere Grade abnehmen, und so die vorgebliche Substanz (das Ding, dessen Beharrlichkeit nicht sonst schon fest steht), obgleich nicht durch Zerstörung, doch durch almmäßliche Nachlassung (remissio) ihrer Kräfte (mithin durch Elanguescence, wenn es mir erlaubt ist, mich dieses Ausdrucks zu bedienen), in nichts verwandelt werden könne. Denn selbst das Bewußtsein hat jeder zeit einen Grad, der immer noch vermindert werden kann, folglich auch das Vermögen, sich seiner bewußt zu sein, und so alle übrigen Vermögen. — Also bleibt die Beharrlichkeit der Seele, als bloß Gegenstandes des inneren Sinnes, ungewiesen, und selbst unerweislich, obgleich ihre Beharrlichkeit im Leben, da das denkende Wesen (als Mensch) sich zugleich ein Gegenstand äußerer Sinne ist, für sich klar ist, womit aber dem rationalen Psychologen gar nicht Gnüge geschieht, der die absolute Beharrlichkeit derselben selbst über das Leben hinaus aus bloßen Begriffen zu beweisen unternimmt.**

** Diejenige, welche, um eine neue Möglichkeit auf die Bahn zu bringen, schon genug getan zu haben glauben, wenn sie darauf troten, daß man
If we take the above propositions in a synthetic connection, as valid for all thinking beings, as indeed they must be taken in the system of rational psychology, and proceed from the category of relation, with the proposition, ‘All thinking beings are, as such, substances’, backwards through the series of the propositions, until the circle is completed, we find no contradiction in their assumptions. This is the procedure 1 of all those who profess to comprehend the possibility of thought—of which they have an example only in the empirical intuitions of our human life—even after this life has ceased. But those who resort to such a method of argument can be quite nonplussed by the citation of other possibilities which are not a whit more adventurous. Such is the possibility of the division of a simple substance into several substances, and conversely the fusing together (coalition) of several into one simple substance. For although divisibility presupposes a composite, it does not necessarily require a composite of substances, but only of degrees (of the manifold powers) of one and the same substance. Now just as we can think all powers and faculties of the soul, even that of consciousness, as diminished by one half, but in such a way that the substance still remains, so also, without contradiction, we can represent this extinguished half as being preserved, not in the soul, but outside it; and we can likewise hold that since everything which is real in it, and which therefore has a degree—in other words, its entire existence, from which nothing is lacking—has been halved, another separate substance would then come into existence outside it. For the multiplicity which has been divided exists before, not indeed as a multiplicity of substances, but as a multiplicity of every reality proper to the substance, that is, of the quantum of existence in it; and the unity of substance was therefore only a mode of existence, which in virtue of this division has been transformed into a plurality of subsistence. Similarly, several simple substances might be fused into one, without anything being lost except only the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the former substances together. We might perhaps also represent the simple substances which yield us the appearance [which we entitle] matter as producing—not indeed by a mechanical or chemical influence upon one another, but by an influence unknown to us, of which the former influence would be merely the appearance—the souls of children, that is, as producing them through such dynamical division of the parent souls, considered as intensive quantities, and those parent souls as making good their loss through coalition with new material of the same kind.

1 [Reading, with Mellin, for sind.]
come at last to the existence\(^1\) of these thinking beings. Now in this system of rational psychology these beings are taken not only as being conscious of their existence independently of outer things, but as also being able, in and by themselves, to determine that existence in respect of the permanence which is a necessary characteristic of substance. This rationalist system is thus unavoidably committed to idealism, or at least to problematic idealism. For if the existence of outer things is not in any way required for determination of one's own existence in time, the assumption of their existence is a quite gratuitous assumption, of which no proof can ever be given.

If, on the other hand, we should proceed analytically, starting from the proposition 'I think', as a proposition that already in itself includes an existence as given, and therefore modality, and analysing it in order to ascertain its content, and so to discover whether and how this 'I' determines its existence in space or time solely through that content;\(^6\) then the propositions of the rational doctrine of the soul would not begin with the concept of a thinking being in general, but with a reality, and we should infer from the manner in which this reality is thought, after everything empirical in it has been removed, what it is that belongs to a thinking being in general.

This is shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I am far from allowing any servicesbleness or validity to such fancies; and as the principles of our Analytic have sufficiently demonstrated, no other than an empirical employment of the categories (including that of substance) is possible. But if the rationalist is bold enough, out of the mere faculty of thought, without any permanent intuition whereby an object might be given, to construct a self-subsistent being, and this merely on the ground that the unity of apperception in thought does not allow of its being explained [as arising] out of the composite, instead of admitting, as he ought to do, that he is unable to explain the possibility of a thinking nature,(^6) why should not the materialist, though he can as little appeal to experience in support of his [conjectured] possibilities, be justified in being equally daring, and in using his principle to establish the opposite conclusion, while still preserving the formal unity upon which his opponent has relied.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\(^1\) [Cf. above, p. 330. As there noted, Kant, in his private copy of the Critique, has changed 'The soul is substance' to 'The soul exists as substance.']

\(^6\) [bloss dadurch.]

\(^6\) [einer denkenden Natur.]

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**WIDERLEGUNG DES MENDELSSOHNISCHEN BEWEISES (B)** 353

durch, so stoinen wir zuletzt auf die Existens derselben, deren sie sich in diessem System, unabhãngenig von äußeren Dingen, nicht allein bewusst sind, sondern diese\(^1\) auch (in Ansehung der Bahrarlichkeit, die notwendig zum Charakter der Substanz gehört) aus sich selbst bestimmen können. Hieraus folgt aber, daß der Idealismus in demselben rationalistischen System unvermeidlich sei, wenigstens der problematische, und wenn das Dasein äußerer Dinge zu Bestimmung seines eigenen in der Zeit gar nicht erforderlich ist, jenes auch nur ganz un- sonst angenommen werde, ohne jemals einen Beweis davon geben zu können.

Befolgen wir dagegen das analytische Verfahren, da das Ich denke, als ein Säaz, der schon ein Dasein in sich schließt, als gegeben, mithin die Modalität, zum Grunde liegt, und vergleichen ihn, um seinen Inhalt, ob und wie nämlich dieses Ich im Raum oder der Zeit bloß dadurch sein Dasein bestimmt, zu erkennen, so würden die Sätze der rationalen Seelenlehre nicht vom Begriffe eines denkenden Wesens überhaupt, sondern von einer Wirklichkeit anfangen, und aus der Art, wie diese gedacht wird, nachdem alles, was dabei empirisch ist, abgesondert worden, das, was einem denkenden Wesen überhaupt zukommt, gefolgt werden, wie folgende Tafel zeigt.

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\(^1\) Akad.-Ausz.: *die sie.*
1. I think,
2. as subject,
3. as simple subject,
4. as identical subject
in every state of my thought.

In the second proposition it has not been determined whether I can exist and be thought as subject only, and not also as a predicate of another being, and accordingly the concept of a subject is here taken in a merely logical sense, and it remains undetermined whether or not we are to understand by it a substance. Similarly, the third proposition establishes nothing in regard to the constitution or subsistence of the subject; none the less in this proposition the absolute unity of apperception, the simple 'I' in the representation to which all combination or separation that constitutes thought relates, has its own importance. For apperception is something real, and its simplicity is already given in the mere fact of its possibility. Now in space there is nothing real which can be simple; points, which are the only simple things in space, are merely limits, not themselves anything that can as parts serve to constitute space. From this follows the impossibility of any explanation in materialist terms of the constitution of the self as a merely thinking subject. But since my existence is taken in the first proposition as given—for it does not say that every thinking being exists, which would be to assert its absolute necessity and therefore to say too much, but only, 'I exist thinking'—the proposition is empirical, and can determine my existence only in relation to my representations in time. But since for this purpose I again require something permanent, which, so far as I think myself, is in no way given to me in inner intuition, it is quite impossible, by means of this simple self-consciousness, to determine the manner in which I exist, whether it be as substance or as accident. Thus, if materialism is disqualified from explaining my existence, spiritualism is equally incapable of doing so; and the conclusion is that in no way whatsoever can we know anything of the constitution of the soul, so far as the possibility of its separate existence is concerned.

How, indeed, should it be possible, by means of the unity
of consciousness—which we only know because we cannot
but make use of it, as indispensable for the possibility of
experience—to pass out beyond experience (our existence in
this life), and even to extend our knowledge to the nature of
all thinking beings in general, through the empirical, but in
respect of every sort of intuition the quite indeterminate pro-
position, 'I think'?

Rational psychology exists not as doctrine, furnishing an
addition to our knowledge of the self, but only as discipline.
It sets impassable limits to speculative reason in this field, and
thus keeps us, on the one hand, from throwing ourselves into
the arms of a soulless materialism, or, on the other hand, from
losing ourselves in a spiritualism which must be quite un-
formed so long as we remain in this present life. But though
it furnishes no positive doctrine, it reminds us that we should
regard this refusal of reason to give satisfying response to our
inquisitive probing into what is beyond the limits of this
present life as reason's hint to divert our self-knowledge from
fruitless and extravagant speculation to fruitful practical em-
ployment. Though in such practical employment it is directed
always to objects of experience only, it derives its principles
from a higher source, and determines us to regulate our actions
as if our destiny reached infinitely far beyond experience, and
therefore far beyond this present life.

From all this it is evident that rational psychology owes
its origin simply to misunderstanding. The unity of conscious-
ness, which underlies the categories, is here mistaken for an
intuition of the subject as object, and the category of sub-
stance is then applied to it. But this unity is only unity in
thought, by which alone no object is given, and to which,
therefore, the category of substance, which always presup-
poses a given intuition, cannot be applied. Consequently, this
subject cannot be known. The subject of the categories cannot
by thinking the categories acquire a concept of itself as an
object of the categories. For in order to think them, its pure
self-consciousness, which is what was to be explained, must
itself be presupposed. Similarly, the subject, in which the re-
presentation of time has its original ground, cannot thereby
determine its own existence in time. And if this latter is im-
possible, the former, as a determination of the self (as a
Thus the expectation of obtaining knowledge which while extending beyond the limits of possible experience is likewise to further the highest interests of humanity, is found, so far as speculative philosophy professes to satisfy it, to be grounded in deception, and to destroy itself in the attempt at fulfilment. Yet the severity of our criticism has rendered reason a not unimportant service in proving the impossibility of dogmatically determining, in regard to an object of experience, anything that lies beyond the limits of experience. For in so doing it has secured reason against all possible assertions of the opposite. That cannot be achieved save in one or other

* The 'I think' is, as already stated, an empirical proposition, and contains within itself the proposition 'I exist'. But I cannot say 'Everything which thinks, exists'. For in that case the property of thought would render all beings which possess it necessary beings. My existence cannot, therefore, be regarded as an inference from the proposition 'I think', as Descartes sought to contend—for it would then have to be preceded by the major premise 'Everything which thinks, exists'—but is identical with it. The 'I think' expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e. perception (and thus shows that sensation, which as such belongs to sensibility, lies at the basis of this existential proposition) But the 'I think' precedes the experience which is required to determine the object of perception through the category in respect of time; and the existence here [referred to] is not a category. The category as such does not apply to an indeterminately given object but only to one of which we have a concept and about which we seek to know whether it does or does not exist outside the concept. An indeterminate perception here signifies only something real that is given, given indeed to thought in general, and so not as appearance, nor as thing in itself (noumenon), but as something which actually\(^1\) exists, and which in the proposition, 'I think', is denoted \(^2\) as such. For it must be observed, that when I have called the proposition, 'I think', an empirical proposition, I do not mean to say thereby, that the 'I' in this proposition is an empirical representation. On the contrary, it is purely intellectual, because belonging to thought in general. Without some empirical representation to supply the material for thought, the actus, 'I think', would not, indeed, take place; but the empirical is only the condition of the application, or of the employment, of the pure intellectual faculty.

\(^1\) [in der Tat] \(^2\) [besteht]
of two ways. Either we have to prove our proposition apodictically; or, if we do not succeed in this, we have to seek out the sources of this inability, which, if they are traceable to the necessary limits of our reason, must constrain all opponents to submit to this same law of renunciation in respect of all claims to dogmatic assertion.

Yet nothing is thereby lost as regards the right, nay, the necessity, of postulating a future life in accordance with the principles of the practical employment of reason, which is closely bound up with its speculative employment. For the merely speculative proof has never been able to exercise any influence upon the common reason of men. It so stands upon the point of a hair, that even the schools preserve it from falling only so long as they keep it unceasingly spinning round like a top; even in their own eyes it yields no abiding foundation upon which anything could be built. The proofs which are serviceable for the world at large preserve their entire value undiminished, and indeed, upon the surrender of these dogmatic pretensions, gain in clearness and in natural force. For reason is then located in its own peculiar sphere, namely, the order of ends, which is also at the same time an order of nature; and since it is in itself not only a theoretical but also a practical faculty, and as such is not bound down to natural conditions, it is justified in extending the order of ends, and therewith our own existence, beyond the limits of experience and of life. If we judged according to analogy with the nature of living beings in this world, in dealing with which reason must necessarily accept the principle that no organ, no faculty, no impulse, indeed nothing whatsoever is either superfluous or disproportioned to its use, and that therefore nothing is purposeless, but everything exactly conformed to its destiny in life—if we judged by such an analogy we should have to regard man, who alone can contain in himself the final end of all this order, as the only creature that is excepted from it. Man's natural endowments—not merely his talents and the impulses to enjoy them, but above all else the moral law within him—go so far beyond all the utility and advantage which he may derive from them in this present life, that he learns thereby to prize the mere consciousness of a righteous will as being, apart from all advantageous consequences, apart even from the

satz apodiktisch beweist, oder, wenn dies nicht gelingt, die Quellen dieses Unvermögens aufsucht, welche, wenn sie in den notwendigen Schranken unserer Vernunft liegen, alsdenn jeden Gegner gerade demselben Gesetze der Enttäuschung aller Ansprüche auf dogmatische Behauptung unterwerfen müssen.

Gleichwohl wird hiedurch für die Befugnis, ja gar die Notwendigkeit, der Annahme eines künftigen Lebens, nach Grundsatzen des spekulatorischen verbundenen praktischen Vernunftgebaus, hierbei nicht das mindeste verloren; denn der bloße spekulatorische Beweis hat auf die gemeine Menschenvernunft ohnedem niemals einzigem Einfluß haben können. Er ist so auf einer Haarspitzte gestellt, daß selbst die Schule ihm auf derselben nur so lange erhalten kann, als sie ihn als einen Kreis um denselben sich unauflhörlich drehen läßt, und er in ihren eigenen Augen also keine beharrliche Grundlage abgibt, worauf etwas gebaut werden könnte. Die Beweise, die für die Welt brauchbar sind, bleiben kie bei alle in ihrem unverminderten Werte, und gewinnen vielmehr durch Abstellung jener dogmatischen Anmaßungen an Klarheit und unverständliche Überzeugung, indem sie die Vernunft in ihr eigentümliches Gebiet, nämlich die Ordnung der Zwecke, die doch zugleich eine Ordnung der Natur ist, versetzen, die dann aber zugleich, als praktisches Vermögen an sich selbst, ohne auf die Bedingungen der letzteren eingeschränkt zu sein, die erstere und mit ihr unsere eigene Existenz über die Grenzen der Erfahrung und des Lebens hinaus zu erweitern berechtigt ist. Nach der Analogie mit der Natur lebender Wesen in dieser Welt, an welchen die Vernunft es notwendig zum Grundsätze annehmen muß, daß kein Organ, kein Vermögen, kein Antrieb, also nichts Unbehörliches, oder für den Gebrauch Unpropor tioniertes, mithin Unzuverlässigtes anzutreffen, sondern alles seiner Bestimmung im Leben genau angemessen sei, zu urteilen, müßte der Mensch, der doch allein dem letzten Endzweck von allem diesem in sich enthalten kann, das einzige Geschöpf sein, welches davon ausgenommen wäre. Denn seine Naturanlagen, nicht bloß den Talenten und Anträben nach, davon Gebrauch zu machen, sondern vornehmlich das moralische Gesetze in ihm, gehen so weit über allen Nutzen und Vorteil, den er in diesem Leben daraus ziehen könnte, daß das letztere, sogar das bloße Bewußtsein der Rechtschaffenheit der Gesinnung, bei Ermutigung aller Vorteile, selbst sogar des Schattenwerks vom Nach-
shadowy reward of posthumous fame, supreme over all other values; and so feels an inner call to fit himself, by his conduct in this world, and by the sacrifice of many of its advantages, for citizenship in a better world upon which he lays hold in idea. This powerful and incontrovertible proof is reinforced by our ever-increasing knowledge of purposiveness in all that we see around us, and by contemplation of the immensity of creation, and therefore also by the consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the possible extension of our knowledge, and of a striving commensurate therewith. All this still remains to us; but we must renounce the hope of comprehending, from the merely theoretical knowledge of ourselves, the necessary continuance of our existence.

CONCLUSION, IN REGARD TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PARALOGISM

The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from the confusion of an idea of reason—the idea of a pure intelligence—with the completely undetermined concept of a thinking being in general. I think myself on behalf of a possible experience, at the same time abstracting from all actual experience; and I conclude therefrom that I can be conscious of my existence even apart from experience and its empirical conditions. In so doing I am confusing the possible abstraction from my empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self, and I thus come to believe that I have knowledge that what is substantial in me is the transcendent subject. But all that I really have in thought is simply the unity of consciousness, on which, as the mere form of knowledge, all determination is based.

The task of explaining the communion of the soul with the body does not properly belong to the psychology with which we are here dealing. For this psychology proposes to prove the personality of the soul even apart from this communion (that is, after death), and is therefore transcendent in the proper sense of that term. It does, indeed, occupy itself with an object of experience, but only in that aspect in which

\[\text{[nur sofern]}\]

358 TRANSZENTENTALE DIALEKT

ruhm, über alles hochschätzen lehrt, und sich innerlich dazu berufen fühlt, sich durch sein Verhalten in dieser Welt, mit Versichtigung auf viele Vorteile, zum Bürger einer besseren, die er in der Idee hat, taglich zu machen. Dieser mächtige, niemals zu widerlegend Beweisgrund, begleitet durch eine sich unaufhörlich vermehrende Erkenntnis der Zweckmäßigkeit in allem, was wir vor uns sehen, und durch eine Aussicht in die Unumgänglichkeit der Schöpfung, mithin auch durch das Bewusstsein einer gewissen Unbegrenztheit in der möglichen Erweiterung unserer Kenntnisse, samt einem dieser angemessenen Triebe bleibt immer noch übrig, wenn wir es gleich aufgeben müssen, die notwendige Fortdauer unserer Existens aus der bloß theoretischen Erkenntnis unserer selbst einzusehen.

BESCHLUSS DER AUFLÖSUNG DES PSYCHOLOGISCHEN PARALOGISMS


Die Aufgabe, die Gemeinschaft der Seele mit dem Körper zu erklären, gehört nicht eigentlich zu derjenigen Psychologie, wovon hier die Rede ist, weil sie die Persönlichkeit der Seele auch außer dieser Gemeinschaft (nach dem Tode) zu beweisen die Absicht hat, und also im eigenthümlichen Verstande transzendent ist, ob sie sich gleich mit einem Objekte der Erfahrung beschäftigt, aber nur so form es

\[\text{[nur sofern]}\]

\[\text{[nur sofern]}\]

\[\text{Akad.-Aug.: und er sich}.\]

\[\text{[nur sofern]}\]
it ceases to be an object of experience. Our teaching, on the other hand, does supply a sufficient answer to this question. The difficulty, peculiar to the problem consists, as is generally recognised, in the assumed heterogeneity of the object of inner sense (the soul) and the objects of the outer senses, the formal condition of their intuition being, in the case of the former, time only, and in the case of the latter, also space. But if we consider that the two kinds of objects thus differ from each other, not inwardly but only in so far as one appears outwardly to the other, and that what, as thing in itself, underlies the appearance of matter, perhaps after all may not be so heterogeneous in character, this difficulty vanishes, the only question that remains being how in general a communion of substances is possible. This, however, is a question which lies outside the field of psychology, and which the reader, after what has been said in the Analytic regarding fundamental powers and faculties, will not hesitate to regard as likewise lying outside the field of all human knowledge.

**GENERAL NOTE ON THE TRANSITION FROM RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY TO COSMOLOGY**

The proposition, 'I think' or 'I exist thinking', is an empirical proposition. Such a proposition, however, is conditioned by empirical intuition, and is therefore also conditioned by the object [that is, the self] which is thought [in its aspect] as appearance. It would consequently seem that on our theory the soul, even in thought, is completely transformed into appearance, and that in this way our consciousness itself, as being a mere illusion, must refer in fact to nothing.

Thought, taken by itself, is merely the logical function, and therefore the pure spontaneity of the combination of the manifold of a merely possible intuition, and does not exhibit the subject of consciousness as appearance; and this for the sufficient reason that thought takes no account whatsoever of the mode of intuition, whether it be sensible or intellectual. I thereby represent myself to myself neither as I am nor as I appear to myself. I think myself only as I do any object in general from whose mode of intuition I abstract. If I here re-

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\[ {^1} \text{[Schein.]} \]
present myself as subject of thoughts or as ground of thought, these modes of representation do not signify the categories of substance or of cause. For the categories are those functions of thought (of judgment) as already applied to our sensible intuition, such intuition being required if I seek to know myself. If, on the other hand, I would be conscious of myself simply as thinking, then since I am not considering how my own self may be given in intuition, the self may be mere appearance to me, the 'I' that thinks, but is no mere appearance in so far as I think; in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself, although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.

The proposition, 'I think', in so far as it amounts to the assertion, 'I exist thinking', is no mere logical function, but determines the subject (which is then at the same time object) in respect of existence, and cannot take place without inner sense, the intuition of which presents the object not as thing in itself but merely as appearance. There is here, therefore, not simply spontaneity of thought, but also receptivity of intuition, that is, the thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now it is to this intuition that the thinking self would have to look for the conditions of the employment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause, etc., if it is not merely to distinguish itself as object in itself, through the 'I', but is also to determine the mode of its existence, that is, to know itself as noumenon. This, however, is impossible, since the inner empirical intuition is sensible and yields only data of appearance, which furnish nothing to the object of pure consciousness for the knowledge of its separate existence, but can serve only for the obtaining of experience.

Should it be granted that we may in course of course discover, not in experience but in certain laws of the pure employment, of reason—laws which are not merely logical rules, but which while holding a priori also concern our existence—ground for regarding ourselves as legislating completely a priori in regard to our own existence, and as determining this existence, there would thereby be revealed a spontaneity through which our reality would be determinable, independently of the conditions of empirical intuition. And we should also become

1 [mein eigenes Selbst.]  2 [abendtälichen Subjekts.]

Wenn ich mich hier als Subjekt der Gedanken, oder auch als Grund des Denkens, vorstelle, so bedeuten diese Vorstellungen nicht die Kategorien der Substanse, oder der Ursache, denn diese sind jene Funktionen des Denkens (Urteils) schon auf unsere sinnliche Anschauung angewandt, welche freilich erfordert werden würden, wenn ich mich erinnern wollte. Nun will ich mich meiner aber nur als denkend bewusst werden; wie mein eigenes Selbst in der Anschauung gegeben sei, das setze ich bei Seite, und da könnte es mir, der ich denke, aber nicht so fern ich denke, bloß Erscheinung sein; im Bewusstsein meiner selbst beim bloßen Denken bin ich das Wesen selbst, von dem mir aber freilich dadurch noch nichts vom Denken gegeben ist.

Der Satz aber, Ich denke, so fern er so viel sagt, als: ich existiere denkend, ist nicht bloß logische Funktion, sondern bestimmmt das Subjekt (welches denn zugleich Objekt ist) in Anschauung der Existens, und kann ohne den inneren Sinn nicht stattfinden, dessen Anschauung jederzeit das Objekt nicht als Ding an sich selbst, sondern bloß als Erscheinung an die Hand gibt. In ihm ist also schon nicht mehr bloße Spontaneität des Denkens, sondern auch Rezeptivität der Anschauung, d. i.: das Denken meiner selbst auf die empirische Anschauung ebendesselben Subjekts angewandt. In dieser letzteren müßte denn nun das denkende Selbst die Bedingungen des Gebruchs seiner logischen Funktionen zu Kategorien der Substanse, der Ursache etc. suchen, um sich als Objekt an sich selbst nicht bloß durch das Ich zu bezeichnen, sondern auch die Art seines Daseins zu bestimmen, d. i. sich als Noumenon zu erkennen, welches aber unmöglich ist, indem die innere empirische Erscheinung sinnlich ist, und nichts als Data der Erscheinung an die Hand gibt, die dem Objekt des reinen Bewusstseins zur Kenntnis der abgesonderten Existens nichts liefern, sondern bloß der Erfahrung zum Behufe dienen kann.

Gesetz aber, es fände sich in der Folge, nicht in der Erfahrung, sondern in gewissen (nicht bloß logischen Regeln, sondern) a priori bestehenden, unsere Existens betreffenden Gesetzen des reinen Vernunftgebrauchs, Veranlassung, uns völlig a priori in Anschauung unseres eigenen Daseins als gesetzgebend und diese Existens auch selbst bestimmend vorauszusetzen, so würde sich dadurch eine Spontaneität entdecken, wodurch unsere Wirklichkeit bestimmbar wäre, ohne dass der Bedingungen der empirischen Anschauung zu bedürfen; und
aware that in the consciousness of our existence there is contained a something a priori, which can serve to determine our existence—the complete determination of which is possible only in sensible terms—as being related, in respect of a certain inner faculty, to a non-sensible intelligible world.

But this would not be of the least service in furthering the attempts of rational psychology. In this marvellous faculty, which the consciousness of the moral law first reveals to me, I should indeed have, for the determination of my existence, a principle which is purely intellectual. But through what predicates would that determination have to be made? They could be no other than those which must be given to me in sensible intuition; and thus I should find myself, as regards rational psychology, in precisely the same position as before, namely, still in need of sensible intuitions to confer meaning on my concepts of understanding (substance, cause, etc.), through which alone I can have knowledge of myself; and these intuitions can never aid me in advancing beyond the field of experience. Nevertheless, in respect of the practical employment, which is always directed to objects of experience, I should be justified in applying these concepts, in conformity with their analogical meaning when employed theoretically, to freedom and the subject that is possessed of freedom. In so doing, however, I should understand by these concepts the merely logical functions of subject and predicate, of ground and consequence, in accordance with which the acts or effects are so determined conformably to those [moral] laws, that they always allow of being explained, together with the laws of nature, in accordance with the categories of substance and cause, although they have their source in an entirely different principle. These observations are designed merely to prevent a misunderstanding to which the doctrine of our self-intuition, as appearance, is particularly liable. We shall have occasion to make further application of them in the sequel.

hier würden wir inne werden, daß im Bewußtsein unseres Daseins a priori etwas enthalten sei, was unsere nur sinnlich durch gängig bestimmmbare Existenz, doch in Ansehung eines gewissen inneren Vermögens in Beziehung auf eine intelli
gibles (freilich nur gedachtes) Welt zu bestimmten dienen kann.

Aber dieses würde nichts desto weniger alle Versuche in der rationalen Psychologie nicht im mindesten weiter bringen. Denn ich würde durch jenes bewundernwürdige Vermögen, welches mir das Bewußtsein des moralischen Gesetzes allerort offenbart, zwar ein Prinzip der Bestimmung meiner Existenz, welches rein intellektuell ist, haben, aber durch welche Prüﬁ
durch keine andere, als die mir in der sinnlichen Anschauung gegeben werden müssen, und so würde ich da wieder
um hingeraut, wo ich in der rationalen Psychologie war, näm
llich in das Bedürfnis sinnlicher Anschauungen, um meinen Ver
standesbegriffen, Substanzen, Ursachen u. s. w., wodurch ich all
er Erkennnis von mir haben kann, Bedeutung zu verschaﬀen

den Ansichten können mich aber über das Feld der Er
fahrung niemals hinaus helfen. Indessen würde ich doch diese Begriffe in Ansehung des praktischen Gebrauchs, welcher doch immer auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung gerichtet ist, der im theoretischen Gebrauche analogischen Bedeutung gemäß, auf
die Freiheit und das Subjekt derselben anzuwenden befugt sein, indem ich bloß die logischen Funktionen des Subjekts und Prüﬁs des Grundes und der Folge darunter verstehne, denen gemäß die Handlungen oder die Wirkungen jener Gesetzen gemäß so bestimmt werden, daß sie zugleich mit den Naturgesetzen, den Kategorien der Substanzen und der Ursachen allemal gemäß erklärt werden können, ob sie gleich aus ganz anderem Prinzip entspringen. Dieses hat nur zur Verhütung des Miß
verstandes, dem die Lehre von unserer Selbstanschauung, als Erscheinung, leicht ausgesetzt ist, gesagt sein sollen. Im Fol
genden wird man davon Gebrauch zu machen Gelegenheit haben.

1 Der voranstehende Textabschnitt aus B ist die Neufassung des nachfolgenden ausführlicheren Abschnitts aus A.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

BOOK II

CHAPTER II

THE ANTIMONY OF PURE REASON

We have shown in the introduction to this part of our work that all transcendental illusion of pure reason rests on dialectical inferences whose schema is supplied by logic in the three formal species of syllogisms—just as the categories find their logical schema in the four functions of all judgments. The first type of these pseudo-rational inferences deals with the unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all representations in general (of the subject or soul), in correspondence with the categorical syllogisms, the major premiss of which is a principle asserting the relation of a predicate to a subject.

The second type of dialectical argument follows the analogy of the hypothetical syllogisms. It has as its content the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the [field of] appearance. In similar fashion, the third type, which will be dealt with in the next chapter, has as its theme the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility of objects in general.

But there is one point that calls for special notice. Transcendental paralogism produced a purely one-sided illusion in regard to the idea of the subject of our thought. No illusion which will even in the slightest degree support the opposing assertion is caused by the concepts of reason. Consequently, although transcendental paralogism, in spite of a favouring illusion, cannot disclaim the radical defect through which in the fiery ordeal of critical investigation it dwindles

The two authors are comparing and contrasting the antinomy of pure reason in the context of transcendental dialectics. The text emphasizes the role of logic and subjective conditions in the formation of syllogisms and the implications of these inferences on the nature of human understanding.
into mere semblance, such advantage as it offers is altogether on the side of pneumatism.

A completely different situation arises when reason is applied to the objective synthesis of appearances. For in this domain, however it may endeavour to establish its principle of unconditioned unity, and though it indeed does so with great though illusory appearance of success, it soon falls into such contradictions that it is constrained, in this cosmological field, to desist from any such pretensions.

We have here presented to us a new phenomenon of human reason—an entirely natural antithetic, in which there is no need of making subtle enquiries or of laying snares for the unwary, but into which reason of itself quite unavoidably falls. It certainly guards reason from the slumber of fictitious conviction such as is generated by a purely one-sided illusion, but at the same time subjects it to the temptation either of abandoning itself to a sceptical despair, or of assuming an obdurate attitude, dogmatically committing itself to certain assertions, and refusing to grant a fair hearing to the arguments for the counter-position. Either attitude is the death of sound philosophy, although the former might perhaps be entitled the euthanasia of pure reason.

Before considering the various forms of opposition and dissension to which this conflict or antinomy of the laws of pure reason gives rise, we may offer a few remarks in explanation and justification of the method which we propose to employ in the treatment of this subject. I entitle all transcendental ideas, in so far as they refer to absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances, cosmical concepts, partly because this unconditioned totality also underlies the concept—itself only an idea—of the world-whole; partly because they concern only the synthesis of appearances, therefore only empirical synthesis. When, on the contrary, the absolute totality is that of the synthesis of the conditions of all possible things in general, it gives rise to an ideal of pure reason which, though it may indeed stand in a certain relation to the cosmical concept, is quite distinct from it. Accordingly, just as the paralogisms of pure reason formed the basis of a dialectical psychology, so the antinomy of pure reason will exhibit to us the transcendental principles


Ehe wir die Auftritte des Zwißens und der Zerrüttungen sehen lassen, welche dieser Widerstreit der Gesetze (Antinomie) der reinen Vernunft veranlaßt, wollen wir gewisse Erörterungen geben, welche die Methode erläutern und rechtfertigen können, deren wir uns in Behandlung unseres Gegenstandes bedienen. Ich nenne alle transzendentalen Ideen, sofern sie die absolute Totalität in der Synthese der Erscheinungen betreffen, Weltbegriffe, teils wegen eben dieser unbedingten Totalität, worauf auch der Begriff des Weltganzen beruht, der selbst nur eine Idee ist, teils weil sie lediglich auf die Synthese der Erscheinungen, mithin die empirische, gehen, da hingegen die absolute Totalität, in der Synthese der Bedingungen aller möglichen Dinge überhaupt, ein Ideal der reinen Vernunft veranlassen wird, welches von dem Weltbegriffe gänzlich unterschieden ist, ob es gleich darauf in Beziehung steht. Daher, so wie die Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft den Grund zu einer dialektischen Psychologie legten, so wird die Antinomie der reinen Vernunft die transzendentalen Grundsätze einer vermeinten reinen (ratio-
of a pretended pure rational cosmology. But it will not do so in order to show this science to be valid and to adopt it. As the title, conflict of reason, suffices to show, this pretended science can be exhibited only in its bedazzling but false illusoriness, as an idea which can never be reconciled with appearances.

THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

Section 1

SYSTEM OF COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS

In proceeding to enumerate these ideas with systematic precision according to a principle, we must bear in mind two points. In the first place we must recognise that pure and transcendent concepts can issue only from the understanding. Reason does not really generate any concept. The most it can do is to free a concept of understanding from the unavoidable limitations of possible experience, and so to endeavour to extend it beyond the limits of the empirical, though still, indeed, in terms of its relation to the empirical. This is achieved in the following manner. For a given conditioned, reason demands on the side of the conditions—to which as the conditions of synthetic unity the understanding subjects all appearances—absolute totality, and in so doing converts the category into a transcendental idea. For only by carrying the empirical synthesis as far as the unconditioned is it enabled to render it absolutely complete; and the unconditioned is never to be met with in experience, but only in the idea. Reason makes this demand in accordance with the principle that if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and consequently the absolutely unconditioned (through which alone the conditioned has been possible) is also given. The transcendental ideas are thus, in the first place, simply categories extended to the unconditioned, and can be reduced to a table arranged according to the [fourfold] headings of the latter. In the second place, not all categories are fitted for such employment, but only those in which the synthesis constitutes a series of conditions subordinated to, not co-ordinated with,
one another, and generative of a [given] conditioned. Absolute totality is demanded by reason only in so far as the ascending series of conditions relates to a given conditioned. It is not demanded in regard to the descending line of consequences, nor in reference to the aggregate of co-ordinated conditions of these consequences. For in the case of the given conditioned, conditions are presupposed, and are considered as given together with it. On the other hand, since consequences do not make their conditions possible, but rather presuppose them, we are not called upon, when we advance to consequences or descend from a given condition to the conditioned, to consider whether the series does or does not cease; the question as to the totality of the series is not in any way a presupposition of reason.

Thus we necessarily think time as having completely elapsed up to the given moment, and as being itself given in this completed form. This holds true, even though such completely elapsed time is not determinable by us. But since the future is not the condition of our attaining to the present, it is a matter of entire indifference, in our comprehension of the latter, how we may think of future time, whether as coming to an end or as flowing on to infinity. We have, as it were, the series \( m, n, o \), in which \( n \) is given as conditioned by \( m \), and at the same time as being the condition of \( o \). The series ascends from the conditioned \( n \) to \( m \) (\( l, k, i \), etc.), and also descends from the condition \( n \) to the conditioned \( o \) (\( p, q, r \), etc.). Now I must presuppose the first series in order to be able to view \( n \) as given. According to reason, with its demand for totality of conditions, \( n \) is possible only by means of that series. Its possibility does not, however, rest upon the subsequent series, \( o, p, q, r \). This latter series may not therefore be regarded as given, but only as allowing of being given (\textit{dabilis}).

I propose to name the synthesis of a series which begins, on the side of the conditions, from the condition which stands nearest to the given appearance and so passes to the more remote conditions, the \textit{regressive} synthesis; and that which advances, on the side of the conditioned, from the first consequence to the more distant, the \textit{progressive}. The first proceeds in \textit{anteecedentia}, the second in \textit{consequentia}. The cosmological ideas deal, therefore, with the totality of the regressive synthesis (nicht beigefügte) Bedingungen zu einem Bedingten. Die absolute Totalität wird von der Vernunft nur so fern gefordert, als sie die aufsteigende Reihe der Bedingungen zu einem gegebenen Bedingten angeht, in mithin nicht, wenn von der absteigenden Lini der Folgen, noch auch von dem Aggregat koordinierter Bedingungen zu diesen Folgen, die Rede ist. Denn Bedingungen sind in Ansehung des gegebenen Bedingten schon vorausgesetzt und mit diesem auch als gegeben anzusehen, anstatt daß, da die Folgen ihre Bedingungen nicht möglich machen, sondern vielmehr voraussetzen, man im Fortgang zu den Folgen (oder im Absteigen von der gegebenen Bedingung zu dem Bedingten) unbekümmert sein kann, ob die Reihe aufhöre oder nicht, und überhaupt die Frage, wegen ihrer Totalität, gar keine Voraussetzung der Vernunft ist.

So denkt man sich notwendig eine bis auf den gegebenen Augenblick völlig abgelaufene Zeit auch als gegeben (wenn gleich nicht durch uns bestimmbar). Was aber die künftige betrifft, da sie die Bedingung nicht ist, zu der Gegenwart zu gelangen, so ist es, um diese zu begreifen, ganz gleichgültig, wie wir es mit der künftigen Zeit halten wollen, ob man sie irgendwo aufhören, oder ins Unendliche laufen lassen will. Es sei die Reihe \( m, n, o \), worin \( n \) als bedingt in Ansehung \( m \), aber zugleich als Bedingung von \( o \) gegeben ist, die Reihe gehe aufwärts von dem bedingten \( n \) zu \( m \) (\( l, k, i \), etc.), im gleichen abwärts von der Bedingung \( n \) zum bedingten \( o \) (\( p, q, r \), etc.), so muß ich die erste Reihe voraussetzen, um \( n \) als gegeben anzusehen, und \( n \) ist nach der Vernunft (der Totalität der Bedingungen) nur vermittelt jener Reihe möglich, seine Möglichkeit beruht aber nicht auf der folgenden Reihe \( o, p, q, r \), die daher auch nicht als gegeben, sondern nur als dabilis angesehen werden könne.

Ich will die Synthesis einer Reihe auf der Seite der Bedingungen, also von derjenigen an, welche die nächste zur gegebenen Erscheinung ist, und so zu den entfernteren Bedingungen, die regressive, diejenige aber, die auf der Seite des Bedingten, von der nächsten Folge zu den entfernteren, fortgeht, die progressive Synthesis nennen. Die erste geht in \textit{antecedentia}, die zweite in \textit{consequentia}. Die kosmologischen Ideen also beschäftigen sich mit der Totalität der regressiven Bedingungen.
proceeding in *antecedentia*, not in *consequentia*. The problem of pure reason suggested by the progressive form of totality is gratuitous and unnecessary, since the raising of it is not required for the complete comprehension of what is given in appearance. For that we require to consider only the grounds, not the consequences.

In arranging the table of ideas in accordance with the table of categories, we first take the two original *quanta* of all our intuition, *time* and *space*. Time is in itself a series, and indeed the formal condition of all series. In it, in regard to a given present, the antecedents can be *a priori* distinguished as conditions (the past) from the consequents (the future). The transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of conditions of any given conditioned therefore refers only to all past time; and in conformity with the idea of reason past time, as condition of the given moment, is necessarily thought as being given in its entirety. Now in space, taken in and by itself, there is no distinction between progress and regress. For as its parts are co-existent, it is an aggregate, not a series. The present moment can be regarded only as conditioned by past time, never as conditioning it, because this moment comes into existence only through past time, or rather through the passing of the preceding time. But as the parts of space are co-ordinated with, not subordinated to, one another, one part is not the condition of the possibility of another; and unlike time, space does not in itself constitute a series. Nevertheless the synthesis of the manifold parts of space, by means of which we apprehend space, is successive, taking place in time and containing a series. And since in this series of the aggregated spaces (as for instance of the feet in a rood) of the given space, those which are thought in extension of the given space are always the condition of the limits of the given space, the measuring of a space is also to be regarded as a synthesis of a series of the conditions of a given conditioned, only with this difference that the side of the conditions is not in itself distinct from that of the conditioned, and that in space *regressus* and *progressus* would therefore seem to be one and the same. Inasmuch as one part of space is not given through the others but only limited by them, we must consider each space, in so far as it is limited, as being also conditioned, in that it presupposes another space as the

Synthesis, und gehen in *antecedentia*, nicht in *consequentia*. Wenn dieses letztere geschieht, so ist es ein willkürliches und nicht notwendiges Problem der reinen Vernunft, weil wir zur vollständigen Begreiflichkeit dessen, was in der Erscheinung gegeben ist, wohl der Gründe, nicht aber der Folgen bedürfen.

Um nun nach der Tafel der Kategorien die Tafel der Ideen einzurichten, so nehmen wir zuerst die zwei ursprünglichen *Quanta* aller unserer Anschauung, Zeit und Raum. Die Zeit ist an sich selbst eine Reihe (und die formale Bedingung aller Reihen), und daher sind in ihr, in Ansehung einer gegebenen Gegenwart, die *Antecedentia* als Bedingungen (das Vergangene) von den *Consequentibus* (dem Künftigen) *a priori* zu unterscheiden. Folglich geht die *transzendentielle Idee*, der absoluten Totalität der Reihe der Bedingungen zu einem gegebenen Bedingten, nur auf alle vergangene Zeit. Es wird nach der Idee der Vernunft die ganze verlaufene Zeit als Bedingung des gegebenen Augenblicks notwendig als gegeben gedacht. Was aber den Raum betrifft, so ist in ihm an sich selbst kein Unterschied des Progressus vom Regressus, weil er ein *Aggregat*, aber keine Reihe ausmacht, indem seine Teile insgesamt zueinander gleich sind. Den gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt konnte ich in Ansehung der vergangenen Zeit nur als bedingt, niemals aber als Bedingung derselben, ansehen, weil dieser Augenblick nur durch die verflossene Zeit (oder vielmehr durch das Verlässen der vorhergehenden Zeit) allererst entspringt. Aber da die Teile des Raumes einander nicht untergeordnet, sondern beigeordnet sind, so ist ein Teil nicht die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des andern, und er macht nicht, so wie die Zeit, an sich selbst eine Reihe aus. Allein die Synthese der mannigfaltigen Teile des Raumes, wodurch wir ihn apprehendieren, ist doch sukzessiv, geschieht also in der Zeit und enthält eine Reihe. Und da in dieser Reihe der aggregierten Räume (z. B. der Füße in einer Rute) von einem gegebenen an die weiter hinzugedachten immer die Bedingung von der Grenze der vorigen sind, so ist das Messen eines Raumes auch als eine Synthese einer Reihe der Bedingungen zu einem gegebenen Bedingten anzusehen, nur daß die Seite der Bedingungen, von der Seite, nach welcher das Bedingte hinliegt, an sich selbst nicht unterschieden ist, folglich Regressus und Progressus im Raume einerlei zu sein scheint. Weil indessen ein Teil des Raumes nicht durch den andern gegeben, sondern nur begrenzt wird, so müssen wir jeden begrenzten Raum in so fern auch als bedingt ansehen, der einen andern Raum als die
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

condition of its limits, and so on. In respect of limitation the advance in space is thus also a regress, and the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in the series of conditions likewise applies to space. I can as legitimately enquire regarding the absolute totality of appearance in space as of that in past time. Whether an answer to this question is ever possible, is a point which will be decided later.

Secondly, reality in space, i.e. matter, is a conditioned. Its internal conditions are its parts, and the parts of these parts its remote conditions. There thus occurs a regressive synthesis, the absolute totality of which is demanded by reason. This can be obtained only by a completed division in virtue of which the reality of matter vanishes either into nothing or into what is no longer matter—namely, the simple. Here also, then, we have a series of conditions, and an advance to the unconditioned.

Thirdly, as regards the categories of real relation between appearances, that of substance with its accidents is not adapted to being a transcendental idea. That is to say, in it reason finds no ground for proceeding regressively to conditions. Accidents, in so far as they inhere in one and the same substance, are co-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series. Even in their relation to substance they are not really subordinated to it, but are the mode of existence of the substance itself. What in this category may still, however, seem to be an idea of transcendental reason, is the concept of the \( \text{4} \) substantial. But since this means no more than the concept of object in general, which subsists in so far as we think in it merely the transcendental subject apart from all predicates, whereas we are here dealing with the unconditioned only as it may exist in the series of appearances, it is evident that the substantial cannot be a member of that series. This is also true of substances in community. They are mere aggregates, and contain nothing on which to base a series.\(^8\) For we cannot say of them, as we can of spaces, whose limits are never determined in and by themselves but only through some other space, that they are subordinated to each other as conditions of the possibility of one another. There thus remains only the category of causality. It presents a series of causes of a given

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1 [Reading, with Erdmann, vom for von.]
2 [keinen Exponenten einer Reihe haben.]
390 KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

B 443 Effect such that we can proceed to ascend from the latter as the conditioned to the former as conditions, and so to answer the question of reason.

A 415 Fourthly, the concepts of the possible, the actual, and the necessary do not lead to any series, save in so far as the accidental in existence must always be regarded as conditioned, and as pointing in conformity with the rule of the understanding to a condition under which it is necessary, and this latter in turn to a higher condition, until reason finally attains unconditioned necessity only in the totality of the series.

When we thus select out those categories which necessarily lead to a series in the synthesis of the manifold, we find that there are but four cosmological ideas, corresponding to the four titles of the categories:

B 443 1. Absolute completeness
        of the Composition
        of the given whole of all appearances.

2. Absolute completeness
    in the Division
    of a given whole in the [field of] appearance.

3. Absolute completeness
    in the Origination
    of an appearance.

4. Absolute completeness
    as regards Dependence of Existence
    of the alterable in the [field of] appearance.

A 416 There are several points which here call for notice. In the first place, the idea of absolute totality concerns only the exposition of appearances, and does not therefore refer to the pure concept, such as the understanding may form, of a totality of things in general. Appearances are here regarded as given; what reason demands is the absolute completeness of the conditions of their possibility, in so far as these conditions constitute a series. What reason prescribes is therefore an absolutely (that is to say, in every respect) complete synthesis, whereby the appearance may be exhibited\(^1\) in accordance with the laws of understanding.

\(^1\) [exponier.]
Secondly, what reason is really seeking in this serial, regressively continued, synthesis of conditions, is solely the unconditioned. What it aims at is, as it were, such a completeness in the series of premisses as will dispense with the need of presupposing other premisses. This unconditioned is always contained in the absolute totality of the series as represented in imagination. But this absolutely complete synthesis is again only an idea; for we cannot know, at least at the start of this enquiry, whether such a synthesis is possible in the case of appearance. If we represent everything exclusively through pure concepts of understanding, and apart from conditions of sensible intuition, we can indeed at once assert that for a given conditioned, the whole series of conditions subordinated to each other is likewise given. The former is given only through the latter. When, however, it is with appearances that we are dealing, we find a special limitation due to the manner in which conditions are given, namely, through the successive synthesis of the manifold of intuition—a synthesis which has to be made complete through the regress. Whether this completeness is sensibly possible is a further problem; the idea of it lies in reason, independently alike of the possibility or of the impossibility of our connecting with it any adequate empirical concepts. Since, then, the unconditioned is necessarily contained in the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of the manifold in the [field of] appearance—the synthesis being executed in accordance with those categories which represent appearance as a series of conditions to a given conditioned—reason here adopts the method of starting from the idea of totality, though what it really has in view is the unconditioned, whether of the entire series or of a part of it. Meantime, also, it leaves undecided whether and how this totality is attainable.

This unconditioned may be conceived in either of two ways. It may be viewed as consisting of the entire series in which all the members without exception are conditioned and only the totality of them is absolutely unconditioned. This regress is to be entitled infinite. Or alternatively, the absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series—a part to which the other members are subordinated, and which does not itself stand

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1 [Einhaltung]
under any other condition. On the first view, the series a parte priori is without limits or beginning, i.e. is infinite, and at the same time is given in its entirety. But the regress in it is never completed, and can only be called potentially infinite. On the second view, there is a first member of the series which in respect of past time is entitled, the beginning of the world, in respect of space, the limit of the world, in respect of the parts of a given limited whole, the simple, in respect of causes, absolute self-activity (freedom), in respect of the existence of alterable things, absolute natural necessity.

We have two expressions, world and nature, which sometimes coincide. The former signifies the mathematical sum-total of all appearances and the totality of their synthesis, alike in the great and in the small, that is, in the advance alike through composition and through division. This same world is entitled nature when it is viewed as a dynamical whole. We are not then concerned with the aggregation in space and time, with a view to determining it as a magnitude, but with the unity in the existence of appearances. In this case the condition of that which happens is entitled the cause. Its unconditioned causality in the field of appearance is called freedom, and its conditioned causality is called natural cause in the narrower [adjectival] sense. The conditioned in existence in general is termed contingent and the unconditioned necessary. The un-

The absolute totality of the series of conditions to a given conditioned is always unconditioned, since outside it there are no further conditions in respect of which it could be conditioned. But this absolute totality of such a series is only an idea, or rather a problematic concept, the possibility of which has to be investigated, especially in regard to the manner in which the unconditioned (the transcendental idea really at issue) is involved therein.

Nature, taken adjectively (formaliter), signifies the connection of the determinations of a thing according to an inner principle of causality. By nature, on the other hand, taken substantively (materialiter), is meant the sum of appearances in so far as they stand, in virtue of an inner principle of causality, in thoroughgoing interconnection. In the first sense we speak of the nature of fluid matter, of fire, etc. The word is then employed in an adjectival manner. When, on the other hand, we speak of the things of nature, we have in mind a self-subsisting whole.

1 [Natur-ursache]
conditioned necessity of *appearances* may be entitled natural necessity.

The ideas with which we are now dealing I have above entitled cosmological ideas, partly because by the term 'world' we mean the sum of all *appearances*, and it is exclusively to the unconditioned in the *appearances* that our ideas are directed, partly also because the term 'world', in the transcendental sense, signifies the absolute totality of all existing things, and we direct our attention solely to the *completeness* of the synthesis, even though that is only attainable in the regress to its conditions. Thus despite the objection that these ideas are one and all transcendent, and that although they do not in kind surpass the object, namely, appearances, but are concerned exclusively with the world of sense, not with noumena, yet carry the synthesis to a degree which transcends all possible experience, I none the less still hold that they quite appropriately be entitled *cosmical concepts.*\(^1\) In respect of the distinction between the mathematically and the dynamically unconditioned at which the regress aims, I might, however, call the first two concepts cosmical in the narrower sense, as referring to the world of the great and the small, and the other two *transcendent concepts of nature.*\(^8\) This distinction has no special immediate value; its significance will appear later.

THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

Section 2

ANTITHETIC OF PURE REASON

If thetic be the name for any body of dogmatic doctrines, antithetic may be taken as meaning, not dogmatic assertions of the opposite, but the conflict of the doctrines of seemingly dogmatic knowledge (*thesis cum antithesis*) in which no one assertion can establish superiority over another. The antithetic does not, therefore, deal with one-sided assertions. It treats only of the conflict of the doctrines of reason with one another and the *causes* of this conflict. The transcendental antithetic is an enquiry into the antinomy of pure reason, its *causes* and *out-
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

come. If in employing the principles of understanding we do
not merely apply our reason to objects of experience, but
venture to extend these principles beyond the limits of expe-
rience, there arise pseudo-rational doctrines which can neither
hope for confirmation in experience nor fear refutation by it.
Each of them is not only in itself free from contradiction, but
finds conditions of its necessity in the very nature of reason—
only that, unfortunately, the assertion of the opposite has, on
its side, grounds that are just as valid and necessary.
The questions which naturally arise in connection with
such a dialectic of pure reason are the following: (1) In what
propositions is pure reason unavoidably subject to an anti-
omy? (2) On what causes does this antimony depend? (3)
Whether and in what way, despite this contradiction, does
there still remain open to reason a path to certainty?
A dialectical doctrine of pure reason must therefore be
distinguished from all sophistical propositions in two respects.

It must not refer to an arbitrary question such as may be raised
for some special purpose, but to one which human reason
must necessarily encounter in its progress. And secondly, both
it and its opposite must involve no mere artificial illusion such
as at once vanishes upon detection, but a natural and un-
avoidable illusion, which even after it has ceased to beguile
still continues to delude though not to deceive us, and which
though thus capable of being rendered harmless can never be
eradicated.

Such dialectical doctrine relates not to the unity of under-
standing in empirical concepts, but to the unity of reason in
mere ideas. Since this unity of reason involves a synthesis ac-
cording to rules, it must conform to the understanding; and
yet as demanding absolute unity of synthesis it must at the
same time harmonise with reason. But the conditions of this
unity are such that when it is adequate to reason it is too great
for the understanding; and when suited to the understanding,
too small for reason. There thus arises a conflict which cannot
be avoided, do what we will.

These pseudo-rational assertions thus disclose a dialectical
battlefield in which the side permitted to open the attack is
invariably victorious, and the side constrained to act on the
defensive is always defeated. Accordingly, vigorous fighters, no

410 TRANSENDENTALE DIALEKTIK
die Ursachen und das Resultat derselben. Wenn wir unsere
Vernunft nicht bloß, zum Gebrauch der Verstandesgrund-
sätze, auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung verwenden, sondern
jene über die Grenze der letzteren hinaus auszudehnen
wagen, so entspringen vernünftelnde Lehrröte, die in
der Erfahrung weder Bestätigung hoffen, noch Widerlegung
fürchten dürfen, und deren jeder nicht allein an sich selbst
ohne Widerspruch ist, sondern so gar in der Natur der Ver-
nunft Bedingungen seiner Notwendigkeit antrifft, nur daß
unglücklicher Weise der Gegensatz eben so gültige und not-
wendige Gründe der Behauptung auf seiner Seite hat.

Die Fragen, welche bei einer solchen Dialektik der reinen
Vernunft sich natürlich darbieten, sind also: 1. Bei welchen
Sätzen denn eigentlich die reine Vernunft einer Antinomie
unausschließlich unterworfen sei. 2. Auf welchen Ursachen
die Antinomie beruhe. 3. Ob und auf welche Art dennoch
der Vernunft unter diesem Widerspruch ein Weg zur Ge-
währheit offen bleibe.

Ein dialectikal Lehrsatz der reinen Vernunft muß dem-
nach dieses, ihn von allen sophistischen Sätzen Unter-
scheidendes, an sich haben, daß er nicht eine willkürliche Frage
betrifft, die man nur in gewisser beliebiger Absicht auf-
wirft, sondern eine solche, auf die jede menschliche Ver-
nunft in ihrem Fortgang notwendig stoßen muß; und
zweitens, daß er, mit seinem Gegensatz, nicht bloß einen
gekünstelten Schein, der, wenn man ihn einzieht, sogleich
verschwindet, sondern einen natürlichen und unvermeid-
llichen Schein bei sich führe, der selbst, wenn man ihn
mehr durch ihn hingenan genommen wird, noch immer täuscht,
obwohl nicht betrügt, und also zwar unschädlich gemacht,
aber niemals vertilgt werden kann.

Eine solche dialectikale Lehre wird sich nicht auf die
Verstandeseinheit in Erfahrungsbegriffen, sondern auf die
Vernunftseinheit in bloßen Ideen beziehen, deren Bedingun-
gen, da sie erstlich, als Synthesis nach Regeln, dem Ver-
stande, und doch zugleich, als absolute Einheit derselben
der Vernunft kongruieren soll, wenn sie der Vernunftseinheit
äquivalent ist, für den Verstand zu groß, und, wenn sie dem
Verstande angemessen, für die Vernunft zu klein sein wird; 1
woraus dann ein Widerspruch entspringen muß, der nicht
vermieden werden kann, man mag es anfangen, wie man
will.

Diese vernünftelnde Behauptungen eröffnen also einen
dialectischen Kampfplatz, wo jeder Teil die Oberhand be-
hält, der die Erlaubnis hat, den Angriff zu tun, und der je-
nehige gewiß unterliegt, der bloß 2 verteidigungswise zu ver-
fahren 3 genötigt ist. Daher auch rügige Ritter, die mögen

1 Akad.-Ausz. = werden. 2 A: sich bloß e. 3 A: führen e.
matter whether they support a good or a bad cause, if only they contrive to secure the right to make the last attack, and are not required to withstand a new onslaught from their opponents, may always count upon carrying off the laurels. We can easily understand that while this arena should time and again be contested, and that numerous triumphs should be gained by both sides, the last decisive victory always leaves the champion of the good cause master of the field, simply because his rival is forbidden to resume the combat. As impartial umpires, we must leave aside the question whether it is for the good or the bad cause that the contestants are fighting. They must be left to decide the issue for themselves. After they have rather exhausted than injured one another, they will perhaps themselves perceive the futility of their quarrel, and part good friends.

This method of watching, or rather provoking, a conflict of assertions, not for the purpose of deciding in favour of one or other side, but of investigating whether the object of controversy is not perhaps a deceptive appearance which each vainly strives to grasp, and in regard to which, even if there were no opposition to be overcome, neither can arrive at any result.—this procedure, I say, may be entitled the sceptical method. It is altogether different from scepticism—a principle of technical and scientific ignorance, which undermines the foundations of all knowledge, and strives in all possible ways to destroy its reliability and steadfastness. For the sceptical method aims at certainty. It seeks to discover the point of misunderstanding in the cases of disputes which are sincerely and competently conducted by both sides, just as from the embarrassment of judges in cases of litigation wise legislators contrive to obtain instruction regarding the defects and ambiguities of their laws. The antinomy which discloses itself in the application of laws is for our limited wisdom the best criterion of the legislation¹ that has given rise to them. Reason, which does not in abstract speculation easily become aware of its errors, is hereby awakened to consciousness of the factors² [that have to be reckoned with] in the determination of its principles.

¹ [der Nomothetik]
² [Momenia]

412 TRANSZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK
sich für die gute oder schlimme Sachen verbürgen, sicher sind, den Siegeskrantz davon zu tragen, wenn sie nur dafür sorgen, daß sie den letzten Angriff zu tun das Vorrecht haben, und nicht verbunden sind, einen neuen Anfall des Gegners auszuhalten. Man kann sich leicht vorstellen, daß dieser Tummsplatz von jeher oft genug betreten worden, daß viel Siege von beiden Seiten erfacht, für den letzten aber, der die Sache entschied, jederzeit so gesorgt worden sei, daß der Verfechter der guten Sache den Platz allein behielt, dadurch, daß seinem Gegner verboten wurde, fernerhin Waffen in die Hände zu nehmen. Als unparteiische Kampfrichter müssen wir es ganz bei Seite setzen, ob es die gute oder die schlimme Sache sei, um welche die Streitenden fechten, und sie ihre Sache erst unter sich ausmachen lassen. Vielleicht daß, nachdem sie einander mehr ermüdet als geschadet haben, sie die Nichtigkeit ihres Streitbandels von selbst einsehen und als gute Freunde auseinander gehen.


¹ Akad.-Ausg.: dies.
But it is only for transcendental philosophy that this sceptical method is essential. Though in all other fields of enquiry it can, perhaps, be dispensed with, it is not so in this field. In mathematics its employment would, indeed, be absurd; for in mathematics no false assertions can be concealed and rendered invisible, inasmuch as the proofs must always proceed under the guidance of pure intuition and by means of a synthesis that is always evident. In experimental philosophy the delay caused by doubt may indeed be useful; no misunderstanding is, however, possible which cannot easily be removed; and the final means of deciding the dispute, whether found early or late, must in the end be supplied by experience.

Moral philosophy can also present its principles, together with their practical consequences, one and all in concreto, in what are at least possible experiences; and the misunderstanding due to abstraction is thereby avoided. But it is quite otherwise with transcendental assertions which lay claim to insight into what is beyond the field of all possible experiences. Their abstract synthesis can never be given in any a priori intuition, and they are so constituted that what is erroneous in them can never be detected by means of any experience. Transcendental reason consequently admits of no other test than the endeavour to harmonise its various assertions. But for the successful application of this test the conflict into which they fall with one another must first be left to develop free and untrammelled. This we shall now set about arranging.*

A 425
B 453

THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

FIRST CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

Thesis
The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited in space.

Antithesis
The world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space.

* The antinomies follow one another in the order of the transcendental ideas above enumerated [p. 390].
Proof

If we assume that the world has no beginning in time, then up to every given moment an eternity has elapsed, and there has passed away in the world an infinite series of successive states of things. Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it can never be completed through successive synthesis. It thus follows that it is impossible for an infinite world-series to have passed away, and that a beginning of the world is therefore a necessary condition of the world’s existence. This was the first point that called for proof.

As regards the second point, let us again assume the opposite, namely, that the world is an infinite given whole of coexisting things. Now the magnitude of a quantum which is not given in intuition as within certain limits, can be thought only through the synthesis of its parts, and the totality of such a quantum only through a synthesis that is brought to completion through repeated addition of

* An indeterminate quantum can be intuited as a whole when it is such that though enclosed within limits we do not require to construct its totality through measurement, that is, through the successive synthesis of its parts. For the limits, in cutting off anything further, themselves determine its completeness.

Proof

For let us assume that it has a beginning. Since the beginning is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing is not, there must have been a preceding time in which the world was not, i.e. an empty time. Now no coming to be of a thing is possible in an empty time, because no part of such a time possesses, as compared with any other, a distinguishing condition of existence rather than of non-existence; and this applies whether the thing is supposed to arise of itself or through some other cause. In the world many series of things can, indeed, begin; but the world itself cannot have a beginning, and is therefore infinite in respect of past time.

As regards the second point, let us start by assuming the opposite, namely, that the world in space is finite and limited, and consequently exists in an empty space which is unlimited. Things will therefore not only be

In Anschauung des zweiten nehme man wiederum das Gegenstück an: so wird die Welt ein unendliches gegebenes Ganzes von zugleich existierenden Dingen sein. Nun können wir die Größe eines Quanti, welches nicht innerhalb gewisser Grenzen jeder Anschauung gegeben wird,* auf keine andere Art, als nur durch die Synthesis der Teile, und die Totalität eines solchen Quanti nur durch die vollendete Synthesis, oder durch wiederholte Hinzusatzung der

* Wir können ein unbestimmtes Quantum als ein Ganzes anschauen, wenn es in Grenzen eingeschlossen ist, ohne die Totalität desselben durch Messung, d. i. die sukzessive Synthesis seiner Teile, konstruieren zu dürfen. Denn die Grenzen bestimmen schon die Vollständigkeit, indem sie alles Mehreres abschneiden.

414 TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK

Beweis

Denn, man nehme an, die Welt habe der Zeit nach keinen Anfang: so ist bis zu jedem gegebenen Zeitpunkte eine Ewigkeit abgelaufen, und mithin eine unendliche Reihe auf verschiedene Zustände der Dinge in der Welt verflossen. Nun besteht aber eben darin die Unendlichkeit einer Reihe, daß sie durch sukzessive Synthesis niemals vollendet sein kann. Also ist eine unendliche verflossene Weitreife unmöglich, mithin ein Anfang der Welt eine notwendige Bedingung ihres Daseins; welches zuerst zu beweisen war.

415 ERSTE ANTINOMIE

Beweis

Denn man setze: sie habe einen Anfang. Da der Anfang ein Dasein ist, vorov eine Zeit vorhergegangen, darin die Welt nicht war, d. i. eine leere Zeit. Nun ist aber in einer leeren Zeit kein Entstehen irgend eines Dinges möglich; weil kein Teil einer solchen Zeit vor einem anderen irgend eine unterscheidende Bedingung des Daseins, vor die des Nichtseins, an sich hat (man mag annehmen, daß sie von sich selbst, oder durch eine andere Ursache entstehle). Also kann zwar in der Welt manche Reihe der Dinge anfangen, die Welt selber aber kann keinen Anfang haben, und ist also in Anschauung der vergangenen Zeit endlich.

Was das zweite betrifft, so nehme man zuvorderst das Gegenstück an, daß nämlich die Welt dem Raume nach endlich und begrenzt ist, so befindet sich sich in einem leeren Raum, der nicht begrenzt ist. Es würde also nicht allein ein Verhältnis der
related in space but also related to space. Now since the world is an absolute whole beyond which there is no object of intuition, and therefore no correlate with which the world stands in relation, the relation of the world to empty space would be a relation of it to no object. But such a relation, and consequently the limitation of the world by empty space, is nothing. The world cannot, therefore, be limited in space; that is, it is infinite in respect of extension.

The concept of totality is in this case simply the representation of the completed synthesis of its parts; for, since we cannot obtain the concept from the intuition of the whole—that being in this case impossible—we can apprehend it only through the synthesis of the parts viewed as carried, at least in idea, to the completion of the infinite.

Space is merely the form of outer intuition (formal intuition). It is not a real object which can be outwardly intuited. Space, as prior to all things which determine (occupy or limit) it, or rather which give an empirical intuition in accordance with its form, is, under the name of absolute space, nothing but the mere possibility of outer appearances in so far as they either exist in themselves or can be added to given appearances. Empirical intuition is not, therefore, a composite of appearances and space (of perception and empty intuition). The one is not the correlate of the other in a synthesis; they are connected in one and the same empirical intuition as matter and form of the intuition. If we attempt to set one of these two factors outside the other, space outside all appearances, there arise all sorts of empty determinations of outer intuition, which yet are not possible perceptions. For example, a determination of the relation of the motion (or rest) of the world to infinite empty space

** Der Begriff der Totalität ist in diesem Falle nichts anderes, als die Vorstellung der vollendeten Synthesis seiner Teile, weil wir nicht von der Anschauung des Ganzen (als welche in diesem Falle unmöglich ist) den Begriff abziehen können, wir diesen nur durch die Synthesis der Teile, bis zur Vollendung des Unendlichen, wenigstens in der Idee fassen können.

** Der Raum ist bloß die Form der äußeren Anschauung (formale Anschauung), aber kein wirklicher Gegenstand, der äußerlich angeschauet werden kann. Der Raum, vor all Diingen, die ihn bestimmen (erfüllen oder begrenzen), oder die vielmehr einer seiner Form gemäß empirische Anschauung geben ist, unter dem Namen des absoluten Raumes, nichts anderes, als die bloße Möglichkeit äußerer Erscheinungen, so fern sie entweder an sich existieren, oder zu gegebenen Erscheinungen noch hinzukommen können. Die empirische Anschauung ist also nicht zusammenhängend aus Erscheinungen und dem Raume (der Wahrnehmung und der leeren Anschauung). Eines ist nicht des andern Correlatum der Synthesis, sondern nur in einer und derselben empirischen Anschauung verbunden, als Materie und Form derselben. Will man eines dieser zwei Stücke außer dem anderen setzen (Raum außerhalb allen Erscheinungen), so entstehen daraus allerlei leere Bestimmungen der äußeren Anschauung, die doch nicht mögliche Wahrnehmungen sind. Z. B. Bewegung oder Ruhe der Welt im unendlichen leeren Raum, eine Bestimmung des
I. On the Thesis

In stating these conflicting arguments I have not sought to elaborate sophisms. That is to say, I have not resorted to the method of the special pleader who attempts to take advantage of an opponent’s carelessness—freely allowing the appeal to a misunderstood law, in order that he may be in a position to establish his own unrighteous claims by the refutation of that law. Each of the above proofs arises naturally out of the matter in dispute, and no advantage has been taken of the openings afforded by erroneous conclusions arrived at by dogmatists in either party.

I might have made a pretence of establishing the thesis in the usual manner of the dogmatists, by starting from a defective concept of the infinitude of a given magnitude. I might have argued that a magnitude is infinite if a greater than itself, as determined by the multiplicity of given units which it is a determination which can never be perceived, and is therefore the predicate of a mere thought-entity.

II. On the Anitthesis

The proof of the infinitude of the given world-series and of the world-whole, rests upon the fact that, on the contrary assumption, an empty time and an empty space, must constitute the limit of the world. I am aware that attempts have been made to evade this conclusion by arguing that a limit of the world in time and space is quite possible without our having to make the impossible assumption of an absolute time prior to the beginning of the world, or of an absolute space extending beyond the real world. With the latter part of this doctrine, as held by the philosophers of the Leibnizian school, I am entirely satisfied. Space is merely the form of outer intuition; it is not a real object which can be outwardly intuited; it is not a correlate of the appearances, but the form of the appearances themselves. And since space is thus no object but only the form of possible objects, it cannot be

Verhältnisse beider untereinander, welche niemals wahrgenommen werden kann, und also auch das Prädikat eines bloßen Gedankendinges ist.
contains, is not possible. Now no multiplicity is the greatest, since one or more units can always be added to it. Consequently an infinite given magnitude, and therefore an infinite world (infinite as regards the elapsed series or as regards extension) is impossible; it must be limited in both respects. Such is the line that my proof might have followed. But the above concept is not adequate to what we mean by an infinite whole. It does not represent how great it is, and consequently is not the concept of a maximum. Through it we think only its relation to any assignable unit in respect to which it is greater than all number. According as the unit chosen is greater or smaller, the infinite would be greater or smaller. Infinity, however, as it consists solely in the relation to the given unit, would always remain the same. The absolute magnitude of the whole would not, therefore, be known in this way; indeed, the above regarded as something absolute in itself that determines the existence of things. Things, as appearances, determine space, that is, of all its possible predicates of magnitude and relation they determine this or that particular one to belong to the real. Space, on the other hand, viewed as a self-subsistent something, is nothing real in itself; and cannot, therefore, determine the magnitude or shape of real things. Space, it further follows, whether full or empty, may be limited by appearances, but appearances cannot be limited by an empty space outside them. This is likewise true of time. But while all this may be granted, it yet cannot be denied that these two non-entities, empty space outside the world and empty time prior to it, have to be assumed if we are to assume a limit to the world in space and in time.

The method of argument which professes to enable us to avoid the above consequence (that of having to

* Man bemerkt leicht, daß hieundurch gesagt werden wolle: der leere Raum, so fern er durch Erscheinungen begrenzt wird, mit- hin derjenige innerhalb der Welt, widerspricht wenigstens nicht den transzendentalen Prinzipien, und könnte also in Ansehung dieser einge- räumt (obgleich darum keine Möglichkeit nicht sofort behauptet) werden.

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| B 459 | A 431 Anm.: | B 461 | A 433 |
FIRST ANTINOMY

401

concept does not really deal with it.

The true transcendental concept of infinitude is this, that the successive synthesis of units required for the enumeration of a quantum can never be completed. Hence it follows with complete certainty that an eternity of actual successive states leading up to a given (the present) moment cannot have elapsed, and that the world must therefore have a beginning.

In the second part of the thesis the difficulty involved in a series that is infinite and yet has elapsed does not arise, since the manifold of a world which is infinite in respect of extension is given as co-existing. But if we are to think the totality of such a multiplicity, and yet cannot appeal to limits that of themselves constitute it a totality in intuition, we have to account for a concept which in this case cannot proceed from the whole to the determinate multiplicity of the parts, but which must demonstrate the possibility of a whole by means of the successive synthesis of the parts. Now since this synthesis

* This quantum therefore contains a quantity (of given units) which is greater than any number—which is the mathematical concept of the infinite.

assumes that if the world has limits in time and space, the infinite void must determine the magnitude in which actual things are to exist consists in surreptitiously substituting for the sensible world some intelligible world of which we know nothing; for the first beginning (an existence preceded by a time of non-existence) an existence in general which presupposes no other condition whatsoever; and for the limits of extension boundaries of the world—whole—thus getting rid of time and space. But we are here treating only of the mundus phaenomenum and its magnitude, and cannot therefore abstract from the aforesaid conditions of sensibility without destroying the very being of that world. If the sensible world is limited, it must necessarily lie in the infinite void. If that void, and consequently space in general as a priori condition of the possibility of appearances, be set aside, the entire sensible world vanishes. This world is all that is given us in our problem. The mundus intelligibilis is nothing but the general concept of a

* Dieses enthält dadurch eine Menge (von gegebener Einheit), die größer ist als alle Zahl, welche der mathematische Begriff des Unendlichen ist.
thesis must constitute a never
to be completed series, I can-
not think a totality either
prior to the synthesis or by
means of the synthesis. For
the concept of totality is in
this case itself the repre-
sentation of a completed synthesis
of the parts. And since this
completion is impossible, so
likewise is the concept of it.

A 434} THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON { A 435
B 462} THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON { B 463

SECOND CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

Thesis

Every composite substance
in the world is made up of
simple parts, and nothing any-
where exists save the simple
or what is composed of the
simple.

Antithesis

No composite thing in the
world is made up of simple
parts, and there nowhere
exists in the world anything
simple.

Proof

Let us assume that com-
posite substances are not
made up of simple parts. If
all composition be then re-
moved in thought, no com-
posite part, and (since we
admit no simple parts) also
no simple part, that is to say,
nothing at all, will remain,
and accordingly no substance
will be given. Either, there-
fore, it is impossible to remove
in thought all composition,
or after its removal there
must remain something which
world in general, in which
abstraction is made from all
conditions of its intuition,
and in reference to which,
therefore, no synthetic pro-
position, either affirmative
or negative, can possibly be
asserted.

diese Synthese nun eine nie zu vollendende Reihe ausma-
chen müßte: so kann man sich nicht vor ihr, und mithin
auch nicht durch sie, eine Totalität denken. Denn der Be-
griß der Totalität selbst ist in diesem Falle die Vorstellung
einer vollendeten Synthese der Teile, und diese Vollendung,
mithin auch der Begriff derselben, ist unmöglich.

griß einer Welt überhaupt, in welchem man von allen Be-
dingungen der Anschauung derselben abtrahiert, und in
Anschauung dessen folglich gar kein synthetischer Satz, we-
der bejahend, noch verneinend möglich ist.

480 TRANSCENDENTALE DIALEKTIK

|| DER ANTINOMIE

ZWEITE ANTINOMIE

II DER REINEN VERSTEHUNG

DES TRANSCENDENTALEN IDEENS

Thesis

Eine jede zusammengesetzte Substanz in der Welt besteht
aus einfachen Teilen, und es existiert überall nichts als das
Einfache, oder das, was aus diesem zusammengesetzt ist.

Antithesis

Kein zusammengesetztes Ding in der Welt besteht aus
einfachen Teilen, und es existiert überall nichts Einfaches
in derselben.

Beweis

Denn, nehmet an, die zusammengesetzte Substanzen be-
ständen nicht aus einfachen Teilen: so würde, wenn alle
Zusammensetzung in Gedanken aufgehoben würde, kein
zusammengesetzter Teil, und (da es keine einfachen Teile
gibt) auch kein einfacher, mithin gar nichts übrig bleiben,
folglich keine Substanz sein gegeben worden. Entweder also
läßt sich unmöglich alle Zusammensetzung in Gedanken
aufheben, oder es muß nach deren Aufhebung etwas ohne
exists without composition, that is, the simple. In the former case the composite would not be made up of substances; composition, as applied to substances, is only an accidental relation in independence of which they must still persist as self-subsistent beings. Since this contradicts our supposition, there remains only the original supposition, that a composite of substances in the world is made up of simple parts.

It follows, as an immediate consequence, that the things in the world are all, without exception, simple beings; that composition is merely an external state of these beings; and that although we can never so isolate these elementary substances as to take them out of this state of composition, reason must think them as the primary subjects of all composition, and therefore, as simple beings, prior to all composition.

of every composite are simple. The simple therefore occupies a space. Now since everything real, which occupies a space, contains in itself a manifold of constituents external to one another, and is therefore composite; and since a real composite is not made up of accidents (for accidents could not exist outside one another, in the absence of substance) but of substances, it follows that the simple would be a composite of substances—which is self-contradictory.

The second proposition of the antithesis, that nowhere in the world does there exist anything simple, is intended to mean only this, that the existence of the absolutely simple cannot be established by any experience or perception, either outer or inner; and that the absolutely simple is therefore a mere idea, the objective reality of which can never be shown in any possible experience, and which, as being without an object, has no application in the explanation of the appearances. For if we assumed that in experience an object might be found for this transcendental idea, the empirical intuition of such an object

alle Zusammensetzung Bestehendes, d. i. das Einfache, übrig bleiben. Im ersten Falle aber würde das Zusammen- ge setzte wiederum nicht aus Substanzen bestehen (weil bei diesem die Zusammensetzung nur eine zufällige Relation der Substanzen ist, ohne welche diese, als für sich beharrliche Wesen, bestehen müssen). Da nun der Fall der Voraussetzung widerspricht, so bleibt nur der zweite übrig: daß nämlich das substantielle Zusammen gesetzte in der Welt aus einfachen Teilen besteht.

sich widerspricht.

Hieraus folgt unmittelbar, daß die Dinge der Welt insgesamt einfache Wesen sein, daß das Zusammen gesetzte nur ein äußerer Zustand derselben sei, und daβ, wenn wir die Elementarsubstanzen gleich niemals völlig aus diesem Zustande der Verbindung setzen und isolieren können, doch die Vernunft sie als die ersten Subjekte aller Komposition, und mithin, vor derselben, als einfache Wesen denken müßte.

1 [Exposition.]
would have to be known as one that contains no manifold [factors] external to one another and combined into unity. But since from the non-consciousness of such a manifold we cannot conclude to its complete impossibility in every kind of intuition of an object; and since without such proof absolute simplicity can never be established, it follows that such simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatsoever. An absolutely simple object can never be given in any possible experience. And since by the world of sense we must mean the sum of all possible experiences, it follows that nothing simple is to be found anywhere in it.

This second proposition of the antithesis has a much wider application than the first. Whereas the first proposition banishes the simple only from the intuition of the composite, the second excludes it from the whole of nature. Accordingly it has not been possible to prove this second proposition by reference to the concept of a given object of outer intuition (of the composite), but only by reference to its relation to a possible experience in general.
I. On the Thesis

When I speak of a whole as necessarily made up of simple parts, I am referring only to a substantial whole that is composite in the strict sense of the term ‘composite’, that is, to that accidental unity of the manifold which, given as separate (at least in thought), is brought into a mutual connection, and thereby constitutes a unity. Space should properly be called not *compositum* but *tuum*, since its parts are possible only in the whole, not the whole through the parts. It might, indeed, be called a *compositum ideale*, but not *reale*. This, however, is a mere subtilety. Since space is not a composite made up of substances (nor even of real accidents), if I remove all compositeness from it, nothing remains, not even the point. For a point is possible only as the limit of a space, and so of a composite. Space and time do not, therefore, consist of simple parts. What belongs only to the state of a substance, even though it has a magnitude, e.g. alteration, does not consist of the simple;

II. On the Antithesis

Against the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, the proof of which is purely mathematical, objections have been raised by the monadists. These objections, however, at once lay the monadists open to suspicion. For however evident mathematical proofs may be, they decline to recognise that the proofs are based upon insight into the constitution of space, in so far as space is in actual fact the formal condition of the possibility of all matter. They regard them merely as inferences from abstract but arbitrary concepts, and so as not being applicable to real things. How can it be possible to invent a different kind of intuition from that given in the original intuition of space, and how can the *a priori* determinations of space fail to be directly applicable to what is only possible in so far as it fills this space? Were we to give heed to them, then beside the mathematical point, which, while simple, is not a part but only the limit of a space, we should have to conceive physical points as being likewise

|| ANMERKUNG ZUR ZWEITEN ANTINOMIE

I. zur Thesis

Wenn ich von einem Ganzen rede, welches notwendig aus einfachen Teilen besteht, so verstehe ich darunter nur ein substantielles Ganze, als das ideale Compositum, d. i. die zufällige Einheit des Mannigfaltigen, welches, abgesehen (wenigstens in Gedanken) gegeben, in eine wechselseitige Verbindung gesetzt wird, und dadurch Eines ausmacht. Den Raum sollte man eigentlich nicht Compositum, sondern Tonum nennen, weil die Teile desselben nur im Ganzen und nicht das Ganze durch die Teile möglich ist. Er würde allenfalls ein compositum ideale; aber nicht real

heissen können. Doch dieses ist nur Substanz. Da der Raum kein Zusammenge setztes aus Substanzen (nicht einmal aus reellen Akzidenzen) ist, so muß, wenn ich alle Zusammen setzung in ihm aufhebe, nichts, auch nicht einmal der Punkt übrig bleiben; denn dieser ist nur als die Grenze eines Raumes (mehrimes eines Zusammen gesetzten) möglich. Raum und Zeit bestehen also nicht aus einfachen Teilen. Was nur zum Zunehmen einer Substanz gehört, ob es gleich eine Größe hat (z. B. die Veränderung), besteht auch nicht aus dem Einfachen, d. i. ein gewisser Grad der Veränderung entsteht nicht durch einen Anwachs aller einfachen Ver

|| II. Anmerkung zur Antithesis

Wider dieser Satze einer unwiderruflichen Teilung der Materie, denselben Beweisgrund bloß mathematisch ist, werden von den Monadisten Einwürfe vorgebracht, welche sich dadurch schon verdächtig machen, daß sie die kürzesten mathematischen Beweise nicht für Einsicht in die Beschaffenheit des Raumes, so fern er in der Tat die formale Bedingung der Möglichkeit aller Materie ist, wollen gelten lassen, sondern sie nur als Sublipse aus abstrakten aber willkürlichen Be griffen annehmen, die auf wirkliche Dinge nicht bezogen werden könnten. Gleich als wenn es auch nur möglich wäre, eine andere Art der Anschauung zu erdenken, als die in der ursprünglichen Anschauung des Raumes gegeben wird, und die Bestimmungen dessen aber *a priori* nicht zugleich alles dasjenige beträffen, was dadurch allein möglich ist, daß es diesen Raum erfüllt. Wenn man ihnen Gehör gibt, so müßte man, außer dem mathematischen Punkte, der einfach, aber
that is to say, a certain degree of alteration does not come about through the accretion of many simple alterations. Our inference from the composite to the simple applies only to self-subsisting things. Accidents of the state [of a thing] are not self-subsisting. Thus the proof of the necessity of the simple, as the constitutive parts of the substantially composite, can easily be upset (and therewith the thesis as a whole), if it be extended too far and in the absence of a limiting qualification be made to apply to everything composite—as has frequently happened.

Moreover I am here speaking only of the simple in so far as it is necessarily given in the composite—the latter being resolvable into the simple, as its constituent parts. The word monas, in the strict sense in which it is employed by Leibniz, should refer only to the simple which is immediately given as simple substance (e.g. in self-consciousness), and not to an element of the composite. This latter is better entitled atomus. As I am seeking to prove the [existence of] simple substances only as elements in the composite, I

änderungen. Unser Schluß vom Zusammengesetzten auf das Einfache gilt nur von für sich selbst bestehenden Dingen. Aber den Vorzug haben, als Teile des Raums, durch ihre bloße Aggregation dieselben zu erfüllen. Ohne nun hier die gemachten und klarer Widerlegungen dieser Ungereimtheit, die man in Menge antrifft, zu wiederholen, so es denn gänzlich umsonst ist, durch bloß diskursive Begriffe die Evidenz der Mathematik weg zu vernichten, will sich der Philosophie hier mit der Mathematik schikanieren, es darum geschehe, weil sie vergibt, daß es in dieser Frage nur um Erhebungen und deren Bedingung zu tun sei. Hier ist es aber nicht getaumt, zum reinen Verstandesbegriff des Zusammengesetzten den Begriff des Einfachen, sondern zur Aneignung des Zusammengesetzten der Materie) die Aneignung des Einfachen zu finden, und dieses ist nach Gesetzen der Beschaffenheit, mithin auch bei Gegenständen der Sinne, gänzlich unmöglich. Es mag also von einem Ganzen aus Substanzen, welches bloß durch den reinen Verstand gedacht wird, immer gelten, daß wir vor aller Zusammensetzung dieselben des Einfachen haben müssen: so gilt dieses doch nicht vom tatam sub-

Ich rede übrigens hier nur von dem Einfachen, sofern es notwendig im Zusammengesetzten gegeben ist, indem dieses darin, als in seine Bestandteile, aufgelöst werden kann. Die eigentliche Bedeutung des Wortes monas (nach Leibnizens Gebrauch) sollte wohl nur auf das Einfache in, welches unmittelbar als einfache Substanz gegeben ist (z. B. im Selbstbewußtsein) und nicht als Element des Zusammengesetzten, welches man—besser den

\[\text{[den Atomus. This use of the term as a masculine is peculiar to Kant.]}\]
might entitle the thesis\(^1\) of the second antinomy, transcendent\al\(\text{atomistic.}\) But as this word has long been appropriated to signify a particular mode of explaining bodily appearances (molecular), and therefore presupposes empirical concepts, the thesis may more suitably be entitled the dialectical principle of monadology.

\(\text{totum substantiale phaenomenon which, as empirical intuition in space, carries with it the necessary characteristic that no part of it is simple, because no part of space is simple. The monadists have, indeed, been sufficiently acute to seek escape from this difficulty by refusing to treat space as a condition of the possibility of the objects of outer intuition (bodies), and by taking instead these and the dynamical relation of substances as the condition of the possibility of space. But we have a concept of bodies only as appearances; and as such they necessarily presuppose space as the condition of the possibility of all outer appearance. This evasion of the issue is therefore futile, and has already been sufficiently disposed of in the Transcendental Aesthetic. The argument of the monadists would indeed be valid if bodies were things in themselves.}

\(\text{The second dialectical assertion has this peculiarity, that over against it stands a dogmatic assertion which is the only one of all the pseudo-rational assertions that undertakes to afford manifest evidence, in an empirical}

\(\)\(^1\) [Reading, with Mellin and Valentiner, \textit{These for Antithese.}]
object, of the reality of that which we have been ascribing only to transcendental ideas, namely, the absolute simplicity of substance—I refer to the assertion that the object of inner sense, the 'I' which there thinks, is an absolutely simple substance. Without entering upon this question (it has been fully considered above), I need only remark, that if (as happens in the quite bare representation, 'I') anything is thought as object only, without the addition of any synthetic determination of its intuition, nothing manifold and no compositeness can be perceived in such a representation. Besides, since the predicates through which I think this object are merely intuitions of inner sense, nothing can there be found which shows a manifold [of elements] external to one another, and therefore real compositeness. Self-consciousness is of such a nature that since the subject which thinks is at the same time its own object, it cannot divide itself, though it can divide the determinations which inhere in it; for in regard to itself every object is absolute unity. Nevertheless, when this subject is viewed outwardly, as
THIRD ANTIONOMY

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

Third Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas

Thesis

Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.

Proof

Let us assume that there is no other causality than that in accordance with laws of nature. This being so, everything which takes place presupposes a preceding state upon which it inevitably follows according to a rule. But the preceding state must itself be something which has taken place (having come to be in a time in which it previously was not); for if it

an object of intuition, it must exhibit [some sort of] compositeness in its appearance; and it must always be viewed in this way if we wish to know whether or not there be in it a manifold [of elements] external to one another.

Proof

Assume that there is freedom in the transcendental sense, as a special kind of causality in accordance with which the events in the world can have come about, namely, a power of absolutely beginning a state, and therefore also of absolutely beginning a series of consequences of that state; it then follows that not only will a series have its absolute beginning
had always existed, its consequence also would have always existed, and would not have only just arisen. The causality of the cause through which something takes place is itself, therefore, something that has taken place, which again presupposes, in accordance with the law of nature, a preceding state and its causality, and this in similar manner a still earlier state, and so on. If, therefore, everything takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature, there will always be only a relative\(^1\) and never a first beginning, and consequently no completeness of the series on the side of the causes that arise the one from the other. But the law of nature is just this, that nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently determined \textit{a priori}. The proposition that no causality is possible save in accordance with laws of nature, when taken in unlimited universality, is therefore self-contradictory; and this cannot, therefore, be regarded as the sole kind of causality.

We must, then, assume a causality through which something takes place, the cause of which is not itself determined in this spontaneity, but that the very determination of this spontaneity to originate the series, that is to say, the causality itself, will have an absolute beginning; there will be no antecedent through which this act, in taking place, is determined in accordance with fixed laws. But every beginning of action presupposes a state of the not yet acting cause; and a \textit{dynamical} beginning of the action, if it is also a first beginning, presupposes a state which has no \textit{causal} connection with the preceding state of the cause, that is to say, in nowise follows from it. Transcendental freedom thus stands opposed to the law of causality; and the kind of connection which it assumes as holding between the successive states of the active causes renders all unity of experience impossible. It is not to be met with in any experience, and is therefore an empty thought-entity.

In nature alone, therefore, [not in freedom], must we seek for the connection and order of cosmical events. Freedom (independence) from the laws of nature is no doubt a liberation from compulsion, but also from the guidance

\[\text{[3ubalternen.]}\]

weil, wenn es jederzeit gewesen wäre, seine Folge auch nicht allererst entstanden, sondern immer gewesen sein würde. Also ist die Kausalität der Ursache, durch welche etwas geschieht, selbst etwas Geschehnies, welches nach dem Gesetze der Natur wiederum einen vorigen Zustand und dessen Kausalität, dieser aber eben so einen noch älteren voraussetzt u. s. w. Wenn also alles nach bloßen Gesetzen der Natur geschieht, so gibt es jederzeit nur einen subalternen, niemals aber einen ersten Anfang, und also überhaupt keine Vollständigkeit der Reihe auf der Seite der von einander abstammenden Ursachen. Nun besteht aber eben darin das Gesetz der Natur: daß ohne hinreichend a priori bestimmte Ursache nichts geschehe. Also widerspricht der Satz, als wenn alle Kausalität nur nach Naturgesetzen möglich sei, sich selbst in seiner unbeschränkten Allgemeinheit, und diese kann also nicht als die einzige angenommen werden.

Durch diese Spontaneität, sondern die Bestimmung dieser Spontaneität selbst zur Hervorbringung der Reihe, d. i. die Kausalität, wird schlechthin angenommen, so daß nichts vorhergeht, wodurch diese geschehende Handlung nach beständigen Gesetzen bestimmt sei. Es setzt aber ein jeder Anfang zu handeln einen Zustand der noch nicht handelnden Ursache voraus, und ein dynamisch erster Anfang der Handlung einen Zustand, der mit dem vorhergehenden eben derselben Ursache gar keinen Zusammenhang der Kausalität hat, d. i. auf keine Weise daraus erfolgt. Also ist die transzendentale Freiheit dem Kausalgesetzes entgegen, und jede solche Verbindung der aufkraftigen Zustände wirkender Ursachen, nach welcher keine Einheit der Erfahrung möglich ist, die also auch in keiner Erfahrung angetroffen wird, mitin ein leeres Gedankending.
THIRD ANTINOMY

of all rules. For it is not permissible to say that the
laws of freedom enter into the causality exhibited in the
course of nature, and so take the place of natural laws.
If freedom were determined in accordance with laws,
it would not be freedom; it would simply be nature
under another name. Nature and transcendent freedom
differ as do conformity to
law and lawlessness. Nature
does indeed impose upon the
understanding the exacting
task of always seeking the
origin of events ever higher
in the series of causes, their
causality being always condi-
tioned. But in compensation
it holds out the promise of
thoroughgoing unity of ex-
perience in accordance with
laws. The illusion of freedom,
on the other hand, offers a
point of rest to the enquiring
understanding in the chain
of causes, conducting it to
an unconditioned causality
which begins to act of itself.
This causality is, however,
blind, and abrogates those
rules through which alone
a completely coherent ex-
perience is possible.
A 448 \ B 476) \ Observation on the Third Antinomy (A 449 \ B 477
II. On the Antithesis

The defender of an omnipotent nature (transcendentalphysiocracy), in maintaing his position against the pseudo-rational arguments offered in support of the counter-doctrine of freedom, would argue as follows. *If you do not, as regards time, admit anything as being mathematically first in the world, there is no necessity, as regards causality, for seeking something that is dynamically first.* What authority have you for inventing an absolutely first state of the world, and therefore an abso- lute beginning of the ever-flowing series of appearances, and so of procuring a resting-place for your imagination by setting bounds to limitless nature? Since the substances in the world have always existed—at least the unity of experience renders necessary such a supposition—there is no difficulty in assuming that change of their states, that is, a series of their alterations, has likewise always existed, and therefore that a first begin- ning, whether mathematical or dynamical, is not to be

I zur Thesis

Die transzendentalen Idee der Freiheit macht zwar bei weitesten nicht den ganzen Inhalt des psychologischen Be- griffs dieses Namens aus, welcher großen Teils empirisch ist, sondern nur den der absoluten Spontaneität der Hand- lung, als den eigentlichen Grund der Immutabilität dersel- ben, ist aber dennoch der eigentliche Stein des Anstöses für die Philosophie, welche unüberwindliche Schwierigkeiten findet, vergleichbar, das von unbedingter Kausalität einzu- schließen. Dasjenige, also in der Frage über die Freiheit des Willens, was die spekulative Vernunft von jeher in so große Verlegenheit gesetzt hat, ist eigentlich nur transzenden- tal, und gehe lediglich darauf, ob ein Vermögen angenom- men werden müsse, eine Reihe von sukzessiven Dingen oder Zuständen von selbst anzustemmen. Wie ein solches möglich sei, ist nicht eben so notwendig, beantworten zu können, da wir uns eben sowohl bei der Kausalität nach Naturgesetzen damit begegnen müssen,

II. Anmerkung zur Antithesis

Der Verteidiger der Allvermögenheit der Natur (trans- zendentale Physiocratie), im Widerspiel mit der Lehre von der Freiheit, würde seinen Satz, gegen die von der Ernüchterung geführten Schlüsse der Letztern, auf folgende Art behaupten. Wenn ihr kein mathematisch Erstes der Zeit nach in der Welt annehmt, so habt ihr auch nicht nötig, ein dynamisch Erstes der Kausalität nach zu-suchen. Wer hat euch geheissen, einen schlechthin ersten Zu- stand der Welt, und mit diesem einen absoluten Anfang der nach und nach ablauenden Reihe der Erscheinungen zu erdenken, und damit ihr eurer Einbildung einen Ruhepunkt verschaffen möchtet, der unumschränkten Natur Grenzen zu setzen? Da die Substanzen in der Welt jederzeit gewesen sind, wenigstens die Einheit der Erfahrung eine solche Vor- aussetzung notwendig macht, so hat es keine Schwierigkeit, auch anzunehmen, daß der Wechsel ihrer Zustände, d. h. eine Reihe ihrer Veränderungen, jederzeit gewesen sei, und mithin kein erst Anfang, weder mathematisch, noch dy-
THIRD ANTINOMY

*a priori* knowledge that this latter type of causality must be presupposed; we are not in the least able to comprehend how it can be possible that through one existence the existence of another is determined, and for this reason must be guided by experience alone. The necessity of a first beginning, due to freedom, of a series of appearances we have demonstrated only in so far as it is required to make an origin of the world conceivable; for all the later following states can be taken as resulting according to purely natural laws. But since the power of spontaneously beginning a series in time is thereby proved (though not understood), it is now also permissible for us to admit within the course of the world different series as capable in their causality of beginning of themselves, and so to attribute to their substances a power of acting from freedom. And we must not allow ourselves to be prevented from drawing this conclusion by a misapprehension, namely that, as a series occurring in the world can have only a relatively first beginning, being always preceded in the world by some other state of things, no looked for. The possibility of such an infinite derivation, without a first member to which all the rest is merely a sequel, cannot indeed, in respect of its possibility, be rendered comprehensible. But if for this reason you refuse to recognise this enigma in nature, you will find yourself compelled to reject many fundamental synthetic properties and forces, which as little admit of comprehension. The possibility even of alteration itself would have to be denied. For were you not assured by experience that alteration actually occurs, you would never be able to excogitate *a priori* the possibility of such a ceaseless sequence of being and not-being.

Even if a transcendental power of freedom be allowed, as supplying a beginning of happenings in the world, this power would in any case have to be outside the world (though any such assumption that over and above the sum of all possible intuitions there exists an object which cannot be given in any possible perception, is still a very bold one). But to ascribe to substances in the world itself such a power, can never be permissible; for, should this a priori zu erkennen, daß eine solche vorausgesetzt werden müsse, ob wir gleich die Möglichkeit, wie durch ein gewisses Dasein das Dasein eines andern gesetzt werde, auf keine Weise begreifen; und unser desfalls lediglich an die Erfahrung halten müssen. Nun haben wir diese Notwendigkeit eines ersten Anfangs einer Reihe von Erscheinungen aus Freiheit, zwar nur eigentlich in so fern darzusetzen, als zur Begreiflichkeit eines Ursprungs der Welt erforderlich ist, indem man alle nachfolgende Zustände für eine Abfolge nach bloßen Naturgesetzen nehmen kann. Weil aber dadurch doch einmal das Vermögen, eine Reihe in der Zeit von selbst anzufangen, bewiesen (obzwar nicht eingeschlossen) ist, so ist es uns nunmehr auch erlaubt, mitten im Laufe der Welt verschiedene Reihen, der Kausalität nach, von selbst anfangen zu lassen, und den Substanzen derselben ein Vermögen beizulegen, aus Freiheit zu handeln. Man lasse sich aber hierbei nicht durch einen Mißverständnis aufhalten: daß, da nämlich eine sukzessive Reihe in der Welt nur einen komparativ ersten Anfang haben kann, indem doch immer ein Zustand der Dinge in der Welt vorhergeht, etwa kein ab-

Wann auch indessen allenfalls ein transcendentes Ver- mögen der Freiheit nachgegeben wird, um die Weltveränderungen anzufangen, so würde dieses Vermögen doch wenigstens nur außerhalb der Welt sein müssen (wiewohl es immer eine klare Annahme: bleibt, außerhalb dem Inbegriff aller möglichen Anschauungen, noch einen Gegenstand anzunehmen, der in keiner möglichen Wahrnehmung gegeben werden kann). Allein, in der Welt selbst, den Substanzen ein solches Vermögen beizumessen, kann nimmermehr erlaubt sein.
absolute first beginning of a series is possible during the course of the world. For the absolutely first beginning of which we are here speaking is not a beginning in time, but in causality. If, for instance, I at this moment arise from my chair, in complete freedom, without being necessarily determined thereto by the influence of natural causes, a new series, with all its natural consequences in infinitum, has its absolute beginning in this event, although as regards time this event is only the continuation of a preceding series. For this resolution and act of mine do not form part of the succession of purely natural effects, and are not a mere continuation of them. In respect of its happening, natural causes exercise over it no determining influence whatsoever. It does indeed follow upon them, but without arising out of them; and accordingly, in respect of causality though not of time, must be entitled an absolutely first beginning of a series of appearances.

This requirement of reason, that we appeal in the series of natural causes to a first beginning, due to freedom, is amply confirmed when we observe that all the philo-

weil allzunehmen die Zusammenhang nach allgemeinen Gesetzen sich einander notwendig bestimmender Er- scheinungen, den man Natur nennt, und mit ihm das Mark- mal empirischer Wahrheit, welches Erfahrung vom Traum unterscheidet, größtenteils verschwindet. Denn es läßt sich, neben einem solchen gesetzlosen Vermögen der Frei- heit, kaum mehr Natur denken; weil die Gesetze der letzteren durch die Einflüsse der erstenen unzweckmäßig abgeändert, und das Spiel der Erscheinungen, welches nach der bloßen Na- tur regelmäßig und gleichförmig sein würde, dadurch ver- wirrt und unzusammenhängend gemacht wird.

Die Bestätigung von der Bedürfnis der Vermuthung, in der Reihe der Naturursachen sich auf einen ersten Anfang aus Freiheit zu berufen, leuchtet daran sehr klar in die Augen.
FOURTH ANTINOMY

Sophers of antiquity, with the sole exception of the Epicurean School, felt themselves obliged, when explaining cosmical movements, to assume a prime mover, that is, a freely acting cause, which first and of itself began this series of states. They made no attempt to render a first beginning conceivable through nature's own resources.

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

Thesis
There belongs to the world, either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary.

Antithesis
An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.

Proof
The sensible world, as the sum-total of all appearances, contains a series of alterations. For without such a series even the representation of serial time, as a condition of the possibility of the sensible world, would not be given us. But every alteration stands under its condition, which precedes it in time and renders

* Time, as the formal condition of the possibility of changes, is indeed objectively prior to them; subjectively, however, in actual consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is given only in connection with perceptions.

Der Antinomie der Transcendentalen Ideen

Thesis
Zu der Welt gehört etwas, das, entweder als ihr Teil, oder ihre Ursache, ein schlechtthin notwendiges Wesen ist.

Antithesis
Es existiert überall kein schlechtthin notwendiges Wesen, weder in der Welt, noch außer der Welt, als ihre Ursache.

Beweis
Die Sinnenwelt, als das Ganze aller Erscheinungen, enthält zugleich eine Reihe von Veränderungen. Denn, ohne diese, würde selbst die Vorstellung der Zeitreihe, als einer Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Sinnenwelt, uns nicht gegeben sein. Eine jede Veränderung aber steht unter ihrer Bedingung, die der Zeit nach vorhergeht, und unter welcher

* Die Zeit geht zwar als formale Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Veränderungen vor dieser objektiv vorher, allein subjektiv, und in der Wirklichkeit des Bewußtseins, ist diese Vorstellung doch nur, so wie jede andere, durch Veranlassung der Wahrnehmungen gegeben.

1 Akad.-Aug.: diesent.
it necessary. Now every conditioned that is given presupposes, in respect of its existence, a complete series of conditions up to the unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. Alteration thus existing as a consequence of the absolutely necessary, the existence of something absolutely necessary must be granted. But this necessary existence itself belongs to the sensible world. For if it existed outside that world, the series of alterations in the world would derive its beginning from a necessary cause which would not itself belong to the sensible world. This, however, is impossible. For since the beginning of a series in time can be determined only by that which precedes it in time, the highest condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the time when the series as yet was not (for a beginning is an existence preceded by a time in which the thing that begins did not yet exist). Accordingly the causality of the necessary cause of conditioned in all its parts, none the less, as a whole, is absolutely necessary and unconditioned. The former alternative, however, conflicts with the dynamical law of the determination of all appearances in time; and the latter alternative contradicts itself, since the existence of a series cannot be necessary if no single member of it is necessary.

If, on the other hand, we assume that an absolutely necessary cause of the world exists outside the world, then this cause, as the highest member in the series of the causes of changes in the world, must begin the existence of the latter and their series. Now this cause must itself begin to act, and its causality would therefore be in time, and so would belong to the sum of appearances, that is, to the world. It follows that it itself, the cause, would not be outside the world—which contradicts our hypothesis. Therefore neither in the world, nor outside the world (though in causal con-

* The word 'begin' is taken in two senses: first as active, signifying that as cause it begins (infinit) a series of states which is its effect; secondly as passive, signifying the causality which begins to operate (fit) in the cause itself. I reason here from the former to the latter meaning.

1 [Menge.] 2 [Teil.]

FOURTH ANTINOMY

alterations, and therefore the cause itself, must belong to time and so to appearance—time being possible only as the form of appearance. Such causality cannot, therefore, be thought apart from that sum of all appearances which constitutes the world of sense. Something absolutely necessary is therefore contained in the world itself, whether this something be the whole series of alterations in the world or a part of the series.

A 456) OBSERVATION ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY (A 457
B 458)

I. On the Thesis

In proving the existence of a necessary being I ought not, in this connection, to employ any but the cosmological argument, that, namely, which ascends from the conditioned in the field of appearance to the unconditioned in concept, this latter being regarded as the necessary condition of the absolute totality of the series. To seek proof of this from the bare idea of a supreme being belongs to another principle of reason, and will have to be treated separately.

The pure cosmological proof, in demonstrating the existence of a necessary being, connection with it), does there exist any absolutely necessary being.

Veränderungen, mithin auch die Ursache selbst, zu der Zeit, mithin zur Erscheinung (an welcher die Zeit allein als deren Form möglich ist), folglich kann sie von der Sinnewelt, als dem Inbegriff aller Erscheinungen, nicht abgesondert gedacht werden. Also ist in der Welt selbst etwas Schlecht- hinnotwendiges enthalten (es mag nun dieses die ganze Weltreihe selbst, oder ein Teil derselben sein).

salverbindung) irgend ein schlechthin notwendiges Wesen.

II. On the Antithesis

The difficulties in the way of asserting the existence of an absolutely necessary highest cause, which we suppose ourselves to meet as we ascend in the series of appearances, cannot be such as arise in connection with mere concepts of the necessary existence of a thing in general. The difficulties are not, therefore, ontological, but must concern the causal connection of a series of appearances for which a condition has to be assumed that is itself unconditioned, and so must be cosmological, and relate to empirical laws. It must be shown that regress in the

ANMERKUNG ZUR VIER TEN ANTINOMIE

I. zur Thesis

Um das Dasein eines notwendigen Wesens zu beweisen, liegt mir hier ob, kein anderes als kosmologisches Argument zu brauchen, welches nämlich von dem Bedingten in der Erscheinung zum Unbedingten im Begriff aufsteigt, indem man dieses als die notwendige Bedingung der absoluten Totalität der Reihe ansieht. Den Beweis, aus der bloßen Idee eines obersten aller Wesen überhaupt, zu versuchen, gehört zu einem anderen Prinzip der Vernunft, und ein solcher wird daher besonders vorkommen müssen.

II. Anmerkung zur Antithese

Wenn man, beim Aufsteigen in der Reihe der Erscheinungen, wider das Dasein eines schlechthin notwendigen obersten Ursache, Schwierigkeiten anzutreffen vermeint, so müssen sich diese auch nicht auf bloße Begriffe vom notwendigen Dasein eines Dinges überhaupt gründen, und mithin nicht ontologisch sein, sondern sich aus der Kausalverbindung mit einer Reihe von Erscheinungen, um zu derselben eine Bedingung anzunehmen, die selbst unbedingt ist, hervor finden, folglich kosmologisch und nach empirischen Gesetzen getönt sein. Es muß sich nämlich zeigen.

Der reine kosmologische Beweis kann man das Dasein eines notwendigen Wesens nicht anders dazu, als daß er es
has to leave unsettled whether this being is the world itself or a thing distinct from it. To establish the latter view, we should require principles which are no longer cosmological and do not continue in the series of appearances. For we should have to employ concepts of contingent beings in general (viewed as objects of the understanding alone) and a principle which will enable us to connect these, by means of mere concepts, with a necessary being. But all this belongs to a transcendental philosophy; and that we are not yet in a position to discuss.

If we begin our proof cosmologically, resting it upon the series of appearances and the regress therein according to empirical laws of causality, we must not afterwards suddenly deviate from this mode of argument, passing over to something that is not a member of the series. Anything taken as condition must be viewed precisely in the same manner in which we viewed the relation of the conditioned to its condition in the series which is supposed to carry us by continuous advance to the supreme condition. If, then, this relation is a series of causes (in the sensible world) can never terminate in an empirically unconditioned condition, and that the cosmological argument from the contingency of states of the world, as evidenced by their alterations, does not support the assumption of a first and absolutely original cause of the series.

A strange situation is disclosed in this antimony. From the same ground on which, in the thesis, the existence of an original being was inferred, its non-existence is inferred in the antithesis, and this with equal stringency. We were first assured that a necessary being exists because the whole of past time comprehends the series of all conditions and therefore also the unconditioned (that is, the necessary); we are now assured that there is no necessary being, and precisely for the reason that the whole of past time comprehends the series of all conditions (which therefore are one and all themselves conditioned). The explanation is this. The former argument takes account only of the absolute totality of the series of conditions determining each other in time.
sensible and falls within the province of the possible empirical employment of understanding, the highest condition or cause can bring the regress to a close only in accordance with the laws of sensibility, and therefore only in so far as it itself belongs to the temporal series. The necessary being must therefore be regarded as the highest member of the cosmical series.

Nevertheless certain thinkers have allowed themselves the liberty of making such a saltus (μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος). From the alterations in the world they have inferred their empirical contingency, that is, their dependence on empirically determining causes, and so have obtained an ascending series of empirical conditions. And so far they were entirely in the right. But since they could not find in such a series any first beginning, or any highest member, they passed suddenly from the empirical concept of contingency, and laid hold upon the pure category, which then gave rise to a strictly intelligible series the completeness of which rested on the existence of an absolutely necessary cause. Since this cause and so reaches what is unconditioned and necessary. The latter argument, on the other hand, takes into consideration the contingency of everything which is determined in the temporal series (everything being preceded by a time in which the condition must itself again be determined as conditioned), and from this point of view everything unconditioned and all absolute necessity completely vanish. Nevertheless, the method of argument in both cases is entirely in conformity even with ordinary human reason, which frequently falls into conflict with itself through considering its object from two different points of view. M. de Mairan regarded the controversy between two famous astronomers, which arose from a similar difficulty in regard to choice of standpoint, as a sufficiently remarkable phenomenon to justify his writing a special treatise upon it. The one had argued that the moon revolves on its own axis, because it always turns the same side towards the earth. The other drew the opposite conclusion that the moon does not revolve on its own axis, because it always

1 [J. J. D. de Mairan (1679-1771)]
was not bound down to any 
sensible conditions, it was 
freed from the temporal con-
dition which would require 
that its causality should itself 
have a beginning. But such 
procedure is entirely illegi-
mate, as may be gathered 
from what follows.

In the strict meaning of the 
category, the contingent is 
so named because its contra-
dictory opposite is possible. 
Now we cannot argue from 
empirical contingency to in-
telligible contingency. When 
anything is altered, the op-
oposite of its state is actual 
at another time, and is there-
fore possible. This present 
state is not, however, the 
contradictory opposite of the 
preceding state. To obtain 
such a contradictory opposite 
we require to conceive, that 
in the same time in which the 
preceding state was, its op-
oposite could have existed in 
is place, and this can never 
be inferred from [the fact of] 
the alteration. A body which 
was in motion (−A) comes 
to rest (−non−A). Now from 
the fact that a state opposite 
to the state A follows upon 
the state A, we cannot argue 
that the contradictory op-
oposite of A is possible, and 
that A is therefore con-
tingent. To prove such a 

mehr, da sie an keine sinnliche Bedingungen gebunden war, 
auch, vor der Zeitbedingung, ihre Kausalität selbst anzu-
lassen, befreit wurde. Dieses Verfahren ist aber ganz wahr-
rechtläich, wie man aus Folgendem schließen kann.

beständig dieselben Seite zukehrt. Beide Schlüsse waren rach-
tig, nachdem man den Standpunkt nahm, aus dem man 
die Mondbewegung beobachten wollte.

Zutreffend, im reinen Sinne der Kategorie, ist das, dessen 
konträriskisches Gegen teil möglich ist. Nun kann man 
aus der empirischen Zufälligkeit auf jene intelligible gar 
richtig schließen. Was verändert wird, dessen Gegen|teil 
(seinem Zustande) ist zu einer andern Zeit wirklich, niemals 
mit möglich, mithin ist dies nicht das kontradiktoriae. 
Gengei teil des vorigen Zustandes, wozu erfordert wird, daß 
in derselben Zeit, da der vorige Zustand war, an der Stelle 
bestehen sein Genteil hätte sein können, welches aus der 
Veränderung gar nicht geschlossen werden kann. Ein Kör-
per, der in Bewegung war = A, kommt in Ruhe = non A. 
Dass von nun, dass ein entgegengesetzter Zustand vom Zu-
stande A auf diesen folgt, kann gar nicht geschlossen wer-
den, dass das konträriskische Genteil von A möglich, 
mitin A zufällig sei, denn dazu würde erfordert werden,
conclusion, it would have to be shown that in place of the motion, and at the time at which it occurred, there could have been rest. All that we know is that rest was real in the time that followed upon the motion, and was therefore likewise possible. Motion at one time and rest at another time are not related as contradictory opposites. Accordingly the succession of opposite determinations, that is, alteration, in no way establishes contingency of the type represented in the concepts of pure understanding; and cannot therefore carry us to the existence of a necessary being, similarly conceived in purely intelligible terms. Alteration proves only empirical contingency; that is, that the new state, in the absence of a cause which belongs to the preceding time, could never of itself have taken place. Such is the condition prescribed by the law of causality. This cause, even if it be viewed as absolutely necessary, must be such as can be thus met with in time, and must belong to the series of appearances.

daß in derselben Zeit, da die Bewegung war, anstatt der selben die Ruhe habe sein können. Nun wissen wir nichts weiter, als daß die Ruhe in der folgenden Zeit wirklich, mithin auch möglich war. Bewegung aber zu einer Zeit, und Ruhe zu einer andern Zeit, sind einander nicht kontradiktarisch entgegengesetzt. Also beweist die Sukzession entgegengesetzter Bestimmungen, d. i. die Veränderung, keinesweges die Zufälligkeit nach Begriffen des reinen Verstandes, und kann also auch nicht auf das Dasein eines notwendigen Wesens, nach reinen Verstandesbegriffen, führen. Die Veränderung beweist nur die empirische Zufälligkeit, d. i. daß der neue Zustand für sich selbst, ohne eine Ursache, die zur vorigen Zeit gehört, gar nicht hätte stattfinden können, zu Folge dem Gesetze der Kausalität. Diese Ursache, und wenn sie auch als schlechthin notwendig angenommen wird, muß auf diese Art doch in der Zeit angetroffen werden, und zur Reihe der Erscheinungen gehören.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

Section 3

THE INTEREST OF REASON IN THESE CONFLICTS

We have now completely before us the dialectic play of cosmological ideas. The ideas are such that an object congruent with them can never be given in any possible experience, and that even in thought reason is unable to bring them into harmony with the universal laws of nature. Yet they are not arbitrarily conceived. Reason, in the continuous advance of empirical synthesis, is necessarily led up to them whenever it endeavours to free from all conditions and apprehend in its unconditioned totality that which according to the rules of experience can never be determined save as conditioned. These pseudo-rational assertions are so many attempts to solve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason. There are just so many, neither more nor fewer, owing to the fact that there are just four series of synthetic presuppositions which impose a priori limitations on the empirical synthesis.

The proud pretensions of reason, when it strives to extend its domain beyond all limits of experience, we have represented only in dry formulas that contain merely the ground of their legal claims. As befits a transcendental philosophy, they have been divested of all empirical features, although only in connection therewith can their full splendour be displayed. But in this empirical application, and in the progressive extension of the employment of reason, philosophy, beginning with the field of our experiences and steadily soaring to these lofty ideas, displays a dignity and worth such that, could it but make good its pretensions, it would leave all other human science far behind. For it promises a secure foundation for our highest expectations in respect of those ultimate ends towards which all the endeavours of reason must ultimately converge. Whether the world has a beginning [in time] and any limit to its extension in space; whether there is anywhere, and perhaps in my thinking self, an indivisible and indestructible unity, or nothing but what is divisible and transitory; whether I am free in my actions or, like other beings, am led by the hand of
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

423

nature and of fate; whether finally there is a supreme cause of the world, or whether the things of nature and their order must as the ultimate object terminate thought—an object that even in our speculations can never be transcended: these are questions for the solution of which the mathematician would gladly exchange the whole of his science. For mathematics can yield no satisfaction in regard to those highest ends that most closely concern humanity. And yet the very dignity of mathematics (that pride of human reason) rests upon this, that it guides reason to knowledge of nature in its order and regularity—alike in what is great in it and in what is small—and in the extraordinary unity of its moving forces, thus rising to a degree of insight far beyond what any philosophy based on ordinary experience would lead us to expect; and so gives occasion and encouragement to an employment of reason that is extended beyond all experience, and at the same time supplies it with the most excellent materials for supporting its investigations—so far as the character of these permits—by appropriate intuitions.

Unfortunately for speculation, though fortunately perhaps for the practical interests of humanity, reason, in the midst of its highest expectations, finds itself so compromised by the conflict of opposing arguments, that neither its honour nor its security allows it to withdraw and treat the quarrel with indifference as a mere mock fight; and still less is it in a position to command peace, being itself directly interested in the matters in dispute. Accordingly, nothing remains for reason save to consider whether the origin of this conflict, whereby it is divided against itself, may not have arisen from a mere misunderstanding. In such an enquiry both parties, perchance, may have to sacrifice proud claims; but a lasting and peaceful reign\(^1\) of reason over understanding and the senses would thereby be inaugurated.

For the present we shall defer this thorough enquiry, in order first of all to consider upon which side we should prefer to fight, should we be compelled to make choice between the opposing parties. The raising of this question, how we should proceed if we consulted only our interest and not the logical criterion of truth, will decide nothing in regard to

\(^1\) [Regiment.]
the contested rights of the two parties, but has this advantage, that it enables us to comprehend why the participants in this quarrel, though not influenced by any superior insight into the matter under dispute, have preferred to fight on one side rather than on the other. It will also cast light on a number of incidental points, for instance, the passionate zeal of the one party and the calm assurance of the other; and will explain why the world hails the one with eager approval, and is implacably prejudiced against the other.

Comparison of the principles which form the starting-points of the two parties is what enables us, as we shall find, to determine the standpoint from which alone this preliminary enquiry can be carried out with the required thoroughness. In the assertions of the antithesis we observe a perfect uniformity in manner of thinking and complete unity of maxims, namely a principle of pure empiricism, applied not only in explanation of the appearances within the world, but also in the solution of the transcendental ideas of the world itself, in its totality. The assertions of the thesis, on the other hand, presuppose, in addition to the empirical mode of explanation employed within the series of appearances, intelligible beginnings; and to this extent its maxim is complex. But as its essential and distinguishing characteristic is the presupposition of intelligible beginnings, I shall entitle it the dogmatism of pure reason.

In the determination of the cosmological ideas, we find on the side of dogmatism, that is, of the thesis:

First, a certain practical interest in which every well-disposed man, if he has understanding of what truly concerns him, heartily shares. That the world has a beginning, that my thinking self is of simple and therefore indestructible nature, that it is free in its voluntary actions and raised above the compulsion of nature, and finally that all order in the things constituting the world is due to a primordial being, from which everything derives its unity and purposive connection—these are so many foundation stones of morals and religion. The antithesis robs us of all these supports, or at least appears to do so.

Secondly, reason has a speculative interest on the side of

1. [intellektuelle Anfänge]
2. [nicht einfach]
3. [Urwesen]
the thesis. When the transcendental ideas are postulated and employed in the manner prescribed by the thesis, the entire chain of conditions and the derivation of the conditioned can be grasped completely a priori. For we then start from the unconditioned. This is not done by the antithesis, which for this reason is at a very serious disadvantage. To the question as to the conditions of its synthesis it can give no answer which does not lead to the endless renewal of the same enquiry. According to the antithesis, every given beginning compels us to advance to one still higher; every part leads to a still smaller part; every event is preceded by another event as its cause; and the conditions of existence in general rest always again upon other conditions, without ever obtaining unconditioned footing and support in any self-subsistent thing, viewed as primordial being.

Thirdly, the thesis has also the advantage of popularity; and this certainly forms no small part of its claim to favour. The common understanding finds not the least difficulty in the idea of the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis. Being more accustomed to descend to consequences than to ascend to grounds, it does not puzzle over the possibility of the absolutely first; on the contrary, it finds comfort in such concepts, and at the same time a fixed point to which the thread by which it guides its movements can be attached. In the restless ascent from the conditioned to the condition, always with one foot in the air, there can be no satisfaction.

In the determination of the cosmological ideas, we find on the side of empiricism, that is, of the antithesis: first, no such practical interest (due to pure principles of reason) as is provided for the thesis by morals and religion. On the contrary, pure empiricism appears to deprive them of all power and influence. If there is no primordial being distinct from the world, if the world is without beginning and therefore without an Author, if our will is not free, if the soul is divisible and perishable like matter, moral ideas and principles lose all validity, and share in the fate of the transcendental ideas which served as their theoretical support.

But secondly, in compensation, empiricism yields advantages to the speculative interest of reason, which are very

1 ['Speculative' means for Kant theoretical, in distinction from the 'practical.']
attractive and far surpass those which dogmatic teaching bearing on the ideas of reason can offer. According to the principle of empiricism the understanding is always on its own proper ground, namely, the field of genuinely possible experiences, investigating their laws, and by means of these laws affording indefinite extension to the sure and comprehensible knowledge which it supplies. Here every object, both in itself and in its relations, can and ought to be represented in intuition, or at least in concepts for which the corresponding images can be clearly and distinctly provided in given similar intuitions. There is no necessity to leave the chain of the natural order and to resort to ideas, the objects of which are not known, because, as mere thought-entities, they can never be given. Indeed, the understanding is not permitted to leave its proper business, and under the pretence of having brought it to completion to pass over into the sphere of idealising reason and of transcendent concepts—a sphere in which it is no longer necessary for it to observe and investigate in accordance with the laws of nature, but only to think and to invent,\(^1\) in the assurance that it cannot be refuted by the facts of nature, not being bound by the evidence which they yield, but presuming to pass them by or even to subordinate them to a higher authority, namely, that of pure reason.

The empiricist will never allow, therefore, that any epoch of nature is to be taken as the absolutely first, or that any limit of his insight into the extent of nature is to be regarded as the widest possible. Nor does he permit any transition from the objects of nature—which he can analyse through observation and mathematics, and synthetically determine in intuition (the extended)—to those which neither sense nor imagination can ever represent \textit{in concreteo} (the simple). Nor will he admit the legitimacy of assuming in nature itself any power that operates independently of the laws of nature (freedom), and so of encroaching upon the business of the understanding, which is that of investigating, according to necessary rules, the origin of appearances. And, lastly, he will not grant that a cause ought ever to be sought outside nature, in an original being. We know nothing but nature, since it alone can present objects to us and instruct us in regard to their laws.

\(^{1}\) \textit{dichten.}

\(^{3}\) A: "noch."
If the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in propounding his antithesis than to subdue the rashness and presumption of those who so far misconstrue the true vocation of reason as to boast of insight and knowledge just where true insight and knowledge cease, and to represent as furthering speculative interests that which is valid only in relation to practical interests (in order, as may suit their convenience, to break the thread of physical enquiries, and then under the pretense of extending knowledge to fasten it to transcendental ideas, through which we really know only that we know nothing); if, I say, the empiricist were satisfied with this, his principle would be a maxim urging moderation in our pretensions, modesty in our assertions, and yet at the same time the greatest possible extension of our understanding, through the teacher fittingly assigned to us, namely, through experience. If such were our procedure, we should not be cut off from employing intellectual presuppositions and faith on behalf of our practical interest; only they could never be permitted to assume the title and dignity of science and rational insight. Knowledge, which as such is speculative, can have no other object than that supplied by experience; if we transcend the limits thus imposed, the synthesis which seeks, independently of experience, new species of knowledge, lacks that substratum of intuition upon which alone it can be exercised.

But when empiricism itself, as frequently happens, becomes dogmatic in its attitude towards ideas, and confidently denies whatever lies beyond the sphere of its intuitive knowledge, it betrays the same lack of modesty; and this is all the more reprehensible owing to the irreparable injury which is thereby caused to the practical interests of reason.

The contrast between the teaching of Epicurus* and that of Plato is of this nature.

* It is, however, open to question whether Epicurus ever propounded these principles as objective assertions. If perhaps they were for him nothing more than maxims for the speculative employment of reason, then he showed in this regard a more genuine philosophical spirit than any other of the philosophers of antiquity. That, in explaining the appearances, we must proceed as if the field of our enquiry were not circumscribed by any limit or beginning of the world; that we must assume the material composing the world to be such as it must be if we are to learn about it from experience;

A 471

B 499

446 TRANSZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK

Zwar, wenn der empirische Philosoph mit seiner Antithese keine andere Absicht hat, als den Vorwitz und die Vermessenheit der ihre wahre Bestimmung verkennenden Vernunft niederzuschlagen, welche mit Einsicht und Wissen groß tut, da wo eigentlich Einsicht und Wissen aufhören, und das, was man in Ansehung des praktischen Interesse gelten läßt, für eine Beförderung des spekulativen Interesse ausgehen will, um, wo es ihrer Gemächlichkeit zuträglich ist, den Faden physischer Untersuchungen abzureißen, und, mit einem Vorgeben von Erweiterung der Erkenntnis, ihn an transzendentale Ideen zu knüpfen, durch die man eigentlich nur erkennt, daß man nichts wisse; wenn, sage ich, der Empirist sich hiemit begnügte, so würde sein Grundsatz eine Maxime der Mäßigung in Ansprüchen, der Bescheidenheit in Behauptungen und zugleich der größten möglichen Erweiterung unseres Verstandes, durch den eigentlich uns vorgesetzten Lehrer, nämlich die Erfahrung, sein. Denn, in solchem Falle, würden uns intellektuelle Voraussetzungen und Glaube, zum Behuf unserer praktischen Angelegenheit, nicht genommen werden; nur könnte man sie nicht unter dem Titel und dem Pompe von Wissenschaft und Vernunft, sie der Einsicht auftreten lassen, weil das eigentliche spekulative Wissen überall keinen anderen Gegenstand, als den der Erfahrung treffen kann, und, wenn man ihre Grenze überschreitet, die Synthese, welche neue und von jener unabhängige Erkenntnisse versucht, kein Substratum der Anschaunung haben, an welchem sie ausgeübt werden könnte.

So aber, wenn der Empirismus in Ansehung der Ideen (wie es mehrere sich geschieht) selbst dogmatisch wird und dasjenige dreist verneint, was über der Sphäre seiner anschauenden Erkenntnisse ist, so fällt er selbst in den Fehler der Unbescheidenheit, der hier um desto tadelbarer ist, weil dadurch das praktische Interesse der Vernunft ein untersetzlicher Nachteil verursacht wird.

Dies ist der Gegensatz des Epikureismus* gegen den Platonismus.

* Es ist indessen noch die Frage, ob Epikur diese Grundsätze als objektive Behauptungen jemals vorgetragen habe. Wenn sie etwa weitere nicht als Maximen des spekulativen Verbrechens der Vernunft waren, so zeigte er daran einen echten philosophischen Geist, als irgend einer der Weltweisen des Altertums. Daß man in Erklärung der Erscheinungen so zu Werke gehen müsse, als ob das Feld der Untersuchung durch eine Grenze oder Anfang der Welt abgeschnitten sei; den Stoff der Welt so annehmen, wie er sein muß, wenn wir von ihm durch Erfahrung be-
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

Each of the two types of philosophy says more than it knows. Epicurus encourages and furthers knowledge, though to the prejudice of the practical; Plato supplies excellent practical principles, but permits reason to indulge in ideal explanations of natural appearances, in regard to which a speculative knowledge is alone possible to us—to the neglect of physical investigation.

Finally, as regards the third factor which has to be considered in a preliminary choice between the two conflicting parties, it is extremely surprising that empiricism should be so universally unpopular. The common understanding, it might be supposed, would eagerly adopt a programme which promises to satisfy it through exclusively empirical knowledge and the rational connections there revealed—in preference to the transcendental dogmatism which compels it to rise to concepts far outstripping the insight and rational faculties of the most practised thinkers. But this is precisely what commends such dogmatism to the common understanding. For it then finds itself in a position in which the most learned can claim no advantage over it. If it understands little or nothing about these matters, no one can boast of understanding much more; and though in regard to them it cannot express itself in so scholastically correct a manner as those with special training, nevertheless there is no end to the plausible arguments which it can propound, wandering as it does amidst mere ideas, about which no one knows anything, and in regard to which it is therefore free to be as eloquent as it pleases; whereas we must postulate no other mode of the production of events than one which will enable them to be [regarded as] determined through unalterable laws of nature; and finally that no use must be made of any cause distinct from the world—all these principles still [retain their value]. They are very sound principles (though seldom observed) for extending the scope of speculative philosophy, while at the same time [enabling us] to discover the principles of morality without depending for this discovery upon alien [i.e., non-moral, theoretical] sources; and it does not follow in the least that those who require us, so long as we are occupied with mere speculation, to ignore these dogmatic propositions [that there is a limit and beginning to the world, a Divine Cause, etc.], can justly be accused of wishing to deny them.

VON DEM INTERESSE DER VERNUNFT

| Ein jeder von beiden sagt mehr als er weiß, doch so, daß der erstere das Wissen, obzwar zum Nachteile des Praktischen, aufmuntert und befördert, der zweite zwar zum Praktischen vortreffliche Prinzipien an die Hand gibt, aber eben dadurch in Ansehung alles dessen, worin uns allein ein spekulatives Wissen verdünnt ist, der Vernunft erlaubt, idealischen Erklärungen der Naturerscheinungen nachzuhalten und darüber die physische Nachforschung zu verabsäumen.

Was endlich das dritte Moment, worauf bei der vorläufigen Wahl zwischen beiden streitigen Teilen gesehen werden kann, anlangt: so ist es überaus befremdlich, daß der Empirismus aller Popularität gänzlich zu wider ist, ob man gleich glauben sollte, der gemeine Verstand werde einen Entwurf begierig aufnehmen, der ihn durch nichts als Erfahrungserkenntnisse und deren vernunftmäßigen Zusammenhang zu befriedigen verpflichtet, anstatt daß die transzendentalen Dogmatik ihn nötigt, zu Begriffen hinaufzusteigen, welche die Einsicht und das Vernunftvermögen der im Denken geübtesten Köpfe weit übersteigen. Aber eben dieses ist sein Bewegungsgrund. Denn er befindet sich alsdenn in einem Zustande, in welchem sich auch der Gelehrteste über ihn nichts herausnehmen kann. Wenn er wenig oder nichts davon versteht, so kann sich doch auch niemand rühmen, viel mehr davon zu verstehen, und, ob er gleich hierüber nicht so schlügerecht als andere sprechen kann, so kann er doch darüber unendlich mehr vermündern, weil er unterlauter Ideen herumwandelt, über die man eben darum am beredsten ist, weil

lehrte werden wollen; daß keine andere Erzeugung der Begebenheiten, als wie sie durch unveränderliche Naturgesetze bestimmt werden, und endlich keine von der Welt unterschiedene Ursache müsse gebraucht wer[den]: sind noch jetzt sehr richtige, aber wenig beobachtete Grundsätze, die spekulative Philosophie zu erweitern, so wie auch die Prinzipien der Moral, unabhängig von fremden Hilfsquellen auszufinden, ohne daß darum derjenige, welcher verlangt, jene dogmatische Sätze, so lange als wir mit der bloßen Spekulation beschäftigt sind, zu igno- rieren, darum beschuldet werden darf, er wolle sie leugnen.

A: *streitigen*.
when matters that involve the investigation of nature are in question, it has to stand silent and to admit its ignorance. Thus indolence and vanity combine in sturdy support of these principles. Besides, although the philosopher finds it extremely hard to accept a principle for which he can give no justification, still more to employ concepts the objective reality of which he is unable to establish, nothing is more usual in the case of the common understanding. It insists upon having something from which it can make a confident start. The difficulty of even conceiving this presupposed starting-point does not disquiet it. Since it is unaware what conceiving really means, it never occurs to it to reflect upon the assumption; it accepts as known whatever is familiar to it through frequent use. For the common understanding, indeed, all speculative interests pale before the practical; and it imagines that it comprehends and knows what its fears or hopes invite it to assume or to believe.

Thus empiricism is entirely devoid of the popularity of transcendental idealising reason; and however prejudicial such empiricism may be to the highest practical principles, there is no need to fear that it will ever pass the limits of the Schools, and acquire any considerable influence in the general life or any real favour among the multitude.

Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it regards all our knowledge as belonging to a possible system, and therefore allows only such principles as do not at any rate make it impossible for any knowledge that we may attain to combine into a system with other knowledge. But the propositions of the antithesis are of such a kind that they render the completion of the edifice of knowledge quite impossible. They maintain that there is always to be found beyond every state of the world a more ancient state, in every part yet other parts similarly divisible, prior to every event still another event which itself again is likewise generated, and that in existence in general everything is conditioned, an unconditioned and first existence being nowhere discernible. Since, therefore, the antithesis thus refuses to admit as first or as a beginning anything that could serve as a foundation for building, a

1 [Reading, with Erdmann, aller Popularität der transcendental-idealisierenden Vernunft för der transcendental-idealisierenden aller Popularität.]
2 [Reading, with Mellin, er...er...er for sie...sie.]

anstatt, daß er über der Nachborschung der Natur ganz ver
stümme und seine Unwissenheit gestehen müßte. Gemäßlichkeit und Eitelkeit also sind schon eine starke Empfehlung dieser Grundsätze. Überdem, ob es gleich einem Philosophen sehr schwer wird, etwas als Grundsatz anzu

Die menschliche Vernunft ist ihrer Natur nach architektonisch, d. i. sie betrachtet alle Erkenntnisse als gehörig zu einem möglich System, und verstattet daher auch nur solche Prinzipien, die eine vorhabende Erkenntnis wenigstens nicht unfähig machen, in irgend einem System mit anderen zusammen zu stehen. Die Sätze der Antithesis sind aber von der Art, daß sie die Vollendung eines Gebäudes von Erkenntnissen gänzlich unmöglich machen. Nach ihnen gibt es über einen Zustand der Welt immer einen noch älteren, in jedem Teile immer noch andere wiederum teilbare, vor jeder Begebenheit eine andere, die wiederum eben so wohl anderweitig erzeugt war, und in Dasein überhaupt alles immer nur bedingt, ohne irgend ein unbedingtes und erstes Dasein anzuerkennen. Da also die Antithesis nirgend ein Erstes einräumt, und keinen Anfang, der schlechthin zum Grunde des Baues dienen könnte, so ist ein vollstän-

1 A: noch weniger. — 2 Akad.-Ausg.: seie.
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

complete edifice of knowledge is, on such assumptions, altogether impossible. Thus the architectonic interest of reason—the demand not for empirical but for pure a priori unity of reason—forms a natural recommendation for the assertions of the thesis.

If men could free themselves from all such interests, and consider the assertions of reason irrespective of their consequences, solely in view of the intrinsic force of their grounds, and were the only way of escape from their perplexities to give adhesion to one or other of the opposing parties, their state would be one of continuous vacillation. To-day it would be their conviction that the human will is free; to-morrow, dwelling in reflection upon the indissoluble chain of nature, they would hold that freedom is nothing but self-deception, that everything is simply nature. If, however, they were summoned to action, this play of the merely speculative reason would, like a dream, at once cease, and they would choose their principles exclusively in accordance with practical interests. Since, however, it is fitting that a reflective and enquiring being should devote a certain amount of time to the examination of his own reason, entirely divesting himself of all partiality and openly submitting his observations to the judgment of others, no one can be blamed for, much less prohibited from, presenting for trial the two opposing parties, leaving them terrorised by no threats, to defend themselves as best they can, before a jury of like standing with themselves, that is, before a jury of fallible men.

THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

Section 4

THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF A SOLUTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEMS OF PURE REASON

To profess to solve all problems and to answer all questions would be impudent boasting, and would argue such extravagant self-conceit as at once to forfeit all confidence. Nevertheless there are sciences the very nature of which requires that every question arising within their domain should be com-

VON DEM INTERESSE DER VERNUNFT


Könnte sich aber ein Mensch von allem Interesse los- sagen, und die Behauptungen der Vernunft, gleichgültig gegen alle Folgen, bloß nach dem Gehalte ihrer Gründe in Betrachtung ziehen: so würde ein solcher, gesetzt daß er keinen Ausweg wüßte, anders aus dem Gedränge zu kommen, als daß er sich einer oder anderer der streitigen Lehren bekennet, in einem unaufhörlich schwankenden Zustande sein. Heute würde es ihm überzeugend vorkom- men, der menschliche Wille sei frei, morgen, wenn er die unauflöschliche Naturkette in Betrachtung zoge, würde er dafür halten, die Freiheit sei nichts als Selbsttäuschung, und alles sei bloß Natur. Wenn es nun aber zum Tun und Handeln käme, so würde dieses Spiel der bloß spekulativen Vernunft, wie Schattenbilder eines Traums, verschwinden, und er würde seine Principien bloß nach dem praktischen Interesse wählen. Weil es aber doch einem nachdenkenden und forschenden Wesen anständig ist, gewisse Zeiten lediglich der Prüfung seiner eigenen Vernunft zu widmen, hiebei aber alle Parteilichkeit gänzlich auszuziehen, und so seine Bemerkungen anderen zur Beurteilung öffentlich mitzuteilen: so kann es niemanden verargert, noch weniger verwirrt werden, die Sätze und Gegensätze, so wie sie sich, durch keine Drohung geschreckt, vor Geschworenen von seinem eigenen Stande (nämlich dem Stande schwacher Menschen) verteidigen können, auftreten zu lassen.

DER ANTINOMIE DER REINEN VERNUNFT VIERTER ABSCHNITT

VON DEN TRANSCENDENTALEN AUFGABEN DER REINEN VERNUNFT, IN SO FERN SIE SCHLECHTERDINGS MÜSSEN AUFGELOST WERDEN KÖNNEN

Alle Aufgaben auflösen und alle Fragen beantworten zu wollen, würde eine unverschämte Großsprecherei und ein so ausschweifender Eigendünkel sein, daß man dadurch sich so fort um alles Zutrauen bringen müßte. Gleichwohl gibt es Wissenschaften, deren Natur es so mit sich bringt, daß eine jede darin vorkommende Frage, aus dem, was man
pletely answerable in terms of what is known, insomuch as the answer must issue from the same sources from which the question proceeds. In these sciences it is not permissible to plead unavoidable ignorance; the solution can be demanded. We must be able, in every possible case, in accordance with a rule, to know what is right and what is wrong, since this concerns our obligation, and we have no obligation to that which we cannot know. In the explanation of natural appearances, on the other hand, much must remain uncertain and many questions insoluble, because what we know of nature is by no means sufficient, in all cases, to account for what has to be explained. The question, therefore, is whether in transcendental philosophy there is any question relating to an object presented to pure reason which is unanswerable by this reason, and whether we may rightly excuse ourselves from giving a decisive answer. In thus excusing ourselves, we should have to show that any knowledge which we can acquire still leaves us in complete uncertainty as to what should be ascribed to the object, and that while we do indeed have a concept sufficient to raise a question, we are entirely lacking in materials or power to answer the same.

Now I maintain that transcendental philosophy is unique in the whole field of speculative knowledge, in that no question which concerns an object given to pure reason can be insoluble for this same human reason, and that no excuse of an unavoidable ignorance, or of the problem's unfathomable depth, can release us from the obligation to answer it thoroughly and completely. That very concept which puts us in a position to ask the question must also qualify us to answer it, since, as in the case of right and wrong, the object is not to be met with outside the concept.

In transcendental philosophy, however, the only questions to which we have the right to demand a sufficient answer bearing on the constitution of the object, and from answering which the philosopher is not permitted to excuse himself on the plea of their impenetrable obscurity, are the cosmological. These questions [bearing on the constitution of the object] must refer exclusively to cosmological ideas. For the object must be given empirically, the question being only as to its conformity to an idea. If, on the other hand, the object is
transcendental, and therefore itself unknown; if, for instance, the question be whether that something, the appearance of which (in ourselves) is thought (soul), is in itself a simple being, whether there is an absolutely necessary cause of all things, and so forth, what we have then to do is in each case to seek an object for our idea; and we may well confess that this object is unknown to us, though not therefore impossible.* The cosmological ideas alone have the peculiarity that they can presuppose their object, and the empirical synthesis required for its concept, as being given. The question which arises out of these ideas refers only to the advance in this synthesis, that is, whether it should be carried so far as to contain absolute totality—such totality, since it cannot be given in any experience, being no longer empirical. Since we are here dealing solely with a thing as object of a possible experience, not as a thing in itself, the answer to the transcendental cosmological question cannot lie anywhere save in the idea. We are not asking what is the constitution of any object in itself, nor as regards possible experience are we enquiring what can be given in concreto in any experience. Our sole question is as to what lies in the idea, to which the empirical synthesis can do no more than merely approximate; the question must therefore be capable of being solved entirely from the idea. Since the idea is a mere creature of reason, reason cannot disclaim its responsibility and saddle it upon the unknown object.

* Although to the question, what is the constitution of a transcendental object, no answer can be given stating what it is, we can yet reply that the question itself is nothing, because there is no given object [corresponding] to it. Accordingly all questions dealt with in the transcendental doctrine of the soul are answerable in this latter manner, and have indeed been so answered; its questions refer to the transcendental subject of all inner appearances, which is not itself appearance and consequently not given as object, and in which none of the categories (and it is to them that the question is really directed) meet with the conditions required for their application. We have here a case where the common saying holds, that no answer is itself an answer. A question as to the constitution of that something which cannot be thought through any determinate predicate—inasmuch as it is completely outside the sphere of those objects which can be given to us—is entirely null and void.

Selbst unbekannt, z. B. ob das Etwas, dessen Erscheinung (in uns selbst) das Denken ist (Seele), ein an sich einfaches Wesen sei, ob es eine Ursache aller Dinge insgesamt gebe, die schlechtin notwendig ist, u. s. w., so sollen wir zu unserer Idee einen Gegenstand suchen, von welchem wir gestehen können, daß er uns unbekannt, aber deswegen doch nicht unmöglich sei.* Die kosmologischen Ideen haben allein das Eigentümliche an sich, daß sie ihren Gegenstand und die zu dessen Begriff erforderliche empirische Synthese als gegeben voraussetzen können, und die Frage, die aus ihnen entspringt, betrifft nur den Fortgang dieser Synthese, sofern er absolute Totalität enthalten soll, welche letztere nichts Empirisches mehr ist, indem sie in keiner Erfahrung gegeben werden kann. Da nun hier lediglich von einem Ding, als Gegenstand einer möglichen Erfahrung und nicht als einer Sache an sich selbst die Rede ist, so kann die Beantwortung der transcendentalen kosmologischen Frage, außer der Idee sonst nirgend liegen, denn sie betrifft keinen Gegenstand an sich selbst; und in Ansehung der möglichen Erfahrung wird die nicht nach demjenigen gefragt, was in concreto in irgend einer Erfahrung gegeben werden kann, sondern was in der Idee liegt, der sich die empirische Synthese bloß nähern soll: also muß sie aus der Idee allein aufgelöst werden können; denn diese ist ein bloßes Geschöpf der Verunft, welche also die Verantwortung nicht von sich abweisen und auf den unbekannten Gegenstand schieben kann.

* Man kann zwar auf die Frage, was ein transcendentaler Gegenstand für eine Beschaftenheit habe, keine Antwort geben; nämlich weiß er es selbst; aber wohl, daß die Frage selbst sinnlos sei, da kein Gegenstand deselben gegeben werden kann, daher sind alle Fragen der transcendentalen Seelenlehre auch belanglos und wirklich belanglos; denn sie betrifft das triviale, subjekt allein beachtenswerte, welches selbst nicht als Erscheinung ist und also nicht als Gegenstand gegeben ist, und vor aushilfe der Kategorien (auf welche doch eigentlich die Frage gestellt ist), Bedingungen ihrer Anwendung an treffen. Also ist hier der Fall, daß der gleiche Ausdruck gilt, daß keine Antwort auf eine Antwort sei, nämlich daß eine Frage nach der Beschaffenheit desjenigen Etwas, was durch kein bestimmtes Prädikat gedacht werden kann, weil es ganzlich außerhalb der Sphäre der Gegenstände gesetzt wird, die uns gegeben werden können, ganzlich unhaltbar und leer sei.

ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON 433

It is not so extraordinary as at first seems the case, that a science should be in a position to demand and expect none but assured answers to all the questions within its domain (quaestiones domesticae), although up to the present they have perhaps not been found. In addition to transcendental philosophy, there are two pure rational sciences, one purely speculative, the other with a practical content, namely, pure mathematics and pure ethics. Has it ever been suggested that, because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, it must remain uncertain what exact relation, in rational or irrational numbers, a diameter bears to a circle? Since no adequate solution in terms of rational numbers is possible, and no solution in terms of irrational numbers has yet been discovered, it was concluded that at least the impossibility of a solution can be known with certainty, and of this impossibility Lambert has given the required proof. In the universal principles of morals nothing can be uncertain, because the principles are either altogether void and meaningless, or must be derived from the concepts of our reason. In natural science, on the other hand, there is endless conjecture, and certainty is not to be counted upon. For the natural appearances are objects which are given to us independently of our concepts, and the key to them lies not in us and our pure thinking, but outside us; and therefore in many cases, since the key is not to be found, an assured solution is not to be expected. I am not, of course, here referring to those questions of the Transcendental Analytic which concern the deduction of our pure knowledge; we are at present treating only of the certainty of judgments with respect to their objects and not with respect to the source of our concepts themselves.

The obligation of an at least critical solution of the questions which reason thus propounds to itself, we cannot, therefore, escape by complaints of the narrow limits of our reason, and by confessing, under the pretext of a humility based on self-knowledge, that it is beyond the power of our reason to determine whether the world exists from eternity or has a beginning; whether cosmical space is filled with beings to infinitude,

1 [J. H. Lambert (1728–77). The proof that π is incommensurable, Lambert communicated, in a memoir on transcendental magnitudes, to the Berlin Academy in 1768.]
or is enclosed within certain limits; whether anything in the world is simple, or everything such as to be infinitely divisible; whether there is generation and production through freedom, or whether everything depends on the chain of events in the natural order; and finally whether there exists any being completely unconditioned and necessary in itself, or whether everything is conditioned in its existence and therefore dependent on external things and its contingent. All these questions refer to an object which can be found nowhere save in our thoughts, namely, to the absolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of appearances. If from our own concepts we are unable to assert and determine anything certain, we must not throw the blame upon the object as concealing itself from us. Since such an object is nowhere to be met with outside our idea, it is not possible for it to be given. The cause of failure we must seek in our idea itself. For so long as we obstinately persist in assuming that there is an actual object corresponding to the idea, the problem, as thus viewed, allows of no solution. A clear exposition of the dialectic which lies within our concept itself would soon yield us complete certainty how we ought to judge in reference to such a question.

The pretext that we are unable to obtain certainty in regard to these problems can be at once met with the following question which certainly calls for a clear answer: Whence come those ideas, the solution of which involves us in such difficulty? Is it, perchance, appearances that demand explanation, and do we, in accordance with these ideas, have to seek only the principles or rules of their exposition? Even if we suppose the whole of nature to be spread out before us, and that of all that is presented to our intuition nothing is concealed from our senses and consciousness, yet still through no experience could the object of our ideas be known by us in concreto. For that purpose, in addition to this exhaustive intuition, we should require what is not possible through any empirical knowledge, namely, a completed synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute totality. Accordingly our question does not require to be raised in the explanation of any given appearance, and is therefore not a question which can be regarded as imposed on us by the object itself. The object can never come before us, since it cannot be given through any possible experience. In all
possible perceptions we always remain involved in conditions, whether in space or in time, and come upon nothing unconditioned requiring us to determine whether this unconditioned is to be located in an absolute beginning of synthesis, or in an absolute totality of a series that has no beginning. In its empirical meaning, the term 'whole' is always only comparative. The absolute whole of quantity (the universe), the whole of division, of derivation, of the condition of existence in general, with all questions as to whether it is brought about through finite synthesis or through a synthesis requiring infinite extension, have nothing to do with any possible experience. We should not, for instance, in any wise be able to explain the appearances of a body better, or even differently, in assuming that it consisted either of simple or of inexhaustibly composite parts; for neither a simple appearance nor an infinite composition can ever come before us.Appearances demand explanation only so far as the conditions of their explanation are given in perception; but all that may ever be given in this way, when taken together in an absolute whole, is not itself a perception. Yet it is just the explanation of this very whole that is demanded in the transcendental problems of reason.

Thus the solution of these problems can never be found in experience, and this is precisely the reason why we should not say that it is uncertain what should be ascribed to the object [of our idea]. For as our object is only in our brain, and cannot be given outside it, we have only to take care to be at one with ourselves, and to avoid that ambiguity which transforms our idea into a supposed representation of an object that is empirically given and therefore to be known according to the laws of experience. The dogmatic solution is therefore not only uncertain, but impossible. The critical solution, which allows of complete certainty, does not consider the question objectively, but in relation to the foundation of the knowledge upon which the question is based.

\[\text{[Reading, with Mellin, keine for eine.]}\]
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

Section 5

SCEPTICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS IN THE FOUR TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

We should of ourselves desist from the demand that our questions be answered dogmatically, if from the start we understood that whatever the dogmatic answer might turn out to be it would only increase our ignorance, and cast us from one inconceivability into another, from one obscurity into another still greater, and perhaps even into contradictions. If our question is directed simply to a yes or no, we are well advised to leave aside the supposed grounds of the answer, and first consider what we should gain according as the answer is in the affirmative or in the negative. Should we then find that in both cases the outcome is mere nonsense, there will be good reason for instituting a critical examination of our question, to determine whether the question does not itself rest on a groundless presupposition, in that it plays with an idea the falsity of which can be more easily detected through study of its application and consequences than in its own separate representation.

This is the great utility of the sceptical mode of dealing with the questions which pure reason puts to pure reason. By its means we can deliver ourselves, at but a small cost, from a great body of sterile dogmatism, and set in its place a sober critique, which as a true cathartic will effectively guard us against such groundless beliefs and the supposed polymathy to which they lead.

If therefore, in dealing with a cosmological idea, I were able to appreciate beforehand that whatever view may be taken of the unconditioned in the successive synthesis of appearances, it must either be too large or too small for any concept of the understanding, I should be in a position to understand that since the cosmological idea has no bearing save upon an object of experience which has to be in conformity with a possible concept of the understanding, it must be

[1] Kant here plays on the double meaning of *sinnlos*, "empty of sense" and "nonsense".
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

entirely empty and without meaning; for its object, view it as we may, cannot be made to agree with it. This is in fact the case with all cosmical concepts; and this is why reason, so long as it holds to them, is involved in an unavoidable antinomy. For suppose:

First, that the world has no beginning: it is then too large for our concept, which, consisting as it does in a successive regress, can never reach the whole eternity that has elapsed. Or suppose that the world has a beginning, it will then, in the necessary empirical regress, be too small for the concept of the understanding. For since the beginning still presupposes a time which precedes it, it is still not unconditioned; and the law of the empirical employment of the understanding therefore obliges us to look for a higher temporal condition; and the world [as limited in time] is therefore obviously too small for this law.

This is also true of the twofold answer to the question regarding the magnitude of the world in space. If it is infinite and unlimited, it is too large for any possible empirical concept. If it is finite and limited, we have a right to ask what determines these limits. Empty space is no self-subsistent correlate of things, and cannot be a condition at which we could stop; still less can it be an empirical condition, forming part of a possible experience. (For how can there be any experience of the absolutely void?) And yet to obtain absolute totality in the empirical synthesis it is always necessary that the unconditioned be an empirical concept. Consequently, a limited world is too small for our concept.

Secondly, if every appearance in space (matter) consists of infinitely many parts, the regress in the division will always be too large for our concept; while if the division of space is to stop at any member of the division (the simple), the regress will be too small for the idea of the unconditioned. For this member always still allows of a regress to further parts contained in it.

Thirdly, if we suppose that nothing happens in the world save in accordance with the laws of nature, the causality of the cause will always itself be something that happens, making necessary a regress to a still higher cause, and thus a continuation of the series of conditions a parte priori without end.

und ohne Bedeutung sein müsse, weil ihr der Gegenstand nicht anpaßt, ich mag ihn derselben bequemen, wie ich will. Und dieses ist wirklich der Fall mit allen Weltbegriffen, welche auch, eben um deswillen, die Vernunft, so lange sie ihnen anhängt, in eine unvermeidliche Antinomie verwirkeln. Denn nehmt

Erstlich an: die Welt habe keinen Anfang, so ist sie für euren Begriff zu groß; denn dieser, welcher in einem sukzessiven Regressus besteht, kann die ganze verflossene Ewigkeit niemals erreichen. Setzet; sie habe einen Anfang, so ist sie wiederum für euren Verstandeskopf in dem notwendigen empirischen Regressus zu klein. Denn, weil der Anfang noch immer eine Zeit, die vorhergeht, voraussetzt, so ist er noch nicht unbedingt, und das Gesetz des empirischen Gebrauchs des Verstandes legt es euch auf, noch nach einer höheren Zeitbedingung zu fragen, und die Welt ist also offenbar für dieses Gesetz zu klein.

Eben so ist es mit der doppelten Beantwortung der Frage, wegen der Weltgröße, dem Raum nach, bewandt. Denn, ist sie unendlich und unbegrenzt, so ist sie für allen möglichen empirischen Begriff zu groß. Ist sie endlich und begrenzt, so fragt ihr mit Recht noch: was bestimmt diese Grenze? Der leere Raum ist nicht ein für sich bestehendes Correlatum der Dinge, und kann keine Bedingung sein, bei der ihr stehen bleiben könntet, noch viel weniger eine empirische Bedingung, die einen Teil einer möglichen Erfahrung ausmacht. (Denn wer kann eine Erfahrung vom Schlechtwollen haben?) Zur absoluten Totalität aber der empirischen Synthese wird jederzeit erfordert, daß das Unbedingte ein Erfahrungsbegriff sei. Also ist eine begrenzte Welt für euren Begriff zu klein.

Zweitens, besteht jede Erscheinung im Raume (Materie) aus unendlich vieler Teilen, so ist der Regressus der Teilung für euren Begriff jederzeit zu groß; und soll die Teilung des Raumes irgend bei einem Gliede derselben (dem Einfachen) aufhören, so ist er für die Idee des Unbedingten zu klein. Denn dieses Glied läßt nach immer einen Regressus zu mehreren in ihm enthaltenen Teilen übrig:

Drittens, nehmt ihr an: in allem, was in der Welt geschieht, sei nichts; als-Erfolg nach Gesetzen der Natur, so ist die Kausalität der Ursache immer wiederum etwas, das geschieht, und eurem Regressus zu noch höherer Ursache, mithin die Verlängerung der Reihe von Bedingungen a parte priori ohne Aufhören notwendig macht. Die bloße
Nature, as working always through efficient causes, is thus too large for any of the concepts which we can employ in the synthesis of cosmical events.

If, in certain cases, we admit the occurrence of self-caused events, that is, generation through freedom, then by an unavoidable law of nature the question 'why' still pursues us, constraining us, in accordance with the law of causality [which governs] experience, to pass beyond such events; and we thus find that such totality of connection is too small for our necessary empirical concept.

Fourthly, if we admit an absolutely necessary being (whether it be the world itself, or something in the world, or the cause of the world), we set it in a time infinitely remote from any given point of time, because otherwise it would be dependent upon another being antecedent to it. But such an existence is then too large for our empirical concept, and is unapproachable through any regress, however far this be carried.

If, again, we hold that everything belonging to the world (whether as conditioned or as condition) is contingent, any and every given existence is too small for our concept. For we are constrained always still to look about for some other existence upon which it is dependent.

We have said that in all these cases the cosmical idea is either too large or too small for the empirical regress, and therefore for any possible concept of the understanding. We have thus been maintaining that the fault lies with the idea, in being too large or too small for that to which it is directed, namely, possible experience. Why have we not expressed ourselves in the opposite manner, saying that in the former case the empirical concept is always too small for the idea, and in the latter too large, and that the blame therefore attaches to the empirical regress? The reason is this. Possible experience is what which can alone give reality to our concepts; in its absence a concept is a mere idea, without truth, that is, without relation to any object. The possible empirical concept is therefore the standard by which we must judge whether the idea is a mere idea and thought-entity, or whether it finds its object in the world. For we can say of anything that it is too large

1 [der Erfahrung.]
or too small relatively to something else, only if the former is required for the sake of the latter, and has to be adapted to it. Among the puzzles propounded in the ancient dialectical Schools was the question, whether, if a ball cannot pass through a hole, we should say that the ball is too large or the hole too small. In such a case it is a matter of indifference how we choose to express ourselves, for we do not know which exists for the sake of the other. In the case, however, of a man and his coat, we do not say that a man is too tall for his coat, but that the coat is too short for the man.

We have thus been led to see that at least a well-grounded suspicion that the cosmological ideas, and with them all the mutually conflicting pseudo-rational assertions, may perhaps rest on an empty and merely fictitious concept of the manner in which the object of these ideas is given to us; and this suspicion may set us on the right path for laying bare the illusion which has so long led us astray.

**THE ANTIMONY OF PURE REASON**

Section 6

**TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AS THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL DIALECTIC**

We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space or time, and therefore all objects of any experience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, that is, mere representations, which, in the manner in which they are represented, as extended beings, or as series of alterations, have no independent existence outside our thoughts. This doctrine I entitle transcendental idealism. The realist in the transcendental meaning of this term, treats these modifications of our sensibility as self-subsistent things, that is, treats mere representations as things in themselves.

It would be unjust to ascribe to us that long-decried

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I have also, elsewhere, sometimes entitled it formal idealism, to distinguish it from material idealism, that is, from the usual type of idealism which doubts or denies the existence of outer things themselves. [Note added in B.]

empirical idealism, which, while it admits the genuine reality of space, denies the existence of the extended beings in it, or at least considers their existence doubtful, and so does not in this regard allow of any properly demonstrable distinction between truth and dreams. As to the appearances of inner sense in time, empirical idealism finds no difficulty in regarding them as real things; indeed it even asserts that this inner experience is the sufficient as well as the only proof of the actual existence of its object (in itself, with all this time-determination).

Our transcendental idealism, on the contrary, admits the reality of the objects of outer intuition, as intuited in space, and of all changes in time, as represented by inner sense. For since space is a form of that intuition which we entitle outer, and since without objects in space there would be no empirical representation whatsoever, we can and must regard the extended beings in it as real; and the same is true of time. But this space and this time, and with them all appearances, are not in themselves things; they are nothing but representations, and cannot exist outside our mind. Even the inner and sensible intuition of our mind (as object of consciousness) which is represented as being determined by the succession of different states in time, is not the self proper, as it exists in itself—that is, is not the transcendental subject—but only an appearance that has been given to the sensibility of this, to us unknown, being. This inner appearance cannot be admitted to exist in any such manner in and by itself; for it is conditioned by time, and time cannot be a determination of a thing in itself. The empirical truth of appearances in space and time is, however, sufficiently secured; it is adequately distinguished from dreams, if both dreams and genuine appearances cohere truly and completely in one experience, in accordance with empirical laws.

The objects of experience, then, are never given in themselves, but only in experience, and have no existence outside it.

That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever perceived them, must certainly be admitted. This, however, only means that in the possible advance of experience we may encounter them. For everything is real which stands in connection with a perception in accordance with the

[Reading, with Erdmann, selbst, mit.]

Es sind demnach die Gegenstände der Erfahrung niemals an sich selbst, sondern nur in der Erfahrung gegeben, und existieren außer derselben gar nicht. Daß es Einwohner im Monde geben könne, ob sie gleich kein Mensch jemals wahrgenommen hat, muß allerdings eingeräumt werden, aber es bedeutet nur soviel: daß wir in dem möglichen Fortschritt der Erfahrung auf sie treffen könnten; denn alles ist wirklich, was mit einer Wahrnehmung nach

Akad.-Ausg.: »demselben.«
laws of empirical advance. They are therefore real if they stand in an empirical connection with my actual consciousness, although they are not for that reason real in themselves, that is, outside this advance of experience.

Nothing is really given us save perception and the empirical advance from this to other possible perceptions. For the appearances, as mere representations, are in themselves real only in perception, which perception is in fact nothing but the reality of an empirical representation, that is, appearance. To call an appearance a real thing prior to our perceiving it, either means that in the advance of experience we must meet with such a perception, or it means nothing at all. For if we were speaking of a thing in itself, we could indeed say that it exists in itself apart from relation to our senses and possible experience. But we are here speaking only of an appearance in space and time, which are not determinations of things in themselves but only of our sensibility. Accordingly, that which is in space and time is an appearance; it is not anything in itself but consists merely of representations, which, if not given in us—that is to say, in perception—are nowhere to be met with.

The faculty of sensible intuition is strictly only a receptivity, a capacity of being affected in a certain manner with representations, the relation of which to one another is a pure intuition of space and of time (mere forms of our sensibility), and which, in so far as they are connected in this manner in space and time, and are determinable according to laws of the unity of experience, are entitled objects. The non-sensible cause of these representations is completely unknown to us, and cannot therefore be intuited by us as object. For such an object would have to be represented as neither in space nor in time (these being merely conditions of sensible representation), and apart from such conditions we cannot think any intuition. We may, however, entitle the purely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, but merely in order to have something corresponding to sensibility viewed as a receptivity. To this transcendental object we can ascribe the whole extent and connection of our possible perceptions, and can say that it is given in itself prior to all experience. But the appearances,

1 [Reading, with Vorländer, *die beide für die beides*.]
2 [mit Vorstellungen affiixiert zu werden.]

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462

**ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON**

**TRANSZENTENTALE DIALEKTIK**

Gesetzes des empirischen Fortgangs in einem Kontext steht. Sie sind also alsdenn wirklich, wenn sie mit meinem wirklichen Bewußtsein in einem empirischen Zusammenhang stehen, ob sie gleich darum nicht an sich, d. i. außer diesem Fortschritt der Erfahrung, wirklich sind.

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Uns ist wirklich nichts gegeben, als die Wahrnehmung und der empirische Fortschritt von dieser zu andern möglichen Wahrnehmungen. Denn an sich selbst sind die Erscheinungen, als bloße Vorstellungen, nur in der Wahrnehmung wirklich, die in der Tat nichts andres ist, als die Wirklichkeit einer empirischen Vorstellung, d. i. Erscheinung. Vor der Wahrnehmung eine Erscheinung ein wirkliches Ding nennen, bedeutet entweder, daß wir im Fortgange der Erfahrung auf eine solche Wahrnehmung treffen müssen, oder es hat gar keine Bedeutung. Denn, daß sie an sich selbst, ohne Beziehung auf unsere Sinne und mögliche Erfahrung, existiere, könnte allerdings gesagt werden, wenn von einem Dinge an sich selbst die Rede wäre. Es ist aber bloß von einer Erscheinung im Raume und der Zeit, die beides keine Bestimmungen der Dinge an sich selbst, sondern nur unserer Sinnlichkeit sind, die Rede; daher das, was in ihnen ist (Erscheinungen), nicht an sich etwas, sondern bloße Vorstellungen sind, die, wenn sie nicht in uns (in der Wahrnehmung) gegeben sind, überall nirgend angetroffen werden.

Das sinnliche Anschauungsvermögen ist eigentlich nur eine Rezeptivität, auf gewisse Weise mit Vorstellungen affiziert zu werden, deren Verhältnis zu einander eine reine Anschauung des Raumes und der Zeit ist (lauter Formen unserer Sinnlichkeit), und welche, so fern sie in diesem Verhältnisse (dem Raume und der Zeit) nach Gesetzen der Einheit der Erfahrung verknüpft und bestimmbar sind, Gegenstände heissen. Die nicht-sinnliche Ursache dieser Vorstellungen ist uns gänzlich unbekannt, und diese können wir daher nicht als Objekt anschauen; denn dergleichen Gegenstand würde weder im Raume, noch der Zeit (als bloßen Bedingungen der sinnlichen Vorstellung) vorgestellt werden müssen, ohne welche Bedingungen wir uns gar keine Anschauung denken können. Indessen können wir die bloß intelligible Ursache, der Erscheinungen überhaupt, das transzendentale Objekt nennen, bloß, damit wir etwas haben, was der Sinnlichkeit als einer Rezeptivität korrespondiert. Diesem transzendentalen Objekt können wir allen Umfang und Zusammenhang unserer möglichen Wahrnehmungen zuschreiben, und sagen: daß es vor aller Erfahrung an sich selbst gegeben sei. Die Erscheinungen aber sind, ihm gemäß,
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

while conforming to it, are not given in themselves, but only in this experience, being mere representations, which as perceptions can mark out a real object only in so far as the perception connects with all others according to the rules of the unity of experience. Thus we can say that the real things of past time are given in the transcendental object of experience; but they are objects for me and real in past time only in so far as I represent to myself (either by the light of history or by the guiding clues of causes and effects) that a regressive series of possible perceptions in accordance with empirical laws, in a word, that the course of the world, conducts us to a past time-series as condition of the present time—a series which, however, can be represented as actual not in itself but only in the connection of a possible experience. Accordingly, all events which have taken place in the immense periods that have preceded my own existence mean really nothing but the possibility of extending the chain of experience from the present perception back to the conditions which determine this perception in respect of time.

If, therefore, I represent to myself all existing objects of the senses in all time and in all places, I do not set them in space and time [as being there] prior to experience. This representation is nothing but the thought of a possible experience in its absolute completeness. Since the objects are nothing but mere representations, only in such a possible experience are they given. To say that they exist prior to all my experience is only to assert that they are to be met with if, starting from perception, I advance to that part of experience to which they belong. The cause of the empirical conditions of this advance (that which determines what members I shall meet with, or how far I can meet with any such in my regress) is transcendental, and is therefore necessarily unknown to me. We are not, however, concerned with this transcendental cause, but only with the rule of the advance in the experience in which objects, that is to say, appearances, are given to me. Moreover, in outcome it is a matter of indifference whether I say that in the empirical advance in space I can meet with stars a hundred times farther removed than the outermost now perceptible to me, or whether I say that they are perhaps to be met with in cosmical space even

1 [bedeuten.]
though no human being has ever perceived or ever will perceive them. For even supposing they were given as things in themselves, without relation to possible experience, it still remains true that they are nothing to me, and therefore are not objects, save in so far as they are contained in the series of the empirical regress. Only in another sort of relation, when these appearances would be used for the cosmological idea of an absolute whole, and when, therefore, we are dealing with a question which oversteps the limits of possible experience, does distinction of the mode in which we view the reality of those objects of the senses become of importance, as serving to guard us against a deceptive error which is bound to arise if we misinterpret our empirical concepts.

THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

Section 7

CRITICAL SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL CONFLICT OF REASON WITH ITSELF

The whole antinomy of pure reason rests upon the dialectical argument: If the conditioned is given, the entire series of all its conditions is likewise given; objects of the senses are given as conditioned; therefore, etc. Through this syllogism, the major premise of which appears so natural and evident, as many cosmological ideas are introduced as there are differences in the conditions (in the synthesis of appearances) that constitute a series. The ideas postulate absolute totality of these series; and thereby they set reason in unavoidable conflict with itself. We shall be in a better position to detect what is deceptive in this pseudo-rational argument, if we first correct and define some of the concepts employed in it.

In the first place, it is evident beyond all possibility of doubt, that if the conditioned is given, a regress in the series of all its conditions is set us as a task.¹ For it is involved in the very concept of the conditioned that something is referred to a condition, and if this condition is again itself conditioned, to a more remote condition, and so through all the members of the

¹ [aufgegeben.]

464

TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK

raume anzutreffen, wenn sie gleich niemals ein Mensch wahrgenommen hat, oder wahrgenommen wird; denn, wenn sie gleich als Dinge an sich selbst, ohne Beziehung auf mögliche Erfahrung, überhaupt gegeben wären, so sind sie doch für mich nichts, mithin keine Gegenstände, als so fern sie in der Reihe des empirischen Regressus enthalten sind: Nur in anderweitiger Beziehung, wenn eben diese Erscheinungen zur kosmologischen Idee von einem absoluten Ganzen gehäuft werden sollen, und, wenn es also um eine Frage zu tun ist, die über die Grenzen möglicher Erfahrung hinausgeht, ist die Unterscheidung der Art, wie man die Wirklichkeit gedachter Gegenstände der Sinne nimmt, von Erheblichkeit, um einem trügerischen Wahn vorzubeugen, welcher aus der Mißdeutung unserer eigenen Erfahrungsgründe unvermeidlich entspringen muß.

498

499

SIEBENTER ABSCHNITT

KRITISCHE ENTSCHEIDUNG DES KOSMOLOGISCHEN STREITS DER VERUNFT MIT SICH SELBST

Die ganze Antinomie der reinen Vernunft beruht auf dem dialektischen Argumente: Wenn das Bedingte gegeben ist, so ist auch die ganze Reihe aller Bedingungen desselben gegeben; nun sind uns Gegenstände der Sinne als bedingt gegeben, folglich etc. Durch diesen Vernunftschluß, dessen Obersatz so natürlich und einleuchtend scheint, werden nun, nach Verschiedenheit der Bedingungen (in der Synthese der Erscheinungen), so fern sie eine Reihe ausmachen, ebenso viel kosmologische Ideen eingeführt, welche die absolute Totalität dieser Reihen postulieren und eben dadurch die Vernunft unvermeidlich in Widerstreit mit sich selbst versetzen. Ehe wir aber das Trüglige dieses vernünftelnden Arguments aufdekken, müssen wir uns durch Berichtigung und Bestimmung gewisser darin vorkommenden Begriffe dazu in Stand setzen.

Zuerst folgender Satz klar und unzweideutig gewiß: daß, wenn das Bedingte gegeben ist, uns eben dadurch ein Regressus in der Reihe aller Bedingungen zugemessen, aufgegeben sei; denn dieses bringt schon der Begriff des Bedingten so mit sich, daß dadurch etwas auf eine Bedingung, und, wenn diese wiederum bedingt ist, auf eine entferntere Bedingung, und so durch alle Glieder der Reihe be-
series. The above proposition is thus analytic, and has nothing to fear from a transcendental criticism. It is a logical postulate of reason, that through the understanding we follow up and extend as far as possible that connection of a concept with its conditions which directly results from the concept itself.

Further, if the conditioned as well as its condition are things in themselves, then upon the former being given, the regress to the latter is not only set as a task, but therewith already really given. And since this holds of all members of the series, the complete series of the conditions, and therefore the unconditioned, is given therewith, or rather is presupposed in view of the fact that the conditioned, which is only possible through the complete series, is given. The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition is here a synthesis of the mere understanding, which represents things as they are, without considering whether and how we can obtain knowledge of them. If, however, what we are dealing with are appearances—as mere representations appearances cannot be given save in so far as I attain knowledge of them, or rather attain them in themselves, for they are nothing but empirical modes of knowledge—I cannot say, in the same sense of the terms, that if the conditioned is given, all its conditions (as appearances) are likewise given, and therefore cannot in any way infer the absolute totality of the series of its conditions. The appearances are in their apprehension themselves nothing but an empirical synthesis in space and time, and are given only in this synthesis. It does not, therefore, follow, that if the conditioned, in the field of appearance, is given, the synthesis which constitutes its empirical condition is given therewith and is presupposed. This synthesis first occurs in the regress, and never exists without it. What we can say is that a regress to the conditions, that is, a continued empirical synthesis, on the side of the conditions, is enjoined or set as a task, and that in this regress there can be no lack of given conditions.

These considerations make it clear that the major premise of the cosmological inference takes the conditioned in the transcendental sense of a pure category, while the minor premise takes it in the empirical sense of a concept of the understanding applied to mere appearances. The argument thus commits that dialectical fallacy which is entitled sophisma.
figurae dictio. This fallacy is not, however, an artificial one; a quite natural illusion of our common reason leads us, when anything is given as conditioned, thus to assume in the major premis, as it were without thought or question, its conditions and their series. This assumption is indeed simply the logical requirement that we should have adequate premisses for any given conclusion. Also, there is no reference to a time-order in the connection of the conditioned with its condition; they are presupposed as given together with it. Further, it is no less natural, in the minor premis, to regard appearances both as things in themselves and as objects given to the pure understanding, than to proceed as we have done in the major, in which we have [similarly] abstracted from all those conditions of intuition under which alone objects can be given. Yet in so doing we have overlooked an important distinction between the concepts. The synthesis of the conditioned with its conditions (and the whole series of the latter) does not in the major premis carry with it any limitation through time or any concept of succession. The empirical synthesis, on the other hand, that is, the series of the conditions in appearance, as subsumed in the minor premis, is necessarily successive, the members of the series being given only as following upon one another in time; and I have therefore, in this case, no right to assume the absolute totality of the synthesis and of the series thereby represented. In the major premis all the members of the series are given in themselves, without any condition of time, but in this minor premis they are possible only through the successive regress, which is given only in the process in which it is actually carried out.

When this error has thus been shown to be involved in the argument upon which both parties alike base their cosmological assertions, both might justly be dismissed, as being unable to offer any sufficient title in support of their claims. But the quarrel is not thereby ended—as if one or both of the parties had been proved to be wrong in the actual doctrines they assert, that is, in the conclusions of their arguments. For although they have failed to support their contentions by valid grounds of proof, nothing seems to be clearer than that since one of them asserts that the world has a beginning and the other that it has no beginning and is from eternity, one of the


Nach der Überweisung eines solchen Fehltritts, des gemeinschaftlich zum Grunde der kosmologischen Behauptungen gelegten Arguments, können beide streitenden Teile mit Recht, als solche, die ihre Forderung auf keinen gründlichen Titel gründen, abgewiesen werden: Dadurch aber ist ihr Zweif noch nicht in so fern geändert, daß sie überführt worden wären, sie, oder einer von beiden, hätten in der Sache selbst, die er behauptet (im Schlussatze), Unrecht, wenn er sie gleich nicht auf tufftige Beweisgründe zu bauen wüsste. Es scheint doch nichts klarer, als daß von zweien, deren der eine behauptet: die Welt hat einen Anfang, der andere: die Welt hat keinen Anfang, sondern sie ist von Ewigkeit her,
two must be in the right. But even if this be so, none the less, since the arguments on both sides are equally clear, it is impossible to decide between them. The parties may be commanded to keep the peace before the tribunal of reason; but the controversy none the less continues. There can therefore be no way of settling it once for all and to the satisfaction of both sides, save by their becoming convinced that the very fact of their being able to refute one another is evidence that they are really quarrelling about nothing, and that a certain transcendental illusion has mocked them with a reality where none is to be found. This is the path which we shall now proceed to follow in the settlement of a dispute that defies all attempts to come to a decision.

* * *

Zeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely reprimanded by Plato as a mischievous Sophist who, to show his skill, would set out to prove a proposition through convincing arguments and then immediately overthrow them by other arguments equally strong. Zeno maintained, for example, that God (probably conceived by him as simply the world) is neither finite nor infinite, neither in motion nor at rest, neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing. To the critics of his procedure he appeared to have the absurd intention of denying both of two mutually contradictory propositions. But this accusation does not seem to me to be justified. The first of his propositions I shall consider presently more in detail. As regards the others, if by the word 'God' he meant the universe, he would certainly have to say that it is neither abidingly present in its place, that is, at rest, nor that it changes its place, that is, is in motion; because all places are in the universe, and the universe is not, therefore, itself in any place. Again, if the universe comprehends in itself everything that exists, it cannot be either similar or dissimilar to any other thing, because there is no other thing, nothing outside it, with which it could be compared. If two opposed judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition, then in spite of their opposition, which does not amount to a contradiction strictly so-called, both fall to the ground, inasmuch as the condition, under which alone either of them can be maintained, itself falls.
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

If it be said that all bodies have either a good smell or a smell that is not good, a third case is possible, namely, that a body has no smell at all; and both the conflicting propositions may therefore be false. If, however, I say: all bodies are either good-smelling or not good-smelling (vel suaveolens vel non suaveolens), the two judgments are directly contradictory to one another, and the former only is false, its contradictory opposite, namely, that some bodies are not good-smelling, comprehending those bodies also which have no smell at all. Since, in the previous opposition (per disparata), smell, the contingent condition of the concept of the body, was not removed by the opposed judgment, but remained attached to it, the two judgments were not related as contradictory opposites.

If, therefore, we say that the world is either infinite in extension or is not infinite (non est infinitus), and if the former proposition is false, its contradictory opposite, that the world is not infinite, must be true. And I should thus deny the existence of an infinite world, without affirming in its place a finite world. But if we had said that the world is either infinite or finite (non-infinite), both statements might be false. For in that case we should be regarding the world in itself as determined in its magnitude, and in the opposed judgment we do not merely remove the infinitude, and with it perhaps the entire separate existence of the world, but attach a determination to the world, regarded as a thing actually existing in itself. This assertion may, however, likewise be false; the world may not be given as a thing in itself, nor as being in its magnitude either infinite or finite. I beg permission to entitle this kind of opposition dialectical, and that of contradictories analytical. Thus of two dialectically opposed judgments both may be false; for the one is not a mere contradictory of the other, but says something more than is required for a simple contradiction.

If we regard the two propositions, that the world is infinite in magnitude and that it is finite in magnitude, as contradictory opposites, we are assuming that the world, the complete series of appearances, is a thing in itself that remains even if I suspend the infinite or the finite regress in the series of its appearances. If, however, I reject this assumption, or

4 [Reading, with Hartenstein, des Körpers \textit{for} der Körper.]
rather than accompanying transcendental illusion, and deny
that the world is a thing in itself, the contradictory opposition
of the two assertions is converted into a merely dialectical
opposition. Since the world does not exist in itself, independ-
ently of the regressive series of my representations, it exists
_in itself_ neither as an _infinite_ whole nor as a _finite_ whole.
It exists only in the empirical regress of the series of appear-
ances, and is not to be met with as something in itself. If, then,
this series is always conditioned, and therefore can never be
given as complete, the world is not an unconditioned whole,
and does not exist as such a whole, either of infinite or of
finite magnitude.

What we have here said of the first cosmological idea,
that is, of the absolute totality of magnitude in the [field
of] appearance, applies also to all the others. The series of
conditions is only to be met with in the regressive synthesis
itself, not in the [field of] appearance viewed as a thing given
in and by itself, prior to all regress. We must therefore say that
the number of parts in a given appearance is in itself neither
finite nor infinite. For an appearance is not something existing
in itself, and its parts are first given in and through the regress
of the decomposing synthesis, a regress which is never given
in absolute completeness, either as finite or as infinite. This
also holds of the series of subordinated causes, and of the
series that proceeds from the conditioned to unconditioned
necessary existence. These series can never be regarded as
being in themselves in their totality either finite or infinite.
Being series of subordinated _representations_, they exist only
in the dynamical regress, and prior to this regress can have no
existence in themselves as self-subsistent series of things.

Thus the antimony of pure reason in its cosmological ideas
vanishes when it is shown that it is merely dialectical, and
that it is a conflict due to an illusion which arises from our
applying to appearances that exist only in our representations,
and therefore, so far as they form a series, not otherwise than
in a successive regress, that idea of absolute totality which
holds only as a condition of things in themselves. From this
antimony we can, however, obtain, not indeed a dogmatic, but
a critical and doctrinal advantage. It affords indirect proof of

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1 [der _dekomponierenden Synthesis._]
the transcendental ideality of appearances—a proof which ought to convince any who may not be satisfied by the direct proof given in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This proof would consist in the following dilemma. If the world is a whole existing in itself, it is either finite or infinite. But both alternatives are false (as shown in the proofs of the antithesis and thesis respectively). It is therefore also false that the world (the sum of all appearances) is a whole existing in itself. From this it then follows that appearances in general are nothing outside our representations—which is just what is meant by their transcendental ideality.

This remark is of some importance. It enables us to see that the proofs given in the fourfold antinomy are not merely baseless deceptions. On the supposition that appearances, and the sensible world which comprehends them all, are things in themselves, these proofs are indeed well-grounded. The conflict which results from the propositions thus obtained shows, however, that there is a fallacy in this assumption, and so leads us to the discovery of the true constitution of things, as objects of the senses. While the transcendental dialectic does not by any means favour scepticism, it certainly does favour the sceptical method, which can point to such dialectic as an example of its great services. For when the arguments of reason are allowed to oppose one another in unrestricted freedom, something advantageous, and likely to aid in the correction of our judgments, will always accrue, though it may not be what we set out to find.

THE ANTIMONY OF PURE REASON

Section 8

THE REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OF PURE REASON IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS

Since no maximum of the series of conditions in a sensible world, regarded as a thing in itself, is given through the cosmological principle of totality, but can only be set as a task that calls for regress in the series of conditions, the principle of pure reason has to be amended in these terms; and it


Diese Anmerkung ist von Wichtigkeit. Man sieht daraus, daß die obigen Beweise der vierschen Antinomie nicht Blendwerke, sondern gründlich waren, unter der Voraussetzung nämlich, daß Erscheinungen oder eine Sinnenwelt, die sie insgesamt in sich begreift, Dinge an sich selbst wären. Der Widerstreit der daraus gezogenen Sätze entdeckt aber, daß in der Voraussetzung eine Falschheit liege, und bringt uns dadurch zu einer Entdeckung der wahren Beschaffenheit der Dinge, als Gegenstände der Sinne. Die transzendentale Dialektik tut also keinesweges dem Skeptizismus einen Vorschub, wohl aber der skeptischen Methode, welche an ihr ein Beispiel ihres großen Nutzens aufweisen kann, wenn man die Argumente der Vernunft in ihrer größten Freiheit gegen einander auftreten läßt, die, ob sie gleich zuletzt nicht dasjenige, was man suchte, dennoch jederzeit etwas Nützliches, und zur Berichtigung unserer Urteile Dienliches, liefern werden.

|| DER ANTIMONE DER REINEN VERNunft

ACHTER ARBENNIT

REGULATIVES PRINZIP DER REINEN VERNunft
IN ANSCHRIF DER KOSMOLOGischen IDEEN

Da durch den kosmologischen Grundsat der Totalität kein Maximum der Reihe von Bedingungen in einer Sinnenwelt, als einem Ding an sich selbst; gegeben wird, sondern bloß im Regressus derselben aufgegeben werden kann, so behält der gedachte Grundsat der reinen Vernunft, in seiner dargestellten berichtigen Bedeutung, annoch seine gute
then preserves its validity, not indeed as the axiom that we think the totality as actually in the object, but as a problem for the understanding, and therefore for the subject, leading it to undertake and to carry on, in accordance with the completeness prescribed by the idea, the regress in the series of conditions of any given conditioned. For in our sensibility, that is, in space and time, every condition to which we can attain in the exposition of given appearances is again conditioned. For they are not objects in themselves—were they such, the absolutely unconditioned might be found in them—but simply empirical representations which must always find in intuition the condition that determines them in space and time. The principle of reason is thus properly only a rule, prescribing a regress in the series of the conditions of given appearances, and forbidding it to bring the regress to a close by treating anything at which it may arrive as absolutely unconditioned. It is not a principle of the possibility of experience and of empirical knowledge of objects of the senses, and therefore not a principle of the understanding; for every experience, in conformity with the given [forms of] intuition, is enclosed within limits. Nor is it a constitutive principle of reason, enabling us to extend our concept of the sensible world beyond all possible experience. It is rather a principle of the greatest possible continuation and extension of experience, allowing no empirical limit to hold as absolute. Thus it is a principle of reason which serves as a rule, postulating what we ought to do in the regress, but not anticipating what is present\(^1\) in the object as it is in itself, prior to all regress. Accordingly I entitle it a regulative principle of reason, to distinguish it from the principle of the absolute totality of the series of conditions, viewed as actually present in the object (that is, in the appearances),\(^8\) which would be a constitutive cosmological principle. I have tried to show by this distinction that there is no such constitutive principle, and so to prevent what otherwise, through a transcendental subjection, inevitably takes place, namely, the ascribing of objective reality to an idea that serves merely as a rule.

In order properly to determine the meaning of this rule of

\(^1\) [gegeben.]

\(^8\) [als im Objekte (den Erscheinungen) an sich selbst gegeben.]
pure reason, we must observe, first, that it cannot tell us what the object is, but only how the empirical regress is to be carried out so as to arrive at the complete concept of the object. If it attempted the former task, it would be a constitutive principle, such as pure reason can never supply. It cannot be regarded as maintaining that the series of conditions for a given conditioned is in itself either finite or infinite. That would be to treat a mere idea of absolute totality, which is only produced in the idea, as equivalent to thinking an object that cannot be given in any experience. For in terms of it we should be ascribing to a series of appearances an objective reality which is independent of empirical synthesis. This idea of reason can therefore do no more than prescribe a rule to the regressive synthesis in the series of conditions; and in accordance with this rule the synthesis must proceed from the conditioned, through all subordinate conditions, up to the unconditioned. Yet it can never reach this goal, for the absolutely unconditioned is not to be met with in experience.

We must therefore first of all determine what we are to mean by the synthesis of a series, in cases in which the synthesis is never complete. In this connection two expressions are commonly employed, which are intended to mark a distinction, though without correctly assigning the ground of the distinction. Mathematicians speak solely of a proressus in infinitum. Philosophers, whose task it is to examine concepts, refuse to accept this expression as legitimate, substituting for it the phrase proressus in indefinitum. We need not stop to examine the reasons for such a distinction, or to enlarge upon its useful or useless employment. We need only determine these concepts with such accuracy as is required for our particular purposes.

Of a straight line we may rightly say that it can be produced to infinity. In this case the distinction between an infinite and an indeterminately great advance (proressus in indefinitum) would be mere subtlety. When we say, 'Draw a line', it sounds indeed more correct to add in indefinitum than in infinitum. Whereas the latter means that you must not cease producing it—which is not what is intended—the former means only, produce it as far as you please; and if we are referring only to what it is in our power to do, this expression is quite hörig zu bestimmen, so ist zuerst zu bemerken, daß sie nicht sagen können, was das Objekt sei, sondern wie der empirische Regressus anzustellen sei, um zu dem vollständigen Begriffe des Objekts zu gelangen. Denn, fände das erstere statt, so würde sie ein konstitutives Prinzip sein, dergleichen aus einer Vernunft niemals möglich ist. Man kann also damit keineswegs die Absicht haben, zu sagen, die Reihe der Bedingungen zu einem gegebenen Bedingten sei an sich endlich, oder unendlich; denn dadurch würde eine bloße Idee der absoluten Totalität, die lediglich in ihr selbst geschaffen ist, einen Gegenstand denken, der in keiner Erfahrung gegeben werden kann, indem einer Reihe von Erscheinungen eine von der empirischen Synthese unabhängige objektive Realität erteilt würde. Die Vernunftidee wird also nur der regressiven Synthese in der Reihe der Bedingungen eine Regel vorschreiben, nach welcher sie vom Bedingten, vermittels aller einander untergeordneten Bedingungen, zum Unbedingten fortgeht, obgleich dieses niemals erreicht wird. Denn das Schlechthin-unbedingte wird in der Erfahrung gar nicht angetroffen.

Zu diesem Ende ist nun erstlich die Synthese einer Reihe, so fern sie niemals vollständig ist, genau zu bestimmen. Man bedenkt sich in dieser Absicht gewöhnlich zweier Ausdrücke, die darin etwas unterscheiden sollen, ohne daß man doch den Grund dieser Unterscheidung recht angeben weiß. Die Mathematiker sprechen lediglich von einem progressus in infinitum, die Forscher der Begriffe (Philosophen) wollen an dessen statt nur den Ausdruck von einem progressus in indefinitum gelten lassen. Ohne mich bei der Prüfung der Bedenklichkeit, die diesen eine solche Unterscheidung angetragen hat, und dem guten oder fruchtbosen Gebrauch derselben aufzuhalten, will ich diese Begriffe in Beziehung auf meine Absicht genau zu bestimmen suchen.

Von einer geraden Linie kann man mit Recht sagen, sie könne ins Unendliche verlängert werden, und hier würde die Unterscheidung des Unendlichen und des unbestimmbar weiten Fortgangs (progressus in indefinitum) eine leere Subtilität sein. Denn, obgleich, wenn es heißt: ziehe eine Linie fort, es freilich richtiger lautet, wenn man hinzu setzt, in indefinitum; als wenn es heißt, in infinitum; weil das erstere nicht mehr bedeutet, als: verlängert sie so, weist ihr wollet, das zweite aber: ihr sollt niemals aufhören, sie zu verlängern. (welches hiebei eben nicht die Absicht ist): so ist doch, wenn nur vom Können die Rede ist, der ertere

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

Correct, for we can always make the line longer, without end. So is it in all cases in which we speak only of the progress, that is, of the advance from the condition to the conditioned: this possible advance proceeds, without end, in the series of appearances. From a given pair of parents the descending line of generation may proceed without end, and we can quite well regard the line as actually so continuing in the world.

For this case reason never requires an absolute totality of the series, since it does not presuppose that totality as a condition and as given (datum), but only as something conditioned, that allows of being given (dażaże), and is added to without end.

Quite otherwise is it with the problem: how far the regress extends, when it ascends in a series from something given as conditioned to its conditions. Can we say that the regress is in infinitum, or only that it is indeterminately far extended (in indefinitum)? Can we, for instance, ascend from the men now living, through the series of their ancestors, in infinitum; or can we only say that, so far as we have gone back, we have never met with an empirical ground for regarding the series as limited at any point, and that we are therefore justified and at the same time obliged, in the case of every ancestor, to search further for progenitors, though not indeed to presuppose them?

We answer: when the whole is given in empirical intuition, the regress in the series of its inner conditions proceeds in infinitum; but when a member only of the series is given, starting from which the regress has to proceed to absolute totality, the regress is only of indeterminate character (in indefinitum). Accordingly, the division of a body, that is, of a portion of matter given between certain limits, must be said to proceed in infinitum. For this matter is given as a whole, and therefore with all its possible parts, in empirical intuition. Since the condition of this whole is its part, and the condition of this part is the part of the part, and so on, and since in this regress of decomposition an unconditioned (indivisible) member of this series of conditions is never met with, not only is there never any empirical ground for stopping in the division, but the further members of any continued division are themselves empirically given prior to the continuation of the division. The division, that is to say, goes on in infinitum. On
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

the other hand, since the series of ancestors of any given man is not given in its absolute totality in any possible experience, the regress proceeds from every member in the series of generations to a higher member, and no empirical limit is encountered which exhibits a member as absolutely unconditioned. And since the members, which might supply the condition, are not contained in an empirical intuition of the whole, prior to the regress, this regress does not proceed in infinitum, by division of the given, but only indefinitely far, searching for further members additional to those that are given, and which are themselves again always given as conditioned.

In neither case, whether the regress be in infinitum or in indefinitum, may the series of conditions be regarded as being given as infinite in the object. The series are not things in themselves, but only appearances, which, as conditions of one another, are given only in the regress itself. The question, therefore, is no longer how great this series of conditions may be in itself, whether it be finite or infinite, for it is nothing in itself; but how we are to carry out the empirical regress, and how far we should continue it. Here we find an important distinction in regard to the rule governing such procedure. When the whole is empirically given, it is possible to proceed back in the series of its inner conditions in infinitum. When the whole is not given, but has first to be given through empirical regress, we can only say that the search for still higher conditions of the series is possible in infinitum. In the former case we could say: there are always more members, empirically given, than I can reach through the regress of decomposition; in the latter case, however, the position is this: we can always proceed still further in the regress, because no member is empirically given as absolutely unconditioned; and since a higher member is therefore always possible, the enquiry regarding it is necessary. In the one case we necessarily find further members of the series; in the other case, since no experience is absolutely limited, the necessity is that we enquire for them. For either we have no perception which sets an absolute limit to the empirical regress, in which case we must not regard the regress as completed, or we have a perception limiting our series, in which case the perception cannot be part of the series traversed (for that which limits must be distinct from that which is

Dagegen ist die Reihe der Voreltern zu einem gegebenen Menschen in keiner möglichen Erfahrung, in ihrer absoluten Totalität, gegeben, der Regressus aber geht doch von jedem Gliede; dieser Zeugung zu einem höheren, so, daß keine empirische Grenze anzutreffen ist, die ein Glied, als schlechtthin unbedingt, darstellte. Da aber gleichwohl auch die Glieder, die hiezü, die Bedingung abgeben könnten, nicht in der empirischen Anschauung des Ganzen schon vor dem Regressus liegen, so geht dieser nicht ins Unendliche (der Teilung des Gegebenen), sondern in unbestimmbar Weite, der Aufsuchung mehrerer Glieder zu den gegebenen, die wiederum jederzeit nur bedingt gegeben sind.

|| In keinem von beiden Fällen, sowohl dem regressus in infinitum, als dem in indefinitum, wird die Reihe der Bedingungen als unendlich im Objekt gegeben angesehen. Es sind nicht Dinge, die an sich selbst, sondern nur Erscheinungen, die, als Bedingungen von einander, nur im Regressus selbst gegeben werden. Also ist die Frage nicht mehr: wie groß diese Reihe der Bedingungen an sich selbst sei, ob endlich oder unendlich, denn sie ist nicht an sich selbst, sondern: wie wir den empirischen Regressus anstellen, und wie weit wir ihn fortsetzen sollen. Und da ist denn ein namhafter Unterschied in Ansehung der Regel dieses Fortschritts. Wenn das Ganze empirisch gegeben worden, so ist es möglich, ins Unendliche in der Reihe seiner inneren Bedingungen zurück zu gehen. Ist jenes aber nicht gegeben, sondern soll durch empirischen Regressus allersortem gegeben werden, so kann ich nur sagen: es ist ins Unendliche möglich, zu noch höheren Bedingungen der Reihe fortzugehen. Im ersteren Falle konnte ich sagen: es sind immer mehr Glieder da, und empirisch gegeben, als ich durch den Regressus (der Dekomposition) erreiche; im zweiten aber: ich kann im Regressus noch immer weiter gehen, weil kein Glied als schlechtthin unbedingt empirisch gegeben ist, und also noch immer ein höheres Glied als möglich und mithin die Nachfrage nach denselben als notwendig zuläßt. Dort war es notwendig, mehr Glieder der Reihe anzutreffen, hier aber ist es immer notwendig, nach mehreren zu fragen, weil keine Erfahrung absolut begrenzt. Denn ihr habt entweder keine Wahrnehmung, die euren empirischen Regressus schlechtthin begrenzt, und dann müßt ihr euren Regressus nicht vollendet halten, oder habt eine solche eure Reihe begrenzende Wahrnehmung, so kann diese nicht ein Teil eurer zurückgelegten Reihe sein (weil das was begrenzt, von dem, was dadurch begrenzt wird, unterschieden
thereby limited), and we must therefore continue our regress to this condition also, and the regress is thus again resumed.

These observations will be set in their proper light by their application in the following section.

THE ANTI-NOMY OF PURE REASON

Section 9

THE EMPIRICAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OF REASON, IN RESPECT OF ALL COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS

We have already, on several occasions, shown that no transcendental employment can be made of the pure concepts either of the understanding or of reason; that the assertion of absolute totality of the series of conditions in the sensible world rests on a transcendental employment of reason in which reason demands this unconditioned completeness from what it assumes to be a thing in itself; and that since the sensible world contains no such completeness, we are never justified in enquiring, as regards the absolute magnitude of the series in the sensible world, whether it be limited or in itself unlimited, but only how far we ought to go in the empirical regress, when we trace experience back to its conditions, obeying the rule of reason, and therefore resting content with no answer to its questions save that which is in conformity with the object.

What therefore alone remains to us is the validity of the principle of reason as a rule for the continuation and magnitude of a possible experience; its invalidity as a constitutive principle of appearances [viewed as things] in themselves has been sufficiently demonstrated. If we can keep these conclusions steadily in view, the self-conflict of reason will be entirely at an end. For not only will this critical solution destroy the illusion which set reason at variance with itself, but will replace it by teaching which, in correcting the misinterpretation that has been the sole source of the conflict, brings reason into agreement with itself. A principle which otherwise would be dialectical will thus be converted into a doctrinal principle. In fact, if this principle can be upheld as determining, in accordance

sein muß), und ihr müßt also euren Regressus auch zu dieser Bedingung weiter fortsetzen, und so fortan.

Der folgende Abschnitt wird diese Bemerkungen durch ihre Anwendung in ihr gehöriges Licht setzen.

DER ANTI-NOMIE DER REINEN VERNUNFT

NEUNTER ABSCHNITT

VON DEM EMPIRISCHEN GEBRAUCHE DES REGULATIVEN PRINZIPS DER VERNUNFT, IN ANSICHT ALLER KOSMOLOGISCHEN IDEEN

Da es, wie wir mehrmalen gezeigt haben, keinen transzendentalen Gebrauch, so wenig von reinem Verständes- als Vernunftbegriffen gibt, da die absolute Totalität der Reihen der Bedingungen in der Sinne der Welt sich lediglich auf einen transzendentalen Gebrauch der Vernunft fügt, welche diese unbedingte Vollständigkeit von demjenigen fordert, was sie als Ding an sich selbst voraussetzt; da die Welt aber dergleichen nicht enthält: so kann die Rede niemals mehr von der absoluten Größe der Reihen in derselben sein, ob sie begrenzt, oder an sich unbegrenzt sein mögen, sondern nur, wie weit wir im empirischen Regressus; bei Zurückführung der Erfahrung auf ihre Bedingungen, zurückgehen sollen, um nach der Regel der Vernunft bei keiner andern, als dem Gegenstand angemessenen Beantwortung der Fragen derselben stehen zu bleiben.

Es ist also nur die Gültigkeit des Vernunftprinzips, als einer Regel der Fortsetzung und Größe einer möglichen Erfahrung, die uns allein über die, nachdem seine Ungültigkeit, als eines konstitutiven Grundsatzes der Erscheinungen an sich selbst, hinfällig dargeboten werden. Auch wider, wenn wir jene ungezweifelt vor Augen legen können, der Streit der Vernunft mit sich selbst völlig endigt, indem nicht allein durch kritische Auflösung der Schein, der sie mit sich entzweit, aufgehoben worden, sondern an dessen Statt der Sinne, in welchem sie mit sich selbst zusammenstimmt und dessen Mißdeutung allein den Streit veranlaßte, aufgeschlossen, und ein sonst dialektischer Grundsatz in einen doktrinalen verwandelt wird.

In der Tat, wenn dieser, seiner subjektiven Bedeutung nach,
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

with its subjective significance, and yet also in conformity with the objects of experience, the greatest possible empirical use of understanding, the outcome will be much the same as if it were—what is impossible from pure reason—an axiom which determined a priori the objects in themselves. For only in proportion as the principle is effective in directing the widest possible empirical employment of the understanding, can it exercise, in respect of the objects of experience, any influence in extending and correcting our knowledge.

I

Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of the Appearances of a Cosmic Whole

Here, as in the other cosmological questions, the regulative principle of reason is grounded on the proposition that in the empirical regress we can have no experience of an absolute limit, that is, no experience of any condition as being one that empirically is absolutely unconditioned. The reason is this: such an experience would have to contain a limitation of appearances by nothing, or by the void, and in the continued regress we should have to be able to encounter this limitation in a perception—which is impossible.

This proposition, which virtually states that the only conditions which we can reach in the empirical regress are conditions which must themselves again be regarded as empirically conditioned, contains the rule in terminis, that however far we may have advanced in the ascending series, we must always enquire for a still higher member of the series, which may or may not become known to us through experience.

For the solution, therefore, of the first cosmological problem we have only to decide whether in the regress to the unconditioned magnitude of the universe, in time and space, this never limited ascent can be called a regress to infinity, or only an indeterminately continued regress (in indefinitum).

The quite general representation of the series of all past states of the world, as well as of all the things which coexist in cosmic space, is itself merely a possible empirical regress which I think to myself, though in an indeterminate manner. Only in this way can the concept of such a series of conditions

den größtmöglichen Verstandesgebrauch in der Erfahrung der Gegenständen derselben angemessen zu bestimmen, bewährt werden kann: so ist es gerade eben so viel, als ob || er wie ein Axiom (welches aus reiner Vernunft unmöglich ist) die Gegenstände an sich selbst a priori bestimmte; denn auch dieses könnte in Ansehung der Objekte der Erfahrung keinen größeren Einfluß auf die Erweiterung und Berichtigung unserer Erkenntnis haben, als daß es sich in dem ausgebreitetensten Erfahrungsgebrauche unseres Verstandes tätig beweise.

1. AUFLÖSUNG DER KOSMOLOGISCHEN IDEE VON DER TOTALITÄT DER ZUSAMMENSETZUNG DER ERScheinungen VON EINEM WeltGANZEN

So wohl hier, als bei den übrigen kosmologischen Fragen, ist der Grund des regulativen Prinzips der Vernunft der Satz: daß im empirischen Regressus keine Erfahrung von einer absoluten Grenze, mithin von keiner Bedingung, als einer solchen, die empirisch schlechthin unbedingt sei, angetroffen werden könne. Der Grund davon aber ist: daß eine dergleichen Erfahrung eine Begrenzung der Erscheinungen durch Nichts, oder das Leere, darauf der fortgeführte Regressus vermittelt; einer Wahrnehmung stoßen könnte, in sich enthalten müßte, welches unmöglich ist.


Nun ist zur Auflösung der ersten kosmologischen Auf gabe nichts weiter nötig, als noch auszumachen: ob in dem Regressus zu der unbedingten Größe des Weltganzen (der Zeit- und dem Raume nach) dieses niemals begrenzte Aufsteigen ein Rückgang ins Unendliche sei, oder eine unbestimmbar fortgesetzter Regressus (in indefinitum).

Die bloße allgemeine Vorstellung der Reihe aller vergangenen Weltzustände, imgleichen der Dinge, welche im Weltraume zugleich sind, ist selbst nichts anders, als ein möglicher empirischer Regressus, den ich mir, obzwar noch unbestimmt, denke, und wodurch der Begriff einer solchen Reihe von Bedingungen...
for a given perception arise at all. Now we have the cosmic whole only in concept, never, as a whole, in intuition. We cannot, therefore, argue from the magnitude of the cosmic whole to the magnitude of the regress, determining the latter in accordance with the former; on the contrary, only by reference to the magnitude of the empirical regress am I in a position to make for myself a concept of the magnitude of the world. But of this empirical regress the most that we can ever know is that from every given member of the series of conditions we have always still to advance empirically to a higher and more remote member. The magnitude of the whole of appearances is not thereby determined in any absolute manner; and we cannot therefore say that this regress proceeds to infinity. In doing so we should be anticipating members which the regress has not yet reached, representing their number as so great that no empirical synthesis could attain thereto, and so should be determining the magnitude of the world (although only negatively) prior to the regress—which is impossible. Since the world is not given me, in its totality, through any intuition, neither is its magnitude given me prior to the regress. We cannot, therefore, say anything at all in regard to the magnitude of the world, not even that there is in it a regress in infinitum. All that we can do is to seek for the concept of its magnitude according to the rule which determines the empirical regress in it. This rule says no more than that, however far we may have attained in the series of empirical conditions, we should never assume an absolute limit, but should subordinate every appearance, as conditioned, to another as its condition, and that we must advance to this condition. This is the regres in infinitum, which, as it determines no magnitude in the object, is clearly enough distinguishable from the regres in infinitum.

a This cosmic series can, therefore, be neither greater nor smaller than the possible empirical regress upon which alone its concept rests. And since this regress can yield neither a determinate infinite nor a determinate finite (that is, anything absolutely limited), it is evident that the magnitude of the world can be taken neither as finite nor as infinite. The regress, through which it is represented, allows of neither alternative.
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

I cannot say, therefore, that the world is \textit{infinite} in space or as regards past time. Any such concept of magnitude, as being that of a given infinitude, is empirically impossible, and therefore, in reference to the world as an object of the senses, also absolutely impossible. Nor can I say that the regress from a given perception to all that limits it in a series, whether in space or in past time, proceeds to \textit{infinity}; that would be to presuppose that the world has infinite magnitude. I also cannot say that the regress is \textit{finite}; an absolute limit is likewise empirically impossible. Thus I can say nothing regarding the whole object of experience, the world of sense; I must limit my assertions to the rule which determines how experience, in conformity with its object, is to be obtained and further extended.

Thus the first and negative answer to the cosmological problem regarding the magnitude of the world is that the world has no first beginning in time and no outermost limit in space.

For if we suppose the opposite, the world would be limited on the one hand by empty time and on the other by empty space. Since, however, as appearance, it cannot in itself be limited in either manner—appearance not being a thing in itself—these limits of the world would have to be given in a possible experience, that is to say, we should require to have a perception of limitation by absolutely empty time or space. But such an experience, as completely empty of content, is impossible. Consequently, an absolute limit of the world is impossible empirically, and therefore also absolutely.\footnote{It may be noted that this proof is presented in a very different manner from the dogmatic proof of the antithesis of the first antinomy. In that argument we regarded the sensible world, in accordance with the common and dogmatic view, as a thing given in itself, in its totality, prior to any regress; and we asserted that unless it occupies all time and all places, it cannot have any determinate position whatsoever in them. The conclusion also was therefore different from that given above; for in the dogmatic proof we inferred the actual infinity of the world.}

\textit{...}

...
This is equivalent to saying, however, that the sensible world has no absolute magnitude, the empirical regress (though which alone it can be given on the side of its conditions) has its own rule, namely, that it must always advance from every member of the series, as conditioned, to one still more remote; doing so by means either of our own experience, or of the guiding-thread of history, or of the chain of effects and causes. And as the rule further demands, our sole and constant aim must be the extension of the possible empirical employment of the understanding, this being the only proper task of reason in the application of its principles.

This rule does not prescribe a determinate empirical regress that must proceed without end in some one kind of appearance, e.g. that in proceeding from a living person through a series of progenitors we must never expect to meet with a first pair, or that in the series of cosmic bodies we must never admit an outermost sun. All that the rule requires is that the advance from appearances be to appearances; for even if these latter yield no actual perception (as is the case when for our consciousness they are too weak in degree to become experience), as appearances they none the less still belong to a possible experience.

All beginning is in time and all limits of the extended are in space. But space and time belong only to the world of sense. Accordingly, while appearances in the world are conditionally limited, the world itself is neither conditionally nor unconditionally limited.

Similarly, since the world can never be given as complete, and since even the series of conditions for which that is given as conditioned cannot, as a cosmic series, be given as complete, the concept of the magnitude of the world is given only through the regress and not in a collective intuition prior to it. But the regress consists only in the determining of the magnitude, and does not give any determinate concept. It does not, therefore, yield any concept of a magnitude which, in relation to a certain [unit-] measure, can be described as infinite. In other words, the regress does not proceed to the infinite, as if the infinite could be given, but only indeterminately far, in order [by means of the regress] to give that empirical magnitude which first becomes actual in and through this very regress.

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AUFLOSUNG: DER ERSTEN ANTIMOMIE


3. Eben um deswillen, und da die Welt niemals ganz, und selbst die Reihe der Bedingungen zu einem gegebenen Be- dingten nicht, als Welteihe, ganz gegeben werden kann, ist der Begriff von der Weltgröße nur durch den Re|gressus, und nicht vor demselben in einer kollektiven Anschauung gegeben. Jener besteht aber immer nur im Be- stimmen der Größe, und gibt also keinen bestimmten Begriff, also auch keinen Begriff von einer Größe, die in Ansehung eines gewissen Maßes unendlich wäre, geht also nicht ins Unendliche (gleichsam gegebene), sondern in un- bestimmte Weite, um eine Größe (der Erfahrung) zu geben, die allererst durch diesen Regressus wirklich wird.
II

Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of Division of a Whole given in Intuition

If we divide a whole which is given in intuition, we proceed from something conditioned to the conditions of its possibility. The division of the parts (subdivisio or decompositio) is a regress in the series of these conditions. The absolute totality of this series would be given only if the regress could reach simple parts. But if all the parts in a continuously progressing decomposition are themselves again divisible, the division, that is, the regress from the conditioned to its conditions, proceeds in infinitum. For the conditions (the parts) are themselves contained in the conditioned, and since this is given complete in an intuition that is enclosed between limits, the parts are one and all given together with the conditioned. The regress may not, therefore, be entitled merely a regress in indefinitum. This was permissible in regard to the first cosmological idea, since it required an advance from the conditioned to its conditions, which, as outside it, were not given through and along with it, but were first added to it in the empirical regress. We are not, however, entitled to say of a whole which is divisible to infinity, that it is made up of infinitely many parts. For although all parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, the whole division is not so contained, but consists only in the continuous decomposition, that is, in the regress itself, whereby the series first becomes actual. Since this regress is infinite, all the members or parts at which it arrives are contained in the given whole, viewed as an aggregate. But the whole series of the division is not so contained, for it is a successive infinite and never whole, and cannot, therefore, exhibit an infinite multiplicity, or any combination of an infinite multiplicity in a whole.

This general statement is obviously applicable to space. Every space intuited as within limits is such a whole, the parts of which, as obtained by decomposition, are always themselves spaces. Every limited space is therefore infinitely divisible.

From this a second application of the statement quite naturally follows, namely, to an outer appearance enclosed.
within limits, that is, to body. Its divisibility is grounded in the divisibility of space, which constitutes the possibility of the body as an extended whole. Body is therefore infinitely divisible, without consisting, however, of infinitely many parts.

It may seem, indeed, that a body, since it has to be represented in space as *substance*, will, as regards the law of the divisibility of space, differ from space. We may certainly grant that decomposition can never remove all compositeness from space; for that would mean that space, in which there is nothing self-subsistent, had ceased to be space, which is impossible. On the other hand, the assertion that if all compositeness of matter be thought away nothing at all will remain, does not appear to be compatible with the concept of a substance which is meant to be the subject of all compositeness, and which must persist in the elements of the composite, even although the connection in space, whereby they constitute a body, be removed. But while this is true of a thing in itself, as thought through a pure concept of the understanding, it does not hold of that which we entitle substance in the [field of] appearance. For this latter is not an absolute subject, but only an abiding image¹ of sensibility; it is nothing at all save as an intuition, in which unconditionedness is never to be met with.

But although this rule of progress *in infinitum* undoubtedly applies to the subdivision of an appearance, viewed as a mere filling of space, it cannot be made to apply to a whole in which already, as given, the parts are so definitely distinguished off from one another that they constitute a *quantum discretum*. We cannot assume that every part of an organised whole is itself again so organised that, in the analysis of the parts to infinity, still other organised parts* are always to be met with; in a word, that the whole is organised to infinity. This is not a thinkable hypothesis. It is true, indeed, that the parts of matter, [as found] in their decomposition *in infinitum*, may be organised. The infinitude of the division of a given appearance in space is grounded solely on the fact that, through this infinitude, only the divisibility (in itself, as regards the number of its parts, absolutely indeterminate) is given—the parts themselves being given and determined only through the subdivision. In a word, the whole is not in itself already divided. The number

¹ [beharrliches Bild.]
² [Kunstteile.]
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

of parts, therefore, which a division may determine in a whole, will depend upon how far we care to advance in the regress of the division. On the other hand, in the case of an organic body conceived as organised in infinitum the whole is represented as already divided into parts, and as yielding to us, prior to all regress, a determinate and yet infinite number of parts. This, however, is self-contradictory. This infinite involution is regarded as an infinite (that is, never to be completed) series, and yet at the same time as completed in a [discrete] complex. 1 Infinite divisibility belongs to appearance only in so far as it is a quantum continuum; it is inseparable from the occupation of space, which is indeed its ground. To view anything as being a quantum discretum, is to take the number of units in it as being determined, and therefore as being in every case equal to some number. How far organisation can go in an organised body, only experience can show; and although, so far as our experience has gone, we may not have arrived with certainty at any inorganic part, the possibility of experiencing such parts must at least be recognised. When, however, we have in mind the transcendental division of an appearance in general, the question how far it may extend does not await an answer from experience; it is decided by a principle of reason which prescribes that, in the decomposition of the extended, the empirical regress, in conformity with the nature of this appearance, be never regarded as absolutely completed.

Concluding Note on the Solution of the Mathematical-transcendental Ideas, and Preliminary Observation on the Solution of the Dynamical-transcendental Ideas.

In representing the antinomy of pure reason, through all the transcendental ideas, in tabular form, and in showing that the ground of this conflict and the only means of removing it is by declaring both the opposed assertions to be false, we have represented the conditions as, in all cases, standing to the conditioned in relations of space and time. This is the assumption ordinarily made by the common understanding, and to it the conflict is exclusively due. On this view all the dialectical representations of totality, in the series of conditions for a given conditioned, are throughout of the same character. The

1 [Zusammenfassung.]

SCHLUSSANMERKUNG UND VORBERINNERUNG

her die Teilung eine Menge in demselben bestimmen kann, die so weit geht, als man im Regressus der Teilung fort-
schreiten will. Dagegen wird bei einem ins Unendliche-ge-
gliederten organischen Körper || das Ganze eben durch die-
sen Begriff schon als eingeteilt vorgestellt; und eine an sich
selbst-bestimmte, aber unendliche Menge der Teile, vor
allem Regressus der Teilung, in ihm angetroffen, wodurch
man sich selbst widerspricht; indem diese unendliche Ein-
vickelung als eine niemals zu vollendende Reihe (unend-
lieh), und gleichwohl doch in einer Zusammennahme als
vollendet, angesehen wird. Die unendliche Teilung be-
zeichnet nur die Erscheinung als quantum continuum, und
ist von der Erfüllung des Raumes unzertrennlich; weil eben
in derselben der Grund der unendlichen Teilbarkeit liegt.
So bald aber etwas als quantum discretum angenommen
wird; so ist die Menge der Einheiten darin bestimmt; daher
auch jederzeit einer Zahl gleich. Wie weit also die Organisie-
 rung in einem gegliederten Körper gehen möge, kann nur
die Erfahrung ausmachen, und wenn sie gleich mit Gewiß-
heit zu keinem unorganischen Teil-gefang, so müssen
solche doch wenigstens in der möglich Erfahrung liegen.
Aber wie weit sich die transzendente Teilung einer Er-
scheinnung überhaupt erstrecke, ist gar keine Sache der Er-
fahrung, sondern ein Principium der Vernunft, den empi-
rischen Regressus, der in der Dekomposition des Ausgedehnten,
der Natur dieser Erscheinung gemäß, niemals für schlecht-
zen vollendet zu halten. ... * * *

|| SCHLUSSANMERKUNG ZUR AUFLOBUNG

DER MATHEMATISCH-TRANSZENDENTALEN,

UND VORBERINNERUNG ZUR AUFLOBUNG

DER DYNAMISCH-TRANSZENDENTALEN IDEEN.

Als wir die Antinomie der reinen Vernunft durch alle
transzendentalen Ideen in einer Tafel vorstellten, da den
Grund dieses Widerspricht und das einzige Mittel, ihn zu
heben, anzeigten, welches darin bestand, daß beide ent-
gegengesetzte Behauptungen für falsch erklärt wurden; so
haben wir ailenthalten die Bedingungen, als zu ihrem Be-
dingten, den Verhältnissen des Raumes und der Zeit ge-
hört, vorgestellt,welches die gewöhnliche Voraussetzung
des gemeinen Menschenverstandes ist, worauf denn auch
jener Widerstreit gänzlich beruhete. In dieser Rücksicht
waren auch alle dialektische Vorstellungen der Totalität,
in der Reihe der Bedingungen zu einem gegebenen Bedin-
gten, durch- und durch von gleicher Art. Es war immer
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

condition is always a member of a series along with the condi-
tioned, and so is *homogeneous* with it. In such a series
the regress was never thought as completed, or if it had to be
so thought, a member, in itself conditioned, must have been
falsely supposed to be a first member, and therefore to be
unconditioned; the object, that is, the conditioned, might not
always be considered merely according to its magnitude, but at
least the series of its conditions was so regarded. Thus arose the
difficulty—a difficulty which could not be disposed of by any
promise but solely by cutting the knot—that reason made
the series either too long or too short for the understanding, so
that the understanding could never be equal to the prescribed
idea.

But in all this we have been overlooking an essential distinc-
tion that obtains among the objects, that is, among those
concepts of understanding which reason endeavours to raise
to ideas. According to the table of categories given above, two
of these concepts imply a *mathematical*, the other two a
dynamical synthesis of appearances. Hitherto it has not been
necessary to take account of this distinction; for just as in the
general representation of all transcendental ideas we have
been conforming to conditions within the [field of] appearance,
so in the two mathematical-transcendental ideas the only
object we have had in mind is object as appearance. But now
that we are proceeding to consider how far dynamical con-
cepts of the understanding are adequate to the idea of reason,
the distinction becomes of importance, and opens up to us an
entirely new view of the suit in which reason is implicated.
This suit, in our previous trial of it, has been dismissed as
resting, on both sides, on false presuppositions. But since in
the dynamical antinomy a presupposition compatible with the
pretensions of reason may perhaps be found, and since the
judge may perhaps make good what is lacking in the pleas
which both sides have been guilty of misstating, the suit may
be settled to the satisfaction of both parties, a procedure im-
possible in the case of the mathematical antinomies.

If we consider solely the extension of the series of condi-
tions, and whether the series are adequate to the idea, or the
idea too large or too small for the series, the series are indeed in

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TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK

... eine Reihe, in welcher die Bedingung mit dem Bedingten,
as Glieder derselben, verknüpft und dadurch gleichartig
waren, daβ der Regressus niemals vollendet gedacht,
oder, wenn dieses geschehen sollte, ein an sich bedingtes
Glied fälschlich als ein erstes, mithin als unbedingt-ange-
nommen werden müßte. Es würde also zwingend nicht aller-
wärts das Objekt, d. i. das Bedingte, aber doch die Rei-
he der Bedingungen zu derselben, bloß ihrer Größe nach
erwogen, und da bestand die Schwierigkeit, die durch kei-
nen Vergleich, sondern durch gänzliche Abschneidung des
Knotens allein gehoben werden konnte, darin, daß die Ver-
nutzung es dem Verstande entweder zu lang oder zu kurz
macht, so daß dieser ihrer Idee niemals gleich kommen
konnte.

Wir haben aber hiebei einen wesentlichen Unterschied
übersehen; der unter den Objekten, d. i., den Verstandes-
begriffen herrscht, welche die Vernunft zu Ideen zu erheben
trachtet, da nämlich, nach unserer obigen Tafel der Kategorien,
zwei derselben mathematische, die zwei übrigen aber eine
dynamische Synthese der Erscheinungen be-
deuten. Bis hierher konnte dieses auch gar wohl geschehen,
indem, so wie wir in der allgemeinen Vorstellung aller trans-
zendenten Ideen immer nur unter Bedingungen in der
Erscheinung blieben, eben so auch in den beiden mathemati-
ischtranszendentalen keinen anderen Gegenstand als
den in der Erscheinung hatten. Jetzt aber, da wir zu dyna-
mischen Begriffen des Verstandes, sofern sie der Vernunft
ideen anpassen sollen, fortgehen, wird jene Unterscheidung
wichtig, und eröffnet uns eine ganz neue Aussicht in An-
sehung des Streitandes, darin die Vernunft verflochten ist,
und welcher, da er vorher, als auf beiderseits falsche Vor-
aussetzungen gebaut, abgewiesen worden, jetzt, da viel-
leicht in der dynamischen Antinomie eine solche Voraus-
setzung stattfindet, die mit der Prämisse der Vernunft
zusammenbestehen kann, aus diesem Gesichtspunkte,
und, da der Richter den Mangel der Rechtsgründe, die
man beiderseits verkannt hatte, ergänzt, zu beider Teile
Genutung verglichen werden können, welches sich
bei dem Streit in der mathematischen Antinomie nicht
tun ließ.

Die Reihen der Bedingungen sind freilich in so fern alle
gleichartig, als man lediglich auf die Erstreckung dessel-
ben sieht; ob sie der Idee angemessen sind, oder ob diese

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1 At. 380; B 387}
these respects all homogeneous. But the concept of the understanding, which underlies these ideas, may contain either a synthesis solely of the *homogeneous* (which is presupposed alike in the composition and in the division of every magnitude), or a synthesis of the *heterogeneous*. For the heterogeneous can be admitted as at least possible in the case of dynamical synthesis, alike in causal connection and in the connection of the necessary with the contingent.

Hence in the mathematical connection of the series of appearances no other than a *sensible* condition is admissible, that is to say, none that is not itself a part of the series. On the other hand, in the dynamical series of sensible conditions, a heterogeneous condition, not itself a part of the series, but *purely intelligible*, and as such outside the series, can be allowed. In this way reason obtains satisfaction and the unconditioned is set prior to the appearances, while yet the invariably conditioned character of the appearances is not obscured, nor their series cut short, in violation of the principles prescribed by the understanding.

Inasmuch as the dynamical ideas allow of a condition of appearances outside the series of the appearances, that is, a condition which is not itself appearance, we arrive at a conclusion altogether different from any that was possible in the case of the mathematical antinomy.\(^1\) In it we were obliged to denounce both the opposed dialectical assertions as false. In the dynamical series, on the other hand, the completely conditioned, which is inseparable from the series considered as appearances, is bound up with a condition which, while indeed empirically unconditioned, is also *non-sensible*. We are thus able to obtain satisfaction for understanding on the one hand and for *reason* on the other.\(^2\) The dialectical

\(^1\) Understanding does not admit among appearances any condition which can itself be empirically unconditioned. But if for some conditioned in the [field of] appearance we can conceive an *intelligible* condition, not belonging to the series of appearances as one of its members, and can do so without in the least interrupting the series of empirical conditions, such a condition may be accepted as *empirically unconditioned*, without prejudice to the continuity of the empirical regress.

\(^2\) [Reading, with Hartenstein, *der mathematischen Antinomie* vor der Antinomie.]

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Für jene zu groß, oder zu klein sein\(^1\). Allein der Verstandesbegriff, der dies den Ideen zum Grunde liegt, enthält entweder lediglich eine Synthese des Gleichartigen (welches bei jeder Größe, in der Zusammensetzung sowohl als Teilung derselben, vorausgesetzt wird), oder auch des Ungleichartigen, welches in der dynamischen Synthese, der Kausalverbindung so wohl, als der des Notwendigen mit dem Zufälligen, wenigstens zugelassen werden kann.

Daher kommt es, daß in der mathematischen Verknüpfung der Reihen der Erscheinungen keine andere als sinnliche Bedingung hinein kommen kann, d. i. eine solche, die selbst ein Teil der Reihe ist; da hingegen die dynamische Reihe sinnlicher Bedingungen—doch noch—eine ungleichartige Bedingung zuläßt, die nicht ein Teil der Reihe ist\(^2\), sondern, als bloß intelligibel, außer der Reihe liegt, wo durch denn der Vernunft ein Genüge getan und das Unbedingte den Erscheinungen vorgesetzt wird, ohne die Reihe der letzteren, als jederzeit-bedingt, dadurch zu verirren und, den Verstandesgrundsätzen zuwider, abzubrechen.

...Dadurch nun, daß die dynamischen Ideen eine Bedingung der Erscheinungen außer der Reihe derselben, d. i. eine solche, die selbst—nicht Erscheinung ist, zulassen, geschieht etwas, was von dem Erfolg der Antinomie gänzlich unterschieden ist. Diese nämlich verursachte, daß beide dialaktische Gegenbehaftungen für falsch erklärt werden mußten. Dagegen das Durchgängigbedingte der dynamischen Reihen, welches von ihnen als Erscheinungen unzertrennlich ist, mit der\(^3\) zwar empirisch unbedingt, aber auch nicht sinnlichen Bedingung verknüpft, dem Verstande

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\(^1\) Akad.-Ausz.: *sind*.

\(^2\) Zusatz von B.

\(^3\) Denn der Verstand erlaubt unter Erscheinungen keine Bedingung, die selbst—empirisch unbedingt wäre. Ließe sich aber eine intelligible Bedingung, die also nicht in die Reihe der Erscheinungen, als ein Glied, mit gehörte, zu einem Bedingten (in der Erscheinung) gedenken, ohne doch dadurch die Reihe empirischer Bedingungen im mindesten zu unterbrechen: so könnte eine solche als empirisch unbedingt zugelassen werden, so daß dadurch dem empirischen kontinuierlichen Regressus nirgend Abbruch geschähe.
arguments, which in one or other way sought unconditioned totality in mere appearances, fall to the ground, and the propositions of reason, when thus given this more correct interpretation, may both alike be true. This can never be the case with those cosmological ideas which refer only to a mathematically unconditioned unity; for in them no condition of the series of appearances can be found that is not itself appearance, and as appearance one of the members of the series.

III

Solution of the Cosmological Idea of Totality in the Derivation of Cosmical Events from their Causes

When we are dealing with what happens there are only two kinds of causality conceivable by us; the causality is either according to nature or arises from freedom. The former is the connection in the sensible world of one state with a preceding state on which it follows according to a rule. Since the causality of appearances rests on conditions of time, and the preceding state, if it had always existed, could not have produced an effect which first comes into being in time, it follows that the causality of the cause of that which happens or comes into being must itself also have come into being, and that in accordance with the principle of the understanding it must in its turn itself require a cause.

By freedom, on the other hand, in its cosmological meaning, I understand the power of beginning a state spontaneously. Such causality will not, therefore, itself stand under another cause determining it in time, as required by the law of nature. Freedom, in this sense, is a pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains nothing borrowed from experience, and which, secondly, refers to an object that cannot be determined or given in any experience. That everything which happens has a cause is a universal law, conditioning the very possibility of all experience. Hence the causality of the cause, which itself happens or comes to be, must itself in turn have a cause; and thus the entire field of experience, however far it may extend, is transformed into a sum-total of the merely natural. But since in this way no absolute totality of

1 [Reading, with Erdmann, Idee for Ideen.] 2 [vom selbst.]
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

conditions determining causal relation can be obtained, reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity which can begin to act of itself, without requiring to be determined to action by an antecedent cause in accordance with the law of causality.

It should especially be noted that the practical concept of freedom is based on this transcendental idea, and that in the latter lies the real source of the difficulty by which the question of the possibility of freedom has always been beset.

Freedom in the practical sense is the will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses. For a will is sensuous, in so far as it is pathologically affected, i.e. by sensuous motives, it is animal (arbitrium brutum), if it can be pathologically necessitated. The human will is certainly an arbitrium sensitivum, not, however, brutum but liberum. For sensibility does not necessitate its action. There is in man a power of self-determination, independently of any coercion through sensuous impulses.

Obviously, if all causality in the sensible world were mere nature, every event would be determined by another in time, in accordance with necessary laws. Appearances, in determining the will, would have in the actions of the will their natural effects, and would render the actions necessary. The denial of transcendental freedom must, therefore, involve the elimination of all practical freedom. For practical freedom presupposes that although something has not happened, it ought to have happened, and that its cause, as found in the field of appearance, is not, therefore, so determining that it excludes a causality of our will—a causality which, independently of those natural causes, and even contrary to their force and influence, can produce something that is determined in the time-order in accordance with empirical laws, and which can therefore begin a series of events entirely of itself.

Here then, as always happens when reason, in venturing beyond the limits of possible experience, comes into conflict with itself, the problem is not really physiological but transcendental. The question as to the possibility of freedom does indeed concern psychology; since it rests on dialectical arguments of pure reason, its treatment and solution belong exclusively to transcendental philosophy. Before attempting

\[\text{[Willkür]}\]

\[\text{[Bewegursachen]}\]
this solution, a task which transcendental philosophy cannot decline, I must define somewhat more accurately the procedure of transcendental philosophy in dealing with the problem.

If appearances were things in themselves, and space and time forms of the existence of things in themselves, the conditions would always be members of the same series as the conditioned; and thus, in the present case, as in the other transcendental ideas, the antinomy would arise, that the series must be too large or too small for the understanding. But the dynamical concepts of reason, with which we have to deal in this and the following section, possess this peculiarity that they are not concerned with an object considered as a magnitude, but only with its existence. Accordingly we can abstract from the magnitude of the series of conditions, and consider only the dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned. The difficulty which then meets us, in dealing with the question regarding nature and freedom, is whether freedom is possible at all, and if it be possible, whether it can exist along with the universality of the natural law of causality. Is it a truly disjunctive proposition to say that every effect in the world must arise either from nature or from freedom; or must we not rather say that in one and the same event, in different relations, both can be found? That all events in the sensible world stand in thorough-going connection in accordance with unchangeable laws of nature is an established principle of the Transcendental Analytic, and allows of no exception. The question, therefore, can only be whether freedom is completely excluded by this inviolable rule, or whether an effect, notwithstanding its being thus determined in accordance with nature, may not at the same time be grounded in freedom. The common but fallacious presupposition of the absolute reality of appearances here manifests its injurious influence, to the confounding of reason. For if appearances are things in themselves, freedom cannot be upheld. Nature will then be the complete and sufficient determining cause of every event. The condition of the event will be such as can be found only in the series of appearances; both it and its effect will be necessary in accordance with the law of nature. If, on the other hand, appearances are not taken for more than they actually are; if they are viewed not as things in themselves, but merely as representations, connected accord-
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

ing to empirical laws, they must themselves have grounds which are not appearances. The effects of such an intelligible cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through other appearances, but its causality is not so determined. While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together with its causality, is outside the series. Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature. This distinction, when stated in this quite general and abstract manner, is bound to appear extremely subtle and obscure, but will become clear in the course of its application. My purpose has only been to point out that since the thorough-going connection of all appearances, in a context of nature, is an inexorable law, the inevitable consequence of obstinately insisting upon the reality of appearances is to destroy all freedom. Those who thus follow the common view have never been able to reconcile nature and freedom.

Possibility of Causality through Freedom, in Harmony with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity.

Whatever in an object of the senses is not itself appearance, I entitle intelligible. If, therefore, that which in the sensible world must be regarded as appearance has in itself a faculty which is not an object of sensible intuition, but through which it can be the cause of appearances, the causality of this being can be regarded from two points of view. Regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, it is intelligible in its action; regarded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is sensible in its effects. We should therefore have to form both an empirical and an intellectual concept of the causality of the faculty of such a subject, and to regard both as referring to one and the same effect. This twofold manner of conceiving the faculty possessed by an object of the senses does not contradict any of the concepts which we have to form of appearances and of a possible experience. For since they are not things in themselves, they must rest upon a transcendental object which determines them as mere representations; and consequently there is nothing to prevent us from ascribing to this transcendental


MÖGLICHKEIT DER KAUSALITÄT DURCH FREIHEIT.

Ich nenne dasjenige an einem Gegenstande der Sinne, was selbst nicht Erscheinung ist, intelligibele. Wenn denn nach denjenigen, was in der Sinnenwelt als Erscheinung angesehen werden muß, an sich selbst auch ein Vermögen hat, welches kein Gegenstand der sinnlichen Anschauung ist, wodurch es aber doch die Ursahe von Erscheinungen sein kann: so kann man die Kausalität dieses Wesens auf zwei Seiten betrachten, als intelligibele nach ihrer Handlung, als eines Dinges an sich selbst, und als sensible, nach den Wirkungen derselben, als einer Erscheinung in der Sinnenwelt. Wir würden uns demnach von dem Vermögen eines solchen Subjekts einen empirischen, ungleichen auch einen intellektuellen Begriff seiner Kausalität machen, welche bei einer und derselben Wirkung zusammenstehen. Eine solche doppelte Seite, das Vermögen eines Gegenstandes der Sinne, sich zu denken, widerspricht keiner von den Begriffen, die wir uns von Erscheinungen und von einer möglichen Erfahrung zu machen haben. Denn, da diesen, weil sie an sich keine Dinge sind, ein transcendentaler Gegenstand zum Grunde liegen muß, der sie als bloße Vorstellungen bestimmt, so hindert nichts, daß wir diesem
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

object, besides the quality in terms of which it appears, a causality which is not appearance, although its effect is to be met with in appearance. Every efficient cause must have a character, that is, a law of its causality, without which it would not be a cause. On the above supposition, we should, therefore, in a subject belonging to the sensible world have, first, an empirical character, whereby its actions, as appearances, stand in thoroughgoing connection with other appearances in accordance with unvarying laws of nature. And since these actions can be derived from the other appearances, they constitute together with them a single series in the order of nature. Secondly, we should also have to allow the subject an intelligible character, by which it is indeed the cause of those same actions [in their quality] as appearances, but which does not itself stand under any conditions of sensibility, and is not itself appearance. We can entitle the former character of the thing in the [field of] appearance, and the latter its character as thing in itself.

Now this acting subject would not, in its intelligible character, stand under any conditions of time; time is only a condition of appearances, not of things in themselves. In this subject no action would begin or cease, and it would not, therefore, have to conform to the law of the determination of all that is alterable in time, namely, that everything which happens must have its cause in the appearances which precede it. In a word, its causality, so far as it is intelligible, would not have a place in the series of those empirical conditions through which the event is rendered necessary in the world of sense. This intelligible character can never, indeed, be immediately known, for nothing can be perceived except in so far as it appears. It would have to be thought in accordance with the empirical character—just as we are constrained to think a transcendental object as underlying appearances, though we know nothing of what it is in itself.

In its empirical character, therefore, this subject, as appearance, would have to conform to all the laws of causal determination. To this extent it could be nothing more than a part of the world of sense, and its effects, like all other

1 [dadurch] 2 [Charakter]


Dieses handelnde Subjekt würde nun, nach seinem intelligiblen Charakter, unter keinen Zeitbedingungen stehen, denn die Zeit ist nur die Bedingung der Erscheinungen, nicht aber der Dinge an sich selbst. In ihm würde keine Handlung entstehen oder vergehen, mitin würde es auch nicht dem Gesetze aller Zeitbestimmung, alles Veränderlichen unterworfen sein. Das alles, was geschehe, in den Erscheinungen (des vorigen Zustandes) seine Ursache antrete. Mit einem Worte, die Kausalität desselben, sofern sie intellektuell ist, stände gar nicht in der Reihe empirischer Bedingungen, welche die Begebenheit in der Sinnenwelt notwendig machen. Dieser intelligibele Charakter könnte zwar niemals unmittelbar gekannt werden, weil wir nichts wahrnehmen können, als sofern es erscheint, aber er würde dem empirischen Charakter gemäß gedacht werden müssen, so wie wir überhaupt einen transzendentalen Gegenstand der Erscheinungen in Gedanken zum Grunde legen müssen, ob wir von ihm wissen, was er an sich selbst sei, nichts wissen.

Nach seinem empirischen Charakter würde also dieses Subjekt, als Erscheinung, allen Gesetzen der Bestimmung nach, der Kausalverbindung unterworfen sein, und es wäre so fern nichts, als ein Teil der Sinnenwelt, dessen Wirkun-
appearances, must be the inevitable outcome of nature. In proportion as outer appearances are found to influence it, and in proportion as its empirical character, that is, the law of its causality, becomes known through experience, all its actions must admit of explanation in accordance with the laws of nature. In other words, all that is required for their complete and necessary determination must be found in a possible experience.

In its intelligible character (though we can only have a general concept of that character) this same subject must be considered to be free from all influence of sensibility and from all determination through appearances. Inasmuch as it is noumenon, nothing happens in it; there can be no change requiring dynamical determination in time, and therefore no causal dependence upon appearances. And consequently, since natural necessity is to be met with only in the sensible world, this active being must in its actions be independent of, and free from all such necessity. No action begins in this active being itself; but we may yet quite correctly say that the active being of itself begins its effects in the sensible world. In so doing, we should not be asserting that the effects in the sensible world can begin of themselves; they are always predetermined through antecedent empirical conditions, though solely through their empirical character (which is no more than the appearance of the intelligible), and so are only possible as a continuation of the series of natural causes. In this way freedom and nature, in the full sense of these terms, can exist together, without any conflict, in the same actions, according as the actions are referred to their intelligible or to their sensible cause.

Explanation of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in its connection with Universal Natural Necessity.

I have thought it advisable to give this outline sketch of the solution of our transcendental problem, so that we may be the better enabled to survey the course which reason has to adopt in arriving at the solution. I shall now proceed to set forth the various factors involved in this solution, and to consider each in detail.

That everything which happens has a cause, is a law of nature. Since the causality of this cause, that is, the action of gen, so wie jede andere Erscheinung, aus der Natur unausbleiblich abzufallen. So wie äußere Erscheinungen in dasselbe einflossen, wie sein empirischer Charakter, d. i. das Gesetz seiner Kausalität, durch Erfahrung erkannt wäre, müßten sich alle seine Handlungen nach Naturgesetzen erklären lassen, und alle Requisite zu einer vollkommenen und notwendigen Bestimmung derselben müßten in einer möglichen Erfahrung angetroffen werden.

Nach dem intelligiblen Charakter desselben aber (ob wir zwar davon nichts als bloß den allgemeinen Begriff desselben haben können) würde dasselbe Subjekt dennoch von allem Einfluße der Sinnlichkeit und Bestimmung durch Erscheinungen freigesprochen werden müssen, und da in ihm, so fern es Noumenon ist, nichts geschieht, keine Veränderung, welche dynamische Zeitbestimmung erheischt, mithin keine Verknüpfung mit Erscheinungen als Ursachen angetroffen wird, so würde dieses tätige Wesen, so fern in seinen Handlungen von aller Naturnotwendigkeit, als die lediglich in der Sinnenwelt angetroffen wird, unabhängig und frei sein. Man würde von ihm ganz richtig sagen, daß es seine Wirkungen in der Sinnenwelt von selbst anfange, ohne daß die Handlung in ihm selbst anfänge; und dieses würde gültig sein, ohne daß die Wirkungen in der Sinnenwelt darum von selbst anfangen dürften, weil sie in derselben jederzeit durch empirische Bedingungen in der vorigen Zeit, aber doch nur vermittelt durch einen allegeminen Charakters (der bloß die Erscheinung des intelligiblen ist), vorher bestimmt, und nur als eine Fortsetzung der Reihe der Naturursachen möglich sind. So würde dem Freiheit und Natur, jedes in seiner vollständigen Bedeutung, bei oben derselben Handlungen, nachdem man sie mit ihrer intelligiblen oder sensiblen Ursache vergleicht, zugleich und ohne allen Widerstreit angetroffen werden. 1 A: bestimmt sein und...
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

the cause, is antecedent in time to the effect which has ensued upon it, it cannot itself have always existed, but must have happened, and among the appearances must have a cause by which it in turn is determined. Consequently, all events are empirically determined in an order of nature. Only in virtue of this law can appearances constitute a nature and become objects of experience. This law is a law of the understanding, from which no departure can be permitted, and from which no appearance may be exempted. To allow such exemption would be to set an appearance outside all possible experience, to distinguish it from all objects of possible experience, and so to make of it a mere thought-entity, a phantom of the brain.

This would seem to imply the existence of a chain of causes which in the regress to their conditions allows of no absolute totality. But that need not trouble us. The point has already been dealt with in the general discussion of the antinomy into which reason falls when in the series of appearances it proceeds to the unconditioned. Were we to yield to the illusion of transcendental realism, neither nature nor freedom would remain. The only question here is this—admitting that in the whole series of events there is nothing but natural necessity, is it yet possible to regard one and the same event as being in one aspect merely an effect of nature and in another aspect an effect due to freedom; or is there between these two kinds of causality a direct contradiction?

Among the causes in the [field of] appearance there certainly cannot be anything which could begin a series absolutely and of itself. Every action, [viewed] as appearance, in so far as it gives rise to an event, is itself an event or happening, and presupposes another state wherein its cause is to be found. Thus everything which happens is merely a continuation of the series, and nothing that begins of itself is a possible member of the series. The actions of natural causes in the time-sequence are thus themselves effects; they presuppose causes antecedent to them in the temporal series. An original act, such as can by itself bring about what did not exist before, is not to be looked for in the causally connected appearances.

Now granting that effects are appearances and that their cause is likewise appearance, is it necessary that the causality of their cause should be exclusively empirical? May it not...
rather be, that while for every effect in the [field of] appearance a connection with its cause in accordance with the laws of empirical causality is indeed required, this empirical causality, without the least violation of its connection with natural causes, is itself an effect of a causality that is not empirical but intelligible? This latter causality would be the action of a cause which, in respect of appearances, is original, and therefore, as pertaining to this faculty, not appearance but intelligible; although it must otherwise, in so far as it is a link in the chain of nature, be regarded as entirely belonging to the world of sense.

The principle of the causal connection of appearances is required in order that we may be able to look for and to determine the natural conditions of natural events, that is to say, their causes in the [field of] appearance. If this principle be admitted, and be not weakened through any exception, the requirements of the understanding, which in its empirical employment sees in all happenings nothing but nature, and is justified in so doing, are completely satisfied; and physical explanations may proceed on their own lines without interference. These requirements are not in any way infringed, if we assume, even though the assumption should be a mere fiction, that some among the natural causes have a faculty which is intelligible only, inasmuch as its determination to action never rests upon empirical conditions, but solely on grounds of understanding. We must, of course, at the same time be able to assume that the action of these causes in the [field of] appearance is in conformity with all the laws of empirical causality. In this way the acting subject, as *causa phaenomenon*, would be bound up with nature through the indissoluble dependence of all its actions, and only as we ascend from the empirical object to the transcendental should we find that this subject, together with all its causality in the [field of] appearance, has in its *noumenon* certain conditions which must be regarded as purely intelligible. For if in determining in what ways appearances can serve as causes we follow the rules of nature, we need not concern ourselves what kind of ground for these appearances and their connection may have to be thought as existing in the transcendental subject, which is empirically

[Reading, with Hartenstein, *noumenon* for *phaenomenon*.]
unknown to us. This intelligible ground does not have to be considered in empirical enquiries; it concerns only thought in the pure understanding; and although the effects of this thought and action of the pure understanding are to be met with in the appearances, these appearances must none the less be capable of complete causal explanation in terms of other appearances in accordance with natural laws. We have to take their strictly empirical character as the supreme ground of explanation, leaving entirely out of account their intelligible character (that is, the transcendental cause of their empirical character) as being completely unknown, save in so far as the empirical serves for its sensible sign.

Let us apply this to experience. Man is one of the appearances of the sensible world, and in so far one of the natural causes the causality of which must stand under empirical laws. Like all other things in nature, he must have an empirical character. This character we come to know through the powers and faculties which he reveals in his actions. In lifeless, or merely animal, nature we find no ground for thinking that any faculty is conditioned otherwise than in a merely sensible manner. Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception, and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object. We entitle these faculties understanding and reason. The latter, in particular, we distinguish in a quite peculiar and especial way from all empirically conditioned powers. For it views its objects exclusively in the light of ideas, and in accordance with them determines the understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own similarly pure concepts.

That our reason has causality, or that we at least represent it to ourselves as having causality, is evident from the imperatives which in all matters of conduct we impose as rules upon our active powers. 'Ought' expresses a kind of necessity and of connection with grounds which is found nowhere else in the
whole of nature. The understanding can know in nature only what is, what has been, or what will be. We cannot say that anything in nature ought to be other than what in all these time-relations it actually is. When we have the course of nature alone in view, 'ought' has no meaning whatsoever. It is just as absurd to ask what ought to happen in the natural world as to ask what properties a circle ought to have. All that we are justified in asking is: what happens in nature? what are the properties of the circle?

This 'ought' expresses a possible action the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept; whereas in the case of a merely natural action the ground must always be an appearance. The action to which the 'ought' applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions. These conditions, however, do not play any part in determining the will itself, but only in determining the effect and its consequences in the [field of] appearance. No matter how many natural grounds or how many sensitive impulses may impel me to will, they cannot give rise to the 'ought', but only to a willing which, while very far from being necessary, is always conditioned; and the 'ought' pronounced by reason confronts such willing with a limit and an end—nay more, forbids or authorises it. Whether what is willed be an object of mere sensibility (the pleasant) or of pure reason (the good), reason will not give way to any ground which is empirically given. Reason does not here follow the order of things as they present themselves in appearance, but frames for itself with perfect spontaneity an order of its own according to ideas, to which it adapts the empirical conditions, and according to which it declarers actions to be necessary, even although they have never taken place, and perhaps never will take place. And at the same time reason also presupposes that it can have causality in regard to all these actions, since otherwise no empirical effects could be expected from its ideas.

Now, in view of these considerations, let us take our stand, and regard it as at least possible for reason to have causality with respect to appearances. Reason though it be, it must none the less exhibit an empirical character. For every cause presupposes a rule according to which certain appearances follow as effects; and every rule requires uniformity in the effects. This uniformity is, indeed, that upon which the
concept of cause (as a faculty) is based, and so far as it must be exhibited by mere appearances may be named the empirical character of the cause. This character is permanent, but its effects, according to variation in the concomitant and in part limiting conditions, appear in changeable forms.

Thus the will of every man has an empirical character, which is nothing but a certain causality of his reason, so far as that causality exhibits, in its effects in the [field of] appearance, a rule from which we may gather what, in their kind and degrees, are the actions of reason and the grounds thereof, and so may form an estimate concerning the subjective principles of his will. Since this empirical character must itself be discovered from the appearances which are its effect and from the rule to which experience shows them to conform, it follows that all the actions of men in the [field of] appearance are determined in conformity with the order of nature, by their empirical character and by the other causes which cooperate with that character; and if we could exhaustively investigate all the appearances of men's wills, there would not be found a single human action which we could not predict with certainty, and recognise as proceeding necessarily from its antecedent conditions. So far, then, as regards this empirical character there is no freedom; and yet it is only in the light of this character that man can be studied—if, that is to say, we are simply observing, and in the manner of anthropology seeking to institute a physiological investigation into the motive causes of his actions.

But when we consider these actions in their relation to reason—I do not mean speculative reason, by which we endeavour to explain their coming into being, but reason in so far as it is itself the cause producing them—if, that is to say, we compare them with [the standards of] reason in its practical bearing, we find a rule and order altogether different from the order of nature. For it may be that all that has happened in the course of nature, and in accordance with its empirical grounds must inevitably have happened, ought not to have happened. Sometimes, however, we find, or at least believe that we find, that the ideas of reason have in actual fact proved their causality in respect of the actions of men, as appearances; and that these actions have taken place, not because they were
determined by empirical causes, but because they were determined by grounds of reason.

Granted, then, that reason may be asserted to have causality in respect of appearance, its action can still be said to be free, even although its empirical character (as a mode of sense\(^1\)) is completely and necessarily determined in all its detail. This empirical character is itself determined in the intelligible character (as a mode of thought\(^2\)). The latter, however, we do not know; we can only indicate its nature by means of appearances; and these really yield an immediate knowledge only of the mode of sense, the empirical character.\(^*\) The action, in so far as it can be ascribed to a mode of thought as its cause, does not follow therefrom in accordance with empirical laws; that is to say, it is not preceded by the conditions of pure reason, but only by their effects in the field of appearance of inner sense. Pure reason, as a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of time, nor consequently to the conditions of succession in time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character does not, in producing an effect, arise or begin to be at a certain time. For in that case it would itself be subject to the natural law of appearances, in accordance with which causal series are determined in time; and its causality would then be nature, not freedom. Thus all that we are justified in saying is that, if reason can have causality in respect of appearances, it is a faculty through which the sensible condition of an empirical series of effects first begins. For the condition which lies in reason is not sensible, and therefore does not itself begin to be. And thus what we failed to find in any empirical series is disclosed as being possible, namely, that the condition of a successive series of events may itself be empirically unconditioned. For

\(^*\) The real morality of actions, their merit or guilt, even that of our own conduct, thus remains entirely hidden from us. Our imputations can refer only to the empirical character. How much of this character is ascribable to the pure effect of freedom, how much to mere nature, that is, to faults of temperament for which there is no responsibility, or to its happy constitution (merito fortunae), can never be determined; and upon it therefore no perfectly just judgments can be passed.

\(^{1}\) [Sinnesart.]

\(^{2}\) [Denkungsart.]
here the condition is outside the series of appearances (in the intelligible), and therefore is not subject to any sensible condition, and to no time-determination through an antecedent cause.

The same cause does, indeed, in another relation, belong to the series of appearances. Man is himself an appearance. His will has an empirical character, which is the empirical cause of all his actions. There is no condition determining man in accordance with this character which is not contained in the series of natural effects, or which is not subject to their law—the law according to which there can be no empirically unconditioned causality of that which happens in time. Therefore no given action (since it can be perceived only as appearance) can begin absolutely of itself. But of pure reason we cannot say that the state wherein the will is determined is preceded and itself determined by some other state. For since reason is not itself an appearance, and is not subject to any conditions of sensibility, it follows that even as regards its causality there is in it no time-sequence, and that the dynamical law of nature, which determines succession in time in accordance with rules, is not applicable to it.

Reason is the abiding condition of all those actions of the will under [the guise of] which man appears. Before ever they have happened, they are one and all predetermined in the empirical character. In respect of the intelligible character, of which the empirical character is the sensible schema, there can be no before and after; every action, irrespective of its relation in time to other appearances, is the immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason. Reason therefore acts freely; it is not dynamically determined in the chain of natural causes through either outer or inner grounds antecedent in time. This freedom ought not, therefore, to be conceived only negatively as independence of empirical conditions. The faculty of reason, so regarded, would cease to be a cause of appearances. It must also be described in positive terms, as the power of originating a series of events. In reason itself nothing begins; as unconditioned condition of every voluntary act, it admits of no conditions antecedent to itself in time. Its effect has, indeed, a beginning in the series of appearances, but never in this series an absolutely first beginning.
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

In order to illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an example of its empirical employment—not, however, to confirm it, for it is useless to endeavour to prove transcendental propositions by examples—let us take a voluntary action, for example, a malicious lie by which a certain confusion has been caused in society. First of all, we endeavour to discover the motives to which it has been due, and then, secondly, in the light of these, we proceed to determine how far the action and its consequences can be imputed to the offender. As regards the first question, we trace the empirical character of the action to its sources, finding these in defective education, bad company, in part also in the viciousness of a natural disposition insensitive to shame, in levity and thoughtlessness, not neglecting to take into account also the occasional causes that may have intervened. We proceed in this enquiry just as we should in ascertaining for a given natural effect the series of its determining causes. But although we believe that the action is thus determined, we none the less blame the agent, not indeed on account of his unhappy disposition, nor on account of the circumstances that have influenced him, nor even on account of his previous way of life; for we presuppose that we can leave out of consideration what this way of life may have been, that we can regard the past series of conditions as not having occurred and the act as being completely unconditioned by any preceding state, just as if the agent in and by himself began in this action an entirely new series of consequences. Our blame is based on a law of reason whereby we regard reason as a cause that irrespective of all the above-mentioned empirical conditions could have determined, and ought to have determined, the agent to act otherwise. This causality of reason we do not regard as only a co-operating agency, but as complete in itself, even when the sensuous impulses do not favour but are directly opposed to it; the action is ascribed to the agent's intelligible character; in the moment when he uttersthe lie, the guilt is entirely his. Reason, irrespective of all empirical conditions of the act, is completely free, and the lie is entirely due to its default.

Such imputation clearly shows that we consider reason to be unaffected by these sensible influences, and not liable to alteration. Its appearances—the modes in which it manifests
itself in its effects—do alter; but in itself [so we consider] there is no preceding state determining the state that follows. That is to say, it does not belong to the series of sensible conditions which render appearances necessary in accordance with laws of nature. Reason is present in all the actions of men at all times and under all circumstances, and is always the same; but it is not itself in time, and does not fall into any new state in which it was not before. In respect to new states, it is determining, not determinable. We may not, therefore, ask why reason has not determined itself differently, but only why it has not through its causality determined the appearances differently. But to this question no answer is possible. For a different intelligible character would have given a different empirical character. When we say that in spite of his whole previous course of life the agent could have refrained from lying, this only means that the act is under the immediate power of reason, and that reason in its causality is not subject to any conditions of appearance or of time. Although difference of time makes a fundamental difference to appearances in their relations to one another—for appearances are not things in themselves and therefore not causes in themselves—it can make no difference to the relation in which the action stands to reason.

Thus in our judgments in regard to the causality of free actions, we can get as far as the intelligible cause, but not beyond it. We can know that it is free, that is, that it is determined independently of sensibility, and that in this way it may be the sensibly unconditioned condition of appearances. But to explain why in the given circumstances the intelligible character should give just these appearances and this empirical character transcends all the powers of our reason, indeed all its rights of questioning, just as if we were to ask why the transcendent object of our outer sensible intuition gives intuition in space only and not some other mode of intuition. But the problem which we have to solve does not require us to raise any such questions. Our problem was this only: whether freedom and natural necessity can exist without conflict in one and the same action; and this we have sufficiently answered. We have shown that since freedom may stand in relation to a quite different kind of conditions from those of natural necessity, the law of the latter does not affect the former, and that both
may exist, independently of one another and without interfering with each other.

The reader should be careful to observe that in what has been said our intention has not been to establish the reality of freedom as one of the faculties which contain the cause of the appearances of our sensible world. For that enquiry, as it does not deal with concepts alone, would not have been transcendental. And further, it could not have been successful, since we can never infer from experience anything which cannot be thought in accordance with the laws of experience. It has not even been our intention to prove the possibility of freedom. For in this also we should not have succeeded, since we cannot from mere concepts a priori know the possibility of any real ground and its causality. Freedom is here being treated only as a transcendental idea whereby reason is led to think that it can begin the series of conditions in the [field of] appearance by means of the sensibly unconditioned, and so becomes involved in an antinomy with those very laws which it itself prescribes to the empirical employment of the understanding. What we have alone been able to show, and what we have alone been concerned to show, is that this antinomy rests on a sheer illusion, and that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature.

IV

Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence of Appearances as regards their Existence in General

In the preceding subsection we have considered the changes of the sensible world in so far as they form a dynamical series, each member being subordinate to another as effect to cause. We shall now employ this series of states merely to guide us in our search for an existence that may serve as the supreme condition of all that is alterable, that is, in our search for necessary being. We are concerned here, not with unconditioned causality, but with the unconditioned existence of substance itself. The series which we have in

506

TRANSZENTENTALE DIALEKTIK

nicht abzifizieren, mithin beide von einander unabhängig und durch einander ungestört stattfinden können.

Man muß wohl bemerken: daß wir hiedurch nicht die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit, als eines der Vermögen, welche die Ursache von den Erscheinungen unserer Sin

nenwelt enthalten, haben darten wollen. Denn, außer daß dieses gar keine transzendentale Betrachtung, die bloß mit Begriffen zu tun hat, gewesen sein würde, so könnte es auch nicht gelingen, indem wir aus der Erfahrung niemals auf etwas, was gar nicht nach Erfahrungsgesetzen gedacht werden muß, schließen können. Ferner haben wir auch gar nicht einmal die Möglichkeit der Freiheit beweisen wollen; denn dieses wäre auch nicht gelungen, weil wir überhaupt von keinem Realgrunde und keiner Kausalität, aus bloßen Begriffen a priori, die Möglichkeit erkennen können. Die Freiheit wird hier nur als transzendentale Idee behandelt, wodurch die Vernunft die Reihe der Bedingungen in der Erscheinung durch das Sinnliche unbedingte schlechthin anzuheben denkt, dabei sich aber in eine Antinomie mit ihren eigenen Gesetzen, welche sie dem empirischen Ge

brauche des Verstandes vorschreibt, verwickelt. Daß nun diese Antinomie auf einem bloßen Scheine beruhe, und, daß Natur der Kausalität aus Freiheit wenigstens nicht widerstreite, das war das einzige, was wir leisten konnten, und woran es uns auch einzig und allein gelegen war.

III. AUFLOSLUNG DER KOSMOSLOGISCHEN IDEE VON DER TOTALITAT

DER ABHANGIGKEIT DER ERScheinungen, IHREM DASEIN NACH UBERHAUPT

In der vorigen Nummer betrachteten wir die Veränderungen der Sinnenwelt in ihrer dynamischen Reihe, da eine jede unter einer andern, als ihrer Ursache, steht. Jetzt dient uns diese Reihe der Zustände nur zur Leitung, um zu einem Dasein zu gelangen, das die höchste Bedingung alles Veränderlichen sein könne, nämlich dem notwendigen Wesen. Es ist hier nicht um die unbedingte Kausalität, sondern die unbedingte Existenz der Substanz selbst zu tun. Also ist die Reihe, welche wir vor uns haben, eigentlich
view is, therefore, really a series of concepts, not a series of intuitions in which one intuition is the condition of the other.

But it is evident that since everything in the sum-total of appearances is alterable, and therefore conditioned in its existence, there cannot be in the whole series of dependent existence any unconditioned member the existence of which can be regarded as absolutely necessary. Hence, if appearances were things in themselves, and if, as would then follow, the condition and the conditioned always belonged to one and the same series of intuitions, by no possibility could a necessary being exist as the condition of the existence of appearances in the world of sense.

The dynamical regress is distinguished in an important respect from the mathematical. Since the mathematical regress is concerned only with the combining of parts to form a whole or the division of a whole into parts, the conditions of this series must always be regarded as parts of the series, and therefore as homogeneous and as appearances. In the dynamical regress, on the other hand, we are concerned, not with the possibility of an unconditioned whole of given parts, or with an unconditioned part for a given whole, but with the derivation of a state from its cause, or of the contingent existence of substance itself from necessary existence. 1 In this latter regress, it is not, therefore, necessary that the condition should form part of an empirical series along with the conditioned.

A way of escape from this apparent antinomy thus lies open to us. Both of the conflicting propositions may be true, if taken in different connections. All things in the world of sense may be contingent, and so have only an empirically conditioned existence, while yet there may be a non-empirical condition of the whole series; that is, there may exist an unconditionally necessary being. This necessary being, as the intelligible condition of the series, would not belong to it as a member, not even as the highest member of it, nor would it render any member of the series empirically unconditioned. The whole sensible world, so far as regards the empirically conditioned existence of all its various members, would be left unaffected. This way of conceiving how an unconditioned

1 (Reading dem for der.)
being may serve as the ground of appearance differs from that which we followed in the preceding subsection, in dealing with the empirically unconditioned causality of freedom. For there the thing itself was as cause (\textit{substantia phaenomenon}) conceived to belong to the series of conditions, and only its \textit{causality} was thought as intelligible. Here, on the other hand, the necessary being must be thought as entirely outside the series of the sensible world (as \textit{ens extramundanum}), and as purely intelligible. In no other way can it be secured against the law which renders all appearances contingent and dependent.

The \textit{regulative principle of reason}, so far as it bears upon our present problem, is therefore this, that everything in the sensible world has an empirically conditioned existence, and that in no one of its qualities can it be unconditionally necessary; that for every member in the series of conditions we must expect, and as far as possible seek, an empirical condition in some possible experience; and that nothing justifies us in deriving an existence from a condition outside the empirical series or even in regarding its place within the series as absolutely independent and self-sufficient. At the same time this principle does not in any way debar us from recognizing that the whole series may rest upon some intelligible being that is free from all empirical conditions and itself contains the ground of the possibility of all appearances.

In these remarks we have no intention of proving the unconditionally necessary existence of such a being, or even of establishing the possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the existence of appearances in the sensible world. Just as, on the one hand, we limit reason, lest in leaving the guiding-thread of the empirical conditions it should go straying into the transcendent, adopting grounds of explanation that are incapable of any representation \textit{in concreto}, so, on the other hand, we limit the law of the purely empirical employment of the understanding, lest it should presume to decide as to the possibility of things in general, and should declare the intelligible to be \textit{impossible}, merely on the ground that it is not of any use in explaining appearances. Thus all that we have shown is that the thoroughgoing contingency of all natural things, and of all their empirical conditions, is quite

\textit{gen} zum Grunde zu legen, von der empirisch unbedingten Kausalität (der Freiheit), im vorigen Artikel, unterschieden, daß bei der Freiheit das Ding selbst, als Ursache (\textit{substantia phaenomenon}), dennoch in \textit{die} Reihe der Bedingungen gehörte, und nur seine \textit{Kausalität} als intelligibel gedacht wurde, hier aber das notwendige Wesen ganz außer der Reihe der Sinnenwelt (als \textit{ens extramundanum}) und bloß intelligibel gedacht werden müßte, wodurch allein es verhüttet werden kann, daß es nicht selbst dem Gesetz der Zufälligkeit und Abhängigkeit aller Erscheinungen unterworfen werde.

Das regulative Prinzip der Vernunft ist also in Ansehung dieser unserer Aufgabe: daß alles in der Sinnenwelt empirisch bedingte Existenz habe, und daß es überall in ihr in Ansehung keiner Eigenschaft eine unbedingte Notwendigkeit gebe; daß kein Glied der Reihe von Bedingungen sei, davon man nicht immer die empirische Bedingung in einer möglichen Erfahrung erwarten, und, so weit man kann, suchen müsse, und nichts uns berechtige, irgend ein Dasein von einer Bedingung außerhalb der empirischen Reihe abzuleiten, oder auch es als in der Reihe selbst für schlechterdings unabhängig und selbständig zu halten, gleichwohl aber dadurch gar nicht in Abrede zu ziehen, daß nicht die ganze Reihe in irgend einem intelligiblen Wesen (welches darum von aller empirischen Bedingung frei ist, und vielmehr den Grund der Möglichkeit aller dieser Erscheinungen enthält) gegründet sein könne.

Es ist aber hierbei gar nicht die Meinung, das unbedingt-notwendige Dasein eines Wesens zu beweisen, oder auch nur die Möglichkeit einer bloß intelligiblen Bedingung der Existenz, der Erscheinungen der Sinnenwelt; hierauf zu gründen, sondern nur eben so, wie wir die Vernunft einschränken, daß sie nicht den Faden der empirischen Bedingungen verlasse, und sich in \textit{transzendent} und keiner Darstellung in \textit{concreto} fähige Erklärungsgründe verlasse, also auch, andererseits, das Gesetz des bloß empirischen Verstandesgebrauchs dahin einzuschränken, daß es nicht über die Möglichkeit der Dinge überhaupt entscheide, und das Intelligible, ob es gleich von uns zur Erklärung der Erscheinungen nicht zu gebrauchen ist, darum nicht für unmöglich erklären. Es wird also dadurch nur gezeigt, daß die durchgängige Zufälligkeit aller Naturdinge, und aller ihrer (empirischen) Bedingungen, ganz wohl mit der will-
482 KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

consistent with the optional assumption of a necessary, though purely intelligible, condition; and that as there is no real contradiction between the two assertions, both may be true. Such an absolutely necessary being, as conceived by the understanding,\(^1\) may be in itself impossible, but this can in no wise be inferred from the universal contingency and dependence of everything belonging to the sensible world, nor from the principle which interdicts us from stopping at any one of its contingent members and from appealing to a cause outside the world. Reason proceeds by one path in its empirical use, and by yet another path in its transcendental use.

The sensible world contains nothing but appearances, and these are mere representations which are always sensibly conditioned; in this field things in themselves are never objects to us. It is not therefore surprising that in dealing with a member of the empirical series, no matter what member it may be, we are never justified in making a leap out beyond the context\(^2\) of sensibility. To do so is to treat the appearances as if they were things in themselves which exist apart from their transcendental ground, and which can remain standing while we seek an outside cause of their existence. This certainly would ultimately be the case with contingent things, but not with mere representations of things, the contingency of which is itself merely phenomenon, and can lead to no other regress than that which determines the phenomena, that is, solely to the empirical regress. On the other hand, to think an intelligible ground of the appearances, that is, of the sensible world, and to think it as free from the contingency of appearances, does not conflict either with the unlimited empirical regress in the series of appearances nor with their thoroughgoing contingency. That, indeed, is all that we had to do in order to remove the apparent antinomy; and it can be done in this way only. If for everything conditioned in its existence the condition is always sensible, and therefore belongs to the series, it must itself in turn be conditioned, as we have shown in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy. Either, therefore, reason through its demand for the unconditioned must remain in conflict with itself, or this unconditioned must be posited outside the series, in the intelligible. Its necessity will not then

\(^1\) [Vorstandswesen.]
\(^2\) [außer dem Zusammenhänge.]
require, or allow of, any empirical condition; so far as appearances are concerned, it will be unconditionally necessary.

The empirical employment of reason, in reference to the conditions of existence in the sensible world, is not affected by the admission of a purely intelligible being; it proceeds, in accordance with the principle of thoroughgoing contingency, from empirical conditions to higher conditions which are always again empirical. But it is no less true, when what we have in view is the pure employment of reason, in reference to ends, that this regulative principle does not exclude the assumption of an intelligible cause which is not in the series. For the intelligible cause then signifies only the purely transcendental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of the sensible series in general. Its existence as independent of all sensible conditions and as in respect of these conditions unconditionally necessary, is not inconsistent with the unlimited contingency of appearances, that is to say, with the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions.

Concluding Note on the whole Antimony of Pure Reason.

So long as reason, in its concepts, has in view simply the totality of conditions in the sensible world, and is considering what satisfaction in this regard it can obtain for them, our ideas are at once transcendental and cosmological. Immediately, however, the unconditioned (and it is with this that we are really concerned) is posited in that which lies entirely outside the sensible world, and therefore outside all possible experience, the ideas become transcendent. They then no longer serve only for the completion of the empirical employment of reason—an idea [of completeness] which must always be pursued, though it can never be completely achieved. On the contrary, they detach themselves completely from experience, and make for themselves objects for which experience supplies no material, and whose objective reality is not based on completion of the empirical series but on pure a priori concepts. Such transcendent ideas have a purely intelligible object; and this object may indeed be admitted as a transcendental object, but only if we likewise admit that, for the rest, we have no know-

\[1\] [Zwacke.]

[Reading, with Erdmann, dies for der.]
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

ledge in regard to it, and that it cannot be thought as a determinate thing in terms of distinctive inner predicates. As it is independent of all empirical concepts, we are cut off from any reasons that could establish the possibility of such an object, and have not the least justification for assuming it. It is a mere thought-entity. Nevertheless the cosmological idea which has given rise to the fourth antinomy impels us to take this step. For the existence of appearances, which is never self-grounded but always conditioned, requires us to look around for something different from all appearances, that is, for an intelligible object in which this contingency may terminate. But once we have allowed ourselves to assume a self-subsistent reality entirely outside the field of sensibility, appearances can only be viewed as contingent modes whereby beings that are themselves intelligences represent intelligible objects. Consequently, the only resource remaining to us is the use of analogy, by which we employ the concepts of experience in order to form some sort of concept of intelligible things—things of which as they are in themselves we have yet not the least knowledge. Since the contingent is not to be known save through experience, and we are here concerned with things which are not to be in any way objects of experience, we must derive the knowledge of them from that which is in itself necessary, that is, from pure concepts of things in general. Thus the very first step which we take beyond the world of sense obliges us, in seeking for such new knowledge, to begin with an enquiry into absolutely necessary being, and to derive from the concepts of it the concepts of all things in so far as they are purely intelligible. This we propose to do in the next chapter.

[Reading, with Hartenstein, anzusehen sind for anzusehen.]

SCHLUSSANMERKUNG

allerdings erlaubt ist, wozu aber; um es als ein durch seine unterscheidende und innere Prädikate bestimmmbares Ding zu denken, wir weder || Gründe der Möglichkeit (als unabhängig von allen Erfahrungsbegriffen), noch die mindeste Rechtfertigung, einen solchen Gegenstand anzunehmen, auf unserer Seite haben, und welches daher ein bloßes Gedankenbild ist. Gleichwohl dringt uns, unter allen kosmologischen Ideen, diejenige, so die vierte Antinomie veranlaßte, diesen Schritt zu wagen. Denn das in sich selbst ganz und gar nicht gegründete, sondern stets bedingte, Dasein der Erscheinungen fordert uns auf: uns nach etwas von allen Erscheinungen Unterschieden, mithin einem intelligenben Gegenstande umzusehen, bei welchem diese Zufälligkeit aufhört. Weil aber, wenn wir uns einmal die Erlaubnis genommen haben, außer dem Felde der gesamten Sinnlichkeit eine vor sich bestehende Wirklichkeit anzunehmen, Erscheinungen nur als zufällige Vorstellungsorten intelligibler Gegenstände, von solchen Wesen, die selbst Intelligenzen sind, anzusehen2; so bleibt uns nichts anders übrig, als die Analogie, nach der wir die Erfahrungsbegriffe nutzen, um uns von intelligenben Dingen, von denen wir an sich nicht die mindeste Kenntnis haben, doch irgend einigen Begriff zu machen. Weil wir das Zufällige nicht anders als durch Erfahrung kennen lernen, hier aber von Dingen, die gar nicht Gegenstände der Erfahrung sein sollen, die Rede ist, so werden wir ihre Kenntnis aus dem, was an sich notwendig ist, aus reinen Begriffen von Dingen überhaupt, ableiten müssen. Daher nötigt uns der erste Schritt, den wir außer der Sinnenwelt tun, || unsere neuen Kenntnisse von der Untersuchung des schlechthinnotwendigen Wesens anzufangen, und von den Begriffen desselben die Begriffe von allen Dingen, so fern sie bloß intelligibel sind, abzuleiten, und diesen Versuch wollen wir in dem folgenden Hauptstücke anstellen.

1 A: *es allerdings;* 2 Akad.-Ausz.: *anzusehen sind.*
Critik der reinen Vernunft

von
Immanuel Kant
Professor in Königsberg.

1781
verlegt Johann Friedrich Hartknoch

Einleitung

I. Transzendentielle Elementarlehre
   Erster Teil. Transzendentielle Ästhetik
   1. Abschnitt. Vom Raume
   2. Abschnitt. Von der Zeit

   Zweiter Teil. Transzendentielle Logik
   1. Abteilung. Transzendentielle Analytik in zwei Büchern und deren verschiedenen Hauptstücken und Abschnitten
   2. Abteilung. Transzendentielle Dialektik in zwei Büchern und deren verschiedenen Hauptstücken und Abschnitten

| II. Transzendentielle Methodenlehre
   1. Hauptstück. Die Disziplin der reinen Vernunft
   2. Hauptstück. Der Kanon der reinen Vernunft
   3. Hauptstück. Die Architektonik der reinen Vernunft
   4. Hauptstück. Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft

   4. Hauptstück. Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

BOOK II

CHAPTER III

THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON

Section I

THE IDEAL IN GENERAL

We have seen above that no objects can be represented through pure concepts of understanding, apart from the conditions of sensibility. For the conditions of the objective reality of the concepts are then absent, and nothing is to be found in them save the mere form of thought. If, however, they are applied to appearances, they can be exhibited in concreto, because in the appearances they obtain the appropriate material for concepts of experience—a concept of experience being nothing but a concept of understanding in concreto. But ideas are even further removed from objective reality than are categories, for no appearance can be found in which they can be represented in concreto. They contain a certain completeness to which no possible empirical knowledge ever attains. In them reason aims only at a systematic unity, to which it seeks to approximate the unity that is empirically possible, without ever completely reaching it.

But what I entitle the ideal seems to be further removed from objective reality even than the idea. By the ideal I understand the idea, not merely in concreto, but in individuo, that is, as an individual thing, determinable or even determined by the idea alone.

Humanity [as an idea] in its complete perfection contains not only all the essential qualities which belong to human nature and constitute our concept of it—and these so extended

\[A 568\]

\[B 598\]
as to be in that complete conformity with their ends which would be our idea of perfect humanity—but also everything which, in addition to this concept, is required for the complete determination of the idea. For of all contradictory predicates one only [of each pair] can apply to the idea of the perfect man. What to us is an ideal was in Plato’s view an idea of the divine understanding, an individual object of its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible being, and the archetype of all copies in the [field of] appearance.

Without soaring so high, we are yet bound to confess that human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals also, which although they do not have, like the Platonic ideas, creative power, yet have practical power (as regulative principles), and form the basis of the possible perfection of certain actions. Moral concepts, as resting on something empirical (pleasure or displeasure), are not completely pure concepts of reason. None the less, in respect of the principle whereby reason sets bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law, these concepts (when we attend merely to their form) may well serve as examples of pure concepts of reason. Virtue, and therewith human wisdom in its complete purity, are ideals. The wise man (of the Stoics) is, however, an ideal, that is, a man existing in thought only, but in complete conformity with the idea of wisdom. As the idea gives the rule, so the ideal in such a case serves as the archetype for the complete determination of the copy; and we have no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine man within us, with which we compare and judge ourselves, and so reform ourselves, although we can never attain to the perfection thereby prescribed. Although we cannot concede to these ideals objective reality (existence), they are not therefore to be regarded as figments of the brain; they supply reason with a standard which is indispensable to it, providing it, as they do, with a concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, and thereby enabling it to estimate and to measure the degree and the defects of the incomplete. But to attempt to realise the ideal in an example, that is, in the [field of] appearance, as, for instance, to depict the [character of the perfectly] wise man in a romance, is impracticable. There is indeed something absurd,

\[\text{[sinnlos]}\]
\[\text{[Urhund]}\]

VON DEM IDEAL ÜBERHaupt

von derselben ausmachen, bis zur vollständigen Konkruenz mit ihren Zwecken, welches unsere Idee der vollkommenen Menschenheit sein wurde, sondern auch alles, was außer diesem Begriffe zu der durchgängigen Bestimmung der Idee gehört; denn von allen entgegengesetzten Prädikaten kann sich doch nur ein einziges zu der Idee des vollkommensten Menschen schicken. Was uns ein Ideal ist, war dem Plato eine Idee des göttlichen Verstandes, ein einzelner Gegenstand in der reinen Anschauung desselben, das Vollkommenste einer jeden Art möglicher Wesen und der Urgrund aller Nachbilder in der Erscheinung:|| Ohne uns aber so weit zu versteigen, müssen wir gestehen, daß die menschliche Vernunft nicht allein Ideen, sondern auch Ideale enthalte, die zwar nicht, wie die platonischen, schöpferische, aber doch praktische Kraft (als regulative Prinzipien) haben, und der Möglichkeit der Vollkommenheit gewisser Handlungen zum Grunde liegen. Moralische Begriffe sind nicht gänzlich reine Vernunftbegriffe, weil ihnen etwas Empirisches (Lust oder Unlust) zum Grunde liegt. Gleichwohl können sie in Ansehung des Prinzips, wodurch die Vernunft der an sich gesetzlosen Freiheit Schranken setzt (also wenn man bloß auf ihre Form Acht hat), gar wohl zum Beispiele reiner Vernunftbegriffe dienen. Tugend, und, mit ihr, menschliche Weisheit in ihrer ganzen Reinigkeit, sind Ideen. Aber der Weise (des Stoikers) ist ein Ideal, d. i. ein Mensch, der bloß in Gedanken existiert, der aber mit der Idee der Weisheit völlig kongruieret. So wie die Idee die Regel gibt, so dient das Ideal in solchem Falle zum Urtheil der durchgängigen Bestimmung des Nachbildes, und wir haben kein anderes Richtmaß unserer Handlungen, als das Verhalten dieses göttlichen Menschen in uns, womit wir uns vergleichen, beurteilen, und dadurch uns bessern, obgleich es niemals erreichen können. Diese Ideale, ob man ihnen gleich nicht objektive Realität (Existenz) zugestehen möchte, sind doch um deswillen nicht für Hürnspinne anzusehen, sondern geben ein unentbehrliches Richtmaß der Vernunft ab, die des Begriffs von dem, was || in seiner Art ganz vollständig ist, bedarf, um danach den Grad und die Mängel des Unvollständigen zu schätzen und abzumesen. Das Ideal aber in einem Beispielen, d. i. in der Erscheinung, realisieren wollen, wie etwa den Wesen in einem Roman, ist unentwirr, und hat darüberd etwas Widersinnisches und wenig Erbau-
and far from edifying, in such an attempt, inasmuch as the
natural limitations, which are constantly doing violence to the
completeness of the idea, make the illusion that is aimed at
altogether impossible, and so cast suspicion on the good itself
—the good that has its source in the idea—by giving it the air
of being a mere fiction.

Such is the nature of the ideal of reason, which must
always rest on determinate concepts and serve as a rule and
archetype, alike in our actions and in our critical judgments.
The products of the imagination are of an entirely different
nature; no one can explain or give an intelligible concept of
them; each is a kind of monogram, a mere set of particular
qualities, determined by no assignable rule, and forming
rather a blurred sketch drawn from diverse experiences than a
determinate image—a representation such as painters and
physiognomists profess to carry in their heads, and which they
treat as being an incommunicable shadowy image1 of their
creations or even of their critical judgments. Such represen-
tations may be entertained, though improperly, ideals of
sensibility, inasmuch as they are viewed as being models
(not indeed realisable) of possible empirical intuitions, and yet
furnish no rules that allow of being explained and examined.

Reason, in its ideal, aims, on the contrary, at complete
determination in accordance with a priori rules. Accordingly
it thinks for itself an object which it regards as being com-
pletely determinable in accordance with principles. The
conditions that are required for such determination are not,
however, to be found in experience, and the concept itself is
therefore transcendental.

CHAPTER III

Section 2

THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAL

(Prototypa Transcendentali)

Every concept is, in respect of what is not contained in it,
undetermined, and is subject to the principle of determin-

1 [Schattenbild.]
ability. According to this principle, of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only one can belong to a concept. This principle is based on the law of contradiction, and is therefore a purely logical principle. As such, it abstracts from the entire content of knowledge and is concerned solely with its logical form.

But every thing, as regards its possibility, is likewise subject to the principle of complete determination, according to which if all the possible predicates of things be taken together with their contradictory opposites, then one of each pair of contradictory opposites must belong to it. This principle\(^1\) does not rest merely on the law of contradiction; for, besides considering each thing in its relation to the two contradictory predicates, it also considers it in its relation to the sum-total of all possibilities, that is, to the sum-total of all predicates of things. Presupposing this sum as being an a priori condition, it proceeds to represent everything as deriving its own possibility from the share which it possesses in this sum of all possibilities.\(^6\) The principle of complete determination concerns, therefore, the content, and not merely the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates which are intended to constitute the complete concept of a thing, and not simply a principle of analytic representation in reference merely to one of two contradictory predicates. It contains a transcendental presupposition, namely, that of the material for all possibility, which in turn is regarded as containing a priori the data for the particular possibility of each and every thing.

The proposition, everything which exists is completely determined, does not mean only that one of every pair of given contradictory predicates, but that one of every pair of possible

In accordance with this principle, each and every thing is therefore related to a common correlate, the sum of all possibilities. If this correlate (that is, the material for all possible predicates) should be found in the idea of some one thing, it would prove an affinity of all possible things, through the identity of the ground of their complete determination. Whereas the determinability of every concept is subordinate to the universality (universalitas) of the principle of excluded middle, the determination of a thing is subordinate to the totality (universalitas) or sum of all possible predicates.

\(^1\) [Reading, with Erdmann, Dieser . . . er . . . er . . . for Dieses . . . es . . . es . . . es.]

Grundsätze der Bestimmbarkeit: daß nur eines, von jeden zweien einander kontradiktiorisch-entgegengesetzten Prädikaten, ihm zu kommen könne, welcher auf dem Satze des Widerspruches beruht, und daher ein bloß logisches Prinzip ist, das von allem Inhalte der Erkenntnis abstrahiert, und nichts, als die logische Form derselben vor Augen hat.

Ein jedes Ding aber, seiner Möglichkeit nach, steht noch unter dem Grundsätzen der durchgängigen Bestimmung, nach welchem ihm von allen möglichen Prädikaten der || Dinge, so fern sie mit ihren Gegenenden verglichen werden, eines zukommen muß. Dieses beruht nicht bloß auf dem Satze des Widerspruches; denn es betrachtet, außer dem Verhältnifs zweier einander-widerstreitenden Prädikate, jedes Ding noch im Verhältnifs auf die gesamte Möglichkeit, als den Inbegriffe aller Prädikate der Dinge überhaupt, und, indem es solche als Bedingung a priori voraussetzt, so stellt es ein jedes Ding so vor, wie es von dem Anteil, den es an jener gesamten Möglichkeit hat, seine eigene Möglichkeit ableite.\(^*\) Das Principium der durchgängigen Bestimmung betrifft also den Inhalt und nicht bloß die logische Form. Es ist der Grundsatz der Synthesis aller Prädikate, die den vollständigen Begriff von einem Dinge machen sollen, und nicht bloß der analytischen Vorstellung, durch eines zweier entgegengesetzten Prädikate, und enthält eine transzendente Voraussetzung, nämlich || die der Materie zu aller Möglichkeit, welche a priori die Data zur besonderen Möglichkeit jedes Dinges enthalten soll.

Der Satz: alles Existierende ist durchgängig bestimmt, bedeutet nicht allein, daß von jedem Paare einander entgegengesetzter gegebenen, sondern auch von

\(^*\) Es wird also durch diesen Grundsatz jedes Ding auf ein gemeinschaftliches Correlatum, nämlich die gesamte Möglichkeit, bezogen, welche, Wenn sie (d. i. der Stoff zu allen möglichen Prädikaten) in der Idee eines einzigen Dinges angetraff werden würde, eine Affinität alls Möglichen durch die Identität des Grundes der durchgängigen Bestimmung derselben beweisen würde. Die Bestimmbarkeit jedes Begriffs ist der Allgemeinheit (universalitas) des Grundsatzes der Ausschließung eines Mitliedern zwischen zweien entgegengesetzten Prädikaten, die Bestimmung aber eines Dinges der Allheit (universalitas) oder dem Inbegriffe aller möglichen Prädikate untergeordnet. \(\text{[B 600 A 572]}\)
IDEAL OF PURE REASON

predicates, must always belong to it. In terms of this proposition the predicates are not merely compared with one another logically, but the thing itself is compared, in transcendental fashion, with the sum of all possible predicates. What the proposition therefore asserts is this: that to know a thing completely, we must know every possible [predicate], and must determine it thereby, either affirmatively or negatively. The complete determination is thus a concept, which, in its totality, can never be exhibited in concreto. It is based upon an idea, which has its seat solely in the faculty of reason—the faculty which prescribes to the understanding the rule of its complete employment.

Although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility, in so far as it serves as the condition of the complete determination of each and every thing, is itself undetermined in respect of the predicates which may constitute it, and is thought by us as being nothing more than the sum-total of all possible predicates, we yet find, on closer scrutiny, that this idea, as a primordial concept, excludes a number of predicates which as derivative are already given through other predicates or which are incompatible with others; and that it does, indeed, define itself as a concept that is completely determinate a priori. It thus becomes the concept of an individual object which is completely determined through the mere idea, and must therefore be entitled an ideal of pure reason.

When we consider all possible predicates, not merely logically, but transcendently, that is, with reference to such content as can be thought a priori as belonging to them, we find that through some of them we represent a being, through others a mere not-being. Logical negation, which is indicated simply through the word not, does not properly refer to a concept, but only to its relation to another concept in a judgment, and is therefore quite insufficient to determine a concept in respect of its content. The expression non-mortal does not enable us to declare that we are thereby representing in the object a mere not-being; the expression leaves all content unaffected. A transcendental negation, on the other hand, signifies not-being in itself, and is opposed to transcendental affirmation, which is something the very concept of which

516 

TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK

allen möglichen Prädikaten ihm immer eines zukomme; es werden durch diesen Satz nicht bloß Prädikate unter einander logisch, sondern das Ding selbst, mit dem Inbegriffe aller möglichen Prädikate, transzendentale Vergleiche. Er will so viel sagen, als: um ein Ding vollständig zu erkennen, muß man alles Mögliche erkennen, und es dadurch, es sei bejahend oder verneinend, bestimmen. Die durchgängige Bestimmung ist folglich ein Begriff, den wir niemals in concreto seiner Totalität nach darstellen können, und gründet sich also auf einer Idee, welche lediglich in der Vernunft ihren Sitz hat, die dem Verstand die Regel seines vollständigen Gebrauchs vorschreibt.

Ob nun zwar diese Idee von dem Inbegriffe aller Möglichkeit, so fern er als Bedingung der durchgängigen Bestimmung eines jeden Dinges zum Grunde liegt, in Ansehung der Prädikate, die denselben ausmachen mögen, selbst noch unbestimmt ist, und wir dadurch nichts weiter als einen Inbegriff aller möglichen Prädikate überhaupt denken, so finden wir doch bei näherer Untersuchung, daß diese Idee, als Urbegriff, eine Menge von Prädikaten ausstöße, die als abgeleitet durch andere schon gegeben sind, oder neben einander nicht stehen können, und daß sie sich bis zu einem durchgängig a priori bestimmten Begriffe läßt, und dadurch der Begriff von einem einzelnen Genstande werde, der durch die bloße Idee durchgängig bestimmt ist; mithin ein Ideal der reinen Vernunft genannt werden muß.

Wenn wir alle möglichen Prädikate nicht bloß logisch, sondern transzendent, d. i. nach ihrem Inhalte, der an ihnen a priori gedacht werden kann, erwägen, so finden wir, daß durch einige derselben ein Sein, durch andere ein bloßes Nichtsein vorgestellt wird. Die logische Verneinung, die lediglich durch das Wörtchen: Nicht, angezeigt wird, hängt eigentlich niemals einem Begriffe, sondern nur dem Verhältnisse desselben zu einem andern im Urteile an, und kann also dazu bei weiterm nicht hinreichend sein, einen Begriff in Ansehung seines Inhalts zu bezeichnen. Der Ausdruck: Nichtstetisch, kann gar nicht zu erkennen geben, daß dadurch ein bloßes Nichtsein am Gegenstande vorge- stellet werde, sondern läßt allen Inhalt unberührt. Eine transzendentale Verneinung bedeutet: dagegen das Nichtsein an sich selbst, dem die transzendentale Bejahung entgegengesetzt wird, welche ein Etwas ist, dessen Begriff an
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

in itself expresses a being. Transcendental affirmation is therefore entitled reality, because through it alone, and so far only as it reaches, are objects something (things), whereas its opposite, negation, signifies a mere want, and, so far as it alone is thought, represents the abrogation of all thinghood.

Now no one can think a negation determinately, save by basing it upon the opposed affirmation. Those born blind cannot have the least notion of darkness, since they have none of light. The savage knows nothing of poverty, since he has no acquaintance with wealth. The ignorant have no concept of their ignorance, because they have none of knowledge, etc.

All concepts of negations are thus derivative; it is the realities which contain the data, and, so to speak, the material or transcendental content, for the possibility and complete determination of all things.

If, therefore, reason employs in the complete determination of things a transcendental substrate that contains, as it were, the whole store of material from which all possible predicates of things must be taken, this substrate cannot be anything else than the idea of an omnimundo realissimus. All true negations are nothing but limitations—a title which would be inapplicable, were they not thus based upon the unlimited, that is, upon "the All".

But the concept of what thus possesses all reality is just the concept of a thing in itself as completely determined; and since in all possible [pairs of] contradictory predicates one predicate, namely, that which belongs to being absolutely, is to be found in its determination, the concept of an ens realissimum is the concept of an individual being. It is therefore a transcendental ideal, which serves as basis for the complete deter-

* The observations and calculations of astronomers have taught us much that is wonderful; but the most important lesson that they have taught us has been by revealing the abyss of our ignorance, which otherwise we could never have conceived to be so great. Reflection upon the ignorance thus disclosed must produce a great change in our estimate of the purposes for which our reason should be employed. [In both A and B this note is attached, presumably by inadvertence, to the preceding sentence.]

1 [Realität (Sachheit).]  
2 [die Aufhebung aller Ding-]  
3 [von einem All der Realität (omnimundo realissimus).]  
4 [das All.]  
5 [einseln.]  
6 [VON DEM TRANZENDEN圆 AL IDEAL]
ideal of pure reason

The logical determination of a concept by reason is based upon a disjunctive syllogism, in which the major premise contains a logical division (the division of the sphere of a universal concept), the minor premise limiting this sphere to a certain part, and the conclusion determining the concept by means of this part. The universal concept of a reality in general cannot be divided a priori, because without experience we do not know any determinate kinds of reality which would be contained under that genus. The transcendental major premise which is presupposed in the complete determination of all things is therefore no other than the representation of the sum of all reality; it is not merely a concept which, as regards its transcendental content, comprehends all predicates under itself; it also contains them within itself; and the complete determination of any and every thing rests on the limitation of this total reality, inasmuch as part of it is ascribed to the thing, and the rest is excluded—a procedure which is in agreement with the 'either—or' of the disjunctive major premise and with the determination of the object, in the minor premise, through one of the members of the division. Accordingly, reason, in employing the transcendental ideal as that by reference to which it determines all possible things, is proceeding in a manner analogous with its procedure in disjunctive syllogisms—this, indeed, is the principle upon which I have based the systematic division of all transcendental ideas, as parallel with, and corresponding to, the three kinds of syllogism.

It is obvious that reason, in achieving its purpose, that, namely, of representing the necessary complete determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being that corresponds to this ideal, but only the idea of such a being, and this only for the purpose of deriving from an unconditioned

durchgängigen Bestimmung, die notwendig bei allem, was existiert, angetroffen wird, zum Grunde liegt, und die oberste und vollständige materielle Bedingung seiner Möglichkeit ausmacht, auf welcher alles Denken der Gegenstände überhaupt ihrem Inhalte nach zurückgeführt werden muß. Es ist aber auch das einzige eigentliche Ideal, dessen die menschliche Vernunft fähig ist; weil nur in diesem einzigen Falle ein an sich allgemeiner Begriff von einem Dinge durch sich selbst durchgängig bestimmt, und als die Vorstellung von einem Individuum erkannt wird.

Die logische Bestimmung eines Begriffs durch die Vernunft beruht auf einem disjunktiven Vernunftschluss, in welchem der Obersatz eine logische Einteilung (die Teilung der Sphäre eines allgemeinen Begriffs) enthält, der Untersatz diese Sphäre bis auf einen Teil einschränkt und der Schlußsatz den Begriff durch diesen bestimmt. Der allgemeine Begriff einer Realität überhaupt kann a priori nicht eingeteilt werden, weil man ohne Erfahrung keine bestimmten Arten von Realität kennt, die unter jener Gattung enthalten wären. Also ist der transcendente Obersatz der durchgängigen Bestimmung aller Dinge nicht anders, als die Vorstellung des Inbegriffs aller Realität, nicht bloß ein Begriff, der alle Prädikate ihrem transcendentalen Inhalte nach unter sich, sondern der sie in sich begreifet, und die durchgängige Bestimmung eines jeden Dinges beruht auf der Einschränkung dieses All der Realität, indem einiges derselben dem Dinge beigelegt, das übrige aber ausgeschlossen wird, welches mit dem Entweder und Oder des disjunktiven Obersatzes und der Bestimmung des Gegenstandes, durch eins der Glieder dieser Teilung im Untersatz, übereinkommt. Demnach ist der Gebrauch der Vernunft, durch den sie das transcendente Ideal zum Grunde ihrer Bestimmung aller möglichen Dinge legt, demjenigen analogisch, nach welchem sie in disjunktiven Vernunftschlüssen verfährt; welches der Satz war, den ich oben zum Grunde der systematischen Einteilung aller transcendentalen Ideen legte, nach welchem sie den drei Arten von Vernunftschlüssen parallel und korrespondierend erzeugt werden.

Es versteht sich von selbst, daß der Vernunft zu dieser ihrer Absicht, nämlich sich lediglich die notwendige durchgängige Bestimmung der Dinge vorzustellen, nicht die Existenz eines solchen Wesens, das dem Ideale gemäß ist, sondern nur die Idee desselben voraussetze, um von einer
unbedingten Totalität der durchgängigen Bestimmung die bedingte, d. i. die des Eingeschränkten abzuleiten. Das Ideal ist ihr also das Urbild (prototypon) aller Dinge, welche insgesamt, als mangelhafte Kopeien (ectypa), den Stoff zu ihrer Möglichkeit daher nehmen, und indem sie derselben mehr oder weniger nahe kommen, dennoch jederzeit unendlich weit daran fehlen; es zu erreichen.

So wird denn alle Möglichkeit der Dinge (der Synthese des Mannigfaltigen ihrem Inhalte nach) als abgeleitet und nur allein die desjenigen, was alle Realität in sich schließt, als ursprünglich angesehen. Denn alle Verneinungen (welche doch die einzigen Prädicate sind, wodurch sich alles andere vom realistischsten Wesen unterscheiden läßt) sind bloße Einschränkungen einer größeren und endlich der höchsten Realität, mithin setzen sie diese voraus, und sind dem Inhalte nach von ihr bloß abgeleitet. Alle Mannigfaltigkeit der Dinge ist nur eine eben so vielfältige Art, den Begriff der höchsten Realität, der ihr gemeinschaftliches Substratum ist, einzuschränken, so wie alle Figuren nur als verschiedene Arten, den unendlichen Raum einzuschränken, möglich sind. Daher wird der bloß in der Vermunft befindliche Gegenstand ihres Ideals auch das Urwesen (ens originarium), so fern es keines über sich hat, das höchste Wesen (ens sumnum), und, so fern alles, als bedingt, unter ihm steht, das Wesen aller Wesen (ens entium) genannt. Alles dieses aber bedeutet nicht das objektive Verhältnis eines wirklich Gegenstandes zu andern Dingen, sondern der Idee zu Begriffen, und läßt uns wegen der Existenz eines Wesens von so ausnehmendem Vorzug in völliger Unwissenheit.

Weil man auch nicht sagen kann, daß ein Urwesen aus viel abgeleiteten Wesen bestehe, indem ein jedes derselben jenes voraussetzt, mithin es nicht ausmachen kann, so wird das Ideal des Urwesens auch als einfach gedacht werden müssen.

Die Ableitung aller anderen Möglichkeit von diesem Urwesen wird daher, genau zu reden, auch nicht als eine Einschränkung seiner höchsten Realität und gleichsam als eine Teilung derselben angesehen werden können; denn andern würde das Urwesen als ein bloßes Aggregat von abgeleiteten Wesen angesehen werden, welches nach dem Vorigen unmöglich ist, ob wir es gleich anfänglich im ersten rohen Schattenrisse so vorstellten. Vielmehr würde der
IDEAL OF PURE REASON  493

reality must condition the possibility of all things as their ground, not as their sum; and the manifoldness of things must therefore rest, not on the limitation of the primordial being itself, but on all that follows from it, including therein all our sensibility, and all reality in the [field of] appearance—existences of a kind which cannot, as ingredients, belong to the idea of the supreme being.

If, in following up this idea of ours, we proceed to hypothesise it, we shall be able to determine the primordial being through the mere concept of the highest reality, as a being that is one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, etc. In short, we shall be able to determine it, in its unconditioned completeness, through all predicaments. The concept of such a being is the concept of God, taken in the transcendental sense; and the ideal of pure reason, as above defined, is thus the object of a transcendental theology.

In any such use of the transcendental idea we should, however, be overstepping the limits of its purpose and validity. For reason, in employing it as a basis for the complete determination of things, has used it only as the concept of all reality, without requiring that all this reality be objectively given and be itself a thing. Such a thing is a mere fiction in which we combine and realise the manifold of our idea in an ideal, as an individual being. But we have no right to do this, nor even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis. Nor do any of the consequences which flow from such an ideal have any bearing upon the complete determination of things, or exercise in that regard the least influence; and it is solely as aiding in their determination that the idea has been shown to be necessary.

But merely to describe the procedure of our reason and its dialectic does not suffice; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this dialectic, that we may be able to explain, as a phenomenon of the understanding, the illusion to which it has given rise. For the ideal, of which we are speaking, is based on a natural, not on a merely arbitrary idea. The question to be raised is therefore this: how does it happen that reason regards all possibility of things as derived from one single fundamental possibility, namely, that of the highest

1 [besonderen.]

VON DEM TRANSCENDENTALEN IDEAL  521

Möglichkeit aller Dinge die höchste Realität als ein Grund und nichts als in begriff zum Grunde liegen, und die Mannigfaltigkeit der ersteren nicht auf der Einschränkung des Urwesens selbst, sondern seiner vollständigen Folge be- ruhen, zu, welcher denn auch unsere ganze Sinnlichkeit, samt aller Realität in der Erscheinung, gehören würde, die zu der Idee des höchsten Wesens, als ein Ingrediens, nicht gehören kann.

Wenn wir nun dieser unserer Idee, indem wir sie hypo- stasierungen, so ferner nachgehen, so werden wir das Urwesen durch den bloßen Begriff der höchsten Realität als ein einiges, einfaches, allgenügsames, ewiges etc., mit einem Worte, es in seiner unbedingten Vollständigkeit durch alle Prädikamente bestimmen können. Der Begriff eines solchen Wesens ist der von Gott, in transzendentalen Verstande gedacht, und so ist das Ideal der reinen Vernunft der Gegenstand einer transzendentalen Theologie, so wie ich es auch oben angeführt habe.

Indessen würde dieser Gebrauch der transzendentalen Idee doch schon die Grenzen ihrer Bestimmung und Zu-lässigkeit überschreiten. Denn die Vernunft legte sie nur, als den Begriff von aller Realität, der durchgängigen Bestimmung der Dinge überhaupt zum Grunde, ohne zu verlangen, daß alle diese Realität objektiv gegeben sei und selbst ein Ding ausmache. Dieses letztere ist eine bloße Er- dichtung, durch welche wir das Mannigfaltige unserer Idee in einem Ideale, als einem besonderen Wesen, zusammen- fassen und realisieren, wozu wir keine Befugnis haben, so gar nicht einmal, die Möglichkeit einer solchen Hypothese geradezu anzunehmen, wie denn auch alle Folgerungen, die aus einem solchen Ideale abfließen, die durchgängige Be- stimmung der Dinge überhaupt, als zu deren Behuf die Idee allein nötig war, nichts angehen, und darauf nicht den mindesten Einfluß haben.

Es ist nicht genug, das Verfahren unserer Vernunft und ihre Dialektik zu beschreiben, man muß auch die Quellen derselben zu entdecken suchen, um diesen Schein selbst, wie ein Phänomen des Verstandes, erklären zu können; denn das Ideal, wovon wir reden, ist auf einer natürlichen und nicht bloß willkürlichen Idee gegründet. Daher fragte ich: wie kommt die Vernunft dazu, alle Möglichkeit der Dinge als abgeleitet von einer einzigen, die zum Grunde liegt, näm-
KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

reality, and thereupon presupposes this to be contained in an individual, primordial being?

The answer is obvious from the discussions in the Transcendental Analytic. The possibility of the objects of the senses is a relation of these objects to our thought, in which something (namely, the empirical form) can be thought a priori, while that which constitutes the matter, reality in the [field of] appearance (that which corresponds to sensation), must be given, since otherwise it could not even be thought, nor its possibility represented. Now an object of the senses can be completely determined only when it is compared with all the predicates that are possible in the [field of] appearance, and by means of them is represented either affirmatively or negatively. But since that which constitutes the thing itself, namely, the real in the [field of] appearance, must be given—otherwise the thing could not be conceived at all—and since that wherein the real of all appearances is given is experience, considered as single and all-embracing, the material for the possibility of all objects of the senses must be presupposed as given in one whole; and it is upon the limitation of this whole that all possibility of empirical objects, their distinction from each other and their complete determination, can alone be based. No other objects, besides those of the senses, can, as a matter of fact, be given to us, and nowhere save in the context of a possible experience; and consequently nothing is an object for us, unless it presupposes the sum of all empirical reality as the condition of its possibility. Now owing to a natural illusion we regard this principle, which applies only to those things which are given as objects of our senses, as being a principle which must be valid of things in general. Accordingly, omitting this limitation, we treat the empirical principle of our concepts of the possibility of things, viewed as appearances, as being a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general.

If we thereupon proceed to hypostatise this idea of the sum of all reality, that is because we substitute dialectically for the distributive unity of the empirical employment of the understanding, the collective unity of experience as a whole;

1 [besonderen.] 2 [Reading, with Hartenstein, dieselben für dieselben.]
3 [in einem Inbegriffe.] 4 [Inbegriff.]

TRANSZENTENTALE DIALEKTIK

lich der der höchsten Realität, anzusehen, und diese sodann, als in einem besonderen Urwesen enthalten, vorauszusetzen?

Die Antwort bietet sich aus den Verhandlungen der transcendentalen Analytik von selbst dar. Die Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Sinne ist ein Verhältnis derselben zu unserem Denken; worin etwas (nämlich die empirische Form) a priori gedacht werden kann, dasjenige aber, was die Materie ausmacht, die Realität in der Erscheinung (was der Empfindung entspricht), gegeben sein muß, ohne welches es auch gar nicht gedacht und mitin seine Möglichkeit nicht vorgestellt werden könnte. Nun kann ein Gegenstand der Sinne nur durchgängig bestimmt werden, wenn er mit allen Prädikaten der Erscheinung verglichen und durch dieselbe bejahend oder verneinend vorgestellt wird. Weil aber darin dasjenige, was das Ding selbst (in der Erscheinung) ausmacht; nämßich das Reale, gegeben sein muß, ohne welches es auch gar nicht gedacht werden könnte; dasjenige aber, worin das Reale aller Erscheinungen gegeben ist, die einige allbefassende Erfahrung ist: so muß die Materie zur Möglichkeit aller Gegenstände der Sinne, als in einem Inbegriffe gegeben, vorausgesetzt werden, auf dessen Einschränkung alleine alle Möglichkeit empirischer Gegenstände, ihr Unterschied von einander und ihre durchgängige Bestimmung, beruhen kann. Nun können uns in der Tat keine andere Gegenstände, als die der Sinne, und nirgends, als in dem Kontext einer möglichen Erfahrung gegeben werden, folglich ist nichts für uns ein Gegenstand, wenn es nicht den Inbegriff aller empirischen Realität als Bedingung seiner Möglichkeit voraussetzt. Nach einer natürlichen Illusion nehmen wir das für einen Grundsatz an, der von allen Dingen überhaupt gelten müsse, welcher eigentlich nur von denen gilt, die als Gegenstände unserer Sinne gegeben werden. Folglich werden wir das empirische Prinzip unserer Begriffe der Möglichkeit der Dinge, als Erscheinungen, durch Weglassung dieser Einschränkung, für ein transcendentes Prinzip der Möglichkeit der Dinge überhaupt halten.

Daß wir aber hernach diese Idee vom Inbegriffe aller Realität hypostasieren, kommt daher: weil wir die distributive Einheit des Erfahrungsgebrauchs des Verstandes in die kollektive Einheit eines Erfahrungsganzen dialektisch
and then thinking this whole [realm] of appearance as one single thing that contains all empirical reality in itself; and then again, in turn, by means of the above-mentioned transcendent subreption, substituting for it the concept of a thing which stands at the source of the possibility of all things, and supplies the real conditions for their complete determination.

CHAPTER III

Section 3

THE ARGUMENTS OF SPECULATIVE REASON IN PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING

Notwithstanding this pressing need of reason to presuppose something that may afford the understanding a sufficient foundation for the complete determination of its concepts, it is yet much too easily conscious of the ideal and merely fictitious character of such a presupposition to allow itself, on this ground alone, to be persuaded that a mere creature of its own thought is a real being—were it not that it is impelled from another direction to seek a resting-place in the regress from the conditioned, which is, given, to the unconditioned. This unconditioned is not, indeed, given as being in itself real, nor as having a reality that follows from its mere concept; it is, however, what alone can complete the series of conditions when we proceed to trace these conditions to their grounds. This is the course which our human reason, by its very nature, leads all of us, even the least reflective, to adopt, though not everyone continues to pursue it. It begins not with concepts, but with common experience, and thus bases itself on some-

This ideal of the ens realissimum, although it is indeed a mere representation, is first realised, that is, made into an object, then hypothesised, and finally, by the natural progress of reason towards the completion of unity, is, as we shall presently show, personified. For the regulative unity of experience is not based on the appearances themselves (on sensibility alone), but on the connection of the manifold through the understanding (in an apperception); and consequently the unity of the supreme reality and the complete determinability (possibility) of all things seems to lie in a supreme understanding, and therefore in an intelligence.
thing actually existing. But if this ground does not rest upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary, it yields beneath our feet. And this latter support is itself in turn without support, if there be any empty space beyond and under it, and if it does not itself so fill all things as to leave no room for any further question—unless, that is to say, it be infinite in its reality.

If we admit something as existing, no matter what this something may be, we must also admit that there is something which exists necessarily. For the contingent exists only under the condition of some other contingent existence as its cause, and from this again we must infer yet another cause, until we are brought to a cause which is not contingent, and which is therefore unconditionally necessary. This is the argument upon which reason bases its advance to the primordial being.

Now reason looks around for a concept that squares with so supreme a mode of existence as that of unconditioned necessity—not for the purpose of inferring a priori from the concept the existence of that for which it stands (for if that were what it claimed to do, it ought to limit its enquiries to mere concepts, and would not then require a given existence as its basis), but solely in order to find among its various concepts that concept which is in no respect incompatible with absolute necessity. For that there must be something that exists with absolute necessity, is regarded as having been established by the first step in the argument. If, then, in removing everything which is not compatible with this necessity, only one existence remains, this existence must be the absolutely necessary being, whether or not its necessity be comprehensible, that is to say, deducible from its concept alone.

Now that which in its concept contains a therefore for every wherefore, that which is in no respect defective, that which is in every way sufficient as a condition, seems to be precisely the being to which absolute necessity can fittingly be ascribed. For while it contains the conditions of all that is possible, it itself does not require and indeed does not allow of any condition, and therefore satisfies, at least in this one feature, the concept of unconditioned necessity. In this respect all other concepts must fall short of it; for since they are deficient and in need of completion, they cannot have as
their characteristic this independence of all further conditions. We are not indeed justified in arguing that what does not contain the highest and in all respects complete condition is therefore itself conditioned in its existence. But we are justified in saying that it does not possess that one feature through which alone reason is in a position, by means of an a priori concept, to know, in regard to any being, that it is unconditioned.

The concept of an ens realissimum is therefore, of all concepts of possible things, that which best squares with the concept of an unconditionally necessary being; and though it may not be completely adequate to it, we have no choice in the matter, but find ourselves constrained to hold to it. For we cannot afford to dispense with the existence of a necessary being; and once its existence is granted, we cannot, in the whole field of possibility, find anything that can make a better grounded claim [than the ens realissimum] to such pre-eminence in the mode of its existence.

Such, then, is the natural procedure of human reason. It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. This being it apprehends as having an existence that is unconditioned. It then looks around for the concept of that which is independent of any condition, and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition of all else, that is, in that which contains all reality. But that which is all-containing and without limits is absolute unity, and involves the concept of a single being that is likewise the supreme being. Accordingly, we conclude that the supreme being, as primordial ground of all things, must exist by absolute necessity.

If what we have in view is the coming to a decision—if, that is to say, the existence of some sort of necessary being is taken as granted, and if it be agreed further that we must come to a decision as to what it is—then the foregoing way of thinking must be allowed to have a certain cogency. For in that case no better choice can be made, or rather we have no choice at all, but find ourselves compelled to decide in favour of the absolute unity of complete reality, as the ultimate source of possibility. If, however, we are not required to come to any decision, and prefer to leave the issue open until the weight of the evidence is such as to compel assent; if, in other words, what we have to do is merely to estimate how much we really

BEWEISGRÜNDE DER SPEKULATIVEN VERNUFT 525
gänzung bedürftig ist, kein solches Merkmal der Unabhängigkeit von allen ferneren Bedingungen an sich zeigt. Es ist wahr, daß hieraus noch nicht sicher gefolgert werden könne, daß, was nicht die höchste und in aller Absicht vollständige Bedingung in sich enthält, darum selbst seiner Existenz nach bedingt sein müsse; aber es hat denn doch das einzige Merkzeichen des unbedingten Daseins nicht an sich, dessen die Vernunft mächtig ist, um durch einen Begriff a priori irgend ein Wesen als unbedingt zu erkennen.

Der Begriff eines Wesens von der höchsten Realität würde sich also unter allen Begriffen möglicher Dinge zu dem Begriffe eines unbedingtnotwendigen Wesens am besten schicken, und, wenn er diesem auch nicht völlig genügt, so haben wir doch keine Wahl, sondern sehen uns genötigt, uns an ihn zu halten, weil wir die Existenz eines notwendigen Wesens nicht in den Wind schlagen dürfen, geben wir sie aber zu, doch in dem ganzen Felde der Möglichkeit nichts finden können, was auf einen solchen Vorzug im Dasein einen gegründetern Anspruch machen könnte.

So ist also der natürliche Gang der menschlichen Vernunft-beschaffen. Zuerst überzeugt sie sich vom Dasein irgendeines notwendigen Wesens. In diesem erkennet sie eine unbedingte Existenz. Nun sucht sie den Begriff des Unabhängigen von aller Bedingung, und findet ihn in dem, was selbst die zuerreichende Bedingung zu allem andern ist, d.i. in demjenigen, was alle Realität enthält. Das All aber ohne Schranken ist absolute Einheit, und führt den Begriff eines einigen, nämlich des höchsten Wesens bei sich, und so schließt sie, daß das höchste Wesen, als Urgrund aller Dinge, schlechthin notwendiger Weise dasei.

Diesem Begriffe kann eine gewisse Gründlichkeit nicht gestritten werden, wenn von Entscheidungen die Rede ist, nämlich, wenn einmal das Dasein irgendeines notwendigen Wesens zugegeben wird, und man darin übereinkommt, daß man seine Partei ergreifen müsse, worin man dasselbe setzen wolle; denn alsdenn kann man nicht sichherrlicher wählen, oder man hat vielmehr keine Wahl, sondern ist genötigt, der absoluten Einheit der vollständigen Realität, als dem Urquelle der Möglichkeit, seine Stimme zu geben. Wenn uns aber nichts treibt, uns zu entschließen, und wir lieber diese ganze Sache dahin gestellt sein ließen, bis wir durch das volle Gewicht der Beweisgründe zum Bei-falle gezwungen würden, d.i. wenn es bloß um Beurteilung
know in the matter, and how much we merely flatter ourselves that we know, then the foregoing argument is far from appearing in so advantageous a light, and special favour is required to compensate for the defectiveness of its claims.

For if we take the issue as being that which is here stated, namely, first, that from any given existence (it may be, merely my own existence) we can correctly infer the existence of an unconditionally necessary being; secondly, that we must regard a being which contains all reality, and therefore every condition, as being absolutely unconditioned, and that in this concept of an ens realissimum we have therefore found the concept of a thing to which we can also ascribe absolute necessity—granting all this, it by no means follows that the concept of a limited being which does not have the highest reality is for that reason incompatible with absolute necessity. For although I do not find in its concept that unconditioned which is involved in the concept of the totality of conditions, we are not justified in concluding that its existence must for this reason be conditioned; just as I cannot say, in the case of a hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition (in the case under discussion, the condition of completeness in accordance with [pure] concepts) does not hold, the conditioned also does not hold. On the contrary, we are entirely free to hold that any limited beings whatsoever, notwithstanding their being limited, may also be unconditionally necessary, although we cannot infer their necessity from the universal concepts which we have of them. Thus the argument has failed to give us the least concept of the properties of a necessary being, and indeed is utterly ineffective.

But this argument continues to have a certain importance and to be endowed with an authority of which we cannot, simply on the ground of this objective insufficiency, at once proceed to divest it. For granting that there are in the idea of reason obligations which are completely valid, but which in their application to ourselves would be lacking in all reality—that is, obligations to which there would be no motives—save on the assumption that there exists a supreme being to give effect and confirmation to the practical laws, in such a situation we should be under an obligation to follow those concepts which, though they may not be objectively sufficient, are yet, zu tun ist, wie viel wir von dieser Aufgabe wissen, und was wir uns nur zu wissen schmeicheln: dann erscheint obiger Schluß bei weitem nicht in so vorteilhafter Gestalt, und bedarf Gunst, um den Mangel seiner Rechtsansprüche zu ersetzen.

Denn, wenn wir alles so gut sein lassen, wie es hier vor uns liegt, daß nämlich erstlich von irgend einer gegebenen Existenz (allenfalls auch bloß meiner eigenen) ein richtiger Schluß auf die Existenz eines unbedingtnotwendigen Wesens stattfinde; zweitens daß ich ein Wesen, welches alle Realität, mithin auch alle Bedingung enthält, als schlecht- hin unbedingt ansehen müßte, folglich der Begriff des Dinges, welches sich zur absoluten Notwendigkeit schickt, hierdurch gefunden sei: so kann daraus doch gar nicht geschlossen werden, daß der Begriff eines eingeschränkten Wesens, das nicht die höchste Realität hat, darum der absoluten Notwendigkeit widerspreche. Denn, ob ich gleich in seinem Begriffe nicht das Unbedingte antreffe, was das All der Bedingungen schon bei sich führt, so kann daraus doch gar nicht gefolgert werden, daß sein Dasein eben darum bedingt sein müsse; so wie ich in einem hypothetischen Vernunftschluss nicht sagen kann: wo eine gewisse Bedingung (nämlich hier der Vollständigkeit nach Begriffen) nicht ist, da ist auch das Bedingte nicht. Es wird uns vielmehr unbenommen bleiben, alle übrige eingeschränkte Wesen eben so wohl für unbedingt notwendig gelten zu lassen, ob wir gleich ihre Notwendigkeit aus dem allgemeinen Begriffen, den wir von ihnen haben, nicht schließen können. Auf diese Weise aber hätte dieses Argument uns nicht den mindesten Begriff von Eigenschaften eines notwendigen Wesens verschafft, und überall gar nichts geleistet.

Gleichwohl bleibt diesem Argumente eine gewisse Wichtigkeit, und ein Ansehen, das ihm, wegen dieser objektiven Unzulänglichkeit, noch nicht sofort genommen werden kann. Denn setzt es gebe Verbindlichkeiten, die in der Idee der Vernunft ganz richtig, aber ohne alle Realität der Anwendung auf uns selbst, d. i. ohne Triebfedern sein würden, wo nicht ein höchstes Wesen vorausgesetzt würde, das den praktischen Gesetzen Wirkung und Nachdruck geben könnte: so würden wir auch eine Verbindlichkeit haben, den Begriffen zu folgen, die, wenn sie gleich nicht objektiv zulänglich sein möchten,
according to the standard of our reason, preponderant, and in comparison with which we know of nothing that is better and more convincing. The duty of deciding would thus, by a practical addition, incline the balance so delicately preserved by the indecisiveness of speculation. Reason would indeed stand condemned in its own judgment—and there is none more circumspect—if, when impelled by such urgent motives, it should fail, however incomplete its insight, to conform its judgment to those pleasures which are at least of greater weight than any others known to us.

Though this argument, as resting on the inner insufficiency of the contingent, is in actual fact transcendental, it is yet so simple and natural that, immediately it is propounded, it commends itself to the commonest understanding. We see things alter, come into being, and pass away; and these, or at least their state, must therefore have a cause. But the same question can be raised in regard to every cause that can be given in experience. Where, therefore, can we more suitably locate the ultimate causality than where there also exists the highest causality, that is, in that being which contains primordially in itself the sufficient ground of every possible effect, and the concept of which we can also very easily entertain by means of the one attribute of an all-embracing perfection. This supreme cause we then proceed to regard as absolutely necessary, as much as we find it absolutely necessary that we should ascend to it, and find no ground for passing beyond it. And thus, in all peoples, there shine amidst the most benighted polytheism some gleams of monotheism, to which they have been led, not by reflection and profound speculation, but simply by the natural bent of the common understanding, as step by step it has come to apprehend its own requirements.

There are only three possible ways of proving the existence of God by means of speculative reason.

All the paths leading to this goal begin either from determinate experience and the specific constitution of the world of sense as thereby known, and ascend from it, in accordance with laws of causality, to the supreme cause outside the

1 [Reading, with Erdmann, jeder for der.]

BEweisgründe der spekulativen Vernunft


Dieses Argument, ob es gleich in der Tat transzendential ist, indem es auf der inneren Unzulänglichkeit des Zufälligen beruht, ist doch so einfältig und natürlich, daß es dem gemeinste Menscheninnere angemessen ist, so bald dieser nur einmal darauf geführt wird. Man sieht Dinge sich verändern, entstehen und vergehen; sie müssen also, oder wenigstens ihr Zustand, eine Ursache haben. Von jeder Ursache aber, die jemals in der Erfahrung gegeben werden mag, läßt sich eben dieses wiederum fragen. Wohin sollen wir nun die obersste Kausalität billiger verlegen, als dahin, wo auch die höchste Kausalität ist, d. i. in dasjenige Wesen, was zu der möglichen Wirkung die Zulänglichkeit in sich selbst ursprünglich enthält, dessen Begriff auch durch den einzigen Zug einer allbefassenden Vollkommenheit sehr leicht zu Stande kommt. Diese höchste Ursache halten wir denn für schlechthin notwendig, weil wir es schlechterdings notwendig finden, bis zu ihr hinaufzusteigen, und keinen Grund, über sie noch weiter hinaus zu gehen. Daher sehen wir bei allen Völkern durch ihre blindste Vielgötterei doch einige Funken des Monotheismus durchschimmern, wozu nicht Nachdenken und tiefe Spekulation, sondern nur ein nach und nach verständlich gewordener natürlicher Gang des gemeinsen Verständes geführt hat.

Es sind nur drei Beweisarten vom Dasein Gottes aus spekulativer Vernunft möglich.

Alle Wege, die man in dieser Absicht einschlagen mag, fangen entweder von der bestimmten Erfahrung und der dadurch erkannten besonderen Beschaffenheit unserer Sinnenwelt an, und steigen von ihr nach Gesetzen der Kausali-
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

world; or they start from experience which is purely indeterminate, that is, from experience of existence in general; or finally they abstract from all experience, and argue completely a priori, from mere concepts, to the existence of a supreme Cause. The first proof is the physico-theological, the second the cosmological, the third the ontological. There are, and there can be, no others.

I propose to show that reason is as little able to make progress on the one path, the empirical, as on the other path, the transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain in thus attempting to soar above the world of sense by the mere power of speculation. As regards the order in which these arguments should be dealt with, it will be exactly the reverse of that which reason takes in the progress of its own development, and therefore of that which we have ourselves followed in the above account. For it will be shown that, although experience is what first gives occasion to this enquiry, it is the transcendental concept which in all such endeavours marks out the goal that reason has set itself to attain, and which is indeed its sole guide in its efforts to achieve that goal. I shall therefore begin with the examination of the transcendental proof, and afterwards enquire what effect the addition of the empirical factor can have in enhancing the force of the argument.

CHAPTER III

Section 4

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

It is evident, from what has been said, that the concept of an absolutely necessary being is a concept of pure reason, that is, a mere idea the objective reality of which is very far from being proved by the fact that reason requires it. For the idea instructs us only in regard to a certain unattainable completeness, and so serves rather to limit the understanding than to extend it to new objects. But we are here faced by what is indeed strange and perplexing, namely, that while the infer-

VIERTER ABSCHNITT

VON DER UNMöGLICHKEIT EINES ONTOLOGISCHEN BEWEISES VOM DASEIN GOTTES

Man sieht aus dem Bisherigen leicht: daß der Begriff eines absolutnotwendigen Wesens ein reiner Vernunftbegriff, d. i. eine bloße Idee sei, deren objektive Realität dadurch, daß die Vernunft ihrer bedarf, noch lange nicht bewiesen ist, welche auch nur auf eine gewisse obzwunerrechbare Vollständigkeit Anweisung gibt, und eigentlich mehr dazu dient, den Verstand zu begrenzen, als ihn auf neue Gegenstände zu erweitern. Es findet sich hier nun das Befremdliche und Widersinnliche, daß der Schluß von einem gegebenen Da-
ence from a given existence in general to some absolutely necessary being seems to be both imperative and legitimate, all those conditions under which alone the understanding can perform a concept of such a necessity are so many obstacles in the way of our doing so.

In all ages men have spoken of an absolutely necessary being, and in so doing have endeavoured, not so much to understand whether and how a thing of this kind allows even of being thought, but rather to prove its existence. There is, of course, no difficulty in giving a verbal definition of the concept, namely, that it is something the non-existence of which is impossible. But this yields no insight into the conditions which make it necessary to regard the non-existence of a thing as absolutely unthinkable. It is precisely these conditions that we desire to know, in order that we may determine whether or not, in resorting to this concept, we are thinking anything at all. The expedient of removing all those conditions which the understanding indispensably requires in order to regard something as necessary, simply through the introduction of the word unconditioned, is very far from sufficient to show whether I am still thinking anything in the concept of the unconditionally necessary, or perhaps rather nothing at all.

Nay more, this concept, at first ventured upon blindly, and now become so completely familiar, has been supposed to have its meaning exhibited in a number of examples; and on this account all further enquiry into its intelligibility has seemed to be quite needless. Thus the fact that every geometrical proposition, as, for instance, that a triangle has three angles, is absolutely necessary, has been taken as justifying us in speaking of an object which lies entirely outside the sphere of our understanding as if we understood perfectly what it is that we intend to convey by the concept of that object.

All the alleged examples are, without exception, taken from judgments, not from things and their existence. But the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the same as an absolute necessity of things. The absolute necessity of the judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the predicate in the judgment. The above proposition does not

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Man hat zu aller Zeit von dem absolut notwendigen Wesen geredet, und sich nicht so wohl Mühe gegeben, zu verstehen, ob und wie man sich ein Ding von dieser Art auch nur denken könne, als vielmehr, dessen Dasein zu beweisen. Nun ist zwar eine Namenerklärung von diesem Begriff ganz leicht, daß es nämlich so etwas sei, dessen Nichtsein unmöglich ist; aber man wird hierdurch um nichts klüger, in Ansehung der Bedingungen, die es unmöglich machen, das Nichtsein eines Dinges als schlechthin nicht nur anzusehen, und die eigentlichen dagegen sind; was man wissen will, nämlich, ob wir uns durch diesen Begriff überall etwas denken, oder nicht. Denn alle Bedingungen, die der Verstand jederzeit bedarf, um etwas als notwendig anzusehen, vermittels des Wortes: Unbedingt, wegwerfen, macht mir noch lange nicht verständlich, ob ich alsdann durch einen Begriff eines Unbedingt notwendigen noch etwas, oder vielleicht gar nichts denke.

Noch mehr: diesen auf das bloße Geratetwöhl gewagten und endlich ganz geläufig gewordenen Begriff hat man noch dazu durch eine Menge Beispiele zu erklären geglaubt, so, daß alle weitere Nachfrage wegen seiner Verständlichkeit ganz unnötig geschienen. Ein jeder Satz der Geometrie, z. B. daß ein Dreieck drei Winkel habe, ist schlechthin notwendig, und so redete man von einem Gegenstande, der ganz außerhalb der Sphäre unseres Verstandes liegt, als ob man ganz wohl verstände, was man mit dem Begriff von ihm sagen wolle.

Alle vorgegebene Beispiele sind ohne Ausnahme nur von Urteilen, aber nicht von Dingen und deren Dasein hergenommen. Die unbedingte Notwendigkeit des Urteils aber ist nicht eine absolute Notwendigkeit der Sachen. Denn die absolute Notwendigkeit des Urteils ist nur eine bedingte Notwendigkeit der Sache oder des Prädikats im Urteile. Der vorige Satz sagte nicht, daß drei Winkel...
declare that three angles are absolutely necessary, but that, under the condition that there is a triangle (that is, that a triangle is given), three angles will necessarily be found in it. So great, indeed, is the deluding influence exercised by this logical necessity that, by the simple device of forming an *a priori* concept of a thing in such a manner as to include existence within the scope of its meaning, we have supposed ourselves to have justified the conclusion that because existence necessarily belongs to the object of this concept—always under the condition that we posit the thing as given (as existing)—we are also of necessity, in accordance with the law of identity, required to posit the existence of its object, and that this being is therefore itself absolutely necessary—and this, to repeat, for the reason that the existence of this being has already been thought in a concept which is assumed arbitrarily and on condition that we posit its object.

If, in an identical proposition, I reject the predicate while retaining the subject, contradiction results; and I therefore say that the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if we reject subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction; for nothing is then left that can be contradicted. To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we reject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of contradiction can then arise. There is nothing outside it that would then be contradicted, since the necessity of the thing is not supposed to be derived from anything external; nor is there anything internal that would be contradicted, since in rejecting the thing itself we have at the same time rejected all its internal properties. 'God is omnipotent' is a necessary judgment. The omnipotence cannot be rejected if we posit a Deity, that is, an infinite being; for the two concepts are identical. But if we say, 'There is no God', neither the omnipotence nor any other of its predicates is given; they are one and all rejected together with the subject, and there is therefore not the least contradiction in such a judgment.

We have thus seen that if the predicate of a judgment is rejected together with the subject, no internal contradiction
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ONTOLOGICAL PROOF

can result, and that this holds no matter what the predicate may be. The only way of evading this conclusion is to argue that there are subjects which cannot be removed, and must always remain. That, however, would only be another way of saying that there are absolutely necessary subjects; and that is the very assumption which I have called in question, and the possibility of which the above argument professes to establish. For I cannot form the least concept of a thing which, should it be rejected with all its predicates, leaves behind a contradiction; and in the absence of contradiction I have, through pure a priori concepts alone, no criterion of impossibility.

Notwithstanding all these general considerations, in which every one must concur, we may be challenged with a case which is brought forward as proof that in actual fact the contrary holds, namely, that there is one concept, and indeed only one, in reference to which the not-being or rejection of its object is in itself contradictory, namely, the concept of the ens realissimum. It is declared that it possesses all reality, and that we are justified in assuming that such a being is possible (the fact that a concept does not contradict itself by no means proves the possibility of its object: but the contrary assertion I am for the moment willing to allow).* Now [the argument proceeds] 'all reality' includes existence; existence is therefore contained in the concept of a thing that is possible. If, then, this thing is rejected, the internal possibility of the thing is rejected—which is self-contradictory.

My answer is as follows. There is already a contradiction in introducing the concept of existence—no matter under what title it may be disguised—into the concept of a thing which we profess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility. If that be allowed as legitimate, a seeming victory has been

*A concept is always possible if it is not self-contradictory. This is the logical criterion of possibility, and by it the object of the concept is distinguishable from the nihil negativum. But it may none the less be an empty concept, unless the objective reality of the synthesis through which the concept is generated has been specifically proved; and such proof, as we have shown above, rests on principles of possible experience, and not on the principle of analysis (the law of contradiction). This is a warning against arguing directly from the logical possibility of concepts to the real possibility of things.


Wider alle diese allgemeine Schlüsse (deren sich kein Mensch weigern kann) fordert ihr mich durch einen Fall auf, den ihr, als einen Beweis durch die Tat, aufstellst; daß es doch einen und zwar nur diesen Einen Begriff gebe, da das Nichtsein oder das Auheben seines Gegenstandes in sich selbst widersprechend sei, und dieses ist der Begriff des allerwirklichsten Wesens. Es hat, sagt ihr, alle Realität, und ihr seid berechtigt, ein solches Wesen als möglich anzunehmen (welches ich vorzüglich einwillige, obgleich der sich nicht widersprechende Begriff noch lange nicht die Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes beweiset)*. Nun ist unter aller Realität auch das Dasein mit begriffen: Also liegt das Dasein in dem Begriffe von einem Möglichen. Wird dieses Ding nun aufgehoben, so wird die innere Möglichkeit des Dinges aufgehoben, welches widersprechend ist.

Ich antworte: Ihr habt schon einen Widerspruch begun- gen, wenn ihr in den Begriff eines Dinges, welches ihr lediglich seiner Möglichkeit nach denken wolltet, es sei unter welchem versteckten Namen, schon den Begriff seiner Exi- stenz hinein brachtet. Räumet man euch dieses ein; so habt

* Der Begriff ist allemal möglich, wenn er sich nicht widerspricht. Das ist das logische Merkmal der Möglichkeit, und dadurch wird sein Gegenstand vom nihil negativum unterschieden. Allein es kann nichts destoweniger ein klarer Begriff sein, wenn die objektive Realität der Synthesis, dadurch der Begriff erzeugt wird, nicht besonders dargetan wird; welches aber jederzeit, wie oben gezweifelt worden, auf Prinzipien möglichster Erfahrung und nicht auf dem Grundzüge der Analysis (dem Satze des Widerspruches) beruht. Das ist eine Warnung von der Mög- lichkeit der Begriffe (logische) nicht sofort auf die Möglichkeit der Dinge (reale) zu schließen.
won; but in actual fact nothing at all is said: the assertion is a mere tautology. We must ask: Is the proposition that this or that thing (which, whatever it may be, is allowed as possible) exists, an analytic or a synthetic proposition? If it is analytic, the assertion of the existence of the thing adds nothing to the thought of the thing; but in that case either the thought, which is in us, is the thing itself, or we have presupposed an existence as belonging to the realm of the possible, and have then, on that pretext, inferred its existence from its internal possibility—which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The word 'reality', which in the concept of the thing sounds other than the word 'existence' in the concept of the predicate, is of no avail in meeting this objection. For if all positing (no matter what it may be that is posited) is entitled reality, the thing with all its predicates is already posited in the concept of the subject, and is assumed as actual; and in the predicate this is merely repeated. But if, on the other hand, we admit, as every reasonable person must, that all existential propositions are synthetic, how can we profess to maintain that the predicate of existence cannot be rejected without contradiction? This is a feature which is found only in analytic propositions, and is indeed precisely what constitutes their analytic character.

I should have hoped to put an end to these idle and fruitless disputations in a direct manner, by an accurate determination of the concept of existence, had I not found that the illusion which is caused by the confusion of a logical with a real predicate (that is, with a predicate which determines a thing) is almost beyond correction. Anything we please can be made to serve as a logical predicate; the subject can even be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content. But a determining predicate is a predicate which is added to the concept of the subject and enlarges it. Consequently, it must not be already contained in the concept.

'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, 'God is omnipotent',

1 [Reading, with Erdmann, könnte for könne.]

UNMÖGLICHKEIT EINES ONTOLOGISCHEN BEWEISES


Ich würde zwar hoffen, diese grüblerische: Argumentation, ohne allen Umschweif, durch eine genaue Bestimmung des Begriffs der Existenz zu nichte zu machen; wenn ich nicht gefunden hätte, daß die Illusion, in: Verwechslung eines logischen Prädikats mit einem realen (d. i. der Bestimmung eines Dinges), beinahe alle Belehrung ausschlage. Zum logischen Prädikat kann alles dienen, was man will; so gar das Subjekt kann von sich selbst prädiziert werden; denn die Logik abstrahiert von allem Inhalte. Aber die Bestimmung ist ein Prädikat, welches über das Begriff des Subjekts hinzukommt und ihn vergrößert. Sie muß also nicht in ihm schon enthalten sein.

Sein ist offenbar kein reales Prädikat, d. i. ein Begriff von irgend etwas, was zu dem Begriff eines Dinges hinzukommen könne. Es ist bloß die Position eines Dinges, oder gewisser Bestimmungen an sich selbst. Im logischen Gebrauche ist es lediglich die Kopula eines Urteils: Der Satz:
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ONTOLOGICAL PROOF

contains two concepts, each of which has its object—God and omnipotence. The small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among which is omnipotence), and say 'God is', or 'There is a God', we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept. The content of both must be one and the same; nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses merely what is possible, by my thinking its object (through the expression 'it is') as given absolutely. Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the latter signify the concept, and the former the object and the positing of the object, should the former contain more than the latter, my concept would not, in that case, express the whole object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it. My financial position is, however, affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them (that is, of their possibility). For the object, as it actually exists, is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state) synthetically; and yet the conceived hundred thalers are not themselves in the least increased through thus acquiring existence outside my concept.

By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing—even if we completely determine it—we do not make the least addition to the thing when we further declare that this thing is. Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the concept; and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists. If we think in a thing every feature of reality except one, the missing reality is not added by my saying that this defective thing exists. On the contrary, it exists with the same defect with which I have thought it, since otherwise what exists would be something different from what I thought. When, therefore, I think a being as the supreme reality, without any defect, the question still remains whether

1 [alle Realität außer einer.]

Gott ist allmächtig, enthält zwei Begriffe, die ihre Objekte haben: Gott und Allmacht; das Wort 'ist' ist nicht noch ein Prädikat oben ein, sondern nur das, was das Prädikat beziehungsweise auf das Subjekt setzt: Nehme ich nun das Subjekt (Gott) mit allen seinen Prädikaten (wörterisch auch die Allmacht gehört) zusammen, und sage: Gott ist, oder es ist ein Gott, so setze ich kein neues Prädikat zum Begriffe von Gott, sondern nur das Subjekt an sich selbst mit allen seinen Prädikaten, und zwar der Gegenstand in Beziehung auf meinen Begriff. Beide müssen genau einerlei enthalten, und es kann daher zu dem Begriffe, der bloß die Möglichkeit ausdrückt, darum, daß ich dessen Gegenstand als schlecht hin gegeben (durch den Ausdruck: er ist) denke, nichts weiter hinzukommen. Und so enthält das Wirkliche nichts mehr als das bloß Mögliche. Hundert wirkliche Taler enthalten nicht das mindeste mehr, als hundert mögliche. Denn, da diese den Begriff, jene aber den Gegenstand und dessen Position an sich selbst bedeuten, so würde, im Fall dieser mehr enthielte als jener, mein Begriff nicht den ganzen Gegenstand ausdrücken, und also auch nicht der angemessene Begriff von ihm sein. Aber in meinem Vermögenszustande ist mehr bei hundert wirklichen Taler als bei dem bloßen Begriffe derselben (d. i. ihrer Möglichkeit). Denn der Gegenstand ist bei der Wirklichkeit nicht bloß in meinem Begriffe analytisch enthalten, sondern kommt zu meinem Begriffe (der eine Bestimmung meines Zustandes ist) synthetisch hinzu, ohne daß, durch dieses Sein außerhalb meines Begriffe, diese gedachte hundert Taler selbst im mindesten vermehrt werden.

|| Wenn ich also ein Ding, durch welche und wie viel Prädikate ich will (selbst in der durchgängigen Bestimmung), denke, so kommt dadurch, daß ich noch hinzusetze, dieses Ding ist, nicht des mindesten zu dem Dinge hinzu. Denn sonst würde nicht eben dasselbe, sondern mehr existieren, als ich im Begriffe gedacht hatte, und ich könnte nicht sagen, daß gerade der Gegenstand meines Begriffs existiere. Denke ich mir auch sogar in einem Dinge die Realität außer einer, so kommt dadurch, daß ich sage, ein solches mangelhaftes Ding existiert, die fehlende Realität nicht hinzu, sondern es existiert gerade mit demselben Mangel behaftet, als ich es gedacht habe, sonst würde etwas anderes, als ich dachte, existieren. Denke ich mir nun ein Wesen als die höchste Realität (ohne Mangel), so bleibt noch immer die
it exists or not. For though, in my concept, nothing may be lacking of the possible real content of a thing in general, something is still lacking in its relation to my whole state of thought, namely, [in so far as I am unable to assert] that knowledge of this object is also possible a posteriori. And here we find the source of our present difficulty. Were we dealing with an object of the senses, we could not confound the existence of the thing with the mere concept of it. For through the concept the object is thought only as conforming to the universal conditions of possible empirical knowledge in general, whereas through its existence it is thought as belonging to the context of experience as a whole. In being thus connected with the content of experience as a whole, the concept of the object is not, however, in the least enlarged; all that has happened is that our thought has thereby obtained an additional possible perception. It is not, therefore, surprising that, if we attempt to think existence through the pure category alone, we cannot specify a single mark distinguishing it from mere possibility.

Whatever, therefore, and however much, our concept of an object may contain, we must go outside it, if we are to ascribe existence to the object. In the case of objects of the senses, this takes place through their connection with some one of our perceptions, in accordance with empirical laws. But in dealing with objects of pure thought, we have no means whatsoever of knowing their existence, since it would have to be known in a completely a priori manner. Our consciousness of all existence (whether immediately through perception, or mediate through inferences which connect something with perception) belongs exclusively to the unity of experience; any [alleged] existence outside this field, while not indeed such as we can declare to be absolutely impossible, is of the nature of an assumption which we can never be in a position to justify.

The concept of a supreme being is in many respects a very useful idea; but just because it is a mere idea, it is altogether incapable, by itself alone, of enlarging our knowledge in regard to what exists. It is not even competent to enlighten us as to the possibility of any existence beyond that which is known in and through experience.¹ The analytic criterion of

¹ [in Anschauung der Möglichkeit eines Mehreren.]
IMPOSSIBILITY OF COSMOLOGICAL PROOF

possibility, as consisting in the principle that bare positives (realities) give rise to no contradiction, cannot be denied to it. But since the realities are not given to us in their specific characters; since even if they were, we should still 1 not be in a position to pass judgment; since the criterion of the possibility of synthetic knowledge is never to be looked for save in experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong, the connection of all real properties in a thing is a synthesis, the possibility of which we are unable to determine a priori. And thus the celebrated Leibniz far from having succeeded in what he plumed himself on achieving—the comprehension a priori of the possibility of this sublime ideal being.

The attempt to establish the existence of a supreme being by means of the famous ontological argument of Descartes is therefore merely so much labour and effort lost; we can no more extend our stock of [theoretical] insight by mere ideas, than a merchant can better his position by adding a few noughts to his cash account.

CHAPTER III

Section 5

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A COSMOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

To attempt to extract from a purely arbitrary idea the existence of an object corresponding to it is a quite unnatural procedure and a mere innovation of scholastic subtlety. Such an attempt would never have been made if there had not been antecedently, on the part of our reason, the need to assume as a basis of existence in general something necessary (in which our regress may terminate); and if, since this necessity must be unconditioned and certain a priori, reason had not, in consequence, been forced to seek a concept which would satisfy, if possible, such a demand, and enable us to know an existence in a completely a priori manner. Such a concept was supposed to have been found in the idea of an ens realestimum; and that

4 [Reading, with B, da aber for weil aber.]
5 [Reading, with Wille, stattfinden for stattfindet.]

536 TRANSGENDENTALE DIALEKTIK
analytische Merkmal der Möglichkeit, das darin besteht, daß bloße Positionen (Realitäten) keinen Widerspruch erzeugen, kann ihm zwar nicht gestritten werden; da aber die Verknüpfung aller realen Eigenschaften in einem Ding eine Synthese ist, über deren Möglichkeit wir a priori nicht urteilen können, weil uns die Realitäten spezifisch nicht gegeben sind, und, wenn dieses auch geschähe, überall gar kein Urteil darin stattfindet, weil das Merkmal der Möglichkeit synthetischer Erkenntnisse immer nur in der Erfahrung gesucht werden muß, zu welcher aber der Gegenstand einer Idee nicht gehören kann: so hat der berühmte Leibniz bei weitem das nicht geleistet, wessen er sich schmeichelte, nämlich eines so erhabenen idealen Wesens Möglichkeit a priori einsehen zu wollen.

Es ist also an dem so berühmten ontologischen (Cartesianschen) Beweise, vom Dasein eines höchsten Wesens, aus Begriffen, alle Mühe und Arbeit verloren, und ein Mensch möchte wohl eben so wenig aus bloßen Ideen an Einsichten reicher werden, als ein Kaufmann an Vermögen, wenn er, um seinen Zustand zu verbessern, seinem Kassenbestand einige Nullen anhängen wollte.

|| DES DREITEN HAUPTSTÜCKS

FÜNFTER ABSCHNITT

VON DER UNMÖGLICHKEIT EINES KOSMOLOGISCHEN BEWEISES VOM DASEIN GOTTES

Es war etwas ganz Unnatürliches und eine bloße Neuerung des Schulwitzes, aus einer ganz willkürlich entworfenen Idee das Dasein des ihr entsprechenden Gegenstandes selbst auszulauben zu wollen. In der Tat würde man es nie auf diesem Wege versucht haben, wäre nicht die Bedürfnis unserer Vernunft, zur Existenz überhaupt irgend etwas Notwendiges (bei dem man im Aufsteigen stehen bleiben könne) anzunehmen, vorhergegangen, und wäre nicht die Vernunft, da diese Notwendigkeit unbedingt und a priori gewiß sein muß, gezwungen worden, einen Begriff zu suchen, der, wo möglich, einer solchen Forderung ein Genüge täte, und ein Dasein vollig a priori zu erkennen gäbe: Diesen glaubte man nun in der Idee eines allerrealesten Wesens zu finden, und so
idea was therefore used only for the more definite knowledge of that necessary being, of the necessary existence of which we were already convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. This natural procedure of reason was, however, concealed from view, and instead of ending with this concept, the attempt was made to begin with it, and so to deduce from it that necessity of existence which it was only fitted to supplement. Thus arose the unfortunate ontological proof, which yields satisfaction neither to the natural and healthy understanding nor to the more academic demands of strict proof.

The cosmological proof, which we are now about to examine, retains the connection of absolute necessity with the highest reality, but instead of reasoning, like the former proof, from the highest reality to necessity of existence, it reasons from the previously given unconditioned necessity of some being to the unlimited reality of that being. It thus enters upon a course of reasoning which, whether rational or only pseudo-rational, is at any rate natural, and the most convincing not only for common sense but even for speculative understanding. It also sketches the first outline of all the proofs in natural theology, an outline which has always been and always will be followed, however much embellished and disguised by superfluous additions. This proof, termed by Leibniz the proof a contingentia mundi, we shall now proceed to expound and examine.

It runs thus: If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now 1, at least, exist. Therefore an absolutely necessary being exists. The minor premis contains an experience, the major premis the inference from there being an experience at all to the existence of the necessary. The proof therefore really begins with experience, and is not wholly a priori or ontological. For this reason, and because the object of all possible experience is called the world, it is entitled the cosmological proof. Since, in dealing with the objects.

This inference is too well known to require detailed statement. It depends on the supposedly transcendental law of natural causality: that everything contingent has a cause, which, if itself contingent, must likewise have a cause, till the series of subordinate causes ends with an absolutely necessary cause, without which it would have no completeness.

...
IMPOSSIBILITY OF COSMOLOGICAL PROOF

of experience, the proof abstracts from all special properties through which this world may differ from any other possible world, the title also serves to distinguish it from the physicotheological proof, which is based upon observations of the particular properties of the world disclosed to us by our senses.

The proof then proceeds as follows: The necessary being can be determined in one way only, that is, by one out of each possible pair of opposed predicates. It must therefore be completely determined through its own concept. Now there is only one possible concept which determines a thing completely a priori, namely, the concept of the ens realissimum. The concept of the ens realissimum is therefore the only concept through which a necessary being can be thought. In other words, a supreme being necessarily exists.

In this cosmological argument there are combined so many pseudo-rational principles that speculative reason seems in this case to have brought to bear all the resources of its dialectical skill to produce the greatest possible transcendental illusion. The testing of the argument may meantime be postponed while we detail in order the various devices whereby an old argument is disguised as a new one, and by which appeal is made to the agreement of two witnesses, the one with credentials of pure reason and the other with those of experience. In reality the only witness is that which speaks in the name of pure reason; in the endeavour to pass as a second witness it merely changes its dress and voice. In order to lay a secure foundation for itself, this proof takes its stand on experience, and thereby makes profession of being distinct from the ontological proof, which puts its entire trust in pure a priori concepts. But the cosmological proof uses this experience only for a single step in the argument, namely, to conclude the existence of a necessary being. What properties this being may have, the empirical premiss cannot tell us. Reason therefore abandons experience altogether, and endeavours to discover from mere concepts what properties an absolutely necessary being must have, that is, which among all possible things contains in itself the conditions (requisita) essential to absolute necessity. Now these, it is supposed, are nowhere to be found save in the concept of an ens realissimum; and the conclusion is therefore drawn, that the ens realissimum is the

TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK

538

durch sich diese Welt von jeder möglich Unterscheiden mag, abstrahiert: so wird er schon in seiner Benennung auch vom physikotheologischen Beweise unterschieden, welcher Beobachtungen der besonderen Beschaffenheit dieser unserer Sinnenwelt zu Beweisgründen braucht.

Nun schließt der Beweis weiter: das notwendige Wesen kann nur auf eine einzige Art, d. i. in Ansehung aller möglichen entgengesetzten Prädikate nur durch eines derselben, bestimmt werden, folglich muß es durch seinen Begriff durchgängig bestimmt sein. Nun ist nur ein einziger Begriff von einem Dinge möglich, der dasselbe a priori durchgängig bestimmt, nämlich der des entis realissimi: also ist der Begriff des allererleertesten Wesens der einzige, dadurch ein notwendiges Wesen werden kann, d. i. es existiert ein höchstes Wesen notwendiger Weise.

In diesem kosmologischen Argumente kommen so viel vernünftelnde Grundsätze zusammen, daß die spekulativen Vernunft hier alle ihre dialektische Kunst aufgeboten zu haben scheint, um den größtmöglichen transzendentalen Schein zu Stande zu bringen. Wir wollen ihre Prüfung indessen eine Weile bei Seite setzen, um nur eine Liste derselben offenbar zu machen, mit welcher sie ein altes Argument in verkleideter Gestalt für ein neues aufstellt und sich auf zweier Zeugen Einstimmung beruft, nämlich einen reinen Vernunftzeugen und einen anderen von empirischer Glaubigubung, da es doch nur der erstere allein ist, welcher bloß seinen Anzug und Stimme verändert, um für einen zweiten gehalten zu werden. Um seinen Grund recht sicher zu legen, fügt sich dieser Beweis auf Erfahrung und gibt sich dadurch das Ansehen, als sei er vom ontologischen Beweise unterschieden, der auf lauter reine Begriffe a priori sein ganzes Vertrauen setzt. Dieser Erfahrung aber bedient sich der kosmologische Beweis nur, um einen einzigen Schritt zu tun, nämlich zum Dasein eines notwendigen Wesens überhaupt. Was dieses für Eigenschaften haben kann, der empirische Beweis darum nicht lehren, sondern da nimmt die Vernunft gänzlich von ihm Abschied und forscht hinter letzter Begriffen: was nämlich ein absolutnotwendiges Wesen überhaupt für Eigenschaften haben müsse, d. i. welches unter allen möglichsen Dingen die erforderlichen Bedingungen (requisita) zu einer absoluten Notwendigkeit in sich enthalte. Nun glaubt sie im Begriffe eines allererleertesten Wesens einzig und alleine diese Requisite anzutreffen, und schließt sodann: das ist das schlechterdingsnotwendige Wesen. Es
absolutely necessary being. But it is evident that we are here presupposing that the concept of the highest reality is completely adequate to the concept of absolute necessity of existence; that is, that the latter can be inferred from the former. Now this is the proposition maintained by the ontological proof; it is here being assumed in the cosmological proof, and indeed made the basis of the proof; and yet it is an assumption with which this latter proof has professed to dispense. For absolute necessity is an existence determined from mere concepts. If I say, the concept of the ens realissimum is a concept, and indeed the only concept, which is appropriate and adequate to necessary existence, I must also admit that necessary existence can be inferred from this concept. Thus the so-called cosmological proof really owes any cogency which it may have to the ontological proof from mere concepts. The appeal to experience is quite superfluous; experience may perhaps lead us to the concept of absolute necessity, but is unable to demonstrate this necessity as belonging to any determinate thing. For immediately we endeavour to do so, we must abandon all experience and search among pure concepts to discover whether any one of them contains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary being. If in this way we can determine the possibility of a necessary being, we likewise establish its existence. For what we are then saying is this: that of all possible beings there is one which carries with it absolute necessity, that is, that this being exists with absolute necessity.

Fallacious and misleading arguments are most easily detected if set out in correct syllogistic form. This we now proceed to do in the instance under discussion.

If the proposition, that every absolutely necessary being is likewise the most real of all beings, is correct (and this is the nurvis probandi of the cosmological proof), it must, like all affirmative judgments, be convertible, at least per accidens. It therefore follows that some entia realissima are likewise absolutely necessary beings: But one ens realissimum is in no respect different from another, and what is true of some under this concept is true also of all. In this case, therefore, I can convert the proposition simpliciter, not only per accidens, and say that every ens realissimum is a necessary being. But

UNMÖGLICHKEIT EINES KOSMOLOGISCHEN BEWEISES 539

ist aber klar, daß man hiebei voraussetze, der Begriff eines Wesens von der höchsten Realität tut dem Begriffe der absoluten Notwendigkeit im Dasein völlig genug, d. i. es lasse sich aus jener auf diese schließen; ein Satz, den das ontologische Argument behauptete, welches man also im kosmologischen Beweise annimmt und zum Grunde legt, da man es doch hatte vermeiden wollen. Denn die absolute Notwendigkeit ist ein Dasein aus bloßen Begriffen. Sage ich nun: der Begriff des entis realissimi ist ein solcher Begriff, und zwar der einzige, der zu dem notwendigen Dasein passend und ihm adäquat ist: so muß ich auch einräumen, daß aus ihm das letztere geschlossen werden können. Es ist also eigentlich nur der ontologische Beweis aus lauter Begriffen, der in dem sogenannten kosmologischen alle Beweiskraft enthält, und die angebliche Erfahrung ist ganz müßig, vielleicht, um uns nur auf den Begriff der absoluten Notwendigkeit zu führen, nicht aber, um diese an irgend einem bestimmten Dinge darzutun. Denn sobald wir dieses zur Absicht haben, müssen wir sofort alle Erfahrung verlassen, und unter reinen Begriffen suchen, welcher von ihnen wohl die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit eines absoluten notwendigen Wesens enthalte. Ist aber auf solche Weise nur die Möglichkeit eines solchen Wesens eingesehen, so ist auch sein Dasein darzutun; denn es heißt so vieles als: unter allem Möglichem ist eines, das absolute Notwendigkeit bei sich führt, d. i. dieses Wesen existiert schlechterdings notwendig.

Alle Blendwerke im Schließen entdecken sich am leichtesten, wenn man sie auf schulp gerechte Art vor Augen stellt. Hier ist eine solche Darstellung.

Wenn der Satz richtig ist: ein jedes schlechtthinnotwendiges Wesen ist zugleich das allerrealste Wesen (als welches der nervus probandi des kosmologischen Beweises ist): so muß er sich, wie alle bejahende Urteile, wenigstens per accidens umkehren lassen; also: einige allerrealste Wesen sind zugleich schlechtthinnotwendige Wesen. Nun ist aber ein ens realissimum von einem anderen in keinem Stücke unterschieden, und, was also von einigen unter diesem Begriffe enthaltenen gilt, das gilt auch von allen. Mithin werde ick'st (in diesem Falle) auch schlechtth in umkehren können, d. i. ein jedes allerreallestes Wesen ist ein notwen-

A: ick®.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF COSMOLOGICAL PROOF 511

since this proposition is determined from its \(^1\) a priori concepts alone, the mere concept of the \textit{ens realissimum} must carry with it the absolute necessity of that being; and this is precisely what the ontological proof has asserted and what the cosmological proof has refused to admit, although the conclusions of the latter are indeed covertly based on it.

Thus the second path upon which speculative reason enters in its attempt to prove the existence of a supreme being is not only as deceptive as the first, but has this additional defect, that it is guilty of an \textit{ignoratio elenchii}. It professes to lead us by a new path, but after a short circuit brings us back to the very path which we had deserted at its bidding.

I have stated that in this cosmological argument there lies hidden a whole nest of dialectical assumptions, which the transcendental critique can easily detect and destroy. These deceptive principles I shall merely enumerate, leaving to the reader, who by this time will be sufficiently expert in these matters, the task of investigating them further, and of refuting them.

We find, for instance, (1) the transcendental principle whereby from the contingent we infer a cause. This principle is applicable only in the sensible world; outside that world it has no meaning whatsoever. For the mere intellectual concept of the contingent cannot give rise to any synthetic proposition, such as that of causality. The principle of causality has no meaning and no application for its application save only in the sensible world. But in the cosmological proof it is precisely in order to enable us to advance beyond the sensible world that it is employed. (2) The inference to a first cause, from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes, given one after the other, in the sensible world. The principles of the employment of reason do not justify this conclusion even within the world of experience, still less beyond this world in a realm into which this series can never be extended. (3) The unjustified self-satisfaction of reason in respect of the completion of this series. The removal of all the conditions without which no concept of necessity is possible is taken by reason to be a completion of the concept of the series, on the ground that we can then conceive nothing further. (4) The confusion between the

\(^1\) [Erdmann would read \textit{reinen} in place of \textit{seinen}.]

\(^{540}\) TRANSZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK
diges Wesen. Weil nun dieser Satz bloß aus seinen Begriffen a priori bestimmt ist: so muß der blöse Begriff des realesten Wesens auch die absolute Notwendigkeit desselben bei sich führen; welches eben der ontologische Beweis behauptete, und der kosmologische nicht anerkennen wollte, gleichwohl aber seinen Schlüssen, obzwar versteckter Weise, unterlag.

So ist denn der zweite Weg, den die spekulative Vernunft nimmt, um das Dasein des höchsten Wesens zu beweisen, nicht allein mit dem ersten gleich trüglich, sondern hat noch dieses Tadelhafte an sich, daß er eine ignoratio elenchii begeht, indem er uns verheißt, einen neuen Fußsteg zu führen, aber, nach einem kleinen Umschweif, uns wiederum auf den alten zurückbringt, den wir seinerseits verlassen hatten.

Ich habe kurz vorher gesagt, daß in diesem kosmologischen Argument sich ein ganzes Nest von dialectischen Anmaßungen verborgen halte, welches die transzendentale Kritik leicht entdecken und zerstören kann. Ich will sie jetzt nur anführen und es dem schon geübten Leser überlassen, den trüglichen Grundsätzen weiter nachzuforschen und sie aufzuheben.

Da befindet sich denn z. B. 1) der transzendentale Grundsatz, vom Zufälligen auf eine Ursache zu schließen, welcher nur in der Sinnwelt von Bedeutung ist, außerhalb der selben aber auch nicht einmal einen Sinn hat. Denn der bloß intellektuelle Begriff des Zufälligen kann gar keinen synthetischen Satz, wie den der Kausalität, hervorbringen, und der Grundsatz der letzteren hat gar keine Bedeutung und kein Merkmal seines Gebrauchs, als nur in der Sinnwelt; hier aber sollte er gerade dazu dienen, um über die Sinnwelt hinaus zu kommen. 2) Der \textit{Schluß}, von der Unmöglichkeit einer unendlichen Reihe über einander abgegebener Ursachen in der Sinnwelt auf eine erste Ursache zu schließen, dazu uns die Prinzipien des Vernunftgebrauchs selbst in der Erfahrung nicht berechtigen, viel weniger diesen Grundsatz über dieselbe (wohin diese Kette gar nicht verlängert werden kann) auszulehnen können. 3) Die falsche Selbstbefriedigung der Vernunft; in Ansehung der Vollendung dieser Reihe, dadurch, daß man endlich alle Bedingung, ohne welche doch kein Begriff einer Notwendigkeit stattfinden kann, wegschaftet, und, daß man alsdann nichts weiter begreifen kann, dieses für eine Vollendung seines Begriffs anmitt. 4) Die Verwechslung der logischen

\(^{546}\) \textit{Akad.-Ausz.: 'Grundsatz'.}
Möglichkeit eines Begriffs von aller vereinigten Realität (ohne inneren Widerspruch) mit der transzendentalen, welche ein Principium der Tunlichkeit einer solchen Synthesis bedarf, das aber wiederum nur auf das Feld möglicher Erfahrungen gehen kann, u. s. w.

Das Kunststück des kosmologischen Beweises zieleth bloß darauf ab, um dem Beweise des Daseins eines notwendigen Wesens a priori durch bloße Begriffe auszuweichen, der ontologisch geführt werden müßte; wozu wir uns aber gezwungen finden mit dieser Absicht schließen aus einem zum Grunde gelegten wirklichen Dasein (einer Erfahrung überhaupt), so gut es sich will tun lassen, auf irgend eine schlechterdingsnotwendige Bedingung desselben. Wir haben alsdenn dieser ihre Möglichkeit nicht nötig zu erklären. Denn, wenn ich bewiesen ist, daß sie dasei, so ist die Frage wegen ihrer Möglichkeit ganz unnötig. Wollen wir nun dieses notwendige Wesen nach seiner Beschaffenheit näher bestimmen, so suchen wir nicht dasjenige, was hinreichend ist, aus seinem Begriffe die Notwendigkeit des Daseins zu begreifen; denn, könnten wir dieses, so hätten wir keine empirische Voraussetzung nötig; nein, wir suchen nur die negative Bedingung (conditio sine qua non), ohne welche ein Wesen nicht absoluten notwendig sein würde. Nun würde das in aller andern Art von Schlüssen, aus einer gegebenen Folte auf ihren Grund, wohl angehen; es trifft sich aber hier ungünstiger Weise, daß die Bedingung, die man zur absoluten Notwendigkeit fordert, nur in einem einzigen Wesen angetroffen werden kann, welches daher in seinem Begriffe alles, was zur absoluten Notwendigkeit erforderlich ist, enthalten müßte, und also einen Schluß a priori auf dieselbe möglich macht; d. i. ich müßte auch umgekehrt schließen können: welchem Dinge dieser Begriff (der höchsten Realität) zukommt, das ist schlechterdings notwendig, und, kann ich so nicht schließen (wie ich denn dieses gethan muß, wenn ich den ontologischen Beweis vermeiden will), so bin ich auch auf meinem neuen Wege verunglückt und befunde mich wiederum da, von wo ich ausging. Der Begriff des höchsten Wesens tut wohl allen Fragen a priori ein Genüße, die wegen der inneren Bestimmungen eines Dinges können aufgetreten werden, und ist darum auch ein Ideal ohne Gleiches, weil der allgemeine Begriff das-

1 A: "Gleiches", weil der allgemeine Begriff das-
IMPOSSIBILITY OF COSMOLOGICAL PROOF 513

individual as being among the things that are possible. But it does not give satisfaction concerning the question of its own existence—though this is the real purpose of our enquiries—and if anyone admitted the existence of a necessary being but wanted to know which among all [existing] things is to be identified with that being, we could not answer: "This, not that, is the necessary being."

We may indeed be allowed to postulate the existence of an all-sufficient being, as the cause of all possible effects, with a view to lightening the task of reason in its search for the unity of the grounds of explanation. But in presuming so far as to say that such a being necessarily exists, we are no longer giving modest expression to an admissible hypothesis, but are confidently laying claim to apodictic certainty. For the knowledge of what we profess to know as absolutely necessary must itself carry with it absolute necessity.

The whole problem of the transcendental ideal amounts to this: either, given absolute necessity, to find a concept which possesses it, or, given the concept of something, to find that something to be absolutely necessary. If either task be possible, so must the other; for reason recognises that only as absolutely necessary which follows of necessity from its concept. But both tasks are quite beyond our utmost efforts to satisfy our understanding in this matter; and equally unavailing are all attempts to induce it to acquiesce in its incapacity.

Unconditioned necessity, which we so indispensably require as the last bearer of all things, is for human reason the veritable abyss. Eternity itself, in all its terrible sublimity, as depicted by a Haller, is far from making the same overwhelming impression on the mind; for it only measures the duration of things, it does not support them. We cannot put aside, and yet also cannot endure the thought, that a being, which we represent to ourselves as supreme amongst all possible beings, should, as it were, say to itself: 'I am from eternity to eternity, and outside me there is nothing save what is through my will, but whence then am I?' All support here fails us; and the greatest perfection, no less than the least perfection, is unsubstantial and baseless for the merely speculative reason, which

1 [Albrecht von Haller (1708–1777), a writer on medical and kindred subjects, author of Die Alpen and other poems.]
makes not the least effort to retain either the one or the other, and feels indeed no loss in allowing them to vanish entirely.

Many forces in nature, which manifest their existence through certain effects, remain for us inscrutable; for we cannot track them sufficiently far by observation. Also, the transcendental object lying at the basis of appearances (and with it the reason why our sensibility is subject to certain supreme conditions rather than to others) is and remains for us inscrutable.

The thing itself\(^1\) is indeed given, but we can have no insight into its nature: But it is quite otherwise with an ideal of pure reason; it can never be said to be inscrutable. For since it is not required to give any credentials of its reality save only the need on the part of reason to complete all synthetic unity by means of it; and since, therefore, it is in no wise given as thinkable object, it cannot be inscrutable in the manner in which an object is. On the contrary it\(^8\) must, as a mere idea, find its place and its solution in the nature of reason, and must therefore allow of investigation. For it is of the very essence of reason that we should be able to give an account of all our concepts, opinions, and assertions, either upon objective or, in the case of mere illusion, upon subjective grounds.

DISCOVERY AND EXPLANATION

of the Dialectical Illusion in all Transcendental Proofs of the Existence of a Necessary Being

Both the above proofs were transcendental, that is, were attempted independently of empirical principles. For although the cosmological proof presupposes an experience in general, it is not based on any particular property of this experience but on pure principles of reason, as applied to an existence given through empirical consciousness in general. Further, it soon abandons this guidance and relies on pure concepts alone. What, then, in these transcendental proofs is the cause of the dialectical but natural illusion which connects the concepts of necessity and supreme reality, and which realises and hypostatises what can be an idea only? Why are we constrained to assume that some one among existing things is in itself

\[^1\] [die Sache selbst.]
\[^8\] [Reading, with Hartenstein, as for er.]

TRANszENDINGALE DIALEKTIK

spekulativen Vernunft, der es nichts kostet, die eine so wie die andere ohne die mindesten Hindernis verschwinden zu lassen.

Viele Kräfte der Natur, die ihr Dasein durch gewisse Wirkungen äußern, bleiben für uns unerforschlich; denn wir können ihnen durch Beobachtung nicht weit genug nachspüren. Das den Erscheinungen zum Grunde liegende transzendente Objekt, und mit ihm der Grund, warum unsere Sinnlichkeit diese vielmehr als an ihrer obersten Bedingungen habe, sind und bleiben für uns unerforschlich, obzwar die Sache selbst übrigens gegeben, aber nicht eingesehen ist. Ein Ideal der reinen Vernunft kann aber nicht unerforschlich bleiben, weil es weiter keine Beglaubigung seiner Realität aufzuweisen hat, als die Bedürfnis der Vernunft, vermittelst desselben alle synthetische Einheit zu vollenden. Da es also nicht einmal als denkbare Gegenstand gegeben ist, so ist es auch nicht als ein solcher unerforschlich; vielmehr muß es, als bloße Idee, in der Natur der Vernunft seinen Sitz und seine Auflösung finden, und also erforscht werden können; denn eben darin besteht Vernunft, daß wir von allen unseren Begriffen, Meinungen und Behauptungen, es sei aus objektiven; oder, wenn sie ein bloßer Schein sind, aus subjektiven Gründen, Rechenschaft geben können.

ENTDECKUNG UND ERKLÄRUNG

DES DIALEKTISCHEN SCHEINS IN ALLEN TRANszENDENTALEN BEWEISEN VOM DASEIN EINES NOTWENDIGEN WESENS

Beide bisher geführte Beweise waren transzendental, d. i. unabhängig von empirischen Prinzipien versucht. Denn, obgleich der kosmologische eine Erfahrung überhaupt zum Grunde legt, so ist er doch nicht aus irgend einer besonderen Beschaffenheit derselben, sondern aus reinen Vernunftprinzipien, in Beziehung auf eine durchs empircische Be- wußtsein überhaupt gegebene Existenz, geführt, und verläßt sogar diese Anleitung, um sich auf lauter reinen Begriffe zu stützen. Was ist nun in diesen transzendentalen Beweisen die Ursache des dialektischen, aber natürlichen Scheins, welcher die Begriffe der Notwendigkeit und höchsten Realität verknüpfen, und dasjenige, was doch nur Idee sein kann, realisiert und hypostasiert? Was ist die Ursache der Unvermeidlichkeit, etwas als an sich notwendig unter den existierenden Dingen anzunehmen, und doch zugleich vor

\[^1\] Akad.-Aug.: est. - \[^8\] A: stone.
necessary, and yet at the same time to shrink back from the
existence of such a being as from an abyss? And how are
we to secure that reason may come to an agreement with
itself in this matter, and that from the wavering condition of
a diffident approval, ever again withdrawn, it may arrive at
settled insight?

There is something very strange in the fact, that once we
assume something to exist we cannot avoid inferring that
something exists necessarily. The cosmological argument rests
on this quite natural (although not therefore certain) inference.
On the other hand, if I take the concept of anything, no
matter what, I find that the existence of this thing can never
be represented by me as absolutely necessary, and that, what-
ever it may be that exists, nothing prevents me from thinking
its non-existence. Thus while I may indeed be obliged to
assume something necessary as a condition of the existent in
general, I cannot think any particular thing as in itself neces-
sary. In other words, I can never complete the regress to the
conditions of existence save by assuming a necessary being,
and yet am never in a position to begin with such a being.

If I am constrained to think something necessary as a
condition of existing things, but am unable to think any
particular thing as in itself necessary, it inevitably follows that
necessity and contingency do not concern the things them-
sonselves; otherwise there would be a contradiction. Conse-
quently, neither of these two principles can be objective. They
may, however, be regarded as subjective principles of reason.
The one calls upon us to seek something necessary as a con-
dition of all that is given as existent, that is, to stop nowhere
until we have arrived at an explanation which is complete
_a priori_; the other forbids us ever to hope for this completion,
that is, forbids us to treat anything empirical as uncondi-
tioned and to exempt ourselves thereby from the toil of its
further derivation. Viewed in this manner, the two principles,
as merely heuristic and _regulative_, and as concerning only the
formal interest of reason, can very well stand side by side. The
one prescribes that we are to philosophise about nature as if
there were a necessary first ground for all that belongs to
existence—solely, however, for the purpose of bringing sys-
tematic unity into our knowledge, by always pursuing such
dem Dasein eines solchen Wesens als einem Abgründe zu-
rückzukehren, und wie fängt man es an, daß sich die Ver-
nunft hierüber selbst verstehe, und, aus dem schwankenden
Zustande eines schüchternen, und immer wiederum zurück-
genommenen Beifalls, zur ruhigen Einsicht gelange?

Es ist etwas überaus Merkwürdiges, daß, wenn man vor-
ausetzt, etwas existiere, man der Folgerung nicht Umgang
haben kann, daß auch irgend etwas notwendigerweise exi-
siere. Auf diesem ganz natürlichen (obzwar darum noch
nicht sicheren) Schlusses beruhete das kosmologische Argu-
ment. Dagegen mag ich einen Begriff von einem Dinge an-
nnehmen, welchen ich will, so finde ich, daß sein Dasein nie-
mals von mir als schlechterdings notwendig vorgestellt wer-
den könne, und daß mich nichts hindere, es mag existieren,
was da wolle, das Nichtsein desselben zu denken, mithin ich
zwar zu dem Existierenden überhaupt etwas Notwendiges
annahmen müsse, kein einziges Ding aber selbst als an sich
notwendig denken könne. Das heißt: ich kann das Zurück-
gehen zu den Bedingungen des Existierens niemals voll-
einden, ohne ein notwendiges Wesen anzunehmen, ich kann
aber von demselben niemals anfangen.

Wenn ich zu existierenden Dingen überhaupt etwas Not-
wendiges denken muß, kein Ding aber an sich selbst als
notwendig zu denken befugt bin, so folgt daraus unvermeid-
lich, daß Notwendigkeit und Zufälligkeit nicht die Dinge
selbst angehen und treffen müßte, weil sonst ein Wider-

spruch vorgehen würde; mithin keiner dieser beiden Grund-
sätze objektiv sei, sondern sie allenfalls nur subjektive Prin-
zipien der Vernunft sein können, nämlich einerseits zu allem,
was als existierend gegeben ist, etwas zu suchen, das not-
wendig ist, d. i. niemals anderswo als bei einer _a priori_ voll-
endeten Erklärung aufzuhören, andererseits aber auch diese
Vollendung niemals zu hothen, d. i. nichts-Empirisches als
unbedingt anzunehmen, und sich dadurch fernerer Ablei-
tung zu überheben. In solcher Bedeutung können beide
Grundsätze als bloß heuristisch und _regulative_ die nichts
als das formale Interesse der Vernunft besorgen, ganz wohl
bei einander bestehen. Denn der eine sagt, ihr sollt so über
t die Natur philosophieren, als ob es zu allem, was zur Exi-
stenz gehört, einen notwendigen ersten Grund gebe, ledig-
lich um systematische Einheit in eure Erkenntnis zu brin-
an idea, as an imagined ultimate ground. The other warns us not to regard any determination whatsoever of existing things as such an ultimate ground, that is, as absolutely necessary, but to keep the way always open for further derivation, and so to treat each and every determination as always conditioned by something else. But if everything which is perceived in things must necessarily be treated by us as conditioned, nothing that allows of being empirically given can be regarded as absolutely necessary.

Since, therefore, the absolutely necessary is only intended to serve as a principle for obtaining the greatest possible unity among appearances, as being their ultimate ground; and since—inasmuch as the second rule commands us always to regard all empirical causes of unity as themselves derived—we can never reach this unity within the world, it follows that we must regard the absolutely necessary as being outside the world.

While the philosophers of antiquity regard all form in nature as contingent, they follow the judgment of the common man in their view of matter as original and necessary. But if, instead of regarding matter relatively, as substratum of appearances, they had considered it in itself, and as regards its existence, the idea of absolute necessity would at once have disappeared. For there is nothing which absolutely binds reason to accept such an existence; on the contrary it can always annihilate it in thought, without contradiction; absolute necessity is a necessity that is to be found in thought alone.

This belief must therefore have been due to a certain regulative principle. In fact, extension and impenetrability (which between them make up the concept of matter) constitute the supreme empirical principle of the unity of appearances; and this principle, so far as it is empirically unconditioned, has the character of a regulative principle. Nevertheless, since every determination of the matter which constitutes what is real in appearances, including impenetrability, is an effect (action) which must have its cause and which is therefore always derivative in character, matter is not compatible with the idea of a necessary being as a principle of all derived unity.

(For its real properties, being derivative, are one and all only

1 [Prinzipium. Kant's more usual term is Prinzip.]

546 TRAUSFENDIALE DIALEKTIK

gen, indem ihr einer solchen Idee, nämlich einem eingebildeten obersten Grunde, nachgeht; der andere aber warnt euch, keine einzige Bestimmung, die die Existenz der Dinge betrifft, für einen solchen obersten Grund, d. i. als absolutnotwendig anzunehmen, sondern euch noch immer den Weg zur ferneren Ableitung offen zu erhalten, und sie daher jederzeit noch als bedingt zu behandeln. Wenn aber von uns alles, was an den Dingen wahrgenommen wird, als bedingtnotwendig betrachtet werden muß: so kann auch kein Ding (das empirisch gegeben sein mag) als absolutnotwendig angesehen werden.

Es folgt aber hieraus, daß ihr das Absolutnotwendige außerhalb der Welt annehmen müßt; weil es nur zu einem Prinzip der größtmöglichen Einheit der Erscheinungen, als deren oberster Grund, dienen soll, und ihr in der Welt niemals dahin gelangen könnt, weil die zweite Regel euch gebietet, alle empirische Ursachen der Einheit jederzeit als abgeleitet anzusehen.

Die Philosophen des Altertums sehen alle Form der Natur als zufällig, die Materie aber, nach dem Urteile der gemeinen Vernunft, als ursprünglich und notwendig an. Würden sie aber die Materie nicht als Substratum der Erscheinungen respektiv, sondern an sich selbst ihrem Dasein nach betrachtet haben, so wäre die Idee der absoluten Notwendigkeit sogleich verschwunden. Denn es ist nichts, was die Vernunft an dieses Dasein schlechthin bindet, sondern sie kann solches, jederzeit und ohne Widerstreit, in Gedanken aufheben; in Gedanken aber zugleich auch allein die absolute Notwendigkeit. || Es mußte also bei dieser Überredung ein gewisses regulatives Prinzip zum Grunde liegen. In der Tat ist auch Ausdehnung und Undurchdringlichkeit (die zusammen den Begriff von Materie ausmachen) das oberste empirische Principium der Einheit der Erscheinungen, und hat, sofern als es empirisch unbedingt ist, eine Eigenschaft des regulativen Prinzips an sich. Gleichwohl, da jede Bestimmung der Materie, welche das Reale derselben ausmacht, mithin auch die Undurchdringlichkeit, eine Wirkung (Handlung) ist, die ihre Ursache haben muß, und daher immer noch abgeleitet ist, so schickt sich die Materie doch nicht zur Idee eines notwendigen Wesens, als eines Prinzips aller abgeleiteten Einheit; weil jede ihrer realen Eigenschaften, als abgeleitet, nur bedingt notwendig.

1 A: seore. - 2 A: seahere.
ILLUSION IN TRANSCENDENTAL PROOFS 517

conditionally necessary, and so allow of being removed—
wherewith the whole existence of matter would be removed.)
If this were not the case, we should have reached the ultimate ground of unity by empirical means—which is forbidden by the second regulative principle. It therefore follows that matter, and in general whatever belongs to the world, is not compatible with the idea of a necessary original being, even when the latter is regarded simply as a principle of the greatest empirical unity. That being or principle must be set outside the world, leaving us free to derive the appearances of the world and their existence from other appearances, with unfailing confidence, just as if there were no necessary being, while yet we are also free to strive unceasingly towards the completeness of that derivation, just as if such a being were presupposed as an ultimate ground.

As follows from these considerations, the ideal of the supreme being is nothing but a regulative principle of reason, which directs us to look upon all connection in the world as if it originated from an all-sufficient necessary cause. We can base upon the ideal the rule of a systematic and, in accordance with universal laws, necessary unity in the explanation of that connection; but the ideal is not an assertion of an existence necessary in itself. At the same time we cannot avoid the transcendental subreption, by which this formal principle is represented as constitutive, and by which this unity is hypo-

tatised. We proceed here just as we do in the case of space. Space is only a principle of sensibility, but since it is the primary source and condition of all shapes, which are only so many limitations of itself, it is taken as something absolutely necessary, existing in its own right, and as an object given a priori in itself. In the same way, since the systematic unity of nature cannot be prescribed as a principle for the empirical employment of our reason, except in so far as we presuppose the idea of an ens realissimum as the supreme cause, it is quite natural that this latter idea should be represented as an actual object, which, in its character of supreme condition, is also necessary—thus changing a regulative into a constitutive principle. That such a substitution has been made becomes evident, when we consider this supreme being, which relatively

1 [Principium.]
to the world is absolutely (unconditionally) necessary, as a thing in and by itself. For we are then unable to conceive what can be meant by its necessity. The concept of necessity is only to be found in our reason, as a formal condition of thought; it does not allow of being hypostatised as a material condition of existence.

CHAPTER III

Section 6

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL PROOF

If, then, neither the concept of things in general nor the experience of any existence in general can supply what is required, it remains only to try whether a determinate experience, the experience of the things of the present world, and the constitution and order of these, does not provide the basis of a proof which may help us to attain to an assured conviction of a supreme being. Such proof we propose to entitle the physico-theological. Should this attempt also fail, it must follow that no satisfactory proof of the existence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea can be possible by pure speculative reason.

In view of what has already been said, it is evident that we can count upon a quite easy and conclusive answer to this enquiry. For how can any experience ever be adequate to an idea? The peculiar nature of the latter consists just in the fact that no experience can ever be equal to it. The transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient original being is so overwhelmingly great, so high above everything empirical, the latter being always conditioned, that it leaves us at a loss, partly because we can never find in experience material sufficient to satisfy such a concept, and partly because it is always in the sphere of the conditioned that we carry out our search, seeking there ever vainly for the unconditioned—no law of any empirical synthesis giving us an example of any such unconditioned or providing the least guidance in its pursuit.

If the supreme being should itself stand in this chain of

Welt schlechthin (unbedingt) notwendig war, als Ding für sich betrachtet, diese Notwendigkeit keines Begriffs fähig ist, und also nur als formale Bedingung des Denkens, nicht aber als materiale und hypostatische Bedingung des Daseins, in meiner Vernunft anzutreffen gewesen sein müsse.

DES DRITTEN HAUPTSTÜCKS
SECHSTER ABSCHNITT:
VON DER UNMÖGLICHKEIT
DES PHYSIKOTHEOLOGISCHEN BEWEISES

Wenn denn weder der Begriff von Dingen überhaupt, noch die Erfahrung von irgend einem Dasein überhaupt, das, was gefordert wird, leisten kann, so bleibt noch ein Mittel übrig, zu versuchen, ob nicht eine bestimmte Erfahrung, mithin die der Dinge der gegenwärtigen Welt, ihre Beschaffenheit und Anordnung, einen Beweisgrund abgebe, der uns sicher zur Überzeugung von dem Dasein eines höchsten Wesens verhelfen könnte. Einen solchen Beweis würden wir den physikotheologischen nennen. Sollte dieser auch unmöglich sein: so ist überall kein genügender Beweis aus bloß spekulatorischer Vernunft für das Dasein eines Wesens, welches unserer transcendentalen Idee entspräche, möglich.


Würde das höchste Wesen in dieser Kette der Bedingungen

1 A: wiirden.
PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL PROOF IMPOSSIBLE 519

conditions, it would be a member of the series, and like the lower members which it precedes, would call for further enquiry as to the still higher ground from which it follows. If, on the other hand, we propose to separate it from the chain, and to conceive it as a purely intelligible being, existing apart from the series of natural causes, by what bridge can reason contrive to pass over to it? For all laws governing the transition from effects to causes, all synthesis and extension of our knowledge, refer to nothing but possible experience, and therefore solely to objects of the sensible world, and apart from them can have no meaning whatsoever.

This world presents to us so immeasurable a stage of variety, order, purposiveness, and beauty, as displayed alike in its infinite extent and in the unlimited divisibility of its parts, that even with such knowledge as our weak understanding can acquire of it, we are brought face to face with so many marvels immeasurably great, that all speech loses its force, all numbers their power to measure, our thoughts themselves all definiteness, and that our judgment of the whole resolves itself into an amazement which is speechless, and only the more eloquent on that account. Everywhere we see a chain of effects and causes, of ends and means, a regularity in origination and dissolution. Nothing has of itself come into the condition in which we find it to exist, but always points to something else as its cause, while this in turn commits us to repetition of the same enquiry. The whole universe must thus sink into the abyss of nothingness. unless, over and above this infinite chain of contingencies, we assume something to support it—something which is original and independently self-subsistent, and which as the cause of the origin of the universe secures also at the same time its continuance. What magnitude are we to ascribe to this supreme cause—admitting that it is supreme in respect of all things in the world? We are not acquainted with the whole content of the world, still less do we know how to estimate its magnitude by comparison with all that is possible. But since we cannot, as regards causality, dispense with an ultimate and supreme being,1 what is there to prevent us ascribing to it a degree of perfection that sets it above everything else that is possible? This we can easily do—though

1 [ein drosseltes und obertes Wesen.]

A 622
B 650

UNMÖGLICHKEIT DES PHYSIKOTHEOLOG. BEWEISES 549

Die geganwärtige Welt eröffnet uns einen so unermöglichen Schauplatz von Mannigfaltigkeit, Ordnung, Zweck-mäßigkeit und Schönheit, man mag diese nun in der Unendlichkeit des Raumes, oder in der unbegrenzten Teilung des- selben verfolgen, daß selbst nach den Kenntnissen, welche unser schwacher Verstand davon hat erwerben können, alle Sprache, über so viele und unabschließliche, Wunder, ihren Nachdruck, alle Zahlen ihre Kraft zu messen, und selbst unsere Gedanken alle Begrenzung vermissen, so, daß sich unser Urteil von Ganzen in ein sprachloses, also desto be- redteres Erstaunen auflösen muß. Allerwärts sehen wir eine Kette von Wirkungen und Ursachen, von Zweck und den Mitteln, Regelmäßigkeit im Entstehen oder Vergehen, und, indem nichts von selbst in den Zustand getreten ist, darin es sich befindet, so weiset er immer weiter hin nach einem anderen Dinge, als seiner Ursache, welche gerade eben dieselbe weitere Nachfrage notwendig macht, so, daß auf solche Weise das ganze All im Abgründe des Nichts versinken müste, nähme man nicht etwas an, das außerhalb diesem unendlichen Zufälligen, für sich selbst ursprünglich und unabhängig bestehend, dasselbe hielte, und als die Ursache seines Ursprungs ihm zugleich seine Fortdauer sicherte. Diese höchste Ursache (in Anschung aller Dinge der Welt), wie groß soll man sie sich denken? Die Welt kennen wir nicht ihrem ganzen Inhalt selber, noch weniger wissen wir ihre Größe durch die Vergleichung mit allem, was möglich ist, zu schätzen. Was hindert uns aber, daß da wir einmal in Absicht auf Kausalität ein äußerstes und oberses Wesen bedürfen, wir3 es nicht zugleich dem Grade der Vollkommenheit nach über alles andere Mögliche setzen soll-

only through the slender outline of an abstract concept—by representing this being to ourselves as combining in itself all possible perfection, as in a single substance. This concept is in conformity with the demand of our reason for parsimony of principles; it is free from self-contradiction, and is never decisively contradicted by any experience; and it is likewise of such a character that it contributes to the extension of the employment of reason within experience, through the guidance which it yields in the discovery of order and purposiveness.

This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the common reason of mankind. It enlivens the study of nature, just as it itself derives its existence and gains ever new vigour from that source. It suggests ends and purposes, where our observation would not have detected them by itself, and extends our knowledge of nature by means of the guiding-concept of a special unity, the principle of which is outside nature. This knowledge again reacts on its cause, namely, upon the idea which has led to it, and so strengthens the belief in a supreme Author [of nature] that the belief acquires the force of an irresistible conviction.

It would therefore not only be uncomfortable but utterly vain to attempt to diminish in any way the authority of this argument. Reason, constantly upheld by this ever-increasing evidence, which, though empirical, is yet so powerful, cannot be so depressed through doubts suggested by subtle and abstruse speculation, that it is not at once aroused from the indecision of all melancholy reflection, as from a dream, by one glance at the wonders of nature and the majesty of the universe—ascending from height to height up to the all-highest, from the conditioned to its conditions, up to the supreme and unconditioned Author [of all conditioned being].

But although we have nothing to bring against the rationality and utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend and to further it, we still cannot approve the claims, which this mode of argument would fain advance, to apodictic certainty and to an assent founded on no special favour or support from other quarters. It cannot hurt the good cause, if the dogmatic
PHYSICO-THEOREMAL PROOF IMPOSSIBLE 521

language of the overweening sophist be toned down to the
more moderate and humble requirements of a belief adequate
to quieten our doubts, though not to command unconditional
submission. I therefore maintain that the physico-theological
proof can never by itself establish the existence of a supreme
being, but must always fall back upon the ontological argu-
tment to make good its deficiency. It only serves as an intro-
duction to the ontological argument; and the latter therefore
contains (in so far as a speculative proof is possible at all) the
one possible ground of proof with which human reason can
never dispense.¹

The chief points of the physico-theological proof are as
follows: (1) In the world we everywhere find clear signs of an
order in accordance with a determinate purpose, carried out
with great wisdom; and this in a universe which is indescrib-
ably varied in content and unlimited in extent. (2) This pur-
posive order is quite alien to the things of the world, and only
belongs to them contingently; that is to say, the diverse things
could not of themselves have co-operated, by so great a com-
bination of diverse means, to the fulfilment of determinate
final purposes, had they not been chosen and designed for
these purposes by an ordering rational principle in conformity
with underlying ideas. (3) There exists, therefore, a sublime
and wise cause (or more than one), which must be the cause
of the world not merely as a blindly working all-powerful
nature, by secundity, but as intelligence, through freedom.
(4) The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of
the reciprocal relations existing between the parts of the world,
as members of an artfully arranged structure—inferred with
certainty in so far as our observation suffices for its verifica-
tion, and beyond these limits with probability, in accordance with
the principles of analogy.

We need not here criticise natural reason too strictly in
regard to its conclusion from the analogy between certain
natural products and what our human art produces when we
do violence to nature, and constrain it to proceed not accord-
ing to its own ends but in conformity with ours—appealing to
the similarity of these particular natural products with houses,
ships, watches. Nor need we here question its conclusion that

¹ [vorbeigehen.]
there lies at the basis of nature a causality similar to that
responsible for artificial products, namely, an understand-
ing and a will; and that the inner possibility of a self-acting
nature (which is what makes all art, and even, it may be,
reason itself, possible) is therefore derived from another,
though superhuman, art—a mode of reasoning which could
not perhaps withstand a searching transcendental criticism.
But at any rate we must admit that, if we are to specify a
cause at all, we cannot here proceed more securely than by
analogy with those purposive productions of which alone the
cause and mode of action are fully known to us. Reason could
never be justified in abandoning the causality which it knows
for grounds of explanation which are obscure, of which it
does not have any knowledge, and which are incapable of
proof.

On this method of argument, the purposiveness and har-
monious adaptation of so much in nature can suffice to prove
the contingency of the form merely, not of the matter, that is,
not of the substance in the world. To prove the latter we should
have to demonstrate that the things in the world would not
of themselves be capable of such order and harmony, in
accordance with universal laws, if they were not in their
substance the product of supreme wisdom. But to prove this
we should require quite other grounds of proof than those
which are derived from the analogy with human art. The
utmost, therefore, that the argument can prove is an architect
of the world who is always very much hampered by the
adaptability of the material in which he works, not a creator
of the world to whose idea everything is subject. This, how-
ever, is altogether inadequate to the lofty purpose which we
have before our eyes, namely, the proof of an all-sufficient
primordial being. To prove the contingency of matter itself,
we should have to resort to a transcendental argument, and
this is precisely what we have here set out to avoid.

The inference, therefore, is that the order and purpuse-
ness everywhere observable throughout the world may be
regarded as a completely contingent arrangement, and that
we may argue to the existence of a cause proportioned to it.
But the concept of this cause must enable us to know some-

1 [freiwirkenden.]
thing quite determinate about it, and can therefore be no other than the concept of a being who possesses all might, wisdom, etc., in a word, all the perfection which is proper to an all-sufficient being. For the predicates—very great', 'astounding', 'immeasurable' in power and excellence—give no determinate concept at all, and do not really tell us what the thing is in itself. They are only relative representations of the magnitude of the object, which the observer, in contemplating the world, compares with himself and with his capacity of comprehension, and which are equally terms of eulogy whether we be magnifying the object or be depreciating the observing subject in relation to that object. Where we are concerned with the magnitude (of the perfection) of a thing, there is no determinate concept except that which comprehends all possible perfection; and in that concept only the allness (omninitudo) of the reality is completely determined.

Now no one, I trust, will be so bold as to profess that he comprehends the relation of the magnitude of the world as he has observed it (alike as regards both extent and content) to omnipotence, of the world-order to supreme wisdom, of the world unity to the absolute unity of its Author, etc. Physico-theology is therefore unable to give any determinate concept of the supreme cause of the world, and cannot therefore serve as the foundation of a theology which is itself in turn to form the basis of religion.

To advance to absolute totality by the empirical road is utterly impossible. None the less this is what is attempted in the physico-theological proof. What, then, are the means which have been adopted to bridge this wide abyss?

The physico-theological argument can indeed lead us to the point of admiring the greatness, wisdom, power, etc., of the Author of the world, but can take us no further. Accordingly, we then abandon the argument from empirical grounds of proof, and fall back upon the contingency which, in the first steps of the argument, we had inferred from the order and purposiveness of the world. With this contingency as our sole premise, we then advance, by means of transcendental concepts alone, to the existence of an absolutely necessary being, and [as a final step] from the concept of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the completely determinate or determin-
able concept of that necessary being, namely, to the concept of an all-embracing reality. Thus the physico-theological proof, failing in its undertaking, has in face of this difficulty suddenly fallen back upon the cosmological proof; and since the latter is only a disguised ontological proof, it has really achieved its purpose by pure reason alone—although at the start it disclaimed all kinship with pure reason and professed to establish its conclusions on convincing evidence derived from experience.

Those who propound the physico-theological argument have therefore no ground for being so contemptuous in their attitude to the transcendental mode of proof, positing as clear-sighted students of nature, and complacently looking down upon that proof as the artificial product of obscure speculative refinements. For were they willing to scrutinise their own procedure, they would find that, after advancing some considerable way on the solid ground of nature and experience, and finding themselves just as far distant as ever from the object which discloses itself to their reason, they suddenly leave this ground, and pass over into the realm of mere possibilities, where they hope upon the wings of ideas to draw near to the object—the object that has refused itself to all their empirical enquiries. For after this tremendous leap, when they have, as they think, found firm ground, they extend their concept—the determinate concept, into the possession of which they have now come, they know not how—over the whole sphere of creation. And the ideal, which this reasoning thus involves, and which is entirely a product of pure reason, they then elucidate by reference to experience, though inadequately enough, and in a manner far below the dignity of its object; and throughout they persist in refusing to admit that they have arrived at this knowledge or hypothesis by a road quite other than that of experience.

Thus the physico-theological proof of the existence of an original or supreme being rests upon the cosmological proof, and the cosmological upon the ontological. And since, besides these three, there is no other path open to speculative reason, the ontological proof from pure concepts of reason is the only possible one, if indeed any proof of a proposition so far exalted above all empirical employment of the understanding is possible at all.
CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY

CHAPTER III

Section 7

CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY BASED UPON SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES OF REASON

If I understand by theology knowledge of the original being, it is based either solely upon reason (theologia ratiocinialis) or upon revelation (revelata). The former thinks its object either through pure reason, solely by means of transcendental concepts (ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium), in which case it is entitled transcendental theology, or through a concept borrowed from nature (from the nature of our soul) — a concept of the original being as a supreme intelligence — and it would then have to be called natural theology. Those who accept only a transcendental theology are called deists; those who also admit a natural theology are called theists. The former grant that we can know the existence of an original being solely through reason, but maintain that our concept of it is transcendental only, namely, the concept of a being which possesses all reality, but which we are unable to determine in any more specific fashion. The latter assert that reason is capable of determining its object more precisely through analogy with nature, namely, as a being which, through understanding and freedom, contains in itself the ultimate ground of everything else. Thus the deist represents this being merely as a cause of the world (whether by its nature or through freedom, remains undecided), the theist as the Author of the world.

Transcendental theology, again, either proposes to deduce the existence of the original being from an experience in general (without determining in any more specific fashion the nature of the world to which the experience belongs), and is then entitled cosmo-theology; or it believes that it can know the existence of such a being through mere concepts, without the help of any experience whatsoever, and is then entitled ontology.

Natural theology infers the properties and the existence of...
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

an Author of the world from the constitution, the order and unity, exhibited in the world—a world in which we have to recognize two kinds of causality with their rules, namely, nature and freedom. From this world natural theology ascends to a supreme intelligence, as the principle either of all natural or of all moral order and perfection. In the former case it is entitled *physico-theology*, in the latter *moral theology*.

Since we are wont to understand by the concept of God not merely an eternal nature that works blindly, as the root-source of all things, but a supreme being who through understanding and freedom is the Author of all things; and since it is in this sense only that the concept interests us, we could, strictly speaking, deny to the *deist* any belief in God, allowing him only the assertion of an original being or supreme cause. However, since no one ought to be accused of denying what he only does not venture to assert, it is less harsh and more just to say that the *deist* believes in a *God*, the *theist* in a *living God*; (*summa intelligens*). We shall now proceed to inquire what are the possible sources of all these endeavours of reason.

For the purposes of this enquiry, theoretical knowledge may be defined as knowledge of what is, practical knowledge as the representation of what ought to be. On this definition, the theoretical employment of reason is that by which I know *a priori* (as necessary) that something is, and the practical that by which it is known *a priori* what ought to happen. Now if it is indubitably certain that something is or that something ought to happen, but this certainty is at the same time only: conditional, then a certain determinate condition of it can be absolutely necessary, or can be an optional and contingent presupposition. In the former case the condition is postulated (*per thesis*); in the latter case it is assumed (*per hypothetin*). Now since there are practical laws which are absolutely necessary, that is, the moral laws, it must follow that if these necessarily presuppose the existence of any being as the condition of:

* Not theological ethics: for this contains moral laws, which presuppose the existence of a supreme ruler of the world. Moral theology, on the other hand, is a conviction of the existence of a supreme being—a conviction which bases itself on moral laws.

1 [welche sich auf sittliche Gesetze gründet substituted in B for welche auf sittliche Gesetze gegründet ist.]

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Da man unter dem Begriff von Gott nicht etwa bloß eine blindwirkende ewige Natur, als die Wurzel der Dinge, sondern ein höchstes Wesen, das durch Verstand | | und Freiheit der Urheber der Dinge sein soll, zu verstehen gewohnt ist, und auch dieser Begriff allein uns interessiert, so konnte man, nach der Strenge, dem Deisten allen Glauben an Gott absprechen, und ihm lediglich die Behauptung eines Urwesens, oder obersten Ursache, übrig lassen. Indessen, da niemand darum, weil er etwas sich nicht zu behaupten getraut, beschuldigt werden darf, er wolle es gar leugnen, so ist es gelinder und billiger, zu sagen: der Deist glaube: einen Gott, der *Theist* aber einen lebendigen Gott (*summam intelligentiam*). Jetzt wollen wir die möglichen Quellen aller dieser Versuche der Vernunft ansuchen.

Ich beginne mich wie hier, die theoretische Erkenntnis durch eine solche zu erklären, wodurch ich erkenne, was da ist, die praktische aber, dadurch im vorstehendem, was das sein soll. Diesem nach ist der theoretische Gebrauch der Vernunft derjenige, durch den ich a priori (als notwendig) erkenne, daß etwas sei; der praktische aber, durch den a priori erkannt wird, was geschehen solle. Wenn nun entweder, daß etwas sei, oder geschehen solle, unzweifelhaft gewiß, aber doch nur bedingt ist: so kann doch entweder eine gewisse bestimmte Bedingung, dazu-schlechthin notwendig sein, oder sie kann nur als beliebig und zufällig vorausgesetzt werden. Im ersten Falle wird die Bedingung postuliert (per thesis), im zweiten supponiert (per hypothetin). Da es praktische Gesetze gibt, die schlechthin notwendig sind (die moralische), so muß, wenn diese irgend ein Dasein, als die...
the possibility of their obligatory power, this existence must be postulated; and this for the sufficient reason that the conditioned, from which the inference is drawn to this determinate condition, is itself known a priori to be absolutely necessary. At some future time we shall show that the moral laws do not merely presuppose the existence of a supreme being, but also, as themselves in a different connection absolutely necessary, justify us in postulating it, though, indeed, only from a practical point of view. For the present, however, we are leaving this mode of argument aside.

Where we are dealing merely with what is (not with what ought to be), the conditioned, which is given to us in experience, is always thought as being likewise contingent. That which conditions it is not, therefore, known as absolutely necessary, but serves only as something relatively necessary, or rather as needful; in itself and a priori it is an arbitrary presupposition, assumed by us in our attempt to know the conditioned by means of reason. If, therefore, in the field of theoretical knowledge, the absolute necessity of a thing were to be known, this could only be from a priori concepts, and never by positing it as a cause relative to an existence given in experience.

Theoretical knowledge is speculative if it concerns an object, or those concepts of an object, which cannot be reached in any experience. It is so named to distinguish it from the knowledge of nature, which concerns only those objects or predicates of objects which can be given in a possible experience.

The principle by which, from that which happens (the empirically contingent) [viewed as [an] effect, we infer a cause, is a principle of the knowledge of nature, but not of speculative knowledge. For, if we abstract from what it is as a principle that contains the condition of all possible experience, and leaving aside all that is empirical attempt to assert it of the contingent in general, there remains not the least justification for any synthetic proposition such as might show us how to pass from that which is before us to something quite different (called its cause). In this merely speculative employment any meaning whose objective reality admits of being made intelligible in concreto, is taken away not only from the concept of the contingent but from the concept of a cause.

Bedingung der Möglichkeit ihrer verbindenden Kraft, notwendig voraussetzen, dieses Dasein postuliert werden, darum, weil das Bedingte, von welchem der Schluß auf diese bestimmte Bedingung geht, selbst a priori als schlechterdingsnotwendig erkannt wird. Wir werden künftig von den moralischen Gesetzen zeigen, daß sie das Dasein eines höchsten Wesens nicht bloß voraussetzen, sondern auch, daß sie in anderweitiger Betrachtung schlechterdings notwendig sind, es mit Recht, aber heilich nur praktisch, postulieren; jetzt setzen wir diese Schlußart noch bei Seite.

Dann ist bloß von dem, was da ist (nicht, was sein soll), die Rede, das Bedingte, welches uns in der Erfahrung gegeben wird, jederzeit auch als zufällig gedacht wird, so kann die zu ihm gehörige Bedingung daraus nicht als schlechterdingsnotwendig erkannt werden, sondern dient nur als eine respektivnotwendige, oder vielmehr mögliche, an sich selbst aber und a priori willkürliche Voraussetzung zum Vernunftverstandnis des Bedingten. Soll also die absolute Notwendigkeit eines Dinges im theoretischen Erkenntnisse erkannt werden, so könnte dieses allein aus Begriffen a priori geschehen, niemals aber als einer Ursache, in Beziehung auf ein Dasein, das durch Erkenntnis gegeben ist.

Eine theoretische Erkenntniss ist spekulativ, wenn sie auf einen Gegenstand, oder solche Begriffe von einem Gegenstande, geht, wenn man in keiner Erfahrung gellauflangen kann. Sie wird der Naturerkennniss entgegengesetzt, welche auf keine anderen Gegenstände oder Prädikate derselben geht, als die in einer möglichen Erfahrung gegeben werden können.

Der Grundzweck bem indem, was geschieht (dem Empirischzufälligen), als Wirkung, auf eine Ursache zu schließen, ist ein Prinzip der Naturerkennniss, aber nicht der spekulativen. Denn, wenn man von ihm, als einem Grundzwecke, der die Bedingung möglicher Erfahrung überhaupt enthält, abstrahiert, und, indem man alles Empirische wegläßt, ihn vom Zufälligen überhaupt aussagen will, so bleibt nicht die mindeste Rechtfertigung eines solchen synthetischen Satzes übrig, um daraus zu ersehen, wie ich von etwas, das da ist, zu etwas davon ganz Verschiedenem (genannt Ursache) übergehen könne; ja der Begriff einer Ursache verliert eben so, wie des Zufälligen, in solchem bloß spekulativen Gebrauche, alle Bedeutung, deren objektive Realität sich in concreto begreiflich machen lasse.
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

If we infer from the existence of things in the world the existence of their cause, we are employing reason, not in the knowledge of nature, but in speculation. For the former type of knowledge treats as empirically contingent, and refers to a cause, not the things themselves (substances), but only that which happens, that is, their states. That substance (matter) is itself contingent in its existence would have to be known in a purely speculative manner. Again, even if we were speaking only of the form of the world, the way in which things are connected and change, and sought to infer from this a cause entirely distinct from the world, this would again be a judgment of purely speculative reason, since the object which we are inferring is not an object of a possible experience. So employed, the principle of causality, which is only valid within the field of experience, and outside this field has no application, nay, is indeed meaningless, would be altogether diverted from its proper use.

Now I maintain that all attempts to employ reason in theology in any merely speculative manner are altogether fruitless and by their very nature null and void, and that the principles of its employment in the study of nature do not lead to any theology whatsoever. Consequently, the only theology of reason which is possible is that which is based upon moral laws or seeks guidance from them. All synthetic principles of reason allow only of an immanent employment; and in order to have knowledge of a supreme being we should have to put them to a transcendent use, for which our understanding is in no way fitted. If the empirically valid law of causality is to lead to the original being, the latter must belong to the chain of objects of experience, and in that case it would, like all appearances, be itself again conditioned. But even if the leap beyond the limits of experience, by means of the dynamical law of the relation of effects to their causes, be regarded as permissible, what sort of a concept could we obtain by this procedure? It is far from providing the concept of a supreme being, since experience never gives us the greatest of all possible effects, such as would be required to provide the evidence for a cause of that kind. Should we seek to make good this lack of determination in our concept, by means of a mere idea of [a being that possesses] the highest perfection and original necessity, this may indeed be granted

KRITIK ALLER THEOLOGIE

Wenn man nun vom Dasein der Dinge in der Welt auf ihre Ursache schließt, so gehört dieses nicht zum natürlichen, sondern zum spekulativen Vernunftgebrauch; weil jener nicht die Dinge selbst (Substanzen), sondern nur das, was geschieht, also ihre Zustände, als empirisch zufällig, auf irgend eine Ursache bezieht; daß die Substanz selbst (die Materie) dem Dasein nach zufällig sei, würde ein bloß spekulative Vernunftkenntniss sein || müssen. Wenn aber auch nur von der Form der Welt, der Art ihrer Verbindung und dem Wechsel derselben die Rede wäre, ich wollte aber daraus auf eine |Ursache schließen, die von der Welt gänzlich unterschieden ist: so würde dieses wiederum ein Urteil der bloß spekulativen Vernunft sein, weil der Gegenstand hier gar kein Objekt einer möglichen Erfahrung ist. Aber alsdann würde der Grundsatz der Kausalität, der nur innerhalb des Felde der Erfahrungen gültig, also an sich selbst ohne Bedeutung ist, von seiner Bestimmung gänzlich abgebracht.

as a favour; it cannot be demanded as a right on the strength of an incontrovertible proof. The physico-theological proof, as combining speculation and intuition, might therefore perhaps give additional weight to other proofs (if such there be); but taken alone, it serves only to prepare the understanding for theological knowledge, and to give it a natural leaning in this direction, not to complete the work in and by itself.

All this clearly points to the conclusion that transcendental questions allow only of transcendental answers, that is, answers exclusively based on concepts that are a priori, without the least empirical admixture. But the question under consideration is obviously synthetic, calling for an extension of our knowledge beyond all limits of experience, namely, to the existence of a being that is to correspond to a mere idea of ours, an idea that cannot be paralleled in any experience. Now as we have already proved, synthetic a priori knowledge is possible only in so far as it expresses the formal conditions of a possible experience; and all principles are therefore only of immanent validity, that is, they are applicable only to objects of empirical knowledge, to appearances. Thus all attempts to construct a theology through purely speculative reason, by means of a transcendental procedure, are without result.

But even if anyone prefers to call in question all those proofs which have been given in the Analytic, rather than allow himself to be robbed of his conviction of the conclusiveness of the arguments upon which he has so long relied, he still cannot refuse to meet my demand that he should at least give a satisfactory account how, and by what kind of inner illumination, he believes himself capable of soaring so far above all possible experience, on the wings of mere ideas. New proofs, or attempts to improve upon the old ones, I would ask to be spared. There is not indeed, in this field, much room for choice, since all merely speculative proofs in the end bring us always back to one and the same proof, namely, the ontological: and I have therefore no real ground to fear the fertile ingenuity of the dogmatic champions of supersensible reason. I shall not, however, decline the challenge to discover the fallacy in any attempt of this kind, and so to nullify its claims; and this I can indeed do without
considering myself a particularly combative person. But by such means I should never succeed in eradicating the hope of better fortune in those who have once become accustomed to dogmatic modes of persuasion; and I therefore confine myself to the moderate demand, that they give, in terms which are universal and which are based on the nature of the human understanding and on all our other sources of knowledge, a satisfactory answer to this one question: how we can so much as make a beginning in the proposed task of extending our knowledge entirely a priori, and of carrying it into a realm where no experience is possible to us, and in which there is therefore no means of establishing the objective reality of any concept that we have ourselves invented. In whatever manner the understanding may have arrived at a concept, the existence of its object is never, by any process of analysis, discoverable within it; for the knowledge of the existence of the object consists precisely in the fact that the object is posited in itself, beyond the [mere] thought of it. Through concepts alone, it is quite impossible to advance to the discovery of new objects and supernatural beings; and it is useless to appeal to experience, which in all cases yields only appearances.

But although reason, in its merely speculative employment, is very far from being equal to so great an undertaking, namely, to demonstrate the existence of a supreme being, it is yet of very great utility in correcting any knowledge of this being which may be derived from other sources, in making it consistent with itself and with every point of view from which intelligible objects may be regarded, and in freeing it from everything incompatible with the concept of an original being and from all admixture of empirical limitations.

Transcendental theology is still, therefore, in spite of all its disabilities, of great importance in its negative employment, and serves as a permanent censor of our reason, in so far as the latter deals merely with pure ideas which, as such, allow of no criterion that is not transcendental. For if, in some other relation, perhaps on practical grounds, the presupposition of a supreme and all-sufficient being, as highest intelli-

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Ob aber gleich die Vernunft in ihrem bloß spekulativen Gebrauche zu dieser so großen Absicht bei weitem nicht zulänglich ist, nämlich zum Dasein eines obersten Wesens zu gelangen: so hat sie doch darin sehr großen | Nutzen, die Erkenntnis desselben, im Falle sie anders woher geschopt werden könnte, zu berichten, mit sich selbst und jeder intellektuellen Absicht einstimmig zu machen, und von allem, was dem Begriffe eines Urwesens zuwider sein möchte; und aller Betümmung empirischer Einschränkungen zu reinigen.

Die transzendentale Theologie bleibt demnach, aller ihrer Unzulänglichkeit ungeachtet, dennoch von wichtigem negativen Gebrauche, und ist eine beständige Zensur unserer Vernunft, wenn sie bloß mit reinen Ideen zu tun hat, die eben darum kein anderes, als transzendentales-Richtmaß zulassen. Denn, wenn einmal, in anderweitiger, vielleicht praktischer Beziehung, die Voraussetzung eines höchsten und allgenugsmagen Wesens, als oberster Intelligenz,
CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY

gence, established its validity beyond all question, it would be of the greatest importance accurately to determine this concept on its transcendental side, as the concept of a necessary and supremely real being, to free it from whatever, as belonging to mere appearance (anthropomorphism in its wider sense), is out of keeping with the supreme reality, and at the same time to dispose of all counter-assertions, whether atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic. Such critical treatment is, indeed, far from being difficult, inasmuch as the same grounds which have enabled us to demonstrate the inability of human reason to maintain the existence of such a being must also suffice to prove the invalidity of all counter-assertions. From what source could we, through a purely speculative employment of reason, derive the knowledge that there is no supreme being as ultimate ground of all things, or that it has none of the attributes which, arguing from their consequences, we represent to ourselves as analogous with the dynamical realities of a thinking being, or (as the anthropomorphists contend) that it must be subject to all the limitations which sensibility inevitably imposes on those intelligences which are known to us through experience.

Thus, while for the merely speculative employment of reason the supreme being remains a mere ideal, it is yet an ideal without a flaw, a concept which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge. Its objective reality cannot indeed be proved, but also cannot be disproved, by merely speculative reason. If, then, there should be a moral theology that can make good this deficiency, transcendental theology, which before was problematic only, will prove itself indispensable in determining the concept of this supreme being and in constantly testing reason, which is so often deceived by sensibility, and which is frequently out of harmony with its own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence outside the world (and not as world-soul), eternity as free from conditions of time, omnipresence as free from conditions of space, omnipotence, etc. are purely transcendental predicates, and for this reason the purified concepts of them, which every theology finds so indispensable, are only to be obtained from transcendental theology.

VON DEM REGULATIVEN GEBRAUCH DER IDEEN

ihre Gültigkeit ohne Widerrede behauptete: so wäre es von der größten Wichtigkeit, diesen Begriff auf seiner transzendentalen Seite, als den Begriff eines notwendigen und allerrealen Wesens, genau zu bestimmen, und, was der höchsten Realität zuwider ist, was zur bloßen Erscheinung (dem Anthropomorphism im weiteren Verstande) gehört, wegzuschaffen, und zugleich alle entgegengesetzten Behauptungen, sie mögen nun atheistisch, oder deistisch, oder anthropomorphistisch sein, aus dem Wege zu räumen; welches in einer solchen kritischen Behandlung sehr leicht ist, indem dieselben Gründe, durch welche das Unvermögen der menschlichen Vernunft, in Ansehung der Behauptung des Daseins eines dergleichen [[ Wesens, vor-Augen gelegt wird, notwendig auch zutreffen, um die Untauglichkeit einer jeden Gegenbehauptung zu beweisen. Denn, wo will jemand durch reine Spekulation der Vernunft die Einsicht hernehmen, daß es kein höchstes Wesen, als Urgrund von allem, gebe, oder daß ihm keine von den Eigenschaften zukomme, welche wir, ihren Folgen nach, als analogisch mit den dynamischen Realitäten eines denkenden Wesens, uns vorstellen, oder daß sie, in dem letzteren Falle, auch allen Einschränkungen unterworfen sein müßten, welche die Sinnlichkeit den Intelligenzen, die wir durch Erfahrung kennen, unvermeidlich auferlegt.

Das höchste Wesen bleibt also für den bloß spekulativen Gebrauch der Vernunft ein bloßes, aber doch fehlerfreies Ideal, ein Begriff, welcher die ganze menschliche Erkenntnis schließt und krönt, dessen objektive Realität auf diesem Wege zwar nicht bewiesen; aber auch nicht widerlegt werden kann, und, wenn es eine Moraltheologie geben sollte, die diesen Mangel ergänzen kann, so beweiset alsdann die vorher nur problematische transzendentele Theologie ihre Unentbehrlichkeit, durch Bestimmung ihres Begriffes und unanfechtliche Zensur einer durch Sinnlichkeit oft genug getäuschten und mit ihren eigenen Ideen nicht immer einstimmigen Vernunft. Die Notwendigkeit, die Unendlichkeit, die Einheit, das Dasein außer der Welt (nicht als Weltseele), die Ewigkeit, ohne Bedingungen der Zeit, die Allgegenwart, ohne Bedingungen des Raumes, die Allmacht etc. sind lauter transzendentele Prädikate, und daher kann der gereinigte Begriff derselben, den eine jede Theologie so sehr nötig hat, bloß aus der transzendentalen gezogen werden.
APPENDIX TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

THE REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS OF PURE REASON

The outcome of all dialectical attempts of pure reason does not merely confirm what we have already proved in the Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all those conclusions of ours which profess to lead us beyond the field of possible experience are deceptious and without foundation; it likewise teaches us this further lesson, that human reason has a natural tendency to transgress these limits, and that transcendental ideas are just as natural to it as the categories are to understanding—though with this difference, that while the categories lead to truth, that is, to the conformity of our concepts with the object, the ideas produce what, though a mere illusion, is none the less irresistible, and the harmful influence of which we can barely succeed in neutralising even by means of the severest criticism.

Everything that has its basis in the nature of our powers must be appropriate to, and consistent with, their right employment—if only we can guard against a certain misunderstanding and so can discover the proper direction of these powers. We are entitled, therefore, to suppose that transcendental ideas have their own good, proper, and therefore immanent use, although, when their meaning is misunderstood, and they are taken for concepts of real things, they become transcendent in their application and for that very reason can be delusive. For it is not the idea in itself, but its use only, that can be either transcendental or immanent (that is, either range beyond all possible experience or find employment within its limits), according as it is applied to an object which is supposed to correspond to it, or is directed solely to the use of understanding in general, in respect of those objects that fall to be dealt with by the understanding. All errors of subjection are to be ascribed to a defect of judgment,1 never to understanding or to reason.

Reason is never in immediate relation to an object, but

1 [Urteilskraft.]
only to the understanding; and it is only through the understanding that it has its own [specific] empirical employment. It does not, therefore, create concepts (of objects) but only orders them, and gives them that unity which they can have only if they be employed in their widest possible application, that is, with a view to obtaining totality in the various series. The understanding does not concern itself with this totality, but only wish that connection through which, in accordance with concepts, such series come into being.

Reason has, therefore, as its sole object, the understanding and its effective application. Just as the understanding unifies the manifold in the object by means of concepts, so reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding, which otherwise are concerned solely with distributive unity.

I accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas never allow of any constitutive employment. When regarded in that mistaken manner, and therefore as supplying concepts of certain objects, they are but pseudo-rational, merely dialectical concepts. On the other hand, they have an excellent, and indeed indispensably necessary, regulative employment, namely, that of directing the understanding towards a certain goal upon which the routes marked out by all its rules converge, as upon their point of intersection. This point is indeed a mere idea, a focus imaginarius, from which, since it lies quite outside the bounds of possible experience, the concepts of the understanding do not in reality proceed; none the less it serves to give to these concepts the greatest [possible] unity combined with the greatest [possible] extension. Hence arises the illusion that the lines have their source in a real object lying outside the field of empirically possible knowledge—just as objects reflected in a mirror are seen as behind it. Nevertheless this illusion (which need not, however, be allowed to deceive us) is indispensably necessary if we are to direct the understanding beyond every given experience (as part of the sum of possible experience), and thereby to secure its greatest possible extension, just as, in the case of mirror-vision, the illusion involved is indispensably necessary if,

1 [Reading, with Mellin, geflossen for ausgeschlossen.]
besides the objects which lie before our eyes, we are also to see those which lie at a distance behind our back.

If we consider in its whole range the knowledge obtained for us by the understanding, we find that what is peculiarly distinctive of reason in its attitude to this body of knowledge, is that it prescribes and seeks to achieve its systematisation, that is, to exhibit the connection of its parts in conformity with a single principle. This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, namely, that of the form of a whole of knowledge—a whole which is prior to the determinate knowledge of the parts and which contains the conditions that determine a priori for every part its position and relation to the other parts. This idea accordingly postulates a complete unity in the knowledge obtained by the understanding, by which this knowledge is to be not a mere contingent aggregate, but a system connected according to necessary laws. We may not say that this idea is a concept of the object, but only of the thoroughgoing unity of such concepts, in so far as that unity serves as a rule for the understanding. These concepts of reason are not derived from nature; on the contrary, we interrogate nature in accordance with these ideas, and consider our knowledge as defective so long as it is not adequate to them. By general admission, pure earth, pure water, pure air, etc., are not to be found. We require, however, the concepts of them (though, in so far as their complete purity is concerned, they have their origin solely in reason) in order properly to determine the share which each of these natural causes has in producing appearances. Thus in order to explain the chemical interactions of bodies in accordance with the idea of a mechanism, every kind of matter is reduced to earths (qua mere weight), to salts and inflammable substances (qua force), and to water and air as vehicles (machines, as it were, by which the first two produce their effects). The modes of expression usually employed are, indeed, somewhat different; but the influence of reason on the classifications of the natural scientist is still easily detected.

If reason is a faculty of deducing the particular from the universal, and if the universal is already certain in itself and given, only judgment is required to execute the process of

\[1 \text{ Urteilskraft.}\]
REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS 535

subsumption, and the particular is thereby determined in a necessary manner. This I shall entitle the apodeictic use of reason. If, however, the universal is admitted as problematic only, and is a mere idea, the particular is certain, but the universality of the rule of which it is a consequence is still a problem. Several particular instances, which are one and all certain, are scrutinised in view of the rule, to see whether they follow from it. If it then appears that all particular instances which can be cited follow from the rule, we argue to its universality, and from this again to all particular instances, even to those which are not themselves given. This I shall entitle the hypothetical employment of reason.

The hypothetical employment of reason, based upon ideas viewed as problematic concepts, is not, properly speaking, constitutive, that is, it is not of such a character that, judging in all strictness, we can regard it as proving the truth of the universal rule which we have adopted as hypothesis. For how are we to know all the possible consequences which, as actually following from the adopted principle, prove its universality? The hypothetical employment of reason is regulative only; its sole aim is, so far as may be possible, to bring unity into the body of our detailed knowledge, and thereby to approximate the rule to universality.

The hypothetical employment of reason has, therefore, as its aim the systematic unity of the knowledge of understanding, and this unity is the criterion of the truth of its rules. The systematic unity (as a mere idea) is, however, only a projected unity, to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem only. This unity aids us in discovering a principle for the understanding in its manifold \(^1\) and special modes of employment, directing its attention to cases which are not given, and thus rendering it more coherent.\(^2\)

But the only conclusion which we are justified in drawing from these considerations is that the systematic unity of the manifold knowledge of understanding, as prescribed by reason, is a logical principle. Its function is to assist the understanding by means of ideas, in those cases in which the understanding cannot by itself establish rules, and at the same time to give

\(^1\) [Reading, with Valentiner, mannigfaltigen for Mannigfaltigen.]
\(^2\) [zusammenhängend.]

VON DEM REGULATIVEN GEBRAUCH DER IDEEN 567

sondere wird dadurch notwendig bestimmt. Dieses will ich den apodiktischen Gebrauch der Vernunft nennen. Oder das Allgemeine wird nur problematisch angenommen, und ist eine bloße Idee, das Besondere ist gewiß, aber die Allgemeinheit der Regel zu dieser Folge ist noch ein Problem; so werden mehrere besondere Fälle, die insgesamt gewiß sind, an der Regel versucht, ob sie daraus fließen, und in diesem Falle, wenn es den Anschein hat, daß alle || anzugebende besondere Fälle daraus abfolgen, wird auf die Allgemeinheit der Regel, aus dieser aber nachher auf alle Fälle, die auch an sich nicht gegeben sind, geschlossen. Diesen will ich den hypothetischen Gebrauch der Vernunft nennen.

Der hypothetische Gebrauch der Vernunft aus zum Grunde gelegten Ideen, als problematischer Begriffe, ist eigentlich nicht konstitutiv, nämlich nicht so beschaffen, daß dadurch, wenn man nach aller Strenge urteilen will, die Wahrheit der allgemeinen Regel, die als Hypothese angenommen worden, folge; denn wie will man alle mögliche Folgen wissen, die, indem sie aus demselben angenommenen Grundsatz folgen, seine Allgemeinheit beweisen? Sondern er ist nur regulativ, um dadurch, so weit als es möglich ist, Einheit in die besonderen Erkenntnisse zu bringen, und die Regel dadurch der Allgemeinheit zu nähern.

Der hypothetische Vernunftgebrauch geht also auf die systematische Einheit der Verstandeserkenntnisse, diese aber ist der Probiereinheit der Wahrheit der Regeln. Umgekehrt ist die systematische Einheit (als bloße Idee) lediglich nur projektierte Einheit, die man an sich nicht als gegeben, sondern nur als Problem ansehen muß; welche aber dazu dient, zu dem Mannigfaltigen \(^3\) und besonderen Verstandesgebrauche ein Prinzip zu finden, und diesen dadurch auch über die Fälle, die nicht gegeben sind, zu leiten und zusammenhängend zu machen.

|| Man sieht aber hiezu nur, daß die systematische oder Vernunftseinheit der mannigfaltigen Verstandeserkenntnis ein logisches Prinzip sei, um, da wo der Verstand allein nicht zu Regeln hinlangt, ihm durch Ideen fortzuhelfen, und zugleich der Verschiedenheit seiner Regeln Einhelligkeit unter einem Prinzip (systematische) und dadurch Zusam-

\(^3\) Akad.- Ausg.: mannigfaltigen.
to the numerous and diverse rules of the understanding unity or system under a single principle, and thus to secure coherence in every possible way. But to say that the constitution of the objects or the nature of the understanding which knows them as such, is in itself determined to systematic unity, and that we can in a certain measure postulate this unity a priori, without reference to any such special interest of reason, and that we are therefore in a position to maintain that knowledge of the understanding in all its possible modes (including empirical knowledge) has the unity required by reason, and stands under common principles from which all its various modes can, in spite of their diversity, be deduced —that would be to assert a transcendental principle of reason, and would make the systematic unity necessary, not only subjectively and logically, as method, but objectively also.

We may illustrate this by an instance of the employment of reason. Among the various kinds of unity which conform to the concepts of the understanding, is that of the causality of a substance, which is called power.¹ The various appearances of one and the same substance show at first sight so great a diversity, that at the start we have to assume just as many different powers as there are different effects. For instance, in the human mind we have sensation, consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, power of discrimination, pleasure, desire, etc. Now there is a logical maxim which requires that we should reduce, so far as may be possible, this seeming diversity, by comparing these with one another and detecting their hidden identity. We have to enquire whether imagination combined with consciousness may not be the same thing as memory, wit, power of discrimination, and perhaps even identical with understanding and reason. Though logic is not capable of deciding whether a fundamental power actually exists, the idea of such a power is the problem involved in a systematic representation of the multiplicity of powers. The logical principle of reason calls upon us to bring about such unity as completely as possible; and the more the appearances of this and that power are found to be identical with one another, the more probable it becomes that they are simply different manifestations of one and the same power.

¹ [Kra7.]

Wir wollen dieses durch einen Fall des Vernunftgebrauchs erläutern. Unter die verschiedenen Arten von Einheit nach Begriffen des Verstandes gehören auch die der Kausalität einer Substanz, welche Kraft genannt wird. Die verschiedenen Erscheinungen eines derselben Substanz zeigen beim ersten Anblick so viel Ungleichartigkeit, daß man daher anfänglich beinahe sovielerlei Kräfte derselben annehmen muß, als Wirkungen sich hervortun, wie in || dem menschlichen Gemüte die Empfindung, Bewußtsein, Einbildung, Erinnerung, Witz, Unterscheidungskraft, Lust, Begierde u.s.w. Anfänglich gebietet eine logische Maxime, diese anscheinende Verschiedenheit so viel als möglich dadurch zu verringern, daß man durch Vergleichung die versteckte Identität entdeckt, und nachsehe, ob nicht Einbildung, mit Bewußtsein verbunden, Erinnerung, Witz Unterscheidungskraft, vielleicht gar Verstand und Vernunft sei. Die Idee einer Grundkraft, von welcher aber die Logik gar nicht ausmittelt, ob es dergleichen gebe, ist wenigstens das Problem einer systematischen Vorstellung der Mannigfaltigkeit von Kräften. Das logische Vernunftprinzip erfordert, diese Einheit so weit als möglich zu finden, und je mehr die Erscheinungen der einen und anderen Kraft unter sich identisch gefunden werden, desto wahrscheinlicher wird es, daß sie nichts, als verschiedene Äußerungen einer und derselben Kraft sein.¹

¹ Akad.-Ausg.: sind.
REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS 537

which may be entitled, relatively to the more specific powers, the fundamental power. The same is done with the other powers.

The relatively fundamental powers must in turn be compared with one another, with a view to discovering their harmony, and so to bring them nearer to a single radical, that is, absolutely fundamental, power. But this unity of reason is purely hypothetical. We do not assert that such a power must necessarily be met with, but that we must seek it in the interests of reason, that is, of establishing certain principles for the manifold rules which experience may supply to us. We must endeavour, wherever possible, to bring in this way systematic unity into our knowledge.

On passing, however, to the transcendental employment of understanding, we find that this idea of a fundamental power is not treated merely as a problem for the hypothetical use of reason, but claims to have objective reality, as postulating the systematic unity of the various powers of a substance, and as giving expression to an apodictic principle of reason. For without having made any attempt to show the harmony of these various powers, may, even after all attempts to do so have failed, we yet presuppose that such a unity does actually exist, and this not only, as in the case cited, on account of the unity of the substance, but also in those cases in which, as with matter in general, we encounter powers which, though to a certain extent homogeneous, are likewise diverse. In all such cases reason presupposes the systematic unity of the various powers, on the ground that special natural laws fall under more general laws, and that parsimony in principles is not only an economical requirement of reason, but is one of nature's own laws.

It is, indeed, difficult to understand how there can be a logical principle by which reason prescribes the unity of rules, unless we also presuppose a transcendental principle whereby such a systematic unity is a priori assumed to be necessarily inherent in the objects. For with what right can reason, in its logical employment, call upon us to treat the multiplicity of powers exhibited in nature as simply a disguised unity, and to derive this unity, so far as may be possible, from a fundamental power—how can reason do this, if it be free to admit

VON DEM REGULATIVEN GEBRAUCH DER IDEEN 569

welche (komparativ) ihre Grundkraft heißen kann. Eben so verfährt man mit den übrigen.

Die komparativen Grundkräfte müssen wiederum unter einander verglichen werden, um sie dadurch, daß man ihre Einelligkeit entdeckt, einer einzigen radikalen, d. i. absoluten Grundkraft nahe zu bringen. Diese VernunftEinheit aber ist bloß hypothetisch. Man behauptet nicht, daß eine solche in der Tat angetroffen werden müsse, sondern, daß man sie zu Gunsten der Vernunft, nämlich zu Errichtung gewisser Prinzipien, für die mancherlei Regeln, die die Erfahrung an die Hand geben mag, suchen, und, wo es sich tun läßt, auf solche Weise systematische Einheit ins Erkenntnis bringen müsse.

Es zeigt sich aber, wenn man auf den transzendentalen Gebrauch des Verstandes Acht hat, daß diese Idee, einer Grundkraft überhaupt, nicht bloß als Problem zum hypothetischen Gebrauch bestimmt sei, sondern objektive Realität vorgebe, dadurch die systematische Einheit der mancherlei Kräfte einer Substanz postuliert und ein apodiktisches Vernunftprinzip errichtet wird. Denn, ohne daß wir einmal die Einelligkeit der mancherlei Kräfte versucht haben, ja selbst wenn es uns nach allen Versuchen mißlingt, sie zu entdecken, setzen wir doch voraus: es werde eine solche anzutreffen sein, und dieses nicht allein, wie in dem angeführten Falle, wegen der Einheit der Substanz, sondern, wo so gar viele, obwohl in gewissem Grade gleichartige, angetroffen werden, wie an der Materie überhaupt, setzt die Vernunft systematische Einheit mannigfaltiger Kräfte voraus, da besondere Naturgesetze unter allgemeineren stehen, und die Er sparung der Prinzipien nicht bloß ein ökonomischer Grund satz der Vernunft, sondern inneres Gesetz der Natur wird.

In der Tat ist auch nicht abzusehen, wie ein logisches Prinzip der VernunftEinheit der Regeln stattfinden könne, wenn nicht ein transzendentales vorausgesetzt würde, durch welches eine solche systematische Einheit, als den Objekten selbst anhängend, a priori als notwendig angenommen wird. Denn mit welcher Befugnis kann die Vernunft im logischen Gebrauche verlangen, die Mannigfaltigkeit der Kräfte, welche uns die Natur zu erkennen gibt, als eine bloß versteckte Einheit zu behandeln, und sie aus irgend einer Grundkraft, so viel an ihr ist, abzuleiten, wenn es ihr frei-
as likewise possible that all powers may be heterogeneous, and that such systematic unity of derivation may not be in conformity with nature? Reason would then run counter to its own vocation, proposing as its aim an idea quite inconsistent with the constitution of nature. Nor can we say that reason, while proceeding in accordance with its own principles, has arrived at knowledge of this unity through observation of the accidental constitution of nature. The law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary law, since without it we should have no reason at all, and without reason no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this no sufficient criterion of empirical truth. In order, therefore, to secure an empirical criterion we have no option save to presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary.

Although philosophers have not always acknowledged this transcendental principle, even to themselves, or indeed been conscious of employing it, we none the less find it covertly implied, in remarkable fashion, in the principles upon which they proceed. That the manifold respects in which individual things differ do not exclude identity of species, that the various species must be regarded merely as different determinations of a few genera, and these, in turn, of still higher genera, and so on; in short, that we must seek for a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical concepts, in so far as they can be deduced from higher and more general concepts—this is a logical principle, a rule of the Schools, without which there could be no employment of reason. For we can conclude from the universal to the particular, only in so far as universal properties are ascribed to things as being the foundation upon which the particular properties rest.

That such unity is to be found in nature, is presupposed by philosophers in the well-known scholastic maxim, that rudiments or principles must not be unnecessarily multiplied (entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda). This maxim declares that things by their very nature supply material for the unity of reason, and that the seemingly infinite variety need not hinder us from assuming that behind this variety there is a unity of fundamental properties—properties from which the

\[^{1}\text{Anfang.}\]

ständte zuzugeben, daß es eben so wohl möglich sei, alle Kräfte wären ungleichartig, und die systematische Einheit ihrer Ableitung der Natur nicht gemäß? denn alsdenn würde sie gerade wider ihre Bestimmung verfahren, indem sie sich eine Idee zum Ziele setzte, die der Naturrichtung ganz widerspräche. Auch kann man nicht sagen, sie habe zuvor von der zufälligen Beschaffenheit der Natur diese Einheit nach Prinzipien der Vernunft abgenommen. Denn das Gesetz der Vernunft, sie zu suchen, ist notwendig, weil wir ohne dasselbe gar keine Vernunft, ohne diese aber keinen zusammenhängenden Verstandesgebrauch, und in dessen Ermangelung kein zureichendes Merkmal empirischer Wahrheit haben würden, und wir also in Ansehung des letzten die systematische Einheit der Natur durchaus als objektiv-gültig und notwendig voraussetzen müssen.

Wir finden diese transzendentale Voraussetzung auch auf eine bewundernswürdige Weise in den Grundsätzen der Philosophen versteckt, wiewohl sie solche darin nicht immer erkannt, oder sich selbst gestanden haben. Daß alle Mannigfaltigkeiten einzelner Dinge die Identität der Art nicht ausschließen; daß die mancherlei Arten nur als verschiedentlich zu bestimmenden Eigenschaften von wenigen Gattungen, diese aber von noch höheren Geschlechtern etc. behandelt werden müssen; daß also eine gewisse systematische Einheit aller möglichen empirischen Begriffe, sofern sie von höheren und allgemeineren abgeleitet werden können, gesucht werden müsse: ist eine Schulregel oder logisches Prinzip; ohne welches kein Gebrauch der Vernunft stattfände, weil wir nur so fern vom Allgemeinen aufs Besondere schließen können, als allgemeine Eigenschaften der Dinge zum Grunde gelegt werden, unter denen die besonderen stehen.

Daß aber auch in der Natur eine solche Einheiligkeit angetroffen werde, setzen die Philosophen in der bekannten Schulregel voraus: daß man die Anfänge (Prinzipien) nicht ohne Not vervielfältigen müsse (entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda). Dadurch wird gesagt: daß die Natur der Dinge selbst zur Vernunft und dem Stoff, und die anscheinende unendliche Verschiedenheit damit nicht, im Hinblick auf die Einheit der Grundgesetze zu vermuten, von welchen die Mannigfaltigkeit nur durch
REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS

Diversity can be derived through repeated determination. This unity, although it is a mere idea, has been at all times so eagerly sought, that there has been need to moderate the desire for it, not to encourage it. A great advance was made when chemists succeeded in reducing all salts to two main genera, acids and alkalies; and they endeavour to show that even this difference is merely a variety, or diverse manifestation, of one and the same fundamental material. Chemists have sought, step by step, to reduce the different kinds of earths (the material of stones and even of metals) to three, and at last to two; but, not content with this, they are unable to banish the thought that behind these varieties there is but one genus. Nay, that there may even be a common principle for the earths and the salts. It might be supposed that this is merely an economical contrivance whereby reason seeks to save itself all possible trouble, a hypothetical attempt, which, if it succeeds, will, through the unity thus attained, impart probability to the presumed principle of explanation. But such a selfish purpose can very easily be distinguished from the idea. For in conformity with the idea everyone presupposes that this unity of reason accords with nature itself, and that reason—although indeed unable to determine the limits of this unity—does not here beg but command.

If among the appearances which present themselves to us, there were so great a variety—I do not say in form, for in that respect the appearances might resemble one another; but in content, that is, in the manifoldness of the existing entities—that even the acutest human understanding could never by comparison of them detect the slightest similarity (a possibility which is quite conceivable), the logical law of genera would have no sort of standing; we should not even have the concept of a genus, or indeed any other universal concept; and the understanding itself, which has to do solely with such concepts, would be non-existent. If, therefore, the logical principle of genera is to be applied to nature (by which I here understand those objects only which are given to us), it presupposes a transcendental principle. And in accordance with this latter principle, homogeneity is necessarily presupposed in the manifold of possible experience (although we are not in a position to determine in a priori fashion its degree; for in the absence of more specific experience, it can only be assumed that it is present).
of homogeneity, no empirical concepts, and therefore no experience, would be possible.

The logical principle of genera, which postulates identity, is balanced by another principle, namely, that of species, which calls for manifoldness and diversity in things, notwithstanding their agreement as coming under the same genus, and which prescribes to the understanding that it attend to the diversity no less than to the identity. This principle (of discriminative observation, that is, of the faculty of distinction) sets a limit to possible indiscernation in the former principle (of the faculty of wit); and reason thus exhibits a twofold, self-conflicting interest, on the one hand interest in extent (universality) in respect of genera, and on the other hand in content (determinateness) in respect of the multiplicity of the species. In the one case the understanding thinks more under its concepts, in the other more in them. This twofold interest manifests itself also among students of nature in the diversity of their ways of thinking. Those who are more especially speculative are, we may almost say, hostile to heterogeneity, and are always on the watch for the unity of the genus; those, on the other hand, who are more especially empirical, are constantly endeavouring to differentiate nature in such manifold fashion as almost to extinguish the hope of ever being able to determine its appearances in accordance with universal principles.

This latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical principle which aims at the systematic completeness of all knowledge—prescribing that, in beginning with the genus, we descend to the manifold which may be contained thereunder, in such fashion as to secure extension for the system, just as in the alternative procedure, that of ascending to the genus, we endeavour to secure the unity of the system. For if we limit our attention to the sphere of the concept which marks out a genus, we can no more determine how far it is possible to proceed in the [logical] division of it, than we can judge merely from the space which a body occupies how far it is possible to proceed in the [physical] division of its parts. Consequently,

Dem logischen Prinzip der Gattungen, welches Identität postuliert, steht ein anderes, nämlich das der Arten entgegen, welches Mannigfaltigkeit und Verschiedenheiten der Dinge, unerachtet ihrer Übereinstimmung unter derselben Gattung, bedarf, und es dem Verstande zur Vorschrift macht, auf diese nicht weniger als auf jene aufmerksam zu sein. Dieser Grundsatz (der Scharfsinnigkeit, oder des Unterscheidungsvermögens) schränkt den Leichtsinn des ersten (des Witzes) sehr ein, und die Vernunft zeigt hier ein doppeltes einander widerstreitendes Interesse, einerseits das Interesse des Umfanges (der Allgemeinheit) in Ansehung der Gattungen, andererseits das Inhalts (der Bestimmtheit) in Absicht auf die Mannigfaltigkeit der Arten, weil der Verstand im ersten Falle zwar viel unter seinen Begriffen, im zweiten aber desto mehr in denselben denkt. Auch äußert sich dieses || an der sehr verschiedenen Denkungsart der Naturforscher, deren einige (die vorzüglich spekulativ sind), der Ungleichartigkeit gleichsam feind, immer auf die Einheit der Gattung hinauschen, die anderen (vorzüglich empirische Köpfe) die Natur unafährlich in so viel Mannigfaltigkeit zu spalten suchen, daß man beinahe die Hoffnung aufgeben müßte, ihre Erscheinungen nach allgemeinen Prinzipien zu beurteilen.

Dieser letzteren Denkungsart liegt offenbar auch ein logisches Prinzip zum Grunde, welches die systematische Vollständigkeit aller Erkenntnisse zur Absicht hat, wenn ich, von der Gattung anhebend, zu dem Mannigfaltigen, das darunter enthalten sein mag, herabsteige, und auf solche Weise dem System Ausbreitung, wie im ersten Falle, da ich zur Gattung aufsteige, Einfalt zu verschaffen suche. Denn aus der Sphäre des Begriffs, der eine Gattung bezeichnet, ist es so wenig, wie aus dem Raume, den Materie einnehmen kann, zu ersehen, wie weit die Teilung derselben

1 [In his Anthropologie, I. § 42, Kant defines wit (ingenium) as the faculty by which we determine the universal appropriate to the particular, in contrast to the faculty of judgment, by which we determine the particular that accords with the universal.]
every genus requires diversity of species, and these in turn
diversity of subspecies; and since no one of these subspecies is
ever itself without a sphere (extent as conceptus communis),
reason, in being carried to completion, demands that no species
be regarded as being in itself the lowest. For since the
species is always a concept, containing only what is common to
different things, it is not completely determined. It cannot,
therefore, be directly related to an individual, and other con-
cepts, that is, subspecies, must always be contained under it.
This law of specification can be formulated as being the prin-
ciple: entium varietates non temere esse minuendas.

But it is easily seen that this logical law would be without
meaning and application if it did not rest upon a transcedental
law of specification, which does not indeed demand an actual
infinity of differences in the things which can be objects to us
—the logical principle, as affirming only the indeterminateness
of the logical sphere in respect of possible division, gives no
occasion for any such assertion—but which none the less im-
oposes upon the understanding the obligation of seeking under
every discoverable species for subspecies, and under every dif-
ference for yet smaller differences. For if there were no lower
concepts, there could not be higher concepts. Now the under-
standing can have knowledge only through concepts, and
therefore, however far it carries the process of division, never
through mere intuition, but always again through lower
concepts. The knowledge of appearances in their complete
determination, which is possible only through the under-
standing, demands an endless progress in the specification of
our concepts, and an advance to yet other remaining differ-
ences, from which we have made abstraction in the concept of
the species, and still more so in that of the genus.

This law of specification cannot be derived from experi-
ence, which can never open to our view any such extensive
prospects. Empirical specification soon comes to a stop in the
distinction of the manifold, if it be not guided by the ante-
cedent transcendental law of specification, which, as a prin-
ciple of reason, leads us to seek always for further differences,
and to suspect their existence even when the senses are unable
to disclose them. That absorbent earths are of different kinds
(chalk and muriatic earths), is a discovery that was possible

VON DEM REGULATIVEN GEBRAUCH DER IDEEN 573

gehen können. Daher jede Gattung verschiedene Arten,
diese aber verschiedene Unterarten erfordert, und, da
keine der letzteren stattfindet, die nicht immer wiederum
eine Sphäre (Umfang als conceptus communis) hätte, so
verlangt die Vernunft in ihrer ganzen Erweiterung, daß
keine Art als die unterste an sich selbst angesehen werde,
weil, da sie doch immer ein Begriff ist, der nur das, was ver-
schiedenen Dingen gemein ist, in sich enthält; dieser nicht
durchgängig bestimmt, mithin auch nicht || zunächst auf
ein Individuum bezogen sein könne, folglich jederzeit an-
dere Begriffe, d. i. Unterarten, unter sich enthalten müsse.
Dieses Gesetz der Spezifikation könnte so ausgedrückt wer-
den: entium varietates non temere esse minuendas.

Man sieht aber leicht, daß auch dieses logische Gesetz
ohne Sinn und Anwendung sein würde, läge nicht ein tran-
szendentes Gesetz der Spezifikation zum Grunde,
welches zwar freilich nicht von den Dingen, die unsere Ge-
genstände werden können, eine wirkliche Unendlichkeit
in Ansehung der Verschiedenheiten fordert; denn dazu gibt
das logische Prinzip, als welches lediglich die Unbestimmt-
heit der logischen Sphäre in Ansehung der möglichen Ein-
teilung behauptet, keinen Anlaß; aber dennoch dem Ver-
stande auferlegt, unter jeder Art, die uns vorkommt, Unter-
arten, und zu jeder Verschiedenheit kleinere Verschieden-
heiten zu suchen. Denn, würde er keiner niedere Begriffe
gaben, so gäbe es auch keine höhere. Nun erkennt der Ver-
stand alles nur durch Begriffe: folglich, so weit er in der Ein-
teilung reicht, niemals durch bloße Anschnauung, sondern
immer wiederum durch niedere Begriffe. Die Erkenntnis
der Erscheinungen in ihrer durchgängigen Bestimmung
(welche nur durch Verstand möglich ist) fordert eine unsau-
hörlich fortzusetzende Spezifikation seiner Begriffe, und
einen Fortgang zu immer noch bleibenden Verschiedenhei-
ten, von dem Begriffe der Art, und noch mehr dem
der Gattung, abstrahiert worden.

|| Auch kann dieses Gesetz der Spezifikation nicht von
der Erfahrung entlehnt sein; denn diese kann keine so weit
gehende Erörterungen geben. Die empirische Spezifikation
bleibt in der Unterscheidung des Mannigfaltigen bald stehen,
weil sie nicht durch das schon vorhergehende transcendental
Gesetz der Spezifikation, als ein 1 Prinzip der Vernunft,
geleitet worden, solches zu suchen, und sie noch immer zu
vermuten, wenn sie sich gleich nicht den Sinnen offenbaren.
Daß absorbierende Erden nach verschiedener-Art (Kalk-
und muriatische Erden) sein 2, bedurfte zur Entdeckung

only under the guidance of an antecedent rule of reason—reason proceeding on the assumption that nature is so richly diversified that we may presume the presence of such differences, and therefore prescribing to the understanding the task of searching for them. Indeed it is only on the assumption of differences in nature, just as it is also only under the condition that its objects exhibit homogeneity, that we can have any faculty of understanding whatsoever. For the diversity of that which is comprehended under a concept is precisely what gives occasion for the employment of the concept and the exercise of the understanding.

Reason thus prepares the field for the understanding: (1) through a principle of the homogeneity of the manifold under higher genera; (2) through a principle of the variety of the homogeneous under lower species; and (3) in order to complete the systematic unity, a further law, that of the affinity of all concepts—a law which prescribes that we proceed from each species to every other by gradual increase of the diversity. These we may entitle the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms. The last named arises from union of the other two, inasmuch as only through the processes of ascending to the higher genera and of descending to the lower species do we obtain the idea of systematic connection in its completeness. For all the manifold differences are then related to one another, inasmuch as they one and all spring from one highest genus, through all degrees of a more and more widely extended determination.

The systematic unity, prescribed by the three logical principles, can be illustrated in the following manner. Every concept may be regarded as a point which, as the station for an observer, has its own horizon, that is, a variety of things which can be represented, and, as it were, surveyed from that standpoint. This horizon must be capable of containing an infinite number of points, each of which has its own narrower horizon; that is, every species contains subspecies, according to the principle of specification, and the logical horizon consists exclusively of smaller horizons (subspecies), never of points which possess no extent (individuals). But for different horizons, that is, genera, each of which is determined by its own concept, there can be a common horizon, in reference to
REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS 543

which, as from a common centre, they can all be surveyed; and from this higher genus we can proceed until we arrive at the highest of all genera, and so at the universal and true horizon, which is determined from the standpoint of the highest concept, and which comprehends under itself all manifoldness—genera, species, and subspecies.

We are carried to this highest standpoint by the law of homogeneity, and to all lower standpoints, and their greatest possible variety, by the law of specification. And since there is thus no void in the whole sphere of all possible concepts, and since nothing can be met with outside this sphere, there arises from the presupposition of this universal horizon and of its complete division, the principle: non datur vacuum formarum, that is, that there are not different, original, first genera, which are isolated from one another, separated, as it were, by an empty intervening space; but that all the manifold genera are simply divisions of one single highest and universal genus. From this principle there follows, as its immediate consequence: datur continuum formarum, that is, that all differences of species border upon one another, admitting of no transition from one to another per saltum, but only through all the smaller degrees of difference that mediate between them. In short, there are no species or subspecies which (in the view of reason) are the nearest possible to each other; still other intermediate species are always possible, the difference of which from each of the former is always smaller than the difference between these.

The first law thus keeps us from resting satisfied with an excessive number of different original genera, and bids us pay due regard to homogeneity; the second, in turn, imposes a check upon this tendency towards unity, and insists that before we proceed to apply a universal concept to individuals we distinguish subspecies within it. The third law combines these two laws by prescribing that even amidst the utmost manifoldness we observe homogeneity in the gradual transition from one species to another, and thus recognise a relationship of the different branches, as all springing from the same stem.

This logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum logicarum) presupposes, however, a transcendental law (lex

\[\text{[Reading, with Hartenstein, et for eis.]}\]

insgesamt als aus einem Mittelpunkt überschauer, || ge- zogen denken, welcher die höhere Gattung ist, bis endlich die höchste Gattung der allgemeine und wahrh Horizont ist, der aus dem Standpunkte des höchsten Begriffs bestimmt wird, und alle Mannigfaltigkeit, als Gattungen, Arten und Unterarten, unter sich befaßt.

Zu diesem höchsten Standpunkte führt mich das Gesetz der Homogenität, zu allen niedrigeren und deren größten Varietät das Gesetz der Spezifikation.Da aber auf solche Weise in dem ganzen Umfange aller möglichen Begriffe nichts Leeres ist, und außer demselben nichts angetroffen werden kann, so entspringt aus der Voraussetzung jenes allgemeinen Gesichtskreises und der durchgängigen Einteilung desselben der Grundsatz: non datur vacuum formarum, d. i. es gibt nicht verschiedenartige und erste Gattungen, die gleichsam isoliert und von einander (durch einen leeren Zwischenraum) getrennt wären, sondern alle mannigfaltige Gattungen sind nur Abteilungen einer einzigen obersten und allgemeinen Gattung; und aus diesem Grundsätze dessen unmittelbare Folge: datur continuum formarum, d. i. alle Verschiedenheiten der Arten grenzen an einander und erlauben keinen Übergang zu einander durch einen Sprung, sondern nur durch all die kleineren Grade des Unterschiedes, dadurch man von einer zu der anderen gelangen kann; mit einem Worte, es gibt keine Arten oder Unterarten, die einander (im Begriffe der Vernunft) die nächsten wären, sondern es sind noch immer Zwischenarten möglich, deren Unterschied von der ersten und zweiten kleiner ist, als dieser ihr Unterschied von einander.

Das erste Gesetz also verhütet die Ausschweifung in die Mannigfaltigkeit verschiedener ursprünglicher Gattungen und empfiehlt die Gleichartigkeit; das zweite schränkt dagegen diese Neigung zur Einheitlichkeit wiederum ein, und gebietet Unterscheidung der Unterarten, bevor man sich mit seinem allgemeinen Begriffe zu den Individuen wende. Das dritte vereinigt jene beide, indem sie bei der höchsten Mannigfaltigkeit dennoch die Gleichartigkeit durch den stufenartigen Übergang von einer Spezies zur anderen verschreibt, welches eine Art von Verwandtschaft der verschiedenen Zweige anzeigt, in so fern sie insgesamt aus einem Stamm entsprossen sind.

Dieses logische Gesetz des continuo specierum (formarum logicarum) setzt aber ein transcendentales voraus (lex con-
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

continui in natura), without which the former law would only lead the understanding astray, causing it to follow a path which is perhaps quite contrary to that prescribed by nature itself. This law must therefore rest upon pure transcendental, not on empirical, grounds. For if it rested on empirical grounds, it would come later than the systems, whereas in actual fact it has itself given rise to all that is systematic in our knowledge of nature. The formulation of these laws is not due to any secret design of making an experiment, by putting them forward as merely tentative suggestions. Such anticipations, when confirmed, yield strong evidence in support of the view that the hypothetically conceived unity is well-grounded; and such evidence has therefore in this respect a certain utility. But it is evident that the laws contemplate the parsimony of fundamental causes, the manifoldness of effects, and the consequent affinity of the parts of nature as being in themselves in accordance both with reason and with nature. Hence these principles carry their recommendation directly in themselves, and not merely as methodological devices.

But it is easily seen that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which no congruent object can be discovered in experience. For in the first place, the species in nature are actually divided, and must therefore constitute a quantum discretum. Were the advance in the tracing of their affinity continuous, there would be a true infinity of intermediate members between any two given species, which is impossible. And further, in the second place, we could not make any determinate empirical use of this law, since it instructs us only in quite general terms that we are to seek for grades of affinity, and yields no criterion whatsoever as to how far, and in what manner, we are to prosecute the search for them.

If we place these principles of systematic unity in the order appropriate to their empirical employment, they will stand thus: manifoldness, affinity, unity, each being taken, as an idea, in the highest degree of its completeness. Reason presupposes the knowledge which is obtained by the understanding and which stands in immediate relation to experience, and

[Reading, with Erdmann, *er for er*]

[Reading, with Erdmann, *Idea for Ideas*]
REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS 

seeks for the unity of this knowledge in accordance with ideas which go far beyond all possible experience. The affinity of the manifold (as, notwithstanding its diversity, coming under a principle of unity) refers indeed to things, but still more to their properties and powers. Thus, for instance, if at first our imperfect experience leads us to regard the orbits of the planets as circular, and if we subsequently detect deviations therefrom, we trace the deviations to that which can change the circle, in accordance with a fixed law, through all the infinite intermediate degrees, into one of these divergent orbits. That is to say, we assume that the movements of the planets which are not circular will more or less approximate to the properties of a circle; and thus we come upon the idea of an ellipse. Since the comets do not, so far as observation reaches, return in any such courses, their paths exhibit still greater deviations. What we then do is to suppose that they proceed in a parabolic course, which is akin to the ellipse, and which in all our observations is indistinguishable from an ellipse that has its major axis indefinitely extended. Thus, under the guidance of these principles, we discover a unity in the generic forms of the orbits, and thereby a unity in the cause of all the laws of planetary motion, namely, gravitation. And we then extend our conquests still further, endeavouring to explain by the same principle all variations and seeming departures from these rules; finally, we even go on to make additions such as experience can never confirm, namely, to conceive, in accordance with the rules of affinity, hyperbolic paths of comets, in the course of which these bodies entirely leave our solar system, and passing from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the universe—a universe which, though for us unlimited, is throughout held together by one and the same moving force.

The remarkable feature of these principles, and what in them alone concerns us, is that they seem to be transcendental, and that although they contain mere ideas for the guidance of the empirical employment of reason—ideas which reason follows only as it were asymptotically, i.e.: ever more closely without ever reaching them—they yet possess, as synthetic a priori propositions, objective but indeterminate validity, and serve as rules for possible experience. They can also be employed with great advantage in the elaboration of experience,

nach Ideen, die viel weiter geht, als Erfahrung reichen kann. Die Verwandtschaft des Mannigfaltigen, unbeschadet seiner Verschiedenheit, unter einem Prinzip der Einheit, betrifft nicht bloß die Dinge, sondern weit mehr noch die bloßen Eigenschaften und Kräfte der Dinge. Daher, wenn uns z. B. durch eine (noch nicht völlig berichtigte) Erfahrung der Lauf der Planeten als kreisförmig gegeben ist, und wir finden Verschiedenheiten, so vermuten wir sie in denjenigen, was den Zirkel nach einem beständigen Gesetz durch alle unendliche Zwischengrade, zu einer | dieser abweichenden Umläufe abändern kann, d. i. die Bewegungen der Planeten, die nicht Zirkel sind, werden etwa dessen Eigenschaften mehr oder weniger nahe kommen, und fallen auf die Ellipse. Die Kometen zeigen eine noch größere Verschiedenheit ihrer Bahnen, da sie (seit weit Beobachtung reicht) nicht einmal im Kreise zurückkehren; allein wir raten auf einen parabolischen Lauf, der doch mit der Ellipsen verwandt ist, und, wenn die lange Achse der letzteren sehr weit gestreckt ist, in allen unseren || Beobachtungen von ihr nicht unterschieden werden kann. So kommen wir, nach Anleitung jener Prinzipien, auf Einheit der Gattungen dieser Bahnen in ihrer Gestalt, dadurch aber weiter auf Einheit der Ursache aller Gesetze ihrer Bewegung (die Gravitation), von da wir nachher unsere Exzerptionen ausdienen, und auch alle Varietäten und scheinbare Abweichungen von jenen Regeln aus demselben Prinzip zu erklären suchen, endlich gar mehr hinzufügen, als Erfahrung jemals bestätigen kann, nämlich, uns nach den Regeln der Verwandtschaft selbst hyperbolische Kometenbahnen zu denken, in welchen dieselbe Körper ganz und gar unsere Sonnenwelt verlassen, und, indem sie von Sonne zu Sonne gehen, die entfernteren Teile eines für uns unbegrenzten Weltsystems, das durch eine und dieselbe bewegende Kraft zusammenhängt, in ihrem Laufe vereinigen.

Was bei diesen Prinzipien merkwürdig ist, und uns, auch allein beschäftigt, ist dieses: daß sie transzendental zu sein scheinen, und ob sie gleich bloße Ideen zur Befolgung des empirischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft enthalten, denen der letztere nur gleichsam asymptotisch, d. i. bloß annähernd folgen kann, ohne sie jemals zu erreichen, sie gleichwohl, als synthetische Sätze a priori, objektive, aber unbestimmte Gültigkeit haben, und zur Regel möglichter Erfahrung dienen, auch wirklich in Bearbeitung derselben, als heuristi-

as heuristic principles. A transcendental deduction of them cannot, however, be effected; in the case of ideas, as we have shown above, such a deduction is never possible.

In the Transcendental Analytic we have distinguished the dynamical principles of the understanding, as merely regulative principles of intuition, from the mathematical, which, as regards intuition, are constitutive. None the less these dynamical laws are constitutive in respect of experience, since they render the concepts, without which there can be no experience, possible a priori. But principles of pure reason can never be constitutive in respect of empirical concepts; for since no schema of sensibility corresponding to them can ever be given, they can never have an object in concreto. If, then, we disallow such empirical employment of them, as constitutive principles, how are we to secure for them a regulative employment, and therewith some sort of objective validity, and what can we mean by such regulative employment?

The understanding is an object for reason, just as sensibility is for the understanding. It is the business of reason to render the unity of all possible empirical acts of the understanding systematic; just as it is of the understanding to connect the manifold of the appearances by means of concepts, and to bring it under empirical laws. But the acts of the understanding are, without the schema of sensibility, undetermined; just as the unity of reason is in itself undetermined, as regards the conditions under which, and the extent to which, the understanding ought to combine its concepts in systematic fashion. But although we are unable to find in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of all concepts of the understanding, an analogon of such a schema must necessarily allow of being given. This analogon is the idea of the maximum in the division and unification of the knowledge of the understanding under one principle. For what is greatest and absolutely complete can be determinately thought, all restricting conditions, which give rise to an indeterminate manifoldness, being left aside. Thus the idea of reason is an analogon of a schema of sensibility; but with this difference, that the application of the concepts of the understanding to the schema of reason does not yield knowledge of the object itself (as is the case in the application of categories to their
sensible schemata), but only a rule or principle for the systematic unity of all employment of the understanding. Now since every principle which prescribes a priori to the understanding thoroughgoing unity in its employment, also holds, although only indirectly, of the object of experience, the principles of pure reason must also have objective reality in respect of that object, not, however, in order to determine anything in it,\(^1\) but only in order to indicate the procedure whereby the empirical and determinate employment of the understanding can be brought into complete harmony with itself. This is achieved by bringing its employment, so far as may be possible, into connection with the principle of thoroughgoing unity, and by determining its procedure in the light of this principle.

I entitle all subjective principles which are derived, not from the constitution of an object but from the interest of reason in respect of a certain possible perfection of the knowledge of the object, maxims of reason. There are therefore maxims of speculative reason, which rest entirely on its speculative interest, although they may seem to be objective principles.

When merely regulative principles are treated as constitutive, and are therefore employed as objective principles, they may come into conflict with one another. But when they are treated merely as maxims, there is no real conflict, but merely those differences in the interest of reason that give rise to differing modes of thought. In actual fact, reason has only one single interest, and the conflict of its maxims is only a difference in, and a mutual limitation of, the methods whereby this interest endeavours to obtain satisfaction.

Thus one thinker may be more particularly interested in manifoldness (in accordance with the principle of specification), another thinker in unity (in accordance with the principle of aggregation).\(^8\) Each believes that his judgment has been arrived at through insight into the object, whereas it really rests entirely on the greater or lesser attachment to one of the two principles. And since neither of these principles is based on objective grounds, but solely on the interest of reason, the

\(^1\) [Reading, with Wille, ihm für ihnen.]
\(^8\) [Aggregation.]
title 'principles' is not strictly applicable; they may more fittingly be entitled 'maxims'. When we observe intelligent people disputing in regard to the characteristic properties of men, animals, or plants—even of bodies in the mineral realm—some assuming, for instance, that there are certain special hereditary characteristics in each nation, certain well-defined inherited differences in families, races, etc., whereas others are bent upon maintaining that in all such cases nature has made precisely the same provision for all, and that it is solely to external accidental conditions that the differences are due, we have only to consider what sort of an object it is about which they are making these assertions, to realise that it lies too deeply hidden to allow of their speaking from insight into its nature. The dispute is due simply to the twofold interest of reason, the one party setting its heart upon, or at least adopting, the one interest, and the other party the other. The differences between the maxims of manifoldness and of unity in nature thus easily allow of reconciliation. So long, however, as the maxims are taken as yielding objective insight, and until a way has been discovered of adjusting their conflicting claims, and of satisfying reason in that regard, they will not only give rise to disputes but will be a positive hindrance, and cause long delays in the discovery of truth.

Similar observations are relevant in regard to the assertion or denial of the widely discussed law of the continuous gradation of created beings, which was propounded by Leibniz, and admirably supported by Bonnet. It is simply the following out of that principle of affinity which rests on the interest of reason. For observation and insight into the constitution of nature could never justify us in the objective assertion of the law. The steps of this ladder, as they are presented to us in experience, stand much too far apart; and what may seem to us small differences are usually in nature itself such wide gaps, that from any such observations we can come to no decision in regard to nature's ultimate design—especially if we bear in mind that in so great a multiplicity of things there can never be much difficulty in finding similarities and approximations. On the other hand, the method of looking for order in nature

\[\text{A 668}\]
\[\text{B 596}\]

1 [Leibniz: \textit{ Nouveaux Essais}, Liv. iii. ch. 6.]
2 [Charles Bonnet (1726-93): \textit{Beachtungen über die Natur}, pp. 29-85.]
in accordance with such a principle, and the maxim which prescribes that we regard such order—leaving, however, undetermined where and how far—as grounded in nature as such, is certainly a legitimate and excellent regulative principle of reason. In this regulative capacity it goes far beyond what experience or observation can verify; and though not itself determining anything, yet serves to mark out the path towards systematic unity.

**THE FINAL PURPOSE OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON**

The ideas of pure reason can never be dialectical in themselves; any deceptive illusion to which they give occasion must be due solely to their misemployment. For they arise from the very nature of our reason; and it is impossible that this highest tribunal of all the rights and claims of speculation should itself be the source of deceptions and illusions. Presumably, therefore, the ideas have their own good and appropriate vocation as determined by the natural disposition of our reason. The mob of sophists, however, raise against reason the usual cry of absurdities and contradictions, and though unable to penetrate to its innermost designs, they none the less inveigh against its prescriptions. Yet it is to the beneficent influences exercised by reason that they owe the possibility of their own self-assertiveness, and indeed that very culture\(^1\) which enables them to blame and to condemn what reason requires of them.

We cannot employ an *a priori* concept with any certainty without having first given a transcendental deduction of it. The ideas of pure reason do not, indeed, admit of the kind of deduction that is possible in the case of the categories. But if they are to have the least objective validity, no matter how indeterminate that validity may be, and are not to be mere empty thought-entities\(^2\) (*entia rationis ratiocinantis*), a deduction of them must be possible, however greatly (as we admit)\(^3\) it may differ from that which we have been able to give of the categories. This will complete the critical work of pure reason, and is what we now propose to undertake.

\(^1\) [Kultur.]
\(^2\) [Gedankensingen.]
\(^3\) [A 670 B 598]
There is a great difference between something being given to my reason as an object absolutely, or merely as an object in the idea. In the former case our concepts are employed to determine the object; in the latter case there is in fact only a schema for which no object, not even a hypothetical one, is directly given, and which only enables us to represent to ourselves other objects in an indirect manner, namely in their systematic unity, by means of their relation to this idea. Thus I say that the concept of a highest intelligence is a mere idea, that is to say, its objective reality is not to be taken as consisting in its referring directly to an object (for in that sense we should not be able to justify its objective validity). It is only a schema constructed in accordance with the conditions of the greatest possible unity of reason—the schema of the concept of a thing in general, which serves only to secure the greatest possible systematic unity in the empirical employment of our reason. We then, as it were, derive the object of experience from the supposed object of this idea, viewed as the ground or cause of the object of experience. We declare, for instance, that the things of the world must be viewed as if they received their existence from a highest intelligence. The idea is thus really only a heuristic, not an ontogenetic concept. It does not show us how an object is constituted, but how, under its guidance, we should seek to determine the constitution and connection of the objects of experience. If, then, it can be shown that the three transcendental ideas (the psychological, the cosmological, and the theological), although they do not directly relate to, or determine, any object corresponding to them, none the less, as rules of the empirical employment of reason, lead us to systematic unity, under the presupposition of such an object in the idea; and that they thus contribute to the extension of empirical knowledge, without ever being in a position to run counter to it, we may conclude that it is a necessary maxim of reason to proceed always in accordance with such ideas. This, indeed, is the transcendental deduction of all ideas of speculative reason, not as constitutive principles for the extension of our knowledge to more objects than experience can give, but as regulative principles of the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical knowledge in general, whereby this empirical

1 [Reading, with Grillo, als for alle.]

VON DER ENDABSICHT DER NATÜRLICHEN DIALEKTIK

Es ist ein großer Unterschied, ob etwas meiner Vernunft als ein Gegenstand schlechthin, oder nur als ein Gegenstand in der Idee gegeben wird. In dem ersteren Falle gehen meine Begriffe dahin, den Gegenstand zu bestimmen; im zweiten ist es wirklich nur ein Schema, dem direkten kein Gegenstand, auch nicht einmal hypothetisch zugegeben wird, sondern welches nur dazu dient, um andere Gegenstände, vermittelt der Beziehung auf diese Idee, nach ihrer systematischen Einheit, mithin indirekt uns vorzustellen. So sage ich, der Begriff einer höchsten Intelligenz ist eine bloße Idee, d. i. seine objektive Realität soll nicht darin bestehen, daß er sich geradezu auf einen Gegenstand bezieht (denn in solcher Bedeutung würden wir seine objektive Gültigkeit nicht rechtfertigen können), sondern er ist nur ein nach Bedingungen der größten Vernunftseinheit geordnetes Schema, von dem Begriffe eines Dinges überhaupt, welches nur dazu dient, um die größte systematische Einheit im empirischen Gebrauche unserer Vernunft zu erhalten, indem man den Gegenstand der Erfahrung gleichsam von dem eingebildeten Gegenstande dieser Idee, als einem Grunde, oder Ursache, ableitet. Alsend heißt es z. B., die Dinge der Welt müssen || so betrachtet werden, als ob sie von einer höchsten Intelligenz ihr Dasein hätten: Auf solche Weise ist die Idee eigentlich nur ein heuristischer und nicht ostensiver Begriff, und zeigt an, nicht wie ein Gegenstand beschaffen ist, sondern wie wir, unter der Leitung desselben, die Beschaffenheit und Verknüpfung der Gegenstände der Erfahrung überhaupt suchen sollen. Wenn man nun zeigen kann, daß, obgleich die dreierlei transcendentalen Ideen (psychologische, kosmologische, und theologische) direkt auf keinen ihnen entsprechenden Gegenstand und dessen Bestimmung bezogen werden, dennoch alle Regeln des empirischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft unter Voraussetzung eines solchen Gegenstandes in der Idee auf systematische Einheit führen und die Erfahrungserkenntnis jederzeit erweitern; niemals aber derselben zuwider sein können: so ist es eine notwendige Maxime der Vernunft, nach dergleichen Ideen zu verfahren. Und dieses ist die transcendente Deduktion aller Ideen der spekulativen Vernunft, nicht als konstitutiver Prinzipien der Erweiterung unserer Erkenntnis über mehr Gegenstände, als Erfahrung geben kann, sondern als regulativer Prinzipien der systematischen Einheit des Manufaltigen der empirischen Erkenntnis überhaupt, welche dadurch in ihren
knowledge is more adequately secured within its own limits and more effectively improved than would be possible, in the absence of such ideas, through the employment merely of the principles of the understanding.

I shall endeavour to make this clearer. In conformity with these ideas as principles we shall, first, in psychology, under the guidance of inner experience, connect all the appearances, all the actions and receptivity of our mind, as if the mind were a simple substance which persists with personal identity (in this life at least), while its states, to which those of the body belong only as outer conditions, are in continual change. Secondly, in cosmology, we must follow up the conditions of both inner and outer natural appearances, in an enquiry which is to be regarded as never allowing of completion, just as if the series of appearances were in itself endless, without any first or supreme member. We need not, in so doing, deny that, outside all appearances, there are purely intelligible grounds of the appearances; but as we have no knowledge of these whatsoever, we must never attempt to make use of them in our explanations of nature. Thirdly, and finally, in the domain of theology, we must view everything that can belong to the context of possible experience as if this experience formed an absolute but at the same time completely dependent and sensibly conditioned unity, and yet also at the same time as if the sum of all appearances (the sensible world itself) had a single, highest and all-sufficient ground beyond itself, namely, a self-subsistent, original, creative reason. For it is in the light of this idea of a creative reason that we so guide the empirical employment of our reason as to secure its greatest possible extension—that is, by viewing all objects as if they drew their origin from such an archetype. In other words, we ought not to derive the inner appearances of the soul from a simple thinking substance but from one another, in accordance with the idea of a simple being; we ought not to derive the order and systematic unity of the world from a supreme intelligence, but to obtain from the idea of a supremely wise cause the rule according to which reason in connecting empirical causes and effects in the world may be employed to best advantage, and in such manner as to secure satisfaction of its own demands.

Now there is nothing whatsoever to hinder us from as-

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* Akad.-Ausg.: welcher.
suming these ideas to be also objective, that is, from hypostatizing them—except in the case of the cosmological ideas, where reason, in so proceeding, falls into antimony. The psychological and theological ideas contain no antimony, and involve no contradiction. How, then, can anyone dispute their [possible] objective reality? He who denies their possibility must do so with just as little knowledge [of this possibility] as we can have in affirming it. It is not, however, a sufficient ground for assuming anything, that there is no positive hindrance to our so doing; we are not justified in introducing thought-entities which transcend all our concepts, though without contradicting them, as being real and determinate objects, merely on the authority of a speculative reason that is bent upon completing the tasks which it has set itself. They ought not to be assumed as existing in themselves, but only as having the reality of a schema—the schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all knowledge of nature. They should be regarded only as analoga of real things, not as in themselves real things. We remove from the object of the idea the conditions which limit the concept provided by our understanding, but which also alone make it possible for us to have a determinate concept of anything. What we then think is a something of which, as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever, but which we none the less represent to ourselves as standing to the sum of appearances in a relation analogous to that in which appearances stand to one another.

If, in this manner, we assume such ideal beings, we do not really extend our knowledge beyond the objects of possible experience; we extend only the empirical unity of such experience, by means of the systematic unity for which the schema is provided by the idea—an idea which has therefore no claim to be a constitutive, but only a regulative principle. For to allow that we posit a thing, a something, a real being, corresponding to the idea, is not to say that we profess to extend our knowledge of things by means of transcendental concepts. For this being is posited only in the idea and not in itself; and therefore only as expressing the systematic

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1. [Gedankenwesen.]
2. [Reading, with the 4th edition, transcendentalen for transcendentalen.]
unity which is to serve as a rule for the empirical employment of reason. It decides nothing in regard to the ground of this unity or as to what may be the inner character of the being on which as cause the unity depends.

Thus the transcendental, and the only determinate, concept which the purely speculative reason gives us of God is, in the strictest sense, deistic; that is, reason does not determine the objective validity of such a concept, but yields only the idea of something which is the ground of the highest and necessary unity of all empirical reality. This something we cannot think otherwise than on the analogy of a real substance that, in conformity with laws of reason, is the cause of all things. This, indeed, is how we must think it, in so far as we venture to think it as a special object, and do not rather remain satisfied with the mere idea of the regulative principle of reason, leaving aside the completion of all conditions of thought as being too surpassingly great for the human understanding. The latter procedure is, however, inconsistent with the pursuit of that complete systematic unity in our knowledge to which reason at least sets no limits.

This, then, is how matters stand: if we assume a divine being, we have indeed no concept whatsoever either of the inner possibility of its supreme perfection or of the necessity of its existence; but, on the other hand, we are in a position to give a satisfactory answer to all those questions which relate to the contingent, and to afford reason the most complete satisfaction in respect to that highest unity after which it is seeking in its empirical employment. The fact, however, that we are unable to satisfy reason in respect to the assumption itself, shows that it is the speculative interest of reason, not any insight, which justifies it in thus starting from a point that lies so far above its sphere; and in endeavouring, by this device, to survey its objects as constituting a complete whole.

We here come upon a distinction bearing on the procedure of thought in dealing with one and the same assumption, a distinction which is somewhat subtle, but of great importance in transcendental philosophy. I may have sufficient ground to assume something, in a relative sense (suppositio relativa), and yet have no right to assume it absolutely (suppositio absoluta).
This distinction has to be reckoned with in the case of a merely regulative principle. We recognise the necessity of the principle, but have no knowledge of the source of its necessity; and in assuming that it has a supreme ground, we do so solely in order to think its universality more determinately. Thus, for instance, when I think as existing a being that corresponds to a mere idea, indeed to a transcendental idea, I have no right to assume any such thing as in itself existing, since no concepts through which I am able to think any object as determined suffice for such a purpose—the conditions which are required for the objective validity of my concepts being excluded by the idea itself. The concepts of reality, substance, causality, even that of necessity in existence, apart from their use in making possible the empirical knowledge of an object, have no meaning whatsoever, such as might serve to determine any object. They can be employed, therefore, to explain the possibility of things in the world of sense, but not to explain the possibility of the universe itself. Such a ground of explanation would have to be outside the world, and could not therefore be an object of a possible experience. None the less, though I cannot assume such an inconceivable being [as existing] in itself, I may yet assume it as the object of a mere idea, relatively to the world of sense. For if the greatest possible empirical employment of my reason rests upon an idea (that of systematically complete unity, which I shall presently be defining more precisely), an idea which, although it can never itself be adequately exhibited in experience, is yet indispensably necessary in order that we may approximate to the highest possible degree of empirical unity, I shall not only be entitled, but shall also be constrained, to realise this idea, that is, to posit for it a real object. But I may posit it only as a something which I do not at all know in itself, and to which, as a ground of that systematic unity, I ascribe, in relation to this unity, such properties as are analogues to the concepts employed by the understanding in the empirical sphere. Accordingly, in analogy with realities in the world, that is, with substances, with causality and with necessity, I think a being which possesses all this in the highest perfection; and since this idea depends merely on my reason, I can think this being as self-subsistent reason,
which through ideas of the greatest harmony and unity is the cause of the universe. I thus omit all conditions which might limit the idea, solely in order, under countenance of such an original ground, to make possible systematic unity of the manifold in the universe, and thereby the greatest possible empirical employment of reason. This I do by representing all connections as if they were the ordinances of a supreme reason, of which our reason is but a faint copy. I then proceed to think this supreme being exclusively through concepts which, properly, are applicable only in the world of sense. But since I make none but a relative use of the transcendent assumption, namely, as giving the substratum of the greatest possible unity of experience, I am quite in order in thinking of a being which I distinguish from the world of sense, through properties which belong solely to that world. For I do not seek, nor am I justified in seeking, to know this object of my idea according to what it may be in itself. There are no concepts available for any such purpose; even the concepts of reality, substance, causality, nay, even that of necessity in existence, lose all meaning, and are empty titles for possible concepts, themselves entirely without content, when we thus venture with them outside the field of the senses. I think to myself merely the relation of a being, in itself completely unknown to me, to the greatest possible systematic unity of the universe, solely for the purpose of using it as a schema of the regulative principle of the greatest possible empirical employment of my reason.

If it be the transcendent object of our idea that we have in view, it is obvious that we cannot thus, in terms of the concepts of reality, substance, causality, etc., presuppose its reality in itself, since these concepts have not the least application to anything that is entirely distinct from the world of sense. The supposition which reason makes of a supreme being, as the highest cause, is, therefore relative only; it is devised solely for the sake of systematic unity in the world of sense, and is a mere something in idea, of which, as it may be in itself, we have no concept. This explains why, in relation to what is given to the senses as existing, we require the idea of a primordial being necessary in itself, and yet can never form the slightest concept of it or of its absolute necessity.

VON DER ENDSACHT DER NATÜRLICHEN DIALEKTIK 589

größten Harmonie und Einheit, Ursache vom Weltganzen ist, denken können, so daß ich alle, die Idee einschränkende, Bedingungen weglasse, lediglich um, unter dem Schutze eines solchen Urgrundes, systematische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen im Weltganzen, und, vermittels derselben, den größtmöglichen empirischen Vernunftgebrauch möglich zu machen, indem ich alle Verbindungen so ansehe, als ob sie Anordnungen einer höchsten Vernunft wären, von der die unsrige ein schwaches Nachbild ist. Ich denke mir alsdann dieses höchste Wesen durch lauter Begriffe, die eigentlich nur in der Sinnenwelt ihre Anwendung haben; da ich aber auch jene transzendente Voraussetzung zu keinem andern als relativen Gebrauch habe, nämlich, daß sie das Substratum der größtmöglichen Erfahrungseinheit abgeben solle, so darf ich ein Wesen, das ich von der Welt unterscheide, ganz wohl durch Eigenschaften denken, die lediglich zur Sinnenwelt gehören. Denn ich verlange keinesweges, und bin auch nicht befugt, es zu verlangen, diesen Gegenstand meiner Idee, nach dem, was er an sich sein mag, zu erkennen; denn dazu habe ich keine Begriffe, und selbst die Begriffe von Realität, Substanz, Kausalität, ja so gar der Notwendigkeit im Dasein, verlieren alle Bedeutung, und sind leere Titel zu Begriffen, ohne allen Inhalt, wenn ich mich außer dem Felde der Sinne damit hinauswäge. Ich denke mir nur die Relation eines mir an sich ganz unbekannten Wesens zur größten systematischen Einheit des Weltganzen, lediglich um es zum Schema des regulativen Prinzips des größtmöglichen empirischen Gebrauchs meiner Vernunft zu machen.

Werfen wir unseren Blick nun auf den transzendentalen Gegenstand unserer Idee, so sehen wir, daß wir seine Wirklichkeit nach den Begriffen von Realität, Substanz, Kausalität etc. an sich selbst nicht voraussetzen können, weil diese Begriffe auf etwas, das von der Sinnenwelt ganz unterschieden ist, nicht die mindeste Anwendung haben. Also ist die Supposition der Vernunft von einem höchsten Wesen, als oberster Ursache, bloß relativ, zum Behuf der systematischen Einheit der Sinnenwelt gedacht, und ein bloßes Etwas in der Idee, wovon wir, was es an sich sei, keinen Begriff haben. Hiedurch erklärt sich auch, woher wir zwar in Beziehung auf das, was existierend den Sinnen gegeben ist, der Idee eines an sich notwendigen Urwesens bedürfen, niemals aber von diesem und seiner absoluten Notwendigkeit den mindesten Begriff haben können.
We are now in a position to have a clear view of the outcome of the whole Transcendental Dialectic, and accurately to define the final purpose of the ideas of pure reason, which become dialectical only through heedlessness and misapprehension. Pure reason is in fact occupied with nothing but itself. It can have no other vocation. For what is given to it does not consist in objects that have to be brought to the unity of the empirical concept, but in those modes of knowledge supplied by the understanding that require to be brought to the unity of the concept of reason—that is, to unity of connection in conformity with a principle. The unity of reason is the unity of system; and this systematic unity does not serve objectively as a principle that extends the application of reason to objects, but subjectively as a maxim that extends its application to all possible empirical knowledge of objects. Nevertheless, since the systematic connection which reason can give to the empirical employment of the understanding not only further its extension, but also guarantees its correctness, the principle of such systematic unity is so far also objective, but in an indeterminate manner (principium vagum). It is not a constitutive principle that enables us to determine anything in respect of its direct object, but only a merely regulative principle and maxim, to further and strengthen in infinitum (indeterminately) the empirical employment of reason—never in any way proceeding counter to the laws of its empirical employment, and yet at the same time opening out new paths which are not within the cognisance of the understanding.

But reason cannot think this systematic unity otherwise than by giving to the idea of this unity an object; and since experience can never give an example of complete systematic unity, the object which we have to assign to the idea is not such as experience can ever supply. This object, as thus entertained by reason (ens rationis ratiocinatae), is a mere idea; it is not assumed as a something that is real absolutely and in itself, but is postulated only problematically (since we cannot reach it through any of the concepts of the understanding) in order that we may view all connection of the things of the world of sense as if they had their ground in such a being. In thus proceeding, our sole purpose is to secure that systematic unity which is indispensable to reason, and

...
NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON

which while furthering in every way the empirical knowledge obtainable by the understanding can never interfere to hinder or obstruct it.

We misapprehend the meaning of this idea if we regard it as the assertion or even as the assumption of a real thing, to which we may proceed to ascribe the ground of the systematic order of the world. On the contrary, what this ground which eludes our concepts may be in its own inherent constitution is left entirely undetermined; the idea is posited only as being the point of view from which alone that unity, which is so essential to reason and so beneficial to the understanding, can be further extended. In short, this transcendental thing is only the schema of the regulative principle by which reason, so far as lies in its power, extends systematic unity over the whole field of experience.

The first object of such an idea is the 'I' itself, viewed simply as thinking nature or soul. If I am to investigate the properties with which a thinking being is in itself endowed, I must interrogate experience. For I cannot even apply any one of the categories to this object, except in so far as the schema of the category is given in sensible intuition. But I never thereby attain to a systematic unity of all appearances of inner sense. Instead, then, of the empirical concept (of that which the soul actually is), which cannot carry us far, reason takes the concept of the empirical unity of all thought; and by thinking this unity as unconditioned and original, it forms from it a concept of reason, that is, the idea of a simple substance, which, unchangeable in itself (personally identical), stands in association with other real things outside it; in a word, the idea of a simple self-subsisting intelligence. Yet in so doing it has nothing in view save principles of systematic unity in the explanation of the appearances of the soul. It is endeavouring to represent all determinations as existing in a single subject, all powers, so far as possible, as derived from a single fundamental power, all change as belonging to the states of one and the same permanent being, and all appearances in space as completely different from the actions of thought. The simplicity and other properties of substance are intended to be only the schema of this regulative principle, and are not presupposed as being the actual ground of the properties of the soul. For these may rest

VON DER ENDABSICHT DER NATÜRLICHEN DIALEKTIK

lich, der empirischen Verstandeserkenntnis aber auf alle Weise beförderlich und ihr gleichwohl niemals hinderlich sein kann.

Man verkennt sogleich die Bedeutung dieser Idee, wenn man sie für die Behauptung, oder auch nur die Voraussetzung einer wirklichen Sache hält, welcher man den Grund der systematischen Weltverfassung zuschreiben gedachte; vielmehr läßt man es gänzlich unausgemacht, was der unse- ren Begriffen sich entziehende Grund derselben an sich für Beschaffenheit habe, und setzt sich nur eine Idee zum Ge- sichtspunkte, aus welchem einzig und allein man jene, der Vernunft so wesentliche und dem Verstande so heilsame, Einheit verbreiten kann; mit einem Worte: [ ... ] dieses trans- zendentale Ding ist bloß das Schema eines regula- tiven Prinzips, wodurch die Vernunft, so viel an ihr ist, systematische Einheit über alle Erfahrung verbreitet.

on altogether different grounds, of which we can know nothing. The soul in itself could not be known through these assumed predicates, not even if we regarded them as absolutely valid in respect of it. For they constitute a mere idea which cannot be represented in concreto. Nothing but advantage can result from the psychological idea thus conceived, if only we take heed that it is not viewed as more than a mere idea, and that it is therefore taken as valid only relatively to the systematic employment of reason in determining the appearances of our soul. For no empirical laws of bodily appearances, which are of a totally different kind, will then intervene in the explanation of what belongs exclusively to inner sense. No windy hypotheses of generation, extinction, and palingenesis of souls will be permitted. The consideration of this object of inner sense will thus be kept completely pure and will not be confused by the introduction of heterogeneous properties. Also, reason's investigations will be directed to reducing the grounds of explanation in this field, so far as may be possible, to a single principle. All this will be best attained through such a schema, viewed as if it were a real being; indeed it is attainable in no other way. The psychological idea can signify nothing but the schema of a regulative concept. For were I to enquire whether the soul in itself is of spiritual nature, the question would have no meaning. In employing such a concept I not only abstract from corporeal nature, but from nature in general, that is, from all predicates of any possible experience, and therefore from all conditions requisite for thinking an object for such a concept; yet only as related to an object can the concept be said to have a meaning.

The second regulative idea of merely speculative reason is the concept of the world in general. For nature is properly the only given object in regard to which reason requires regulative principles. This nature is twofold, either thinking or corporeal. To think the latter, so far as regards its inner possibility, that is, to determine the application of the categories to it, we need no idea, that is, no representation which transcends experience. Nor, indeed, is any idea possible in this connection, since in dealing with corporeal nature we are guided solely by sensible intuition. The case is different from that of the fundamental psychological concept ("I"), which

egenschaften. Denn diese können auch auf ganz anderen Gründen beruhen, die wir gar nicht kennen, wie wir denn die Seele auch durch diese angenommene Prädikate eigentlich nicht an sich selbst erkennen konnten, wenn wir sie gleich von ihr schlechthin wollen gelten lassen, indem sie eine bloße Idee ausmachen, die in concreto gar nicht vorgestellt werden kann. Aus einer solchen psychologischen Idee kann nun nichts andres als Vorteil entspringen, wenn man sich nur hütet, sie für etwas mehr als bloße Idee, d. i. bloß relativisch auf den systematischen Vernunftsgebrauch in Ansehung der Erscheinungen unserer Seele, gelten zu lassen. Denn da mengen sich keine empirische Gesetze körperlicher Erscheinungen, die ganz von anderer Art sind, in die Erklärungen dessen, was bloß für den inneren Sinn gehört; da werden keine windige Hypothesen, von Erzeugung, Zerstörung und Palingenie der Seelen etc. zugelassen; also wird die Betrachtung dieses Gegenstandes des inneren Sinnes ganz rein und unvermengt mit ungleichartigen Eigenschaften angestellt, überdem die Vernunftuntersuchung darauf gerichtet, die Erklärungsgründe in diesem Subjekte, so weit es möglich ist, auf ein einziges Prinzip hinaus zu führen; welches alles durch ein solches Schema, als ob es ein wirkliches Wesen wäre, am besten, ja so gar einzig und allein, bewirkt wird. Die psychologische Idee kann auch nichts andres als das Schema eines regulativen Begriffs bedeuten. Denn, wollte ich auch nur-fragen, ob die Seele nicht an sich geistiger Natur sei, so hätte diese Frage gar keinen Sinn. Denn durch einen solchen Begriff nehme ich nicht bloß die körperliche Natur, sondern überhaupt alle Natur weg, d. i. alle Prädikate irgend einer möglichen Erfahrung, mithin alle Bedingungen, zu einem solchen Begriff einen Gegenstand zu denken, als welches doch einzig und allein es macht, daß man sagt, er habe einen Sinn.

Die zweite regulative Idee der bloß spekulativen Vernunft ist der Weltbegriff überhaupt. Denn Natur ist eigentlich nur das einzige gegebene Objekt, in Ansehung dessen die Vernunft regulative Prinzipien bedarf. Diese Natur ist zweifach, entweder die denkende, oder die körperliche Natur. Allein zu der letzteren, um sie ihrer inneren Möglichkeit nach zu denken, d. i. die Anwendung der Kategorien auf dieselbe zu bestimmen, bedürfen wir keiner Idee; d. i. einer die Erfahrung übersteigenden Vorstellung; es ist auch keine in Ansehung derselben möglich, weil wir darin bloß durch sinnliche Anschauung geleitet werden, und nicht wie in dem psychologischen Grundbegriffe (Ich), welcher eine gewisse

Zusatz von B.
contains a priori a certain form of thought, namely, the unity of thought. There therefore remains for pure reason nothing but nature in general, and the completeness of the conditions in nature in accordance with some principle. The absolute totality of the series of these conditions, in the derivation of their members, is an idea which can never be completely realised in the empirical employment of reason, but which yet serves as a rule that prescribes how we ought to proceed in dealing with such series, namely, that in explaining appearances, whether in their regressive or in their ascending order, we ought to treat the series as if it were in itself infinite, that is, as if it proceeded in indefiniteum. When, on the other hand, reason is itself regarded as the determining cause, as in [the sphere of] freedom, that is to say, in the case of practical principles, we have to proceed as if we had before us an object, not of the senses, but of the pure understanding. In this practical sphere the conditions are no longer in the series of appearances; they can be posited outside the series, and the series of states can therefore be regarded as if it had an absolute beginning, through an intelligible cause. All this shows that the cosmological ideas are nothing but simply regulative principles, and are very far from positing, in the manner of constitutive principles, an actual totality of such series. The fuller treatment of this subject will be found in the chapter on the antinomy of pure reason.

The third idea of pure reason, which contains a merely relative supposition of a being that is the sole and sufficient cause of all cosmological series, is the idea of God. We have not the slightest ground to assume in an absolute manner (to suppose in itself) the object of this idea; for what can enable us to believe in or assert a being of the highest perfection and one absolutely necessary by its very nature, merely on the basis of its concept, or if we did how could we justify our procedure? It is only by way of its relation to the world that we can attempt to establish the necessity of this supposition; and it then becomes evident that the idea of such a being, like all speculative ideas, seeks only to formulate the command of reason, that all connection in the world be viewed in accordance with the principles of a systematic unity—as if all such connection had its source in one single all-embracing being, as the supreme and

Die dritte Idee der reinen Vernunft, welche eine bloß relative Supposition eines Wesens enthält, als der einigen und allgenussamen Ursache aller kosmologischen Reihen, ist der Vernunftbegriff von Gott. Den Gegenstand dieser Idee haben wir nicht den mindesten Grund schlechthin anzunehmen (ansich zusupponieren), denn was kann uns wohl dazu vermögen, oder auch nur berechtigen, ein Wesen von der höchsten Vollkommenheit, und als seiner Natur nach schlechthin notwendig, aus dessen bloßem Begriffe an sich selbst zu glauben, oder zu behaupten, wäre es nicht die Welt, in Beziehung auf welche diese Supposition allein notwendig sein kann; und da zeigt es sich klar, daß die Idee desselben, so wie alle spekulative Ideen, nichts weiter sagen wolle, als daß die Vernunft gebiete, alle Verknüpfung der Welt nach Prinzipien einer systematischen Einheit zu betrachten, mithin: als ob sie insgesamt aus einem einzigen allbefassenden Wesen, als oberster und allgenussamer Ur-
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

all-sufficient cause. It is thus evident that reason has here no other purpose than to prescribe its own formal rule for the extension of its empirical employment, and not any extension beyond all limits of empirical employment. Consequently it is evident that this idea does not, in any concealef fashion, involve any principle that claims, in its application to possible experience, to be constitutive in character.

This highest formal unity, which rests solely on concepts of reason, is the purpose unity of things. The speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the purpose of a supreme reason. Such a principle opens out to our reason, as applied in the field of experience, altogether new views as to how the things of the world may be connected according to teleological laws, and so enables it to arrive at their greatest systematic unity. The assumption of a supreme intelligence, as the one and only cause of the universe, though in the idea alone, can therefore always benefit reason and can never injure it. Thus if, in studying the shape of the earth (which is round, but somewhat flattened), of the mountains, seas, etc., we assume it to be the outcome of wise purposes on the part of an Author of the world, we are enabled to make in this way a number of discoveries. And provided we restrict ourselves to a merely regulative use of this principle, even error cannot do us any serious harm. For the worst that can happen would be that where we expected a teleological connection (nexus finalis), we find only a mechanical or physical connection (nexus effectivus). In such a case, we merely fail to find the additional unity; we do not destroy the unity upon which reason insists in its empirical

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The advantage arising from the spherical shape of the earth is well known. But few are aware that its spheroidal flattening alone prevents the continental elevations, or even the smaller hills, thrown up perhaps by earthquakes, from continuously, and indeed quite appreciably in a comparatively short time, altering the position of the axis of the earth. The protuberance of the earth at the equator forms so vast a mountain that the impetus of all the other mountains can never produce any observable effect in changing the position of the earth's axis. And yet, wise as this arrangement is, we feel no scruples in explaining it from the equilibrium of the formerly fluid mass of the earth.

1 [scheinbaren] 2 [Absicht] 3 [teleologischen]
NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON 561

employment. But even a disappointment of this sort cannot affect the teleological law itself, in its general bearing. For although an anatomist can be convicted of error when he assigns to some member of an animal body an end1 which it can be clearly shown not to subserve, it is yet quite impossible to prove in any given case that an arrangement of nature, be it what it may, subserves no end whatsoever. Accordingly, medical physiology extends its very limited empirical knowledge of the ends served by the articulation of an organic body, by resorting to a principle for which pure reason has alone been responsible; and it carries this principle so far as to assume confidently, and with general approval, that everything in an animal has its use, and subserves some good purpose. If this assumption be treated as constitutive it goes much further than observation has thus far been able to justify; and we must therefore conclude that it is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, to aid us in securing the highest possible systematic unity, by means of the idea of the purposive causality of the supreme cause of the world—as if this being, as supreme intelligence, acting in accordance with a supremely wise purpose, were the cause of all things.

If, however, we overlook this restriction of the idea to a merely regulative use, reason is led away into mistaken paths. For it then leaves the ground of experience, which alone can contain the signs that mark out its proper course, and ventures out beyond it to the incomprehensible and unsearchable, rising to dizzy heights where it finds itself entirely cut off from all possible action in conformity with experience.

The first error which arises from our using the idea of a supreme being in a manner contrary to the nature of an idea, that is, constitutively, and not regulatively only, is the error of ignava ratio.* We may so entitle every principle which makes

* This was the title given by the ancient dialecticians to a sophistical argument, which ran thus: If it is your fate to recover from this illness, you will recover, whether you employ a physician or not. Cicero states that this mode of argument has been so named, because, if we conformed to it, reason would be left without any use in life. On the same ground I apply the name also to the sophistical argument of pure reason.

3 [Zweck]
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

us regard our investigation into nature, on any subject, as absolutely complete, disposing reason to cease from further enquiry, as if it had entirely succeeded in the task which it had set itself. Thus the psychological idea, when it is employed as a constitutive principle to explain the appearances of our soul, and thereby to extend our knowledge of the self beyond the limits of experience (its state after death), does indeed simplify the task of reason; but it interferes with, and entirely ruins, our use of reason in dealing with nature under the guidance of our experiences. The dogmatic spiritualist explains the abiding and unchanging unity of a person throughout all change of state, by the unity of the thinking substance, of which, as he believes, he has immediate perception in the 'I'; or he explains the interest which we take in what can happen only after our death, by means of our consciousness of the immaterial nature of the thinking subject, and so forth. He thus dispenses with all empirical investigation of the cause of these inner appearances, so far as that cause is to be found in physical grounds of explanation; and to his own great convenience, though at the sacrifice of all real insight, he professes, in reliance upon the assumed authority of a transcendental reason, to have the right to ignore those sources of knowledge which are immanent in experience. These detrimental consequences are even more obvious in the dogmatic treatment of our idea of a supreme intelligence, and in the theological system of nature (physico-theology) which is falsely based upon it. For in this field of enquiry, if instead of looking for causes in the universal laws of material mechanism, we appeal directly to the unspeakable decrees of supreme wisdom, all those ends which are exhibited in nature, together with the many ends which are only ascribed by us to nature, make our investigation of the causes a very easy task, and so enable us to regard the labour of reason as completed, when, as a matter of fact, we have merely dispensed with its employment—an employment which is wholly dependent for guidance upon the order of nature and the series of its alterations, in accordance with the universal laws which they are found to exhibit. This error can be avoided, if we consider from the teleological point of view not merely certain parts of nature, such as the distribu-

[1] (nach ihren inneren und allgemeinen Gesetzen.)
tion of land, its structure, the constitution and location of the mountains, or only the organisation of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, but make this systematic unity of nature completely universal, in relation to the idea of a supreme intelligence. For we then treat nature as resting upon a purposiveness, in accordance with universal laws, from which no special arrangement is exempt, however difficult it may be to establish this in any given case. We then have a regulative principle of the systematic unity of teleological connection—a connection which we do not, however, predetermine. What we may presume to do is to follow out the physico-mechanical connection in accordance with universal laws, in the hope of discovering what the teleological connection actually is. In this way alone can the principle of purposive unity aid always in extending the employment of reason in reference to experience, without being in any instance prejudicial to it.

The second error arising from the misapprehension of the above principle of systematic unity is that of perversa ratio (στρεφον πρότερον). The idea of systematic unity should be used only as a regulative principle to guide us in seeking for such unity in the connection of things, according to universal laws of nature; and we ought, therefore, to believe that we have approximated to completeness in the employment of the principle only in proportion as we are in a position to verify such unity in empirical fashion—a completeness which is never, of course, attainable. Instead of this the reverse procedure is adopted. The reality of a principle of purposive unity is not only presupposed but hypostatised; and since the concept of a supreme intelligence is in itself completely beyond our powers of comprehension, we proceed to determine it in an anthropomorphic manner, and so to impose ends upon nature, forcibly and dictatorially, instead of pursuing the more reasonable course of searching for them by the path of physical investigation. And thus teleology, which is intended to aid us merely in completing the unity of nature in accordance with universal laws, not only tends to abrogate such unity, but also prevents reason from carrying out its own professed purpose, that of proving from nature, in conformity with these laws, the existence of a supreme intelligent cause.

1 [Reading, with Wille, nach diesem for nach diesem.]
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

For if the most complete purposiveness cannot be presupposed a priori in nature, that is, as belonging to its essence, how can we be required to search for it, and through all its gradations to approximate to the supreme perfection of an Author of all things, a perfection that, as absolutely necessary, must be knowable a priori? The regulative principle prescribes that systematic unity as a unity in nature, which is not known merely empirically but is presupposed a priori (although in an indeterminate manner), be presupposed absolutely, and consequently as following from the essence of things. If, however, I begin with a supreme purposive being as the ground of all things, the unity of nature is really surrendered, as being quite foreign and accidental to the nature of things, and as not capable of being known from its own universal laws. There then arises a vicious circle; we are assuming just that very point which is mainly in dispute.

To take the regulative principle of the systematic unity of nature as being a constitutive principle, and to hypostatise, and presuppose as a cause, that which serves, merely in idea, as the ground of the consistent employment of reason, is simply to confound reason. The investigation of nature takes its own independent course, keeping to the chain of natural causes in conformity with their universal laws. It does indeed, in so doing, proceed in accordance with the idea of an Author of the universe, but not in order to deduce therefrom the purposiveness for which it is ever on the watch, but in order to obtain knowledge of the existence of such an Author from this purposiveness. And by seeking this purposiveness in the essence of the things of nature, and so far as may be possible in the essence of things in general, it seeks to know the existence of this supreme being as absolutely necessary. Whether this latter enterprise succeed or not, the idea remains always true in itself, and justified in its use, provided it be restricted to the conditions of a merely regulative principle.

Complete purposive unity constitutes what is, in the absolute sense, perfection. If we do not find this unity in the essence of the things which go to constitute the entire object of experience, that is, of all our objectively valid knowledge, and therefore do not find it in the universal and necessary laws of nature, how can we profess to infer directly from this unity the

VON DER EINHEIT DER NATÜRLICHEN DIALEKTIK

man nicht die höchste Zweckmäßigkeit in der Natur a priori, d. i. als zum Wesen derselben gehörig, voraussetzen kann, wie will man denn angewiesen sein, sie zu suchen und auf der Stufenleiter derselben sich der höchsten Vollkommenheit eines Urhebers, als einer schlechtherdings notwendigen, mithin a priori erkennbaren Vollkommenheit, zu nähern? Das regulative Prinzip verlangt, die systematische Einheit als Natureinheit, welche nicht bloß empirisch erkannt, sondern a priori, obzwar noch unbestimmt, vorausgesetzt wird, schlechterdings, mithin als aus dem Wesen der Dinge folgend, vorausgesetzt. Lege ich aber zuvor ein höchstes ordnendes Wesen zum Grunde, so wird die Natureinheit in der Tat aufgehoben. Denn sie ist der Natur der Dinge ganz fremd und zufällig, und kann auch nicht aus allgemeinen Gesetzen derselben erkannt werden. Daher entspringt ein fehlerhafter Zirkel im Beweisen, da man das voraussetzen, was eigentlich hat bewiesen werden sollen.

Das regulative Prinzip der systematischen Einheit der Natur für ein konstitutives nehmen, und was nur in der Idee zum Grunde des einhellige Gebrauchs der Vernunft gelegt wird, als Ursache hypostatisch vorausgesetzt, heißt nur, die Vernunft verwirren. Die Naturforschung geht ihren Gang ganz allein an der Kette der Naturursachen nach allgemeinen Gesetzen derselben, zwar nach der Idee eines Urhebers, aber nicht um die Zweckmäßigkeit, der sie allerwärts nachgeht, von demselben abzuleiten, sondern sein Dasein aus dieser Zweckmäßigkeit, die in den Wesen der Naturdinge gesucht wird, womöglich auch in den Wesen aller Dinge überhaupt, mithin als schlechthin notwendig zu erkennen. Das letztere mag nun gelingen oder nicht, so bleibt die Idee immer richtig, und eben sowohl auch-deren Gebrauch, wenn er auf die Bedingungen eines bloß regulativen Prinzips restringiert worden.

Vollständige zweckmäßige Einheit ist Vollkommenheit (schlechthin betrachtet). Wenn wir diese nicht in dem Wesen der Dinge, welche den ganzen Gegenstand der Erfahrung, d. i. aller unserer objektivgültigen Erkenntnis, ausmachen, mithin in allgemeinen und notwendigen Naturgesetzen finden: wie wollen wir daraus gerade auf die Idee
NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON 565

idea of a supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of an original being, as the source of all causality? The greatest possible systematic unity, and consequently also purposive unity, is the training school for the use of reason, and is indeed the very foundation of the possibility of its greatest possible employment. The idea of such unity is, therefore, inseparably bound up with the very nature of our reason. This same idea is on that account legislative for us; and it is therefore very natural that we should assume a corresponding legislative reason (intellec tus archetypus), from which, as the object of our reason, all systematic unity of nature is to be derived.

In discussing the antinomy of pure reason we have stated that the questions propounded by pure reason must in every case admit of an answer, and that in their regard it is not permissible to plead the limits of our knowledge (a plea which in many questions that concern nature is as unavoidable as it is relevant). For we are not here asking questions in regard to the nature of things, but only such questions as arise from the very nature of reason, and which concern solely its own inner constitution. We are now in a position to confirm this assertion—which at first sight may have appeared rash—so far as regards the two questions in which pure reason is most of all interested; and thus finally to complete our discussion of the dialectic of pure reason.

If, in connection with a transcendental theology, we ask, first, whether there is anything distinct from the world, which contains the ground of the order of the world and of its connection in accordance with universal laws, the answer is that there undoubtedly is. For the world is a sum of appearances; and there must therefore be some transcendental ground of the appearances, that is, a ground which is thinkable only by the pure understanding. If, secondly, the question be, whether this being is substance, of the greatest reality, necessary, etc.,

* After what I have already said regarding the psychological idea and its proper vocation, as a principle for the merely regulative employment of reason, I need not dwell at any length upon the transcendental illusion by which the systematic unity of all the manifoldness of inner sense is hypostatised. The procedure is very similar to that which is under discussion in our criticism of the theological ideal.

600 TRANZENDENTALE DIALEKTIK


Frägt man denn also (in Absicht auf eine transzendentele Theologie) erstlich: ob es etwas von der Welt Unterschiedenes gebe, was den Grund der Weltordnung und ihres Zusammenhanges nach allgemeinen Gesetzen enthalte, so ist die Antwort: ohne Zweifel. Denn die Welt ist eine Summe von Erscheinungen, es muß also irgend ein transzen-dentaler, d. i. bloß dem reinen Verstande denkbarer Grund derselben sein. Ist zweitens die Frage: ob dieses Wesen Substanz, von der größten Realität, notwendig etc.

* Dasjenige, was ich schon vorher von der psychologischen Idee und deren eigentlichen Bestimmung, als Prinzipi zum bloß regulativen Vernunftgebrauch, gesagt habe, überhebt mich der Weitläufigkeit, die transzendentale Illusion, nach der jene systematische Einheit aller Mannigfaltigkeit des inneren Sinnes hypostatisch vorgestellt wird, noch besonders zu erörtern. Das Verfahren hiebei ist demjenigen sehr ähnlich, welches die Kritik in Ansehung des theologischen Ideals beobachtet.
we reply that this question is entirely without meaning. For all categories through which we can attempt to form a concept of such an object allow only of empirical employment, and have no meaning whatsoever when not applied to objects of possible experience, that is, to the world of sense. Outside this field they are merely titles of concepts, which we may admit, but through which [in and by themselves] we can understand nothing. If, thirdly, the question be, whether we may not at least think this being, which is distinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of experience, the answer is: certainly, but only as object in idea and not in reality, namely, only as being a substratum, to us unknown, of the systematic unity, order, and purposiveness of the arrangement of the world—an idea which reason is constrained to form as the regulative principle of its investigation of nature. Nay, more, we may freely, without laying ourselves open to censure, admit into this idea certain anthropomorphisms which are helpful to the principle in its regulative capacity. For it is always an idea only, which does not relate directly to a being distinct from the world, but to the regulative principle of the systematic unity of the world, and only by means of a schema of this unity, namely, through the schema of a supreme intelligence which, in originating the world, acts in accordance with wise purposes. What this primordial ground of the unity of the world may be in itself, we should not profess to have thereby decided, but only how we should use it, or rather its idea, in relation to the systematic employment of reason in respect of the things of the world.

But the question may still be pressed: Can we, on such grounds, assume a wise and omnipotent Author of the world? Undoubtedly we may; and we not only may, but must, do so. But do we then extend our knowledge beyond the field of possible experience? By no means. All that we have done is merely to presuppose a something, a merely transcendental object, of which, as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever. It is only in relation to the systematic and purposive ordering of the world, which, if we are to study nature, we are constrained to presuppose, that we have thought this unknown being by analogy with an intelligence (an empirical concept); that is, have endowed it, in respect of the ends and perfection


Auf solche Weise aber können wir doch (wird man fortzufahren zu fragen) einen einigen weisen und allgewaltigen Welturheber annehmen? Ohne allen Zweifel; und nicht allein dies, sondern wir müssen einen solchen voraussetzen. Aber alsdenn erweitern wir doch unsere Erkenntnis über das Feld möglicher Erfahrung? Keinesweges. Denn wir haben nur ein Etwas vorausgesetzt, wohl von wir gar keinen Begriff haben, was es an sich selbst sei (einen bloß transzendenten Gegenstand), aber, in Beziehung auf die systematische und zweckmäßige Ordnung des Weltaufbaus, welche wir, wenn wir die Natur studieren, voraussetzen müssen, haben wir jenes uns unbekannte Wesen nur nach der Analogie mit einer Intelligenz (einem empirischen Begriff) gedacht, d. i. es in Ansehung der Zwecke und der Vollkommenheit,

1 A: "Ugrund".
which are to be grounded upon it, with just those properties which, in conformity with the conditions of our reason, can be regarded as containing the ground of such systematic unity. This idea is thus valid only in respect of the employment of our reason in reference to the world. If we ascribed to it a validity that is absolute and objective, we should be forgetting that what we are thinking is a being in idea only; and in thus taking our start from a ground which is not determinable through observation of the world, we should no longer be in a position to apply the principle in a manner suited to the empirical employment of reason.

But, it will still be asked, can I make any such use of the concept and of the presupposition of a supreme being in the rational consideration of the world? Yes, it is precisely for this purpose that reason has resorted to this idea. But may I then proceed to regard seemingly purposive arrangements as purposes, and so derive them from the divine will, though, of course, mediate through certain special natural means, themselves established in furtherance of that divine will? Yes, we can indeed do so; but only on condition that we regard it as a matter of indifference whether it be asserted that divine wisdom has disposed all things in accordance with its supreme ends, or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a regulative principle in the investigation of nature and a principle of its systematic and purposive unity, in accordance with universal laws, even in those cases in which we are unable to detect that unity. In other words, it must be a matter of complete indifference to us, when we perceive such unity, whether we say that God in his wisdom has willed it to be so, or that nature has wisely arranged it thus. For what has justified us in adopting the idea of a supreme intelligence as a schema of the regulative principle is precisely this greatest possible systematic and purposive unity—a unity which our reason has required as a regulative principle that must underlie all investigation of nature. The more, therefore, we discover purposiveness in the world, the more fully is the legitimacy of our idea confirmed. But since the sole aim of that principle was to guide us in seeking a necessary unity of nature, and that in the greatest possible degree, while we do indeed,

die sich auf demselben gründen, gerade mit denen Einigungen begabt, die nach den Bedingungen unserer Vernunft den Grund einer solchen systematischen Einheit enthalten können. Diese Idee ist also respektiv auf den Weltgebrauch unserer Vernunft ganz gegründet. Wollten wir ihr aber schlechthin objektive Gültigkeit erteilen, so würden wir vergessen, daß es lediglich ein Wesen der Idee sei, das wir denken, und, indem wir alsdenn von einem durch die Weltbetrachtung gar nicht bestimmmbaren Grunde anfingten, würden wir dadurch außer Stand gesetzt, dieses Prinzip dem empirischen Vernunftgebrauch angemessen anzuwenden.

Aber (wird man ferner fragen) auf solche Weise kann ich doch von dem Begriffe und der Voraussetzung eines höchsten Wesens in der vernünftigen Weltbetrachtung Gebrauch machen? Ja, dazu war auch eigentlich diese Idee von der Vernunft zum Grunde gelegt. Allein darf ich nun zweckähnliche Anordnungen als Absichten ansehen, indem ich sie vom göttlichen Willen, obzwar vermittelt besonderer dazu in der Welt darauf gestellten Anlagen, ableite? Ja, das könnt ihr auch tun, aber so, daß es euch gleich viel gelten muß, ob jemand sage, die göttliche Weisheit hat alles so zu seinen obersten Zwecken geordnet, oder die Idee der höchsten Weisheit ist ein Regulativ in der Nachforschung der Natur und ein Prinzip der systematischen und zweckmäßigen Einheit derselben nach allgemeinen Naturgesetzen, auch selbst da, wo wir jene nicht gewahr werden, d. i. es muß euch da, wo ihr sie wahrnehmt, völlig einerlei sein, zu sagen: Gott hat es weislich so gewollt, oder die Natur hat es also weislich geordnet. Denn die größte systematische und zweckmäßige Einheit, welche eure Vernunft aller Naturforschung als regulatives Prinzip zum Grunde zu legen verlangte, war eben das, was euch berechtigte, die Idee einer höchsten Intelligenz als ein Schema des regulativen Prinzips zum Grunde zu legen, und, so viel ihr nun, nach demselben, Zweckmäßigkeit in der Welt antrefft, so viel habt ihr Bestätigung der Rechtmäßigkeit eurer Idee; da aber gedachtes Prinzip nichts andres zur Absicht hatte, als notwendige und größtmögliche Natureinheit zu suchen, so werden wir

1 [zweckähnliche Anordnungen als Absichten.]

1 Akad.-Ausg.: ihres.
in so far as we attain that unity, owe it to the idea of a supreme being, we cannot, without contradicting ourselves, ignore the universal laws of nature—with a view to discovering which the idea was alone adopted—and look upon this purposiveness of nature as contingent and hyperphysical in its origin. For we were not justified in assuming above nature a being with those qualities, but only in adopting the idea of such a being in order to view the appearances as systematically connected with one another in accordance with the principle of a causal determination.

For the same reasons, in thinking the cause of the world, we are justified in representing it in our idea not only in terms of a certain subtle anthropomorphism (without which we could not think anything whatsoever in regard to it), namely, as a being that has understanding, feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and desires and volitions corresponding to these, but also in ascribing to it a perfection which, as infinite, far transcends any perfection that our empirical knowledge of the order of the world can justify us in attributing to it. For the regulative law of systematic unity prescribes that we should study nature as if systematic and purposive unity, combined with the greatest possible manifoldness, were everywhere to be met with, in infinitum. For although we may succeed in discovering but little of this perfection of the world, it is nevertheless required by the legislation of our reason that we must always search for and surmise it; and it must always be beneficial, and can never be harmful, to direct our investigations into nature in accordance with this principle. But it is evident that in this way of representing the principle as involving the idea of a supreme Author, I do not base the principle upon the existence and upon the knowledge of such a being, but upon its idea only, and that I do not really derive anything from this being, but only from the idea of it—that is, from the nature of the things of the world, in accordance with such an idea. A certain, unformulated consciousness of the true use of this concept of reason seems indeed to have inspired the modest and reasonable language of the philosophers of all times, since they speak of the wisdom and providence of nature and of divine wisdom, just as if nature and divine wisdom were

\[\text{[Reading, with Hartenstein, die for der.]}\]

these, so we at least achieve, der Idee eines höchsten Wesens zu danken haben, können aber die allgemeinen Gesetze der Natur, als in Absicht auf welche die Idee zum Grunde gelegt wurde, ohne mit uns selbst in Widerspruch zu geraten, | nicht vorbei gehen, um diese Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur als zufällig und hyperphysisch ihrem Ursprunge nach anzusehen, weil wir nicht berechtigt waren, ein Wesen über die Natur von den gedachten Eigenschaften anzunehmen, sondern nur die Idee desselben zum Grunde zu legen, um nach der Analogie einer Kausalbestimmung der Erscheinungen als systematisch unter einander verkniipft anzusehen.

Eben daher sind wir auch berechtigt, die Weltursache in der Idee nicht allein nach einem subtileren Anthropomorphism (ohne welchen sich gar nichts von ihm denken lassen würde), nämlich als ein Wesen, das \text{das} \ Verständ, Wohlgefallen und Mißfallen, imgleichen eine denselben gemäß Begierde und Willen hat etc., zu denken, sondern demselben endliche Vollkommenheit beizulegen, die also diejenige weit übersteigt, dazu wir durch empirische Kenntnis der Weltordnung berechtigt sein können. Denn das regulative Gesetz der systematischen Einheit will, daß wir die Natur so studieren sollen, als ob allenthalben ins Unendliche systematische und zweckmäßige Einheit, bei der größtmöglichen Mannigfaltigkeit, angetroffen würde. Denn, wiewohl wir nur wenig von dieser Weltvollkommenheit auszählen, oder erreichen werden, so gehört es doch zur Gesetzgebung unserer Vernunft, sie allerwärts zu suchen und zu vermuten, und es muß uns jederzeit vorteilhaft sein, niemals aber kann es nachteilig werden, nach diesem Prinzip die Naturbetrachtung anzustellen. Es ist aber, unter dieser Vorstellung, der zum Grunde gelegten Idee eines höchsten Urhebers, auch klar: daß ich nicht das Dasein und die Kenntnis eines solchen Wesens, sondern nur die Idee desselben zum Grunde lege, und also eigentlich nichts von diesem Wesen, sondern bloß von der Idee desselben, d. i. von der Natur der Dinge der Welt, nach einer solchen Idee, ableite. Auch scheint ein gewisses, obzwar unentwickeltes Bewußtsein, des echten Gebrauchs dieses unseren Vernunftbegriffs, die bescheidene und billige Sprache der Philosophen aller Zeiten veranlaßt zu haben, da sie von der Weisheit und Vorsehung der Natur, und der göttlichen Weisheit, als gleichbedeutenden Aus-
equivalent expressions—and indeed, so long as they are dealing solely with speculative reason, giving preference to the former mode of expression, on the ground that it enables us to avoid making profession of more than we are justified in asserting, and that it likewise directs reason to its own proper field, namely, nature.

Thus pure reason, which at first seemed to promise nothing less than the extension of knowledge beyond all limits of experience, contains, if properly understood, nothing but regulative principles, which, while indeed prescribing greater unity than the empirical employment of understanding can achieve, yet still, by the very fact that they place the goal of its endeavours at so great a distance, carry its agreement with itself, by means of systematic unity, to the highest possible degree. But if, on the other hand, they be misunderstood, and be treated as constitutive principles of transcendent knowledge, they give rise, by a dazzling and deceptive illusion, to persuasion and a merely fictitious knowledge, and therewith to contradictions and eternal disputes.

* * *

Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to concepts, and ends with ideas. Although in respect of all three elements it possesses a priori sources of knowledge, which on first consideration seem to scorn the limits of all experience, a thoroughgoing critique convinces us that reason, in its speculative employment, can never with these elements transcend the field of possible experience, and that the proper vocation of this supreme faculty of knowledge is to use all methods, and the principles of these methods, solely for the purpose of penetrating to the innermost secrets of nature, in accordance with every possible principle of unity—that of ends being the most important—but never to soar beyond its limits, outside which there is for us nothing but empty space. The critical examination, as carried out in the Transcendental Analytic, of all propositions which may seem to extend our knowledge beyond actual experience, has doubtless sufficed to convince us that they can never lead to anything more than a possible experience. Were it not that we are suspicious of abstract and general doctrines, however clear, drücken reden, ja den ersteren Ausdruck, so lange es um bloß spekulative Vernunft zu tun ist, vorziehen, weil er die Anmaßung einer größeren Behauptung, als die ist, wozu wir befugt sind, zurück hält, und zugleich die Vernunft auf ihr eigentümliches Feld, die Natur, zurück weiset.

So enthält die reine Vernunft, die uns anfangs nichts Geringeres, als Erweiterung der Kenntnisse über alle Grenzen der Erfahrung, zu versprechen schien1, wenn wir sie recht verstehen, nichts als regulative Prinzipien, die zwar größere Einheit gebieten, als der empirische Verständesgebrauch erreichen kann, aber eben dadurch, daß sie das Ziel der Annäherung desselben so weit hinaus rücken, die Zusammenstimmung desselben mit sich selbst durch systematische Einheit zum höchsten Grade bringen, wenn man sie aber mißversteht, und sie für konstitutive Prinzipien transzendenter Erkenntnisse hält, durch einen zwar günsden, aber trügen Schein, Uberredung und eingebildetes Wissen, hemet aber ewige Widersprüche und Streitigkeiten hervorbringen.

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So fängt denn alle menschliche Erkenntnis mit Anschauungen an, geht von da zu Begriffen, und endigt mit Ideen. Ob sie zwar in Ansehung aller drei Elemente Erkenntnisquellen a priori hat, die beim ersten Anblicke die Grenzen aller Erfahrung zu verschmähen scheinen, so überzeugt doch eine vollendete Kritik, daß alle Vernunft im spekulativen Gebrauche mit diesen Elementen niemals über das Feld möglicher Erfahrung hinaus kommen können, und daß die eigentliche Bestimmung dieses obersten Erkenntnisvermögens sei, sich aller Methoden und der Grundsätze derselben nur zu bedienen, um der Natur nach allen möglichen Prinzipien der Einheit, worunter die der Zwecke die vornehmste ist, bis in ihr Innerstes nachzugehen, niemals aber ihre Grenze zu überfliegen, außerhalb welcher für uns nichts als leerer Raum ist. Zwar hat uns die kritische Untersuchung aller Sätze, welche unsere Erkenntnis über die wirkliche Erfahrung hinaus erweitern können, in der transzendentalen Analytik hinreichend überzeugt, daß sie niemals zu etwas mehr, als einer möglichen Erfahrung leiten können, und, wenn man nicht selbst gegen die klügsten abstrakten und allgemeinen Lehrtätzen2 miftrauisch wäre, wenn nicht rei-

1 Akad.-Ausz.: schien. 2 klügste oder abstrakte und allgemeine Lehrtätzen.
and were it not that specious and alluring prospects tempt us to escape from the compulsion which these doctrines impose, we might have been able to spare ourselves the laborious interrogation of all those dialectical witnesses that a transcendent reason brings forward in support of its pretensions. For we should from the start have known with complete certainty that all such pretensions, while perhaps honestly meant, must be absolutely groundless, inasmuch as they relate to a kind of knowledge to which man can never attain. But there is no end to such discussions, unless we can penetrate to the true cause of the illusion by which even the wisest are deceived. Moreover, the resolution of all our transcendent knowledge into its elements (as a study of our inner nature) is in itself of no slight value, and to the philosopher is indeed a matter of duty. Accordingly, fruitless as are all these endeavours of speculative reason, we have none the less found it necessary to follow them up to their primary sources. And since the dialectical illusion does not merely deceive us in our judgments, but also, because of the interest which we take in these judgments, has a certain natural attraction which it will always continue to possess, we have thought it advisable, with a view to the prevention of such errors in the future, to draw up in full detail what we may describe as being the records of this lawsuit, and to deposit them in the archives of human reason.