Einleitung

I. Transzendentale Ebene Elementarllehre
   Erster Teil. Transz. Transzendentale Ästhetik
      1. Abschnitt. Vom 1. Vom Raume
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   Zweiter Teil. Transz. Transzendentale Logik
      1. Abteilung. Transz. Transzendentale Analytik in zwei Büchern und deren Abschnitten
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II. Transzendentaler Mentaler Methodenlehre
   1. Hauptstück. Die 1. Die Disziplin der reinen Vernunft
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KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, pt III
NOTES ON FINISHING THE BI-LINGUAL EDITION

Finally I can breathe a sigh of relief (a sign of jouissance?) at finishing the bi-lingual version of this often quoted and referred to text. I must say that it is a spine-tingling experience to read Kant in German on page 635/676 where he states:

Not being a specialist in Kant, I was also struck when I saw the term ‘onto-theology’ on page 525. Also interesting are the following terms in Greek:
Hysteron proteron p. 563 (proteron spelled with an omicron instead of an omega)
Kat’ anthropon p.593
Kat’ aletheian p. 593 which the Liddell & Scott dictionary spells as kat’ aletheion, Arist. Pol. I 278b, 33

Confessing my lack once again, I am not a Greek scholar, but a full explanation of these terms would be interesting. (Was kann ich wissen?)

Once more, I would like to acknowledge my debt to Adrian Johnston and Daniel Collins for advice and encouraging me to continue with this project. (Was soll ich tun?)

This bi-lingual is only a crude proto-type of what I feel should be common place for the study of important texts which are originally in another language. Hopefully there will be many more to come! (Was darf ich hoffen?)

Richard G. Klein
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Sep. 21, 2003
II
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD
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II
TRANSZENDENTALE METHODENLEHRE
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD

If we look upon the sum of all knowledge of pure speculative reason as an edifice for which we have at least the idea within ourselves, it can be said that in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements we have made an estimate of the materials, and have determined for what sort of edifice and for what height and strength of building they suffice. We have found, indeed, that although we had contemplated building a tower which should reach to the heavens, the supply of materials suffices only for a dwelling-house, just sufficiently commodious for our business on the level of experience, and just sufficiently high to allow of our overlooking it. The bold undertaking that we had designed is thus bound to fail through lack of material—not to mention the babel of tongues, which inevitably gives rise to disputes among the workers in regard to the plan to be followed, and which must end by scattering them over all the world, leaving each to erect a separate building for himself, according to his own design. At present, however, we are concerned not so much with the materials as with the plan; and inasmuch as we have been warned not to venture at random upon a blind project which may be altogether beyond our capacities, and yet cannot well abstain from building a secure home for ourselves, we must plan our building in conformity with the material which is given to us, and which is also at the same time appropriate to our needs.

I understand, therefore, by Transcendental Doctrine of Method the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason. In this connection, we shall have to treat of a discipline, a canon, an architectonic, and finally a history of pure reason, and to provide (in its transcendental reference) what, in relation to the use of the understanding in general, the Schools have attempted, though very unsatis-


Ich verstehe also unter der transzendentalen Methodlehre die Bestimmung der formalen Bedingungen eines vollständigen Systems der reinen Vernunft. Wir werden es in dieser Absicht mit einer Disziplin, einem Kanon, einer Architektur, endlich einer Geschichte der reinen Vernunft zu tun haben, und dasjenige in transzendentaler Absicht leisten, was, unter dem Namen einer praktischen Logik, in Ansehung des Gebrauchs des Verstandes überhaupt in den Schulen gesucht, aber schlecht geleistet wird;
factorily, under the title of a practical logic. For since universal logic is not confined to any particular kind of knowledge made possible by the understanding (for instance, not to its pure knowledge) and is also not confined to certain objects, it cannot, save by borrowing knowledge from other sciences, do more than present the titles of possible methods and the technical terms which are used for purposes of systematisation in all kinds of sciences; and this serves only to acquaint the novice in advance with names the meaning and use of which he will not learn till later.

TRANSCENDENTIAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD

CHAPTER I
THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON

Owing to the general desire for knowledge, negative judgments, that is, those which are such not merely as regards their form but also as regards their content, are not held in any very high esteem. They are regarded rather as the jealous enemies of our unceasing endeavour to extend our knowledge, and it almost requires an apology to win for them even tolerance, not to say favour and high repute.

As far as logical form is concerned, we can make negative any proposition we like; but in respect to the content of our knowledge in general, which is either extended or limited by a judgment, the task peculiar to negative judgments is that of rejecting error. Accordingly, negative propositions intended to reject false knowledge, where yet no error is possible, are indeed true but empty, that is, are not suited to their purpose, and just for this reason are often quite absurd, like the proposition of the Schoolman, that Alexander could not have conquered any countries without an army.

But where the limits of our possible knowledge are very narrow, where the temptation to judge is great, where the illusion that besets us is very deceptive and the harm that results from the error is considerable, there the negative instruction, which serves solely to guard us from errors, has even more importance than many a piece of positive information by

DER TRANSCENDENTALE METHODENLEHRE

ERSTES HAUPTSTÜCK
DIE DISZIPLIN DER REINEN VERNUNFT

Die negativen Urteile, die es nicht bloß der logischen Form, sondern auch dem Inhalte nach sind, stehen bei der Wissbegierde der Menschen in keiner sonderlichen Achtung; man sieht sie wohl gar als neidische Feinde unseres unablässig zur Erweiterung strebenden Erkenntnistriebes an, und es bedarf beinahe einer Apologie, um ihnen nur Duldung, und noch mehr, um ihnen Gunst und Hochschätzung zu verschaffen.

Man kann zwar logisch alle Sätze, die man will, negativ ausdrücken, in Ansehung des Inhalts aber unserer Erkenntnis überhaupt, ob sie durch ein Urteil erweitert, oder beschränkt wird, haben die verneinenden das eigentümliche Geschäfte, lediglich den Irrtum abzuhalten. Daher auch negative Sätze, welche eine falsche Erkenntnis abhalten sollen, wo doch niemals ein Irrtum möglich ist, zwar sehr wahr, aber doch leer, d. i. ihrem Zwecke gar nicht angemessen, und eben darum oft lächerlich sind. Wie der Satz jenes Schulredners: daß Alexander ohne Kriegsheer keine Länder hätte erobern können.

Wo aber die Schranken unserer möglichen Erkenntnis sehr enge, der Anreiz zum Urteilen groß, der Schein, der sich darbietet, sehr betrüglich, und der Nachteil aus dem Irrtum erheblich ist, da hat das Negativeder Unterweisung, welches bloß dazu dient, um uns vor Irrtümern zu bewahren, noch mehr Wichtigkeit, als manche positive Belehrung, da-
which our knowledge is increased. The compulsion, by which the constant tendency to disobey certain rules is restrained and finally extirpated, we entitle discipline. It is distinguished from culture, which is intended solely to give a certain kind of skill, and not to cancel any habitual mode of action already present. Towards the development of a talent, which has already in itself an impulse to manifest itself, discipline will therefore contribute in a negative, culture and doctrine in a positive, fashion.

That temperament and our various talents (such as imagination and wit) which incline to allow themselves a free and unlimited activity are in many respects in need of a discipline, everyone will readily admit. But that reason, whose proper duty it is to prescribe a discipline for all other endeavours, should itself stand in need of such discipline may indeed seem strange; and it has, in fact, hitherto escaped this humiliation, only because, in view of its stately guise and established standing, nobody could lightly come to suspect it of idly substituting fancies for concepts, and words for things.

There is no need of a critique of reason in its empirical employment, because in this field its principles are always subject to the test of experience. Nor is it needed in mathematics, where the concepts of reason must be forthwith exhibited in concreto in pure intuition, so that everything unsounded and arbitrary in them is at once exposed. But where neither empirical nor pure intuition keeps reason to a visible track, when, that is to say, reason is being considered in its transcendental employment, in accordance with mere concepts, it stands so greatly in need of a discipline, to restrain its tendency towards extension beyond the narrow limits of possible experience and to guard it against extravagance and error, that the whole

* I am well aware that in the terminology of the Schools the title discipline is commonly used as synonymous with instruction. However, there are so many other cases where discipline in the sense of training by constraint is carefully distinguished from instruction in the sense of teaching, and the very nature of things itself makes it so imperative that we should preserve the only expressions suitable for this distinction, that it is desirable that the former term should never be used in any but the negative sense.

1 [Reading, with Erdmann, von sich for vor sich.]
philosophy of pure reason has no other than this strictly negative utility. Particular errors can be got rid of by censure, and their causes by criticism. But where, as in the case of pure reason, we come upon a whole system of illusions and fallacies, intimately bound together and united under common principles, a quite special negative legislation seems to be required, erecting a system of precautions and self-examination under the title of a discipline, founded on the nature of reason and the objects of its pure employment—a system in face of which no pseudo-rational illusion will be able to stand, but will at once betray itself, no matter what claims it may advance for exceptional treatment.

But it is well to note that in this second main division of the transcendental Critique the discipline of pure reason is not directed to the content but only to the method of knowledge through pure reason. The former has already been considered in the Doctrine of Elements. But there is so much similarity in the mode of employing reason, whatever be the object to which it is applied, while yet, at the same time, its transcendental employment is so essentially different from every other, that without the admonitory negative teaching of a discipline, specially devised for the purpose, we cannot hope to avoid the errors which inevitably arise from pursuing in improper fashion methods which are indeed suitable to reason in other fields, only not in this transcendental sphere.

CHAPTER I

Section I

THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN ITS DOGMATIC EMPLOYMENT

Mathematics presents the most splendid example of the successful extension of pure reason, without the help of experience. Examples are contagious, especially as they quite naturally flatter a faculty which has been successful in one field, [leading it] to expect the same good fortune in other fields. Thus pure reason hopes to be able to extend its domain as successfully and securely in its transcendental as in its mathematical em-

DESERSTEN HAUPHTSTÜCKS
ERSTER ABCNITT

DIE DISZIPLIN DER REINEN VERNUNFT
IM DOGMATISCH EN GEBRAUCHE

Die Mathematik gibt das glänzendste Beispiel, einer sich, ohne Beihilfe der Erfahrung, von selbst glücklich erweiternden reinen Vernunft. Beispiele sind ansteckend, vornehmlich für dasselbe Vermögen, welches sich natürlicherweise schmeichelt, eben dasselbe Glück in anderen Fällen zu haben, welches ihm in einem Falle zu Teil worden. Daher hofft reine Vernunft, im transcendentalen.|| Gebrauche sich eben so glücklich und gründlich erweitern zu können, als es ihr im mathematischen gelungen ist, wenn sie vornehmlich

1 A: *sich wohl*.
ployment, especially when it resorts to the same method as has been of such obvious utility in mathematics. It is therefore highly important for us to know whether the method of attaining apodeictic certainty which is called mathematical is identical with the method by which we endeavour to obtain the same certainty in philosophy, and which in that field would have to be called dogmatic.

Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from concepts; mathematical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from the construction of concepts. To construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition which corresponds to the concept. For the construction of a concept we therefore need a non-empirical intuition. The latter must, as intuition, be a single object, and yet none the less, as the construction of a concept (a universal representation), it must in its representation express universal validity for all possible intuitions which fall under the same concept. Thus I construct a triangle by representing the object which corresponds to this concept either by imagination alone, in pure intuition, or in accordance therewith also on paper, in empirical intuition—in both cases completely a priori, without having borrowed the pattern from any experience. The single figure which we draw is empirical, and yet it serves to express the concept, without impairing its universality. For in this empirical intuition we consider only the act whereby we construct the concept, and abstract from the many determinations (for instance, the magnitude of the sides and of the angles), which are quite indifferent, as not altering the concept 'triangle'.

Thus philosophical knowledge considers the particular only in the universal, mathematical knowledge the universal in the particular, or even in the single instance, though still always a priori and by means of reason. Accordingly, just as this single object is determined by certain universal conditions of construction, so the object of the concept, to which the single object corresponds merely as its schema, must likewise be thought as universally determined.

The essential difference between these two kinds of knowledge through reason consists therefore in this formal difference, and does not depend on difference of their material or objects. Those who propose to distinguish philosophy from
mathematics by saying that the former has as its object quality only and the latter quantity only, have mistaken the effect for the cause. The form of mathematical knowledge is the cause why it is limited exclusively to quantities. For it is the concept of quantities only that allows of being constructed, that is, exhibited a priori in intuition; whereas qualities cannot be presented in any intuition that is not empirical. Consequently reason can obtain a knowledge of qualities only through concepts. No one can obtain an intuition corresponding to the concept of reality otherwise than from experience; we can never come into possession of it a priori out of our own resources, and prior to the empirical consciousness of reality. The shape of a cone we can form for ourselves in intuition, unassisted by any experience, according to its concept alone, but the colour of this cone must be previously given in some experience or other. I cannot represent in intuition the concept of a cause in general except in an example supplied by experience; and similarly with other concepts. Philosophy, as well as mathematics, does indeed treat of quantities, for instance, of totality, infinity, etc. Mathematics also concerns itself with qualities, for instance, the difference between lines and surfaces, as spaces of different quality, and with the continuity of extension as one of its qualities. But although in such cases they have a common object, the mode in which reason handles that object is wholly different in philosophy and in mathematics. Philosophy confines itself to universal concepts; mathematics can achieve nothing by concepts alone but hastens at once to intuition, in which it considers the concept in concreto, though not empirically, but only in an intuition which it presents a priori, that is, which it has constructed, and in which whatever follows from the universal conditions of the construction must be universally valid of the object of the concept thus constructed.

Suppose a philosopher be given the concept of a triangle and be left to find out, in his own way, what relation the sum of its angles bears to a right angle. He has nothing but the concept of a figure enclosed by three straight lines, and possessing three angles. However long he meditates on this concept, he will never produce anything new. He can analyse and clarify the concept of a straight line or of an angle or of the number three, but he can never arrive at any proper...
ties not already contained in these concepts. Now let the geometrician take up these questions. He at once begins by constructing a triangle. Since he knows that the sum of two right angles is exactly equal to the sum of all the adjacent angles which can be constructed from a single point on a straight line, he prolongs one side of his triangle and obtains two adjacent angles, which together are equal to two right angles. He then divides the external angle by drawing a line parallel to the opposite side of the triangle, and observes that he has thus obtained an external adjacent angle which is equal to an internal angle—and so on. In this fashion, through a chain of inferences guided throughout by intuition, he arrives at a fully evident and universally valid solution of the problem.

But mathematics does not only construct magnitudes (quanta) as in geometry; it also constructs magnitude as such (quantitas), as in algebra. In this it abstracts completely from the properties of the object that is to be thought in terms of such a concept of magnitude. It then chooses a certain notation for all constructions of magnitude as such (numbers),¹ that is, for addition, subtraction, extraction of roots, etc. Once it has adopted a notation for the general concept of magnitudes so far as their different relations are concerned, it exhibits in intuition, in accordance with certain universal rules, all the various operations through which the magnitudes are produced and modified. When, for instance, one magnitude is to be divided by another, their symbols are placed together, in accordance with the sign for division, and similarly in the other processes; and thus in algebra by means of a symbolic construction, just as in geometry by means of an ostensive construction (the geometrical construction of the objects themselves), we succeed in arriving at results which discursive knowledge could never have reached by means of mere concepts.

Now what can be the reason of this radical difference in the fortunes of the philosopher and the mathematician, both of whom practise the art of reason, the one making his way by means of concepts, the other by means of intuitions which he exhibits a priori in accordance with concepts? The cause is evident from what has been said above, in our exposition of the

¹ [Reading, with Hartenstein and Erdmann (Zahlen), alt... Wurzel ustw., for (Zahlen, alt... Subtraktion ustw).]
fundamental transcendental doctrines. We are not here concerned with analytic propositions, which can be produced by mere analysis of concepts (in this the philosopher would certainly have the advantage over his rival), but with synthetic propositions, and indeed with just those synthetic propositions that can be known *a priori*. For I must not restrict my attention to what I am actually thinking in my concept of a triangle (this is nothing more than the mere definition); I must pass beyond it to properties which are not contained in this concept, but yet belong to it. Now this is impossible unless I determine my object in accordance with the conditions either of *empirical* or of pure intuition. The former would only give us an empirical proposition (based on the measurement of the angles), which would not have universality, still less necessity, and so would not at all serve our purpose. The second method of procedure is the mathematical one, and in this case is the method of geometrical construction, by means of which I combine in a pure intuition (just as I do in empirical intuition) the manifold which belongs to the schema of a triangle in general, and therefore to its concept. It is by this method that universal synthetic propositions must be constructed.

It would therefore be quite futile for me to philosophise upon the triangle, that is, to think about it discursively. I should not be able to advance a single step beyond the mere definition, which was what I had to begin with. There is indeed a transcendental synthesis [framed] from concepts alone, a synthesis with which the philosopher is alone competent to deal; but it relates only to a thing in general, as defining the conditions under which the perception of it can belong to possible experience. But in mathematical problems there is no question of this, nor indeed of existence at all, but only of the properties of the objects in themselves, [that is to say], solely in so far as these properties are connected with the concept of the objects.

In the above example we have endeavoured only to make clear the great difference which exists between the discursive employment of reason in accordance with concepts and its intuitive employment by means of the construction of concepts. This naturally leads on to the question, what can be the cause
which necessitates such a twofold employment of reason, and how we are to recognise whether it is the first or the second method that is being employed.

All our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions, for it is through them alone that an object is given. Now an a priori concept, that is, a concept which is not empirical, either already includes in itself a pure intuition (and if so, it can be constructed), or it includes nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions which are not given a priori. In this latter case we can indeed make use of it in forming synthetic a priori judgments, but only discursively in accordance with concepts, never intuitively through the construction of the concept.

The only intuition that is given a priori is that of the mere form of appearances, space and time. A concept of space and time, as quanta, can be exhibited a priori in intuition, that is, constructed, either in respect of the quality (figure) of the quanta, or through number in their quantity only (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous manifold). But the matter of appearances, by which things are given us in space and time, can only be represented in perception, and therefore a posteriori. The only concept which represents a priori this empirical content of appearances is the concept of a thing in general, and the a priori synthetic knowledge of this thing in general can give us nothing more than the mere rule of the synthesis of that which perception may give a posteriori. It can never yield an a priori intuition of the real object, since this must necessarily be empirical.

Synthetic propositions in regard to things in general, the intuition of which does not admit of being given a priori, are transcendental. Transcendental propositions can never be given through construction of concepts, but only in accordance with concepts that are a priori. They contain nothing but the rule according to which we are to seek empirically for a certain synthetic unity of that which is incapable of intuitive representation a priori (that is, of perceptions). But these synthetic principles cannot exhibit a priori any one of their concepts in a specific instance; they can only do this a posteriori, by means of experience, which itself is possible only in conformity with these principles.
Wenn man von einem Begriffe synthetisch urteilen soll, so muß man aus diesem Begriffe hinausgehen, und zwar zur Anschauung, in welcher er gegeben ist. Denn, bliebe man bei dem stehen, was im Begriffe enthalten ist, so wäre das Urteil bloß analytisch, und eine Erklärung des Gedanken, nach demjenigen, was wirklich in ihm enthalten ist. Ich kann aber von dem Begriffe zu der ihm korrespondierenden reinen oder empirischen Anschauung gehen, um ihn in desselben in concreto zu erwägen, und, was dem Gegenstande desselben zukommt, a priori oder a posteriori zu erkennen. Das erstere ist die rationale und mathematische Erkenntnis durch die Konstruktion des Begriffs, das zweite die bloße empirische (mechanische) Erkenntnis, die niemals notwendige und apodiktische Sätze geben kann. So könnte ich meinen empirischen Begriff vom Golde zergliedern, ohne dadurch etwas weiter zu gewinnen, als alles, was ich bei diesem Worte wirklich denke, herzählen zu können, wodurch in meinem Erkenntnis zwar eine logische Verbesserung vorgeht, aber keine Vermehrung oder Zusatz erworben wird. Ich nehme aber die Materie, welche unter diesem Namen vorkommt, und stelle mit ihr Wahrnehmungen an, welche mir verschiedene synthetische, aber empirische Sätze an die Hand geben werden. Den mathematischen Begriff eines Triangels würde ich konstruieren; d. i. a priori in der Anschauung geben, und auf diesem Wege eine synthetische, aber rationale Erkenntnis bekommen. Aber, wenn mir der transzentrale Begriff einer Realität, Substanz, Kraft etc. gegeben ist, so bezeichnet er weder eine empirische, noch reine Anschauung, sondern jeddich die Synthesis der empirischen Anschauungen (die also a priori nicht gegeben werden können), und es kann also aus ihm, weil die Synthesis nicht a priori zu der Anschauung, die ihm korrespondiert, hinausgehen kann, auch kein bestimmender synthetischer Satz, sondern nur ein Grundsatz der Synthesis

* Mittelteil des Begriffes der Ursache gehe ich wirklich aus dem empirischen Begriff von einer Begebenheit (da etwas geschah) heraus, aber nicht zu der Anschauung, die den Begriff der Ursache in concreto darstellt, sondern zu den Zeitbedingungen überhaupt, die in der Erfahrung dem Begriff der Ursache gemäß gefunden werden möchten. Ich verfähre also bloß nach Begriffen, und kann nicht durch Konstruktion der Begriffe verfahren, weil der Begriff eine Regle der Synthesis der Wahrnehmungen ist, die keine reine Anschauungen sind, und sich also a priori nicht geben lassen.
empirical intuitions. A transcendental proposition is therefore synthetic knowledge through reason, in accordance with mere concepts; and it is discursive, in that while it is what alone makes possible any synthetic unity of empirical knowledge, it yet gives us no intuition a priori.

There is thus a twofold employment of reason; and while the two modes of employment resemble each other in the universality and a priori origin of their knowledge, in outcome they are very different. The reason is that in the [field of] appearance, in terms of which\(^1\) all objects are given us, there are two elements, the form of intuition (space and time), which can be known and determined completely a priori, and the matter (the physical element) or content—the latter signifying something which is met with in space and time and which therefore contains an existent\(^8\) corresponding to sensation. In respect to this material element, which can never be given in any determinate fashion other than empirically, we can have nothing a priori except indeterminate concepts of the synthesis of possible sensations, in so far as they belong, in a possible experience, to the unity of apperception. As regards the formal element, we can determine our concepts in a priori intuition, inasmuch as we create for ourselves, in space and time, through a homogeneous synthesis, the objects themselves—these objects being viewed simply as quantas. The former method is called the employment of reason in accordance with concepts; in so employing it\(^8\) we can do nothing more than bring appearances under concepts, according to their actual content. The concepts cannot be made determinate in this manner,\(^4\) save only empirically, that is, a posteriori (although always in accordance with these concepts as rules of an empirical synthesis). The other method is the employment of reason through the construction of concepts; and since the concepts here relate to an a priori intuition, they are for this very reason themselves a priori and can be given in a quite determinate fashion in pure intuition, without the help of any empirical data. The consideration of everything which exists in space or time, in regard to the questions, whether and how far it is a quantum

\(^1\) [als wodurch.]
\(^2\) [Dasein.]
\(^3\) [Reading, with Erdmann, in dem for indem.]
\(^4\) [Reading, with Erdmann, dadurch for darauf.]
or not, whether we are to ascribe to it positive being or the absence of such, how far this something occupying space or time is a primary substratum or a mere determination [of substance], whether there be a relation of its existence to some other existence, as cause or effect, and finally in respect of its existence whether it is isolated or is in reciprocal relation to and dependence upon others—these questions, as also the question of the possibility of this existence, its actuality and necessity, or the opposites of these, one and all belong altogether to knowledge obtained by reason from concepts, such knowledge being termed *philosophical*. But the determination of an intuition *a priori* in space (figure), the division of time (duration), or even just the knowledge of the universal element in the synthesis of one and the same thing in time and space, and the magnitude of an intuition that is thereby generated (number)—all this is the work of reason through construction of concepts, and is called *mathematical*.

The great success which attends reason in its mathematical employment quite naturally gives rise to the expectation that it, or at any rate its method, will have the same success in other fields as in that of quantity. For this method has the advantage of being able to realise all its concepts in intuitions, which it can provide *a priori*, and by which it becomes, so to speak, master of nature; whereas pure philosophy is all at sea when it seeks through *a priori* discursive concepts to obtain insight in regard to the natural world, being unable to intuit *a priori* (and thereby to confirm) their reality. Nor does there seem to be, on the part of the experts in mathematics, any lack of self-confidence as to this procedure—or on the part of the vulgar of great expectations from their skill—should they apply themselves to carry out their project. For, since they have hardly ever attempted to philosophise in regard to their mathematics (a hard task!), the specific difference between the two employments of reason has never so much as occurred to them. Current, empirical rules, which they borrow from ordinary consciousness, they treat as being axiomatic. In the question as to the source of the concepts of space and time they are not in the least interested, although it is precisely with these concepts (as the only original quanta) that they are themselves occupied. Similarly, they think it unnecessary to investigate...
the origin of the pure concepts of understanding and in so
doing to determine the extent of their validity; they care only
to make use of them. In all this they are entirely in the right,
provided only they do not overstep the proper limits, that is,
the limits of the natural world. But, unconsciously, they pass
from the field of sensibility to the precarious ground of pure and
even transcendental concepts, a ground (instabilis tellus, in-
nabili undis) that permits them neither to stand nor to swim, and
where their hasty tracks are soon obliterated. In mathematics,
on the other hand, their passage gives rise to a broad highway,
which the latest posterity may still tread with confidence.

We have made it our duty to determine, with exactitude and
certainty, the limits of pure reason in its transcendental
employment. But the pursuit of such transcendental know-
ledge has this peculiarity, that in spite of the plainest and most
urgent warnings men still allow themselves to be deluded by
false hopes, and therefore to postpone the total abandonment
of all proposed attempts to advance beyond the bounds of ex-
perience into the enticing regions of the intellectual world. It
therefore becomes necessary to cut away the last anchor of
these fantastic hopes, that is, to show that the pursuit of the
mathematical method cannot be of the least advantage in this
kind of knowledge (unless it be in exhibiting more, plainly
the limitations of the method); and that mathematics
philosophy, although in natural science they do, indeed, go
in hand in hand, are none the less so completely different, that
the procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other.

The exactness of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms
and demonstrations. I shall content myself with showing that:
none of these, in the sense in which they are understood by the
mathematician, can be achieved or imitated by the philosopher.
I shall show that in philosophy the geometrician can by his
method build only so many houses of cards, just as in mathe-
matics the employment of a philosophical method results only
in mere talk. Indeed it is precisely in knowing its limits that
philosophy consists; and even the mathematician, unless his
talent is of such a specialised character that it naturally confines
itself to its proper field, cannot afford to ignore the warnings
of philosophy, or to behave as if he were superior to them.

1 Mathematik.

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legen, und eben so scheint es ihnen unnütz zu sein, den Ur-
sprung reiner Verstandesbegriffe, und hiermit auch den Um-
fang ihrer Gültigkeit zu erforschen, sondern nur, sich ihrer
tzu bedienen. In allem diesem tun sie ganz recht, wenn sie
nur ihre angewiesene Grenze, nämlic die der Natur nicht
überschreiten. So aber geraten sie unvermerkt, von dem
Feld der Sinnlichkeit, auf den unsicheren Boden reiner
und selbst transzendentaler Begriffe, wo der Grund (instabilis
tellus, innabili undis) ihnen weder zu stehen, noch zu
schwimmen erlaubt, und sich nur flüchtige Schritte tun lassen,
von denen die Zeit nicht die mindeste Spur aufbehält,
da hingegen ihr Gang in der Mathematik eine Hereistraße
macht, welche noch die spätesten Nachkommenschaft mit
Zuvorsicht betreten kann.

Da wir es uns zur Pflicht gemacht haben, die Grenzen der
reinen Vernunft im transzendentalen Gebrauche genau und
mit Gewißheit zu bestimmen, diese Art der Bestrebung aber
das Besondere an sich hat, unerachtet der nachdrücklich-
sten und drastischsten Warnungen, sich noch immer durch Hoff-
nung inhalten zu lassen, ehe man den Anschlag gänzlich
aufgibt, über Grenzen der Erfahrungen hinaus in die reinen
Gegenden des Intellektuellen zu gelangen: so ist es not-
wendig, noch gleichsam den letzten Anker einer phantasie-
reichen Hoffnung wegzunehmen, und zu zeigen, daß die Be-
folgung der mathematischen Methode in dieser Art Erkenn-
nis nicht den mindesten Vorteil schaffen könne, es müßte
denn der sein, die Blühen ihrer selbst desto deutlicher auf-
zudecken, daß Meßkunst und Philosophie zwei ganz ver-
schiedene Dinge seien, ob sie sich zwar in der Naturwissen-
schaft einander die Hand bieten, mithin das Verfahren des
einen niemals von dem andern nachgeahmt werden könne.

Die Gründlichkeit der Mathematik beruht auf Definitionen,
Axiomen, Demonstrationen. Ich werde mich damit be-
gnügen, zu zeigen: daß keines dieser Stücke in dem Sinne,
darin sie der Mathematiker nimmt, von der Philosophie
könne geleistet, noch nachgeahmt werden. Daß der Meß-
künstler, nach seiner Methode, in der Philosophie nichts als
Kartengebäude zu bauen bringt, der Philosoph nach der
seinen in dem Anteil der Mathematik nur ein Geschwätz
erregen könne, wiewohl eben darin Philosophie besteht,
seine Grenzen zu kennen, und selbst der Mathematiker,
wen das Talent desselben nicht etwa schon von der Natur
begrenzt und auf sein Fach eingeschränkt ist, die Warnun-
gen der Philosophie nicht ausschlagen, noch sich über sie
wegsetzen kann.

2 Akad.-Ausz.: solche.
1. Definitions.—To define, as the word itself indicates, really only means to present the complete, original concept of a thing within the limits of its concept. If this be our standard, an empirical concept cannot be defined at all, but only made explicit. For since we find in it only a few characteristics of a certain species of sensible object, it is never certain that we are not using the word, in denoting one and the same object, sometimes so as to stand for more, and sometimes so as to stand for fewer characteristics. Thus in the concept of gold one man may think, in addition to its weight, colour, malleability, also its property of resisting rust, while another will perhaps know nothing of this quality. We make use of certain characteristics only so long as they are adequate for the purpose of making distinctions; new observations remove some properties and add others; and thus the limits of the concept are never assured. And indeed what useful purpose could be served by defining an empirical concept, such, for instance, as that of water? When we speak of water and its properties, we do not stop short at what is thought in the word, water, but proceed to experiments. The word, with the few characteristics which we attach to it, is more properly to be regarded as merely a designation than as a concept of the thing; the so-called definition is nothing more than a determining of the word. In the second place, it is also true that no concept given a priori, such as substance, cause, right, equity, etc., can, strictly speaking, be defined. For I can never be certain that the clear representation of a given concept, which as given may still be confused, has been completely effected, unless I know that it is adequate to its object. But since the concept of it may, as given, include many obscure representations, which we overlook in our analysis, although we are constantly making use of them in our application of the concept, the completeness of the analysis of my concept is always in doubt, and a multiplicity

* Completeness means clearness and sufficiency of characteristics; by limits is meant the precision shown in there not being more of these characteristics than belong to the complete concept; by original is meant that this determination of these limits is not derived from anything else, and therefore does not require any proof; for if it did, that would disqualify the supposed explanation from standing at the head of all the judgments regarding its object.
of suitable examples suffices only to make the completeness probable, never to make it apodictically certain. Instead of the term, definition, I prefer to use the term, exposition, as being a more guarded term, which the critic can accept as being up to a certain point valid, though still entertaining doubts as to the completeness of the analysis. Since, then, neither empirical concepts nor concepts given a priori allow of definition, the only remaining kind of concepts, upon which this mental operation can be tried, are arbitrarily invented concepts. A concept which I have invented I can always define; for since it is not given to me either by the nature of understanding or by experience, but is such as I have myself deliberately made it to be, I must know what I have intended to think in using it. I cannot, however, say that I have thereby defined a true object. For if the concept depends on empirical conditions, as e.g. the concept of a ship’s clock, this arbitrary concept of mine does not assure me of the existence or of the possibility of its object. I do not even know from it whether it has an object at all, and my explanation may better be described as a declaration of my project than as a definition of an object. There remain, therefore, no concepts which allow of definition, except only those which contain an arbitrary synthesis that admits of a priori construction. Consequently, mathematics is the only science that has definitions. For the object which it thinks it exhibits a priori in intuition, and my explanation may better be described as a declaration of my project than as a definition of an object. 

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1 [This term Kant usually employs in the sense of explanation, but, as above indicated, it is used in the preceding sentence in the sense of definition.]

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zweifelhaft, und kann nur durch vielfältig zutretende Beispiele vermutlich, niemals aber apodiktisch gewiß gemacht werden. Anstatt des Ausdrucks: Definition, würde ich lieber den der Exposition brauchen, der immer noch behutsam bleibt, und bei dem der Kritiker sie auf einen gewissen Grad gelten lassen und doch wegen der Ausführlichkeit noch Bedenken tragen kann. Da also weder empirisch, noch a priori gegebene Begriffe definiert werden können, so bleiben keine andere als willkürlich gedachte übrig, an denen man dieses Kunststück versuchen kann. Meinen Begriff kann ich in solchem Falle jederzeit definieren; denn ich muß doch wissen, was ich habe denken wollen, da ich ihn selbst vorsätzlich gemacht habe, und er mir weder durch die Natur des Verständes, noch durch die Erfahrung gegeben worden, aber ich kann nicht sagen, daß ich dadurch einen wahren Gegenstand definiert habe. Denn, wenn der Begriff auf empirischen Bedingungen beruht, z. B. eine Schiffsrut, so wird der Gegenstand und dessen Möglichkeit durch diesen willkürlichen Begriff noch nicht gegeben; ich weiß daraus nicht einmal, ob er überall einen Gegenstand habe, und meine Erklärung kann besser eine Deklaration (meines Projekts) als Definition eines Gegenstandes heißen. Also blieben keine andere Begriffe übrig, die zum Definieren taugen, als solche, die eine willkürliche Synthese enthalten, welche a priori konstruiert werden kann, mithin hat nur die Mathematik Definitionen. Denn, den Gegenstand, den sie denkt, stellt sie auch a priori in der Anschauung dar, und dieser kann sicher nicht mehr noch weniger enthalten, als der Begriff, weil durch die Erklärung der Begriff von dem Gegenstand ursprünglich, d. i. ohne die Erklärung irgend wovon abzuleiten, gegeben wurde. Die deutsche Sprache hat für die Ausdrücke der Exposition, Explication, Deklaration und Definition nichts mehr, als das eine Wort: Erklärung, und daher müssen wir schon von der Strenge der Forderung, da wir nämlich den philosophischen Erklärungen den Ehrenamen der Definition verweigerten, etwas ablassen, und wollen diese ganze Anmerkung darauf einschränken, daß philosophische Definitionen nur als Expositionen gegebener, mathematische aber als Konstruktionen ursprünglich ge-
concepts, originally framed by the mind itself; and that while the
former can be obtained only by analysis (the completeness of
which is never apodictically certain), the latter are produced
synthetically. Whereas, therefore, mathematical definitions
make their concepts, in philosophical definitions concepts are
only explained. From this it follows:

(a) That in philosophy we must not imitate mathematics
by beginning with definitions, unless it be by way simply of
experiment. For since the definitions are analyses of given
concepts, they presuppose the prior presence of the concepts,
although in a confused state; and the incomplete exposition
must precede the complete. Consequently, we can infer a good
deal from a few characteristics, derived from an incomplete
analysis, without having yet reached the complete exposition,
that is, the definition. In short, the definition in all its precision
and clarity ought, in philosophy, to come rather at the end
than at the beginning of our enquiries. In mathematics, on
the other hand, we have no concept whatsoever prior to the
definition, through which the concept itself is first given. For
this reason mathematical science must always begin, and it can
always begin, with the definition.

(b) That mathematical definitions can never be in error.
For since the concept is first given through the definition, it
includes nothing except precisely what the definition intends
should be understood by it. But although nothing incorrect can
be introduced into its content, there may sometimes, though
rarely, be a defect in the form in which it is clothed, namely as
regards precision. Thus the common explanation of the circle
that it is a curved line every point in which is equidistant

* Philosophy is full of faulty definitions, especially of definitions
which, while indeed containing some of the elements required, are
yet not complete. If we could make no use of a concept till we
had defined it, all philosophy would be in a pitiable plight. But
since a good and safe use can still be made of the elements obtained
by analysis so far as they go, defective definitions, that is, propositions
which are properly not definitions, but are yet true, and are therefore
approximations to definitions, can be employed with great advantage.
In mathematics definition belongs ad esse, in philosophy ad melius
esse. It is desirable to attain an adequate definition, but often very
difficult. The jurists are still without a definition of their concept of
right.

macher Begriffe, jene nur analytisch durch Zergliederung
derm Vollständigkeit nicht apodiktisch gewiß ist), diese
synthetisch zu Stade gebracht werden, und also den Be-
griiff selbst machen, dagegen die ersteren ihn nur erklä-
ren. Hieraus folgt:

a) daß man es in der Philosophie der Mathematik nicht
so nachtun müßte, die Definitionen voranzuschicken, als nur
etwa zum bloßen Versuche. Denn, da sie Zergliederungen
gegebener Begriffe sind, so gehen diese Begriffe, obzwar nur
noch verworren, voran, und die unvollständige Exposition
gibt die vollständigen, so, daß wir aus einigen Merk-
malen, die wir aus einer noch unvollendeten Zergliederung
gezogen haben, manches vorher schließen können, ehe wir
zur vollständigen Exposition, d. i. zur 1. Definition, gelangt
sind; mit einem Worte, daß in der Philosophie die Definition,
as abgemessene Deutlichkeit, das Werk eher schließen,
as Anfangs müßte. Dagegen haben wir in der Mathematik
gar keinen Begriff vor der Definition, als durch welche der
Begriff allererst gegeben wird, sie muß also und kann auch
jederzeit davon anfangen.

b) Mathematische Definitionen können niemals irren.
Denn, weil der Begriff durch die Definition zuerst gegeben
wird, so enthält er gerade nur das, was die Definition durch
ihn gedacht haben will. Aber, obgleich dem Inhalte nach
nichts Unrichtiges darin vorkommen kann, so kann doch
bisweilen, obzwar nur selten, in der Form (der Einkleidung)
gefehlt werden, nämlich in Ansehung der Präzision. So hat
die gütige Erklärung der Kreislinie, daß sie eine krumme Linie sei,
deren alle Punkte von einem ||, einigen (dem Mit-

* Die Philosophie wimmelt von fehlerhaften Definitionen, vornehm-
lieh solchen, die zwar-richtig Elemente zur Definition, aber noch nicht
vollständig enthalten. Würde man nun eher gar nichts mit einem Be-
griif anfangen können, als bis man ihn definit hätte, so würde es gar
schlecht mit allem Philosophieren stehen. Da aber, so weit die Elemente
(die Zergliederung) reichen, immer ein guter und sicherer Gebrauch de-
von zu machen ist, so können auch mangelhafte Definitionen, d. i.
Sätze, die eigentlich noch nicht Definitionen, aber übrigens wahr und
also Annährungen zu ihnen sind, sehr nützlich gebraucht werden. In
der Mathematik gehören die Definition ad esse, in der Philosophie ad
melius esse. Es ist schön, aber oft sehr schwer, dazu zu gelangen. Noch
suchen die Juristen eine Definition zu ihrem Begriff soms* Recht.

1 A: sedere — 2 Ad sumere.
from one and the same point (the centre), has the defect that
the determination, curved, is introduced unnecessarily. For
there must be a particular theorem, deduced from the de-
finite and easily capable of proof, namely, that if all points
in a line are equidistant from one and the same point, the line
is curved (no part of it straight). Analytic definitions, on
the other hand, may err in many ways, either through introducing
characteristics which do not really belong to the concept, or by
lacking that completeness which is the essential feature of a
definition. The latter defect is due to the fact that we can never
be quite certain of the completeness of the analysis. For these
reasons the mathematical method of definition does not admit
of imitation in philosophy.

2. Axioms.—These, in so far as they are immediately
certain, are synthetic a priori principles. Now one concept
cannot be combined with another synthetically and also at the
same time immediately, since, to be able to pass beyond either
concept, a third something is required to mediate our know-
ledge. Accordingly, since philosophy is simply what reason
knows by means of concepts, no principle deserving the name
of an axiom is to be found in it. Mathematics, on the other
hand, can have axioms, since by means of the construction of
concepts in the intuition of the object it can combine the pre-
dicates of the object both a priori and immediately, as, for
instance, in the proposition that three points always lie in a
plane. But a synthetic principle derived from concepts alone
can never be immediately certain, for instance, the proposition
that everything which happens has a cause. Here I must look
round for a third something, namely, the condition of time-
determination in an experience; I cannot obtain knowledge of
such a principle directly and immediately from the concepts
alone. Discursive principles are therefore quite different from
intuitive principles, that is, from axioms; and always require
a deduction. Axioms, on the other hand, require no such de-
duction, and for the same reason are evident—a claim which
the philosophical principles can never advance, however great
their certainty. Consequently, the synthetic propositions of pure,
transcendental reason are, one and all, infinitely removed from
being as evident—which is yet so often arrogantly claimed
on their behalf—as the proposition that *twice two make four.*

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telpunkte) gleich weit ab stehen, den Fehler, daß die Be-

Stimmung krumm unnötiger Weise eingeflossen ist. Denn

es muß einen besonderen Lehrsatz geben, der aus der De-

finition gefolgt wird und leicht bewiesen werden kann:
daß eine jede Linie, deren alle Punkte von einem einigen
gleich weit ab stehen, krumm (kein Teil von ihr gerade) sei.
Analytische Definitionen können dagegen auf vielfältige Art
irren, entweder indem sie Merkmale hineinbringen, die wirk-
lich nicht im Begriffe lagen, oder an der Ausführlichkeit er-
mangeln, die das Wesentliche einer Definition ausmacht,
weil man der Vollständigkeit seiner Zergliederung nicht so
völlig gewiß sein kann. Um deswillen läßt sich die Methode
der Mathematik im Definieren in der Philosophie nicht
nachahmen.

2. Von den Axiomen. Diese sind synthetische Grund-
sätze a priori, so fern sie unmittelbar gewiß sind. Nun läßt
sich nicht ein Begriff mit dem anderen synthetisch und doch
unmittelbar verbinden, weil, damit wir über einen Begriff
hinausgehen können, ein drittes vermittelndes Erkenntnis
nötig ist. Da nun Philosophie bloß die Vernunftkenntnis
nach Begriffen ist, so wird in ihr kein Grundsatz anzutreffen
sein, der den Namen eines Axioms verdien. Die Mathematik
dagegen ist der Axiomen fähig; weil sie vermittelst der Kon-
struktion der Begriffe in der Anschauung des Gegenstandes
die Prädikate desselben a priori und unmittelbar verknüp-
fen kann, z. B. daß drei Punkte jederzeit in einer Ebene
liegen. Dagegen kann ein synthetischer Grundsatz bloß aus
Begriffen niemals unmittelbar gewiß sein; z. B. der Satz:
alles, was geschicht, hat seine Ursache, da ich mich nach
einem Dritten herumsehen muß, nämlich der Bedingung der
Zeitbestimmung in einer Erfahrung; und nicht direkt un-
mittelbar aus den Begriffen allein einen solchen Grundsatz
erkennen konnte. Diskursive Grundsätze sind also-ganz et-
was anderes, als intuitive, d. i. Axiomen. Jene erfordern
ejederzeit noch eine Deduktion, deren die letztern ganz und
gar entbehren können, und, da diese eben um desselben
Grundes willen1 evident sind, welches die philosophischen
Grundsätze, bei aller ihrer Gewißheit, doch niemals vorge-
geben können, so fehlt unendlich viel daran, daß irgend ein
synthetischer Satz der reinen und transcendentalen Ver-
nunft so augenscheinlich sei (wie man sich trotzig auszu-

1 A: ewegens.
In the Analytic I have indeed introduced some axioms of intuition into the table of the principles of pure understanding; but the principle¹ there applied is not itself an axiom, but serves only to specify the principle² of the possibility of axioms in general, and is itself no more than a principle¹ derived from concepts. For the possibility of mathematics must itself be demonstrated in transcendental philosophy. Philosophy has therefore no axioms, and may never prescribe its a priori principles in any such absolute manner, but must resign itself to establishing its authority in their regard by a thorough deduction.

3. Demonstrations.—An apodeictic proof can be called a demonstration, only in so far as it is intuitive. Experience teaches us what is, but does not teach us that it could not be other than what it is. Consequently, no empirical grounds of proof can ever amount to apodeictic proof. Even from a priori concepts, as employed in discursive knowledge, there can never arise intuitive certainty, that is, demonstrative evidence, however apodeictically certain the judgment may otherwise be. Mathematics alone, therefore, contains demonstrations, since it derives its knowledge not from concepts but from the construction of them, that is, from intuition, which can be given a priori in accordance with the concepts. Even the method of algebra with its equations, from which the correct answer, together with its proof, is deduced by reduction, is not indeed geometrical in nature, but is still constructive in a way characteristic of the science.³ The concepts attached to the symbols, especially concerning the relations of magnitudes, are presented in intuition; and this method, in addition to its heuristic advantages, secures all inferences against error by setting each one before our eyes. While philosophical knowledge must do without this advantage, inasmuch as it has always to consider the universal in abstracto (by means of concepts), mathematics can consider the universal in concreto (in the single intuition) and yet at the same time through pure a priori representation, whereby all errors are at once made evident. I should therefore prefer to

gaben. Ich habe zwar in der Analytik, bei der Tafel der Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes, auch gewisser Axiomen der Anschauung gedacht; allein der daselbst angeführte Grundsatz war selbst kein Axiom, sondern diente nur dazu, das Principium der Möglichkeit der Axiomen überhaupt anzugeben, und selbst nur ein Grundsatz aus Begriffen. Denn sogar die Möglichkeit der Mathematik muß in der Transzendentalphilosophie gezeigt werden. Die Philosophie hat also keine Axiomen und darf niemals ihre Grundsätze a priori so schlecht in gebieten, sondern muß sich dazu bequemen, ihre Befugnis wegen derselben durch gründliche Deduktion zu rechtfertigen.

³ Von den Demonstrationen. Nur ein apodiktischer Beweis, so fern er intuitiv ist, kann Demonstration heißen. Erfahrung lehrt uns wohl, was dasei, aber nicht, daß es gar nicht anders sein könne. Daher können empirische Beweggründe keinen apodiktischen Beweis verschaffen. Aus Begriffen a priori (im diskursiven Erkenntnisse) kann aber niemals anschauliche Gewißheit, d. i. Evidenz entspringen, so sehr auch sonst das Urteil apodiktisch gewiß sein mag. Nur die Mathematik enthält also Demonstrationen, weil sie nicht aus Begriffen, sondern der Konstruktion derselben, d. i. der Anschauung, die den Begriffen entsprechend a priori gegeben werden kann, ihr Erkenntnis ableitet. Selbst das Verfahren der Algebra mit ihren Gleichungen, aus denen sie durch Reduktion die Wahrheit zusammendem Beweise hervorbringt, ist zwar keine geometrische; aber doch charakteristische Konstruktion, in welcher man an den Zeichen die Begriffe, vornehmlich von dem Verhältnisse der Größen, in der Anschauung darlegt, und, ohne einmal auf das Heuristische zu sehen, alle Schlüsse vor Fehlern dadurch sichert, daß jeder derselben vor Augen gestellt wird. Da hingegen das philosophische Erkenntnis dieses Vorteils entbehren muß, indem es das Allgemeine jederzeit in abstracto (durch Begriffe) betrachten muß, indessen daß Mathematik das Allgemeine in concreto (in der einzelnen Anschauung) und doch durch reine Vorstellung a priori erwägen kann, wobei jeder Fehltritt sichtbar wird. Ich möchte die erstern daher
THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON

call the first kind *aeromastic* (discursive) proofs, since they may be conducted by the agency of words alone (the object in thought), rather than *demonstrations* which, as the term itself indicates, proceed in and through the intuition of the object.

From all this it follows that it is not in keeping with the nature of philosophy, especially in the field of pure reason, to take pride in a dogmatic procedure, and to deck itself out with the title and insignia of mathematics, to whose ranks it does not belong, though it has every ground to hope for a sisterly union with it. Such pretensions are idle claims which can never be satisfied, and indeed must divert philosophy from its true purpose, namely, to expose the illusions of a reason that forgets its limits, and by sufficiently clarifying our concepts to recall it from its presumptuous speculative pursuits to modest but thorough self-knowledge. Reason must not, therefore, in its transcendental endeavours, hasten forward with sanguine expectations, as though the path which it has traversed led directly to the goal, and as though the accepted premisses could be so securely relied upon that there can be no need of constantly returning to them and of considering whether we may not perhaps, in the course of the inferences, discover defects which have been overlooked in the principles, and which render it necessary either to determine these principles more fully or to change them entirely.

I divide all apodictic propositions, whether demonstrable or immediately certain, into *dogmata* and *mathemata*. A synthetic proposition directly derived from concepts is a *dogma*; a synthetic proposition, when directly obtained through the construction of concepts, is a *mathema*. Analytic judgments really teach us nothing more about the object than what the concept which we have of it already contains; they do not extend our knowledge beyond the concept of the object, but only clarify the concept. They cannot therefore rightly be called dogmas (a word which might perhaps be translated *doctrines*). Of the two kinds of synthetic *a priori* propositions only those belonging to philosophical knowledge can, according to the ordinary usage of words, be entitled dogmas; the propositions of arithmetic or geometry would hardly be so

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lieber akroamatische (diskursive) Beweise nennen, weil sie sich nur durch lauter Worte (den Gegenstand in Gedanken) führen lassen, als Demonstrationen, welche, wie der Ausdruck es schon anzeigt, in der Anschauung des Gegenstandes fortgehen.

Aus allem diesem folgt nun, daß es sich für die Natur der Philosophie gar nicht schicke, vornehmlich im Felde der reinen Vernunft, mit einem dogmatischen Gange zu strotzen, und sich mit den Titeln und Bändern der Mathematik auszuschmücken, in deren Orden sie doch nicht gehört, ob sie zwar auf schwesterliche Vereinigung mit derselben zu hoffen alle Ursache hat. Jene sind eitle Annahmen, die niemals gelingen können, vielmehr ihre Absicht rückgängig machen müssen, die Blendwerke einer ihrer Grenzen verkennenden Vernunft zu entdecken, und, vermittelt hinreichender Aufklärung unserer Begriffe, den Eigendünkel der Spekulation auf das bescheidene, aber gründliche Selbsterkennen zurückzuführen. Die Vernunft wird also in ihren transzendentalen Versuchen nicht so zuversichtlich vor sich hinsehen können, gleich als wenn der Weg, den sie zurückgelegt hat, so ganz gerade zum Ziele führe, und auf ihre zum Grunde gelegte Prämisse nicht so mutig rechnen können, daß es nicht nötig wäre, öfters zurück zu sehen und Acht zu haben, ob sich nicht etwa im Fortgange der Schlüsse Fehler entdecken, die in den Prinzipien überhaupt übersehen worden, und es nötig machen, sie entweder mehr zu bestimmen, oder ganz abzuändern.

Ich teile alle apodiktischen Sätze (sie mögen nun erweislich oder auch unmittelbar gewiß sein) in Dogmata und Mathemata ein. Ein direktsynthetischer Satz aus Begriffen ist ein Dogma; *hingegen* ein dergleichen Satz, durch Konstruktion der Begriffe, ist ein Mathema. Analytische Urteile lehren uns eigentlich nichts mehr vom Gegenstande, als was der Begriff, den wir von ihm haben, schon in sich enthält, weil sie die Erkenntnis über den Begriff des Subjekts nicht erweitern, sondern diesen nur erläutern. Sie können daher nicht füglic Dogmen heißen (welches Wort man vielleicht durch *Lehrsprüche* übersetzen könnte). Aber unter den gedachten zween Arten synthetischer Sätze a priori können, nach dem gewöhnlichen Redegebrauch, nur die zum philosophischen Erkenntnisse gehörige diesen Namen führen, und man würde schwerlich die Sätze der Rechenkunst, oder Geometrie, Dogmata nennen. Also bestätigt

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\[A. 736\] \[B. 704\]
named. The customary use of words thus confirms our interpretation of the term, namely. that only judgments derived from concepts can be called dogmatic, not those based on the construction of concepts.

Now in the whole domain of pure reason, in its merely speculative employment, there is not to be found a single synthetic judgment directly derived from concepts. For, as we have shown, ideas cannot form the basis of any objectively valid synthetic judgment. Through concepts of understanding pure reason does, indeed, establish secure principles, not however directly from concepts alone, but always only indirectly through relation of these concepts to something altogether contingent, namely, possible experience. When such experience (that is, something as object of possible experiences) is presupposed, these principles are indeed apodictically certain; but in themselves, directly, they can never be known a priori. Thus no one can acquire insight into the proposition that everything which happens has its cause, merely from the concepts involved. It is not, therefore, a dogma, although from another point of view, namely, from that of the sole field of its possible employment, that is, experience, it can be proved with complete apodictic certainty. But though it needs proof, it should be entitled a principle, not a theorem, because it has the peculiar character that it makes possible the very experience which is its own ground of proof, and that in this experience it must always itself be presupposed.

Now if in the speculative employment of pure reason there are no dogmas, to serve as its special subject-matter, all dogmatic methods, whether borrowed from the mathematician or specially invented, are as such inappropriate. For they only serve to conceal defects and errors, and to mislead philosophy, whose true purpose is to present every step of reason in the clearest light. Nevertheless its method can always be systematic: For our reason is itself, subjectively, a system, though in its pure employment, by means of mere concepts, it is no more than a system whereby our investigations can be conducted in accordance with principles of unity, the material being provided by experience alone. We cannot here discuss the method peculiar to transcendental philosophy; we are at present con-

\[\text{[auch dem Inhalte nach.]}\]
Chapter 1

Section 2

The Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of Its Polemical Employment

Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism; should it limit freedom of criticism by any prohibitions, it must harm itself, drawing upon itself a damaging suspicion. Nothing is so important through its usefulness, nothing so sacred, that it may be exempted from this searching examination, which knows no respect for persons. Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence. For reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objections or even his veto.

But while reason can never refuse to submit to criticism, it does not always have cause to fear it. In its dogmatic (non-mathematical) employment it is not, indeed, so thoroughly conscious of such exact observation of its own supreme laws, as not to feel constrained to present itself with diffidence, nay, with entire renunciation of all assumed dogmatic authority, to the critical scrutiny of a higher judicial reason.

The situation is, however, quite otherwise, when reason has to deal not with the verdict of a judge, but with the claims of a fellow-citizen, and against these has only to act in self-defence. For since these are intended to be just as dogmatic in denial as its own are in affirmation, it is able to justify itself κατ’ ἀλήθειαν, in a manner which ensures it against all interference, and provides it with a title to secure possession that need fear no outside claims, although κατ’ ἀλήθειαν the title cannot itself be conclusively proved.

By the polemical employment of pure reason I mean the

630   DISZIPLIN IM POLEMISCHEN GEBRAUCHE
631   DES ERSTEN HAUPTSTÜCKS
ZWEITER ABSCHNITT

Die Vernunft muß sich in allen ihren Unternehmungen der Kritik unterwerfen, und kann der Freiheit derselben durch kein Verbot Abbruch tun, ohne sich selbst zu schaden und einen ihr nachteiligen Verdacht auf sich zu ziehen. Da ist nun nichts so wichtig, in Ansehung des Nutzens, nichts so heilig, das sich dieser prüfenden und mustrenden Durchsuchung, die kein Ansehen der Person kennt, entziehen dürfte. Auf dieser Freiheit beruht sogar die Existenz der Vernunft, die kein diktoratisches Ansehen hat, sondern deren Ausspruch jederzeit nichts als die Einstimmung freier Bürger ist, deren jeglicher seine Bedenklichkeiten, ja sogar sein Veto, ohne Zurückhalten muß äußern können.

Ob nun aber gleich die Vernunft sich der Kritik niemals verweigern kann, so hat sie doch nicht jederzeit Ursache, sie zu scheuen. Aber die reine Vernunft in ihrem dogmatischen (nicht mathematischen) Gebrauche ist sich nicht so sehr der genauesten Beobachtung ihrer obersten Gesetze bewußt, daß sie nicht mit Blödigkeit, ja mit gänzlicher Ablegung alles angemaßten dogmatischen Ansehens, vor dem kritischen Auge einer höheren und richtlicheren Vernunft erscheinen müßte.

Ganz anders ist es bewandt, wenn sie es nicht mit der Zensur des Richters, sondern den Ansprüchen ihres Mitbürger zu tun hat, und sich dagegen bloß verteidigen soll. Denn, da diese eben sowohl dogmatisch sein wollen, obzwar im Verneinen, als jene im Bejahen: so findet eine Rechtfer- tigung κατ’ ἀλήθειαν statt, die wider alle Beseitigung sichert, und einen titulierten Besitz verschafft, der keine fremde Anmaßungen scheuen darf, ob er gleich selbst κατ’ ἀλήθειαν nicht hinreichend bewiesen werden kann.

Unter dem polemischen Gebrauche der reinen Vernunft
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

defence of its propositions as against the dogmatic counter-propositions through which they are denied. Here the contention is not that its own assertions may not, perhaps, be false, but only that no one can assert the opposite with apodictic certainty, or even, indeed, with a greater degree of likelihood. We do not here hold our possessions upon sufferance; for although our title to them may not be satisfactory, it is yet quite certain that no one can ever be in a position to prove the illegality of the title.

It is grievous, indeed, and disheartening, that there should be any such thing as an ahntithetic of pure reason, and that reason, which is the highest tribunal for all conflicts, should thus be at variance with itself. We had to deal, in a previous chapter, with such an ahntithetic; but it turned out to be only an apparent conflict, resting upon a misunderstanding. In accordance with the common prejudice, it took appearances as being things in themselves, and then required an absolute completeness of their synthesis in the one mode or in the other (this being equally impossible in either way)—a demand which is not at all permissible in respect of appearances. There was, therefore, no real self-contradiction of reason in the propounding of the two propositions, that the series of appearances given in themselves has an absolutely first beginning, and that this series is absolutely and in itself without any beginning. For the two propositions are quite consistent with each other, inasmuch as appearances, in respect of their existence (as appearances), are in themselves nothing at all, that is, [so regarded] are something self-contradictory; for the assumption [that they do thus exist in themselves] must naturally lead to self-contradictory inferences.

But there are other cases in which we cannot allege any such misunderstanding, and in which we cannot, therefore, dispose of the conflict of reason; in the above manner—when, for instance, it is asserted, on the one hand, theistically, that there is a supreme being, and on the other hand, atheistically, that there is no supreme being; or as in psychology, that everything which thinks is endowed with absolute and abiding unity and is therefore distinct from all transitory material unity, and, in opposition there to, that the soul is not immaterial unity

verstehe ich nun die Verteidigung ihrer Sätze gegen die dogmatischen Verneinungen derselben. Hier kommt es nun nicht darauf an, ob ihre Behauptungen nicht vielleicht auch falsch sein möchten, sondern nur, daß niemand das Gegen- teil jemals mit apodiktischer Gewißheit (ja auch nur mit größerem Scheine) behaupten könne. Denn wir sind alsdenn doch nicht bittweise in unserem Besitz, wenn wir einen, ob- zwar nicht hinreichenden, Titel derselben vor uns haben, und es völlig gewiß ist, daß niemand die Unrechtmäßigkeit dieses Besitzes jemals beweisen könne.

Es ist etwas Bekümmern-des und Niederschlagendes, daß er überhaupt eine Ahntithetik der reinen Vernunft geben, und diese, die doch den obersten Gerichtshof über alle Streitigkeiten vorstellt, mit sich selbst in Streit geraten soll. Zwar hatten wir oben eine solche scheinbare Ahntithetik derselben vor uns; aber es zeigte sich, daß sie auf einem Miß- verstande beruhete, da man nämlich, dem gemeinen Vorurteil gemäß, Erscheinungen für Sachen an sich selbst nahm, und den eine absolute Vollständigkeit ihrer Synthese, auf eine oder andere Art (die aber auf beiderlei Art gleich unmöglich war), verlangte, welches aber von Erscheinungen gar nicht erwartet werden kann. Es war also damals kein wirklicher Widerspruch der Vernunft mit ihr selbst bei den Sätzen: die Reihe an sich gegebener Erscheinungen hat einen absolut ersten Anfang, und: diese Reihe ist schlechthin und an sich selbst ohne allen Anfang; denn beide Sätze bestehen gar wohl zusammen, weil Erscheinungen nach ihrem Dasein (als Erscheinungen) an sich selbst gar nichts, d. i. etwas Widersprechendes sind, und also deren Voraussetzung natürlicher Weise widersprechende Folgerungen nach sich ziehen muß.

Ein solcher Mißverstand kann aber nicht vorgewandt und dadurch der Streit der Vernunft beigelogen werden, wenn etwa theistisch behauptet würde: es ist ein höch- stes Wesen, und dagegen atheistisch: es ist kein höch- stes Wesen; oder, in der Psychologie: alles, was denkt, ist von absoluter beharrlicher Einheit und also von aller vergänglichen materiellen Einheit unterschieden, welchem ein anderer entgegengesetzt: die Seele ist nicht immaterielle

1 [Reading, with Vorländers, die anders for anders.

A: was da denkt,.
and cannot be exempt from transitoriness. For since in these
cases the understanding has to deal only with *things in them-
selves* and not with appearances, the object of such questions
is free from any foreign element that is in contradiction with
its nature. There would indeed be a real conflict, if pure reason
had anything to say on the negative side which amounted to
a positive ground for its negative contentions. For so far as
concerns criticism of the grounds of proof offered by those
who make dogmatic affirmations, the criticism\(^1\) can be freely
admitted, without our having on that account to give up these
affirmations, which have at least the interest of reason in
their favour—an interest to which the opposite party cannot
appeal.

I do not at all share the opinion which certain excellent
and thoughtful men (such as Sulzer\(^6\)), in face of the
weakness of the arguments hitherto employed, have so often
been led to express, that we may hope sometime to discover
conclusive demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of
our reason—that there is a God, and that there is a future life.
On the contrary, I am certain that this will never happen. For
whence will reason obtain ground for such synthetic assertions,
which do not relate to objects of experience and their inner
possibility. But it is also apodictically certain that there will
never be anyone who will be able to assert the opposite with
the least show (of proof), much less, dogmatically. For since
he could prove this only through pure reason, he must undertake
to prove that a supreme being, and the thinking subject in
us [viewed] as pure intelligence, are *impossible*. But whence
will he obtain the modes of knowledge which could justify
him in thus judging synthetically in regard to things that lie
beyond all possible experience. We may therefore be so\(^8\)
completely assured that no one will ever prove the opposite, that
there is no need for us to concern ourselves with formal argu-
ments. We are always in a position to accept these propositions
—propositions which are so very closely bound up with the
speculative interest of our reason in its empirical employment,
and which, moreover, are the sole means of reconciling the

\(^1\) [Reading, with Wille, *thar* for *thm.*]  
\(^6\) [J. G. Sulzer (1720–1779).]  
\(^8\) [Reading, with Erdmann, *so ganz* for *ganz.*]
speculative with the practical interest. As against our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic only, we are equipped with our non liquet, which cannot fail to disconcert him. At the same time we do not mind his turning this argument upon ourselves, since we always have in reserve the subjective maxim of reason, which is necessarily lacking to our opponent, and under its protection can look upon all his vain attacks with a tranquil indifference.

There is thus no real antithetic of pure reason. For the arena for such an antithetic would have to be located in the domain of pure theology and psychology; and in that domain no combatant can be adequately equipped, or have weapons that we need fear. Ridicule and boasting form his whole armoury, and these can be laughed at, as mere child’s play. This is a comforting consideration, and affords reason fresh courage; for upon what could it rely, if, while it alone is called upon to remove all errors, it should yet be at variance with itself, and without hope of peace and quiet possession.

Everything which nature has itself instituted is good for some purpose. Even poisons have their use. They serve to counteract other poisons generated in our bodily humours, and must have a place in every complete pharmacopoeia. The objections against the persuasions and complacency of our purely speculative reason arise from the very nature of reason itself, and must therefore have their own good use and purpose, which ought not to be disdained. Why has Providence placed many things which are closely bound up with our highest interests so far beyond our reach that we are only permitted to apprehend them in a manner lacking in clearness and subject to doubt—in such fashion that our enquiring gaze is more excited than satisfied? We may, indeed, be in doubt whether it serves any useful purpose, and whether it is not perhaps even harmful, to venture upon bold utterances in regard to such uncertain matters. But there can be no manner of doubt that it is always best to grant reason complete liberty, both of enquiry and of criticism, so that it may not be hindered in attending to its own proper interests. These interests are no less furthered by the limitation than by the extension of its speculations, and will always suffer when outside influences

[Reading, with 5th edition, and for oder.]

634 TRANSZENDENTALE METHODENLEHRE

esse zu vereinigen die einzigen Mittel sind. Für den Gegner (der hier nicht bloß als Kritiker betrachtet werden muß) haben wir unser non liquet in Bereitschaft, welches ihn unfähig verirren muß, indessen daß wir die Retorsion des selben auf uns nicht weigern, indem wir die subjektive Maxime der Vernunft beständig im Rückhalte || haben, die dem Gegner notwendig fehlt, und unter deren Schutz wir alle seine Luftstrecie mit Ruhe und Gleichgültigkeit ansehen können.

Auf solche Weise gibt es eigentlich gar keine Antithetik der reinen Vernunft. Denn der einzige Kampfplatz für sie würde auf dem Felde der reinen Theologie und Psychologie zu suchen sein; dieser Boden aber trägt keinen Kämpfer in seiner ganzen Rüstung, und mit Waffen, die zu fürchten wären. Er kann nur mit Spott oder Großsprecherei auftreten, welches als ein Kinderspiel belacht werden kann. Das ist eine störende Bemerkung, die der Vernunft wieder Mut gibt; denn, worauf wollte sie sich sonst verlassen, wenn sie, die allein alle Irrungen abzutun berufen ist, in sich selbst zerrüttet wäre, ohne Frieden und ruhigen Besitz hoffen zu können?

Alles, was die Natur selbst anordnet, ist zu irgend einer Absicht gut. Selbst Gifte dienen dazu, andere Gifte, welche sich in unseren eigenen Sitten erzeugen, zu überwältigen, und dürfen daher in einer vollständigen Sammlung von Heilmitteln (Öffizin) nicht fehlen. Die Einwürfe, wider die Überredungen und den Eigendünkel unserer bloße spekulativen Vernunft, sind selbst durch die Natur dieser Vernunft aufgegeben, und müssen also ihre gute Bestimmung und Absicht haben, die man nicht in den Wind schlagen muß. Wozu hat uns die Vorsorge manche Gegenstände, ob sie gleich mit unserem höchsten Interesse zusammenhängen, so hoch gestellt, daß uns fast || nur vergönnet ist, sie in einer undeutlichen und von uns selbst bezweifelten Wahrnehmung anzutreffen, dadurch ausspähende Blicke mehr gereizt, als befriedigt werden. Ob es nützlich sei, in Ansehung solcher Aussichten dreifte Bestimmungen zu wagen, ist wenigstens zweifelhaft, vielleicht gar schädlich. Allernütz und ohne allen Zweifel ist es nützlich, die forschende sowohl, als prüfende Vernunft in völlige Freiheit zu versetzen, damit sie unhindert ihr eigen Interesse besorgen könne, welches eben so wohl dadurch befördert wird, daß sie ihren Einsichten Schranken setzt, als daß sie solche erweitert, und welches allemal leidet, wenn sich fremde Hände eingemengen.

A: befördert wird, dadurch, daß,
THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON

intervene to divert it from its proper path, and to constrain it by what is irrelevant to its own proper ends.

Allow, therefore, your opponent to speak in the name of reason, and combat him only with weapons of reason. For the rest, have no anxiety as to the outcome in its bearing upon our practical interests, since in a merely speculative dispute they are never in any way affected. The conflict serves only to disclose a certain antimony of reason which, inasmuch as it is due to the very nature of reason, must receive a hearing and be scrutinised. Reason is benefited by the consideration of its object from both sides, and its judgment is corrected in being thus limited. What is here in dispute is not the practical interests of reason but the mode of their presentation. For although we have to surrender the language of knowledge, we still have sufficient ground to employ, in the presence of the most exacting reason, the quite legitimate language of a firm faith.

If we should ask the dispassionate David Hume, [by temperament] so peculiarly fitted for balanced judgment, what led him to undermine, through far-fetched subtleties so elaborately thought out, the conviction which is so comforting and beneficial for mankind, that their reason has sufficient insight for the assertion and for the determinate conception of a supreme being, he would answer: ‘Soley in order to advance reason in its self-knowledge, and because of a certain indignation at the violence that is done to reason by those who, while boasting of its powers, yet hinder it from candid admission of the weaknesses which have become obvious to it through its own self-examination’. If, on the other hand, we should ask Priestley, who was wholly devoted to the empirical employment of reason and out of sympathy with all transcendent speculation, what motives had induced him—himself a pious and zealous teacher of religion—to pull down two such pillars of all religion as the freedom and immortality of the soul (the hope of a future life is for him only the expectation of the miracle of resurrection), he would not be able to give

um sie wider ihren natürlichen Gang nach erzwungenen Absichten zu lenken.

Lasset demnach euren Gegner nur Vernunft sagen, und bekämpfe ihn bloß mit Waffen der Vernunft. Übrigens seid—wegen der guten Sache (des praktischen Interesse) außer Sorge, denn die kommt im bloß spekulativen Streite niemals mit ins Spiel. Der Streit entdeckt alsdenn nichts, als eine gewisse Antinomie der Vernunft, die, da sie auf ihrer Natur beruhet, notwendig angehört und geprüft werden muß. Er kultiviert dieselbe durch Betrachtung ihres Gegenstandes auf zweien Seiten, und berichtet ihr Urteil dadurch, daß er solches einschränkt. Das, was hierbei streitig wird, ist nicht die Sache, sondern der Ton. Denn es bleibt euch noch genug übrig, um die vor der schärfsten Vernunft gerechtfertigte Sprache eines festen Glaubens zu sprechen, wenn ihr gleich die des Wissens habt aufgeben müssen.

Wenn man den kalblütigen, zum Gleichgewichte des Urteils eigentlich geschaffenen David Hume fragen sollte; was bewog euch, durch mühsam ergründete Bedenken, die für den Menschen so törichte und nützliche Überredung, daß ihre Vernunft einsicht zur Behauptung und zu bestimmten Begriff eines höchsten Wesens zulange, zu untergraben? so würde er antworten: nichts, als die Absicht, die Vernunft in ihrer Selbsterkenntnis weiter zu bringen, und zugleich ein gewisser Unwill, über den Zwang, den man der Vernunft antun will, indem man mit ihr groß tut, und die zueinander hindert, ein freimütiges Gestaendnis ihrer Schwächen abzulegen, die ihr bei der Prüfung ihrer selbst offenbar werden. Fragt ihr dagegen den, den Grundsätzen des empirischen Vernunftgebrauchs allein ergebenen, und aller transzendenten Spekulation abgeneigten Priestley, was er für Bewegungsgründe gehabt habe, unserer Seele Freiheit und Unsterblichkeit (die Hoffnung des künftigen Lebens ist bei ihm nur die Erwartung eines Wunders der Wiedererweckung), zwei solche Grundpfeiler aller Religion niederzureißen, er, der selbst ein frommer und eifrige Lehrer der Religion ist: so würde er nichts andres antwe—

\[\textit{[nicht die Sache, sondern der Ton.]}\]
\[\textit{[The reference is to Hume's \textit{Dialogues concerning Natural Religion} (1779).]}\]
\[\textit{[Joseph Priestley (1733-1804): \textit{Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit} (1777); \textit{The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity} (1777).]}\]
any other answer than that he was concerned for the interest of reason, which must suffer when we seek to exempt certain objects from the laws of material nature, the only laws which we can know and determine with exactitude. It would be unjust to decry the latter (who knew how to combine his paradoxical teaching with the interests of religion), and so to give pain to a well-intentioned man, simply because he is unable to find his bearings, having strayed outside the field of natural science. And the same favour must be accorded to the no less well disposed and in his moral character quite blameless Hume, when he insists upon the relevance, in this field, of his subtly thought-out speculations. For, as he rightly held, their object lies entirely outside the limits of natural science, in the domain of pure ideas.

What, then, is to be done, especially in view of the danger which would thus seem to threaten the best interests of mankind? Nothing is more natural, nothing is more reasonable, than the decision which we are hereby called upon to make: Leave such thinkers free to take their own line. If they exhibit talent, if they initiate new and profound enquiries, in a word, if they show reason, reason always stands to gain. If we resort to other means than those of untrammelled reason, if we raise the cry of high treason, and act as if we were summoning the vulgar to extinguish a conflagration—the vulgar who have no understanding of such subtle enquiries—we make ourselves ridiculous. For the question at issue is not as to what, in these enquiries, is beneficial or detrimental to the best interests of mankind, but only how far reason can advance by means of speculation that abstracts from all interests, and whether such speculation can count for anything, or must not rather be given up in exchange for the practical. Instead, therefore, of rushing into the fight, sword in hand, we should rather play the part of the peaceable onlooker, from the safe seat of the critic. The struggle is indeed toilsome to the combatants, but for us can be entertaining; and its outcome—certain to be quite bloodless—must be of advantage as contributing to our theoretical insight. For it is indeed absurd to look to reason for enlightenment, and yet to prescribe beforehand which side she must necessarily favour. Besides, reason is already of itself so confined and held

ten können, als: das Interesse der Vernunft, welche damit verliert, daß man gewisse Gegenstände den Gesetzen der materiellen Natur, den einzigen, die wir genau kennen und bestimmen können, || entziehen will. Es würde unbillig scheinen, den letzteren, der seine paradoxe Behauptung mit der Religionsabsicht zu vereinigen weiß, zu verschleieren, und einem wohldenkenen Manne wehe zu tun, weil er sich nicht zurechte finden kann, so bald er sich aus dem Felde der Naturlehre verloren hatte. Aber diese Gunst muß dem nicht minder gutgesinnten und seinem sittlichen Charakter nach untadelhaften Hume eben sowohl zu Statten kommen, der seine abgezogene Spekulation darum nicht verlassen kann, weil er mit Recht dafür hält, daß ihr Gegenstand ganz außerhalb den Grenzen der Naturwissenschaft im Felde reiner Ideen liege.

Was ist nun hiebei zu tun, vornehmlich in Ansehung der Gefahr, die daraus dem gemeinen Besten zu drohen scheint? Nichts ist natürlicher, nichts billiger, als die Entschließung, die ihr deshalb zu nehmen habt. Laß diese Leute nur machen; wenn sie Talent, wenn sie tiefe und neue Nachforschung, mit einem Worte, wenn sie nur Vernunft zeigen, so gewinnt jederzeit die Vernunft. Wenn ihr andere Mittel ergreift, als die einer zwanglosen Vernunft, wenn ihr über Hochverrat schreit, das gemeine Wesen, das sich auf so subtile Bearbeitungen gar nicht versteht, gleichsam als zum Feuerlöschen zusammen ruft, so macht ihr euch lächerlich. Denn es ist die Rede gar nicht davon, was dem gemeinen Besten hierunter vorteilhaft, oder nachteilig sei, sondern nur, wie weit die Vernunft es wohl in ihrer von allem Interesse abstrahlenden || Spekulation bringen könne, und ob man auf diese überhaupt etwas rechnen, oder sie lieber gegen das praktische gar aufgeben müsse. Anstatt also mit dem Schwerte drein zu schlagen, so sehet vielmehr von dem sicheren Sitze der Kritik diesem Streite geruhig zu, der für die Kämpfenden mühsam, für euch unterhaltend, und, bei einem gewiß unblutigen Ausgang, für eure Einsichten er- sprießlich ausfallen muß. Denn es ist sehr was Ungereimtes, von der Vernunft Aufklärung zu erwarten, und ihr doch vorher vorzuschreiben, auf welche Seite sie notwendig ausfallen müsse. Überdem wird Vernunft schon von selbst
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within limits by reason, that we have no need to call out the
guard, with a view to bringing the civil power to bear upon
that party whose alarming superiority may seem to us to be
dangerous. In this dialectic no victory is gained that need give
us cause for anxiety.

Reason does indeed stand in sore need of such dialectical
debate; and it is greatly to be wished that the debate had been
instituted sooner and with unqualified public approval. For in
that case criticism would sooner have reached a ripe maturity,
and all these disputes would of necessity at once have come to
an end, the opposing parties having learned to recognise the
illusions and prejudices which have set them at variance.

There is in human nature a certain disingenuousness,
which, like everything that comes from nature, must finally
contribute to good ends, namely, a disposition to conceal our
real sentiments, and to make show of certain assumed sentiments
which are regarded as good and creditable. This
tendency to conceal ourselves and to assume the appearance
of what contributes to our advantage, has, undoubtedly, not
only civilised us, but gradually, in a certain measure, moralised
us. For so long as we were not in a position to see
through the outward show of respectability, honesty, and
modesty, we found in the seemingly genuine examples of
goodness with which we were surrounded a school for self-
improvement. But this disposition to represent ourselves as
better than we are, and to give expression to sentiments which
we do not share, serves as a merely provisional arrangement,
to lead us from the state of savage rudeness, and to allow of
our assuming at least the outward bearing\(^1\) of what we know to
be good. But later, when true principles have been developed,
and have become part of our way of thought, this duplicity
must be more and more earnestly combated; otherwise it cor-
rupts the heart, and checks the growth of good sentiments
with the rank weeds of fair appearances.

I am sorry to observe the same disingenuousness, mis-
representation, and hypocrisy even in the utterances of specu-
lative thought, where there are far fewer hindrances to our
making, as is fitting, frank and unreserved admission of our
thoughts, and no advantage whatsoever in acting otherwise.

\(^1\) [die Manier.]
For what can be more prejudicial to the interests of knowledge
than to communicate even our very thoughts in a falsified
form, to conceal doubts which we feel in regard to our
own assertions, or to give an appearance of conclusiveness
to grounds of proofs which we ourselves recognise to be in-
sufficient. So long as mere personal vanity is what breeds
these secret devices—and this is generally the case with those
speculative judgments which concern no special interest and
do not easily allow of apodictic certainty—it is counteracted,
in the process of enlisting general acceptance, by the vanity of
others; and thus in the end the result is the same as would have
been obtained, though much sooner, by entirely sincere and
honest procedure. When the common people are of opinion
that those who indulge in subtle questionings aim at nothing
less than to shake the very foundations of public welfare, it
may, indeed, seem not only prudent but permissible, and in-
deed even commendable, to further the good cause through so-
phistical arguments rather than allow its supposed antagonists
the advantage of having made us lower our tone to that of a
merely practical conviction, and of having compelled us to
admit our lack of speculative and apodictic certainty. I
cannot, however, but think that nothing is so entirely incompa-
tible with the purpose of maintaining a good cause as deceit,
hypocrisy, and fraud. Surely the least that can be demanded
is that in a matter of pure speculation, when weighing the con-
siderations cited by reason, we should proceed in an entirely
sincere manner. If we could confidently count even upon this
little, the conflict of speculative reason regarding the im-
portant questions of God, the immortality of the soul, and
freedom, would long ago have been decided, or would very
soon be brought to a conclusion. Thus it often happens that
purity of purpose is in inverse ratio to the goodness of the
cause, and that candour and honesty are perhaps more likely
to be found among its assailants than among its defenders.

I shall therefore assume that I have readers who do not
wish to see a righteous cause defended in an unrighteous
manner; and that they will consequently take it as agreed,
that, according to our principles of criticism, and having regard
not to what commonly happens, but to what ought to happen,
there can, properly speaking, be no polemic of pure reason.

keinen Vorteil haben. Denn was kann den Einsichten
nachteiliger sein, als so gar bloße Gedanken verfälscht ein-
der mitzuteilen, Zweifel, die wir wider unsere eigene Be-
hauptungen fühlen, zu verhehlen, oder Beweisgründen, die
uns selbst nicht genugtun, einen Anstrich von Evidenz zu
geben? So lange indessen bloß die Privatheitkeit diese ge-
heimen Ränke anstiftet (welches in spekulativen Urteilen,
die kein besonderes Interesse haben und nicht leicht einer
apodiktischen Gewißheit fähig sind, gemeinlich der Fall
ist), so widersteht denn doch die Eitelkeit anderer mit
öffentlich-Jeneemhigung, und die Sachen kommen
zuletzt dahin, wo die lauterste-Gesinnung und Aufrichtig-
keit, obgleich weit früher, sie hingebracht* haben würde. Wo
aber das gemeine Wesen dafür hält, daß spitzfindige Ver-
nünftler mit nichts minderem umgehen, als die Grundeste
der öffentlichen Wohlfahrt wankend zu machen, da scheint
es nicht allein der Klugheit gemäß, sondern auch erlaubt
und wohl gar rühmlich, der guten Sache eher durch Schein-
gründe zu Hilfe zu kommen, als den vermeintlichen Geg
ern derselben auch nur den Vorteil zu lassen, unsern Ton
zur Mäßigung einer bloß praktischen Überzeugung herab-
zustimmen, und uns zu nötigen, den Mangel der spekulativen
und apodiktischen Gewißheit zu gestehen. Indessen sollte
ich denken, daß sich mit der Absicht, eine gute Sache zu
behaupten, in der Welt wohl nichts über, als Hinterlist,
Verstellung und Betrug vereinigen lasse. Daß es in der Ab-
wiegung der Vernunft|gründe einer bloßen Spekulation
alles ehrlich zugehen müsse, ist wohl das wenigste, was man
dennern kann. Könnte man aber auch nur auf dieses wenige
sicher rechnen, so wäre der Streit der spekulativen Ver-
nunft, über die wichtigen Fragen von Gott, der Unsterblich-
heit (der Seele) und der Freiheit, entweder längst entschie-
den, oder würde sehr bald zu Ende gebracht werden. So
steht öfters die Lauterkeit der Gesinnung im umgekehrten
Verhältnisse der Gutartigkeit der Sache selbst, und diese
hat vielleicht mehr aufrichtige und redliche Gegner, als
Verteidiger.

Ich setze also Leser voraus, die keine gerechte Sache mit
Unrecht verteidigt wissen wollen. In Ansehung deren ist es
nun entschieden, daß, nach unseren Grundsätzen der Kri-
tik, wenn man nicht auf dasjenige sieht, was geschieht, son-
dern was billig geschehen sollte, es eigentlich gar keine Pole-

* A: »gebracht«.
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For how can two persons carry on a dispute about a thing the reality of which neither of them can present in actual or even in possible experience—a dispute in which they brood over the mere idea of the thing, in order to extract from it something more than the idea, namely, the reality of the object itself? What means have they of ending the dispute, since neither of them can make his thesis genuinely comprehensible and certain, but only attack and refute that of his opponent? For this is the fate of all assertions of pure reason: that since they transcend the conditions of all possible experience, outside which the authentication of truth is in no wise possible, while at the same time they have to make use of the laws of the understanding—laws which are adapted only for empirical employment, but without which no step can be taken in synthetic thought—neither side can avoid exposing its weakness, and each can therefore take advantage of the weakness of the other.

The critique of pure reason can be regarded as the true tribunal for all disputes of pure reason; for it is not involved in these disputes—disputes which are immediately concerned with objects—but is directed to the determining and estimating of the rights of reason in general, in accordance with the principles of their first institution.

In the absence of this critique reason is, as it were, in the state of nature, and can establish and secure its assertions and claims only through war. The critique, on the other hand, arriving at all its decisions in the light of fundamental principles of its own institution, the authority of which no one can question, secures to us the peace of a legal order, in which our disputes have to be conducted solely by the recognised methods of legal action. In the former state, the disputes are ended by a victory to which both sides lay claim, and which is generally followed by a merely temporary armistice, arranged by some mediating authority; in the latter, by a judicial sentence which, as it strikes at the very root of the conflicts, effectively secures an eternal peace. The endless disputes of a merely dogmatic reason thus finally constrain us to seek relief in some critique of reason itself, and in a legislation based upon such criticism. As Hobbes maintains, the state of nature is a state of injustice and violence, and we have no option save to abandon it and submit ourselves to the constraint of law, which

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limits our freedom solely in order that it may be consistent with the freedom of others and with the common good of all.

This freedom will carry with it the right to submit openly for discussion the thoughts and doubts with which we find ourselves unable to deal, and to do so without being decried as troublesome and dangerous citizens. This is one of the original rights of human reason, which recognises no other judge than that universal human reason in which everyone has his say. And since all improvement of which our state is capable must be obtained from this source, such a right is sacred and must not be curtailed. Indeed we are very ill-advised in decrying as dangerous any bold assertions against, or audacious attacks upon, the view which already has on its side the approval of the largest and best portion of the community; in so doing we are ascribing to them an importance which they are not entitled to claim. Whenever I hear that a writer of real ability has demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, the hope of a future life, and the existence of God, I am eager to read the book, for I expect him by his talents to increase my insight into these matters. Already, before having opened it, I am perfectly certain that he has not justified any one of his specific claims; not because I believe that I am in possession of conclusive proofs of these important propositions, but because the transcendental critique, which has disclosed to me all the resources of our pure reason, has completely convinced me that, as reason is incompetent to arrive at affirmative assertions in this field, it is equally unable, indeed even less able, to establish any negative conclusion in regard to these questions. For from what source will the freethinker derive his professed knowledge\(^1\) that there is, for example, no supreme being? This proposition is outside the field of possible experience, and therefore beyond the limits of all human insight. The reply of the dogmatic defender of the good cause I should not read at all. I know beforehand that he will attack the sophistical arguments of his opponent simply in order to gain acceptance for his own; and I also know that a quite familiar line of false argument does not yield so much material for new observations as one that is novel and ingeniously elaborated.

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\(^1\) [Reading, with Wille, der Freigeist seine angebliche Kenntnis für der angebliche Freigeist seine Kenntnis.]
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The opponent of religion is indeed, in his own way, no less dogmatic, but he affords me a welcome opportunity of applying and, in this or that respect, amending the principles of my Critique, while at the same time I need be in no fear of these principles being in the least degree endangered.

But must not the young, at least, when entrusted to our academical teaching, be warned against such writings, and preserved from a premature knowledge of such dangerous propositions, until their faculty of judgment is mature, or rather until the doctrine which we seek to instil into them has taken such firm root, that they are able effectively to withstand all persuasion to contrary views, from whatever quarter it may come?

If we are to insist on holding to dogmatic procedure in matters of pure reason, and on disposing of our opponents in strictly polemical fashion, that is, by ourselves taking sides in the controversy, and therefore equipping ourselves with proofs in support of the opposite assertions, certainly this procedure would for the time being be the most expedient; but in the long run nothing would be more foolish and ineffective than to keep youthful reason thus for a period under tutelage. This will indeed guard the young temporarily against perversion. But when, later, either curiosity or the fashion of the age brings such writings under their notice, will their youthful conviction then stand the test? Whatever, in withstand the attacks of his opponent, has at his disposal only dogmatic weapons, and is unable to develop the dialectic which lies concealed in his own breast no less than in that of his antagonist, [is in a dangerous position]. He sees sophistical arguments, which have the attraction of novelty, set in opposition to sophistical arguments which no longer have that attraction, but, on the contrary, tend to arouse the suspicion that advantage has been taken of his youthful credulity. And accordingly he comes to believe that there can be no better way of showing that he has outgrown childish discipline than by casting aside these well-meant warnings; and accustomed as he is to dogmatism, he drinks deep draughts of the poison, which destroys his principles by a counter-dogmatism.

In academic teaching we ought to pursue the course exactly opposite to that which is here recommended, pro-

würde der nach seiner Art auch dogmatische Religionsgegner meiner Kritik gewünschte Beschäftigung und Anlaß zu mehrerer Berichtigung ihrer Grundsätze geben, ohne daß seinetwegen im mindesten etwas zu befürchten wäre.

Aber die Jugend, welche dem akademischen Unterrichte anvertraut ist, soll doch wenigstens vor dergleichen Schriften gewarnt, und von der frühen Kenntnis so gefährlicher Sätze abgehalten werden, ehe ihre Urteilskraft gereift, oder vielmehr die Lehre, welche man in ihnen gründen will, fest gewurzelt ist, um aller Überredung zum Gegenteil, woher sie auch kommen möge, kräftig zu widerstehen?

Müßte es bei dem dogmatischen Verfahren in Sachen der reinen Vernunft bleiben, und die Abfertigung der Gegner eigentlich polemisch, d. i. so beschaffen sein, daß man sich ins Gefechte einließe, und mit Beweisgründen zu entgegen- gesetzt? Behauptungen bewaffnete, so wäre freilich nichts ratsamer vor der Hand, aber zugleich nichts etlicher und fruchloser auf der Dauer, als die Vernunft der Jugend eine Zeitlang unter Vormundschaft zu setzen, und wenigstens so lange vor Verführung zu bewahren. Wenn aber in der Folge entweder Neugierde, oder der Modenton des Zeitalters ihr dergleichen Schriften in die Hände spielen, wird alsdenn jene jugendliche Überredung noch Stich halten? Derjenige, der nichts als dogmatische Waffen mitbringt, um den Angriffen seines Gegners zu widerstehen, und die verborogene Dialektik; die nicht mindestens in seinem eigenen Busen, als in dem des Gegenteils liegt, nicht zu entwickeln weiß, sieht Scheingründe, die den Vorzug der Neugkeit haben; gegen Scheingründe; welche dergleichen nicht mehr haben, sondern vielmehr den Verdacht einer mißbrauchten Leichtgläubigkeit der Jugend erregen, auftreten. Er glaubt nicht besser zeigen zu können, daß er der Kinderzucht entwachsen sei, als wenn er sich über jene wohlgemeinte Warnungen weisset, und, dogmatisch gewohnt; trinkt er das gift, das seine Grundsätze-dogmatisch verdirbt, in langen Zügen in sich.

Gerade das Gegenteil von dem, was man hier anrägt, muß in der akademischen Unterweisung geschehen, aber freilich
vided always that the teaching is based on thorough instruction in the criticism of pure reason. For in order to bring the principles of this criticism into operation as soon as possible, and to show their sufficiency even when dialectical illusion is at its height, it is absolutely necessary that the attacks which seem so terrible to the dogmatist should be made to exercise their full force upon the pupil’s reason, which though still weak has been enlightened through criticism, and that the pupil should thus be allowed the opportunity of testing for himself, one by one, by reference to the critical principles, how groundless are the assertions of those who have launched these attacks. As it is by no means difficult for him to resolve these arguments into thin air, he early begins to feel his own capacity to secure himself against such injurious deceptions, which must finally lose for him all their illusory power. Those same blows which destroy the structures of the enemy must indeed be equally destructive to any speculative structure which he may perchance himself wish to erect. This does not, however, in the least disturb him, since he has no need of any such shelter, being still in possession of good expectations in the practical sphere, where he may confidently hope to find firmer ground upon which to erect his own rational and beneficial system.

There is, therefore, properly speaking, no polemic in the field of pure reason. Both parties beat the air, and wrestle with their own shadows, since they go beyond the limits of nature, where there is nothing that they can seize and hold with their dogmatic grasp. Fight as they may, the shadows which they cleave asunder grow together again forthwith, like the heroes in Valhalla, to dispose themselves anew in the bloodless contests.

But neither can we admit that there is any sceptical employment of pure reason, such as might be entitled the principle of neutrality in all its disputes. To set reason at variance with itself, to supply it with weapons on both sides, and then to look on, quietly and scoffingly, at the fierce struggle, is not, from the dogmatic point of view, a seemly spectacle, but appears to suggest a mischievous and malevolent disposition. If, however, we consider the invincible obstinacy and the boastfulness of those who argue dogmatically, and who refuse to allow their claims to be moderated by any criticism, there

nur unter der Voraussetzung eines gründlichen Unterrichts in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Denn, um die Principien derselben so früh als möglich in Ausübung zu bringen, und ihre Zulänglichkeit: bei dem größten dialektischen Scheine zu zeigen, ist es durchaus nötig, die für den Dogmatiker so furchtbaren Angriffe wider seine, obzwar noch schwache, aber durch Kritik aufgeklärte Vernunft zu richten, und ihn den Versuch machen zu lassen, die grundlosen Behauptungen des Gegners Stück vor Stück an jenen Grundsätzen zu prüfen. Es kann ihm gar nicht schwer werden, sie in lauter Dunst aufzulösen; und so fühlt er frühzeitig seine eigene Kraft, sich wider dergleichen scheinliche Blendwerke, die für ihn zuletzt allen Schein verliert, völlig zu sichern. Ob nun zwar eben dieselbe Streiche, die das Gebäude des Feindes nieder schlaget, auch seinem eigenen spekulativen Bauwerke, wenn er etwa dergleichen zu errichten gedächt, eben so verderblich sein müssen: so ist er darüber doch gänzlich unbekümmert, indem er es gar nicht bedarf, darinnen zu wohnen, sondern noch eine Aussicht in das praktische Feld vor sich hat, wo er mit Grunde einen festen Boden hoffen kann, um darauf sein vernünftiges und heiliges System zu errichten.

So gibt’s demnach keine eigentliche Polemik im Felde der reinen Vernunft: Beide Teile sind Luftflechter, die sich mit ihrem Schatten herumhalten; denn sie gehen über die Natur hinaus, wo für ihre dogmatischen Griffe nichts vorhanden ist, was sich fassen und halten ließe. Sie haben gut kämpfen; die Schatten, die sie zerhauen; wachsen, wie die Helden in Walhalla, in einem Augenblicke wiederum zusammen, um sich aufs neue in unblutigen Kämpfen belustigen zu können.

Es gibt aber auch keinen zulässigen, skeptischen Gebrauch der reinen Vernunft, welchen man den Grundsatz der Neutraleität bei allen ihren Streitigkeiten nennen könnte. Die Vernunft wider sich selbst zu verhetzen, ihr auf beiden Seiten Waffen zu reichen, und alsdenn, ihrem hitzigsten Gefechte ruhig und spöttisch zuzusehen, sieht aus einem dogmatischen Gesichtspunkte nicht wohl aus; sondern hat das Ansehen einer schadenfreien und hämischen Gemütssart an sich. Wenn man indessen die unbezwängliche Verblendung und das Großtun der Vernünftler, die sich durch keine Kritik will mäßigen lassen, ansehe, so ist doch wirklich
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is really no other available course of action than to set against the boasting of the one side the no less justified boasting of the other, in the hope that the resistance thus offered to reason may at least serve to disconcert it, to awaken some doubts as to its pretensions, and to make it willing to give a hearing to criticism. But to allow ourselves simply to acquiesce in these doubts, and thereupon to set out to commend the conviction and admission of our ignorance not merely as a remedy against the complacency of the dogmatists, but likewise as the right method of putting an end to the conflict of reason with itself, is a futile procedure, and can never suffice to overcome the restlessness of reason. At best it is merely a means of awakening it from its sweet dogmatic dreams, and of inducing it to enter upon a more careful examination of its own position. Since, however, the sceptical method of escaping from the troublesome affairs of reason appears to be, as it were, a short cut by which we can arrive at a permanent peace in philosophy, or [if it be not that], at least the road favoured by those who would feign make show of having a philosophical justification for their contemptuous dislike of all enquiries of this kind, I consider it necessary to exhibit this way of thinking in its true light.

The Impossibility of a Sceptical Satisfaction of Pure Reason in its Internal Conflicts

The consciousness of my ignorance (unless at the same time this ignorance is recognised as being necessary), instead of ending my enquiries, ought rather to be itself the reason for entering upon them. All ignorance is either ignorance of things or ignorance of the function and limits of knowledge. If ignorance is only accidental, it must incite me, in the former regard to a dogmatic enquiry concerning things (objects), in the latter regard to a critical enquiry concerning the limits of my possible knowledge. But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary, and that I am therefore absolved from all further enquiry, cannot be established empirically, from observation, but only through an examination, critically conducted, of the primary sources of our knowledge. The determination of the limits of our reason cannot, therefore, be made save on a priori

1 [Reading, with Erdmann, nur for nun.]
grounds; on the other hand, that limitation of it which consists merely in an indeterminate knowledge of an ignorance never to be completely removed, can be recognised a posteriori by reference to that which, notwithstanding all we know, still remains to be known. The former knowledge of our ignorance, which is possible only through criticism of reason itself, is science; the latter is nothing but perception, and we cannot say how far the inferences from perception may extend.

If I represent the earth as it appears to my senses, as a flat surface, with a circular horizon,¹ I cannot know how far it extends. But experience teaches me that wherever I may go, I always see a space around me in which² I could proceed further; and thus I know the limits of my actual knowledge of the earth at any given time, but not the limits of all possible geography. But if I have got so far as to know that the earth is a sphere and that its surface is spherical, I am able even from a small part of it, for instance, from the magnitude of a degree, to know determinately, in accordance with principles a priori, the diameter, and through it the total superficial area of the earth; and although I am ignorant of the objects which this surface may contain, I yet have knowledge in respect of its circuit, magnitude, and limits.

The sum of all the possible objects of our knowledge appears to us to be a plane, with an apparent horizon—namely, that which in its sweep comprehends it all, and which has been entitled by us the idea of unconditioned totality. To reach this concept empirically is impossible, and all attempts to determine it a priori in accordance with an assured principle have proved vain. None the less all the questions raised by our pure reason are as to what may be outside the horizon,³ or, it may be, on its boundary line.

The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human reason who have imagined that they have sufficiently disposed of all such questions by setting them outside the horizon of human reason—a horizon which yet he was not able to determine. Hume dwelt in particular upon the principle of causality, and quite rightly observed that its truth, and even the objective validity of the concept of efficient cause in

¹ [Reading, with Erdmann, darin der H. H.]
² [Reading, with Erdmann, dem Horizonte vor diesem Horizonte.]
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general, is based on no insight, that is, no *a priori* knowledge, and that its authority cannot therefore be ascribed to its necessity, but merely to its general utility in the course of experience, and to a certain subjective necessity which it thereby acquires, and which he entitles custom. From the incapacity of our reason to make use of this principle in any manner that transcends experience, he inferred the nullity of all pretensions of reason to advance beyond the empirical.

A procedure of this kind—subjecting the facts\(^1\) of reason to examination, and if necessary to blame—may be entitled the censorship of reason. This censorship must certainly lead to *doubt* regarding all transcendent employment of principles. But this is only the second step, and does not by any means complete the work of enquiry. The first step in matters of pure reason, marking its infancy, is dogmatic. The second step is sceptical; and indicates that experience has rendered our judgment wiser and more circumspect. But a third step, such as can be taken only by fully matured judgment, based on assured principles of proved universality, is now necessary, namely, to subject to examination, not the facts of reason, but reason itself, in the whole extent of its powers, and as regards its aptitude for pure *a priori* modes of knowledge. This is not the censorship but the *criticism* of reason, whereby not its present *bounds*\(^2\) but its determinate [and necessary] *limits*,\(^3\) not its ignorance on this or that point but its ignorance in regard to all possible questions of a certain kind, are demonstrated from principles, and not merely arrived at by way of conjecture. Scepticism is thus a resting-place for human reason, where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings and make survey of the region in which it finds itself, so that for the future it may be able to choose its path with more certainty. But it is no dwelling-place for permanent settlement. Such can be obtained only through perfect certainty in our knowledge, alike of the objects themselves and of the limits within which all our knowledge of objects is enclosed.

Our reason is not like a plane indefinitely far extended, the limits of which we know in a general way only; but must rather be compared to a sphere, the radius of which can be determined from the curvature of the arc of its surface—that

\(^1\) *die Fakten.*

\(^2\) *Schränken.*

\(^3\) *Grenzen.*
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

is to say, from the nature of synthetic a priori propositions —and whereby we can likewise specify with certainty its volume and its limits. Outside this sphere (the field of experience) there is nothing that can be an object for reason; nay, the very questions in regard to such supposed objects relate only to subjective principles of a complete determination of those relations which can come under the concepts of the understanding and which can be found within the empirical sphere.

We are actually in possession of a priori synthetic modes of knowledge, as is shown by the principles of understanding which anticipate experience. If anyone is quite unable to comprehend the possibility of these principles, he may at first be inclined to doubt whether they actually dwell in us a priori; but he cannot on this account declare that they are beyond the powers of the understanding, and so represent all the steps which reason takes under their guidance as being null and void. All that he can say is that if we could have insight into their origin and authenticity, we should be able to determine the scope and limits of our reason, but that until we can have such insight any assertions as to the limits of reason are made at random. And on this ground a general doubt regarding all dogmatic philosophy, proceeding as such philosophy does without criticism of reason itself, is entirely justified; but we cannot therefore altogether deny to reason the right to take such forward steps, once we have prepared and secured the way for them by a more thorough preparation of the ground. For all the concepts, nay, all the questions, which pure reason presents to us, have their source not in experience, but exclusively in reason itself, and must therefore allow of solution and of being determined in regard to their validity or invalidity. We have no right to ignore these problems, as if their solution really depended on the nature of things, and as if we might therefore, on the plea of our incapacity, decline to occupy ourselves with their further investigation; for since reason is the sole begetter of these ideas, it is under obligation to give an account of their validity or of their illusion, dialectical nature.

All sceptical polemic should properly be directed only against the dogmatist, who, without any misgivings as to his fundamental objective principles, that is, without criticism,

1 [Reading, with Erdmann, Erkenntnisse für Erkenntnis.]

...
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proceeds complacently upon his adopted countenance; it should be
designed simply to put him out of countenance and thus to
bring him to self-knowledge. In itself, however, this polemic
is of no avail whatsoever in enabling us to decide what it is
that we can and what it is that we cannot know. All unsuccessful
dogmatic attempts of reason are facts,\(^1\) and it is always of
advantage to submit them to the censorship of the skeptic.
But this can decide nothing regarding those expectations of
reason which lead it to hope for better success in its future
attempts, and to build claims on this foundation; and conse-
sequently no mere censorship can put an end to the dispute
regarding the rights of human reason.

Hume is perhaps the most ingenious of all the sceptics, and
beyond all question is without rival in respect of the influence
which the sceptical procedure can exercise in awakening
reason to a thorough self-examination. It will therefore well
reap us to make clear to ourselves, so far as may be relevant to
our purpose, the course of the reasoning, and the errors, of so
acute and estimable a man—a course of reasoning which at
the start was certainly on the track of truth.

Hume was perhaps aware, although he never followed the
matter out, that in judgments of a certain kind we pass beyond
our concept of the object. I have entitled this kind of judg-
ments *synthetic*. There is no difficulty, so to say, by means of
experience, I can pass beyond the concept which I previously
have. Experience is in itself a synthesis of perceptions, wherein
the concept which I have obtained by means of a perception is increased through the addition of other per-
ceptions. But we suppose ourselves to be able to pass *a priori*
beyond our concept, and so to extend our knowledge. This we
attempt to do either through the pure understanding, in respect
of that which is at least capable of being an *object of experi-
ence*, or through pure reason, in respect of such properties of
things, or indeed even of the existence of such things, as can
never be met with in experience. Our sceptical philosopher did
not distinguish these two kinds of judgments, as he yet ought
to have done, but straightway proceeded to treat this self-
increment of concepts, and, as we may say, this spontaneous
generation on the part of our understanding and of our reason,

\(^1\) *Facts.*
without impregnation by experience, as being impossible. He therefore regarded all the supposed a priori principles of these faculties as fictitious, and concluded that they are nothing but a custom-bred habit arising from experience and its laws, and are consequently merely empirical, that is, rules that are in themselves contingent, and to which we ascribe a supposititious necessity and universality. In support of his assertion of this startling thesis, he cited the universally recognised principle of the relation between cause and effect. For since no faculty of understanding can carry us from the concept of a thing to the existence of something else that is thereby universally and necessarily given, he believed that he was therefore in a position to conclude that in the absence of experience we have nothing that can increase our concept and justify us in propounding a judgment which thus enlarges itself a priori. That sunlight should melt wax and yet also harden clay, no understanding, he pointed out, can discover from the concepts which we previously possessed of these things, much less infer them according to a law. Only experience is able to teach us such a law. But, as we have discovered in the Transcendental Logic, although we can never pass immediately beyond the content of the concept which is given us, we are nevertheless able, in relation to a third thing, namely, possible experience, to know the law of its connection with other things, and to do so in an a priori manner. If, therefore, wax, which was formerly hard, melts, I can know a priori that something must have preceded, ([that something being] for instance [in this case] the heat of the sun), upon which the melting has followed according to a fixed law, although a priori, independently of experience, I could not determine, in any specific manner, either the cause from the effect, or the effect from the cause. Hume was therefore in error in inferring from the contingency of our determination in accordance with the law the contingency of the law itself. The passing beyond the concept of a thing to possible experience (which takes place a priori and constitutes the objective reality of the concept) he confounded with the synthesis of the objects of actual experience, which is always empirical. He thus confounds a principle of affinity, which has its seat in the understanding and affirms necessary connection, with a rule of
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association, which exists only in the imitative faculty of imagination, and which can exhibit only contingent, not objective, connections.

The sceptical errors of this otherwise singularly acute thinker arose chiefly from a defect which he shares in common with all dogmatists, namely, that he did not make a systematic review of all the various kinds of a priori synthesis ascribable to the understanding. For he would then have found, to mention only one of many possible examples, that the principle of permanence is a principle of this character, and that, like the principle of causality, it anticipates experience. He would thus have been able to prescribe determinate limits to the activities whereby the understanding and pure reason extend themselves a priori. Instead of so doing, he merely restricts the understanding, without defining its limits, and while creating a general mistrust fails to supply any determinate knowledge of the ignorance which for us is unavoidable. For while subjecting to censorship certain principles of the understanding, he makes no attempt to assess the understanding itself, in respect of all its powers, by the assay-balance of criticism; while rightly denying to the understanding what it cannot really supply, he goes on to deny it all power of extending itself a priori, and this in spite of his never having tested it as a whole. Thus the fate that waits upon all scepticism likewise befalls Hume, namely, that his own sceptical teaching comes to be doubted, as being based only on facts which are contingent, not on principles which can constrain to a necessary renunciation of all right to dogmatic assertions.

Further, he draws no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason, though it is indeed chiefly against the latter that his attacks are directed. Accordingly that peculiarly characteristic ardour with which reason insists upon giving free rein to itself, has not in the least been disturbed but only temporarily impeded. It does not feel that it has been shut out from the field in which it is wont to disport itself; and so, in spite of its being thwarted in this and that direction, it cannot be made entirely to desist from these ventures. On the contrary, the attacks lead only to counter-preparations,
and make us the more obstinate in insisting upon our own views. But a complete review of all the powers of reason—and the conviction thereby obtained of the certainty of its claims to a modest territory, as also of the vanity of higher pretensions—puts an end to the conflict, and induces it to rest satisfied with a limited but undisputed patrimony.

To the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the sphere of his understanding, and therefore has not determined, in accordance with principles, the limits of his possible knowledge, these sceptical attacks are not only dangerous but even destructive. For he does not know beforehand how far his powers extend, and indeed believes that their limits can be determined by the simple method of trial and failure. In consequence of this, if on being attacked there is a single one of his assertions that he is unable to justify, or which involves illusion for which he also cannot account in terms of any principles, suspicion falls on all his contentions, however plausible they may appear.

The sceptic is thus the taskmaster who constrains the dogmatic reasoner to develop a sound critique of the understanding and reason. When we have advanced thus far, we need fear no further challenge, since we have learned to distinguish our real possessions from that which lies entirely outside them; and as we make no claims in regard to this latter domain, we cannot become involved in any dispute in respect to it. While, therefore, the sceptical procedure cannot of itself yield any satisfying answer to the questions of reason, none the less it prepares the way by arousing reason to circumspection, and by indicating the radical measures which are adequate to secure it in its legitimate possessions.

CHAPTER I

Section 3

THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN REGARD TO HYPOTHESES

Since criticism of our reason has at last taught us that we cannot by means of its pure and speculative employment arrive at any knowledge whatsoever, may it not seem that a...
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proportionately wider field is opened for hypotheses? For are we not at liberty, where we cannot make assertions, at least to invent theories and to have opinions? 1

If the imagination is not simply to be visionary, but is to be inventive under the strict surveillance of reason, there must always previously be something that is completely certain, and not invented or merely a matter of opinion, namely, the possibility of the object itself. Once that is established, it is then permissible to have recourse to opinion in regard to its actuality; but this opinion, if it is not to be groundless, must be brought into connection with what is actually given and so far certain, as serving to account for what is thus given. Then, and only then, can the supposition be entitled an hypothesis.

As we cannot form the least conception a priori of the possibility of dynamical connection, and as the categories of the pure understanding do not suffice for devising any such conception, but only for apprehending it when met with in experience, we cannot, in accordance with these categories, creatively imagine any object in terms of any new quality that does not allow of being given in experience; and we cannot, therefore, make use of such an object in any legitimate hypothesis; otherwise we should be resting reason on empty figments of the brain, and not on concepts of things. Thus it is not permissible to invent any new original powers, as, for instance, an understanding capable of intuiting its objects without the aid of senses; or a force of attraction without any contact; or a new kind of substance existing in space and yet not impenetrable. Nor is it legitimate to postulate a form of communion of substances which is different from any revealed in experience, a presence that is not spatial, a duration that is not temporal. In a word, our reason cannot employ as conditions of the possibility of things only the conditions of possible experience; it can never proceed to form concepts of things quite independently of these conditions. Such concepts, though not self-contradictory, would be without an object.

1 [zu dichten und zu meinen.] 2 [schräg, heig.] 3 [von der sel.]
4 [Reading, with Vorländer, Kategorien... dannen ist Kategorie... dient.]
5 [ursprünglich aussinnen.] 6 [laut Hirngespinst.]
The concepts of reason are, as we have said, mere ideas, and have no object that can be met with in any experience. None the less they do not on this account signify objects that having been invented are thereupon assumed to be possible. They are thought only problematically, in order that upon them (as heuristic fictions), we may base regulative principles of the systematic employment of the understanding in the field of experience. Save in this connection they are merely thought-entities, the possibility of which is not demonstrable, and which therefore do not allow of being employed, in the character of hypotheses, in explanation of the actual appearances. It is quite permissible to think the soul as simple, in order, in conformity with this idea, to employ as the principle of our interpretation of its inner appearances a complete and necessary unity of all its faculties; and this in spite of the fact that this unity is such as can never be apprehended in concreto. But to assume the soul as a simple substance (a transcendent concept), would be [to propound] a proposition which is not only indemonstrable—as is the case with many physical hypotheses—but is hazarded in a quite blind and arbitrary fashion. For the simple can never be met with in any experience whatsoever; and if by substance here meant the permanent object of sensible intuition, the possibility of a simple appearance is quite incomprehensible. Reason does not afford any sufficient ground for assuming, [even] as a matter of opinion, merely intelligible beings, or merely intelligible properties of things belonging to the sensible world, although (as we have no concepts of their possibility or impossibility) we also cannot lay claim to any insight that justifies us in dogmatically denying them.

In the explanation of given appearances, no things or grounds of explanation can be adduced other than those which have been found to stand in connection with given appearances in accordance with the already known laws of the appearances. A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere idea of reason is used in explanation of natural existences, would really be no explanation; so to proceed would be to explain something, which in terms of known empirical principles we do not understand sufficiently, by something which

\[ \text{[Gedankendinge.]} \]  

\[ \text{[Naturdinge.]} \]
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we do not understand at all. Moreover, the principle of such
an hypothesis would at most serve only for the satisfaction of
reason, not for the furtherance of the employment of the
understanding in respect of objects. Order and purposiveness
in nature must themselves be explained from natural grounds
and according to natural laws; and the wildest hypotheses, if
only they are physical, are here more tolerable than a hyper-
physical hypothesis, such as the appeal to a divine Author,
assumed simply in order that we may have an explanation.
That would be a principle of ignava ratio; for we should be
passing over all causes the objective reality of which, at least
as regards their possibility, can be ascertained in the course
of experience, in order to rest in a mere idea—an idea that is
very comforting to reason. As regards the absolute totality of
the ground of explanation of the series of these causes, such
totality need suggest no difficulty in respect of natural exist-
ences; since these existences are nothing but appearances, we
need never look to them for any kind of completeness in the
synthesis of the series of conditions.

It can never be permissible, in the speculative employment
of reason, to resort to transcendental hypotheses, and to pre-
sume that we can make good the lack of physical grounds of
explanation by appealing to the hyperphysical. The objection
to such procedure is twofold: partly, that reason, so far from
being in the least advanced thereby, is cut off from all progress
in its own employment; partly, that this license would in the
end deprive reason of all the fruits that spring from the cul-
tivation of its own proper domain, namely, that of experience.
For whenever the explanation of natural existences is found
to be difficult, there is always at hand a transcendental ground
of explanation which relieves us from further investigation,
and our enquiry is brought to an end not through insight, but
by the aid of a principle which while utterly incomprehensible
has from the start been so constructed as necessarily to con-
tain the concept of what is absolutely primordial.

The second requirement for the admissibility of an hypo-
thesis is its adequacy in accounting a priori for those con-
sequences which are [de facto] given. If for this purpose we
have to call in auxiliary hypotheses, they give rise to the sus-

a [Weltobjekte]  b [etwas Vollenkommense]
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...opinion that they are mere fictions; for each of them requires the same justification as is necessary in the case of the fundamental hypothesis, and they are not, therefore, in a position to bear reliable testimony. If we assume an absolutely perfect cause, we need not be at a loss in explaining the purposiveness, order, and vastness which are displayed in the world; but in view of what, judged at least by our concepts, are the obvious deviations and evils, other new hypotheses are required in order to uphold the original hypothesis in face of the objections which these suggest. If the simple self-sufficiency of the human soul has been employed to account for its appearances, it is contorted by certain difficulties, due to those phenomena which are similar to the changes that take place in matter (growth and decay), and we have therefore to seek the aid of new hypotheses, which are not indeed without plausibility, but which yet have no credentials save what is conferred upon them by that opinion—the fundamental hypothesis—which they have themselves been called in to support.

If the instances here cited as examples of the assertions made by reason—the incorporeal unity of the soul and the existence of a supreme being—are propounded not as hypotheses, but as dogmas proved a priori, I am not at present concerned with them, save to remark that in that case care must be taken that the proof has the apodictic certainty of a demonstration. For to set out to show no more than that the reality of such ideas is probable is as absurd as to think of proving a proposition of geometry merely as a probability. Reason, when employed apart from all experience, can know propositions entirely a priori, and as necessary, or it can know nothing at all. Its judgments, therefore, are never opinions; either it must abstain from all judgment, or must affirm with apodictic certainty. Opinions and probable judgments as to what belongs to things can be propounded only in explanation of what is actually given, or as consequences that follow in accordance with empirical laws from what underlies the actually given. They are therefore concerned only with the series of the objects of experience. Outside this field, to form opinions is merely to play with thoughts. For we should then have to presuppose yet another opinion—the opinion that we may perhaps arrive at the truth by a road that is uncertain.

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...einer bloßen Erfahrung, weil jede derselben an sich solche Rechtfertigung bedarf, welche der zum Grunde gelegte Gedanke nötig hatte, und daher keinen tückigen Zeugen abgeben kann. Wenn, unter Voraussetzung einer unbeschränkt vollkommenen Ursache, zwar an Erklärungsgründen aller Zweckmäßigkeit, Ordnung und Größe, die sich in der Welt finden, kein Mangel ist, so bedarf jene doch, den, wenigstens nach unseren Begriffen, sich zeigenden Abweichungen und Übeln, noch neuer Hypothesen, um gegen diese, als Einwürfe, gerettet zu werden. Wenn die einfache Selbständigkeit der menschlichen Seele, die zum Grunde ihrer Erscheinungen gelegt worden, durch die Schwierigkeiten ihrer, den Abänderungen einer Materie (dem Wachstum und Abnahme) ähnlichen Phänomene angefochten wird, so müssen neue Hypothesen zu Hilfe gerufen werden, die zwar nicht ohne Schein, aber doch ohne alle Beglaubigung sind, außer derjenigen, welche ihnen die zum Hauptgründe angenommene Meinung gibt, der sie gleichwohl das Wort reden sollen.

Wenn die hier zum Beispielen angeführten Vernunftbauten (unkörperliche Einheit der Seele und Dasein eines höchsten Wesens) nicht als Hypothesen, sondern a priori bewiesene Dogmate gelten sollen, so ist alsdenn von ihnen gar nicht die Rede: In solchem Falle aber sehe man sich ja vor, daß der Beweis die apodiktische Gewißheit einer Demonstration habe. Denn die Wirklichkeit solcher Ideen bloß wahrscheinlich machen zu wollen, ist ein ungereimter Vorsatz, eben so, als wenn man einen Satz der Geometrie bloß wahrscheinlich zu beweisen gedächte. Die von aller Erfahrung abgesonderte Vernunft kann alles nur a priori und als notwendig oder gar nicht erkennen; daher ist ihr Urteil niemals Meinung, sondern entweder Enthaltung von allem Urteile, oder apodiktische Gewißheit. Meinungen und wahrscheinliche Urteile von dem, was Dingen zukommt, können nur als Erklärungsgründe dessen, was wirklich gegeben ist, oder Folgen nach empirischen Gesetzen von dem, was als wirklich zum Grunde liegt, mithin nur in der Reihe der Gegenstände der Erfahrung vorkommen. Außer diesem Felse ist meinen so viel, als mit Gedanken spielen; es müßte denn sein, daß man von einem unsicheren Wege des Urteils bloß die Meinung hätte, vielleicht auf ihm die Wahrheit zu finden.
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But although, in dealing with the merely speculative questions of pure reason, hypotheses are not available for the purposes of basing propositions upon them, they are yet entirely permissible for the purposes of defending propositions; that is to say, they may not be employed in any dogmatic, but only in polemical fashion. By the defence of propositions I do not mean the addition of fresh grounds for their assertion, but merely the nullifying of the sophistical arguments by which our opponent professes to invalidate this assertion. Now all synthetic propositions of pure reason have this peculiarity, that while in asserting the reality of this or that idea we can never have knowledge sufficient to give certainty to our proposition, our opponent is just as little able to assert the opposite. This equality of fortune [in the ventures] of human reason does not, in speculative modes of knowledge, favour either of the two parties, and it is consequently the fitting battle-ground for their never-ending feuds. But as will be shown, reason has, in respect of its practical employment, the right to postulate what in the field of mere speculation it can have no kind of right to assume without sufficient proof. For while all such assumptions do violence to [the principle of] completeness of speculation, that is a principle with which the practical interest is not at all concerned. In the practical sphere reason has rights of possession, of which it does not require to offer proof, and of which, in fact, it could not supply proof. The burden of proof accordingly rests upon the opponent. But since the latter knows just as little of the object under question, in trying to prove its non-existence, as does the former in maintaining its reality, it is evident that the former, who is asserting something as a practically necessary supposition, is at an advantage (melior est conditio possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, as it were in self-defence, on behalf of his own good cause, the very same weapons that his opponent employs against that cause, that is, hypotheses. These are not intended to strengthen the proof of his position, but only to show that the opposing party has much too little understanding of the matter in dispute to allow of his flattering himself that he has the advantage in respect of speculative insight.

Hypotheses are therefore, in the domain of pure reason, permissible only as weapons of war, and only for the purpose

|| Ob aber gleich bei bloß spekulativen Fragen der reinen Vernunft keine Hypothesen stattfinden, um Sätze darauf zu gründen, so sind sie dennoch ganz zulässig, um sie allenfalls nur zu verteidigen, d. i. zwar nicht im dogmatischen, aber doch im polemischen Gebrauche. Ich verstehe aber unter Verteidigung nicht die Vermehrung der Beweisgründe seiner Behauptung, sondern die bloße Vereitelung der Scheineinsichten des Gegners, welche unserem behaupteten Satz Abbruch tun sollen. Nun haben aber alle synthetische Sätze aus reiner Vernunft das Eigentümliche an sich: daß, wenn der, welcher die Realität gewisser Ideen behauptet, gleich niemals so viel weiß, um diesen seinen Satz gewiß zu machen, auf der andern Seite der Gegner eben so wenig wissen kann, um das Widerspiel zu behaupten. Diese Gleichheit, des Loses der menschlichen Vernunft, begründet nun zwar im spekulativen Erkenntnisse keinen von beiden, und da ist auch der rechte Kampfplatz nimmer beizulegender Fehden. Es wird sich aber in der Folge zeigen, daß doch, in Ansehung des praktischen Gebrauchs, die Vernunft ein Recht habe, etwas anzunehmen, was sie auf keine Weise im Felde der bloßen Spekulation, ohne hinreichende Beweisgründe, voraussatzweise befugt wäre; weil alle solche Voraussetzungen der Vollkommenheit der Spekulation Abbruch tun, um welche sich aber das praktische Interesse gar nicht bekümmert. Dort ist sie also im Besitze, dessen Rechtmaßigkeit sie nicht beweisen darf, und wovon sie in der Tat den Beweis auch nicht führen könnte. Der Ge- gnerr soll also beweisen: Da dieser aber eben so wenig etwas von dem bezweifelten Gegenstande weiß, um dessen Nichtsein darzutun, als er, der die Gegenwartlichkeit behauptet: so zeigt sich hier ein Vorteil auf der Seite desjenigen, der etwas als praktischnotwendige Voraussetzung behauptet (melior est conditio possidentis). Es steht ihm nämlich frei, sich gleichsam aus Notwehr eben derselben Mittel für seine gute Sache, als der Gegner wider dieselbe, d. i. der Hypothesen zu bedienen, die gar nicht dazu dienen sollen, um den Beweis derselben zu verstärken, sondern nur zu zeigen, daß der Gegner viel zu wenig von dem Gegenstande des Streits verstehe, als daß er sich eines Vorteiles der spekulativen Einsicht in Ansehung unserer schmeicheln könne.

Hypothesen sind also im Felde der reinen Vernunft nur als Kriegswaffen erlaubt, nicht um darauf ein Recht zu
of defending a right, not in order to establish it. But the opposing party we must always look for in ourselves. For speculative reason in its transcendental employment is in itself dialectical; the objections which we have to fear lie in ourselves. We must seek them out, just as we would do in the case of claims that, while old, have never become superannuated, in order that by annulling them we may establish a permanent peace. External quiescence is merely specious. The root of these disturbances, which lies deep in the nature of human reason, must be removed. But how can we do so, unless we give it freedom, nay, nourishment, to send out shoots so that it may discover itself to our eyes, and that it may then be entirely destroyed? We must, therefore, bethink ourselves of objections which have never yet occurred to any opponent, and indeed lend him our weapons, and grant him the most favourable position which he could possibly desire. We have nothing to fear in all this, but much to hope for; namely, that we may gain for ourselves a possession which can never again be contested.

Thus for our complete equipment we require among other things the hypotheses of pure reason. For although they are but leaden weapons, since they are not steeled by any law of experience, they are yet as effective as those which our opponents can employ against us. If, therefore, having assumed (in some non-speculative connection) the nature of the soul to be immaterial and not subject to any corporeal change, we are met by the difficulty that nevertheless experience seems to prove that the exaltation and the derangement of our mental powers are alike in being merely diverse modifications of our organs, we can weaken the force of this proof by postulating that our body may be nothing more than a fundamental appearance which in this our present state (in this life) serves as a condition of our whole faculty of sensibility, and therewith of all our thought, and that separation from the body may therefore be regarded as the end of this sensible employment of our faculty of knowledge and the beginning of its intellectual employment. Thus regarded, the body would not be the cause of thought, but merely a restrictive condition of it, and therefore, while indeed furthering the sensible and animal life, it would because of this very fact have to be considered a hind-


Zu eurer vollständigen Rüstung gehören nun auch die Hypothesen der reinen Vernunft, welche, obzwir nur bleierne Waffen (weil sie durch kein Erfahrungsgesetz gestürt sind), dennoch immer so viel vermögen, als die, deren sich irgend ein Gegner wider euch bedienen mag. Wenn euch also, wider die (in irgend einer anderen 'nicht spekulativen Rücksicht) angenommene immaterielle und keiner körperlichen Umwandlung unterworfenene Natur der Seele, die Schwierigkeit aufstößt, daß gleichwohl die Erkenntung so wohl die Erhebung, als Zerrüttung unserer Geisteskraft bloß als verschiedene Modifikation unserer Organen zu be- weisen scheine: so könnt ihr die Kraft dieses Beweises dadurch schwächen, daß ihr angehnet, unser Körper sei nichts, als die Fundamentalerscheinung, worauf, als Bedingung, sich in dem jetzigen Zustande (im Leben) das ganze Vermögen der Sinnlichkeit und hiemit alles Denken bezieht. Die Trennung vom Körper sei das Ende dieses sinnlichen Gebrauchs eurer Erkenntniskraft und der Anfang des intellektuellen. Der Körper wäre also nicht die Ursache des Denkens, sondern eine bloße restringierende Bedingung desselben, mithin zwar als Beförderung des sinnlichen und animatischen, aber desto mehr auch als Hindernis des reinen
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ance to the pure and spiritual life. The dependence of the animal and sensible upon the bodily constitution would then in novis prove the dependence of our entire life upon the state of our organs. We might go yet further, and discover quite new objections, which either have never been suggested or have never been sufficiently developed.

Generation, in man as in non-rational creatures, is dependent upon opportunity, often indeed upon sufficiency of food, upon the moods and caprices of rulers, nay, even upon vice. And this makes it very difficult to suppose that a creature whose life has its first beginning in circumstances so trivial and so entirely dependent upon our own choice, should have an existence that extends to all eternity. As regards the continuance (here on earth) of the species as a whole, this difficulty is negligible, since accident in the individual case is still subject to a general law, but as regards each individual it certainly seems highly questionable to expect so potent an effect from causes so insignificant. But to meet these objections we can propound a transcendental hypothesis, namely, that all life is, strictly speaking, intelligible only, is not subject to changes of time, and neither begins in birth nor ends in death; that this life is an appearance only, that is, a sensible representation of the purely spiritual life, and that the whole sensible world is a mere picture which in our present mode of knowledge hovers before us, and like a dream has in itself no objective reality; that if we could intuit ourselves and things as they are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual beings, our sole and true community with which has not begun through birth and will not cease through bodily death—both birth and death being mere appearances.

Now of all this we have not the least knowledge. We plead it only in hypothetical fashion, to meet the attack; we are not actually asserting it. For it is not even an idea of reason, but is a concept devised merely for the purposes of self-defence. None the less we are here proceeding in entire conformity with reason. Our opponent falsely represents the absence of empirical conditions as itself amounting to proof of the total

and spiritualen Lebens anzusehen, und die Abhängigkeit des ersteren von der körperlichen Beschaffenheit beweise nichts für die Abhängigkeit des ganzen Lebens von dem Zustande unserer Organen. Ihr könnt aber noch weiter gehen, und wohl gar neue, entweder nicht aufgeworifene, oder nicht weit genug getriebene Zweifel ausfindig machen.

Die Zufälligkeit der Zeugungen, die bei Menschen, so wie beim vernunftlosen Geschöpf, von der Gelegenheit, überdem aber auch oft vom Unterhalte, von der Regierung, ihrer Launen und Einfällen, oft so gar vom Laster abhängt, macht eine große Schwierigkeit wider die Meinung der auf Ewigkeiten sich erstreckenden Fortdauer eines Geschöpf's, dessen Leben unter so unerheblichen und unserer Freiheit so ganz und gar überlassenen Umständen zuerst angefangen hat. Was die Fortdauer der ganzen Gattung (hier auf Erden) betrifft, so hat diese Schwierigkeit in Anschau derselben wenig auf sich, weil der Zufall im einzelnen nichts desto weniger einer Regel im ganzen unterworfen ist; aber in Anschau eines jeden Individuum eine so mächtige Wirkung von so geringfügigen Ursachen zu erwarten, scheint allerdings bedenklich. Hieudere könnt ihr aber eine transzendentale Hypothese aufbieten: daß alles Leben eigentlich nur intelligibel sei, den Zeitveränderungen gar nicht unterworfen, und weder durch Geburt angefangen habe, noch durch den Tod beendet werde. Dafs dieses Leben nichts als eine bloße Erscheinung, d. i. eine sinnliche Vorstellung von dem reinen geistigen Leben, und die ganze Sinnenwelt ein bloßes Bild ist, welches unserer jetzigen Erkenntnisart verschwebe, und, wie ein Traum, an sich keine objektive Realität habe; daβ, wenn wir die Sachen und uns selbst anschauen sollen, wie sie sind, wir uns in der Welt geistiger Naturen sehen würden, mit welcher unsere einzig wahre Gemeinschaft weder durch Geburt angefangen habe, noch durch den Leibestod (als bloße Erscheinungen) aufhören werde u. s. w.

Ob wir nun gleich von allem diesem, was wir hier wider den Angriff hypothetisch vorschützen, nicht das mindeste wissen, noch im Ernst behaupten, sondern alles nicht einmal Vernunftidee, sondern bloß zur Gegenwehr ausge- dachter Begriff ist, so verfahren wir doch hiebei ganz vernunftmäßig, indem wir dem Gegner, welcher alle Möglichkeit erschöpf't zu haben meint, indem er den Mangel ihrer empirischen Bedingungen für einen Beweis der gänzlichen
impossibility of our belief, and is therefore proceeding on
the assumption that he has exhausted all the possibilities.
What we are doing is merely to show that it is just as little
possible for him to comprehend the whole field of possible
things through mere laws of experience as it is for us to reach,
outside experience, any conclusions justifiable for our reason.
Anyone who employs such hypothetical means of defence
against the rash and presumptuous negations of his opponent
must not be considered to intend the adoption of these opinions
as his own; he abandons them, as soon as he has disposed of
the dogmatic pretensions of his opponent. For though
a merely negative attitude to the assertions of others may
seem very modest and moderate, to proceed to represent
the objections to an assertion as proofs of the counter-assertion
is to make claims no less presumptuous and visionary
than if the positive position and its affirmations had been adopted.

It is evident, therefore, that in the speculative employment
of reason hypotheses, regarded as opinions, have no validity
in themselves, but only relatively to the transcendent pre-
tensions of the opposite party. For to make principles of pos-
sible experience conditions of the possibility of things in general
is just as transcendent a procedure as to assert the objective
reality of [transcendent] concepts, the objects of which can-
not be found anywhere save outside the limits of all possible
experience. What pure reason judges assertorically, must
(like everything that reason knows) be necessary; otherwise
nothing at all is asserted Accordingly, pure reason does
not, in point of fact, contain any opinions whatsoever.
The hypotheses, above referred to, are merely problematical
judgments, which at least cannot be refuted, although they do
not indeed allow of any proof. They are therefore nothing
but 1 private opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot properly dis-
 pense with them as weapons against the misgivings which
are apt to occur; they are necessary even to secure our inner
tranquillity. We must preserve to them this character, care-
fully guarding against the assumption of their independent
authority or absolute validity, since otherwise they would
drown reason in fictions and delusions.

1 [Reading, with Hartenstein, reine for keine.]
THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN REGARD TO ITS PROOFS

What distinguishes the proofs of transcendental synthetic propositions from all other proofs which yield an a priori synthetic knowledge is that, in the case of the former, reason may not apply itself, by means of its concepts, directly to the object, but must first establish the objective validity of the concepts and the possibility of their a priori synthesis. This rule is not made necessary merely by considerations of prudence, but is essential to the very possibility of the proofs themselves. If I am to pass a priori beyond the concept of an object, I can do so only with the help of some special guidance, supplied from outside this concept. In mathematics it is a priori intuition which guides my synthesis; and thereby all our conclusions can be drawn immediately from pure intuition. In transcendental knowledge, so long as we are concerned only with concepts of the understanding, our guide is the possibility of experience. Such proof does not show that the given concept (for instance, of that which happens) leads directly to another concept (that of a cause); for such a transition would be a saltus which could not be justified. The proof proceeds by showing that experience itself, and therefore the object of experience, would be impossible without a connection of this kind. Accordingly, the proof must also at the same time show the possibility of arriving synthetically and a priori at some knowledge of things which was not contained in the concepts of them. Unless this requirement be met, the proofs, like streams which break their banks, run wildly at random, whithersoever the current of hidden association may chance to lead them. The semblance of conviction which rests upon subjective causes of association, and which is regarded as insight into a natural affinity, cannot balance the misgivings to which so hazardous a course must rightly give rise. On this account, all attempts to prove the principle of sufficient reason have, by the universal ad-

Wie unterscheidet die Beweise der transcendentalen synthetischen Sätze von allen anderen Beweisen, die einen a priori synthetischen Erkenntnis geliefert, dass, in dem Fall des letzteren, die Vernunft nicht selbst, durch die Verwendung ihrer Begriffe, direkt auf den Gegenstand zutreten kann, sondern dass erstens die Möglichkeit der Begriffe und zweitens die Synthese der Begriffe a priori geben muss. Dieser Regel ist es nicht aus reiner Prämisse gefolgt, aber es ist notwendig für die Möglichkeit der Beweise. In der Mathematik ist es die a priori Intuition, die die Synthese leitet, und daraus können alle Schlüsse unmittelbar geführt werden. Im transcendentalen Erkenntnis, so lange es bloß mit Begriffen des Verstandes zu tun hat, ist diese Richtschnur die mögliche Erfahrung. Der Beweis zeigt nämlich nicht, dass der gegebene Begriff (z.B. von dem, was geschieht) geradewegs auf einen anderen Begriff (den einer Ursache) führe; denn dergleichen Übergang wäre ein Sprung, der sich gar nicht verantworten ließe; sondern er zeigt, dass die Erfahrung selbst, mithin das Objekt der Erfahrung, ohne eine solche Verknüpfung unmöglich wäre. Also müste der Beweis zugleich die Möglichkeit anzeigen, synthetisch und a priori zu einer gewissen Erkenntnis von Dingen zu gelangen, die in den Begriffen von ihnen nicht enthalten war. Ohne diese Aufmerksamkeit laufen die Beweise wie Wasser, welche ihre Ufer durchbrechen, wild und querfeld ein, dahin, wo der Hang der verborgenen Assoziation sie zufälliger Weise herleitet. Der Schein der Überzeugung, welcher auf subjektiven Ursachen der Assoziation beruht, und für die Einsicht einer natürlichen Affinität gehalten wird, kann der Bedenklichkeit gar nicht die Waage halten, die sich billiger maßen über dergleichen gewagte Schritte finden müsste. Daher sind auch alle Versuche, den Satz des zureichenden Grundes zu beweisen,
mission of those concerned, been fruitless; and prior to our
own transcendental criticism it was considered better, since
that principle could not be surrendered, boldly to appeal to
the common sense of mankind—an expedient which always
is a sign that the cause of reason is in desperate straits—
rather than to attempt new dogmatic proofs.

But if the proposition to be proved is an assertion of pure
reason, and if I am therefore proposing to pass beyond my em-
pirical concepts by means of mere ideas, justification of such a
step in synthesis (supposing it to be possible) is all the more
necessary as a precondition of any attempt to prove the propo-
sition itself. However plausible the alleged proof of the simple
nature of our thinking substance, derived from the unity of
apprehension, may be, it is faced by the unavoidable difficul-
ty, that since the [notion of] absolute simplicity is not a concept
which can be immediately related to a perception, but, as an
idea, would have to be inferred, there can be no understanding
how the bare consciousness (which is, or at least can be,
contained in all thought), though it is indeed so far a simple
representation, should conduct us to the consciousness and the
knowledge of a thing in which thought alone can be contained.

If I represent to myself the power of a body in motion, it is
so far for me absolute unity, and my representation of it is
simple; and I can therefore express this representation by the
motion of a point—for the volume of the body is not here a
relevant consideration, and can be thought, without diminu-
tion of the moving power, as small as we please, and therefore even
as existing in a point. But I may not therefore conclude that
if nothing be given to me but the moving power of a body, the
body can be thought as simple substance—merely because its
representation abstracts from the magnitude of its volume
and is consequently simple. The simple arrived at by abstrac-
tion is entirely different from the simple as an object; though
the 'I', taken in abstraction, can contain in itself no manifold,
in its other meaning, as signifying the soul itself, it can be a
highly complex concept, as containing under itself, and as
denoting, what is very composite. I thus detect in these
arguments a paralogism. But in order to be armed against this

1 [Reading, with Hartenstein, eines for mein,es.]
2 [sehr vielen.]
paralogism (for without some forewarning we should not entertain any suspicion in regard to the proof), it is indispensably necessary to have constantly at hand a criterion of the possibility of those synthetic propositions which are intended to prove more than experience yields. This criterion consists in the requirement that proof should not proceed directly to the desired predicate but only by means of a principle that will demonstrate the possibility of extending our given concept in an a priori manner to ideas, and of realising the latter. If this precaution be always observed, if before attempting any proof, we discreetly take thought as to how, and with what ground for hope, we may expect such an extension through pure reason, and whence, in such a case, this insight, which is not developed from concepts, and also cannot be anticipated in reference to any possible experience, is yet to be derived, we can by so doing spare ourselves much difficult and yet fruitless labour, not expecting from reason what obviously exceeds its power—or rather, since reason, when obsessed by passionate desire for the speculative enlargement of its domain, is not easily to be restrained, by subjecting it to the discipline of self-control.

The first rule is, therefore, not to attempt any transcendental proofs until we have considered, with a view to obtaining justification for them, from what source we propose to derive the principles on which the proofs are to be based, and with what right we may expect success in our inferences. If they are principles of the understanding (for instance, that of causality), it is useless to attempt, by means of them, to attain to ideas of pure reason; such principles are valid only for objects of possible experience. If they are principles of pure reason, it is again labour lost. Reason has indeed principles of its own; but regarded as objective principles, they are one and all dialectical, and can have no validity save as regulative principles for its employment in experience, with a view to making experience systematically coherent. But if such professed proofs are propounded, we must meet their deceptive power of persuasion with the non liquet of our matured judgment; and although we may not be able to detect the illusion involved, we are yet entirely within our rights in demanding a deduction of the principles employed in them;

Allein, um diesen vorher zu ahnden (denn ohne eine solche vorläufige Vermutung würde man gar keinen Verdacht gegen den Beweis fassen), ist durchaus nötig, ein immerwährendes Kriterium der Möglichkeit solcher synthetischen Sätze, die mehr beweisen sollen, als Erfahrung geben kann, bei Hand zu haben, welches darin besteht: daß der Beweis nicht geradezu auf das verlangte Prädikat, sondern nur vermittelst eines Prinzips der Möglichkeit, unseren gegebenen Begriff a priori bis zu Ideen zu erweitern, und diese zu realisieren, geführt werde. Wenn diese Behutsamkeit immer geübt wird, wenn man, ehe der Beweis noch versucht wird, zuvor weislich bei sich zu Rate geht, wie und mit welchem Grade der Hoffnung man wohl eine solche Erweiterung durch eine Vernunft erwarten könne, und woher man, in dergleichen Falle, diese Einsicht, die nicht aus Begriffen entwickelt, und auch nicht in Beziehung auf mögliche Erfahrung antizipiert werden können, denn hernennen wolle: so kann man sich viel schwere und dennoch fruchtlose Bemühungen ersparen, indem man der Vernunft nichts zumuten, was offenbar über ihr Vermögen geht, oder vielmehr die, die bei Anwendung ihrer spekulativen Erweiterungssucht, sich nicht gerne einschränken läßt, der Disziplin der Enthaltsamkeit unterwirft.

Die erste Regel ist also diese: keine transzendentalen Beweise zu versuchen, ohne zuvor überlegt und sich desfalls gerechtfertigt zu haben, woher man die Grundsätze nehmen wolle; auf welche man sie zu errichten gedenkt, und mit welchem Rechte man von ihnen den guten Erfolg der Schlüsse erwarten könne. Sind es Grundsätze des Verstandes (z. B. der Kausalität), so ist es umsonst, vermittelt ihrer zu Ideen der reinen Vernunft zu gelangen; denn jene gelten nur für Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung. Sollten es Grundsätze aus der reinen Vernunft sein, so ist wiederum alle Mühe umsonst. Denn die Vernunft hat deren zwar, aber als objective Grundsätze sind sie insgesamt dialektisch, und können allenfalls nur wie regulative Prinzipien des systematisch zusammenhängenden Erfahrungsgebräuchs gültig sein. Sind aber dergleichen angebliche Beweise schon vorhanden: so setzet der trägtigen Überzeugung das non liquet eurer gereiften Urteilskraft entgegen, und, ob ihr gleich das Blendwerk derselben noch nicht durchdringen könnt, so habt ihr doch völlig Recht, die Deduktion der darin gebrauchten Grundsätze zu verlangen, welche, wenn sie aus
and if these principles have their source in reason alone, the demand is one which can never be met. And there is thus no need for us to concern ourselves with the particular nature and with the refutation of each and every groundless illusion; at the tribunal of a critical reason, which insists upon laws, this entire dialectic, so inexhaustible in its artifices, can be disposed of in bulk.

The second peculiarity of transcendental proofs is that only one proof can be found for each transcendental proposition. If I am inferring not from concepts but from the intuition which corresponds to a concept, it is a pure intuition as in mathematics, or an empirical intuition as in natural science, the intuition which serves as the basis of the inference supplies me with manifold material for synthetic propositions, material which I can connect in more than one way, so that, as it is permissible for me to start from more than one point, I can arrive at the same proposition by different paths.

In the case of transcendental propositions, however, we start always from one concept only, and assert the synthetic condition of the possibility of the object in accordance with this concept. Since outside this concept there is nothing further through which the object could be determined, there can therefore be only one ground of proof. The proof can contain nothing more than the determination of an object in general in accordance with this one single concept. In the Transcendental Analytic, for instance, we derived the principle that everything which happens has a cause, from the condition under which alone a concept of happening in general is objectively possible—namely, by showing that the determination of an event in time, and therefore the event as belonging to experience, would be impossible save as standing under such a dynamical rule. This is the sole possible ground of proof; for the event, in being represented, has objective validity, that is, truth, only in so far as an object is determined for the concept by means of the law of causality. Other proofs of this principle have, indeed, been attempted, for instance, from the contingency [of that which happens]. But on examining this argument, we can discover no mark of contingency save only the happening, that is, the existence of the object preceded by its non-existence, and thus are brought back to the same

1 A: swie.
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ground of proof as before. Similarly, if the proposition, that everything which thinks is simple, is to be proved, we leave out of account the manifold of thought, and hold only to the concept of the 'I', which is simple and to which all thought is related. The same is true of the transcendental proof of the existence of God; it is based solely on the coincidence of the concepts of the most real being and of necessary being, and is not to be looked for anywhere else.

This caution reduces the criticism of the assertions of reason to very small compass. When reason is conducting its business through concepts only, there is but one possible proof, if, that is to say, there be any possible proof at all. If, therefore, we observe the dogmatist coming forward with ten proofs, we can be quite sure that he really has none. For had he one that yielded—as must always be required in matters of pure reason—apodictic proof, what need would he have of the others? His purpose can only be that of the parliamentary advocate, who intends his various arguments for different groups, in order to take advantage of the weakness of those before whom he is pleading—hearers who, without entering deeply into the matter, desire to be soon quit of it, and therefore seize upon whatever may first happen to attract their attention, and decide accordingly.

The third rule peculiar to pure reason, in so far as it is to be subjected to a discipline in respect of transcendental proofs, is that its proofs must never be apagogical, but always ostensive. The direct or ostensive proof, in every kind of knowledge, is that which combines with the conviction of its truth insight into the sources of its truth; the apagogical proof, on the other hand, while it can indeed yield certainty, cannot enable us to comprehend truth in its connection with the grounds of its possibility. The latter is therefore to be regarded rather as a last resort than as a mode of procedure which satisfies all the requirements of reason. In respect of convincing power, it has, however, this advantage over the direct proofs, that contradiction always carries with it more clearness of representation than the best connection, and so approximates to the intuitive certainty of a demonstration.

The real reason why apagogical proofs are employed in

\[\text{[Reziprokabilitäten]}\]

Beweisgrund zurück. Wenn der Satz bewiesen werden soll: alles, was denkt, ist einfach: so hält man sich nicht bei dem Mannigfaltigen des Denkens auf, sondern beharret bloß bei dem Begriffe des Ich, welcher einfach ist und worauf alles Denken bezogen wird. Eben so ist es mit dem transzendentalen Beweise vom Dasein Gottes bewandt, welcher lediglich auf der Reziprokabilität der Begriffe vom realsten und notwendigen Wesen beruht, und nirgend anders gesucht werden kann.

Durch diese warnende Anmerkung wird die Kritik der Vernunft behauptungen sehr ins Klare gebracht. Wo Vernunft ihr Geschäft durch bloße Begriffe treibt, da ist nur ein einziger Beweis möglich, wenn überall nur irgend einer möglich ist. Daher, wenn man schon den Dogmatiker mit zehn Beweisen auftreten sieht, da kann man sicher glauben, daß er gar keinen habe. Denn, hätte er einen, der (wie es in Sachen der reinen Vernunft sein muß) apodiktisch bewiese, wozu bedürfte er der übrigen? Seine Absicht ist nur, wie die von jenem Parlamentsadvokaten: das eine Argument ist für diesen, das andere für jenen, nämlich, um sich die Schwäche seines Richters zu Nutze zu machen, die, ohne sich tief einzulassen, und, um von dem Geschäft bald loszukommen, das Erstebeste, was ihnen eben auffällt, ergreifen und darnach entscheiden.

Die dritte eigentümliche Regeln der reinen Vernunft, wenn sie in Ansehung transzendentaler Beweise einer Disziplin unterworfen wird, ist: daß ihre Beweise niemals apagogisch, sondern jederzeit ostensiv sein müssen. Der direkte oder ostensive Beweis ist in aller Art der Erkenntnis derjenige, welcher, mit der Überzeugung von der Wahrheit, zugleich Einsicht in die Quellen derselben verbindet; der apagogische dagegen kann zwar Gewißheit, aber nicht Begreiflichkeit der Wahrheit in Ansehung des Zusammenhanges mit den Gründen ihrer Möglichkeit hervorbringen.

Daher sind die letzten mehr eine Notnütze, als ein Verfahren, welches allen Absichten der Vernunft ein Genüge tut. Doch haben diese einen Vorzug der Evidenz vor den direkten Beweisen, darin: daß der Widerspruch allemal mehr Klarheit in der Vorstellung bei sich führt, als die beste Verknüpfung, und sich dadurch dem Anschaulichen einer Demonstration mehr nähert.

Die eigentliche Ursache des Gebrauchs apagogischer
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various sciences would seem to be this. When the grounds from which this or that knowledge has to be derived are too numerous or too deeply concealed, we try whether we may not arrive at the knowledge in question through its consequences. Now this modus ponens, that is, the inference to the truth of an assertion from the truth of its consequences, is only permissible when all its possible consequences are [known to be] true; for in that case there is only one possible ground for this being so, and that ground must also be true. But this procedure is impracticable; to discover all possible consequences of any given proposition exceeds our powers. None the less this mode of reasoning is resorted to, although indeed with a certain special modification, when we endeavour to prove something merely as an hypothesis. The modification made is that we admit the conclusion as holding according to analogy, namely, on the ground that if all the many consequences examined by us agree with an assumed ground, all other possible consequences will also agree with it. But from the nature of the argument, it is obvious that an hypothesis can never, on such evidence, be transformed into demonstrated truth. The modus tollens of reasoning, which proceeds from consequences to their grounds, is not only a quite rigorous but also an extremely easy mode of proof. For if even a single false consequence can be drawn from a proposition, the proposition is itself false. Instead, then, as in an ostensive proof, of reviewing the whole series of grounds that can lead us to the truth of a proposition, by means of a complete insight into its possibility, we require only to show that a single one of the consequences resulting from its opposite is false, in order to prove that this opposite is itself false, and that the proposition which we had to prove is therefore true.

The apagogic method of proof is, however, permissible only in those sciences where it is impossible mistakenly to substitute what is subjective in our representations for what is objective, that is, for the knowledge of that which is in the object. Where such substitution tends to occur, it must often happen that the opposite of a given proposition contradicts only the subjective conditions of thought, and not the object, or that the two propositions contradict each other only under a subjective condition which is falsely treated as being object-

Beweise in verschiedenen Wissenschaften ist wohl diese. Wenn die Gründe, von denen eine gewisse Erkenntnis abgeleitet werden soll, zu mannigfaltig oder zu tief verborgen liegen: so versucht man, ob sie nicht durch die Folgen zu erreichen sei. Nun wäre der modus ponens, auf die Wahrheit einer Erkenntnis aus der Wahrheit ihrer Folgen zu schließen, nur alsdenn, wenn alle mögliche Folgen daraus wahr sind; denn alsdenn ist zu diesem nur ein einziger Grund möglich, der also auch der wahre ist. Dieses Verfahren aber ist untunlich, weil es über unsere Kräfte geht, alle mögliche Folgen von irgend einem angenommenen Satz zu sehen; doch bedient man sich dieser Art zu schließen, obzwar freilich mit einer gewissen Nachsicht, wenn es darum zu tun ist, um etwas bloß als Hypothese zu beweisen, indem man den Schluß nach der Analogie einräumt: daß, wenn so viele Folgen, als man nur immer versucht hat, mit einem angenommenen Grunde wohl zusammenstimmen, alle übrige mögliche auch darauf einstimmen werden. Um deswillen kann durch diesen Weg niemals eine Hypothese in demonstrierte Wahrheit verwandelt werden. Der modus tollens der Vernunftschlüsse, die von den Folgen auf die Gründe schließen, beweiset nicht allein ganz streng, sondern auch überaus leicht. Denn, wenn auch nur eine einzige falsche Folge aus einem Satze gezogen werden kann, so ist dieser Satz falsch. Anstatt nun die ganze Reihe der Gründe in einem ostensiven Beweise durchzulaufen, die auf die Wahrheit einer Erkenntnis, vermittelt der vollständigen Einsicht in ihre Möglichkeit, führen kann, darf man nur unter den aus dem Gegenteil derselben fließenden Folgen eine einzige falsch finden, so ist dieses Gegenteil auch falsch, mit hin die Erkenntnis, welche man zu beweisen hatte, wahr.

Die apagogische Beweisart kann aber nur in denen Wissenschaften erlaubt sein, wo es unmöglich ist, das Subjektive unserer Vorstellungen dem Objektiven, nämlich der Erkenntnis desjener, was am Gegenstande ist, unterscheiden. Wo dieses letztere aber herrscht, ist, da muß es sich häufig zutragen, daß das Gegenteil eines gewissen Satzes entweder bloß den subjektiven Bedingungen des Denkens widerspricht, aber nicht dem Gegenstande, oder daß beide Sätze nur unter einer subjektiven Bedingung, die fälschlich für objektiv gehalten, einander widersprechen,
ive; the condition being false, both can be false, without it being possible to infer from the falsity of the one to the truth of the other.

In mathematics this subreption is impossible; and it is there, therefore, that apagogical proofs have their true place. In natural science, where all our knowledge is based upon empirical intuitions, the subreption can generally be guarded against through repeated comparison of observations; but in this field this mode of proof is for the most part of little importance. The transcendental enterprises of pure reason, however, are one and all carried on within the domain proper to dialectical illusion, that is, within the domain of the subjective, which in its premisses presents itself to reason, nay, forces itself upon reason, as being objective. In this field, therefore, it can never be permissible, so far as synthetic propositions are concerned, to justify assertions by disproving their opposite. For either this refutation is nothing but the mere representation of the conflict of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions under which alone anything can be conceived by our reason, which does not at the least contribute to the disproof of the thing itself—just as, for instance, we must recognise that while the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being is altogether inconceivable to us, and that every speculative proof of a necessary supreme being is therefore rightly to be opposed on subjective grounds, we have yet no right to deny the possibility of such a primordial being in itself—or else both parties, those who adopt the affirmative no less than those who adopt the negative position, have been deceived by transcendental illusion, and base their assertions upon an impossible concept of the object. In that case we can apply the rule: non entis nulla sunt praeclara; that is, all that is asserted of the object, whether affirmatively or negatively, is erroneous, and consequently we cannot arrive apagogically at a knowledge of the truth through refutation of the opposite. If, for instance, it be assumed that the sensible world is given in itself in its totality, it is false that it must be either infinite in space or finite and limited. Both contentions are false. For appearances (as mere representations) which yet are to be given in themselves (as objects) are something impossible; and though the infinitude of this imaginary whole would

und, da die Bedingung falsch ist, alle beide falsch sein kön-
nen, ohne daß von der Falsheit des einen auf die Wahrheit
des andern geschlossen werden kann.

In der Mathematik ist diese Subreption unmöglich; da-
hier haben sie daselbst auch ihren eigenen Platz. In der
Naturwissenschaft, weil sich daselbst alles auf empirische
Anschauungen gründet, kann jene Erschöpfung durch viel
vernünftige Beobachtungen zwar mehrerein verhüttet wer-
den; aber diese Beweisart ist daselbst doch mehrerein un-
erheblich. Aber die transzendentalen Versuche der reinen
Vernunft werden insgesamt innerhalb des eigentlichen
Medium des dialektischen Scheins angestellt, d. i. des Sub-
jectiven, welches sich der Vernunft in ihren Prämissen als
objektiv anbietet, oder gar aufdringt. Hier nun kann es,
was synthetische Sätze betrifft, gar nicht erlaubt werden,
seine Behauptungen dadurch zu rechtfertigen, daß man das
Gegenteil widerlegt. Denn, entweder diese Widerlegung ist
nichts andres, als die bloße Vorstellung des Widerstreits der
tes, der Möglichkeit eines solchen Urwesens aber an sich selbst
mit Unrecht widersetzt), oder beide, sowohl der behau-
tende, als der verneinende Teil, legen, durch den transzen-
dentalen Schein betrogen, einen unmöglichen Begriff vom
Gegenstande zum Grunde, und || da gilt die Regel: non
entis nulla sunt praedicata, d. i. sowohl was man bejahend,
as was man verneinend von dem Gegenstande behauptete,
ist beides unrichtig, und man kann nicht apagogisch durch
die Widerlegung des Gegenteils zur Erkenntnis der Wahr
heit gelangen. So zum¹ Beispiel, wenn vorausgesetzt wird,
 daß die Sinnenwelt an sich selbst ihrer Totalität nach
geben sei, so ist es falsch, daß sie entweder unendlich
dem Räume nach, oder endlich und begrenzt sein müsse,
darum, weil beides falsch ist. Denn Erscheinungen (als bloße
Vorstellungen), die doch an sich selbst (als Objekte) ge
geben wären, sind etwas Unmögliches, und die Unendlich
keit dieses eingebildeten Ganzen würde zwar unbedingt

¹ A: So wie zum.
Indeed, be unconditioned, it would contradict (since everything in appearances is conditioned) the unconditioned determination of magnitude, [that is, of totality], which is presupposed in the concept.

The apagogic method of proof is the real deluding influence by which those who reason dogmatically have always held their admirers. It may be compared to a champion who seeks to uphold the honour and incontestable rights of his adopted party by offering battle to all who would question them. Such boasting proves nothing, however, in regard to the merits of the issue but only in regard to the respective strength of the combatants, and this indeed only in respect of those who take the offensive. The spectators, observing that each party is alternately conqueror and conquered, are often led to have sceptical doubts in regard to the very object of the dispute. They are not, however, justified in adopting such an attitude; it is sufficient to declare to the combatants: non densoribus istis tempus eget. Everyone must defend his position directly, by a legitimate proof that carries with it a transcendental deduction of the grounds upon which it is itself made to rest. Only when this has been done, are we in a position to decide how far its claims allow of rational justification. If an opponent relies on subjective grounds, it is an easy matter to refute him. The dogmatist cannot, however, profit by this advantage. His own judgments are, as a rule, no less dependent upon subjective influences; and he can himself in turn be similarly cornered by his opponent. But if both parties proceed by the direct method, either they will soon discover the difficulty, nay, the impossibility, of showing ground for their assertions, and will be left with no resort save to appeal to some form of prescriptive authority; or our criticism will easily discover the illusion to which their dogmatic procedure is due, compelling pure reason to relinquish its exaggerated pretensions in the realm of speculation, and to withdraw within the limits of its proper territory—that of practical principles.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD

CHAPTER II

THE CANON OF PURE REASON

It is humiliating to human reason that it achieves nothing in its pure employment, and indeed stands in need of a discipline to check its extravagances, and to guard it against the deceptions which arise therefrom. But, on the other hand, reason is reassured and gains self-confidence, on finding that it itself can and must apply this discipline, and that it is not called upon to submit to any outside censorship; and, moreover, that the limits which it is compelled to set to its speculative employment likewise limit the pseudo-rational pretensions of all its opponents, and that it can secure against all attacks whatever may remain over from its former exaggerated claims. The greatest and perhaps the sole use of all philosophy of pure reason is therefore only negative; since it serves not as an organon for the extension but as a discipline for the limitation of pure reason, and, instead of discovering truth, has only the modest merit of guarding against error.

There must, however, be some source of positive modes of knowledge which belong to the domain of pure reason, and which, it may be, give occasion to error solely owing to misunderstanding, while yet in actual fact they form the goal towards which reason is directing its efforts. How else can we account for our inextinguishable desire to find firm footing somewhere beyond the limits of experience? Reason has a presentiment of objects which possess a great interest for it. But when it follows the path of pure speculation, in order to approach them, they fly before it. Presumably it may look for better fortune in the only other path which still remains open to it, that of its practical employment.

|| DER TRANSCENDENTALEN METHODENLEHRE

ZWEITES HAUPTSTÜCK

DER KANON DER REINEN VERNUNFT

Es ist demütigend für die menschliche Vernunft, daß sie in ihrem reinen Gebrauche nichts ausrichtet, und sogar noch einer Disziplin bedarf, um ihre Ausschweifungen zu bändigen, und die Blendwerke, die ihr daher kommen, zu verhüten. Allein andererseits erhebt es sie wiederum und gibt ihr ein Zutrauen zu sich selbst, daß sie diese Disziplin selbst ausüben kann und muß, ohne eine andere Zensur über sich zu gestatten, imgleichen daß die Grenzen, die sie ihrem spekulativen Gebrauche zu setzen genötigt ist, zugleich die vermunftlichen Annahmen jedes Gegners einschränken, und mithin alles, was ihr noch von ihren vorher übertriebenen Forderungen übrig bleiben möchte, gegen alle Angriffe sicher stellen könne. Der größte und vielleicht einzige Nutzen aller Philosophie der reinen Vernunft ist also wohl nur negativ; da sie nämlich nicht, als Organon, zur Erweiterung, sondern, als Disziplin, zur Grenzbestimmung dient, und, anstatt Wahrheit zu entdecken, nur das stille Verdienst hat, Irrtümer zu verhüten.

Indessen muß es doch irgendwo einen Quell von positiven Erkenntnissen geben, welche ins Gebiete der reinen Vernunft gehören, und die vielleicht nur durch Mißverständnisse von Irrtümern Anlaß geben, in der Tat aber das Ziel der Beseitigung der Vernunft ausmachen. Denn welcher Ursache sollte sonst wohl die nicht zu dämpfende Begierde, durchaus über die Grenze der Erfahrung hinaus irgendwo festen Fuß zu fassen, zuzuschreiben sein? Sie ahnet Gegenstände, die ein größtes Interesse für sie bei sich führen. Sie tritt den Weg der bloßen Spekulation an, um sich ihnen zu nähern; aber diese fliehen vor sie. Vermutlich wird auf dem einzigen Wege, der ihr noch übrig ist, nämlich dem des praktischen Gebrauchs, besseres Glück für sie zu hoffen sein.

1 Akad.-Ausg.: sührs.
I understand by a canon the sum-total of the *a priori* principles of the correct employment of certain faculties of knowledge. Thus general logic, in its analytic portion, is a canon for understanding and reason in general; but only in regard to their form; it abstracts from all content. The transcendental analytic has similarly been shown to be the canon of the pure understanding; for understanding alone is capable of true synthetic modes of knowledge *a priori*. But when no correct employment of a faculty of knowledge is possible there is no canon. Now all synthetic knowledge through pure *reason* in its speculative employment is, as has been shown by the proofs given, completely impossible. There is therefore no canon of its speculative employment; such employment is entirely dialectical. All transcendental logic is, in this respect, simply a discipline. Consequently, if there be any correct employment of pure *reason*, in which case there must be a canon of its employment, the canon will deal not with the speculative but with the *practical employment of reason*. This practical employment of reason we shall now proceed to investigate.

THE CANON OF PURE REASON

Section I

THE ULTIMATE END OF THE PURE EMPLOYMENT OF OUR REASON

Reason is impelled by a tendency of its nature to go out beyond the field of its empirical employment, and to venture in a pure employment, by means of ideas alone, to the utmost limits of all knowledge, and not to be satisfied save through the completion of its course in [the apprehension of] a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is this endeavour the outcome merely of the speculative interests of reason? Must we not rather regard it as having its source exclusively in the practical interests of reason?

I shall, for the moment, leave aside all question as to the success which attends pure reason in its speculative exercise, and enquire only as to the problems the solution of which
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constitutes its ultimate aim, whether reached or not, and in respect of which all other aims are to be regarded only as means. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason, have a certain unity, in order that they may, as thus unified, further that interest of humanity which is subordinate to no higher interest.

The ultimate aim to which the speculation of reason in its transcendental employment is directed concerns three objects: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. In respect of all three the merely speculative interest of reason is very small; and for its sake alone we should hardly have undertaken the labour of transcendental investigation—a labour so fatiguing in its endless wrestling with insuperable difficulties—since whatever discoveries might be made in regard to these matters, we should not be able to make use of them in any helpful manner in concreto, that is, in the study of nature. If the will be free, this can have a bearing only on the intelligible cause of our volition. For as regards the phenomena of its outward expressions, that is, of our actions, we must account for them—in accordance with a maxim which is inviolable, and which is so fundamental that without it we should not be able to employ reason in any empirical manner whatsoever—in the same manner as all other appearances of nature, namely, in conformity with unchangeable laws. If, again, we should be able to obtain insight into the spiritual nature of the soul, and therewith of its immortality; we could make no use of such insight in explaining either the appearances of this present life or the specific nature of a future state. For our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative, and does not in the least extend our knowledge, yielding no sufficient material for inferences, save only: such as are merely fictitious and cannot be sanctioned by philosophy. If, thirdly, the existence of a supreme intelligence be proved, by its means we might indeed render what is purposive in the constitution and ordering of the world comprehensible in a general sort of way, but we should not be in the least warranted in deriving from it any particular arrangement or disposition, or in boldly inferring any such, where it is not perceived. For it is a necessary rule of the speculative employment of reason, not to pass over natural causes, and, abandoning
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that in regard to which we can be instructed by experience, to
deduce something which we know from something which enti-
tirely transcends all our [possible] knowledge. In short, these
tree propositions are for speculative reason always trans-
cendent, and allow of no immanent employment—that is,
employment in reference to objects of experience, and so in
some manner really of service to us—but are in themselves,
notwithstanding the very heavy labours which they impose
upon our reason, entirely useless.

If, then, these three cardinal propositions are not in any
way necessary for knowledge, and are yet strongly recom-
mended by our reason, their importance, properly regarded,
must concern only the practical.

By 'the practical' I mean everything that is possible
through freedom. When, however, the conditions of the exer-
cise of our free will are empirical, reason can have no other
than a regulative employment in regard to it, and can serve
only to effect unity in its empirical laws. Thus, for instance,
in the precepts of prudence, the whole business of reason
consists in uniting all the ends which are prescribed to us by
our desires in the one single end, happiness, and in co-
ordinating the means for attaining it. In this field, therefore,
reason can supply none but pragmatical laws of free action,
for the attainment of those ends which are commended to us by
the senses; it cannot yield us laws that are pure and deter-
mined completely a priori. Laws of this latter type, pure prac-
tical laws, whose end is given through reason completely a
priori, and which are prescribed to us not in an empirically
conditioned but in an absolute manner, would be products of
pure reason. Such are the moral laws; and these alone, there-
fore, belong to the practical employment of reason, and allow
of a canon.

The whole equipment of reason, in the discipline which
may be entitled pure philosophy, is in fact determined with
a view to the three above-mentioned problems. These, how-
ever, themselves in turn refer us yet further, namely, to the
problem what we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is
a God and a future world. As this concerns our attitude to
the supreme end, it is evident that the ultimate intention
of nature in her wise provision for us has indeed, in the

VON DEM LETZTEN ZWECKE

uns durch Erfahrung belehren können, aufzugeben, um et-
was, was wir kennen, von demjenigen abzuleiten, was alle
unsere Kenntnis gänzlich übersteigt. Mit einem Worte, diese
drei Sätze bleiben für die spekulative Vernunft jederzeit
transzendent, und haben gar keinen immanenten, d. i. für
Gegenstände der Erfahrung zulässigen, mithin für uns auf
einige Art nützlichen Gebrauch, sondern sind an sich be-
trachtet ganz müßige und dabei noch äußerst schwere An-
strengungen unserer Vernunft.

Wenn demnach diese drei Kardinalsätze uns zum Wissen
gar nicht nötig sind, und uns gleichwohl durch unsere Ver-
nunft dringend empfohlen werden: so wird ihre Wichtig-
heit wohl eigentlich nur das Praktische angehen müssen.

Praktisch ist alles, was durch Freiheit möglich ist. Wenn
die Bedingungen der Ausübung unserer freien Willkür aber
empirisch sind, so kann die Vernunft dabei keinen anderen
als regulativen Gebrauch haben, und nur die Einheit empiri-
ischer Gesetze zu bewirken dienen, wie z. B. in der Lehre
von der Klarheit die Vereinigung aller Zwecke, die uns von
unseren Neigungen aufgegeben sind, in den einigen, die
Glückseligkeit, und die Zusammenstimmung der Mittel,
und das ganze Geschehen der Vernunft ausmacht, die um deswillen keine andere als prakti-
ische Gesetze des freien Verhaltens, zu Erreichung der uns
von den Sinnen empfohlenen Zwecke, und also keine reine
Gesetze, völlig a priori bestimmt, liefern kann. Dagegen
würden reine praktische Gesetze, deren Zweck durch die
Vernunft völlig a priori gegeben ist, und die nicht empirisch-
bedingt, sondern schlechthin gebieten, Produkte der reinen
Vernunft sein. Dergleichen aber sind die moralischen
Gesetze, mithin gehören diese allein zum praktischen Ge-
brauche der reinen Vernunft, und erlauben einen Kanon.

Die ganze Zurüstung also der Vernunft, in der Bearbei-
tung, die man reine Philosophie nennen kann, ist in der Tat
nur auf die drei gedachten Probleme gerichtet. Diese selber
aber haben wiederum ihre entferntere Absicht, nämlich,
was zu tun sei, wenn der Wille frei, wenn ein Gott und
eine künftige Welt ist. Da dieses nun unser Verhalten in Be-
ziehung auf den höchsten Zweck betrift, so ist die letzte Ab-
sicht derweislich uns versorgenden Natur, bei der Einrichtung
THE CANON OF PURE REASON

constitution of our reason, been directed to moral interests alone.¹

But we must be careful, in turning our attention to an object which is foreign to transcendental philosophy, that we do not indulge in digressions to the detriment of the unity of the system, nor on the other hand, by saying too little on this new topic, fail in producing conviction through lack of clearness. I hope to avoid both dangers, by keeping as close as possible to the transcendental, and by leaving entirely aside any psychological, that is, empirical, factors that may perchance accompany it.

I must first remark that for the present I shall employ the concept of freedom in this practical sense only, leaving aside that other transcendental meaning which cannot be empirically made use of in explanation of appearances, but is itself a problem for reason, as has been already shown. A will is purely animal (arbitrium brutum), which cannot be determined save through sensuous impulses, that is, pathologically. A will which can be determined independently of sensuous impulses, and therefore through motives which are represented only by reason, is entitled freewill (arbitrium liberum), and everything which is bound up with this will, whether as ground or as consequence, is entitled practical. [The fact of practical freedom can be proved through experience. For the human will is not determined by that alone which stimulates, that is, immediately affects the senses; we have the power to overcome the impressions on our faculty of sensuous desire, by calling up representations of what, in a more indirect manner, is useful or injurious. But these considerations, as to what is desirable in respect of our whole state, that is, as to what is good and useful, are based on reason. Reason therefore provides]

¹ All practical concepts relate to objects of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, that is, of pleasure and pain, and therefore, at least indirectly, to the objects of our feelings. But as feeling is not a faculty whereby we represent things, but lies outside our whole faculty of knowledge, the elements of our judgments so far as they relate to pleasure or pain, that is, the elements of practical judgments, do not belong to transcendental philosophy, which is exclusively concerned with pure a priori modes of knowledge.

unserer Vernunft, eigentlich nur aufs Moralische gestellt.

Es ist aber Behutsamkeit nötig, um, da wir unser Augenmerk auf einen Gegenstand werfen, der der transzendentalen Philosophie fremd ist, nicht in Episoden auszuschweifen, und die Einheit des Systems zu verletzen, andererseits auch, um, indem man von seinem neuen Stoffe zu wenig sagt, es an Deutlichkeit oder Überzeugung nicht fehlen zu lassen. Ich hoffe beides dadurch zu leisten, daß ich mich so nahe als möglich am Transzendentalen halte, und das, was etwa hiebei psychologisch, d. i. empirisch sein möchte, gänzlich bei Seite setze.

Und da ist denn zuerst anzumerken, daß ich mich vorjetzt des Begriffs der Freiheit nur im praktischen Verstände bedienen werde, und den in transzendentaler Bedeutung, welcher nicht als ein Erklärungsgrund der Errscheinungen empirisch vorausgesetzt werden kann, sondern selbst ein Problem für die Vernunft ist, hier, als oben abgetan, bei Seite setze. Eine Willkür nämlichs ist bloß tierisch (arbitrium brutum), die nicht anders als durch sinnliche Antriebe, d. i. pathologisch bestimmt werden kann. Diejenige aber, welche unabhängig von sinnlichen Antrieben, mithin durch Bewegursachen, welche nur von der Vernunft vorgestellt werden, bestimmt werden kann, heißt die freie Willkür (arbitrium liberum), und alles, was mit dieser, es sei als Grund oder Folge, zusammenhält, wird praktisch genannt. Die praktische Freiheit kann durch Erfahrung bewiesen werden. Denn, nicht bloß das, was reizt, d. h. die Sinne unmittelbar affiziert, bestimmt die menschliche Willkür, sondern wir haben ein Vernömen, durch Vorstellungen von dem, was selbst auf enterneter Art nützlich oder schädlich ist, die Eindrücke auf unser sinnliches Begehrensvermögen zu überwinden; diese Überlegungen aber von dem, was in Ansehung unseres ganzen Zustandes begehrswert, d. i. gut und nützlich ist, beruhen auf der Vernunft.

Alle praktischen Begriffe gehen auf Gegenstände des Wohlgeliebens, oder Mißfallens, d. i. der Lust und Unlust, mithin, wenigstens indirekt, auf Gegenstände unseres Gefühls. Da dieses aber keine Vorstellungs-kraft der Dinge ist, sondern außer der gesamten Erkenntniskraft liegt, so gehören die Elemente unserer Urteile, so fern sie sich auf Lust oder Unlust beziehen, mithin der praktischen, nicht in den Inbegriff der Transzendentalphilosophie, welche lediglich mit reinen Erkenntnissen a priori zu tun hat.

¹ A: 'enterneter.'
laws which are imperatives, that is, objective laws of freedom, which tell us what ought to happen—although perhaps it never does happen—therein differing from laws of nature, which relate only to that which happens. These laws are therefore to be entitled practical laws.

Whether reason is not, in the actions through which it prescribes laws, itself again determined by other influences, and whether that which, in relation to sensuous impulses, is entitled freedom, may not, in relation to higher and more remote operating causes, be nature again, is a question which in the practical field does not concern us, since we are demanding of reason nothing but the rule of conduct; it is a merely speculative question, which we can leave aside so long as we are considering what ought or ought not to be done. While we thus through experience know practical freedom to be one of the causes in nature, namely, to be a causality of reason in the determination of the will, transcendental freedom demands the independence of this reason—in respect of its causality, in beginning a series of appearances—from all determining causes of the sensible world. Transcendental freedom is thus, as it would seem, contrary to the law of nature, and therefore to all possible experience; and so remains a problem. But this problem does not come within the province of reason in its practical employment; and we have therefore in a canon of pure reason to deal with only two questions, which relate to the practical interest of pure reason, and in regard to which a canon of its employment must be possible—Is there a God? and, Is there a future life? The question of transcendental freedom is a matter for speculative knowledge only, and when we are dealing with the practical, we can leave it aside as being an issue with which we have no concern. Moreover, a quite sufficient discussion of it is to be found in the antinomy of pure reason.

Diese gibt daher auch Gesetze, welche Imperativen, d. i. objektive Gesetze der Freiheit sind, und welche sagen, was geschehen soll, ob es gleich vielleicht nie geschieht, und sich darin von Naturgesetzen, die nur von dem handeln, was geschieht, unterscheiden, weshalb sie auch praktische Gesetze genannt werden.

Ob aber die Vernunft selbst in diesen Handlungen, dadurch sie Gesetze vorschreibt, nicht wiederum durch anderweitige Einflüsse bestimmt sei, und das, was in Absicht auf sinnliche Antriebe Freiheit heißt, in Ansehung höherer und entfernterer wirkenden Ursachen, nicht wiederum Natur sein möge, das geht uns im Praktischen, da wir nur die Vernunft um die Vorschrift des Verhaltens: zunächst befragen, nichts an, sondern ist eine bloß spekulative Frage, die wir, so lange als unsere Absicht aufs Tun oder Lassen gerichtet ist, bei Seite setzen können. Wir erkennen also die praktische Freiheit durch Erfahrung, als eine von den Naturursachen, nämlich eine Kausalität der Vernunft in Bestimmung des Willens, indessen daß die transzendentale Freiheit eine Unabhängigkeit dieser Vernunft selbst (in Ansehung ihrer Kausalität, eine Reihe von Erscheinungen anzuwenden) von allen bestimmenden Ursachen der Sinnenwelt fördert, und so fern dem Naturgesetzen, mithin aller möglichen Erfahrung, zuwider zu sein scheint, und also ein Problem bleibt. Allein für die Vernunft im praktischen Gebrauche gehört dieses Problem nicht, also haben wir es in einem Kanon der reinen Vernunft nur mit zwei Fragen zu tun, die das praktische Interesse der reinen Vernunft angehen, und in Ansehung deren ein Kanon ihres Gebrauchs möglich sein muß, nämlich: ist ein Gott? ist ein künftiges Leben? Die Frage wegen der transzendentalen Freiheit betrifft bloß das spekulative Wissen, welche wir als ganz gleichgültig bei Seite setzen können, wenn es um das [Praktische] zu tun ist, und worüber in der Antinomie der reinen Vernunft schon hinreichende Erörterung zu finden ist.
Section 2

The Ideal of the Highest Good, as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason

Reason, in its speculative employment, conducted us through the field of experience, and since it could not find complete satisfaction there, from thence to speculative ideas, which, however, in the end brought us back to experience. In so doing the ideas fulfilled their purpose, but in a manner which, though useful, is not in accordance with our expectation. One other line of enquiry still remains open to us: namely, whether pure reason may not also be met with in the practical sphere, and whether it may not there conduct us to ideas which reach to those highest ends of pure reason that we have just stated, and whether, therefore, reason may not be able to supply to us from the standpoint of its practical interest what it altogether refuses to supply in respect of its speculative interest.

All the interests of my reason, speculative as well as practical, combine in the three following questions:

1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?

The first question is merely speculative. We have, as I flatter myself, exhausted all the possible answers to it, and at least have found the answer with which reason must perforce content itself, and with which, so long as it takes no account of the practical, it has also good cause to be satisfied. But from the two great ends to which the whole endeavour of pure reason was really directed, we have remained just as far removed as if through love of ease we had declined this labour of enquiry at the very outset. So far, then, as knowledge is concerned, this much, at least, is certain and definitively established, that in respect of these two latter problems, knowledge is unattainable by us.

The second question is purely practical. As such it can
indeed come within the scope of pure reason, but even so is not transcendental but moral, and cannot, therefore, in and by itself, form a proper subject for treatment in this Critique.

The third question—If I do what I ought to do, what may I then hope?—is at once practical and theoretical, in such fashion that the practical serves only as a clue that leads us to the answer to the theoretical question, and when this is followed out, to the speculative question. For all hoping is directed to happiness, and stands in the same relation to the practical and the law of morality as knowing and the law of nature to the theoretical knowledge of things. The former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is (which determines the ultimate possible end) because something ought to happen; the latter, that something is (which operates as the supreme cause) because something happens.

Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires, extensively, in respect of their manifoldness, intensively, in respect of their degree, and protensively, in respect of their duration. The practical law, derived from the motive of happiness, I term pragmatic (rule of prudence), and that law, if there is such a law, which has no other motive than worthiness of being happy, I term moral (law of morality). The former advises us what we have to do if we wish to achieve happiness; the latter dictates to us how we must behave in order to deserve happiness. The former is based on empirical principles; for only by means of experience can I know what desires there are which call for satisfaction; or what those natural causes are which are capable of satisfying them. The latter takes no account of desires, and the natural means of satisfying them, and considers only the freedom of a rational being in general, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonise with a distribution of happiness that is made in accordance with principles. This latter law can therefore be based on mere ideas of pure reason, and known a priori.

I assume that there really are pure moral laws which determine completely a priori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness) what is and is not to be done, that is, which determine the employment of the freedom of a rational being in general; and that these laws command in an absolute manner (not merely hypothetically, on the supposition

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solche zwar der reinen Vernunft angehören, ist aber ursprünglich nicht transcendental, sondern moralisch, mithin kann sie unsere Kritik an sich selbst nicht beschäftigen.

Die dritte Frage, nämlich: wenn ich nun tue, was ich soll, was darf ich alsdenn hoffen? ist praktisch und theoretisch zugleich, so, daß das Praktische nur als ein Leitfaden zu Beantwortung der theoretischen, und, wenn diese hoch geht, spekulativen Frage führt. Denn alles Hoffen geht auf Glückseligkeit, und ist in Absicht auf das Praktische und das Sittengesetz eben dasselbe, was das Wissen und das Natursachen in Ansehung der theoretischen Erkenntnis der Dinge ist. Jenes läuft zuletzt auf den Schluß hinaus, daß etwas sei (was den letzten möglichen Zweck bestimmt), welches geschehen soll; dieses, daß etwas sei (was als oberste Ursache wirkt), welches geschehe.

Glückseligkeit ist die Befriedigung aller unserer Neigungen (so wohl extensive, der Mannigfaltigkeit derselben, als intensive, dem Grade, auch protensive, der Dauer nach). Das praktische Gesetz aus dem Bewegungsgrunde der Glückseligkeit nenne ich pragmatisch (Klugheitsregel); dasjenige aber, wofern ein solches ist, das zum Bewegungsgrunde nichts anderes hat, als die Würdigung, glücklich zu sein, moralisch (Sittensatz). Das erstere rät, was zu tun sei, wenn wir der Glückseligkeit wollen teilhaftig, das zweite gebietet, wie wir uns verhalten sollen, um der Glückseligkeit würdig zu werden. Das erstere gründet sich auf empirische Prinzipien; denn anders, als vermittelt der Erfahrung, kann ich weder wissen, welche Neigungen das sind, die befriedigt werden wollen, noch welches die Naturalursachen sind, die ihre Befriedigung bewirken können. Das zweite abstrahiert von Neigungen, und Naturmitten, sie zu befriedigen, und betrachtet nur die Freiheit eines vernünftigen Wesens überhaupt, und die notwendigen Bedingungen, unter denen sie allein mit der Auseinandersetzung der Glückseligkeit nach Prinzipien zusammenstimmt, und kann also wenigstens auf bloßen Ideen der reinen Vernunft beruhen und a priori erkannt werden.

Ich nehme an, daß es wirklich reine moralische Gesetze gebe, die völlig a priori (ohne Rücksicht auf empirische Bewegungsgründe, d. i. Glückseligkeit) das Tun und Lassen, d. i. den Gebrauch der Freiheit eines vernünftigen Wesens überhaupt, bestimmen, und daß diese Gesetze schlechterdings (nicht bloß hypothetisch unter Voraus
tion of other empirical ends), and are therefore in every respect necessary. I am justified in making this assumption, in that I can appeal not only to the proofs employed by the most enlightened moralists, but to the moral judgment of every man, in so far as he makes the effort to think such a law clearly.

Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative employment, but in that practical employment which is also moral, principles of the possibility of experience, namely, of such actions as, in accordance with moral precepts, might be met with in the history of mankind. For since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be possible for them to take place. Consequently, a special kind of systematic unity, namely the moral, must likewise be possible. We have indeed found that the systematic unity of nature cannot be proved in accordance with speculative principles of reason. For although reason does indeed have causality in respect of freedom in general, it does not have causality in respect of nature as a whole; and although moral principles of reason can indeed give rise to free actions, they cannot give rise to laws of nature. Accordingly it is in their practical, meaning thereby their moral, employment, that the principles of pure reason have objective reality.

I entitle the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance with all moral laws; and this is what by means of the freedom of the rational being it can be, and what according to the necessary laws of morality it ought to be. Owing to our here leaving out of account all conditions (ends) and even all the special difficulties to which morality is exposed (weakness or depravity of human nature), this world is so far thought as an intelligible world only. To this extent, therefore, it is a mere idea, though at the same time a practical idea, which really can have, as it also ought to have, an influence upon the sensible world, to bring that world, so far as may be possible, into conformity with the idea. The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an object of an intelligible intuition (we are quite unable to think any such object), but as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment, that is, as a corpus mysticum of the rational beings in it, so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in setzung anderer empirischer Zwecke) gebieten, und also in aller Absicht notwendig sein. Diesen Satz kann ich mit Recht voraussetzen, nicht allein, indem ich mich auf die Beweise der aufgeklärtesten Moralisten, sondern auf das sittliche Urteil eines jeden Menschen berufe, wenn er sich ein dergleichen Gesetz deutlich denken will.

Die reine Vernunft enthält also, zwar nicht in ihrem spekulative, aber doch in einem gewissen praktischen, nämlich dem moralischen Gebrauche, Prinzipien der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung, nämlich solcher Handlungen, die den sittlichen Vorschriften gemäß in der Geschichte des Menschen anzutreffen sein könnten. Denn, da sie gebietet, daß solche geschehen sollen, so müssen sie auch geschehen können, und es muß also eine besondere Art von systematischer Einheit, nämlich die moralische, möglich sein, indessen daß die systematische Natureinheit nach spekulative Prinzipien der Vernunft nicht bewiesen werden konnte, weil die Vernunft zwar in Ansehung der Freiheit überhaupt, aber nicht in Ansehung der gesamten Natur Kausalität hat, und moralische Vernunftprinzipien zwar freie Handlungen, aber nicht Naturgesetze hervorbringen könnten. Demnach haben die Prinzipien der reinen Vernunft, in ihrem praktischen, namentlich aber dem moralischen Gebrauche, objektive Realität.

Ich nenne die Welt, so fern sie allen sittlichen Gesetzen gemäß wäre (wie sie es denn, nach der Freiheit der vernünftigen Wesen, sein kann, und, nach den notwendigen Gesetzen der Sittlichkeit, sein soll), eine moralische Welt. Diese wird so fern bloß als intelligible Welt gedacht, weil darin von allen Bedingungen (Zwecken) und selbst von allen Hindernissen der Moralität in derselben (Schwäche oder Unlauterkeit der menschlichen Natur) abstrahiert wird. So fern ist sie also eine bloße, aber doch praktische Idee, die wirklich ihren Einfluß auf die Sinnenwelt haben kann und soll, um sie dieser Idee so viel als möglich gemäß zu machen. Die Idee einer moralischen Welt hat daher objektive Realität, nicht als wenn sie auf einen Gegenstand einer intelligiblen Anschauung ginge (dergleichen wir uns gar nicht denken können), sondern auf die Sinnenwelt, aber als einen Gegenstand der reinen Vernunft in ihrem praktischen Gebrauche, und ein corpus mysticum der vernünftigen Wesen in ihr, so fern deren freie Willkür unter mora-

complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every other.

This is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason that concern its practical interest:—Do that through which thou comest worthy to be happy. The second question is:—If I so behave as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I hope thereby to obtain happiness? In answering this question we have to consider whether the principles of pure reason, which prescribe the law a priori, likewise connect this hope necessarily with it.

I maintain that just as the moral principles are necessary according to reason in its practical employment, it is in the view of reason, in the field of its theoretical employment, no less necessary to assume that everyone has ground to hope for happiness in the measure in which he has rendered himself by his conduct worthy of it, and that the system of morality is therefore inseparably—though only in the idea of pure reason—bound up with that of happiness.

Now in an intelligible world, that is, in the moral world, in the concept of which we leave out of account all the hindrances to morality (the desires), such a system, in which happiness is bound up with and proportioned to morality, can be conceived as necessary, inasmuch as freedom, partly inspired and partly restricted by moral laws, would itself be the cause of general happiness, since rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would themselves be the authors both of their own enduring well-being and of that of others. But such a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the carrying out of which rests on the condition that everyone does what he ought, that is, that all the actions of rational beings take place just as if they had proceeded from a supreme will that comprehends itself in, or under itself, all private wills. But since the moral law remains binding for every one in the use of his freedom, even although others do not act in conformity with the law, neither the nature of the things of the world nor the causality of the actions themselves and their relation to morality determine how the consequences of these actions will be related to happiness. The alleged necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the necessary endeavour to render the self worthy of happiness cannot there-

lischen Gesetzen sowohl mit sich selbst, als mit jedes anderen Freiheit durchgängige systematische Einheit an sich hat.


Ich sage demnach: daß eben sowohl, als die moralischen Prinzipien nach der Vernunft in ihrem praktischen Gebrauche notwendig sind, eben so notwendig sei es auch nach der Vernunft, in ihrem theoretischen Gebrauch anzunehmen, daß jedermann die Glückseligkeit in demselben Maße zu hoffen Ursache habe, als er sich derselben in seinem Verhalten würdig gemacht hat, und daß also das System der Sittlichkeit mit dem der Glückseligkeit unzertrennlich, aber nur in der Idee der reinen Vernunft verbunden sei.

Nun läßt sich in einer intelligiblen, d. i. der moralischen Welt, in deren Begriff wir von allen Hindernissen der Sittlichkeit (der Neigungen) abstrahieren, ein solches System der mit der Moralität verbundenen proportionierten Glückseligkeit auch als notwendig denken, weil die durch sittliche Gesetze teils bewegte, teils restringierte Freiheit selbst die Ursache der allgemeinen Glückseligkeit, die vernünftigen Wesen also selbst, unter der Leitung solcher Prinzipien, Urheber ihrer eigenen und zugleich anderer dauerhaften Wohltat sein würden. Aber dieses System der sich selbst lobenden Moralität ist nur eine Idee, deren Ausführung auf der Bedingung beruht, daß jedermann tut, was er soll, d. i. alle Handlungen vernünftiger Wesen so geschehen, als ob sie aus einem obersten Willen, der alle Privatwillkür in sich, oder unter sich befaßt, entspringen. Da aber die Verbindlichkeit aus dem moralischen Gesetze für jedes besonderem Gebruch der Freiheit gültig bleibt, wenn gleich andere diesem Gesetze sich nicht gemäß verhielten, so ist weder der Natur der Dinge der Welt, noch der Kausalität der Handlungen selbst und ihrem Verhältnisse zur Sittlichkeit bestimmt, wie sich ihre Folgen zur Glückseligkeit verhalten, und die angeführte notwendige Verknüpfung der Hoffnung, glücklich zu sein, mit den unablässigten Bestreben, sich der Glückseligkeit würdig zu machen, kann

\textsuperscript{1} Zusatz von B.
fore be known through reason. It can be counted upon only if a Supreme Reason, that governs according to moral rules, be likewise posited as underlying nature as its cause.

The idea of such an intelligence in which the most perfect moral will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in the world—so far as happiness stands in exact relation with morality, that is, with worthiness to be happy—I entitle the ideal of the supreme good. It is, therefore, only in the ideal of the supreme original good that pure reason can find the ground of this connection, which is necessary from the practical point of view, between the two elements of the supreme derivative good—the ground, namely, of an intelligible, that is, moral world. Now since we are necessarily constrained by reason to represent ourselves as belonging to such a world, while the senses present to us nothing but a world of appearances, we must assume that moral world to be a consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (in which no such connection between worthiness and happiness is exhibited), and therefore to be for us a future world. Thus God and a future life are two postulates which, according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation which that same reason imposes upon us.

Morality, by itself, constitutes a system. Happiness, however, does not do so, save in so far as it is distributed in exact proportion to morality. But this is possible only in the intelligible world, under a wise Author and Ruler. Such a Ruler, together with life in such a world, which we must regard as a future world, reason finds itself constrained to assume; otherwise it would have to regard the moral laws as empty figments of the brain, since without this postulate the necessary consequence which it itself connects with these laws could not follow. Hence also everyone regards the moral laws as commands; and this the moral laws could not be if they did not connect a priori suitable consequences with their rules, and thus carry with them promises and threats. But this again they could not do, if they did not reside in a necessary being, as the supreme good, which alone can make such a purposive unity possible.

Leibniz entitled the world, in so far as we take account only of the rational beings in it, and of their connection ac-
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cording to moral laws under the government of the supreme
good, the kingdom of grace, distinguishing it from the kingdom of nature, in which these rational beings do indeed stand under moral laws, but expect no other consequences from their actions than such as follow in accordance with the course of nature in our world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore, as in the world of grace, where all happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves limit our share in it through being unworthy of happiness, is, from the practical standpoint, a necessary idea of reason.

Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions, that is, subjective principles, are entitled maxims. The estimation of morality, in regard to its purity and consequences, is effected in accordance with ideas, the observance of its laws in accordance with maxims.

It is necessary that the whole course of our life be subject to moral maxims; but it is impossible that this should happen unless reason connects with the moral law, which is a mere idea, an operative cause which determines for such conduct as is in accordance with the moral law an outcome, either in this or in another life, that is in exact conformity with our supreme ends. Thus without a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approval and admiration, but not springs of purpose and action. For they do not fulfill in its completeness that end which is natural to every rational being and which is determined a priori, and rendered necessary, by that same pure reason.

Happiness, taken by itself, is, for our reason, far from being the complete good. Reason does not approve happiness (however inclination may desire it) except in so far as it is united with worthiness to be happy, that is, with moral conduct. Morality, taken by itself, and with it, the mere worthiness to be happy, is also far from being the complete good. To make the good complete, he who behaves in such a manner as not to be unworthy of happiness must be able to hope that he will participate in happiness. Even the reason that is free from all private purposes, should it put itself in the place of a being that had to distribute all happiness to others, cannot judge otherwise; for in the practical idea both elements are essentially


Praktische Gesetze, sofern sie zugleich subjektive Gründe der Handlungen, d. i. subjektive Grundsätze werden, heißen Maximen. Die Beurteilung der Sittlichkeit, ihrer Reinigung und Folgen nach, geschieht nach Ideen, die Befolgung ihrer Gesetze nach Maximen.

Es ist notwendig, daß unser ganzes Lebenswandel sittlichen Maximen untergeordnet werde; es ist aber zugleich unmöglich, daß dieses geschehe, wenn die Vernunft nicht mit dem moralischen Gesetze, welches eine bloße Idee ist, eine wirkende Ursache verknüpft, welche dem Verhalten nach denselben einen unseren höchsten Zwecken genau entsprechenden Ausgang, es sei in diesem, oder einem anderen Leben, bestimmt. Ohne also einen Gott, und eine für uns jetzt nicht sichtbare, aber gehöfte Welt, sind die herrlichen Ideen der Sittlichkeit zwar Gegenstände des Beifalls und der Bewunderung, aber nicht Triebfedern des Vorsatzes und der Ausübung, weil sie nicht den ganzen Zweck, der einem jeden vernünftigen Wesen natürlich und durch eben dieselbe reine Vernunft a priori bestimmt und notwendig ist, erfüllen.

Glückseligkeit allein ist für unsere Vernunft bei weitem nicht das vollständige Gut. Sie billigt solche nicht (so sehr als auch Neigung dieselbe wünschen mag), wofür sie nicht mit der Würdigung, glücklich zu sein, d. i. dem sittlichen Wohlverhalten, vereinigt ist. Sittlichkeit allein, und, mit ihr, die bloße Würdigung, glücklich zu sein, ist aber auch noch lange nicht das vollständige Gut. Um dieses zu vollenden, muß der, so sich als der Glückseligkeit nicht unwert verhalten hatte, hoffen können, ihrer teilhaftig zu werden. Selbst die von aller Privatsicht freie Vernunft, wenn sie, ohne dabei ein eigenes Interesse in Betracht zu ziehen, sich in die Stelle eines Wesens setzte, das alle Glückseligkeit andern auszuteilen hätte, kann nicht anders urteilen; denn in der praktischen Idee sind beide Stücke wesentlich ver-
connected, though in such a manner that it is the moral disposition which conditions and makes possible the participation in happiness, and not conversely the prospect of happiness that makes possible the moral disposition. For in the latter case the disposition would not be moral, and therefore would not be worthy of complete happiness—happiness which in the view of reason allows of no limitation save that which arises from our own immoral conduct.

Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of the rational beings who are thereby rendered worthy of it, alone constitutes the supreme good of that world wherein, in accordance with the commands of a pure but practical reason, we are under obligation to place ourselves. This world is indeed an intelligible world only, since the sensible world holds out no promise that any such systematic unity of ends can arise from the nature of things. Nor is the reality of this unity based on anything else than the postulate of a supreme original good. In a supreme good, thus conceived, self-subsistent reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause, establishes, maintains, and completes the universal order of things, according to the most perfect design—an order which in the world of sense is in large part concealed from us.

This moral theology has the peculiar advantage over speculative theology that it inevitably leads to the concept of a sole, all-perfect, and rational primordial being, to which speculative theology does not, on objective grounds, even so much as point the way, and as to the existence of which it is still less capable of yielding any conviction. For neither in transcendental nor in natural theology, however far reason may carry us, do we find any ground for asuming only some one single being which we should be justified in placing prior to all natural causes, and upon which we might make them in all respects dependent. On the other hand, if we consider from the point of view of moral unity, as a necessary law of the world, what the cause must be that can alone give to this law its appropriate effect, and so for us obligatory force, we conclude that there must be one sole supreme will, which comprehends all these laws in itself. For how, under different wills, should we find complete

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1 [Zweckmäßigkeit.] 2 [Reading, with Wille, vorseizen for vorsetzen.]

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bunden, obwohl so, daß die moralische Gesinnung, als Be dung, den Anteil an Glückseligkeit, und nicht umgekehrt die Aussicht auf Glückseligkeit die moralische Gesinnung zuerst möglich mache. Denn im letzteren Falle wäre sie nicht moralisch, und also auch nicht der ganzen Glück seligkeit würdig, die vor der Vernunft keine andere Einschränkung erkennt, als die, welche von unserem eigenen unsittlichen Verhalten herrührt.

Glückseligkeit also, in dem genauen Ebenmaße mit der Sittlichkeit der vernünftigen Wesen, dadurch die sier selbst würdig sein 1, macht allein das höchste Gut einer Welt aus, darin wir uns nach den Vorschriften der reinen aber praktischen Vernunft durchaus versetzen müssen, und welche freiwillig nur eine intellektible Welt ist, da die Sinnenwelt uns von der Natur der Dinge dergleichen systematische Einheit der Zwecke nicht verheißt, deren Realität auch auf nichts andres gegründet werden kann, als auf die Voraussetzung eines höchsten ursprünglichen Guts, da selbständige Vernunft, mit aller Zulänglichkeit einer obersten Ursache ausgerüstet, nach der vollkommensten Zweckmäßigkeit die allgemeine, obgleich in der Sinnenwelt uns sehr verborgene Ordnung der Dinge gründet, erhält und vollführt.

Diese Moralphilologie hat nun den eigentümlichen Vorzug vor der spekulativen, daß sie unausbleiblich auf den Begriff eines einigen, allervollkommensten und vernünftigen Urwesens führt, worauf uns spekulative Theologie nicht einmal aus objektiven Gründen hinweist, geschweige uns davon überzeugen konnte. Denn, wir finden weder in der transzendenten, noch natürlichen Theologie, so weit uns auch Vernunft darin führen mag, einigen bedeuten den Grund, nur ein einiges Wesen anzunehmen, welches wir allen Natursachen vorsetzen, und von dem wir gleich dieselbe in allen Stücken abhängend zu machen hineinreichende Ursache hätten. Dagegen, wenn wir aus dem Gesichtspunkte der sittlichen Einheit, als einem notwendigen Weltgesetze, die Ursache erwägen, die diesem allein den angemessenen Effekt, mithin auch für uns verbindende Kraft geben kann, so muß es ein einiger oberster Wille sein, der alle diese Gesetze in sich befaßt. Denn, wie wollten wir unter verschiedenen Willen vollkommene Einheit der Zwecke
unity of ends. This Divine Being must be omnipotent, in order that the whole of nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to his will; omniscient, that He may know our innermost sentiments and their moral worth; omnipresent, that He may be immediately at hand for the satisfying of every need which the highest good demands; eternal, that this harmony of nature and freedom may never fail, etc.

But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences—a world which is indeed, as mere nature, a sensible world only, but which, as a system of freedom, can be entitled an intelligible, that is, a moral world (regnum gratiae)—leads inevitably also to the purposive unity of all things, which constitute this great whole, in accordance with universal laws of nature (just as the former unity is in accordance with universal and necessary laws of morality), and thus unites the practical with the speculative reason. The world must be represented as having originated from an idea if it is to be in harmony with that employment of reason without which we should indeed hold ourselves to be unworthy of reason, namely, with the moral employment—which is founded entirely on the idea of the supreme good. In this way all investigation of nature tends to take the form of a system of ends, and in its widest extension becomes a physico-theology. But this, as it has its source in the moral order, as a unity grounded in freedom's own essential nature, and not accidentally instituted through external commands, connects the purposiveness of nature with grounds which must be inseparably connected a priori with the inner possibility of things, and so leads to a transcendental theology—a theology which takes the ideal of supreme ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity. And since all things have their origin in the absolute necessity of the one primordial being, that principle connects them in accordance with universal and necessary laws of nature.

What use can we make of our understanding, even in respect of experience, if we do not propose ends to ourselves? But the highest ends are those of morality, and these we can know only as they are given us by pure reason. But though provided with these, and employing them as a clue, we cannot make use of the knowledge of nature in any serviceable manner
in the building up of knowledge, unless nature has itself shown unity of design.¹ For without this unity we should ourselves have no reason, inasmuch as there would be no school for reason, and no fertilisation² through objects such as might afford materials for the necessary concepts. But the former purposive unity is necessary, and founded on the will’s own essential nature, and this latter unity [of design in nature] which contains the condition of its application in concreto, must be so likewise. And thus the transcendental enlargement of our knowledge, as secured through reason, is not to be regarded as the cause, but merely as the effect of the practical purposiveness which pure reason imposes upon us.

Accordingly we find, in the history of human reason, that until the moral concepts were sufficiently purified and determined, and until the systematic unity of their ends was understood in accordance with these concepts and from necessary principles, the knowledge of nature, and even a quite considerable development of reason in many other sciences, could give rise only to crude and incoherent concepts of the Deity, or as sometimes happened resulted in an astonishing indifference in regard to all such matters. A greater preoccupation with moral ideas, which was rendered necessary by the extraordinarily pure moral law of our religion, made reason more acutely aware of its object, through the interest which it was compelled to take in it. And this came about, independently of any influence exercised by more extended views of nature or by correct and reliable transcendental insight (for that has always been lacking). It was the moral ideas that gave rise to that concept of the Divine Being which we now hold to be correct—and we so regard it not because speculative reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it completely harmonises with the moral principles of reason. Thus it is always only to pure reason, though only in its practical employment, that we must finally ascribe the merit of having connected with our highest interest a knowledge which reason can think only, and cannot establish, and of having thereby shown it to be, not indeed a demonstrated dogma, but a postulate which is absolutely necessary in view of what are reason’s own most essential ends.

¹ [zweckmäßige Einheit.] ² [Kultur.]

Von dem Ideal des Höchsten Guts

Von dem Ideal des Höchsten Guts machen, wo die Natur nicht selbst zweckmäßige Einheit hingeleget hat; denn ohne diese hätten wir sogar selbst keine Vernunft, weil wir keine Schule für dieselbe haben würden, und keine Kultur durch Gegenstände, welche den Stoff zu solchen Begriffen darbieten. Jene zweckmäßige Einheit ist aber notwendig, und in dem Wesen der Willkür selbst gegründet, diese also, welche die Bedingung der Anwendung derselben in concreto enthält, muß es auch sein, und so würde die transzendente Steigerung unserer Vernunft erkenntnis nicht die Ursache, sondern bloß die Wirkung von der praktischen Zweckmäßigkeit sein, die uns die reine Vernunft auferlegt.

But when practical reason has reached this goal, namely, the concept of a sole primordial being as the supreme good, it must not presume to think that it has raised itself above all empirical conditions of its application, and has attained to an immediate knowledge of new objects, and can therefore\(^1\) start from this concept, and can deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it is these very laws that have led us, in virtue of their inner practical necessity, to the postulate of a self-sufficient cause, or of a wise Ruler of the world, in order that through such agency effect may be given to them. We may not, therefore, in reversal of such procedure, regard them as accidental and as derived from the mere will of the Ruler, especially as we have no conception of such a will, except as formed in accordance with these laws. So far, then, as practical reason has the right to serve as our guide, we shall not look upon actions as obligatory because they are the commands of God, but shall regard them as divine commands because we have an inward obligation to them. We shall study freedom according to the purposive unity that is determined in accordance with the principles of reason, and shall believe ourselves to be acting in conformity with the divine will in so far only as we hold sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of the actions themselves; and we shall believe that we can serve that will only by furthering what is best in the world, alike in ourselves and in others. Moral theology is thus of immanent use only. It enables us to fulfil our vocation in this present world by showing us how to adapt ourselves to the system of all ends, and by warning us against the fanaticism, and indeed the impiety, of abandoning the guidance of a morally legislative reason in the right conduct of our lives, in order to derive guidance directly from the idea of the Supreme Being. For we should then be making a transcendent employment of moral theology; and that,\(^8\) like a transcendent use of pure speculation, must pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.

\(^1\) [Reading, with Hartenstein, nur für um.]

\(^8\) [Reading, with Grillo, der aber für aber.]

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Wenn aber praktische Vernunft nun diesen hohen Punkt erreicht hat, nämlich den Begriff eines einigen Urwesens, als des höchsten Gutes, so darf sie sich gar nicht unterwirken, gleich als hätte sie sich über alle empirische Bedingungen seiner Anwendung erhoben, und zur unmittelbaren Kenntnis neuer Gegenstände emporgeschwungen, um von diesen Begriffen auszugehen, und die moralischen Gesetze selbst von ihm abzuleiten. Denn diese waren es eben, deren innere praktische Notwendigkeit uns zu der Voraussetzung einer selbständigen Ursache, oder eines weisen Weltregierers führte, um jenen Gesetzen Effekt zu geben, und daher können wir sie nicht nach diesem wiederum als zufällig und vom bloßen Willen abgeleitet ansehen, insonderheit von einem solchen Willen, von dem || wir gar keinen Begriff haben würden, wenn wir ihn nicht jenen Gesetzen gemäß gebildet hätten. Wir werden, so weit praktische Vernunft uns zu führen das Recht hat, Handlungen nicht darum für verbindlich halten, weil sie Gebote Gottes sind, sondern sie darum als göttliche Gebote ansehen\(^1\), weil wir dazu innerlich verbindlich sind. Wir werden die Freiheit, unter der zweckmäßigen Einheit nach Prinzipien der Vernunft, studieren, und nur so fern glauben, dem göttlichen Willen gemäß zu sein, als wir das Sittengesetz, welches uns die Vernunft aus der Natur der Handlungen selbst lehrt, heilig halten, ihm\(^2\) dadurch allein zu dienen glauben, daß wir das Weltbeste an uns und an andern befördern. Die Moraltheologie ist also nur von immanentem Gebrauche, nämlich unsere Bestimmung hier in der Welt zu erfüllen, indem wir in das System aller Zwecke passen, und nicht schwärmersisch oder wohl gar frevelhaft den Leitfaden einer moralisch gesetzgebenden Vernunft im guten Lebenswandel zu verlassen, um ihn unmittelbar an die Idee des höchsten Wesens zu knüpfen, welches einen transzendenten Gebrauch geben würde, aber eben so, wie der der bloßen Spekulation, die letzten Zwecke der Vernunft verkehren und vereiteln muß.

\(^1\) A: • sie als göttliche Gebote ansehen, darum • \(^2\) Akad.-Ausg.: • und ihm •.
The holding of a thing to be true is an occurrence in our understanding which, though it may rest on objective grounds, also requires subjective causes in the mind of the individual who makes the judgment. If the judgment is valid for everyone, provided only he is in possession of reason, its ground is objectively sufficient, and the holding of it to be true is entitled conviction. If it has its ground only in the special character of the subject, it is entitled persuasion.

Persuasion is a mere illusion, because the ground of the judgment, which lies solely in the subject, is regarded as objective. Such a judgment has only private validity, and the holding of it to be true does not allow of being communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and in respect of it the judgments of each and every understanding must therefore be in agreement with each other (consentientia uni tertio, consentienti inter se). The touchstone whereby we decide whether our holding a thing to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore external, namely, the possibility of communicating it and of finding it to be valid for all human reason. For there is then at least a presumption that the ground of the agreement of all judgments with each other, notwithstanding the differing characters of individuals, rests upon the common ground, namely, upon the object, and that it is for this reason that they are all in agreement with the object—the truth of the judgment being thereby proved.

So long, therefore, as the subject views the judgment merely as an appearance of his mind, persuasion cannot be subjectively distinguished from conviction. The experiment, however, whereby we test upon the understanding of others whether those grounds of the judgment which are valid for us have the same effect on the reason of others as on our own, is a means, although only a subjective means, not indeed of producing conviction, but of detecting any merely private validity
in the judgment, that is, anything in it which is mere persuasion.

If, in addition, we can specify the subjective cause of the judgment, which we have taken as being its objective grounds, and can thus explain the deceptive judgment as an event in our mind, and can do so without having to take account of the character of the object, we expose the illusion and are no longer deceived by it, although always still in some degree liable to come under its influence, in so far as the subjective cause of the illusion is inherent in our nature.

I cannot assert anything, that is, declare it to be a judgment necessarily valid for everyone, save as it gives rise to conviction. Persuasion I can hold to on my own account, if it so pleases me, but I cannot, and ought not, to profess to impose it as binding on anyone but myself.

The holding of a thing to be true, or the subjective validity of the judgment, in its relation to conviction (which is at the same time objectively valid), has the following three degrees: opining, believing, and knowing. Opining is such holding of a judgment as is consciously insufficient, not only objectively, but also subjectively. If our holding of the judgment be only subjectively sufficient, and is at the same time taken as being objectively insufficient, we have what is termed believing. Lastly, when the holding of a thing to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is knowledge. The subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself), the objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for everyone). There is no call for me to spend further time on the explanation of such easily understood terms.

I must never presume to opine, without knowing at least something by means of which the judgment, in itself merely problematic, secures connection with truth, a connection which, although not complete, is yet more than arbitrary fiction. Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain. For if, in respect of this law also, I have nothing but opinion, it is all merely a play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth. Again, opining is not in any way permissible in judging by means of pure reason. For since such judging is not based on grounds of experience, but being in

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every case necessary has all to be arrived at a priori, the principle of the connection requires universality and necessity, and therefore complete certainty; otherwise we should have no guidance as to truth. Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics; either we must know, or we must abstain from all acts of judgment. It is so likewise in the case of the principles of morality, since we must not venture upon an action on the mere opinion that it is allowed, but must know it to be so.

In the transcendental employment of reason, on the other hand, while opining is doubtless too weak a term to be applicable, the term knowing is too strong. In the merely speculative sphere we cannot therefore make any judgments whatsoever. For the subjective grounds upon which we may hold something to be true, such as those which are able to produce belief, are not permissible in speculative questions, inasmuch as they do not hold independently of all empirical support, and do not allow of being communicated in equal measure to others.

But it is only from a practical point of view that the theoretically insufficient holding of a thing to be true can be termed believing. This practical point of view is either in reference to skill or in reference to morality, the former being concerned with optional and contingent ends, the latter with ends that are absolutely necessary.

Once an end is accepted, the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically necessary. This necessity is subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I know of no other conditions under which the end can be attained. On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for everyone, if I know with certainty that no one can have knowledge of any other conditions which lead to the proposed end. In the former case my assumption and the holding of certain conditions to be true is a merely contingent belief; in the latter case it is a necessary belief. The physician must do something for a patient in danger, but does not know the nature of his illness. He observes the symptoms, and if he can find no more likely alternative, judges it to be a case of phthisis. Now even in his own estimation his belief is contingent only; another observer

1. [Glaube. This is also Kant's term for 'faith' (cf. above pp. 31, 296).]

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TRANZENDENTALE METHODENLEHRE


Im transzendentalen Gebrauche der Vernunft ist der gegen Meinen freilich zu wenig, aber Wissen auch zu viel. In bloß spekulativer Absicht können wir also hier gar nicht urteilen; weil subjektive Gründe des Fürwahrhaltns, wie die, so das Glauben bewirken können, bei spekulativen Fragen keinen Beifall verdienen, da sie sich frei von allernempirischen Beihilfe nicht halten, noch in gleichen Maße andern mitteilen lassen.

Es kann aber überall bloß in praktischer Beziehung das theoretisch unzureichende Fürwahrhalten Glauben genannt werden. Diese praktische Absicht ist nun entweder die der Geschicklichkeit, oder der Sittlichkeit, die erste zu beliebigen und zufälligen, die zweite aber zu schlechthin notwendigen Zwecken.

Wenn einmal ein Zweck vorgesehen ist, so sind die Bedingungen der Erreichung desselben hypothetischnotwendig. Diese Notwendigkeit ist subjektiv, aber doch nur | comparativ zureichend, wenn ich gar keine andere Bedingungen weiß, unter denen der Zweck zu erreichen wäre; aber sie ist schlechthin und für jedermann zureichend, wenn ich gewiß weiß, daß niemand andere Bedingungen kennen könne, die auf den vorgesehenen Zweck führen. Im ersten Falle ist meine Voraussetzung und das Fürwahrhalten gewisser Bedingungen ein bloß zufälliger, im zweiten Falle aber ein notwendiger Glaube. Der Arzt muß bei einem Kranken, der in Gefahr ist, etwas tun, kennt aber die Krankheit nicht. Er sieht auf die Erscheinungen, und urteilt, weil er nichts Besseres weiß, es sei die Schwindsucht. Sein Glaube ist selbst in seinem eigenen Urteile bloß zufällig, ein anderer
might perhaps come to a sounder conclusion. Such contingent belief, which yet forms the ground for the actual employment of means to certain actions, I entitle *pragmatic belief*.

The usual touchstone, whether that which someone asserts is merely his persuasion—or at least his subjective conviction, that is, his firm belief—is *betting*. It often happens that someone propounds his views with such positive and uncompromising assurance that he seems to have entirely set aside all thought of possible error. A bet disconcerts him. Sometimes it turns out that he has a conviction which can be estimated at a value of one ducat, but not of ten. For he is very willing to venture one ducat, but when it is a question of ten he becomes aware, as he had not previously been, that it may very well be that he is in error. If, in a given case, we represent ourselves as staking the happiness of our whole life, the triumphant tone of our judgment is greatly abated; we become extremely diffident, and discover for the first time that our belief does not reach so far. Thus *pragmatic belief* always exists in some specific degree, which, according to differences in the interests at stake, may be large or may be small.

But in many cases, when we are dealing with an object about which nothing can be done by us, and in regard to which our judgment is therefore purely theoretical, we can conceive and picture to ourselves an attitude for which we regard ourselves as having sufficient grounds, while yet there is no existing means of arriving at certainty in the matter. Thus even in purely theoretical judgments there is an *analogon of practical judgments*, to the mental entertaining of which the term 'belief' is appropriate, and which we may entitle *doctrinal belief*. I should be ready to stake my all on the contention—were it possible by means of any experience to settle the question—that at least one of the planets which we see is inhabited. Hence I say that it is not merely opinion, but a strong belief, on the correctness of which I should be prepared to run great risks, that other worlds are inhabited.

Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief. For as regards theoretical knowledge of the world, I can *cite* nothing which necessarily presupposes this thought as the condition of my explanations:

1 [sein Unternehmen]
of the appearances exhibited by the world, but rather am bound so to employ my reason as if everything were mere nature. Purposive unity is, however, so important a condition of the application of reason to nature that I cannot ignore it, especially as experience supplies me so richly with examples of it. But I know no other condition under which this unity can supply me with guidance in the investigation of nature, save only the postulate that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things in accordance with the wisest ends. Consequently, as a condition of what is indeed a contingent, but still not unimportant purpose, namely, to have guidance in the investigation of nature, we must postulate a wise Author of the world. Moreover, the outcome of my attempts [in explanation of nature] so frequently confirms the usefulness of this postulate, while nothing decisive can be cited against it, that I am saying much too little if I proceed to declare that I hold it merely as an opinion. Even in this theoretical relation it can be said that I firmly believe in God. This belief is not, therefore, strictly speaking, practical; it must be entitled a doctrinal belief, to which the theology of nature (physico-theology) must always necessarily give rise. In view of the magnificent equipment of our human nature, and the shortness of life so ill-suited to the full exercise of our powers, we can find in this same divine wisdom a no less sufficient ground for a doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul.

In such cases the expression of belief is, from the objective point of view, an expression of modesty, and yet at the same time, from the subjective point of view, an expression of the firmness of our confidence. Were I even to go the length of describing the merely theoretical holding of the belief as an hypothesis which I am justified in assuming, I should thereby be pledging myself to have a more adequate concept of the character of a cause of the world and of the character of another world than I am really in a position to supply. For if I assume anything, even merely as an hypothesis, I must at least know so much of its properties that I require to assume, not its concept, but only its existence. The term 'belief' refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence in that furthering of the activities of my reason which confirms me in the idea, and which
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yet does so without my being in a position to give a speculative account of it.

But the merely doctrinal belief is somewhat lacking in stability; we often lose hold of it, owing to the speculative difficulties which we encounter, although in the end we always inevitably return to it.

It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For here it is absolutely necessary that something must happen, namely, that I must in all points conform to the moral law. The end is here irrefragably established, and according to such insight as I can have, there is only one possible condition under which this end can connect with all other ends, and thereby have practical validity, namely, that there be a God and a future world. I also know with complete certainty that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions which lead to the same unity of ends under the moral law. Since, therefore, the moral precept is at the same time my maxim (reason prescribing that it should be so), I inevitably believe in the existence of God and in a future life, and I am certain that nothing can shake this belief, since my moral principles would thereby be themselves overthrown, and I cannot disclaim them without becoming abhorrent in my own eyes.

Thus even after reason has failed in all its ambitious attempts to pass beyond the limits of all experience, there is still enough left to satisfy us, so far as our practical standpoint is concerned. No one, indeed, will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God, and a future life; if he knows this, he is the very man for whom I have long [and vainly] sought. All knowledge, if it concerns an object of mere reason, can be communicated; and I might therefore hope that under his instruction my own knowledge would be extended in this wonderful fashion. No, my conviction is not logical, but moral certainty; and since it rests on subjective grounds (of the moral sentiment), I must not even say, 'It is morally certain that there is a God, etc.', but 'I am morally certain, etc.' In other words, belief in a God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment that as there is little danger of my losing the latter, there is equally little cause for fear that the former can ever be taken from me.

1 [Reading, with Grillo, führen for führe.]
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The only point that may seem questionable is the basing of this rational belief on the assumption of moral sentiments. If we leave these aside, and take a man who is completely indifferent with regard to moral laws, the question propounded by reason then becomes merely a problem for speculation, and can, indeed, be supported by strong grounds of analogy, but not by such as must compel the most stubborn scepticism to give way. But in these questions no man is free from all interest. For although, through lack of good sentiments, he may be cut off from moral interest, still even in this case enough remains to make him fear the existence of a God and a future life. Nothing more is required for this than that he at least cannot pretend that there is any certainty that there is no such being and no such life. Since that would have to be proved by mere reason, and therefore apodeictically, he would have to prove the impossibility of both, which assuredly no one can reasonably undertake to do. This may therefore serve as negative belief, which may not, indeed, give rise to morality and good sentiments, but may still give rise to an analogon of these, namely, a powerful check upon the outbreak of evil sentiments.

But, it will be said, is this all that pure reason achieves in opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience? Nothing more than two articles of belief? Surely the common understanding could have achieved as much, without appealing to philosophers for counsel in the matter.

I shall not here dwell upon the service which philosophy has done to human reason through the laborious efforts of its criticism, granting even that in the end it should turn out to be merely negative; something more will be said on this point in the next section. But I may at once reply: Do you really require that a mode of knowledge which concerns all men...

* The human mind (as I likewise believe, must necessarily be the case with every rational being) takes a natural interest in morality, although this interest is not undivided and practically preponderant. If we confirm and increase this interest, we shall find reason very teachable and itself more enlightened as regards the uniting of the speculative with the practical interest. But if we do not take care that we first make men good, at least in some measure good, we shall never make honest believers of them.

Das einzige Bedenkliche, das sich hiebei findet, ist, daß sich dieser Vernunftglaube auf die Voraussetzung moralischer Gesinnungen gründet. Gehn wir davon ab, und nehmen einen, der in Ansehung sittlicher Gesetze gänzlich gleichgültig wäre, so wird die Frage, welche die Vernunft aufwirft, bloß eine Aufgabe für die Spekulation, und kann alsdann zwar noch mit starken Gründen aus der Analogie, aber nicht mit solchen, denen sich die hartnäckigste Zweifelsucht ergeben müßte, unterstützt werden. Es ist aber kein Mensch bei diesen Fragen frei von allem Interesse. Denn, ob er gleich von dem moralischen, durch den Mangel guter Gesinnungen, getrennt sein möchte: so bleibt doch auch in diesem Falle genug übrig, um zu machen, daß er ein göttliches Dasein und eine Zukunft fürchte. Denn hierzu wird nichts mehr erfordert, als daß er wenigstens keine Gewißheit vorschüchzen könne, daß kein solches Wesen und kein künftig Leben anzutreffen sei, wozu, weil es durch bloße Vernunft, mithin apodiktisch bewiesen werden müßte, er die Unmöglichkeit von beiden darzutun haben würde, welches gewiß kein vernünftiger Mensch übernehmen kann. Das würde ein negativer Glaube sein, der zwar nicht Moralität und gute Gesinnungen, aber doch das Analogon derselben bewirken, nämlich den Ausbruch der bösen mächtig zurückhalten könnte.

Ist das aber alles, wird man sagen, was reine Vernunft ausrichtet, indem sie über die Grenzen der Erfahrung hinaus Aussichten eröffnet? nichts mehr, als zwei Glaubensartikel? so viel hätte auch wohl der gemeine Verstand, ohne darüber die Philosophen zu Rate zu ziehen, ausrichten können!

Ich will hier nicht das Verdienst rühmen, das Philosophie durch die mühsame Bestrebung ihrer Kritik um die menschliche Vernunft habe, gesetzt, es sollte auch beim Ausgang bloß negativ befunden werden; denn davon wird in dem folgenden Abschnitte noch etwas vorkommen. Aber verlangt ihr denn, daß ein Erkenntnis, welches alle Menschen...
should transcend the common understanding, and should only be revealed to you by philosophers? Precisely what you find fault with is the best confirmation of the correctness of the above assertions. For we have thereby revealed to us, what could not at the start have been foreseen, namely, that in matters which concern all men without distinction nature is not guilty of any partial distribution of her gifts, and that in regard to the essential ends of human nature the highest philosophy cannot advance further than is possible under the guidance which nature has bestowed even upon the most ordinary understanding.

1 [gemeinsten]
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD

CHAPTER III

THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON

By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. As systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge, architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge, and therefore necessarily forms part of the doctrine of method.

In accordance with reason's legislative prescriptions, our diverse modes of knowledge must not be permitted to be a mere rhapsody, but must form a system. Only so can they further the essential ends of reason. By a system I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea. This idea is the concept provided by reason—of the form of a whole—in so far as the concept determines a priori not only the scope of its manifold content, but also the positions which the parts occupy relatively to one another. The scientific concept of reason contains, therefore, the end and the form of that whole which is congruent with this requirement. The unity of the end to which all the parts relate and in the idea of which they all stand in relation to one another, makes it possible for us to determine from our knowledge of the other parts whether any part be missing, and to prevent any arbitrary addition, or in respect of its completeness any indeterminateness that does not conform to the limits which are thus determined a priori. The whole is thus an organised unity (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio). It may grow from within (per intus-susceptionem), but not by external addition (per appositionem). It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which is not by

|| DER TRANSCENDENTALEN METHODENLEHRE

DREITES HAUPTSTÜCK

DIE ARCHITEKTONIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT

Ich verstehe unter einer Architektonik die Kunst der Systeme. Weil die systematische Einheit dasjenige ist, was gemeinsame Erkenntnis allerrst zur Wissenschaft, d. i. aus einem bloßen Aggregat derselben ein System macht, so ist Architektonik die Lehre des Sientifischen in unserer Erkenntnis überhaupt, und sie gehört also notwendig zur Methodenlehre.

Unter der Regierung der Vernunft dürfen unsere Erkenntnisse überhaupt keine Rhapsodie, sondern sie müssen ein System ausmachen, in welchem sie allein die wesentlichen Zwecke derselben unterstützen und befördern können. Ich verstehe aber unter einem Systeme die Einheit der mannigfaltigen Erkenntnisse unter einer Idee. Diese ist der Vernunftbegriff von der Form eines Ganzen, so fern durch denselben der Umfang der Mannigfaltigen so wohl, als die Stelle der Teile untereinander, a priori bestimmt wird. Der sientifische Vernunftbegriff enthält also den Zweck und die Form des Ganzen, das mit denselben kongruiert. Die Einheit des Zwecks, worauf sich alle Teile und in der Idee des selben auch unter einander beziehen, macht, daß ein jeder Teil bei der Kenntnis der übrigen vermißt werden kann, und keine zufällige Hinzusetzung, oder unbestimmte Größe der Vollkommenheit, die nicht ihre a priori bestimmte Grenzen habe, stattfindet. Das Ganze ist also gegliedert (articulatio) und nicht gehäuft (coacervatio); es kann zwar innerlich (per intus susceptionem), aber nicht äußerlich (per appositionem) wachsen, wie ein tierischer Körper, dessen Wachstum

\[ A \, 83^a \]
\[ B \, 86^b \]
the addition of a new member, but by the rendering of each member, without change of proportion, stronger and more effective for its purposes.

The idea requires for its realisation a schema, that is, a constituent manifold and an order of its parts, both of which must be determined a priori from the principle defined by its end. The schema, which is not devised in accordance with an idea, that is, in terms of the ultimate aim of reason, but empirically in accordance with purposes that are contingently occasioned (the number of which cannot be foreseen) yields technical unity; whereas the schema which originates from an idea (in which reason propounds the ends a priori, and does not wait for them to be empirically given) serves as the basis of architectonic unity. Now that we call science, the schema of which must contain the outline (monogramma) and the division of the whole into parts, in conformity with the idea, that is, a priori, and in so doing must distinguish it with certainty and according to principles from all other wholes, is not formed in technical fashion, in view of the similarity of its manifold constituents or of the contingent use of our knowledge in concreto for all sorts of optional external ends, but in architectonic fashion, in view of the affinity of its parts and of their derivation from a single supreme and inner end, through which the whole is first made possible.

No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an idea upon which to base it. But in the working out of the science the schema, nay even the definition which, at the start, he first gave of the science, is very seldom adequate to his idea. For this idea lies hidden in reason, like a germ in which the parts are still undeveloped and barely recognisable even under microscopic observation. Consequently, since sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest, we must not explain and determine them according to the description which their founder gives of them, but in conformity with the idea which, out of the natural unity of the parts that we have assembled, we find to be grounded in reason itself. For we shall then find that its founder, and often even his latest successors, are groping for an idea which they have never succeeded in making clear to themselves, and that

1 [wesentliches]
consequently they have not been in a position to determine the proper content, the articulation (systematic unity), and limits of the science.

It is unfortunate that only after we have spent much time in the collection of materials in somewhat random fashion at the suggestion of an idea lying hidden in our minds, and after we have, indeed, over a long period assembled the materials in a merely technical manner, does it first become possible for us to discern the idea in a clearer light, and to devise a whole architectonically in accordance with the ends of reason. Systems seem to be formed in the manner of lowly organisms, through a *generatio aequiva* from the mere confluence of assembled concepts, at first imperfect, and only gradually attaining to completeness, although they one and all have had their schema, as the original germ, in the sheer self-development of reason. Hence, not only is each system articulated in accordance with an idea, but they are one and all organically united in a system of human knowledge, as members of one whole, and so as admitting of an architectonic of all human knowledge, which, at the present time, in view of the great amount of material that has been collected, or which can be obtained from the ruins of ancient systems, is not only possible, but would not indeed be difficult. We shall content ourselves here with the completion of our task, namely, merely to outline the *architectonic* of all knowledge arising from pure reason; and in doing so we shall begin from the point at which the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and throws out two stems, one of which is *reason*. By reason I here understand the whole higher faculty of knowledge, and am therefore contrasting the rational with the empirical.

If I abstract from all the content of knowledge, objectively regarded, then all knowledge, subjectively regarded, is either historical or rational. Historical knowledge is *cognitio ex datis*; rational knowledge is *cognitio ex principiis*. However a mode of knowledge may originally be given, it is still, in relation to the individual who possesses it, simply historical, if he knows only so much of it as has been given to him from outside (and this in the form in which it has been given to him), whether through immediate experience or narration, or (as in the case

\[1 \text{ (\textit{wie Gewürme})} \]

\[2 \text{ (\textit{blosse})} \]
of general knowledge) through instruction. Anyone, therefore, who has learnt (in the strict sense of that term) a system of philosophy, such as that of Wolff, although he may have all its principles, explanations, and proofs, together with the formal divisions of the whole body of doctrine, in his head, and, so to speak, at his fingers' ends, has no more than a complete historical knowledge of the Wolffian philosophy. He knows and judges only what has been given him. If we dispute a definition, he does not know whence to obtain another. He has formed his mind on another's, and the imitative faculty is not itself productive. In other words, his knowledge has not in him arisen out of reason, and although, objectively considered, it is indeed knowledge due to reason, it is yet, in its subjective character, merely historical. He has grasped and kept; that is, he has learnt well, and is merely a plaster-cast of a living man. Modes of rational knowledge which are rational objectively (that is, which can have their first origin solely in human reason) can be so entitled subjectively also, only when they have been derived from universal sources of reason, that is, from principles—the sources from which there can also arise criticism, nay, even the rejection of what has been learnt.

All knowledge arising out of reason is derived either from concepts or from the construction of concepts. The former is called philosophical, the latter mathematical. I have already treated of the fundamental difference between these two modes of knowledge in the first chapter [of this Transcendental Doctrine of Method]. Knowledge [as we have just noted] can be objectively philosophical, and yet subjectively historical, as is the case with most novices, and with all those who have never looked beyond their School, and who remain novices all their lives. But it is noteworthy that mathematical knowledge, in its subjective character, and precisely as it has been learned, can also be regarded as knowledge arising out of reason, and that there is therefore in regard to mathematical knowledge no such distinction as we have drawn in the case of philosophical knowledge. This is due to the fact that the sources of knowledge, from which alone the teacher can derive his knowledge, lie nowhere but in the essential and genuine principles of reason, and consequently cannot be acquired by the novice from any other rung (allgemeiner Erkenntnisse) gegeben sein. Daher hat der, welcher ein System der Philosophie, z. B. das Wolffische, eigentlich gelernt hat, ob er gleich alle Grundsätze, Erklärungen und Beweise, zusammen der Einteilung des ganzen Lehrgebäudes, im Kopf hätte, und alles an den Fingern abzählen könnte, doch keine andere als vollständige historische Erkenntnis der Wolffischen Philosophie; er weiß und urteilt nur so viel, als ihm gegeben war. Streitet ihm eine Definition, so weiß er nicht, wo er eine andere hernehmen soll. Er bildete sich nach fremder Vernunft, aber das nachbildende Vermögen ist nicht das erzeugende, d. i. das Erkenntnis entsprang zu ihm nicht aus Vernunft, und, ob es gleich, objektiv, allerdings ein Vernunftsehen war, so ist es doch, subjektiv, bloß historisch. Er hat gut gelaßt und behalten, d. i. gelernt, und ist ein Gipsabdruck von einem lebenden Menschen. Vernunftsehen, die es objektiv sind (d. i. anfangs nur aus der eigenen Vernunft des Menschen entspringen können), dürfen nur denn allein auch subjektiv diesen Namen führen, wenn sie aus allgemeinen Quellen der Vernunft, woraus auch die Kritik, ja selbst die Verwerfung des Gelernten entspringen kann, d. i. aus Prinzipien geschöpft worden.

Alle Vernunftsehen ist nun entweder dieaus Begriffen, oder aus der Konstruktion der Begriffe; die erstere heißt philosophisch, die zweite mathematisch. Von dem inneren Unterschiede beider habe ich schon im ersten Hauptstücke gehandelt. Ein Erkenntnis demnach kann objektiv philosophisch sein, und ist doch subjektiv historisch, wie bei den meisten Lehrlingen, und bei allen, die über die Schule niemals hinaussehen und zeitlebens Lehrlinge bleiben. Es ist aber doch sonderbar, daß das mathematische Erkenntnis, so wie man es erlernt hat, doch auch subjektiv für Vernunftsehen gelten kann, und ein solcher Unterschied bei ihr nicht so wie bei dem philosophischen stattfindet. Die Ursache ist, weil die Erkenntnisquellen, aus denen der Lehrer allein schöpfen kann, nirgend anders als in den wesentlichen und echten Prinzipien der Vernunft liegen, und mithin von dem Lehrlinge nirgend anders herzogenommen, noch etwa ge-

1 A: *zu anfangen*. - 2 Akad.-Ausz.: *ihn*.
source, and cannot be disputed; and this, in turn, is owing to the fact that the employment of reason is here in concreto only, although likewise a priori, namely, in intuition which is pure, and which precisely on that account is infallible, excluding all illusion and error. Mathematics, therefore, alone of all the sciences (a priori) arising from reason, can be learned; philosophy can never be learned, save only in historical fashion; as regards what concerns reason, we can at most learn to philosophize.

Philosophy is the system of all philosophical knowledge. If we are to understand by it the archetype for the estimation of all attempts at philosophising, and if this archetype is to serve for the estimation of each subjective philosophy, the structure of which is often so diverse and liable to alteration, it must be taken objectively. Thus regarded, philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science which nowhere exists in concreto, but to which, by many different paths, we endeavour to approximate, until the one true path, overgrown by the products of sensibility, has at last been discovered, and the image, hitherto so abortive, has achieved likeness to the archetype, so far as this is granted to [mortal] man. Till then we cannot learn philosophy; for where is it, who is in possession of it, and how shall we recognize it? We can only learn to philosophise, that is, to exercise the talent of reason, in accordance with its universal principles, on certain actually existing attempts at philosophy, always, however, reserving the right of reason to investigate, to confirm, or to reject these principles in their very sources.

Hitherto the concept of philosophy has been a merely scholastic concept—a concept of a system of knowledge which is sought solely in its character as a science, and which has therefore in view only the systematic unity appropriate to science, and consequently no more than the logical perfection of knowledge. But there is likewise another concept of philosophy, a conceptus cosmicus, which has always formed the real basis of the term 'philosophy', especially when it has been as it were personified and its archetype represented in the ideal philosopher. On this view, philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason.

1 [fehlerfreien.]
2 [Reading, with Rosenkrantz, welches for welche.]
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(teleologia rationis humanae), and the philosopher is not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason. In this sense of the term it would be very vainglorious to entitle oneself a philosopher, and to pretend to have equalled the pattern which exists in the idea alone.

The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician, however successful the two former may have been in their advances in the field of rational knowledge, and the two latter more especially in philosophical knowledge, are yet only artificers in the field of reason. There is a teacher, conceived in the ideal, who sets them their tasks, and employs them as instruments, to further the essential ends of human reason. Him alone we must call philosopher; but as he nowhere exists, while the idea of his legislation is to be found in that reason with which every human being is endowed, we shall keep entirely to the latter, determining more precisely what philosophy prescribes as regards systematic unity, in accordance with this cosmical concept, from the standpoint of its essential ends.

Essential ends are not as such the highest ends; in view of the demand of reason for complete systematic unity, only one of them can be so described. Essential ends are therefore either the ultimate end or subordinate ends which are necessarily connected with the former as means. The former is no other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy. On account of this superiority which moral philosophy has over all other occupations of reason, the ancients in their use of the term 'philosopher' always meant, more especially, the moralist; and even at the present day we are led by a certain analogy to entitle anyone a philosopher who appears to exhibit self-control under the guidance of reason, however limited his knowledge may be.

The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, and therefore contains not only

*lchen Zwecke der menschlichen Vernunft (teleologia rationis humanae), und der Philosoph ist nicht ein Vernunftkünstler, sondern der Gesetzgeber der menschlichen Vernunft. In solcher Bedeutung wäre es sehr ruhmredig, sich selbst einen Philosophen zu nennen, und sich anzumaßen, dem Urbilde, das nur in der Idee liegt, gleichgekommen zu sein.

Der Mathematiker, der Naturkundiger, der Logiker sind, so vortrefflich die ersteren auch überhaupt im Vernunfterkennen, die zweiten besonders im philosophischen Erkenntnisse Fortgang haben können, doch nur Vernunftkünstler. Es gibt noch einen Lehrer im Ideal, der alle diese ansetzt, sie als Werkzeuge nutzt, um die wesentlichen Zwecke der menschlichen Vernunft zu befördern. Diesen allein müßten wir den Philosophen nennen; aber, da er selbst doch nirgend, die Idee aber seiner Gesetzgebung allenthalben in jeder Menschenvernunft angetroffen wird, so wollen wir uns lediglich an der letzteren halten, und näher bestimmen, was Philosophie, nach diesem Weltbegriffe, für eine systematische Einheit aus den Standpunkte der Zwecke vorschreiben.

Wesentliche Zwecke sind darum noch nicht die höchsten, derein (bei vollkommener systematischer Einheit der Vernunft) nur ein einziger sein kann. Daher sind sie entweder der Endzweck; oder subalterne Zwecke, die zu jenem als Mittel notwendig gehören. Der erstere ist kein anderer, als die ganze Bestimmung des Menschen, und die Philosophie über dieselbe heißt Moral. Um dieses Vorzugs willen, den die Moralphilosophie vor aller anderen Vernunftbewerbung hat, verstand man auch bei den Alten unter dem Namen des Philosophen jederzeit zugleich und vorzüglich den Moralisten, und selbst macht der äußere Schein der Selbstbeherrschung durch Vernunft, daß man jemanden noch jetzt, bei seinem eingeschränkten Wissen, nach einer gewissen Analogie, Philosoph nennt.

Die Gesetzgebung der menschlichen Vernunft (Philosophie) hat nun zwei Gegenstände, Natur und Freiheit, und

* Weltbegriff heißt hier derjenige, der das betrifft, was jemanden notwendig interessiert; mithin bestimme ich 'die Absicht einer Wissenschaft nach Schultbegriffen', wenn sie nur als eine von den Geschicklichkeiten zu gewissen 'beliebigen Zwecken' angesehen wird.
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the law of nature, but also the moral law, presenting them at first in two distinct systems, but ultimately in one single philosophical system. The philosophy of nature deals with all that is, the philosophy of morals with that which ought to be.

All philosophy is either knowledge arising out of pure reason, or knowledge obtained by reason from empirical principles. The former is termed pure, the latter empirical philosophy.

The philosophy of pure reason is either a *proaedeutic* (preparation), which investigates the faculty of reason in respect of all its pure *a priori* knowledge, and is entitled *criticism*, or secondly, it is the system of pure reason, that is, the science which exhibits in systematic connection the whole body (true as well as illusory) of philosophical knowledge arising out of pure reason, and which is entitled *metaphysics*. The title 'metaphysics' may also, however, be given to the whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of criticism, and so as comprehending the investigation of all that can ever be known *a priori* as well as the exposition of that which constitutes a system of the pure philosophical modes of knowledge of this type—in distinction, therefore, from all empirical and from all mathematical employment of reason.

Metaphysics is divided into that of the *speculative* and that of the *practical* employment of pure reason, and is therefore either *metaphysics of nature or metaphysics of morals*. The former contains all the principles of pure reason that are derived from mere concepts (therefore excluding mathematics), and employed in the *theoretical* knowledge of all things; the latter, the principles which in *a priori* fashion determine and make necessary *all our actions*. Now morality is the only code of laws applying to our actions which can be derived completely *a priori* from principles. Accordingly, the metaphysics of morals is really pure moral philosophy, with no underlying basis of anthropology or of other empirical conditions. The term 'metaphysics', in its *strict* sense, is commonly reserved for the metaphysics of speculative reason. But as pure moral philosophy really forms part of this special

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1 [Kritik] 2 [das Tun und Lassen.] 3 [Reading, with the 4th edition, in eigenen Vorstande für im engeren Verstande.]
branch of human and philosophical knowledge derived from pure reason, we shall retain for it the title 'metaphysics'. We are not, however, at present concerned with it, and may therefore leave it aside.

It is of the utmost importance to isolate the various modes of knowledge according as they differ in kind and in origin, and to secure that they be not confounded owing to the fact that usually, in our employment of them, they are combined. What the chemist does in the analysis of substances, and the mathematician in his special disciplines, is in still greater degree incumbent upon the philosopher, that he may be able to determine with certainty the part which belongs to each special kind of knowledge in the diversified employment of the understanding and its special value and influence. Human reason, since it first began to think, or rather to reflect, has never been able to dispense with a metaphysics; but also has never been able to obtain it in a form sufficiently free from all foreign elements. The idea of such a science is as old as speculative human reason; and what rational being does not speculate, either in scholastic or in popular fashion? It must be admitted, however, that the two elements of our knowledge—that which is in our power \( ^1 \) completely a priori, and that which is obtainable only a posteriori from experience—have never been very clearly distinguished, not even by professional thinkers, and that they have therefore failed to bring about the delimitation of a special kind of knowledge, and thereby the true idea of the science which has preoccupied human reason so long and so greatly. When metaphysics was declared to be the science of the first principles of human knowledge, the intention was not to mark out a quite special kind of knowledge, but only a certain precedence in respect of generality, which was not sufficient to distinguish such knowledge from the empirical. For among empirical principles we can distinguish some that are more general, and so higher in rank than others; but where in such a series of subordinated members—a series in which we do not distinguish what is completely a priori from what is known only a posteriori—are we to draw the line which distinguishes the highest or first members from the lower subordinate members? What should we say, if in the

\[ ^1 \text{[Gewah.]} \]
reckoning of time we could distinguish the epochs of the world only by dividing them into the first centuries and those that follow? We should ask: Does the fifth, the tenth century, etc., belong with the first centuries? So in like manner I ask: Does the concept of the extended belong to metaphysics? You answer, Yes. Then, that of body too? Yes. And that of fluid body? You now become perplexed; for at this rate everything will belong to metaphysics. It is evident, therefore, that the mere degree of subordination (of the particular under the general) cannot determine the limits of a science; in the case under consideration, only complete difference of kind and of origin will suffice. But the fundamental idea of metaphysics was obscured on yet another side, owing to its exhibiting, as a priori knowledge, a certain similarity to mathematics. Certainly they are related, in so far as they both have an a priori origin; but when we bear in mind the difference between philosophical and mathematical knowledge, namely, that the one is derived from concepts, whereas in the other we arrive at a priori judgments only through the construction of concepts, we have to recognise a decided difference of kind, which has indeed always been in a manner felt but could never be defined by means of any clear criteria. Thus it has come about that since philosophers failed in the task of developing even the idea of their science, they could have no determinate end or secure guidance in the elaboration of it, and, accordingly, in this arbitrarily conceived enterprise, ignorant as they were of the path to be taken, they have always been at odds with one another as regards the discoveries which each claimed to have made on his own separate path, with the result that their science has been brought into contempt, first among outsiders, and finally even among themselves.

All pure a priori knowledge, owing to the special faculty of knowledge in which alone it can originate, has in itself a peculiar unity; and metaphysics is the philosophy which has as its task the statement of that knowledge in this systematic unity. Its speculative part, which has especially appropriated this name, namely, what we entitle metaphysics of nature, and which considers everything in so far as it is (not that which

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1 [Reading, with Erdmann, das Besondere for das Besondere.]
ought to be) by means of a priori concepts, is divided in the following manner.

Metaphysics, in the narrower meaning of the term, consists of transcendental philosophy and physiology of pure reason. The former treats only of the understanding and of reason, in a system of concepts and principles which relate to objects in general but take no account of objects that may be given (Ontologia); the latter treats of nature, that is, of the sum of given objects (whether given to the senses, or, if we will, to some other kind of intuition) and is therefore physiology—although only rationalis. The employment of reason in this rational study of nature is either physical or hyperphysical, or, in more adequate terms, is either immanent or transcendent. The former is concerned with such knowledge of nature as can be applied in experience (in concreto), the latter with that connection of objects of experience which transcends all experience. This transcendental physiology has as its object either an inner connection or an outer connection, both, however, transcending possible experience. As dealing with an inner connection it is the physiology of nature as a whole, that is, the transcendental knowledge of the world; as dealing with an outer connection, it is the physiology of the relation of nature as a whole to a being above nature, that is to say, it is the transcendental knowledge of God.

Immanent physiology, on the other hand, views nature as the sum of all objects of the senses, and therefore just as it is given us, but solely in accordance with a priori conditions, under which alone it can ever be given us. There are only two kinds of such objects. 1. Those of the outer senses, and so their sum, corporeal nature. 2. The object of inner sense, the soul, and in accordance with our fundamental concepts of it, thinking nature. The metaphysics of corporeal nature is entitled physics; and as it must contain only the principles of an a priori knowledge of it, rational physics. The metaphysics of thinking nature is entitled psychology, and on the same ground is to be understood as being only the rational knowledge of it.

The whole system of metaphysics thus consists of four main parts: (1) ontology; (2) rational physiology; (3) rational cosmology; (4) rational theology. The second part, namely,

soll), aus Begriffen a priori erwählt, wird nun auf folgende Art eingeteilt.

Die im engeren Verstande so genannte Metaphysik besteht aus der Transzendentalphilosophie und der Physiologie der reinen Vernunft. Die erstere betrachtet nur den Verstand, und Vernunft selbst in einem System aller Begriffe und Grundsätze, die sich auf Gegenstände überhaupt beziehen, ohne Objekte anzunehmen, die gegeben wären (ontologia); die zweite betrachtet Natur, d. i. den Inbegriff gegebener Gegenstände (sie mögen nun den Sinnen, oder, wenn man will, einer andern Art von Anschauung gegeben sein), und ist also Physiologie (obgleich nur rationalis). Nun ist aber der Gebrauch der Vernunft in dieser rationalen Naturbetrachtung entweder physisch, oder hyperphysisch, oder besser, entweder immanent oder transzendent. Der erstere geht auf die Natur, so weit als ihre Kenntnis in der Erfahrung (in concreto) kann angewandt werden, der zweite auf diejenige Verknüpfung der Gegenstände der Erfahrung, welche alle Erfahrung übersteigt. Diese transzendenten Physiologie hat daher entweder eine innere Verknüpfung, oder äußere, die aber beide über mögliche Erfahrung hinausgehen, zu ihrem Gegenstande; jene ist die Physiologie der gesamten Natur, d. i. die transzendentale Welterkenntnis, diese des Zusammenhanges der gesamten Natur mit einem Wesen über der Natur, d. i. die transzendentale Gotteserkenntnis.


Demnach besteht das ganze System der Metaphysik aus vier Hauptteilen: 1. Der Ontologie. 2. Der rationalen Physiologie. 3. Der rationalen Kosmologie. 4. Der rationalen Theologie. Der zweite Teil, nämlich die Na-
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the doctrine of nature as developed by pure reason, contains two divisions, *physica rationalis* and *psychologia rationalis*. The originative idea of a philosophy of pure reason itself prescribes this division, which is therefore *architectonic*, in accordance with the essential ends of reason, and not merely *technical*, in accordance with accidentally observed similarities, and so instituted as it were at haphazard. Accordingly the division is also unchangeable and of legislative authority. There are, however, some points which may well seem doubtful, and may weaken our conviction as to the legitimacy of its claims.

First of all, how can I expect to have knowledge *a priori* (and therefore a metaphysics) of objects in so far as they are given to our senses, that is, given in an *a posteriori* manner? And how is it possible to know the nature of things and to arrive at a rational physiology according to principles *a priori*? The answer is this: we take nothing more from experience than is required to *give us* an object of outer or of inner sense. The object of outer sense we obtain through the mere concept of matter (impenetrable, lifeless extension), the object of inner sense through the concept of a thinking being (in the empirical inner representation, 'I think'). As to the rest, in the whole metaphysical treatment of these objects, we must entirely dispense with all empirical principles which do not add to these concepts any other more special experience, with a view to our passing further judgments upon the objects.

Secondly, how are we to regard *empirical psychology*,

* I must not be taken as meaning thereby what is commonly called *physica generalis*; the latter is rather mathematics than philosophy of nature. The metaphysics of nature is quite distinct from mathematics. It is very far from enlarging our knowledge in the fruitful manner of mathematics, but still is very important as yielding a criticism of the pure knowledge of understanding in its application to nature. For lack of it, even mathematicians, holding to certain common concepts, which though common are yet in fact metaphysical, have unconsciously encumbered their doctrine of nature with hypotheses which vanish upon criticism of the principles involved, without, however, doing the least injury to the employment of mathematics—employment which is quite indispensable in this field.

* [ursprüngliche]
which has always claimed its place in metaphysics, and from which in our times such great things have been expected for the advancement of metaphysics, the hope of succeeding by \textit{a priori} methods having been abandoned. I answer that it belongs where the proper (empirical) doctrine of nature belongs, namely, by the side of \textit{applied} philosophy, the \textit{a priori} principles of which are contained in pure philosophy; it is therefore so far connected with applied philosophy, though not to be confounded with it. Empirical psychology is thus completely banished from the domain of metaphysics; it is indeed already completely excluded by the very idea of the latter science. In conformity, however, with scholastic usage we must allow it some sort of a place (although as an episode only) in metaphysics, and this from economical motives, because it is not yet so rich as to be able to form a subject of study by itself, and yet is too important to be entirely excluded and forced to settle elsewhere, in a neighbourhood that might well prove much less congenial than that of metaphysics. Though it is but a stranger it has long been accepted as a member of the household, and we allow it to stay for some time longer, until it is in a position to set up an establishment of its own in a complete anthropology, the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature.

Such, then, in general, is the idea of metaphysics. At first more was expected from metaphysics than could reasonably be demanded, and for some time it diverted itself with pleasant anticipations. But these hopes having proved deceptive, it has now fallen into general disrepute. The argument of our Critique, taken as a whole, must have sufficiently convinced the reader that although metaphysics cannot be the foundation of religion, it must always continue to be a bulwark of it, and that human reason, being by its very nature dialectical, can never dispense with such a science, which curbs it, and by a scientific and completely convincing self-knowledge, prevents the devastations of which a lawless speculative reason would otherwise quite inevitably be guilty in the field of morals as well as in that of religion. We can therefore be sure that however cold or contemptuously critical may be the attitude of those who judge a science not by its nature but by its accidental effects, we shall always return to metaphysics as to a beloved one with whom we have had a quarrel. For here we are
concerned with essential ends—ends with which metaphysics must ceaselessly occupy itself, either in striving for genuine insight into them, or in refuting those who profess already to have attained it.

Metaphysics, alike of nature and of morals, and especially that criticism of our adventurous and self-reliant reason which serves as an introduction or propaedeutic to metaphysics, alone properly constitutes what may be entitled philosophy, in the strict sense of the term. Its sole preoccupation is wisdom; and it seeks it by the path of science, which, once it has been trodden, can never be overgrown, and permits of no wandering. Mathematics, natural science, even our empirical knowledge, have a high value as means, for the most part, to contingent ends, but also, in the ultimate outcome, to ends that are necessary and essential to humanity. This latter service, however, they can discharge only as they are aided by a knowledge through reason from pure concepts, which, however we may choose to entitle it, is really nothing but metaphysics.

For the same reason metaphysics is also the full and complete development of human reason. Quite apart from its influence, as science, in connection with certain specific ends, it is an indispensable discipline. For in dealing with reason it treats of those elements and highest maxims which must form the basis of the very possibility of some sciences, and of the use of all. That, as mere speculation, it serves rather to prevent errors than to extend knowledge, does not detract from its value. On the contrary this gives it dignity and authority, through that censorship which secures general order and harmony, and indeed the well-being of the scientific commonwealth, preventing those who labour courageously and fruitfully on its behalf from losing sight of the supreme end, the happiness of all mankind.

1 [die Vollendung aller Kultur.]

Zwecke betrifft; rastlos, entweder auf gründliche Einsicht oder Zerstörung schon vorhandener guten Einsichten arbeiten muß. Metaphysik also, sowohl der Natur, als der Sitten, vornehmlich die Kritik der sich auf eigenen Flügeln wagenden Vernunft, welche vorüber (propädeutisch) vorhergeht, machen: eigentlich allein dasjenige aus, was wir im echten Verstande Philosophie nennen können. Diese bezieht alles auf Weisheit; aber durch den Weg der Wissenschaft; den einzigen, der, wenn er einmal gebahnt ist, niemals verwächst, und keine Verirrungen verstattet. Mathematik, Naturwissenschaft, selbst die empirische Kenntnis des Menschen haben einen hohen Wert: als Mittel, größtenteils zu zufälligen, am Ende aber doch: zu notwendigen und wesentlichen Zwecken der Menschheit, aber alsdenn nur durch Vermittlung einer Vernunftkenntnis aus bloßen Begriffen, die, man mag sie benennen wie man will, eigentlich nichts als Metaphysik ist.

Eben deswegen ist Metaphysik auch die Vollendung aller Kultur der menschlichen Vernunft, die unentbehrlich ist, wenn man gleich ihren Einfluß, als Wissenschaft, auf gewisse bestimmte Zwecke bei: Denn sie betrachtet die Vernunft nach ihren Elementen und obersten Maximen, die selbst der Möglichkeit einiger Wissenschaften, und dem Gebrauche der, zum Grunde liegen müssen. Daß sie, als bloße Spekulation, mehr dazu dient, Irrtümer abzuhalten, als Erkenntnis zu erweitern, tut ihrem Werte keinen Abbruch, sondern gibt ihr vielmehr Würde und Ansehen durch das Zensoramt, welches die allgemeine Ordnung und Eintracht, ja den Wohlstand des wissenschaftlichen gemeinen Wesens sichert, und dessen mutige und fruchtbare Bearbeitungen abhält, sich nicht von dem Hauptzwecke, der allgemeinen Glückseligkeit, zu entfernen.
A 854) THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD

CHAPTER IV

THE HISTORY OF PURE REASON

THIS title stands here only in order to indicate one remaining division of the system, which future workers must complete. I content myself with casting a cursory glance, from a purely transcendental point of view, namely, that of the nature of pure reason, on the works of those who have laboured in this field—a glance which reveals [many stately] structures, but in ruins only.

It is a very notable fact, although it could not have been otherwise, that in the infancy of philosophy men began where we should incline to end, namely, with the knowledge of God, occupying themselves with the hope, or rather indeed with the specific nature, of another world. However gross the religious concepts generated by the ancient practices which still persisted in each community from an earlier more barbarous state, this did not prevent the more enlightened members from devoting themselves to free investigation of these matters; and they easily discerned that there could be no better ground¹ or more dependable way of pleasing the invisible power that governs the world, and so of being happy in another world at least, than by living the good life. Accordingly theology and morals were the two motives, or rather the two points of reference, in all those abstract enquiries of reason to which men came to devote themselves. It was chiefly, however, the former that step by step committed the purely speculative reason to those labours which afterwards became so renowned under the name of metaphysics.

¹ [Reading, with Rosenkrantz, grundlichere for grundliche.]

B 387)

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VIERTES HAUPTSTÜCK

DIE GESCHICHTE DER REINEN VERUNNUT

Dieser Titel steht nur hier, um eine Stelle zu bezeichnen, die im System übrig bleibt, und künftig ausgefüllt werden muß. Ich begnüge mich, aus einem bloß transzendentalen Gesichtspunkte, nämlich der Natur der reinen Vernunft, einen flüchtigen Blick auf das Ganze der bisherigen Bearbeitungen derselben zu werfen, welches freilich meinem Auge zwar Gebäude, aber nur in Ruinen vorstellt.

Es ist merkwürdig genug, ob es gleich natürlicherweise nicht anders zugehen konnte, daß die Menschen im Kindesalter der Philosophie davon anfingen, wo wir jetzt lieber endigen möchten, nämlich, zuerst die Erkenntnis Gottes, und die Hoffnung oder wohl gar die Beschaffenheit einer andern Welt zu studieren. Was auch die alten Gebräuche, die noch von dem rohen Zustande der Völker übrig waren, für grobe Religionsbegriffe eingeführt haben mochten, so hinderte dieses doch nicht den aufgeklärten Teil, sich freien Nachforschungen über diesen Gegenstand zu widmen, und man sahe leicht ein, daß es keine gründliche und zuverlässigere Art geben könne, der unsichtbaren Macht, die die Welt regiert, zu getallen, um wenigstens in einer andern Welt glücklich zu sein, als dem guten Lebenswandel. Daher waren Theologie und Moral die zwei Triebfedern, oder, besser, Beziehungspunkte zu allen abgezogenen Vernunftforschungen, denen man sich nachher jederzeit gewidmet hat. Die erstere war indessen eigentlich das, was die bloß spekulative Vernunft nach und nach in das Gattion zog, welches in der Folge unter dem Namen der Metaphysik so berühmt geworden.

¹ Zusatz von B.
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I shall not here attempt to distinguish the periods of history in which this or that change in metaphysics came about, but shall only give a cursory sketch of the various ideas which gave rise to the chief revolutions [in metaphysical theory]. And here I find that there are three issues in regard to which the most noteworthy changes have taken place in the course of the resulting controversies.

1. In respect of the object of all our 'knowledge through reason', some have been mere sensualists, others mere intellectualists. Epicurus may be regarded as the outstanding philosopher among the former, and Plato among the latter. The distinction between the two schools, subtle as it is, dates from the earliest times; and the two positions have ever since been maintained in unbroken continuity. Those of the former school maintained that reality is to be found solely in the objects of the senses, and that all else is fiction; those of the latter school, on the other hand, declared that in the senses there is nothing but illusion, and that only the understanding knows what is true. The former did not indeed deny reality to the concepts of the understanding; but this reality was for them merely logical, whereas for the others it was mystical. The former conceded intellectual concepts, but admitted sensible objects only. The latter required that true objects should be purely intelligible, and maintained that by means of the pure understanding we have an intuition that is unaccompanied by the senses—the senses, in their view, serving only to confuse the understanding.

2. In respect of the origin of the modes of 'knowledge through pure reason', the question is as to whether they are derived from experience, or whether in independence of experience they have their origin in reason. Aristotle may be regarded as the chief of the empiricists, and Plato as the chief of the noologists. Locke, who in modern times followed Aristotle, and Leibniz, who followed Plato (although in considerable disagreement with his mystical system), have not been able to bring this conflict to any definitive conclusion. However we may regard Epicurus, he was at least much more consistent in this sensual system than Aristotle and Locke, inasmuch as he never sought to pass by inference beyond the limits of experience. This is especially true as regards Locke,

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Ich will jetzt die Zeiten nicht unterscheiden, auf welche diese oder jene Veränderung der Metaphysik traf, sondern nur die Verschiedenheit der Idee, welche die hauptsächlichsten Revolutionen veranlaßte, in einem flüchtigen Abriß darstellen. Und da finde ich eine dreifache Absicht, in welcher die namhaftesten Veränderungen auf dieser Bühne des Streits gestiftet worden.


KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

who, after having derived all concepts and principles from experience, goes so far in the use of them as to assert that we can prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul with the same conclusiveness as any mathematical proposition—though both lie entirely outside the limits of possible experience.

3. In respect of method.—If anything is to receive the title of method, it must be a procedure in accordance with principles. We may divide the methods now prevailing in this field of enquiry into the naturalistic and the scientific. The naturalist of pure reason adopts as his principle that through common reason, without science, that is, through what he calls sound reason, he is able, in regard to those most sublime questions which form the problem of metaphysics, to achieve more than is possible through speculation. Thus he is virtually asserting that we can determine the size and distance of the moon with greater certainty by the naked eye than by mathematical devices. This is mere misology, reduced to principles; and what is most absurd of all, the neglect of all artificial means is eulogised as a special method of extending our knowledge. For as regards those who are naturalists from lack of more insight, they cannot rightly be blamed. They follow common reason, without boasting of their ignorance as a method which contains the secret how we are to fetch truth from the deep well of Democritus. Quod sapio, satis est mihi; non ego curio, esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones is the motto with which they may lead a cheerful and praiseworthy life, not troubling themselves about science, nor by their interference bringing it into confusion.

As regards those who adopt a scientific method, they have the choice of proceeding either dogmatically or sceptically; but in any case they are under obligation to proceed systematically. I may cite the celebrated Wolff as a representative of the former mode of procedure, and David Hume as a representative of the latter, and may then, conformably with my present purpose, leave all others unnamed. The critical path alone is still open. If the reader has had the courtesy and patience to accompany me along this path, he may now judge for himself whether, if he cares to lend his aid in making this

a Persius [Sat. iii 78-79].

Geschichte der reinen Vernunft

nachdem er alle Begriffe und Grundsätze von der Erfahrung abgeleitet hatte, so weit im Gebrauch derselben geht, daß er behauptet, man könne das Dasein Gottes und die Unsterblichkeit der Seele (obzwar beide Gegenstände ganz außer den Grenzen möglicher Erfahrung liegen) ebenso evident beweisen, als irgend einen mathematischen Lehrsatz.

3. In Ansehung der Methode. Wenn man etwas Methode nennen soll, so muß es ein Verfahren nach Grundsätzen sein. Nun kann man die jetzt in diesem Fache der Nachforschung herrschende Methode in die naturalistische und dievol vol . . . siche teilen. Der Naturalist der reinen Vernunft nimmt es sich zum Grundsatz: daß durch gemeine Vernunft ohne Wissenschaft (welche er die gesunde Vernunft nennt) sich in Ansehung der erhabensten Fragen, die die Aufgabe der Metaphysik ausmachen, mehr ausrichten lasse, als durch Spekulation. Er behauptet also, daß man die Größe und Weite des Mondes sicherer nach dem Augenmaße, als durch mathematische Umschweife bestimmen könne. Es ist bloße Misologie, auf Grundsätze gebraucht, und, welches das Ungereimteste ist, die Vernachlässigung aller künstlichen Mittel, als eine eigene Methode angerühmt, seine Erkenntnis zu erweitern. Denn was die Naturalisten aus Mangel mehrerer Einsicht betrifft, so kann man ihnen mit Grunde nichts zur Last legen. Sie folgen der gemeinen Vernunft, ohne sich ihrer Unwissenheit als einer Methode zu rühmen, die das Geheimnis enthält solle, die Wahrheit aus dem tiefen Brunnen herauszuholen. Quod sapio; satis est mihi; non ego curio, esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones, Pers., ist ihr Wahlspruch, bei dem sie vergnügt und beifalls würdig lieben können, ohne sich um die Wissenschaft zu bekümmern, noch deren Geschäfte zu verwirren.

Was nun die Beobachter einer systematischen Methode betrifft, so haben sie hier die Wahl, entweder dogmatisch oder skeptisch, in allen Fällen aber doch die Verbindlichkeit, systematisch zu verfahren. Wenn ich hier in Ansehung der ersteren den berühmten Wolff, bei der zweiten David Hume nenne, so kann ich die übrigen, meiner jetzigen Absicht nach, ungenannt lassen. Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen. Wenn der Leser diesen in meiner Gesellschaft durchzuwandern Gefälligkeit und Geduld gehabt hat, so mag er jetzt urteilen, ob nicht, wenn es ihm beliebt, das Seinige dazu beizutragen, um diesen Pfisteg...
path into a high-road, it may not be possible to achieve before the end of the present century what many centuries have not been able to accomplish; namely, to secure for human reason complete satisfaction in regard to that with which it has all along so eagerly occupied itself, though hitherto in vain.
Die neue Ausgabe der Werke Immanuel Kants trägt den Charakter einer Studienausgabe. Sie hat daher eine doppelte Aufgabe zu erfüllen: sie muß sich so eng wie möglich an die Originalfassung der Werke Kants anschließen, und sie muß sich gleichwohl bemühen, die Schwierigkeiten, die von der äußeren Gestalt des Textes her den Zugang zum Werke Kants behindern, soweit wie möglich zu erleichtern.

Diesen Ansprüchen kann keine der bisherigen Ausgaben völlig genügen. Entweder wird der Versuch unternommen, bis in die Einzelheiten hinein die Eigentümlichkeiten des Originals wiederzugeben. Das ist etwa das Bemühen der Akademie-Ausgabe, die sich bis hin zu den Eigenheiten der Schreibweise weitgehend an die Originale anlehnt, überdies einen umfangreichen, allerdings nicht vollständigen Apparat mit Lesarten und Konjekturen anfügt, in der Zeichensetzung jedoch neueren Gesichtspunkten folgt und damit gelegentlich den Kantischen Sätzen eine bestimmte, eigenwillige Auslegung gibt. Der andere Versuch besteht darin, nicht nur Zeichensetzung, sondern auch Rechtschreibung und Sprachlaut weitgehend zu modernisieren und dadurch einen gut lesbaren Text zu geben. Das ist etwa die Absicht der früheren Insel-Ausgabe gewesen. Dem scheint entgegenzukommen, daß viele Einzelheiten in den Originalausgaben der Werke Kants aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach auf die Arbeit der Setzer zurückgehen, und daß ferner aus den wenigen noch erhaltenen Manuskripten Kants und aus seinen Briefen keine eindeutigen und durchgängigen Regeln für die Eigenheiten seiner Schreibart und Zeichensetzung zu entnehmen sind, überdies auch fraglich bleibt, ob aus Briefen und Vorlesungsmanuskripten ohne weiteres auf die Form der Werke geschlossen werden kann. Sind so gewisse Eingriffe in die äußere Textgestalt notwendig, so ist es doch bei so weitgehenden Änderungen, wie sie die frühere Insel-Ausgabe vornimmt, unvermeidlich, daß Klang und Rhythmus der Sprache Kants beeinträchtigt werden und der Sinn seiner Aussagen durch die mit der Modernisierung von Schreibart und Zeichensetzung unausbleiblich verkürzte Auslegung zuweilen verändert wird.

Eine in die Einzelheiten gehende Rechtfertigung der Editionsgrundsätze wird der Schlußband der Ausgabe bringen, dem ein Band mit einem umfassenden Register der von Kant erwähnten Personen sowie der wichtigsten Begriffe aus seinen Werken folgen wird.


Für unermüdliche Hilfe schuldet der Herausgeber den Mitarbeitern Dr. Käte Weischedel, Dr. Norbert Hinske, Dr. Johannes Müller und cand.phil. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, für freundliche Unterstützung bei der Beschaffung der Originale den Universitätsbibliotheken Göttingen, Heidelberg, Marburg und vor allem Berlin (Freie Universität) besonderen Dank.

Wilhelm Weischedel
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