

LA PSYCHANALYSE VRAIE ET FAUSSE by Jacques Lacan.

Argument d'une communication pour un congrès tenu à Barcelone en Septembre 1958

LA PSYCHANALYSE VRAIE ET FAUSSE	True and False Psychoanalysis	True Psychoanalysis, and False
French text is from 'Pas-tout Lacan'	Translation of Duane Rouselle The editors of the journal (Re)-Turn reneged on their promise to the translator to publish this translation in the next issue of the their journal.	Translation of Adrian Price from Hurly Burly #Issue 11 May 2014
Cet exposé fut soumis à la censure qui refusa de le publier dans les actes du congrès. C'est seulement en 1992 que le texte de cette conférence – écrit en Juin 1958 – sera publié pour la première fois par la revue Freudiana, à la fois dans sa version originale et sa traduction espagnole (Freudiana, publicacion de le Escuela europea de psicoanalisis del campo freudiano, Cataluna, Paidos, 1992, n° 4/5, pp. 11-21). La présente version est parue dans l'Âne, 1992, n° 51, pp. 24 à 27.	This conference paper, which was originally written in June of 1958, was rejected for publication. Consequently it was not published in its original French version until 1992 (in Freudiana, along with a Spanish translation). The current 2013 translation is based off of the French version which appeared in l'Âne, 1992, No. 51, p.24 to 27. <i>I have taken some liberties with my translation of the original text (which include slight adjustments to the punctuation and sentence structure) so as to facilitate a transmission to a general audience.</i>	
24)1.– Pour distinguer la vraie psychanalyse de la fausse, on se réfère à une notion de la psychanalyse authentique, et à une notion d'une psychanalyse conforme à la vérité manifestée par son expérience. S'il s'agit pourtant ici de vérité à proprement parler, c'est qu'autant dans l'ordre de sa découverte que dans celui où elle opère à des	1.To distinguish true psychoanalysis from false psychoanalysis requires a concept of "authentic psychoanalysis" as well as a notion of psychoanalytic truth which can be validated through clinincial experience. If, however, truth strictly speaks, then it is so that, within the order of its exposure, and where it	1.To distinguish between true and false psychoanalysis we refer to a notion of authentic psychoanalysis, and to a notion of a psychoanalysis that conforms to the truth that is manifested by the experience it entails. What is at issue here, however, is truth as such, in so far as both in the realm of its

fins curatives, le rapport de l'homme à la vérité est dominant.	operates for curative purposes, the relationship of man to truth is dominant.	discovery and in the realm in which it operates with curative aims, man's relationship to truth predominates.
Ainsi la psychanalyse fautive ne l'est pas seulement du fait de s'écarter du champ qui motive son procédé. Cet écart, quelles qu'en soient les intentions effectives, exige un oubli ou une méconnaissance. Et l'un et l'autre la condamnent à des effets pernicieux.	Thus false psychoanalysis occurs when we depart from the scope which motivates this process of bringing the relationship of man to truth. When this occurs, regardless of the actual intention, it is because of an oversight or a misunderstanding. In either case, the effect is pernicious.	False psychoanalysis is therefore false not just because it departs from the field that accounts for its procedure. Whatever its actual intentions may be, this departure implies forgetting or misjudging, both of which condemn it to pernicious effects.
LA CAUSALITÉ LOGIQUE	THE CAUSAL LOGIC	
2.– La psychanalyse vraie a son fondement dans le rapport de l'homme à la parole. Cette détermination dont l'énoncé est évident, est l'axe par rapport auquel doivent être jugés et jaugés ses effets : ceux-ci étant entendus dans leur extension la plus générale, à savoir non seulement comme changements diversement bénéfiques, mais comme révélation d'un ordre effectif dans des faits jusqu'alors restés inexplicables, à vrai dire apparition de faits nouveaux.	2. True psychoanalysis has its foundation in the relationship (<i>rapport</i>) of man to speech (<i>parole</i>). The determination of the statement is the axis around which we judge and gauge psychoanalysis's effects : the latter being understood only in its broadest extension (i.e., not only as various beneficial changes in the analysand but also as the revelation of the effective structure of facts that hitherto remained explicable to the analysand, these are the really new facts.)	2. True psychoanalysis has its foundation in man's relation to speech. This determination, expressed as it is in a self-evident statement, is the axis according to which its effects must be judged and gauged, effects which are to be understood in the widest possible sense, that is, not only as changes that are beneficial in various ways, but as revealing an indisputable order in hitherto inexplicable facts, which ought truly to be called the appearance of new facts.
Ce rapport de l'homme à la parole est évident dans le médium de la psychanalyse : ce qui rend d'autant plus extraordinaire qu'on le néglige dans son fondement	The relation (<i>rapport</i>) of man to speech (<i>parole</i>) is evident in the medium of psychoanalysis : this makes it all the more extraordinary that some neglect its foundation.	Man's relation to speech is patent in the medium of psychoanalysis, which makes it all the more extraordinary that people

		should neglect it in its foundations.
<p>Mais il s'agit d'un cercle, car à ne pas reconnaître le fondement, on cherche ailleurs le médium : à savoir dans on ne sait quel affect immédiat, véritable délire à couvrir une action par où l'homme approche peut-être au plus près du foyer constituant de la raison. C'est le spectacle que nous offre la psychanalyse en tant qu'elle cherche à se justifier des méthodes des disciplines coexistantes en son champ, ce qu'elle ne fait qu'au prix de substantifications mythiques et d'alibis fallacieux.</p>	<p>But it is a circle, if we do not recognize the foundation then we do not seek to understand the medium : with what a knowledge (savoir) does man's immediate affects, known through his veritable ravings, become exposed through his constituent reason. This is the scene we provide for psychoanalysis as it seeks to justify it methods within the scope of its co-existing disciplines, which it does at the cost of mythical substantifications and false alibis.</p>	<p>But this is ultimately a circle, since failing to recognize it foundations means that its medium is sought elsewhere, namely, in some immediate affect or other, which is an utter delusion, covering up as it does an action through which man perhaps comes closest to the core that constitutes reason. Hence the spectacle that psychoanalysis makes of itself in attempting to justify resorting to the methods of coexisting disciplines in its field, which it does solely at the cost of mythical substantifications and spurious alibis.</p>
<p>. Que le substrat biologique du sujet soit dans l'analyse intéressé jusqu'en son fonds, n'implique nullement que la causalité qu'elle découvre y soit réductible au biologique. Ce qu'indique la notion, primordiale dans Freud, de surdétermination, jamais élucidée jusqu'à présent.</p>	<p>This causality of th subject is not reducible to the biological substrate of the subject. This was indicated to us by the essential Freudian concept of overdetermination (<i>surdétermination</i>), a concept which has remained unexplained until now</p>	<p>The fact that the subject's biological substrate is implicated in analysis at its deepest level on no account implies that the causality it discovers can be reduced to a biological dimension here. This is what is implied by the notion overdetermination, which is fundamental in in Freud's work but has never been elucidated until now.</p>
<p>Qu'on ne croie pas pour autant trouver ici la position dite culturaliste. Car pour autant qu'elle se réfère à un critère social de la norme psychique, elle contredit encore plus l'ordre découvert par Freud en ce qu'il montre</p>	<p>We do not believe that we are supporting the so-called culturalist position. As long as our position continues to refer to a social criterion of psychical standards the nit still contradicts the discoveries of Freud which radically</p>	<p>Which should not, however, lead us to conclude as to the so-called cultural position. For inasmuch as the latter refers to a social criterion of psychical normality, it is even more at odds with the realm discovered by Freud in that</p>

d'antériorité radicale par rapport au social ¹ .	antedates the relation (<i>rapport</i>) to the social. ²	it radically precedes this social dimension ¹ .
1 Cf Totem et Tabou	2 Cf. Totem and Taboo	1 Cf. Freud, S. "Totem and Taboo", the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XIII, transl. J. Strachey, Hogarth Press, London, 1995.
3.– À revenir à l'émergence (dans la génialité de Freud) de l'interprétation (<i>Deutung</i>) des rêves, de la psychopathologie quotidienne et du trait d'esprit, soit au registre de ce qui dès lors vient au jour de la connaissance et de la praxis sous le nom d'inconscient, on reconnaît que ce sont les lois et les effets propres au langage qui en constituent la causalité ; causalité qu'il faut dire logique plutôt que psychique, si l'on donne à logique l'acception des effets du logos et non pas seulement du principe de contradiction.	3.To return the emergence (within the genius of Freud) of the interpretation (<i>Deutung</i>) of dreams, of the psychopathology of everyday life and of wit, is to record that which comes to light through knowledge (connaissance) and praxis in the name of the unconscious. It is recognized in the laws and specific effects of language which is its constituent causality ; causality must be logically spoken (<i>dire</i>), and psychoanalysis must provide this logical sense.	If we now return to the dawn (in Freud's genius) of the interpretation (<i>Deutung</i>) of dreams of everyday psychopathology, and the flash of wit, that is to say, to the register of what thereupon comes to the light of cognisance and praxis under the term of the unconscious, one discerns that it is the laws and the effects that are specific to language that constitutes its causality, a causality that , if we take logic to mean not only the principle of contradiction but also the effects of the Logos, must be called logical rather than psychical.
Les mécanismes dits du condensé (<i>Verdichtung</i>) et du virement (<i>Verschiebung</i>) recouvrent exactement les (26)structures par où s'exercent dans le langage les effets de métaphore et de métonymie. C'est-à-dire les deux modes où la construction la plus récente de la théorie linguistique (Roman Jakobson et consort ³) subsume dans une structure spécifique (impossible à retrancher	The so-called condensation (<i>Verdichtung</i>) and displacement (<i>Verschiebung</i>) mechanisms explain precisely the structures which exert effects through language, that is, metaphor and metonymy. This is to claim that recent linguistic theory (Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle ⁴ subsumes a specific structure (impossible to reduce to the physiological function but rather puts it to the service of a living language) of the	The mechanisms known as condensation (<i>Verdichtung</i>) and transferral (<i>Verschiebung</i>) neatly cover the structures by which the effects of metaphor and metonymy are brought about in language, that is to say, the two modes whereby the most recent construction in linguistic theory (Roman Jakobson and consort ²) subsumes the particular action of the signifier into a specific

<p>même du fonctionnement physiologique des appareils mis dans le vivant au service du langage), l'action propre du signifiant, en tant qu'il faut considérer cette action comme engendrant la signification dans le sujet dont elle s'empare, en le marquant comme signifié.</p> <p>3 Cf. <i>Fundamentals of Language</i>, de Roman Jakobson et Morris Halle, 1956</p>	<p>activities of the subject into one which generates meaning in the subject by seizing the signifier to a signified.</p> <p>4 Cf. <i>Fundamentals of Language</i>, Roman Jakobson and Morris Hall, 1956</p>	<p>structure (which is impossible to separate even from the physiological functioning of the systems that in the living being, are put at the service of language), inasmuch as this action should be considered to be what generates signification in the subject that it appropriates on marking him as a signified.</p> <p>2 Cf. Jakobson, R. and Halle, M., <i>Fundamentals of Language</i>, Mouton, The Hague, 1956.</p>
<p>Il ne s'agit pas ici de l'Anschluss par où l'on tente aujourd'hui de faire rentrer la psychanalyse dans une psychologie perpétuant un héritage académique sous l'étiquette de psychologie générale, – voire de l'assimiler aux plus récentes assomptions de la matière humaine sous les rubriques variées de la sociologie.</p>	<p>It is not a question here of the <i>Anschluss</i> by which we now attempt to enter psychoanalysis through psychology, thereby perpetuating an academic heritage under the label of <i>general psychology</i> – or to assimilate the latest assumptions to the various rubrics of sociology.</p>	<p>This has nothing to do with the Anschluss by way of which people have lately been trying to include psychoanalysis into a branch of psychology that perpetuates academic heritage under the label of general psychology, indeed, to liken it to the most recent assumption of human matter in the various subsections of sociology.</p>
<p>Il s'agit de la lecture suggestive de l'anticipation, faite par Freud dans l'analyse de l'inconscient, des formules mêmes où Ferdinand de Saussure, dix ans après la <i>Traumdeutung</i>, fonde l'analyse des langues positives. Car la linguistique a déplacé le centre de gravité des sciences, dont le titre, singulièrement inactuel d'être promu depuis lors de sciences humaines, conserve un anthropocentrisme dont Freud a affirmé que sa</p>	<p>It is suggestive that this reading was anticipated by Freud in his analysis of the unconscious, and that they reveal the same formulas as Ferdinand de Saussure ; one can notice it as early as the <i>Traumdeutung</i> and its analysis of language. Language has shifted the center of gravity in the human sciences but it retains that anthropocentrism of which Freud's discovery claimed to have ruined the last stronghold by denouncing the autonomy of the conscious</p>	<p>It has to do with the suggestive reading of Freud's anticipation, in his analysis of the unconscious, of the very formulas with which Ferdinand de Saussure, ten years after the <i>Traumdeutung</i>, founded the analysis of positive languages. For linguistics has shifted the centre of gravity of the sciences, whose title, singularly outmoded for having been since then promoted to the rank of human sciences,</p>

<p>découverte ruinait le dernier bastion – en dénonçant l'autonomie où le sujet conscient des philosophes maintenait l'attribut propre à l'âme dans la tradition du zoologiste spiritualiste.</p>	<p>subject which philosophers preserved through the soul of the zoological spiritual tradition.</p>	<p>conserves, an anthropocentrism, the last bastion of which Freud claimed had been laid to ruin by his discovery – in decrying the autonomous character of the specific attribute of the soul which the conscious subject of the philosophers served to maintain in the tradition of spiritual zoologism.³</p> <p>3[TN. Reading <i>la tradition de zoologisme spiritualiste</i> for <i>la tradition du zoologiste spiritualiste</i>, thus preferring the 2001 reprint over the 1992 publication]</p>
<p>LE SUJET COMME SIGNIFIANT</p> <p>4.– Toute promotion de l'intersubjectivité dans la personologie humaine ne saurait donc s'articuler qu'à partir de l'institution d'un Autre comme lieu de la parole. C'est « l'autre scène », <i>anderer Schauplatz</i>, où Freud, empruntant le terme à Fechner, désigne dès l'origine le plateau gouverné par la machinerie de l'inconscient.</p>	<p>THE SUBJECT OF MEANING</p> <p>4. Any promotion of intersubjectivity within human personology must therefore be linked to the institution of an Other instead of speech (<i>parole</i>). This is "the other scene, ", <i>anderer Schauplatz</i>, which Freud, borrowing the term from Fechner, designates from the beginning as the machinery of the unconscious.</p>	<p>4. Any form of promotion of inter-subjectivity in human personology can, therefore, only be expressed once the Other has been instituted as a locus of speech. This is the "other scene ", <i>anderer Schauplatz</i>, which Freud borrowing the term from Fechner, points to from the very beginning as the platform that is governed by the machinery of the unconscious.</p>
<p>C'est sur cette scène que le sujet apparaît comme surdéterminé par l'ambiguïté inhérente au discours. Car dans la communication parlée, même quand il s'agit de transmission « objective », l'entérinement dans le discours domine l'effet de signal, de même que la mise à l'épreuve du code rétrofléchit l'action de message. Qu'on passe à la</p>	<p>It is within this scene that the subject appears to be overdetermined (<i>surdéterminé</i>) by the ambiguity inherent to discourse (<i>discours</i>). In spoken (<i>parlée</i>) communication, even when it is an "objective" transmission, the endorsement of discourse (<i>discours</i>) dominates the effect of the signal. We pass to the function of the pact of speech</p>	<p>It is on this stage that subject appears as overdetermined by the inherent ambiguity of discourse. For in spoken communication, even in the case of 'objective' transmission, ratification in discourse dominates the signal effect, just as testing out the code retroflexes the message-action. Moving on to the function of the spoken pact,</p>

<p>fonction de pacte de la parole, on touchera aussitôt que nul message du sujet ne s'articule qu'à se constituer dans l'Autre sous une forme inversée : « Tu es ma femme, tu es mon maître ».</p>	<p>(<i>parole</i>) when the subject receives his message back from the Other in an inverted form : "You're my wife, you are my master."</p>	<p>we immediately touch on the fact that no message from the subject can be expressed without being constituted in the Other in an inverted form : 'Thou art my wife, thou art my master'.</p>
<p>Structure méconnue dans les prémisses des théories modernes de l'information où devrait pourtant être marquée l'antériorité du récepteur par rapport à toute émission.</p>	<p>These are misrecognized (<i>méconnue</i>) structures within modern information theory. Nonetheless, there should be some anticipation on the part of the receiver with respect to any transmission.</p>	<p>The structure has been ignored in the premises of modern information theory, where the anteriority of the receiver in relation to any sending really ought to have been noted.</p>
<p>Ici encore Freud devance ces travaux en permettant de distinguer le sujet comme strictement constitué par les symboles-indices, indiquant dans le discours sa place comme émetteur du message, du sujet en tant qu'il entre dans le message, non, comme on le croit, comme objet qui s'y représente, mais comme signifiant qui s'y donne : ce qui est possible pour ce que les images qui conduisent ses fonctions, deviennent par l'opération de la demande, symboles-images du discours</p>	<p>Here again Freud anticipates the work of modern information theory by distinguishing the subject as strictly composed by symbols and by indicating the subject's place in the discourse (<i>discours</i>) of the message sender. The subject enters the message not, as is commonly believed, as an object that represents him or her, but rather as the meaning (<i>signifiant</i>) that gives the message : it is possible that the function of the images turn into the operation of a demand (<i>demande</i>) through the symbols-images (<i>symbols-images</i>) of discourse (<i>discours</i>)</p>	<p>Here again, Freud pre-empted these efforts in enabling us to single out the subject as being strictly constituted by the <i>index-symbols</i>. Indicating his place in discourse as the sender of the message, of the subject, inasmuch as he enters the message not, as is thought, as an object that represents itself as he enters the message, not, as is thought, as an object that represents itself in the latter, but as a signifier that is given to it, which is possible as a result of the images that convey its functions becoming, through the operation of demand, <i>image-symbols</i> of discourse.</p>
<p>PRÉTEXTE D'UNE ORTHOPÉDIE</p>	<p>THE PRETENCE OF ORTHOPEDICS</p>	
<p>5.– C'est cette capture imaginaire du sujet dans le</p>	<p>5. It is this imaginary capture of the subject in the discourse</p>	<p>5. It is the imaginary capture of the subject in the</p>

<p>discours de l'Autre qui semble aller si loin que de pouvoir intéresser sa physiologie la plus intime. C'est elle qui centre la notion vulgaire qui s'est substituée, de par son emploi en psychanalyse, au concept rigoureux du <i>symbolique</i> : car il faut définir celui-ci comme constitué dans la chaîne signifiante, seul lieu pensable de la surdétermination comme telle, par la double possibilité qu'elle ouvre à la <i>combinaison</i> et à la <i>substitution</i> des éléments discrets qui sont le matériel du signifiant.</p>	<p>(<i>discours</i>) of the Other which seems to go so far as to be of particular interest for his most intimate physiology. Psychoanalysis has substituted a vulgar notion for the strict concept of the symbolic : it is necessary to define the subject as being constituted within the signifying chain rather than as being overdetermined (<i>surdétermination</i>) as such. This opens up two possibilities in relation to material signifiers : combination (<i>combinaison</i>) and substitution (<i>substitution</i>).</p>	<p>discourse of the Other that seems to extend so far as to be able to concern his most intimate physiology. This imaginary capture is what centres the vulgar notion that, for having been used in psychoanalysis, has come to be substituted for the rigorous concept of the <i>symbolic</i> : for the latter must be defined as constituted in the signifying chain, the only conceivable locus for overdetermination as such, by virtue of the dual possibility that it offers for the <i>combination</i> and the <i>substitution</i> of the discrete elements that are the material of the signifier.</p>
<p>Mais la fascination propre à <i>l'imaginaire</i>, ici distingué du symbolique, s'est exercée sur ceux-là mêmes, à savoir les psychanalystes, qui en découvraient les formes dans la dialectique où le sujet se révélait symbolisé.</p>	<p>But the specific imaginary fascination is here distinguished from the symbolic. The imaginary has exerted pressure on these same people, namely, psychoanalysts, who discovered the dialectical forms through which the subject is revealed symbolically.</p>	<p>Yet, the fascination that characterizes the <i>imaginary</i>, which we have here distinguished from the symbolic, exerted itself on precisely those, namely the psychoanalysts, who discovered its forms in the dialectic wherein the subject was shown to be symbolized.</p>
<p>. Le double effet de l'imaginaire en tant qu'écran opposant son filtre à la communication du message inconscient, et en tant qu'élément constitué du code symbolique, a été confondu par eux en une seule puissance, qu'ils n'ont pu dès lors apprécier qu'à des effets de résonance, aux</p>	<p>The double effect of the imaginary (stemming from the part which operates as a screen or filter of the unconscious message, as well as a part which remains constituted by the symbolic) has been confusing for psychoanalysts who find in the imaginary a single power. They were therefore unable to appreciate these resonances</p>	<p>They confounded the dual effect of the imaginary, in so far as it is a screen that sets its filter against the communication of the unconscious message and an element that is constituted by the symbolic code, concluding as to a single power, which they were subsequently only able to appraise with effects</p>

<p>interférences de plus en plus obscurcies.</p>	<p>and the interference was increasingly obscured.</p>	<p>of resonance, and increasingly obscure interferences.</p>
<p>Il en est résulté notamment que la résistance du discours n'a jamais été distinguée de la résistance du sujet.</p>	<p>The result has been such that the resistance of discourse (<i>discours</i>) has never been distinguished from the resistance of the subject.</p>	<p>The main result of this was that the resistance of discourse was never distinguished from the resistance of the subject.</p>
<p>La suite s'en est manifestée dans un contresens toujours accru à mesure que Freud dans une hâte, qu'il faut bien dire angoissante, à en suivre la trace dans un style de « bouteille à la mer », nous donnait à le rectifier en articulant la fonction du Moi dans la topique intra-subjective</p>	<p>The sequence is manifested in a misinterpretation that has constantly increased in usage as many tried to understand Freud in haste. It must be said that this is agonizing and that we must track the message sent to us from Freud, as if it were a message in a bottle "by rectifying the function of the ego for the topic of intra-subjectivity.</p>	<p>There followed an ever increasing misinterpretation, in direct relation to Freud's having left it to us, in undeniably anxiety-provoking haste, on following its trait in "message in a bottle" style, to rectify it by articulating the function of the Ego in intra-subjective topology.</p>
<p>Ce leurre imaginaire où Freud situe le Moi dans son « Introduction au narcissisme » dès 1914 et dont nous-mêmes, dans le début de notre carrière, avons voulu restaurer le relief sous le nom de stade du miroir, le fait brutal que l'analyse du Moi soit introduite (ne connaîtrait-on des articles de Freud que leur titre, ce qui est plus fréquent qu'on ne croit chez les analystes) avec et sous l'angle de la psychologie collective, – tout cela qui est fait pour donner au Moi un statut analytique où sa fonction imaginaire se coordonne à sa valeur d'objet idéal, disons le mot : métonymique –, n'a servi que</p>	<p>This imaginary lure, which Freud described within his "Introduction to Narcissism" in 1914⁵, and which we ourselves, in the beginning of our career, wanted to use to name the mirror stage, brings out the brutal fact that the analysis of the ego is introduced (that no one knows this is more common than you would think among analysts) with and under the terms of collective psychology—all of this is done to provide me with the analytical status of the imaginary function as it coordinates its ideal value object, we name this the metonymic function – it has served as a pretext⁶ for the introduction of a psychic</p>	<p>This imaginary lure wherein Freud locates the Ego, as of 1914, in "On Narcissism : An Introduction", and whose proper dimensions I wanted to restore at the start of my career under the heading of the mirror-stage, the brutal fact that Ego analysis was introduced (is it really only the titles of Freud's articles that people know, which is more common among analysts than one thinks) with and from the angle of group psychology—all of this, which was done in order to confer on the Ego analytic status whereby its imaginary function was coordinated with its value as an ideal object, that is to</p>

<p>de prétexte à l'introduction d'une orthopédie psychique qui s'acharne avec une obstination gâteuse à un renforcement du Moi : négligeant que c'est là aller dans le sens du symptôme, de la formation de défense, de l'alibi névrotique, – et s'abritant d'une harmonie préétablie de la maturation des instincts à la morale dont le postulat restera attaché à l'histoire de notre époque comme le témoignage d'un obscurantisme sans précédent.</p>	<p>orthopedics with a senile obstinacy toward the strengthening of the ego : neglecting that this is going in the direction of symptom, in the formation of defense, as a neurotic alibi. And sheltering a pre-established harmony of moral instincts whose premise remains attached to the history of our time, as the testimony of an unprecedented obscurantism.</p> <p>5*The proper German title us Zur Einführung des Narzißmus and its well known English title is "On Narcissism."</p> <p>6 The French word prétexte can be translated as "pretext," or "pretense."</p>	<p>say, more precisely a metonymic object – has served merely as a pretext to introduce a psychical orthopaedics that strives with doddering obstinacy to strengthen the ego, thereby neglecting the fact that this amounts to going along with the symptom, defense formations, and neurotic alibis ; and hiding behind a prestablished harmony that covers everything from instinctual maturation to morality and whose postulate shall remain stamped upon the history of our era as a testimony to unprecedented obscurantism.</p>
<p>6.– Les positions ici avancées sous une forme radicale résumant le double travail d'un commentaire de textes que nous poursuivons depuis sept ans dans un séminaire hebdomadaire couvrant par an environ trois cents pages de l'œuvre de Freud, – et d'un enseignement de présentation clinique et de contrôle thérapeutique qui se poursuit depuis cinq ans sous l'égide de la Clinique des maladies mentales et de l'encéphale (Professeur Jean Delay) de la Faculté de Médecine de Paris.</p>	<p>6. The progress that we are documenting here in radical form summarizes the work we have been pursuing for seven years in a weekly seminar covering about three hundred pages of Freud's work in a year. It also summarizes the clinical teachings that have continued for five years under the auspices of the Clinic of mental illness (Professor Jean Delay) of the Faculty of Medicine in Paris.</p>	<p>6. The position that I am putting forward here in a radical form summarise the dual activity of a textual commentary that I have been giving for the last seven years in a weekly seminar covering around three-hundred pages of Freud's works a year, and teaching in the form of clinical presentations and therapeutic supervision over the last five years under the auspices of the Clinic for Mental Illness and Encephalon (Professor Jean Delay) at the Paris Faculty of Medicine.</p>
<p>Les conséquences de ce travail théorique et pratique sur la direction de la cure, – au triple point de vue de la place de l'interprétation dans</p>	<p>The consequences of our theoretical and practical work, on the direction of the cure (including interpretation during analysis, handling the</p>	<p>The consequences of this practical and theoretical work on the direction of the treatment [from the threefold standpoint at the</p>

<p>l'analyse, du maniement du transfert, et des normes mêmes où se fixent les buts et la terminaison de la cure –, ont été exposées au Colloque international tenu cette année à Royaumont par la Société Française de Psychanalyse, soit par le groupe qui nous accompagne dans ce labeur.</p>	<p>transference, and the standards attached to the goals and the termination of the cure in the clinic), were exposed to the international Symposium that was held this year Royaumont by the French Psychoanalytical Society, the group which accompanies us through our struggle.</p>	<p>place of interpretation in analysis ; the handling of transference, and the specific norms according to which the goals and the end of treatment are set] were presented at the international colloquium held this year in Royaumont by the Société française de psychanalyse, that is, by the group that has been accompanying me in this work.</p>
<p>Les mêmes personnalités dont la place dans la Société internationale de psychanalyse a pour effet que la langue française est la seule langue de grande culture dans laquelle il n'y ait pas de traduction complète des œuvres de Freud – la partie traduite y étant tissée d'oublis, de non-sens, de falsifications et d'erreurs qui en rendent la lecture au mieux inintelligible et au pire controuvée –, sont aussi celles que nous rencontrons pour s'opposer à toute discussion de ces travaux dans la Société internationale de psychanalyse, fondée par Freud.</p>	<p>Those individuals whose position within the International Society of Psychoanalysis has the effect of producing the opinion that the French language is the only language of high culture (within which there is the opinion that there is no complete translation of Freud's works ; the translation being woven together by oversights, non-sense, falsification, and errors that make reading it unintelligible) are also those that we choose to oppose in our discussions of his work in the International Psychoanalytic Society founded by Freud.</p>	<p>The same persons, whose place in the International Society of Psychoanalysis has meant that the French language is the only language of a major culture in which there is no complete translation of Freud's works⁴ [the part that has been translated being shot through with oversights, nonsense, falsifications and errors that make reading it at best unintelligible and at worst contrived] are also those that we come up against in their opposition to the slightest discussion of these works in the International Society of Psychoanalysis, founded by Freud.</p> <p>4 The final touch in this situation is worthwhile mentioning : a scrupulous translation by a member of our group, of an essential and hitherto untranslated article by Freud has not been authorized for publication.</p> <p>We should add that this situation is not directed at me personally, in that it is the very same situation that has meant that Freud's letters to Fliess – printed in violation of Freud's testamentary wish, which is perhaps</p>

		excusable – have undergone censorship that appears to the least biased critics [cf, Erikson, E. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. XXXVI, 1955, p.1] as intorable as it is suspect, which is in any case inexcusable.
<p>7.– Un facteur unifie les directions qu'on appelle phases de la doctrine de Freud : elles fixent les lignes cardinales de la recherche où devait s'orienter le problème à jamais ouvert par sa découverte : celui des rapports liant le sujet au signifiant. C'est le problème de l'identification, quant au sujet. Quant à ses relations au réel, il exclut absolument la position de la réalité comme purement et simplement donnée, à quoi la psychanalyse aujourd'hui se réfère, tant par l'usage qu'elle fait de la notion de sens de la réalité, voire d'épreuve de la réalité, que par l'appui qu'elle y trouve pour se réduire à une pratique de plus en plus organisée d'une pédagogie corrective.</p>	<p>7. A unifying faction directs the phases of the doctrine of Freud, they fix the cardinal lines of research which directs movement away from the problem opened up by his discovery : the relationship (<i>rappports</i>) of the subject to the signifier. This is the problem of identification for the subject. As for his relationship with reality, this absolutely excludes a relationship to reality as such, what psychoanalysis today refers to as a remedial education finds support in this notion of a test of reality.</p>	<p>7. A particular factor unites the directions known as the phases of Freud's doctrine : they establish the cardinal lines of research that were to orient the problem opened up once and for all by his discovery : that of the relations binding the subject to the signifier. This is the problem of identification with regard to the subject. With regard to the subject's relations to the real, this problem utterly excludes the position of reality as purely and simply a given, to which psychoanalysis today refers, as much in the use it makes of the notion of the sense of reality, and indeed reality testing, as in the support that it finds in the latter to reduce itself to a practice that is increasingly organized as a corrective pedagogy.</p>
<p>. Il va de soi que nous ne mettons pas ce faisant en question la primauté du réel, simplement nous rappelons que le langage y introduit une dimension de nature à le « mettre en question ». C'est au niveau de cette mise en question que se situe le drame de la névrose. Vouloir réduire celle-ci dans sa véracité irréductible, ne peut conduire qu'à un recul du</p>	<p>It goes without saying that we do not thereby question the primacy of reality, we just remind you that language introduces a dimension of reality which opens up a new question. It is this new question that opens up the drama of neurosis. The neurotic wants to reduce it to its irreducible truth and this can only lead to a decrease in the symptoms tied to the very</p>	<p>It goes without saying that in saying this we are not calling into question the primacy of the real, we are simply reminding you that language introduces into the latter a dimension that is of such a nature as to "call it into question". It is at the level of this calling into question that the drama of neurosis resides. Wanting to reduce neurosis in its</p>

<p>symptôme jusqu'aux racines mêmes de l'être, à la destruction de ce qui témoignait dans la souffrance.</p>	<p>roots of his being, the destruction of which is reflected in suffering.</p>	<p>irreducible veracity can only lead to the symptom withdrawing to the very roots of Being, to the destruction of what was bearing witness in the midst of suffering.</p>
<p>En fait la résistance rencontrée témoigne à elle seule de l'impasse de l'entreprise, et la compulsion de répétition découverte par Freud a été aussi par lui identifiée à l'insistance d'une vérité qui clame encore dans le désert de l'ignorance.</p>	<p>In fact the resistance encountered is evidence alone of the deadline of our enterprise, and the repetition compulsion discovered by Freud was also identified by him as the insistence of a truth which persists even in the desert of ignorance.</p>	<p>Indeed, the resistance that is met here bears witness by itself to the impasse to which this effort leads, and the repetition compulsion discovered by Freud was also identified by him with a truth that clamours still in the desert of ignorance.</p>
<p>L'opposition dialectique, c'est-à-dire liée par une relation d'occultation alternante, du principe de réalité au principe du plaisir, n'est concevable qu'au niveau de l'identification signifiante. Ils ne peuvent du point de vue de l'adaptation que se confondre strictement.</p>	<p>The dialectical opposition, which is bound by an alternating black-out relationship, from the reality principle to the pleasure principle, makes it conceivable that identification is significant. The two principles can not adapt so as to strictly merge.</p>	<p>This dialectical opposition, in so far as it is bound by a relation of alternating occultation, between the reality principle and the pleasure principle, is conceivable only on the level of signifying identification. From an adaptive standpoint they can only be strictly confused.</p>
<p>Or toute la psychanalyse se développe dans la dimension de leur conflit. Ainsi la promotion d'une sphère sans conflit au centre de la théorie, comme au pivot de l'action thérapeutique, nous apporte de New-York le signe dernier du renoncement achevé aux principes d'une découverte, – de son détournement à des fins de suggestion sociale et d'assujettissement psychologique.</p>	<p>Or any psychoanalysis which develops with the dimension of its conflict. Promoting a conflict-free sphere in the center of its theory (as the pivot around which the therapeutic act moves) brings us to New York, the latest sign of renunciation accomplished by the principles of discover. It is a misuse (détournement) for the purposes of social suggestion and psychological subjection.</p>	<p>Indeed, the entire domain of psychoanalysis evolves in the dimension of the conflict between them. Thus, the promotion of a conflict-free sphere at the heart of theory, and at the hub of therapeutic action, has brought us fresh from New York the latest sign of a complete relinquishing of the principles of a discovery—the sign of its misappropriation to ends of</p>

		social suggestion and psychological subjugation.
LA CONDITION DU DÉSIR	THE CONDITION OF DESIRE	
8.– Il n'a pas manqué de gens pour nous faire grief de solliciter Freud, et de manquer à l'essentiel, en réduisant au champ de la parole et du langage, – objet du rapport par lequel à Rome, en 1953, s'est inaugurée la vie de notre groupe –, un mouvement de l'être qui le soutient et le dépasse de toutes parts. Du préverbal à l'ineffable, il n'est pas de catégorie qu'on n'agite pour nous réfuter, au silence près dont on se méfie à juste titre.	8.Many people complain to us that we failed to solicit Freud and that we missed the essential and reduced the field to speech and language –this was the subject of the report which inaugurated our group in 1953. The preverbal to the ineffable, there is no category that we are moved to refute, silence rightly makes us wary.	8.There has been no shortage of people to reproach us for turning to Freud, and for missing the point, in reducing to the field of speech and language [the theme of the report which in Rome, in 1953, marked the birth of our group] a movement of Being that sustains and exceeds it from all sides. From the preverbal to the ineffable, all manner of categories are dangled before us by way of discouragement, just short of silence, of which people are wary and rightly so.
²⁷⁾ Articulons ici que nous ne confondons pas plus l'être avec le dicible, que nous ne tenons l'étant pour l'antithèse de la raison.	We articulate here that we do not confuse non-being with speakable, we do not want to be the anti-thesis of reason.	Let us state here and now that we do not confuse Being with the sayable any more than we hold the entity to be the antithesis of reason.
(Bien au contraire, ramenant à sa source freudienne la souffrance dont la névrose nous révèle le pathétique bien tempéré, nous tentons de saisir le désir dans les rêts mêmes où Freud nous le montre fixé. Ces rêts sans doute le traversent et l'articulent dans l'interrogation passionnée qui arrache le vivant, à demi déhiscent de la vie, qu'est l'homme, à la condition du besoin, pour l'élever à la position de cette demande sans objet, que	On the contrary, through Freudian neurosis, whose suffering reveals the pathetic well-tempered, we try to understand the desire in the same way in which Freud demonstrates it to be fixed. This probably rests and is articulated in the passionate question that tears the living, half de hiscent life, man to elevate his position to a moot demand that we call love, hate, and ignorance.	Quite the contrary, in bringing back to it Freudian source the suffering of which neurosis reveals the well-tempered pathos, we are attempting to seize hold of desire in the very toils wherein Freud shows it to be trapped. These toils, undoubtedly penetrate and fashion it in the impassioned questioning that extracts the living being, half-dehiscent from life, which is man, from the condition of need, in order

<p>nous appelons l'amour, la haine et l'ignorance.</p>		<p>to raise it to the position of the objectless demand that we call love, hate, and ignorance.</p>
<p>C'est là, entre l'inconditionné de cette demande et la satisfaction dont on prétend l'étouffer, que surgit cette condition quasi-perversive en sa forme absolue qu'est le désir. Place prédestinée chez le sujet parlant pour que la Vénus aveugle de la nature y cherche dans l'angoisse son symbole vivant. Ici le phallus, où les anciens voyaient le signe où le logos marque la vie de son empreinte, et dont ce n'est pas en vain que le mystère devait être tu, puisqu'à être dit, il ne pouvait être que dégradé, nous a révélé sa fonction symbolique : dans le complexe de castration. Ce que la psychanalyse d'aujourd'hui tente de réduire à la fonction imaginaire d'un « objet partiel ».</p>	<p>It was there, between the unconditioned demand and the satisfaction which claims to stifle this demand that there arises an almost perverse condition of desire. There is a predestined position in the subject speaking (<i>parlant</i>) for the blind nature of Venus while he looks in anguish at its living symbol. Here, the phallus – the ancients saw the sign where the <i>logos</i> marked an imprint – has revealed its symbolic function : the castration complex. What today psychoanalysis attempts to reduce through the imaginary function as the "partial object".</p>	<p>It is here between the unconditional character of this demand⁵ and the satisfaction by which people claims it is quashed, the there emerges the nigh-on perverse condition of desire in its absolute form. A place preordained in the speaking subject for the blind Venus⁷ of nature to seek therein in anxiety its living symbol. Here, the phallus, which the Ancients saw as the sign wherein the <i>Logos</i> brands life with its mark, and whose mystery was not deliberately hidden in vain since in being spoken it could only be degraded, has revealed its symbolic function to us, in the castration complex. Which psychoanalysis today is trying to reduce to the imaginary function of a 'partial object'.</p> <p>5 [TN Reading l'inconditionnel de cette demande for l'inconditionné de cette demande thus preferring the 2001 reprint over the 1992 publication.]</p> <p>⁷ This may be a reference to the 1941 French film <i>Venus aveugle</i> (blind Venus) wherein a beautiful woman learns that she is going blind and so sacrifices herself to her lover by pretending she no longer loves him.</p>
<p>Mais nous devons entendre Freud quand il nous dit que dans le rêve, seule son élaboration l'intéresse. Le désir inconscient, indiqué</p>	<p>But we need to hear Freud when he tells us that the development of the object in the dream is of interest to us. Unconscious desire, stated in</p>	<p>But we should heed Freud when he tells us that in dreams it is only working through that interests him. Unconscious desire, which</p>

<p>dans la métaphore onirique, n'a d'objet que métonymique. Il est désir au-delà de la reconnaissance autant que reconnaissance à quoi se dérobe le désir.</p>	<p>the dream metaphor, has not metonymic object. It is desire beyond recognition as well as a recognition of a hidden desire.</p>	<p>is indicated in oneiric metaphor, has a purely metonymic object. It is desire that is beyond recognition as much as it is recognition from which desire slips away.</p>
<p>Enseignement trop ardu pour que les augures de la psychanalyse d'aujourd'hui n'en soient pas venus à se dire : « Un rêve après tout n'est qu'un rêve », et même à en faire le mot de passe dont ils se saluent.</p>	<p>Education is too difficult for the omen of psychoanalysis today. They do not exist from (venus), they state : "A dream is after all just a dream," and they even make this the password they hail.</p>	<p>The teachings are too arduous for the fortune-tellers of psychoanalysis today not to have ended up saying to themselves : "After all, a dream is just a dream", and even to have made this the watchword with which they greet one another.</p>
<p>Ce rêve et ce désir en effet ne sont pas articulables en termes d'adaptation à la réalité, soit en ces termes qui, sous le nom de tension vécue, de résistance affective, de partie saine ou distordue du moi, de relation duelle entre l'analysé et l'analyste, font revivre les étonnantes mystifications de la psychothérapie autoritaire.</p>	<p>Dream and desire are in fact not articulable in terms of an adaptation to reality. In these terms, there is a tension experienced – from the healthy ego to the distorted ego in the relationship of the analyst and the analyzed – which revives the amazing deceptions of authoritarian psychotherapy.</p>	<p>These dreams and this desire are not articulable in terms of adaptation to reality, that is to say, in terms that, under the name of experienced tension, affective resistance, the health or distorted part of the ego, or the dyadic relation between the analysed party and the analyst, give a new lease of life to the astounding mystifications of authoritarian psychotherapy.</p>
<p>C'est donc bien nous, et non pas eux, qui disons que le désir, qu'il soit du rêve ou de la veille, n'est pas articulable dans la parole. Mais il n'est pas vrai pourtant qu'il ne soit pas articulé dans le langage, et que, glissant comme l'anneau du jeu de furet au fil de la métonymie qui le retient dans un cercle de fantasme, il ne produise pas</p>	<p>It is therefore us, and them, who claim that desire, in the dream the day before, is not articulable in speech. But it is not true, however, that it is not articulated in language. And, as the sliding ring game ferrets over the metonymy that holds within it a circle of fantasy, it is not meant to metaphorically</p>	<p>And so it is we, and not they, who say that desire, whether the desire of the dream or of waking life, is not articulable in speech. But it is not true, however, that desire is not articulated in language and that, sliding along the thread of metonymy that retains it in a circle of fantasy, like the object in the hunt-the-ring</p>

<p>métaphoriquement le signifié du symptôme où ce fantasme se réalise.</p>	<p>produce the symptom where this fantasy has come true.</p>	<p>parlour game, it does not metaphorically produce the signified of the symptom in which this fantasy is fulfilled.</p>
<p>LA PUISSANCE DE LA VÉRITÉ</p>	<p>THE POWER OF THE TRUTH</p>	
<p>9.– Nous voici tout près des problèmes de la cure et de la distinction profonde entre la suggestion et le transfert. Le transfert est ce lien à l'Autre qu'établit la forme de demande à quoi l'analyse fait sa place, pour que de cette place cette répétition, où ce n'est pas le besoin qui se répète, mais l'au-delà qu'y dessine la demande, puisse être saisie dans son effet de désir et analysée dans son effet de suggestion.</p>	<p>9. We are close to the problem of treatment when we make a profound distinction between suggestion and transference. The transference is the line toward the Other established by the demand through which the analysis takes place. It is the repetition of this place, and so after the demand is drawn out, we can distinguish between the effect of desire during analysis and the effect of suggestion.</p>	<p>9. Here we are focusing on the problems of treatment and of the profound distinction between suggestion and transference. Transference is the bond with the Other that is, established by the form of demand for which analysis makes a place, so that from this place, this repetition, in which it is not need that is repeated but the beyond that is traced out by demand, can be grasped through its effect of desire and analysed through its effect of suggestion.</p>
<p>C'est à mesure que l'effet de suggestion issu de l'inconscient dissipe ses mirages, que le désir doit s'articuler en tant que signifiant dans la question existentielle qui donne son horizon au transfert.</p>	<p>There is a measure to the effect of suggestion owing to the unconscious dissipation of its mirages. Desire's meaning must be articulated within the existential question that gives its horizon as the transference.</p>	<p>As the effect of suggestion that arises from the unconscious disperses its mirages, desire is necessarily articulated as signifying in the existential question that provides a horizon for transference.</p>
<p>En quelque terme que celle-ci se résolve, c'est au lieu de l'Autre que le sujet se trouvera : à la place de ce qui était (<i>Wo Es war...</i>) et qu'il faut qu'il assume (... , <i>soll Ich werden</i>).</p>	<p>The expression that resolves all of this it is the place of the Other that the subject will discover : where it was (<i>Wo Es war...</i>), I must become (...<i>soll Ich werden</i>).</p>	<p>Whatever the terms in which this question is resolved, it is in the locus of the Other that the subject shall find himself : in the place of what used to be [<i>Wo Es war...</i>] and which he</p>

		has to take on board [..., <i>soll ich werden</i>].
Ici le précepte : « Tu aimeras ton prochain comme toi-même » ne sonne pas moins étrangement que le <i>Tât twam asi</i> , comme on l'éprouve à y répondre à la première personne où éclate l'absurdité qu'il y aurait à prendre son dernier terme pour son dernier mot, tandis que l'autre boucle son cercle à l'achever : « comme toi-même, tu es ceci que tu hais parce que tu l'ignores ».	Here the precept : "Though shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" does not sound any less strange than the <i>Tât tvam asi</i> , as if to respond to the first person who broke the absurdity that would make his last term his last word, while the other loop completes its circle : « you're this, you hate because you do not know. »	Here, the precept "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself : sounds no less odd than <i>Tat tvam asi</i> , as one feels on replying to it in the first person, on which the absurdity of taking its final term for one's last word immediately transpires, whilst the other closes its circle by completing it : " as thyself, thou art that which thou doest hate, for thou art ignorant thereof "
Nulle part comme dans Freud de nos jours ne se respire l'air de la raison conquérante, ni ce style dont au XVIII ^e siècle l'homme s'avança vers la dénudation de son désir, pour en poser, sous la figure de la nature, à Dieu la question. Pointe unique dans l'histoire d'une philosophie qui avait fait sa loi de la négation du désir. Pointe dont on s'étonne à constater comment la philosophie a réussi à la discréditer comme celle d'une clarté artificielle, voire artificieuse, alors qu'elle posait la question la plus profonde.	No part of Freud these days does not breath the air of defeat, because the eighteenth century man, in great style, went toward the denudation of desire, to ask, in the face of nature, God a question. It was a unique point of view in the history of philosophy which discovered the law of the negation of desire. A point, and it is surprising to see how philosophy has managed to discredit Freud as an artificial light or as artful, simply for asking the most profound question.	Nowhere in thid day and age as much as in Freud does one breathe the air of conquering reason, nor th style on whose basic man in the eighteenth century moved towards laying bare his desire, in order to pose its questions, under the guise of nature, to God. This constitutes a unique peak in the history of a philosophy that had made the negation of desire its law. A peak that we are surprised to see philosophy managing to discredit as indicating artificial, not to say guileful, clarity, when in fact i twas asking the profoundest of questions.
Sans doute cette philosophie des lumières, et son parangon l'homme du plaisir, ont-ils fait une erreur. Ils ont voulu expliquer ce qui	No doubt, many Enlightenment thinkers, with their paragon man of pleasure, made a mistake. They wanted to explain that anything which	The philosophy of the Enlightenment, and its paragon the man of pleasure undoubtedly committed an error. They

<p>s'opposait à leur question par l'imposture et faire de l'obscurantisme un complot contre la liberté de la nature.</p>	<p>opposed their question was deception and darkness and a conspiracy against the freedom of nature.</p>	<p>sought to explain what opposed their question as imposture, and to turn obscurantism into a plot against the freedom of nature.</p>
<p>C'est de cette erreur que nous subissons le retour. Car les monstres qu'on forge pour les besoins d'une cause nous apportent la preuve la plus étonnante de la puissance de la vérité : ils viennent eux-mêmes au jour.</p>	<p>This is the error of which we are now experiencing a return. The monsters that need to forge a cause also bring us the most amazing proof of the power of the truth : they themselves come to light.</p>	<p>We are now subjected to the return of this error, for the monsters that are forged for the needs of a cause bring us the most astonishing proof the power of truth : they come into existence as such.</p>
<p>Ceux qui ont mon âge ont pu saisir comment la propagande anti-allemande des Alliés de la Grande Guerre, a engendré l'hitlérisme, qui la justifia après coup.</p>	<p>Those who are my age understand how it is that the anti-German propoganda of the Allies of World War I resulted in Hitlerism, who subequently use dit as justification.</p>	<p>People of my generation have been able to see how the anti-German propaganda of the Allies of the Great War begat Hitlerism, which justified it retroactively.</p>
<p>Plus paradoxalement, mais par un retour du même ordre, la reprise d'une mise en question essentielle de l'homme par rapport à la nature, au nom cette fois de la vérité qui la pénètre, aboutit à ce résultat singulier : que ceux-là mêmes dont le réinventeur de cette question a voulu faire les gardiens de son legs, s'organisent pour le transformer en instrument d'équivoque et de conformisme et se constituent réellement en une Église qui sait que son autorité est de néant, puisqu'elle renie ce qui est son action même, en la ravalant aux connivences d'un aveuglement qu'elle-même entretient.</p>	<p>Paradoxically, it is a return of the same order, the recovery of a question of the essential man in his relation (<i>rapport</i>) to nature, but this time in the name of a truth that penetrates him and leads to the singular result : even those who reinvent the issue and want to be guardians of the other legacy, organize to transform it into an instrument of ambiguity and conformity and strive to constitute a church that knows its authority is empty because they remain blind to the blindness they themselves maintain.</p>	<p>More paradoxically, but by way of a return of the same kind, the resumptio of an essential questioning of man with respect to nature, this time in the name of the truth that penetrates it, led to the odd result that precisely those whom the re-inventor of this question wanted to make the guardians of his legacy got together to transform it into an instrument of equivocation and conformity, and actually formed a Church that knows, that its authority is nil because it denies its very action in reducing it to a conniving blindness that it fosters of its own accord.</p>

<p>10.– Comment ne pas reconnaître en effet la fausseté de leur position dans son apparence même, à savoir ce contraste qui fait que la psychanalyse est tout juste tolérée dans sa pratique, quand son prestige est universel : quand « psychanalyse de... », de quelque objet qu'il s'agisse, veut dire pour tous qu'on entre dans la raison profonde d'une apparente déraison, et que pourtant dans la science la psychanalyse vit dans une sorte de quarantaine qui n'a rien à faire avec l'effet de la spécialisation.</p>	<p>10. How indeed do they not recognize the falsity of their position in its very appearance, namely, that psychoanalysis is barely tolerated in practice even while its prestige is universal : "psychoanalysis of", any object whatsoever, implies that it goes into the deep because of an apparent irrationality, and yet in the science of psychoanalysis there lives a kind of quarantine which has nothing to do with the effect of specialization.</p>	<p>10.Indeed, how can one fail to recognize the falsity of their position and even in its very appearance, namely, the contrast that has led to psychoanalysis being only barely tolerated in its practice when its prestige is universal, that is, when "psychoanalysis of...", whatever the object in question, implies for everyone going into the underlying reason behind apparent unreason, and yet in science psychoanalysis subsists in a kind of quarantine that has nothing to do with the effect of specialization.</p>
<p>Situation faite de méconnaissances accordées, et que n'explique plus depuis longtemps la prétendue résistance des laïcs. Si celle-ci est quelque part maintenant, ce n'est pas ailleurs que chez les psychanalystes eux-mêmes, et patente dans cet effort de se faire valoir par les analogies les plus bâtardees et les fictions les plus douteuses, – conjoint à cette bégueulerie qu'ils manifestent devant les emplois diversement abusifs qui sont faits au dehors des notions qu'ils diffusent, non sans en ressentir une secrète complaisance.</p>	<p>The situation grants misunderstandings (<i>méconnaissances</i>), and not long ago we explained the alleged strength of the layman. If he is somewhere now then he is not far away from the home of the psychoanalysts themselves, and it is evident in the efforts they give to enforce the most illegitimate analogies and the most doubtful fictions. This prudery demonstrates the different misuses of psychoanalysis which are made outside of the concepts we broadcast, no without feeling a certain complacency.</p>	<p>This situation is the result of consensual misjudgements, and for a long while now has not been able to be explained away by the supposed resistance of laymen. If this resistance is to be found anywhere these days the nit is nowhere else than in the psychoanalysts themselves, and it is glaring in their efforts to promote themselves by means of the most misbegotten analogies and dubious fictions, combined with the prudishness that they exhibit in the face of the various improper uses made, outside their circles, of the notions they broadcast, and not without experiencing a secret self satisfaction in this regard.</p>

<p>Faut-il voir dans le consentement dont ils jouissent dans la moitié du monde civilisé un effet du pardon que méritent ceux qui ne savent pas ce qu'ils font ? Ou revenir à la preuve, que constitue, pour la vérité d'une tradition, l'indignité de ses ministres.</p>	<p>Should we see in the consent they have in the civilized world the effect of forgiveness among those who do not know what they do? Or shall we return to the evidence that is the truth of our tradition and indignity of its ministers.</p>	<p>Should we see in the consent that they enjoy across half the civilized world an effect of the forgiveness that falls to those who know not what they do? Or should we come back to the proof, constituted, for the truth of a tradition, by the unworthiness of its minister?</p>
<p>Nul doute que la confiance privilégiée dans la parole qu'implique le maintien du choix de ses moyens formels, soit le principe de vérité par quoi la psychanalyse subsiste, malgré l'imbécillité des idéaux dont elle l'assaisonne.</p>	<p>No doubt, the preferred confidence in speech (<i>parole</i>) is involved in maintaining the choice of our formal methods and the principle of truth which remains for psychoanalysis, despite the stupidity of the ideals which are currently in season.</p>	<p>Without a doubt the privileged trust in speech that is implied in preserving the choice of its formal means is the principle of truth through which psychoanalysis subsists, despite the imbecility of the ideals with which the latter seasons it.</p>
<p>Sans doute cela suffit-il, – non pas que la parole ne soit le véhicule naturel de l'erreur, élu du mensonge, et normal du malentendu, mais parce qu'elle se déploie dans la dimension de la vérité, et ainsi la suscite, fût-ce à l'horreur du sujet.</p>	<p>No doubt, it is enough – not that speech (<i>parole</i>) is the natural vehicle of error, an elected lie, or normal misunderstanding, but because it unfolds in the dimension of truth, and thus raises the horror of the subject.</p>	<p>No doubt this is sufficient, not that speech isn't the natural vehicle of error, the chosen vehicle of mendacity, and the normal vehicle of misunderstanding, but because speech is deployed in the dimensions of truth, and so gives rise to it, albeit to the subject's horror.</p>
<p>C'est bien là un truisme, et même le truisme par excellence. Il retrouve les propos que nous venons d'avancer, pour repenser la psychanalyse et reconduire sa mission.</p>	<p>It is a truism, it is even the ultimate truism. He finds the words that we have to put into motion in order to rethink psychoanalysis and extend its mission.</p>	<p>This is of course a truism, and indeed the paragon of all truisms. It converges with the remarks we have just put forward, to rethink psychoanalysis and perpetuate its mission.</p>
<p>Un mystère subsiste pourtant sur les conditions propres à la</p>	<p>Yet, there remains a mystery as to conditions required to</p>	<p>Yet, a mystery remains regarding the specific</p>

<p>garde du patrimoine disciplinaire qu'engendre un champ où le praticien lui-même doit se tenir au niveau du sujet qu'il découvre, – à savoir ici non pas le sujet de la connaissance, œil en face du monde réel, mais le sujet de la parole, – c'est-à-dire en tant qu'il émerge à la dimension de la vérité.</p>	<p>guard the disciplinary heritage to a field where the practitioner himself is to be held as the subject he discovers – this is not the topic of knowledge (<i>connaissance</i>) but the subject of speech (<i>parole</i>) – that is to say, as it emerges in the dimension of truth.</p>	<p>conditions required for guarding the disciplinary heritage that is generated by a field in which the practitioner himself has to keep to the level of the subject that he discovers (to wit, in this case, not the subject of cognizance, an eye looking onto the real world, but the subject of speech) that is, inasmuch as he emerges with the dimension of truth.</p>
<p>C'est à une nécessité profonde que Freud est confronté quand il se soucie instamment de fonder la communauté qui assurera cette garde. Est-ce seulement un accident quand il s'abandonne romantiquement à y laisser s'insérer ce praesidium <i>secret</i> où se préfigurent les appareils les plus modernes de notre politique ? J'ai déjà touché à ce sujet ailleurs en me fondant sur les documents vertigineux livrés par Jones. Nous sommes alors en 1912.</p>	<p>This is the profound need that Freud faces when he is faced with the care of the community which will ensure its custody. It is only an accident that occurs when he abandons himself romantically to us to protect the secrets which prefigure our modern political apparatuses? I have already touched upon this topic elsewhere based on the vertiginous documents of Jones. We are, then, in 1912.</p>	<p>Freud was faced with a profound necessity in his urgent preoccupation with founding the community that would ensure this guard. Was it merely an accident that he surrendered romantically to allowing that secret praesidium that foreshadows the most modern apparatuses of our politics to be installed within it? I have already touched on this subject elsewhere, drawing on the astonishing documents that Jones has made available. This takes us back to 1912.</p>
<p>Le fruit, il faut le savourer maintenant dans cette théorie de la <i>validation</i> des théories par les conciles¹, qu'un membre de la camarilla qui a détenu après la dernière guerre dans la Société internationale les pouvoirs exécutifs, articula sans la moindre vergogne.</p>	<p>The fruit, now to be enjoyed, as our theory <i>validates</i> the theories of councils⁹ - there is a member of the cabal that has held executive powers shamelessly since after the last war in the International Society.</p>	<p>The fruit of this now has to be savoured in the theory of the "validation" of theories by councils⁹, which a member of the camarilla who held the executive powers in the post-war international Society voiced without a hint of shame.</p> <p>9. Cf. Kris, E., "The Nature of Psychoanalytic Propositions and their</p>

<p>1. Cf. Kris Ernst, « The Nature of Psychoanalytic Propositions and Their Validation », in Freedom and Experience, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1947.</p>		<p>Validation”, Freedom and Experience, Ed. S. Hook, N.R. Konventz, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1967.</p>
<p>Mimétisme singulier de l'histoire à l'endroit de cette analyse d'une Église sans foi, d'une armée sans patrie, que Freud nous a donnée, dans un ouvrage plus haut cité, et où il faut reconnaître que l'art a une fois de plus forgé une forme signifiante avant son émergence dans le réel.</p>	<p>A mimicry of history has transformed the place of analysis to a church without faith, like an army without a country. Freud has given us, in a work cited above, notice that the work has been significantly forged before its emergence in reality</p>	<p>And so, history is strangely imitative with respect to the analysis of a church without faith, of an army without homeland, which Freud gave us in a work cited above, and in which one must recognize that art yet again forged a signifying form prior to its emergence in the real.</p>
<p>Ici la psychanalyse se manifeste elle-même passion dans l'acte qui la constitue, suscitant à nouveau en son sein le mot de ralliement dont Voltaire conspuait l'imposture : « Écrasons l'infâme ».</p>	<p>Here psychoanalyst's passion manifests itself in the act which is again raising itself by the catchword which Voltaire used: “Crush the infamous thing!”</p> <p>June 1958</p>	<p>Here, psychoanalysis reveals itself as passion in the act that constitutes it, arousing once more it its heart the rallying cry with which Voltaire shouted down imposture: Écrasons l'infâme.</p> <p>June 1958</p>