

## Jacques Lacan: Conférences et entretiens dans des universités nord-américaines

Le Séminaire 23: Le sinthome ; Leçon 1: De l'usage logique du sinthome	Paris	November 18, 1975	Tuesday	
Kanzer Seminar w. Q & A	Yale	November 24, 1975	Monday	Jack Stone
Interview w. the students, response to their questions	Yale	November 24, 1975	Monday	Jack Stone
Law School Auditorium	Yale	November 25, 1975	Tuesday	Jack Stone;Adrian Price w. Russell Grigg
<b>Auditorium School of International Affairs</b>	<b>Columbia University</b>	<b>December 01, 1975</b>	<b>Monday</b>	<b>Jack Stone; Adrian Price w. Russell Grigg</b>
w. Q & A	MIT	December 02, 1975	Tuesday	Jack Stone
4 discourses	MIT	December 02, 1975	Tuesday	Jack Stone
Le Séminaire 23: Le sinthome ; Leçon 2: De ce qui fait trou dans le réel	Paris	December 09, 1975	Tuesday	Jack Stone

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<b>Columbia University Auditorium School of International Affairs 1 decembre 1975</b>	<b>Columbia University Auditorium, School of International Affairs 12/01/75</b>	<b>School of International Affairs Auditorium, Columbia University December 1, 1975</b>
	Translation by Jack W. Stone	Translation is by Adrian Price with Russell Grigg
(42)LE SYMPTOME	<sup>(42)</sup> THE SYMPTOM	[The Symptom]
Dans l'analyse, il y a quand même, il faut le dire, certains résultats. Ce n'est pas toujours ce qu'on attend : c'est parce qu'on a tort d'attendre, c'est ce qui fait la difficulté d'être analyste. Les analystes, j'ai essayé d'en spécifier quelque chose que j'ai dénommé le discours analytique	In analysis, there are nonetheless, it must be said, certain results. They are not always what one expects: because one is wrong to expect, which is what makes it difficult to be an analyst. I have tried to specify something about analysts that I have named analytic discourse.	In analysis, there are nonetheless, it must be said, certain results They are not always what we expect; and this is because we are wrong to expect, which is the difficulty of being an analyst. I tried to spell out something about analysts, which I called the "analytic discourse."
Le discours analytique existe parce que c'est l'analysant qui le tient...	Analytic discourse exists because it is the analysand who sustains it ( <i>le</i>	The analytic discourse exists because it's the analysand who

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<p>heureusement. Il a l'heur (h-e-u-r), l'heur qui est quelques fois un bon-heur, d'avoir rencontré un analyste. Ça n'arrive pas toujours. Souvent l'analyste croit que la pierre philosophale – si je puis dire – de son métier, ça consiste à se taire. Ce que je dis là, c'est bien connu. C'est tout de même un tort, une déviation, le fait que des analystes parlent peu. Il arrive que je fasse ce qu'on appelle des supervisions. Je ne sais pas pourquoi on a appelé ça supervision. C'est une super-audition. Je veux dire qu'il est très surprenant qu'on puisse, à entendre ce que vous a raconté un praticien- surprenant qu'à travers ce qu'il vous dit on puisse avoir une représentation de celui qui est en analyse, qui est analysant. C'est une nouvelle dimension. Je parlerai toute à l'heure de ce fait, la dit-mension que je n'écris pas tout à fait comme on l'écrit d'habitude en français. Le mieux, c'est que je fasse un effort et que je vous montre comment je l'écris :</p>	<p><i>tient</i>) . . . fortunately (<i>heureusement</i>). He has the <i>heur</i> (h-e-u-r), the <i>heur</i>, which is sometimes a <i>bon-heur</i>,<sup>1</sup> to have met an analyst. This doesn't always happen. Often the analyst believes the philosopher's stone--if I can say this--of his profession consists of remaining silent. I happen to do what are called supervisions. I don't know why they call it supervision. It's a super-audition. I mean, it is very surprising that one might, in hearing what a practitioner has told you--surprising, that through what he says to you, you can have a representation of the one who is in analysis, the analysand. This is a new dimension. I will soon speak of this fact, the dit-mension, which I write not at all as one usually writes it in French. The best thing for me to do is to make an effort and show you how I write it:  <a href="#">TN.1 Happiness or good luck.</a></p>	<p>supports it. . . fortunately. His fortune – the fortune that is sometimes his good fortune, the good fortune of having met an analyst. This doesn't always happen. Analysts often believe that the philosopher's stone of his trade, as it were, consists in remaining silent. What I'm saying is well known. Even so, it's wrong, a deviation, that analysts should speak so little. As it happens, I conduct what are known as "supervisions." I don't know why it came to be called supervision. It's a super-audition. I mean it's very surprising that on hearing what a practitioner has told you, through what he tells you, you can form a representation about the person in analysis, who is an analysand. It's a new dimension. I'll speak shortly about this fact, the <i>dit-mension</i> that I don't spell exactly as it is usually spelled in French. The best thing would be for me to go to the effort of showing you how I spell it</p>
<p>dit-mension</p>	<p>dit-mension</p>	<p>dit-mension</p>
<p>C'est comme ça que je l'écris... dit-mension..., mention, c'est-à-dire – en anglais, ça se comprend – mention, l'endroit où repose un dit.</p>	<p>That's how I write it . . . dit-mension . . . which is to say--in English, this is understood--<i>mention</i>, the place where a said (<i>dit</i>) reposes.</p>	<p>That's how I spell it--dit-mension --<i>mention/mansion</i>, that is, in English, I mean <i>mention</i>, the place where <i>un dit</i>, a saying resides.</p>
<p>(43)Alors, l'analyste, quand même, a des choses à dire. Il a des choses</p>	<p><sup>(43)</sup> So the analyst, nonetheless, has some things to say. He has some</p>	<p>So , nevertheless, an analyst does have things to say. He has things</p>

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<p>à dire à son analysant, à celui qui, tout de même, n'est pas là pour s'affronter au simple silence de l'analyste. Ce que l'analyste a à dire est de l'ordre de la vérité. Je ne sais pas si vous avez de la vérité quelque chose de très sensible. Je veux dire : si vous avez une idée de ce que c'est que la vérité. Tout discours implique au moins une place qui est celle de la vérité. Ce que j'appelle discours est en référence avec un lien social. L'analyse est de cet ordre. À ceci près que, comme elle est toute neuve, parce que, après tout, elle ne date pas de si longtemps, elle comporte un pacte. Un analysant sait que l'analyste l'attendra un certain nombre de fois par semaine et en principe il doit s'y rendre. Sinon, l'analyste – même s'il n'est pas venu – réclamera des honoraires. Naturellement, ça implique que l'analyste aussi a des devoirs. Il doit être là. La vérité, à partir de quand ça commence-t-il ?</p>	<p>things to say to his analysand, to the one who, all the same, is not there to encounter the simple silence of the analyst. What the analyst has to say is of the order of the truth. I don't know if you have much of a sense of the truth (<i>de la vérité quelque chose de très sensible</i>). I mean: if you have an idea of what the truth is. Every discourse implies at least one place that is that of the truth. What I call discourse is in reference to a social link. Analysis is of this order. Except that, since it is wholly new, because, after all, it doesn't date back such a long time, it involves a pact. An analysand knows that the analyst will expect him a certain number of times a week and in principle the analysand must be there. If not, the analyst--even if the analysand does not come--will demand some fees. Naturally, this implies that the analyst also has some duties. He must be there. The truth, when does this begin?</p>	<p>to say to his analysand, to the one who, all the same, hasn't come along simply to be confronted by his analyst's silence. What the analyst has to say belongs to the order of truth. I don't know whether you get anything very tangible with truth, I mean – whether you have an idea of what truth is. Every discourse implies at least one place that is the place of truth.[8] What I call a discourse is in reference to a social bond. Analysis is of this order. With the qualification that, as it's quite new, because after all, it doesn't go back all that far, it comprises a pact. An analysand knows that the analyst will expect him so many times a week and that, in principle, he is required to attend. Otherwise, the analyst – even if he doesn't come—will demand his fee. Naturally, this implies that the analyst has his duties, too. He has to be there. When does truth begin?</p>
<p>Ça commence à partir du moment où on emploie des phrases. La phrase, c'est un dire. Et ce dire, c'est le dire de la vérité.</p>	<p>It begins from the moment when one makes use of sentences. The sentence is a saying (<i>dire</i>). And this saying is <i>the saying of the truth</i>.</p>	<p>It begins when you start to use sentences. A sentence is an act of saying [<i>un dire</i>]. And this act of saying is one of <i>saying the truth</i>.</p>
<p>J'ai quelque part – pas seulement dit, mais écrit, il y a une nuance... il y a plus qu'une nuance, il y a une montagne entre le dire et l'écrit. La preuve, c'est que les gens se croient beaucoup plus sûrs d'une promesse quand ils ont ce qu'on</p>	<p>Somewhere I have--not only said, but written, that there is a nuance . . . there is more than a nuance, there is a mountain between the saying and the written. The proof is that people believe themselves a lot more sure of a promise when</p>	<p>Somewhere I said—not just said but wrote, There is a nuance.... There's more than a nuance; there's a mountain between saying and writing. The proof is that people consider themselves much more confident of a promise</p>

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<p>appelle un papier. Un papier qui est une reconnaissance de dette, par exemple. Ce papier, ça donne support à la vérité de la promesse. On voit mal quelqu'un dire : « Cet écrit n'est pas de moi ». En tout cas, c'est à partir de ce moment-là qu'interviennent des expertises, à savoir des graphologues qui disent : « Oui, c'est bien cette écriture-là », ce qui prouve qu'une écriture a aussi quelque chose d'individuel. Mais l'écriture n'a pas toujours existé. Avant, il y avait la tradition orale. Ça n'empêchait pas que des choses se transmettent de voix à voix. L'origine du principe de la poésie, c'est ça.</p>	<p>they have what one calls a paper. A paper that acknowledges a debt, for example. This paper gives support to the truth of the promise. It looks bad for someone to say: "This writing is not mine." In any case, this is when some expertises intervene, handwriting analysts who say: "Yes, this is indeed his writing (<i>cette écriture-là</i>)," which proves that a writing also has something individual about it. But writing has not always existed. Before, there was oral tradition. This did not prevent things from being transmitted from voice to voice. This is the origin of the principle of poetry.</p>	<p>when it's in writing. As in a note that is an "IOU", for instance. This note lends support to the truth of the promise. It would be hard to imagine someone saying, "That note isn't mine." In any case, that's when the experts step in, namely the graphologists who say, "Yes that's the same handwriting alright," which proves that writing also has something individual about it. But writing hasn't always existed. Before hand, there was the oral tradition. This didn't prevent things from being transmitted from mouth to mouth. The origin of the principle of poetry lies there.</p>
<p>J'ai énoncé un certain nombre de points sur ce qu'il en est de la vérité. C'est soutenable de dire que la vérité a une structure de fiction. C'est ce qu'on appelle normalement le mythe – beaucoup de vérités ont une existence mythique –, c'est bien en cela qu'on ne peut pas l'épuiser, la dire toute. Ce que j'ai énoncé sous cette forme : de la vérité, il n'y a que mi dire. La vérité, on la dit comme on peut, c'est-à-dire en partie. Seulement tel que ça se (44)présente, ça se présente comme un tout.</p>	<p>I have made a certain number of points about what there is of the truth. It is sustainable to say that the truth has a structure of fiction. It is what we normally call myth--a lot of truths have a mythic existence--this is indeed why one cannot exhaust it, say it all. Which I have said in this form: there is only a half-saying (<i>mi-dire</i>) of the truth. One says the truth as one can, which is to say, in part. It is only in this way that<sup>(44)</sup> it presents itself, presents itself as a whole (<i>tout</i>).</p>	<p>I've stated a number of points about what truth is. It's a defensible proposition to say that truth has the structure of fiction. This is what is normally called "myth" – many truths have a mythical existence – it is precisely for this reason that truth cannot be exhausted, that the whole truth cannot be said. This is what I stated in the following form – truth can only be half said. One speaks the truth as best one can, that is, in part. It is just that in the way it presents itself, it presents itself as a whole.</p>
<p>Et c'est bien là que gît la difficulté : c'est qu'il faut faire sentir à celui qui est en analyse que cette vérité n'est pas toute, qu'elle n'est pas vraie pour tout le monde, qu'elle n'est pas – c'est une vieille idée – qu'elle n'est pas générale, qu'elle</p>	<p>And it is indeed there that lodges the difficulty: it is that one must make felt to the one who is in analysis that this truth is never whole, that it is not true for everyone, that it is not--this is an old idea--that it is not general, that</p>	<p>And that's precisely where the difficulty lies – it's that you have to make the one who is in analysis sense that this truth is not whole, that it's not true for everyone, that it isn't – this is an old idea –that it isn't general, that it's not valid for</p>

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<p>ne vaut pas pour tous. Comment cette chose est-elle possible, qu'il y ait des analystes ? La chose n'est possible que du fait que l'analysant reçoit cognition – si on peut dire – d'observer une règle, de ne dire que ce qu'il peut avoir à dire, que ce qui lui tient à cœur comme on dit en français. Ce qui est faire écho, mais ce n'est pas parce qu'une chose est un écho qu'elle est spécifiée, ce qui est faire écho à une très vieille idée de ce qui était le centre de l'être dit humain – celui qu'on appelait anthropos : le centre, c'était cœur – tumos –, c'est comme ça tout au moins que ça se désignait ; ce qui était sous le cœur, c'était épitumien. Mais c'était une conception qui donnait à l'homme un privilège. Il y avait deux espèces d'hommes : celui qui se spécifiait d'être d'une polis –... lambda, iota, sigma – d'être un citoyen, celui-là seul était un être humain plein de droit. Bien sûr, tout ceci s'est brouillé. Il n'en reste pas moins qu'à travers les structures différentes la relation dite politique continue d'exister. Elle existe tout de même plus solidement que tout autre.</p>	<p>it does not hold (<i>vaut</i>) for everyone. How is it possible that there are analysts? The thing is only possible because the analysand receives cognition--if one can say this--from observing a rule, to only say what he can have to say, what he bears in his heart (<i>tient à cœur</i>) as we say in French. This is to echo--but it is not because a thing is an echo that it is specified--this is to echo a very old idea of what was the center of the being called human--what one called <i>anthropos</i>: the center was the heart--<i>tumos</i>--that is at least how it was designated; beneath the heart was the epitumean. But this conception gave man a privilege. There were two kinds of men: those specified as being from a <i>polis</i>-- . . . lambda, iota, sigma-- as being citizens, who alone were human beings in the full sense (<i>de plein droit</i>). Of course, all this is a bit muddled. It nonetheless remains the case that through different structures the relation called political continues to exist. It exists, all the same, more solidly than any other relation.</p>	<p>everyone. How is such a thing as that there are analysts possible? The thing is only possible due to the fact that the analysand is made aware – as it were – of a rule to be observed, to say only what he might have to say, only what is close to his heart, as we say. This echoes –but it's not because a thing is an echo that it is singled out – this echoes a very old idea of what the center of the being known as human used to be, the one they used to call <i>anthropos</i>. The center was the heart –<i>thumos</i> –at the very least that's how it used to be designated. What you had on your [9] <i>chest</i> in your heart, was <i>epithumia</i>. But it was a conception that gave man a privilege. There were two kinds of man. The one who was specified as being from a polis (π,ό,λ,ι,ς), as being a citizen – he alone was a human being who enjoyed full rights. Of course, all this has become blurred. It is still the case, however, that the relationship known as <i>political</i> goes on existing throughout the different structures. It exists more solidly than any other, nevertheless.</p>
<p>J'ai frayé le chemin à quelque chose que j'ai appelé le dire de la vérité. L'analyste a averti, avant que le postulant entre en analyse, il a averti qu'il devait tout dire. Qu'est-ce que veut dire « tout dire » ? Ça ne peut pas avoir du sens. Ça ne peut vouloir dire que dire</p>	<p>I have cleared the path for something I have called the saying of the truth. The analyst has warned, before the postulant enters into analysis, he has warned him that he must say everything (<i>tout dire</i>). What does "say everything" mean? This</p>	<p>I've opened the way to something I've called "the saying of the truth." Before the candidate went into analysis, the analyst informed him that he would have to say everything. What does it mean to say everything? It doesn't make sense . It can only only mean "Say</p>

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<p>n’importe quoi. En fait, c’est ce qui se passe. C’est par là qu’on entre en analyse. L’étrange, c’est qu’il se passe quelque chose qui est de l’ordre d’une inertie, d’une polarisation, d’une orientation. L’analysant (si l’analyse, ça fonctionne, ça avance) en vient à parler d’une façon de plus en plus centrée, centrée sur quelque chose qui depuis toujours s’oppose à la polis (au sens de cité), c’est savoir sur sa famille particulière. L’inertie qui fait qu’un sujet ne parle que de papa ou de maman est quand même une curieuse affaire. À dire n’importe quoi, il est curieux que cette pente se suive, que ça fasse, ça finisse par faire comme l’eau, par faire rivière, rivière de retour à ce par quoi on tient à sa famille, c’est à dire par l’enfance. On peut dire que là s’explique le fait que l’analyste n’intervient que d’une vérité particulière, parce qu’un enfant n’est (45) pas un enfant abstrait. Il a eu une histoire et une histoire qui se spécifie de cette particularité : ce n’est pas la même chose d’avoir eu sa maman et pas la maman du voisin, de même pour le papa.</p>	<p>cannot have meaning (<i>du sens</i>). This can only mean to say no matter what. In fact, this is what happens. This is how one enters analysis. The strange thing is that something happens on the order of an inertia, a polarization, an orientation. The analysand (if the analysis functions, advances) comes to speak in a more and more centered way, centered on something that has always been opposed to the <i>polis</i> (in the sense of the town), a knowledge about his particular family. The inertia that makes a subject only speak of mama or papa is nonetheless a curious business. In saying no matter what, it is curious that this inclination (<i>pente</i>) is followed, that this acts, this ends up acting like water, by making itself a river, a river of return to what holds one to one’s family, which is to say, one’s childhood. We could say that this explains the fact that the analyst only intervenes from a particular truth, because the child <sup>(45)</sup> is not an abstract child. He has had a history and a history specified by this particularity: it is not the same thing to have had his mama and the mama of his neighbor, and it’s the same for the papa.</p>	<p>any old thing whatever.” In point of fact, that’s what happens. It’s how you enter into analysis. The strange thing is that something in the order of an inertia, a polarization, an orientation occurs. The analysand – if the analysis is functioning, if it’s moving forward – comes to speak in an increasingly focused way, focused on something that has always stood in opposition to the <i>polis</i> – in the sense of the city – and that is, namely, one’s own particularly family. This inertia that means that a subject only ever speaks about mum or dad is nevertheless a strange business. It’s strange that this tendency should ensue, that this should happen, that it should end up behaving like water, making a river, a river of return to that by which one clings to one’s family, namely, childhood. It may be said that this explains the fact that an analyst only intervenes by way of a particular truth, because a child is not an abstract child. He has a history, and a history that is specified by this particularity. It’s not the same thing to have had your own mum and not your neighbor’s mum. The same goes for your dad.</p>
<p>Ce n’est pas du tout ce qu’on croit, un papa. Ce n’est pas du tout forcément celui qui, à une femme, a fait cet enfant-là. Dans beaucoup de cas, il n’y a aucune garantie,</p>	<p>A papa is not all what one believes. He is not at all necessarily the one who made that child with a woman. In many cases, there is no guarantee, given</p>	<p>A dad is not at all what he’s reckoned to be. He’s really not necessarily the one who had this child with that woman. In many cases there’s no guarantee</p>

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<p>étant donné que la femme, après tout, il, peut lui arriver bien des choses, surtout si elle traîne un peu. C'est pour ça que papa, ce n'est pas du tout, forcément, celui qui est – c'est le cas de le dire – le père au sens réel, au sens de l'animalité. Le père, c'est une fonction qui se réfère au réel, et ce n'est pas forcément le vrai du réel. Ça n'empêche pas que le réel du père, c'est absolument fondamental dans l'analyse. Le mode d'existence du père tient au réel. C'est le seul cas où le réel est plus fort que le vrai. Disons que le réel, lui aussi, peut être mythique. Il n'empêche que, pour la structure, c'est aussi important que tout dire vrai. Dans cette direction est le réel.</p>	<p>that, after all, many things can happen to the woman, especially if she is a little loose (<i>si elle traîne un peu</i>). This is why papa is not at all, necessarily, the one who is--it must be said--the father in the real, animal sense. The father is a function that refers to the real, and this is not necessarily the true of the real (<i>le vrai du réel</i>). This does not prevent the real of the father from being absolutely fundamental in analysis. The father's mode of existence is owed to the real. This is the only case where the real is stronger than the true. Let us say that the real, too, can be mythic. This does not prevent it from being as important, for structure, as any truthful saying (<i>dire vrai</i>). In this direction is the real.</p>	<p>whasoever, given that, after all, a good many things can happen to a woman, especially if she gets around a bit. That's why Dad is really not necessarily the one who, as it were, is the father in the real sense, in the sense of animal life. The father is a function that refers to the real, and this is not necessarily the truth of the real. This doesn't prevent the real of the father being absolutely fundamental in analysis. The father's mode of existence stems from this real. It's the only case where the real is stronger than the true. Let's say that the real, too, can be mythical. This doesn't change the fact that, for the structure, it is just as important as any true statement [<i>dire</i>]. The real lies in this direction.</p>
<p>C'est fort inquiétant. C'est fort inquiétant qu'il y ait un réel qui soit mythique, et c'est bien pour ça que Freud a maintenu si fortement dans sa doctrine la fonction du père</p>	<p>It is very disturbing. It is very disturbing that there is a mythic real, and this is indeed why Freud so strongly maintained the function of the father in his doctrine.</p>	<p>It's very worrying. It's very worrying that there is a real that is mythical, and it's very much for this reason that Freud clung so strongly to the father's function in his doctrine. [10]</p>
<p>Bon. Jusqu'ici j'ai parlé lentement pour que au moins vous entendiez quelques vérités fondamentales, mais je dois vous dire ceci : c'est que, comme j'enseigne depuis excessivement longtemps, je ne me souviens même plus de ce que j'ai dit la première fois – celle que vous trouverez reproduite dans le Séminaire I, paru déjà, il y a presque vingt-deux ans, paru en</p>	<p>Well. Up to now I have spoken slowly so that you might at least understand some fundamental truths, but I must tell you this: since I have been teaching for an excessively long time, I no longer even remember what I said the first time--which you will find reproduced in <i>Seminar I</i>, already published (<i>paru</i>), almost twenty-two years ago, published as a</p>	<p>Well, so far I've been speaking slowly so that you might at least hear a few fundamental truths, but I have to tell you this: as I've been teaching for an excessively long time, I don't even remember anymore what I said the first time round, some twenty-two years ago, which you will find reproduced in <i>Seminar I</i>, and which has already been published</p>

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<p>reproduction de mon séminaire –, je fais confiance au sténographe, à la personne qui a bien voulu être sûr de remettre les choses dans son français à lui, c’est quelqu’un de très bien, de mon immédiate parenté, qui veut bien faire ce travail.</p>	<p>reproduction of my seminar--I have confidence in my stenographer, the person who very much wanted to be sure to put things in her [his?] own French; this is a very good person, someone closely related to me, who indeed wanted to do this work.</p>	<p>as a reproduction of my seminar. I trust the stenographer, and also the person who was prepared to make sure that everything got put into his own French. He’s very good, one of my immediate kin, and is quite prepared to undertake this task.</p>
<p>Ce que j’ai énoncé d’abord concernant le dire, le dire de la vérité, c’est la pratique qui nous l’enseigne. Et j’ai amorcé, dans ce que je viens d’énoncer, j’ai amorcé ceci : c’est que c’est une par-dit, une analyse. Une partie entre quelqu’un qui parle, mais qu’on a averti que sa parlote avait de l’importance. Vous savez il y a des gens à qui on a affaire dans l’analyse, avec qui il est dur d’obtenir ça. Il y en a pour qui dire quelques mots ce n’est pas si facile. On appelle ça autisme. C’est vite dit. Ce n’est pas du tout forcément ça.</p>	<p>What I have stated to begin with concerning the saying, the saying of the truth, is that it is the practice that teaches it to us. And I have suggested (<i>amorcé</i>), in what I have stated, I have suggested this: that this is a par-said (<i>par-dit</i>), an analysis. A part[y?] (<i>partie</i>) for (<i>entre</i>) someone who speaks, but whom one has warned that his chitchat (<i>parlote</i>) has importance. You know there are people one has to deal with in analysis with whom it is hard to obtain this. There are some for whom saying words is not easy. One calls this autism. This is a bit hastily said. It is not necessarily that.</p>	<p>What I said at the outset concerning saying, the saying of truth, has been taught us by our practice. And I started, in what I was just stating, I started with this – an analysis is a part-said, with parts for someone who speaks, but who has been informed that his chatter is important [, and an analyst]. You know there are people one deals with in analysis with whom this is hard to obtain. There are those for whom saying a few words isn’t so easy. It is what is known as autism. This is easily said. It’s really not necessarily that at all.</p>
<p>C’est simplement des gens pour qui le poids des mots est très (46)sérieux et qui ne sont pas facilement disposés à en prendre à leur aise avec ces mots. J’ai quelquefois à répondre à des cas comme ceux-là dans cette fameuse supervision de tout à l’heure que, plus simplement, nous appelons en français un contrôle (ce qui ne veut pas dire, bien sûr, que nous croyons</p>	<p>They are simply people for whom the weight of words is very (46) serious and who are not disposed to take their ease with these words. I sometimes have to respond to cases like these with that famous supervision I just referred to, which, more simply, we call a control in French (which, of course, does not mean we believe we control anything). Me, often, in my controls--at the</p>	<p>They are simply people for whom the weight of words is very serious and who are not easily disposed to feeling comfortable with these words. I sometimes have to respond to cases like these in that famous supervision I mentioned earlier, which, more straightforwardly, we call <i>contrôle</i> in French which doesn’t mean of course that we think we are controlling anything. As far as I’m</p>






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<p>contrôler rien). Moi, souvent, dans mes contrôles – au début tout au moins – j’encourage plutôt l’analyste – ou celui ou celle qui se croit tel –, je l’encourage à suivre son mouvement. Je ne pense pas que ça soit sans raison que – non pas il se mette dans cette position, c’est très peu contrôlé – mais je ne pense pas que ça soit sans raison que quelqu’un vienne lui raconter quelque chose au nom simplement de ceci : qu’on lui a dit que c’était un analyste. Ce n’est pas sans raison, parce qu’il en attend quelque chose. Maintenant, ce dont il s’agit c’est de comprendre comment ce que je viens là de vous dépeindre à très gros traits peut fonctionner.</p>	<p>beginning at least--I encourage the analyst--or he or she who believe themselves such--to follow his movements instead. I do not think it is without reason that--not that he puts himself in this position; there is very little control over this--but I think it is not without reason that someone come to tell him or her (<i>lui</i>) something simply in the name of this: that he has been told that this person was an analyst. It is not without reason, because he expects something from it. Now, it is a question of understanding how what I am depicting for you in very broad strokes can function.</p>	<p>concerned, often my <i>contrôles</i> – at least at the beginning – I rather encourage analysts – or him or her who thinks he or she is one – I encourage them to follow their movement. I don’t think it is for no reason – not that they should put themselves in this position, that’s very little controlled –but I don’t think it’s for no reason that someone should come and tell someone something simply by virtue of the fact that he was told this person was an analyst. It’s not for no reason, because he expects to get something from it. And now, what we have to understand is how what I’ve just roughly sketched out is able to</p>
<p>Fonctionner de façon telle que, quand même, le lien social constitué par l’analyse rebondisse, se perpétue. C’est là que j’ai pris parti et que j’ai dit... – dans quelque chose où, d’un côté, il y a quelqu’un qui parle sans le moindre souci de se contredire, et puis, de l’autre, quelqu’un qui ne parle pas – puisque, la plupart du temps, il faut bien laisser la parole à celui qui est là pour quelque chose ; quand il parle, il est supposé dire la vérité, mais pas n’importe laquelle, la vérité qu’il faut que l’analysant entende. Qu’il faut que l’analysant entende : pourquoi ? Pour ce qu’il attend, à savoir d’être libéré du symptôme.</p>	<p>Can function in a way that, nonetheless, the social link constituted by analysis might rebound, might perpetuate itself. It is there that I have taken a side (<i>pris parti</i>) and I have said . . . --in something where, on the one hand, someone speaks without worrying in the least about contradicting himself, and then, on the other, someone does not speak--since, most of the time, it is indeed necessary to let the person who is there for something do the talking; when he speaks, he is supposed to say the truth, not just any truth, but the truth the analysand has to hear. That the analysand has to hear, why? For what he expects, that is, to be freed of the symptom.</p>	<p>function in such a way that, nonetheless, the social bond constituted by analysis may progress and carry on. That’s where I took a stand and I said – in something where, on the one hand, there’s someone who’s speaking without the slightest concern for self-contradiction, and then, on the other, someone who doesn’t speak – because, most of the time, you have to let the person who is there for something speak – when he speaks, he’s supposed to say the truth. But not any old truth; the truth that the analysand must hear. That the analysand must hear – whatever for? For what he expects, namely, to be free of his symptom.</p>

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<p>Qu'est-ce que ça peut supposer que, par dire, quelqu'un soit libéré du symptôme ? Ça suppose que le symptôme et cette sorte d'intervention de l'analyste – il me semble que c'est le moins qu'on puisse avancer – sont du même ordre. Le symptôme lui aussi dit quelque chose. Il dit, il est une autre forme de vrai dire et ce qu'en somme fait l'analyste, c'est d'essayer de faire un peu plus que de glisser dessus. C'est bien pourquoi l'analyse, la théorie analytique use d'un terme comme résistance. Le symptôme, ça résiste, ce n'est pas quelque chose qui s'en va tout seul ; mais présenter une analyse comme quelque chose qui serait un duel est aussi tout à fait contraire à la vérité, c'est bien pour ça que j'ai – avec le temps, ce n'est pas venu tout de suite – essayé de construire quelque chose qui rende compte de ce qui se passe dans (47)une analyse. Je n'ai pas la moindre « conception du monde », comme on dit. Le monde, c'est cette charmante petite coquille dans laquelle on met au centre cette pierre précieuse, cette chose unique que serait l'homme. Il est censé avoir (étant donné ce schéma) des choses qui palpitent en lui : un monde intérieur. Et puis, le monde, ce serait un monde extérieur. Je ne crois pas du tout que ça suffise. Je ne crois pas du tout qu'il y ait un monde intérieur reflet du monde</p>	<p>What might it suppose that, by a saying (<i>dire</i>), someone might be freed of the symptom? It supposes that the symptom and this sort of intervention on the part of the analyst--this seems to me the least one can say--are of the same order. The symptom also says something to the analyst (<i>lui aussi dit quelque chose</i>). It says--it is another form of the truthful saying (<i>vrai dire</i>) and what the analyst does, in sum, is to try to do a little more than to gloss (<i>glisser</i>) over it. This indeed is why analysis, analytic theory, uses a term like resistance. The symptom, that resists (<i>ça résiste</i>). It is not something that goes away all by itself; but presenting an analysis as something on the order of a duel is also completely contrary to the truth. This is why I have--with time, it did not come right away--tried to construct something that would account for what happens in <sup>(47)</sup>an analysis. I do not have the least "conception of the world," as one says. The world is that charming little shell at the center of which one puts that precious stone, that unique thing that would be man. It is conceived to have (given this schema) things that palpitate in it: an interior world. And the world, then, would be an exterior world. I do not at all believe that this suffices. I do not at all believe there is an interior world that is the reflection of the exterior world, or <i>visa-versa</i> (<i>ni</i></p>	<p>What is implied by the fact that in speaking someone is freed of his [11] symptom? It assumes that a symptom and this kind of intervention by the analyst – it seems to me that this is the minimum one can assert – are of the same order. Symptoms also say something. A symptom says something, and it is another form of truthful saying. All in all, what this analyst does is try to do a little more than skip over it. This is precisely why analysis, analytic theory, uses a term like <i>resistance</i>. Symptoms resist. This is not something that goes away by itself. But to present an analysis as being something like a duel would also be quite contrary to the truth. That's precisely why I've tried – over time it didn't come along straight away – to construct something that accounts for what goes on in an analysis. I don't have the slightest "conception of the world," as they say. The world is that charming little shell in the center of which one places a precious stone, that unique thing that man is supposed to be. Man is supposed to have – given this scheme of things – these things that palpitate within him – an inner world. And then the world itself is said to be an outside world. I really don't believe that this is adequate. I really don't believe that there is an inner world that is the reflection of the outside world, nor the contrary</p>

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<p>extérieur, ni non plus le contraire. J'ai essayé de formuler quelque chose qui incontestablement suppose une organisation plus compliquée. Si nous disons – nous, analystes – qu'il y a un inconscient, c'est fondé sur l'expérience. L'expérience consiste en ceci, c'est que dès l'origine il y a un rapport avec « lalangue », qui mérite d'être appelée, à juste titre, maternelle parce que c'est par la mère que l'enfant – si je puis dire – la reçoit. Il ne l'apprend pas. Il y a une pente. Il est très surprenant de voir comment un enfant manipule très tôt des choses aussi notablement grammaticales que l'usage des mots « peut-être » ou « pas encore ». Bien sûr l'a-t-il entendu, mais qu'il en comprenne le sens est quelque chose qui mérite toute notre attention.</p>	<p><i>non plus le contraire</i>). I have tried to formulate something that incontestably supposes a more complicated organization. If we say--we analysts--that there is an unconscious, this is founded on experience. The experience consists of this: from the origin there has been a relationship with "lalangue," which merits being called, quite correctly, maternal because it is through the mother that the child--if I can say this -- receives it. He does not learn it. He has an inclination toward it. It is very surprising to see how a child very soon manipulates things as notably grammatical as the usage of the words "perhaps" ("<i>peut-être</i>") or "not yet" ("<i>pas encore</i>"). Of course, he has heard them, but the fact he understands their meaning is something that merits all of our attention.</p>	<p>either. I've tried to formulate some thing that incontestably presupposes a more complicated organization. If we say – we analysts – that there is an unconscious, this is based on experience. The experience consists in the fact that from the origins there has been a relationship with <i>lalangue</i> that deserves to be called, rightly, the mother tongue, because it's from the mother that the child, as it were, receives it. He doesn't learn it. There's an inclination. It's surprising to see how early on it is that a child handles things as notably grammatical as the use of the words <i>maybe</i> or <i>not yet</i>. Of course, he's heard that, but that he should understand the meaning of it is something that deserves all our attention.</p>
<p>Il y a dans le langage quelque chose qui est structuré. Les linguistes s'y enclosent, à manifester cette structure qu'on appelle grammaticale. Et que l'enfant y soit si à l'aise, que si tôt il se familiarise avec l'usage d'une structure qui – ce n'est pas pour rien qu'on l'y a repérée, mais d'une façon élaborée – est ce qu'on appelle figures de rhétorique manifeste qu'on ne lui apprend pas la grammaire. On élabore la grammaire à partir de ce qui déjà fonctionne comme parole. Et cela n'est pas ce qu'il y a</p>	<p>In language there is something structured. Linguists enclose themselves in this, in manifesting this structure one calls grammatical. The fact that the child is so at ease with it, that he so soon familiarizes himself with the usage of a structure that--it is not for nothing that we have pinpointed it, but in an elaborated way--one calls figures of rhetoric manifests that one does not teach him grammar. One elaborates grammar starting with what already functions as speech. And grammar (<i>cela</i>) is not what is most</p>	<p>In language, there is something that is structured. Linguists confine themselves to this, making apparent the structure called "grammatical." And that the child should be so comfortable in it, that so early on he should familiarize himself with the use of a structure that – it's not for nothing that it was ascertained there, but in an elaborated fashion – is what are called "rhetorical figures," signals that grammar isn't taught to him. Grammar is developed on the basis of what is already operating as speech. This</p>

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<p>de plus caractéristique. Si j’ai employé le terme : « l’inconscient est structuré comme un langage, c’est bien parce que je veux maintenir qu’un langage, ça n’est pas le langage. Il y a quelque chose dans le langage de déjà trop général, de trop logique.</p>	<p>characteristic. If I have employed the term, "the unconscious is structured like a language," it is because I want to maintain that a language is not the language. There is something in <i>the</i> language of the already too general, of the too logical.</p>	<p>is not its most characteristic feature. If I’ve been saying, “The unconscious is structured like a language,” it’s because I want to maintain that <i>a</i> language is not language <i>per se</i>. There is something in language <i>per se</i> that is already too general, too logical.</p>
<p>C’est tout le système qui se présente comme s’il était inné que l’enfant joue, à propos d’un départ de sa mère, avec l’énoncé qui a tellement frappé Freud – cela chez un de ses petits-enfants –, l’énoncé Fort-Da. C’est là que tout s’insère. C’est déjà, ce Fort-Da, une figure de rhétorique.</p>	<p>It is the whole system, which presents itself as if it were innate, that the child plays, in reference to the departure of its mother, with the statement that so struck Freud--coming from one of his grandchildren--the statement <i>Fort-Da</i>. It is there that all is inserted. This is already, this <i>Fort-Da</i>, a figure of rhetoric.</p>	<p>It is the entire system, present as if it were innate, that the child plays [12] in relation to one of his mother’s departure with the statement that so struck Freud – from one of his grandchildren’s utterances – <i>Fort-Da</i>. This is where it all gets inserted. This <i>Fort-Da</i> is already a rhetorical figure.</p>
<p>Quelqu’un dont j’étais plutôt étonné qu’il m’ait cité, parce que je ne savais même pas qu’il me connaissait – il me connaît (48) manifestement à travers Paul de Man, Paul de Man qui m’a accueilli à Yale, Paul de Man à qui bien sûr je ne peux qu’être reconnaissant de tout le soin qu’il a pris pour frayer mon arrivée aux Amériques –, mais, quand même, je suis surpris de ceci que tellement de personnes après tout disent certaines choses qui ne sont pas tellement loin de ce que je dis... Il se produit comme ça dans plusieurs places une sorte de petit tourbillon, une manière de dire qui est ce que j’appelle, moi, le style. Je n’ai pas de « conception du monde », mais j’ai un style, un</p>	<p>Someone of whom I was rather astonished that he cited me, because I did not even know he knew me--he knows me (48) manifestly through Paul de Man, Paul de Man who greeted me at Yale, Paul de Man to whom, of course, I can only be very grateful for all the care he took to clear the way for my arrival in the Americas--but, nonetheless, I am surprised that so many people say certain things that are not so far from what I say . . . a sort of little whirlpool is produced like that in several places, a manner of saying things (<i>de dire</i>) that, me, I call style. I do not have a "conception of the world," but I have a style, a style that, naturally, is not altogether easy, but this is the</p>	<p>Someone by whom I was rather surprised to have been quoted, because I didn’t even know he knew me – clearly he knows me through Paul de Man, who welcomed me at Yale, and of course I can only be grateful to for all the care he has taken to open the way for me to travel to the Americas – but, all the same, I’m surprised that so many people should after all be saying certain things that really aren’t that far from what I’ve been saying. It happens like that, in different places, a kind of whirlwind, a way of speaking tht is what I personally call “style”. I don’t have a “conception of the world”, but I have a style, one that, naturally isn’t altogether easy. But that’s</p>




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<p>style qui, naturellement, n'est pas tout à fait facile, mais c'est là tout le problème. Qu'est-ce que c'est qu'un style ? Qu'est-ce que c'est qu'une chose ? Qu'est-ce que c'est que la façon dont un style se situe, se caractérise ? Moi, au temps où je parlais seulement avec des camarades, ce qui était, le plus naturel, c'était de dire « ce n'est pas tout à fait ça » et si ce que j'ai écrit après l'avoir dit, si ce que j'ai écrit, d'élaborer ce que j'ai dit, a un cachet, c'est de marquer que j'essaie de serrer au plus près ce qui est « tout à fait ça ». Bien sûr, ce n'est pas facile, ce n'est pas facile de partir, comme par exemple font des structuralistes, d'une division entre nature et culture. La culture, moi, c'est ce que j'ai essayé d'écarteler sous la forme de quatre discours, mais bien sûr ce n'est pas limitatif. C'est le discours qui flotte, qui surnage à la surface de notre politique à nous, je veux dire de notre façon de concevoir un certain lien social. Si le lien était purement politique, nous y avons ajouté autre chose. Nous y avons ajouté le discours qu'on appelle universitaire, le discours qu'on appelle scientifique, qui ne se confondent pas, contrairement à ce qu'on imagine. Le discours scientifique, ce n'est pas pour rien que, dans le champ universitaire, on lui réserve des facultés spéciales. On le tient à l'écart, mais ce n'est pas pour rien. J'ai montré quelque part qu'il y a</p>	<p>whole problem. What is a style? What is a thing? How is a style situated, characterized? Me, in the time when I only spoke with comrades, which was the most natural thing to do, it was to say "this is not altogether that" and if what I have written after having said it, if what I have written to elaborate what I have said, has a certain <i>cachet</i>, it is from marking that I try to get a firmer grip on what is "altogether that." Of course, this is not easy; it is not easy to start, as, for example, some structuralists do, from a division between nature and culture. Culture is what I myself have tried to quarter in the form of four discourses, but of course this is not limitative. It is discourse that floats (<i>qui flotte, qui surnage</i>) on the surface of our politics, I mean of our way of conceiving of a certain social link. If this link was purely political, we have added something else there. We have added the discourse one calls academic (<i>universitaire</i>) and the discourse one calls scientific, which are not the same thing (<i>qui ne se confondent pas</i>), contrary to what one imagines. It is not for nothing that, in the academic field, one reserves special faculties for scientific discourse. One keeps it separate, but this is not for nothing. I have shown somewhere that there is a relationship, which is not anodyne, between scientific discourse and hysteric discourse.</p>	<p>the whole problem. What is a style? What is a thing? What is the way in which a style is situated and characterized? For my part, at the time when I only used to speak with my colleagues, the most natural thing was to say, "It's not exactly that," and if what I wrote after saying it, elaborating on what I said, is at all distinctive, it's because it carries the mark of my attempt to grasp as tightly as possible what <i>that is, exactly</i>. Of course, it's not easy; it's not easy to start off, as, for example, the structuralists do, with a division between nature and culture. Culture is what I have been trying to quarter into the form of four discourses, but of course, it's not limited to these. Discourse is what floats, what skims across the surface of our own politics, I mean, our way of conceiving of a certain social bond. If the bond was purely a political one, we have added something else to it. We have added the discourse called the "university discourse," and the discourse called "scientific," which are not to be confused, contrary to what one might imagine. It is not for nothing that special faculties have been set aside in the academic field for the scientific discourse. It's kept at a distance, but not for nothing. Somewhere I have shown that there is a relationship, which is not insignificant, between scientific discourse and hysteric discourse</p>







<p>Conférences et entretiens dans des universités nord-américaines. Scilicet n° 6/7, 1975, pp. 42-52.</p>	<p>Conferences and Conversations at North American Universities. Scilicet n° 6/7, 1975, pp 42-52.</p>	<p>The text was originally published in French in Scilicet 6/7 (1976) : 42-52. This translation appears in Culture/Clinic 1. Applied Lacanian Psychoanalysis ; University of Minnesota Press, 2013. pp.8-16.</p>
<p>un rapport, qui n'est pas anodin, entre le discours scientifique et le discours hystérique. Ça peut paraître bizarre – à un certain enchaînement près de certaines fonctions que j'ai définies en y employant un certain S1 et un certain S2, qui n'ont pas la même fonction, et aussi un certain S que j'appelle sujet et un certain objet (a), à un certain ordre tournant près de ces quatre fonctions –, le discours scientifique ne se distingue du discours hystérique que par l'ordre dans lequel tout cela se répartit.</p>	<p>This might appear bizarre--in a certain sequence near certain functions that I have defined in employing a certain S<sub>1</sub> and a certain S<sub>2</sub>, which are not the same function, and also a certain S that I call a subject and a certain object (a), in a certain revolving order near these four functions-- scientific discourse only distinguishes itself from hysteric discourse by the order in which all this is distributed.</p>	<p>That might seem strange – except for a certain chain of certain functions that I've defined by employing a certain S<sub>1</sub> and a certain S<sub>2</sub>, which don't have the same function and also a certain S that I call the "subject" and a certain "object" (a), except for a certain order of rotation of these four functions –scientific discourse is only distinct from hysteric discourse by the order in which all of that is distributed.</p>
<p>(49) Tout cela a abouti à quelque chose qu'on peut dessiner en employant plusieurs couleurs différentes. J'ai cru pouvoir lier le symbolique (c'est celui-là, c'est l'arbitraire), le réel et l'imaginaire.</p>	<p><sup>(49)</sup> All this has led to something that one can draw in employing several different colors. I have believed myself able to link the symbolic (it's that one there; it's the arbitrary), the real, and the imaginary.</p>	<p>All of this has resulted in something that can be drawn using several different colors. I believed I could link the symbolic – that's this one here, the arbitrary one – the real and the imaginary. [13]</p>
		
<p>Comment se fait-il qu'après avoir distingué ce symbolique, cet imaginaire, et ce réel, et les avoir spécifiés de ceci que le</p>	<p>How does it happen that after having distinguished this symbolic, this imaginary, and this real, and having specified from this that the</p>	<p>How is it that, having distinguished this symbolic, this imaginary, and this real from one another, and having specified them by the fact</p>




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<p>symbolique, c'est notre lien au langage, c'est de cette distinction que nous sommes des êtres parlants ? C'est un cercle vicieux de dire que nous sommes des êtres parlants. Nous sommes des « parlêtres », mot qu'il y a avantage à substituer à l'inconscient, d'équivoquer sur la parlote, d'une part, et sur le fait que c'est du langage que nous tenons cette folie qu'il y a de l'être : parce que c'est sûr que nous y croyons, nous y croyons à cause de tout ce qui paraît faire substance ; mais en quoi est-ce de l'être, en dehors du fait que le langage use du verbe être ? Il use du verbe être, mais modérément. L'homme pourrait dire qu'il est un corps, et ce serait très sensé, car c'est évident que le fait qu'il consiste en un corps est ce qu'il a de plus certain. On a émis quelques doutes sur l'existence d'un monde extérieur au nom de ceci qu'après tout nous n'en n'avons que des perceptions, mais il suffit de se faire (comme j'ai fait moi-même toute à l'heure), de se faire une bosse en rencontrant quelque chose de dur pour qu'il soit tout à fait manifeste qu'il y a des choses qui résistent, qu'il y a des choses qui ne se déplacent pas si facilement ; en revanche, ce sur quoi l'homme insiste, c'est non pas qu'il est un corps, mais, comme il s'exprime (c'est là quelque chose de saisissant), qu'il en a un.</p>	<p>symbolic is our link to language, that it is from this that comes this distinction that we are speaking <i>beings</i> (<i>êtres parlants</i>)? It is a vicious circle to say we are speaking beings. We are "<i>parlêtres</i>," a word that has the advantage of substituting for the unconscious, by equivocating on <i>parlote</i> (chitchat), on the one hand, and on the fact that <i>it is to language</i> we owe this crazy idea (<i>folie</i>) that there is a being: because it is certain that we believe in it; we believe in it because of what appears to constitute (<i>faire</i>) a substance; but how is this from being, outside of the fact that language uses the verb "to be"? It uses the verb to be, but moderately. Man could say he <i>is</i> a body, and this would be very sensible, for it is obvious that the fact that he consists in a body is what he is most certain of. One has emitted some doubts about the existence of the exterior world in the name of our, after all, only having some perceptions of it, but it suffices to raise (as I just did myself) a bump (<i>bosse</i>) in encountering something hard for it to be altogether manifest that there are things that resist, that there are things that are not displaced so easily; on the other hand, what man insists on is not that he is a body, but, as it is expressed (this is something quite striking [<i>saisissant</i>] ), <i>that he has one</i>.</p>	<p>that the symbolic is our bond with language, based on this distinction, we are speaking <i>beings</i>? It's viciously circular to say that we are speaking beings, <i>être parlants</i>. We are <i>parlêtres</i> – a word it would be advantageous to substitute for the unconscious, equivocating, as it does, on <i>parleying</i>, on the one hand, and on the fact that it's <i>from language</i> that we get this crazy idea that there is being, on the other – for it is certain that we believe in it, we believe in it because of everything that appears to make for substance. But in what way is this being, apart from the fact that language uses the verb <i>to be</i>? It uses the verb <i>to be</i>, but only moderately. A man might say that he is a body, and this would make a lot of sense for it's obvious that the fact he consists of a body is, for him, what is the most certain thing about him. A few doubts have been cast on the existence of an outside world in the name of the fact that, after all, we only ever have perceptions of it. But it is sufficient to get – as I did earlier – to get a bump on the head by running into something hard, for it to be quite obvious that there are things that resist, that there are things that don't move so easily. On the other hand, what man insists on is not that he is a body, but, as he expresses it – and this is something quite striking – <i>that he has one</i>.</p>

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<p>Au nom de quoi peut-il dire qu'il a un corps ? Au nom de ceci qu'il le traite à la vacomme-je-te-pousse, il le traite comme un meuble. Il le met dans des wagons par exemple et là il se laisse trimbaler. C'était quand même vrai aussi, ça commençait à s'amorcer (50) quand il le mettait dans des chariots. Alors, je voudrais dire que cette histoire de parlêtre, ça se rencontre avec cette autre appréhension du corps et ça ne va pas tout seul. Je veux dire qu'un corps a une autre façon de consister que ce que j'ai désigné là sous une forme parlée, sous la forme de l'inconscient, en tant que c'est de la parole comme telle qu'il surgit. Ce sont des marques dont nous voyons la trace dans ce qu'il en est de l'inconscient. Ce sont des marques qui sont celles laissées par une certaine façon d'avoir rapport à un savoir, qui constitue la substance fondamentale de ce qu'il en est de l'inconscient. L'inconscient, nous imaginons que c'est quelque chose comme un instinct, mais ce n'est pas vrai. Nous manquons tout à fait de l'instinct, et la façon dont nous réagissons est liée non pas à un instinct, mais à un certain savoir véhiculé non pas tant par des mots que par ce que j'appelle des signifiants. Des signifiants, c'est ce qui dit, c'est une rhétorique bien sûr beaucoup plus profonde, c'est ce qui prête à équivoque. L'interprétation doit toujours –</p>	<p>In the name of what can he say he has a body? In the name of his treating it as a go-as-I-push-you, treating it like a piece of furniture. For example, he puts it in wagons and lets himself be carted around. It is nonetheless also true that this began to be initiated (<i>s'amorcer</i>)<sup>(50)</sup> when he put it in chariots. Well, I would like to say that this <i>parlêtre</i> story meets with this other apprehension of the body and that this does not go all by itself. I mean that a body has another way of consisting than the one I have designated there as having a spoken form, the form of the unconscious, inasmuch as it arises from speech as such. These are marks of which we see the trace in what there is of the unconscious. These are marks left by a certain way of having a relation (<i>rapport</i>) to a knowledge, which constitutes the fundamental substance of what there is of the unconscious. The unconscious, we imagine it is something like an instinct, but this is not true. We are altogether lacking in instinct, and the way we react is linked, not to an instinct, but to a certain knowledge borne not so much by words as by what I call signifiers. Signifiers, this is what says, this is, of course, a much more profound rhetoric, this is what lends itself to the equivocal. Interpretation must always—for the analyst—take into account that, in what is said, there is the sound (<i>le sonore</i>), and that</p>	<p>In the name of what can he say that he has a body? In the name of the fact that he treats it any old how, he treats it like a piece of furniture. He puts it in a train carriage, for instance, and lets himself get carted around. That too was nevertheless true; it started when he began putting it in carts. So, I would like to say that this history of the <i>parlêtre</i> is encountered with this other apprehension of the body, and it's not self-evident. I mean that a body has another way of consisting than what I was just referring [14] to as a spoken form, in the form of the unconscious, in so far as it is from speech, as such, that it emerges. These are marks whose trace we can see in the unconscious. These are marks that have been left by a certain way of relating to knowledge that constitute the fundamental substance of the unconscious. We imagine that the unconscious is something like an instinct but this isn't true. We utterly lack any instinct whatsoever, and the way we react isn't linked to an instinct but to certain knowledge conveyed not so much by words as by what I call "signifiers." Signifiers, they are what is said – there's a much more profound rhetoric of course – they are what lends itself to equivocation. Interpretation must always, on the analyst's side, take into account that, in what is said, there is the</p>



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<p>chez l’analyste – tenir compte de ceci que, dans ce qui est dit, il y a le sonore, et que ce sonore doit consonner avec ce qu’il en est de l’inconscient.</p>	<p>this sound must consonate with what there is of the unconscious.</p>	<p>sonorous element. And this has to be consonant with the unconscious.</p>
<p>Il y a quelque chose d’important dans cette façon de représenter le lien : le lien du symbolique, de l’imaginaire et du réel, et voici quoi. C’est que ce n’est pas nécessairement à plat que nous devons poser ces trois termes. Le corps, bien sûr, a aussi forme, une forme que nous croyons être sphérique, mais nous devons aussi savoir dessiner des choses autrement.</p>	<p>There is something important in this way of representing the link, the link between the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real, and this is what it is: we need not necessarily pose these three terms as being flat. The body, of course, also has a form, a form we believe to be spherical, but we must also know how to draw things otherwise.</p>	<p>There’s something important in this way of representing the bond – the bond among the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real – and here’s what it is. It is that we are not necessarily to lie these three terms out flat. The body, of course, also has a shape, a shape we think of as spherical, but we must also know how to draw things differently.</p>
		
<p>Il est comme vous le voyez remarquable que pour un objet qui m’est aussi familier que vous pouvez (51)imaginer que me soit cette façon de dessiner le nœud, que je sois forcé de garder un petit papier. Ça veut dire que ce n’est pas si naturel de dessiner ça comme ça. Ceci est donc un nœud</p>	<p>It is, as you see, remarkable that for an object as familiar as you <sup>(51)</sup>can imagine this way of drawing the knot is for me, that I am forced to keep a little piece of paper on hand. That means it is not so natural to draw it like this. This is therefore a knot.</p>	<p>As you can see, it’s remarkable that for an object as familiar to me as you can imagine this way of drawing the knot to be, I am obliged to use a piece of paper. That means that it’s not so natural as all that to draw it like that. This, then, is a knot.</p>

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<p>J'espère que tous voient que ça fait nœud. Qu'est-ce que ça veut dire ? Ça veut dire que, au regard de cette référence à la sphère, 1 enveloppe 2. Le 1 par rapport au 2, on peut lui en faire faire le tour très exactement, d'ailleurs comme on peut faire faire par le 1 le tour de 2. Mais qu'est-ce que veut dire le fait que le 3 se dispose de cette façon-là ? Il se dispose d'une façon qui est rendue sensible par cette manière de disposer ce que nous appelons dans l'occasion la sphère et la croix, à ceci près que ce n'est pas une sphère, mais que c'est un rond. Un rond, ce n'est pas du tout la même chose qu'une sphère. Supposez que je rétrécisse ceci par le milieu et nous obtiendrons ça, qui est une forme de plus de ce que nous pouvons énoncer comme étant un nœud borroméen.</p>	<p>I hope everyone sees that this makes a knot. What does that mean? That means, in regard to this reference to the sphere, 1 envelopes 2. We can quite precisely make the 1 encircle the 2, as we can the 2 the 1. But what does it mean that the 3 is situated in this fashion? It is situated in a fashion rendered sensible by the manner of arranging what we call in this instance <i>the sphere and the cross</i>, except this is not a sphere, but a ring (<i>ronde</i>). A ring is not the same thing as a sphere. Let us suppose that I shrink this ring in the middle and we obtain this, which is one more form of what we can state (<i>énoncer</i>) as being a Borromean knot.</p>	<p>I hope you can all see that this is a knot. What does that mean? It means that, with respect to this reference to the sphere, 1 goes around 2. For 1 in relation to 2, you can get it to go around it exactly, just as you can, more- [15] over, get 1 to go around 2 exactly. But what does it mean for 3 to be arranged like that? It's arranged in a way that is made tangible by this way of arranging things that on occasion we call "the sphere and the cross," except that here it's not a sphere, it's a ring. A ring isn't at all the same thing as a sphere. Suppose I make this narrower here in the middle, then we get this, which is a further form of what we can state as being a Borromean knot.</p>
		
<p>Je veux dire que, de quelque façon que le numéro 3 ici enveloppe le 1, il est enveloppé par l'autre, mais il est enveloppé par l'autre dans une troisième dimension.</p>	<p>I mean that, in whatever way the number 3 here envelopes the 1, it is enveloped by the other, but it is enveloped by the other in a third dimension. Contrary to what we</p>	<p>I mean that, whichever way number 3 here goes around 1, it still has the other one wrapped around it, but it has the other one wrapped around it in a third</p>

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<p>Contrairement à ce qu'on imagine – nous autres qui sommes ambitieux et qui passons notre temps à rêver à une quatrième –, nous ferions mieux de (52)penser au poids que la dit-mension troisième a (celle que j'ai décrite tout à l'heure). Il faudrait s'émerveiller de la troisième avant d'en faire une de plus. Il n'y a rien de plus facile que d'en faire une de plus. Quand elles sont toutes séparées, à savoir si nous supposons trois cercles... qui s'en vont tous à la dérive, il suffit d'en faire un quatrième ; il suffit de le rattacher par un cercle d'une façon dont ça fasse un rond pour que nous retrouvions ce qui fait de ces cercles la consistance.</p>	<p>imagine--we others who are ambitious and who pass our time dreaming of a fourth--we would do better <sup>(52)</sup> to think of the weight of the third dit-mension (which I have just described). One must marvel at the third before making one more. Nothing is easier than making one more. When they are all separated, that is, if we suppose three circles . . . which all drift away, it suffices to make a fourth; it suffices to reconnect them with a circle, a circle constituting a ring (<i>d'une façon dont ça fasse un rond</i>), to rediscover what constitutes the consistency of these circles (<i>ce qui fait de ces cercles la consistance</i>)</p>	<p>dimension. Contrary to what one imagines – those of us who are very ambitious and spend our time dreaming of a fourth one – we would be better off thinking about the weight that the third dit-mension has – the one I described earlier. We ought to marvel at the third one before making another one. There's nothing easier than making another one. When they are all separate, that is, if we take three circles that can all drift off on their own, it's sufficient to make a fourth; it's sufficient to attach it with a circle in such a way that it makes a ring, for us to find ourselves back with what give consistency to these circles.</p>
		
<p>Après vous avoir fournit de ces nœuds la donnée qui aboutit à cette notion qu'il n'y a pas d'espace, qu'il n'y a que des nœuds – ou, plus exactement, c'est en fonction des nœuds que nous pensons l'espace –, maintenant, puisque je ne termine pas trop tard..., je serais heureux d'entendre vos questions...</p>	<p>After having furnished you with these knots the given that leads to this notion that there is no space, that there are only knots--or, more precisely, that it is as a function of (<i>en fonction de</i>) knots that we think space--now, since I am not finishing too late . . . I would be happy to hear your questions . . .</p>	<p>Having provided you with these facts about these knots, which lead to the notion that there is no such thing as space, tht there are only knots – or, more accurately, that it's by means of knots that we think space – now, because I haven't finished too late, I'd be happy to take your questions.</p>