

## Conférences et entretiens dans des universités nord-américaines

Le Séminaire 23: Le sinthome ; Leçon 1: De l'usage logique du sinthome	Paris	November 18, 1975	Tuesday	
Kanzer Seminar w. Q & A	Yale	November 24, 1975	Monday	Jack Stone
Interview w. the students, response to their questions	Yale	November 24, 1975	Monday	Jack Stone
Law School Auditorium	Yale	November 25, 1975	Tuesday	Jack Stone;Adrian Price w. Russell Grigg
International Affairs	Columbia	December 01, 1975	Monday	Jack Stone; Adrian Price w. Russell Grigg
<b>w. Q &amp; A</b>	<b>MIT</b>	<b>December 02, 1975</b>	<b>Tuesday</b>	<b>Jack Stone; Jack Stone and Russell Grigg</b>
<b>4 discourses</b>	<b>MIT</b>	<b>December 02, 1975</b>	<b>Tuesday</b>	<b>Jack Stone; Jack Stone and Russell Grigg</b>
Le Séminaire 23: Le sinthome ; Leçon 2: De ce qui fait trou dans le réel	Paris	December 09, 1975	Tuesday	Jack Stone

<b>French Text is from Scilicet 6/7</b>	<b>Translation by Jack W. Stone</b>	<b>Translation by Jack W. Stone w. Russell Grigg</b>
Conférences dans les universités nord-américaines : le 2 décembre 1975 au Massachusetts Institute of Technology, parue dans <i>Scilicet</i> , 1975, n° 6-7, pp. 53-63.	Conferences in North American Universities: December 2, 1975 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, published in <i>Scilicet</i> , 1975, n° 6-7, pp. 53-63	MIT Lecture on Topology. Lectures in North American Universities ; 2 December 1975 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, published in <i>Scilicet</i> , No. 6-7, pp. 53-63
(53)La linguistique est ce par quoi la psychanalyse pourrait s'accrocher à la science	. <sup>(53)</sup> Linguistics is that by which psychoanalysis could hook on to science.	Linguistics is that through which psychoanalysis might hook on to science.
Mais la psychanalyse n'est pas une science, c'est une pratique.	But psychoanalysis is not a science; it is a practice.	But psychoanalysis is not a science; it is a practice.
En en parlant tout à l'heure avec moi, M. Quine m'a posé la question de ce que je devais à Cl. Lévi-Strauss : je lui dois beaucoup, sinon tout. Ça n'empêche pas que j'ai de la structure une tout autre notion que la sienne.	As we where speaking of it a little while ago, Mr. Quine asked me what I owed to Claude Lévi-Strauss: I owe him a lot, if not everything. That doesn't prevent me from having a wholly other notion of structure than his.	When Mr. Quine was talking to me about this just now, he asked me what I owed to Claude Lévi-Strauss. I owe him a great deal, if not everything. That doesn't prevent me from having a conception of structure that is completely different from his.
Je pense que la structure n'a rien à	I think structure has nothing to do	I think structure has nothing to do

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faire avec la philosophie, qui de l'homme raisonne comme elle peut, mais qui met en son centre l'idée que l'homme est fait pour la sagesse.	with philosophy, which reasons about man as it can, but which puts at its center the idea that man is made for wisdom.	with philosophy, which reasons about man as best it can, but places at its center the idea that man is made for wisdom.
Je n'ai, conformément à la pensée de Freud, aucune amitié pour la sagesse. Je ne fais pas de philosophie parce que c'est très loin de ce quelqu'un qui s'adresse à nous, pour que nous lui répondions par la sagesse.	I have, conforming to Freud's thought, no friendship with wisdom. I do not do philosophy because it is very far from this someone who addresses us, to answer him with wisdom.	I am in agreement with Freud's thought in being no friend of wisdom. I do not do philosophy because it is far removed from the one who addresses himself to us, for us to reply with wisdom.
J'ai essayé de densifier, de formuler quelque chose concernant notre pratique, quelque chose qui soit cohérent. Ça m'a amené à des élucubrations qui me tracassent beaucoup.	I have tried to densify, to formulate, something concerning our practice, something coherent. This has led me to some elucubrations that worry me a lot.	I have tried to make something more dense, to formulate something concerning our practice that would be coherent. This has led me to certain lucubrations that have preoccupied me.
Ça m'a mené à un enseignement que j'ai mené avec beaucoup de prudence. Je suis passé à l'enseignement parce qu'on me l'a demandé, Dieu sait pourquoi.	This has led me to a teaching that I have led with a lot of prudence. I have resorted to teaching because it was asked it of me, God knows why.	It has led me to a teaching that I have carried out very cautiously. I began to teach because I was asked to. God knows why.
Il est sûr que la pratique après Freud se véhicule de façon telle qu'on peut se demander si Freud a bien cru qu'à lui tout seul il survivrait.	It is certain that after Freud the practice is carried on ( <i>se véhicule</i> ) in a way that one might ask oneself if Freud believed he would even survive himself.	It is clear that [psychoanalytic] practice after Freud has been conveyed in a way that leads one to wonder whether Freud believed that it would even survive him.
De la façon dont il s'y est pris, on peut penser que ceux formés par la pratique elle-même avaient vraiment autorité pour trancher ce qu'il en était de l'analyste. La question à laquelle je suis arrivé : qui est capable d'être un analyste ? a conduit un certain nombre de (54)mon entourage à me quitter (cela à la suite de la mise en place d'une enquête : comment quelqu'un, après une expérience analytique, pouvait-il se mettre en situation d'être analyste ?).	From the way he is taken in it, one might think that those formed by the practice itself truly had authority to decide what an analyst is. The question I have come to: who is capable of being an analyst? has led a certain number of my <sup>(54)</sup> my colleagues ( <i>mon entourage</i> ) to leave me (this, following the putting in place of an inquest: how could someone, after an analytic experience, put himself in the situation of being an analyst?).	<i>From the way he went about it,, one can think that those formed by the practice itself had the authority to decide what psychoanalysis is about. The question that I came to, "Who is capable of being an analyst? ", led a certain number of those around me to abandon me. (this happened after an investigation was set up into how someone, after an analytic experience, can put themselves in the position of being an analyst).</i>










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Ça m'a mené assez loin, comme je l'ai dit dans mes précédentes conférences aux USA, les points où ça m'a mené, je n'ose pas dire comme théorie : y a-t-il de l'analyse une théorie ? Oui, certainement. Je ne suis pas sûr que j'en ai la meilleure.	This has led me quite far, as I have said in my preceding talks ( <i>conferences</i> ) in the USA, the points where this has led me, I dare not say as a theory: is there a theory of analysis? Yes, certainly. I am not sure that I have the best.	This has taken me quite a long way, as I have said in my preceding talks in the USA, the points this has led me to, I wouldn't say as theory : is there a theory of analysis? Yes, certainly. I am not sure I have the best one.
Après avoir beaucoup réfléchi, j'ai distingué deux assises. La référence au corps, d'abord. On peut s'apercevoir, pour l'analyse, que du corps elle n'appréhende que ce qu'il y a de plus imaginaire.	After having reflected a lot, I have distinguished two foundations ( <i>assises</i> ). The reference to the body, first. One can grasp that ( <i>s'apercevoir</i> ), for analysis, the body is apprehended only as what is most imaginary.	After giving it a lot of thought, I have distinguished two foundations. First, the reference to the body. One can grasp that analysis only apprehends the body as what is most imaginary.
Un corps ça se reproduit par une forme.	A body is reproduced by a form.	A body is reproduced by a form.
Forme qui se manifeste en ceci que ce corps se reproduit, subsiste et fonctionne tout seul.	A form that is manifested in that this body is reproduced, subsists, and functions all alone.	A form that is apparent in the fact that this body reproduces, subsists, and functions all on its own.
De son fonctionnement nous n'avons pas le moindre renseignement.	We haven't the least information about its functioning.	We don't have the slightest information about the way it functions.
Nous l'appréhendons comme forme.	We apprehend it as a form.	We apprehend it as a form.
Nous l'apprécions comme tel par son apparence.	We appreciate it as such by its appearance.	We value it as such in its appearance.
Cette apparence du corps humain, les hommes l'adorent.	This appearance of the human body, men adore it.	Men adore the appearance of the human body.
Ils adorent en somme une pure et simple image.	They adore, in sum, a pure and simple image.	They adore a pure and simple image, in short.
J'ai commencé à mettre l'accent sur ce que Freud appelle narcissisme, <i>id est</i> le nœud fondamental qui fait que, pour se donner une image de ce qu'il appelle le monde, l'homme le conçoit comme cette unité de pure forme que représente pour lui le corps.	I have begun to put the accent on what Freud calls narcissism, <i>id est</i> the fundamental knot that makes it so that, to give himself an image of what he calls the world, man conceives of it as this unity of pure form that the body represents for him.	I have begun to emphasize what Freud calls narcissism, <i>id est</i> the fundamental knot that brings it about that, in order to give himself an image of what he calls the world, man conceives of it as this unity, of pure form that the body represents for him.
La surface du corps, c'est de là que	From the surface of the body, man	It is from the surface of the body

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<p>l'homme a pris l'idée d'une forme privilégiée. Et sa première appréhension du monde a été l'appréhension de son semblable. Puis ce corps, il l'a vu, il l'a abstrait, il en a fait une sphère : la bonne forme. Cela reflète la bulle, le sac de peau. Au-delà de cette idée du sac enveloppé et enveloppant (l'homme a commencé par là), l'idée de la concentricité des sphères a été son premier rapport à la science comme telle. Dans la science grecque, nous voyons cette harmonie des sphères dont on est maintenant peu surpris et dont on peut dire avec Pascal qu'elle n'existe plus. [1]</p>	<p>has taken the idea of a privileged form. And his first apprehension of the world has been the apprehension of his <i>semblable</i>. Then, this body, he has seen it, he has abstracted it, he has made of it a sphere: the good form. It reflects the bubble, the sack of skin. Beyond this idea of the enveloped and enveloping sack (man began with this), the idea of the concentricity of the spheres has been his first relation (<i>rapport</i>) to science as such. In Greek science, we see this harmony of the spheres by which one is now a little surprised and of which one can say with Pascal that it no longer exists.</p>	<p>that man has taken the idea of a privileged form. And his first apprehension of the world is the apprehension of his <i>semblable</i>. He thus saw this body, he abstracted it, he made it into a sphere : the good form. This is reflected in the bubble, the bag of skin. Beyond this idea of the enveloped and the enveloping sack (man started out with this), the idea of the concentricity of the spheres was his first relation to science as such. In Greek science, we see this harmony of the spheres, by which we are hardly surprised now and of which it can be said, with Pascal that it no longer exists.</p>
<p>« Le centre est partout et la circonférence nulle part », dit Pascal. Ça ne veut pas dire qu'il eut raison : le centre n'est pas partout. Ça veut dire que nous devons appréhender quelque chose d'un autre ordre que l'espace sphérique.</p>	<p>"The center is everywhere and the circumference nowhere," says Pascal. This doesn't mean he was right: the center is not everywhere. This means we must apprehend something of another order than spherical space.</p>	<p>"The centre is everywhere and the circumference nowhere," says Pascal. This is not to say he was right :the centre is not everywhere. This means we must apprehend something of another order than spherical space.</p>
<p>Il n'est pas sûr que l'image de la circonférence soit la meilleure (55)représentation d'une sphère, et c'est ainsi que j'ai été amené à frayer une voie, à savoir que le cercle n'est pas l'image correcte d'une sphère, c'est l'image d'une sphère quand on la sectionne, c'est-à-dire quand on la met à plat.</p>	<p>It is not sure that the image of the circumference is the best <sup>(55)</sup>representation of a sphere, and it is thus that I have been led to clear a path, that is, that the circle is not the correct image of a sphere; it is the image of a sphere when one sections it, which is to say, when one flattens it out.</p>	<p>It is not clear that the image of the circumference is the best representation of a sphere, and this is how I've been lead to break new ground, namely that the circle is not the correct image of a sphere ; it is the image of a sphere when it is sectioned, that is, when it is flattened out.</p>
<p>Cette mise à plat, à mesure que nous avançons dans le monde, tend à s'effilocheur comme si cette surface sur laquelle nous projetons tout ce qui nous entoure avait des trous.</p>	<p>This flattening out (<i>mise à plat</i>), in the measure that we advance in the world, tends to fray as if this surface on which we project everything surrounding us had holes.</p>	<p>This sheet of paper upon which we draw is quite tangible, we can do no better than to lay it out flat. As we make our way in the world, this flattening out tends to unravel as if this surface on to which we project everything that surrounds us has holes in it.</p>

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<p>Et le cercle se caractérise de faire trou. Choc en retour : l'idée mathématique de la topologie. Dans le monde il n'y a pas seulement des cercles. Mais ces cercles entre eux peuvent faire nœud. C'est par là que la topologie a commencé. C'est par ces nœuds qu'il m'a été possible de faire lien avec ce qu'il en est de notre expérience.</p>	<p>And the circle is characterized as making a hole. Shock in return: the mathematical idea of topology. In the world, there are not only circles. But these circles can make a knot between them. This is how topology began. These knots have made it possible for me to make a link with what there is of our experience.</p>	<p>And it is characteristic of a circle to make a hole. Counterblow : the mathematical idea of topology. There are not only circles in the world. But knots can be made from these circles. This is how topology began. It is by virtue of these knots that I have been able to make a link with what is involved in our experience.</p>
<p>Ces nœuds, s'il y a consistance fermée, circulaire, représentable, de ces trois termes que j'ai frayés, à partir de Freud :</p>	<p>These knots, if there is a closed, circular, representable consistency of these three terms I have cleared the way for (<i>frayés</i>), beginning with Freud:</p>	<p>These knots, if there is a closed, circular and representable of these three terms that I have advanced on the basis of Freud :</p>
<p>– De la capture à partir de la forme du corps.</p>	<p>–From the capture beginning with <i>the form</i> of the body.</p>	<p>--the capture based on the <i>form</i> of the body.</p>
<p>– De cet usage de la parole, frappant, quelle que soit l'idée qu'on puisse se faire de ce qui conditionne chez l'humain le fait qu'il parle. (C'est une autre consistance.)</p>	<p>– From this usage of speech, which is striking, whatever idea one might have of what conditions for the human the fact that he speaks. (This is another consistency.)</p>	<p>--this striking use of speech, whatever the idea one might have of what conditions in humans the fact of speaking. (This is another consistency.)</p>
<p>Nous devons nous apercevoir que ce que nous appelons la logique n'a d'autre support que le logos. L'étrange : nous apercevons si mal et si peu que cette logique est circulaire. Elle ne se tient, ne se substantie, cette logique, que de faire cercle. Le cercle vicieux, c'est le ba-ba de la logique.</p>	<p>We must grasp that what we call logic has no other support than the <i>logos</i>. The strange thing: we grasp so badly and so little that this logic is circular. It only holds, only substantifies itself, this logic, by making a circle. The vicious circle is the a-b-c (<i>b-a-ba</i>) of logic.</p> <p>From the moment we depart from language it is to language we return.</p>	<p>We have to realize that what we call logic has no other support than the <i>logos</i>. Strangely, we are so poor at realising, so little aware, that this logic is circular. It only holds together, it is only substantiated, by becoming a circle. The vicious circle is the a-b-c of logic.</p> <p>From the moment we commence with language it is to language that we return.</p>
<p>- Comment, à partir de là, nous nous imaginons toucher à un réel qui soit un troisième cercle, si l'on peut dire ; que sa forme soit</p>	<p>- How, beginning with that, we imagine ourselves to touch on a <i>real</i> which would be a third circle, if one can say this; that its form</p>	<p>--How on that basis, do we imagine that we touch on a <i>real</i> that would be a third circle, as it were; whether its form would be</p>

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circulaire, c'est ce qui nous échappe.	would be circular, this is what escapes us.	circular is what escapes us.
Du réel qui soit tout à fait du réel, ça...	Of the real that would be altogether of the real, this . . .	A real that would be entirely real, well ...
Les premiers linéaments de la science montrent le réel pour l'œil humain comme ce qui revenait toujours dans le ciel à la même place : les étoiles dites fixes (bien à tort puisqu'elles tournent et, si elles tournent, c'est parce que c'est nous qui tournons). Ça n'a pas été évident d'emblée.	The first lineaments of science show the real for the human eye as what returned always to the same place in the heavens: the stars said to be fixed (quite wrongly, since they turn and, if they turn, it is because it is we who turn). This was not obvious at first.	The first lineaments of science show the real to the human eye as that which would always return to the same place in the heavens ; the stars said to be fixed (quite wrongly because they turn, and if they turn it is because it is we who are turning). This was not obvious at first.
Il n'y a pas d'autre définition possible du réel que : c'est (56)l'impossible ; quand quelque chose se trouve caractérisé de l'impossible, c'est là seulement le réel ; quand on se cogne, le réel, c'est l'impossible à pénétrer.	There is no other possible definition of the real than: it is <sup>(56)</sup> the impossible; when something finds itself characterized as impossible, it is only there that is the real; when one bangs into it ( <i>se cogne</i> ), the real, it is the impossible to penetrate.	There is no other possible definition of the real than this : it is the impossible ; the real is only there where something is encountered characterised as impossible ; when one bumps into something, the real is the impossible to penetrate.
Nous avons rêvé qu'il soit élastique. C'est en cela que j'ai été amené à écrire autrement le terme d'existence : ex-sistence. Ce qui se heurte à quelque chose et ce à quoi quelque chose se heurte, c'est précisément les autres consistances.	We have dreamed that it would be elastic. Because of this, I have been led to write the term existence otherwise: ex-sistence. What bumps into something and into what something bumps are precisely the other consistencies.	We have dreamed that it would be elastic. It is this that led me to write the term "existence" in another way: ex-sistence. What bumps into something and what something bumps into are precisely the other consistencies.
Ces trois termes :	These three terms:	These three terms :
– ceux que nous imaginons comme une forme,	– those we imagine as a form,	--those that we imagine as a form,
ceux que nous tenons comme circulaires dans le langage,	– those we take for being ( <i>tenons comme</i> ) circular in language,	--those that we maintain as circular in language.
– et cette ex-sistence aussi bien à l'imaginaire qu'au langage, m'ont mené à la mise en valeur de ce pour quoi ils se nouent entre eux.	– and this ex-sistence to language and the imaginary as well, which have led me to stress why they are knotted together.	--and this ex-sistence both to the imaginary and to language have led me to highlight that by which they are knotted together.
En tout cas, c'est pratique.	In any case, it's practical.	In any case, it's practical.

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C'est une corde, un fil véhiculé par moi. Ça a rendu service au moins dans cette pratique.	It is a cord, a thread drawn ( <i>véhiculé</i> ) by me. This has rendered a service, at least in this practice.	This is a piece of rope, a piece of cord that I have brought with me. It has been useful, at least in this practice.
Ces trois cercles, je les nomme, mais leur ordre n'est pas indifférent. Les colorier introduit une distinction, indique qu'ils sont différents	These three circles, I name them, but their order is not indifferent. Coloring them introduces a distinction, indicates they are different.	I have given these three circles a name, but their order is not indifferent. Colouring them introduces a distinction and indicates they are different.
I, R, S, sont détachés. Cela se voit au fait qu'ils sont superposés :	I, R, S, are detached. This is seen in the fact that they are superimposed:	I, R, S are unattached. This can be seen in the fact that they are superimposed.
– d'abord I,	– first, I,	--first, I,
– en dessous R,	– beneath it, R,	--underneath, R,
– en dessous S,	– beneath R, S.	--underneath, S.
Le S passe au-dessous des deux autres cercles. Tout se passe comme si les trois cercles étaient indépendants.	The S passes beneath the two other circles. Everything happens as if the three circles were independent.	S passes underneath the other two circles. Everything happens as if the three circles were independent of one another.
Alors, le cercle qui les noue doit	Then, the circle that knots them must	Now, the circle that knots them together must
– attraper le cercle qui est en dessous,	– catch the circle beneath it,	--catch the circle that is underneath,
– passer deux fois dessus I,	– pass over the I twice,	Pass twice over I,
– revenir à celui qui est en dessous pour le prendre en passant en dessous (figure 1).	– return to the one beneath it to take it in passing beneath it (figure 1).	--return to the one that underneath and catch it by passing underneath it (Figure 1).
Passage par-dessus le dessus, dessous le dessous, fondamental ; cette figure 1 est exactement la même que la figure 2 ; pour l'obtenir, il suffit de tirer un peu le rond S.	A fundamental passage above the above, beneath the beneath; figure 1 is exactly the same as figure 2; to obtain figure 2, it suffices to pull on ring S a little.	Passing over the one above, underneath the one below – fundamental. Figure 1 is exactly the same as Figure 2 ; to obtain Figure 2, it suffices to pull a little on the ring S.
Sur un autre dessin, on peut des trois cercles faire trois droites (figure 3).	In another drawing, one can make three straight lines of these circles (figure 3).	In another drawing, one can make three straight lines of these three circles (Figure 3).
La figure à quatre ronds, figure 2, je l'appelle figure de la réalité	The four-ringed figure, figure 2, I call the figure of psychic reality,	The four-ringed figure, Figure 2, I call the figure of psychic reality,

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psychique, et $\Sigma$ est le symptôme.	and $\Sigma$ is the symptom.	and $\Sigma$ is the figure of the symptom.
Le symptôme, c'est la note propre de la dimension humaine. <sup>(57)</sup>	The symptom is the note proper of the human dimension. <sup>(57)</sup>	The symptom is a feature specific to the human dimension.
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Figure 1</b></p> 	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Figure 1</b></p> 	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Figure 1</b></p> 
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Figure 2</b></p> 	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Figure 2</b></p> 	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Figure 2</b></p> 
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Figure 3</b></p> 	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Figure 3</b></p> 	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Figure 3</b></p> 
<sup>(58)</sup> Dieu a peut-être des symptômes, mais sa connaissance est probablement d'ordre	<sup>(58)</sup> God perhaps has some symptoms, but his knowledge ( <i>connaissance</i> ) is probably of the	God may perhaps have symptoms, but his knowledge is probably of the paranoiac order. One wonders



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paranoïaque. Un Dieu qui a créé le monde avec des paroles, on se demande ce que peut être sa consistance.	paranoiac order. One asks oneself what might be the consistency of a God who created the world with words.	what might be the consistency of a God who created the world with words.
La spécificité de la figure 2 est que ça fait cercle : $\Sigma+S$ , c'est ce qui fait une nouvelle sorte de S. Le symptôme fait tout autant partie de l'inconscient. La linguistique est ce qui spécifie ce dont nous interprétons le symptôme.	The specificity of figure 2 is that this ( $\zeta\alpha$ ) makes a circle: $\Sigma+S$ , this makes a new sort of S. The symptom is just as much a part of the unconscious. Linguistics specifies that by which we interpret the symptom.	The specificity of Figure 2 is that it makes a circle : $\Sigma+S$ is what makes a new kind of S. The symptom is just as much a part of the unconscious. Linguistics is what specifies that with which we interpret a symptom.
En interprétant, nous faisons avec le $\Sigma$ circularité, nous donnons son plein exercice à ce qui peut se supporter de la langue, alors que l'analysant, ce dont il donne toujours témoignage, c'est de son symptôme.	In interpreting, we make with the $\Sigma$ a circularity, we give full exercise to what can be supported of <i>la langue</i> , while what the analysand has always testified to is his symptom.	In interpreting it, we make a circularity with the $\Sigma$ , we give free rein to what in <i>la langue</i> can be supported, while what the analysand always testifies to is his symptom.
Il n'y a pas de meilleure façon de marquer la pure différence que la couleur ; ainsi dans ce nouement particulier, le coloriage rend sensible qu'il y a deux espèces de nœuds borroméens impossibles à confondre.	There is no better way to mark pure difference than color; thus, in this particular knotting, the coloring makes it felt that there are two types of Borromean knots, which are impossible to confuse with one another.	There is no better way to mark pure difference than by colour ; thus, in this particular knotting, the colours make it clear that there are two types of Borromean knots, which are impossible to confuse with one another.
Il suffit qu'il y ait un rond qui se rompe pour que les deux autres soient libres, différenciant le nœud de la chaîne où seule la rupture d'un rond du milieu libère les extrémités.	It suffices for one ring to be broken for the two others to be free, differentiating the knot from the chain where only the rupture of a middle ring frees the extremities.	It is enough to break one ring in order for the other two to come free ; this differentiates the knot from the chain where simply breaking one ring in the middle frees the outside ones.
Il est facile de s'apercevoir que ce nœud borroméen peut avoir autant de ronds qu'on veut.	It is easy to grasp that this Borromean knot can have as many rings as one wants.	It is easy to see that this Borromean knot can have as many rings as one likes.
Je me contente de quatre	I content myself with four.	I make do with four.
Le nœud à trois termes R, S, I, il n'y a pas que lui. Nous ne pouvons nous en contenter car, de n'être pas distinguables, ces trois termes	There is not only the three-termed knot, R, S, I. We cannot content ourselves with it, for, since they are not distinguishable, these	The three-termed knot, R,S,I, is not the only one. It won't do for us given that, in being indistinguishable, these three

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pourraient passer pour une nouvelle forme d'imaginaire, de réel, voire de symbolique : sans la mathématique, nous ne nous apercevions pas que ces trois sont trinitaires.	three terms could pass for a new form of imaginary, of real, even of symbolic: without mathematics, we would not grasp that these three are trinitary.	terms could pass for a new form of the imaginary, the real, and even the symbolic without mathematics, we would not be able to see that these three are trinitarian.
La Trinité, nous la rencontrons tout le temps. Notamment dans le domaine sexuel. Ce n'est pas seulement un individu qui le fixe, mais aussi un autre ; cela est marqué dans l'expérience de l'analyse sur des relations cliniques (cliniques, l'analysant est sur un divan, il s'agit d'un certain <i>clinamen</i> , cf. Lucrece et les épicuriens dans leur nominalisme).	We encounter the Trinity all the time. Notably in the sexual domain. It is not only an individual that it fixes, but also another; this is marked in the experience of analysis of clinical relations (clinical, the analysand is on the couch; it is a question of a certain <i>clinamen</i> , cf. Lucretious and the Epicureans in their nominalism).	We encounter the Trinity all the time. Especially in the sexual domain. It is not only one individual that sets this domain, but also another ; in the experience of analysis this is marked in clinical relations (clinically the analysand is on the couch ; it is a matter of a certain <i>clinamen</i> , cf. Lucretius and the Epicureans in their nominalism).
Le prétendu mystère de la Trinité divine reflète ce qui est en chacun de nous, et ce que ça illustre le mieux c'est la connaissance paranoïaque.	The so-called mystery of the Divine Trinity reflects what is in each of us, and what it illustrates best is paranoiac knowledge.	The so-called mystery of the Divine Trinity reflects what there is in each one of us, and what illustrates this best is paranoid knowledge.
Freud disait que l'analyse était une « paranoïa raisonnée » ; il y a cette face dans l'analyse.	Freud said that analysis was a "organized paranoia" ( <i>paranoia raisonnée</i> ); analysis does have this aspect ( <i>face</i> ).	Freud said that analysis was a 'guided paranoia' ; there is this aspect to analysis.
À elle seule, l'analyse confirme que de ces trois catégories, R, S, I, (59)les meilleurs représentants sont des dingues. Les raides-fous ne doutent pas un seul instant d'être dans le réel.	On its own, analysis confirms that the best representatives of these three categories, R, S, I, <sup>(59)</sup> are the nuts ( <i>dingues</i> ). The rigidly mad ( <i>raides-fous</i> ) do not doubt for a single instant being in the real.	Analysis in itself confirms that the best representatives of these three categories, R,S,I, are the crazies [ <i>dingues</i> ]. The rigid madman [ <i>raides-fous</i> ] do not doubt for a single instant that they are in the real.
Cela pourrait prêter à gaudrioles concernant la Trinité divine, parce que la Trinité divine, ce n'est pas si dingue, si dieu-ingue.	This could lend itself to some dirty jokes concerning the Divine Trinity, because the Divine Trinity is not so <i>dingue</i> , so <i>dieu-ingue</i> .	This could lend itself to some badinage concerning the Divine Trinity, because the Divine Trinity is not so much <i>dingue</i> , so <i>dieu ingue</i> .
C'est bien pour ça qu'il doit y avoir un quatrième terme.	This is indeed why there must be a fourth term	This is precisely why there has to be a fourth term.
Symptôme et inconscient : vis sans fin, ronde. Et on n'arrive jamais à	Symptom and unconscious; an endless screw, round. And one	Symptom and unconscious ; an endless round screw. And one

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ce que tout soit défoulé : Urverdrängung : il y a un trou.	never succeeds in unwinding it all ( <i>à ce que tout soit défoulé</i> <sup>1</sup> ): <i>Urverdrängung</i> : there is a hole. TN.1 Lacan translates <i>Verdrängung</i> (repression) as <i>refoulement</i> (the <i>Urverdrängung</i> is the primally repressed) . <i>Défoulé</i> could be translated as "un-" or "de-repressed," but I wanted to retain something of the endless screw or plumber's snake ( <i>vis sans fin</i> ) metaphor.	never arrives at the point where everything would be unfurled [ <i>défoulé</i> ] : <i>Urverdrängung</i> : there is a hole.
C'est parce qu'il y a un nœud et quelque réel qui reste là dans le fond.	This is because there is a knot and some real that remains at the bottom ( <i>dans le fond</i> ).	This is because there is a knot and something real that remains deep down.
QUESTIONS ET REPONSES	QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS	QUESTIONS AND REPLIES
1. – Question à Roman Jakobson.	1. –Question to Roman Jakobson.	1— <i>Question to Roman Jakobson</i>
D'eux vient de <i>de illis</i> .	<i>D'eux</i> [of them] comes from <i>de illis</i> .	'D'eux'[of them] comes from 'illis'.
Deux de <i>duo</i> .	<i>Deux</i> [two] from <i>duo</i> .	'Deux' [two] from 'duo'
Le phonème est-il destiné à happer l'équivoque, ou est-ce hasard pour l'oreille française ?	Is the phoneme destined to snatch up ( <i>happer</i> ) the equivoke, or is this chance only for the French ear?	Is the phoneme destined to catch onto [ <i>happer</i> ] equivocation, or is this a coincidence for the French ear ?
N'est-ce cette équivoque (qui est ce sur quoi joue l'interprétation) qui est ce qui fait cercle du symptôme avec le symbolique ?	Is it not the equivoke (which is what interpretation plays on) that makes a circle of the symptom with the symbolic?	Isn't this equivocation (which is what interpretation plays on) what makes the circle of the symptom with the symbolic ?
Car, intervenant d'une certaine manière sur le symptôme, on se trouve équivoquer.	For, intervening in a certain manner on the symptom, one finds oneself equivocating.	Since, by intervening in a certain way on the symptom, one finds oneself using equivokes.
Y a-t-il un versant de la linguistique traitable comme	Is there a side of linguistics treatable in this way ( <i>comme tel</i> )?	Is there some aspect of linguistics that would be useful as such ?





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tel ?		
Ce serait le versant qui est toujours ce à quoi un analyste doit être sensible : <i>le fun</i> .	This would be the side to which an analyst must always be sensible: <i>the fun</i> (le fun).	This would be the aspect that an analyst should always be sensitive to : <i>the fun</i> .
<p><i>Réponse</i> : Il y a de nombreux travaux sur ce sujet, en particulier sur les langues indiennes. Jackson, spécialiste des aphasies, a écrit sur le calembour. Il n’y a que les langues formalisées (artificielles) qui ne font pas calembour. Et la grammaire tend à actualiser le calembour.</p>	<p><i>Answer</i>: There are numerous works on this subject, particularly on Indian languages. Jackson, a specialist on aphasias, has written on the pun. The only languages that do not make puns are formalized (artificial) languages. And grammar tends to actualize the pun.</p>	<p>Rep ly : There are numerous works on this subject, particularly on the Indian languages. Jackson*, a specialist on aphasias, has written on the <i>calembour</i>, the pun. The only languages that do not make puns are formalized (artificial) languages. And grammar has a tendency to actualise puns.</p> <p>* John Hughlings Jackson, (1835 – 1911) was an English neurologist. He is best known for his research on epilepsy. Through his own careful examination, detailed logging and analysis of patients who presented with focal lesions causing epilepsy, hemiplegia, and often loss of speech (aphasia), he began to conceive of such diseases as the result of processes of dissolution, the opposite of evolution, or de-evolution. His theories highly influenced Freud (See <i>On Aphasia</i>) and Ernest Jones. See <a href="https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.63978/2015.63978.Selected-Writings-Of-John-Hughlings-Jackson2_djvu.txt">https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.63978/2015.63978.Selected-Writings-Of-John-Hughlings-Jackson2_djvu.txt</a> for his remarks on jokes and puns</p>
2. – Lacan au tableau noir	2. – Lacan at the blackboard.	2 – Lacan at the blackboard.
La figure 1 est-elle plane ? Pour le quatrième rond, il faut perforer. Les nœuds, ça s’imagine et, plus exactement, ça ne s’imagine pas. Les nœuds sont la chose à quoi l’esprit est le plus rebelle. C’est si peu conforme au côté enveloppé-enveloppant de tout ce (60) qui regarde le corps que je considère que se briser à la pratique des nœuds, c’est briser l’inhibition.	Is figure 1 a plane? For the fourth ring, it must be perforated. Knots are not imagined ( <i>ça ne s’imagine pas</i> ). Knots are the thing against which the mind most rebels. They are so little conformed with the enveloped-enveloping side of all (60) that regards the body that I consider breaking oneself in to the practice of knots as breaking inhibition. Inhibition: the	Is Figure 1 a plane ? For the fourth ring, it needs to be perforated. Knots can be imagined [ <i>les noueds, cas’imagine</i> ], and, more precisely, that cannot be imagined. Knots are the thing that the mind rebels against the most. They are so little in keeping with the enveloped-enveloping aspect of everything regarding the body that I consider banging one’s head on the practice

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L'inhibition : l'imaginaire se formerait d'inhibition mentale.	imaginary would be formed by mental inhibition.	a way of rupturing inhibition. Inhibition : the imaginary would be formed by mental inhibition.
Le signifiant n'est pas le phonème.	The signifier is not the phoneme.	The signifier is not a phoneme.
Le signifiant, c'est la lettre. Il n'y a que la lettre qui fasse trou.	The signifier is the letter. Only the letter makes a hole	The signifier is the letter. Only the letter makes a hole.
3. – Question de M. QUINE. : Le but de l'analyse est-il de défaire le nœud ?	3. – Question of MR. QUINE. : The aim ( <i>but</i> ) of analysis is to un-make the knot?	3 – Question from Mr. Quine. The aim of analysis is to undo the knot ?
Réponse : Non, ça tient ferme.	Answer : No, that holds firm.	Reply : No, that holds fast.
On pourrait avancer que si Freud démontre quelque chose, c'est que la sexualité fait trou, mais l'être humain n'a pas la moindre idée de ce que c'est.	One could advance that if Freud demonstrates something, it is that sexuality makes a hole, but the human being hasn't the least idea what this is.	One could claim that if Freud demonstrates anything, it is that sexuality makes a hole ; but the human being doesn't have the slightest idea about what that is.
Une femme se présente pour l'homme par un symptôme ; une femme, c'est un symptôme pour l'homme.	A woman presents herself for the man by a symptom; a woman is a symptom for the man.	A woman is made present for a man through a symptom ; a woman is a symptom for a man.
4. – L'âme	4. – The soul.	4 –The soul.
La seule chose qui me semble substantifier l'âme est le symptôme.	The only thing that seems to me to substantify the soul is the symptom.	It seems to me that the only thing that substantifies the soul is the symptom.
L'homme penserait avec son âme. L'âme serait l'outil de la pensée. Qu'est-ce que ferait l'âme de ce prétendu outil ?	Man would think with his soul. The soul would be the tool of thought. What would be the soul of this so-called tool?	Man supposedly thinks with his soul. The soul is supposedly the instrument of thought. What would be the soul of this so-called instrument ?
L'âme du symptôme est quelque chose de dur, comme un os.	The soul of the symptom is something hard, like a bone.	The soul of the symptom is something hard, like a bone.
Nous croyons penser avec notre cerveau.	We believe we think with our brain.	We believe we think with our brain.
Moi, je pense avec mes pieds, c'est là seulement que je rencontre quelque chose de dur ; parfois, je	Me, I think with my feet, it is only there that I encounter something hard; at times, I think with the	Me, I think with my feet, it is only there that I encounter something hard ; at times, when I bang into

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pense avec les peauciers du front, quand je me cogne. J'ai vu assez d'électroencéphalogrammes pour savoir qu'il n'y a pas ombre d'une pensée.	platysmas ( <i>peauciers</i> ) of my forehead, when I bang into something. I have seen enough electro-encephalograms to know that there is no shadow of a thought there.	something, I think with the skin of my forehead. I have seen enough electro-encephalograms to know that there is not a shadow of a thought there.
5 – Les nœuds ont-ils trois dimensions ?	5 – Do the knots have three dimensions?	5 – Are the knots three dimensional ?
Exactement. <i>Le more geometrico</i> , la pensée géométrique néglige tout à fait la réalité de l'espace. Nous croyons connaître quelque chose de la troisième dimension à cause de la vision binoculaire, mais nous fonctionnons toujours dans deux dimensions.	Exactly. <i>The more geometrico</i> , geometric thought altogether neglects the reality of space. We believe we know something of the third dimension because of binocular vision, but we always function in two dimensions.	Exactly. <i>The more geometrico</i> , geometrical thought, altogether neglects the reality of space. We think we know something about the third dimension because of binocular vision, but we always function in two dimensions.
6. – Question de M. QUINE : Les modèles solides nous donnent une idée de la troisième dimension. C'est seulement la vision qui la manque.	6. – Question of Mr. Quine: solid models give us an idea of the third dimension. It is only vision that misses it.	6 –Question from Mr. Quine : Solid models give us an idea of the third dimension. It is only vision that lacks it.
Réponse : On peut se représenter la troisième dimension par la sphère armillaire, mais personne n'a pensé à cette figure-ci.	<i>Answer</i> : One can represent the third dimension by the armillary sphere, but no one has thought of this figure:	Reply : The third dimension can be represented by the armillary sphere, but no one has ever thought of this figure.
Insert Figure 4 here		
Les modèles ne nous mettent guère dans la troisième dimension. Nous vivons dans des cubes, nous pensons être dans des sphères.	Models scarcely put us in the third dimension. We live in cubes; we think ourselves to be in spheres.	Models scarcely place us in the third dimension. We live in cubes ; we think we are in spheres.
Rien de moins sûr que nous ayons un intérieur.	There is nothing less sure than our having an interior.	Nothing is less certain than that we have an interior.
Les déchets viennent peut-être de l'intérieur, mais la caractéristique de l'homme est qu'il ne sait que faire de ses déchets.	Waste ( <i>les déchets</i> ) perhaps comes from the interior, but the characteristic of man is that he doesn't know what to do with his waste.	Waste perhaps comes from inside, but it is characteristic of man that he doesn't know what to do with his waste.
La civilisation, c'est le déchet,	Civilization is waste, <i>cloaca</i>	Civilization is waste, <i>Cloaca</i>

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<i>cloaca maxima.</i>	<i>maxima.</i>	<i>maxima.</i>
Les déchets sont la seule chose qui témoigne que nous ayons un intérieur.	Waste is the only thing that testifies to our having an interior.	Waste is the only thing that testifies to our having an interior.
2 décembre 1975	December 02, 1975	December 02, 1975
<b>IMPROMPTU SUR LE DISCOURS ANALYTIQUE</b>	<b>IMPROMPTU ON ANALTIC DISCOURSE</b>	<b>IMPROMPTU REMARKS ON THE ANALYTIC DISCOURSE</b>
$\begin{array}{c} a \quad \mathcal{S} \\ S_2 \quad S_1 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} a \quad \mathcal{S} \\ S_2 \quad S_1 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} a \quad \mathcal{S} \\ S_2 \quad S_1 \end{array}$
– S <sub>1</sub> est ce par quoi se représente le sujet : une parole, le parlêtre. C'est en tant que le sujet dit n'importe quoi que ça va au lieu de la vérité.	– S <sub>1</sub> is what represents the subject: a speech, the <i>parlêtre</i> . It is inasmuch as the subject says no matter what that this goes to the place of the truth.	--S <sub>1</sub> is that by which the subject is represented : a word [ <i>une parole</i> ], the speaking being. It is insofar as the subject says anything that it [ça] goes to the place of truth.
$S_2 <----- S_1$	$S_2 <----- S_1$	$S_2 <----- S_1$
– L'analyste est incarné par un semblant de (a) ; il est en somme produit par le dire de la vérité, tel qu'il se fait dans la relation S <sub>1</sub> ---->S <sub>2</sub> . L'analyste est en quelque sorte une chute de ce dire et, en tant que tel, il fait semblant de « comprendre », et c'est en ça qu'il intervient au niveau de l'inconscient.	– The analyst is incarnated by a <i>semblant</i> of an (a); he is, in sum, produced by the saying of the truth, as is done in the relation S <sub>1</sub> --->S <sub>2</sub> . The analyst is a kind of falling ( <i>chute</i> ) of this saying, and, as such, he pretends ( <i>fait semblant</i> ) to "understand," and that's how he intervenes at the level of the unconscious.	--The analyst is incarnated by a <i>semblant</i> of (a) ; he is, in sum, produced by the act of speaking the truth, such as it occurs in the realtion S <sub>1</sub> --->S <sub>2</sub> . The analyst is in a way what falls from this act of saying, and, as such, makes 'semblant' of understanding ; that is how he intervenes at the level of the unconscious.
$\begin{array}{c} S_1----->S_2 \\ \downarrow \\ (a) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} S_1----->S_2 \\ \downarrow \\ (a) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} S_1----->S_2 \\ \downarrow \\ (a) \end{array}$
– La vérité est caractérisée par le fait de ce S <sub>2</sub> : l'analyste ne dit que des paroles ; celui qui est supposé savoir quelque chose, c'est l'analyste : pure supposition, bien sûr.	– Truth is characterized by the fact of this S <sub>2</sub> : the analyst only says words; the one who is supposed to know something is the analyst: a pure supposition, of course.	--Truth is characterised by reason of this S <sub>2</sub> : the analysand <sup>1</sup> only says words ; the one who is supposed to know something is the analyst : pure supposition, of course. TN.1 Reading 'analysand' for 'analyste'
Ce S <sub>2</sub> , ce que l'analyste est supposé savoir, n'est jamais complètement dit ; il n'est dit que sous la forme de mi-dire de la	This S <sub>2</sub> , what the analyst is supposed to know, is never completely said; it is only said in the form of the half-saying ( <i>mi-</i>	This S <sub>2</sub> , that which the analyst is supposed to know, is never completely said ; it is only said in the form of half-saying the truth.

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vérité.	<i>dire</i> ) of the truth.	
C'est par ce discours analytique que j'ai fait la distinction entre ce qui est énoncé et une sorte de mi-dire.	It is by this analytic discourse that I have made the distinction between what is stated ( <i>énoncé</i> ) and a sort of half-saying.	It is through this analytic discourse that I have made the distinction between what is uttered and a sort of half-saying.
C'est en tant que l'analyste est ce semblant de déchet (a) qu'il intervient au niveau du sujet S, c'est-à-dire de ce qui est conditionné	It is inasmuch as the analyst is this <i>semblant</i> of waste (a) that he intervenes at the level of the subject S, which is to say, of what is conditioned:	It is insofar as the analyst is this semblant of waste (a) that he intervenes at the level of the subject \$, that is, at the level of what is conditioned :
1. par ce qu'il énonce,	1. by what it states ( <i>ce qu'il énonce</i> ),	1. by what he utters.
2. par ce qu'il ne dit pas.	2. by what it does not say ( <i>ce qu'il ne dit pas</i> ).	2. by what he does not say.



The silence corresponds to the semblant of waste.