I have often found that the translator's notes to the new translations of Freud, edited by Adam Phillips and published by Penguin Books to be sometimes more interesting than the new translation.

Here are the notes of the translator, John Reddick on his translation of Freud's metapsychological paper, *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus*, which he has translated as *On the Introduction of Narcissism* as opposed to Strachey's translation of the title *On Narcissism: An Introduction*.

He is highly critical of Strachey's translation of this paper, and you will be able to follow his argument as a bilingual of the Strachey translation will follow Reddick's notes.

Richard G. Klein

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**Translator's Preface**

It is a curious and remarkable fact that Sigmund Freud's ideas have entered and conditioned modern consciousness not in their original German form, but mainly through English translations, most notably those enshrined in the *Standard Edition*, under the general editorship of James Strachey, and the ever jealous guardianship of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. This circumstance would be enough in itself to justify new English versions even if the *Standard Edition* were flawless, since no translation, however good, can ever render the shapes and shades of an original text in all their subtlety; but in fact the *Standard Edition* is deeply, systematically flawed, making new translations all the more imperative. Take the opening paragraph of the *Narcissism* essay, for instance, which in the *Standard Edition* reads as follows:

**ON NARCISSISM: AN INTRODUCTION**

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The term narcissism is derived from clinical description and was chosen by Paul Näcke in 1899 to denote the attitude of a person who treats his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated — who looks at it, that is to say, strokes it and fondles it till he obtains complete satisfaction through these activities. Developed to this degree, narcissism has the significance of a perversion that has absorbed the whole of the subject's sexual life, and it will consequently exhibit the characteristics which we expect to meet with in the study of all perversions.

If this were handed in by a student as a translation exercise, it would end up covered in red pencil, with everything from light squiggles
to heavy underlinings and multiple exclamation marks, for it is so full of slips and shifts and omissions as to be a travesty of Freud's original. At the less serious end of the spectrum, 'attitude' would merit at least a squiggle: Freud's word is Verhalten, 'behaviour'; so, too, would 'developed to this degree': Freud's in dieser Ausbildung simply means 'in this form' or, more loosely, 'in this sense'; the phrase 'has the significance of' would also elicit a tut-tut and a squiggle, since the German translates quite simply as 'means' or 'signifies' (the second sentence would thus more crisply and more correctly begin 'Narcissism in this form means ...'). We can also cavil at 'absorbed', as it loses the force of Freud's graphic metaphor aufgesogen, which in this context means 'sucked up' or 'swallowed up'; while 'exhibit[s] the characteristics' is an unduly loose rendering of words that more strictly mean 'is subject to the expectations ...' (unterliegt den Erwartungen). A more serious distortion lurks in the words 'a person who treats his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated': what Freud's German unambiguously says is that the narcissist (in Näcke's sense of the term) treats his own body in the same way in which he - the narcissist himself - might treat that of any other sexual object.

Whilst none of these infelicities makes much difference on its own, their cumulative effect is to alter the whole tone and thrust of the passage (and we find similar shifts if we take almost any paragraph in Freud's original German and compare it with the translation offered in the Standard Edition). They are as nothing, however, by the side of the two quite startling mistranslations that reveal themselves in these few lines. One of them is in fact much worse than a mistranslation - it is a flagrant case of bowdlerization. No one reading the first sentence of the Standard Edition could possibly divine that in Freud's original the narcissist is said to stroke and caress and gaze at his own body mit sexuellem Wohlgefallen, 'with sexual pleasure': this oh-so-explicit phrase is quite simply excised - and thus another bit of Freud's characteristic oomph and colour is obliterated. Much more serious, however, is the garbled title: the wording 'On Narcissism: An Introduction' is a grave misrepresentation of Freud's heading Zur Einführung des Narzissmus, which unarguably refers to the introduction of narcissism, and not to any kind of introduction to narcissism. This may conceivably have been ignorance on the part of the Standard Edition translators (they commonly misunderstand Freud's German) - but it is much more likely to have been a case of deliberate spin: Freud's choice of words clearly reflects the newness of his narcissism theory and a concomitant sense that it therefore needs a good deal of explaining; the Standard Edition (mis-)title, however, implies that the theory is soundly established, and that the novice reader is about to be introduced to it, rather as a first-year undergraduate might be introduced to macro-economics or human anatomy. The agenda here (and elsewhere) is clear, and not a little pernicious: Freud's writing is to be presented not as a hot and sweaty struggle with intractable and often crazily daring ideas, but as a cut-and-dried corpus of unchallengeable dogma.

This agenda is what also underlies the gravest and most pervasive defect of the Standard Edition, and that is its wilfully turgid and often obfuscatory style. Even the very best-educated English-speakers are likely to reach for their dictionary in the face of 'the thaumaturgical power of words', for example, whereas any German-speaking child of eight or nine would readily understand Freud's own plain-speaking description of the magical power of words: 'die Zauberkraft des Wortes'. Freud is often said to be a great prose-writer, but while this is plainly a nonsense if we compare his prose with that of Goethe or Nietzsche or Grass, he certainly writes with unmistakable verve and punch, particularly in the derring-do period when he was boldly carving out his more radical ideas - the period so powerfully reflected in this volume. The Standard Edition fed Freud through a kind of voice-synthesizer to make him sound like a droning academic; one of the main aspirations of this present translation is to render not only his meanings, but also the mercurial flavour of his style, so that his sometimes combative, sometimes diffident, sometimes solemn, sometimes mischievous voice can be clearly heard in all its registers.

It has to be admitted, however, that while it is easy enough to criticize other people's translations, it is far from easy to make one's own - especially in the case of Freud, whose particular patterns of
thought and language are sometimes hard even to construe, let alone render into satisfactory English. But the very fact that Freud’s ideas have permeated world culture chiefly through the medium of the Standard Edition and the English terminology there enshrined, adds a whole extra dimension of difficulty: on page after page the re-translator faces the challenge of whether to retain or reject the old, often dubious, but now universally accepted terms invented by the earlier translators. In some cases the decision was easy: ‘anaclitic’, for instance, is a preposterous neologism founded on plain ignorance of Freud’s German (Anlehnung), and was rejected with relish and relief; ‘frustration’ was likewise rejected as a startledly inept misrendering of the important term Versagung (‘refusal’ is used instead). It was easy, too, to discard ‘instinct’ and ‘satisfaction’ as translations of Trieb and Befriedigung, and to use ‘drive’ and ‘gratification’ in their place. Other terms, however, are often provoked months of head-scratching. In the end, ‘(super-)ego’ and ‘id’ – Latinisms quite devoid of the earthy punch of Freud’s (Über-)Ich and Es – were reluctantly retained, for want of any practicable alternatives; so too, with even greater reluctance, was Strachey’s opaque and ugly word ‘cathect’, together with the associated verb ‘cathect’: other translators in the new Penguin Freud Library have opted for plain-English alternatives to these rebarbative inventions, but all such alternatives seemed to me to have misleading connotations. In general, specific terms of Freud’s are consistently translated (thus for instance Abfuhr is always rendered as ‘release’, in preference to ‘discharge’ as used in the ‘Standard Translation’), but in some cases his vocabulary renders any such laudable consistency impossible. A particularly fascinating instance of this is Freud’s word Instanz, a metaphor he deploys again and again to describe the various processes of surveillance, admonition, censorship, control to which, in his view, every human psyche is enduringly subject. Borrowing the term from the forbidding realms of the law (where it is a standard term for ‘court’, ‘tribunal’ etc.), Freud applies it to the whole panoply of – literally – forbidding forces that bear upon individuals almost from the moment of their birth, firstly from without in the persons of their parents and, in due course, their teachers and the larger community, then from within in the form of internalized control mechanisms – chiefly hypostatized by Freud in the ‘pleasure principle’ and, above all, the ‘super-ego’. The sheer frequency of the word Instanz turns it into an integrative and (discomfitingly) evocative cypher in Freud’s original texts – but this distinctive effect cannot be reproduced in English, which simply has no equivalent word or concept, so that we are forced to use a whole gamut of different makeshift terms, from ‘parental voice’ (Elterninstanz) through to ‘entity’, ‘agency’, ‘matrix’, ‘arbiter’ – and numerous others besides. (One wonders whether Freud could ever have arrived at his vision-cum-analysis of the human psyche if he had been born and brought up in, say, France or England, since it so clearly derives – like the poetic visions of Franz Kafka – from a specifically Austro-German matrix of notions and assumptions.)

Various traps and chicanes await the translator of texts from an earlier age. One of these is the lure of anachronisms. In general this particular lure has been resisted throughout the present volume – though it has to be admitted that the alert reader might find a handful of words and idioms that were not yet current in English in the period when Freud wrote the relevant essays (no prizes for their discovery . . .). Another inerterate problem, rendered all the more acute by the prevailing fashion for political correctness, is that of gendered language. Sharing as he did the premises and predilections of his age, Freud’s perspective is of course overwhelmingly phallocentric. In general, this perspective has been faithfully transferred into English (to do anything else would be to practise a modern form of bowdlerism). Furthermore, it has been applied by extension to those situations where the rules of German grammar required Freud to use the neuter – most conspicuously in references to children, the noun Kind in German being neuter (das Kind). In such contexts grammatically neuter pronouns and possessive adjectives are assumed to refer to males unless there is specific evidence to the contrary.

Finally, a word on dictionaries. One of the major disadvantages suffered by earlier translators of Freud was that they didn’t have at their disposal the plethora of excellent German–English dictionaries
now available. Chief amongst these is the multi-volume set produced in the 1960s and early 1970s under the wonderful editorship of Trevor Jones at Jesus College, Cambridge – though if the assiduous reader spots weaknesses in my translation of German words beginning with S through to Z, then they should please direct their brickbats at Oxford University Press, who have signally failed to publish the missing volume(s)! On the other hand, the OUP certainly deserve the warmest possible plaudits for their Oxford English Dictionary: no one could wish for a better resource than this matchless work, and having plundered its riches several times daily for many months, I happily close by offering grateful obeisance to what is surely one of the mightiest achievements of English culture.
Notes

On the Introduction of Narcissism

1. [The title given in the Standard Edition is On Narcissism: an Introduction – but this is a startling mistranslation of Freud's wording (Zur Einführung des Narzissmus). Far from introducing us to an apparently well-recognized phenomenon, as the Standard Edition mis-title implies, Freud is signalling the introduction of a whole new theory of narcissism (cf. the fifth paragraph of the essay!).]

2. [It is at once striking and instructive that the phrase 'with sexual pleasure' (mit sexuellem Wohlgefallen) is simply omitted from the Standard Edition.]

3. [Freud's term Unterbringung der Libido (in other contexts Libidounterbringung) is a metaphor that cannot be adequately replicated in English. The relevant verb (unterbringen) means 'house', 'accommodate', 'find an appropriate niche for'. The Standard Edition has 'allocation', but this suggests something quite different from Freud's original.]

4. Otto Rank (1911) ['Ein Beitrag zum Narzissismus' ('A Contribution on Narcissism')].

5. Regarding these propositions, cf. the discussion of the 'end of the world' in the analysis of Senate President Schreber (1911); cf. also Abraham (1908) [Freud deals with the Schreber case in 'Psychoanalytic Remarks on an Autobiographically Described Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)'; an English version of Abraham's treatise may be found in K. Abraham, Selected Papers (London 1927; New York 1953), Ch. 11].

6. ['Cathexis' is an ugly and opaque term – coined by James Strachey – that has nothing of the apparent simplicity of Freud's metaphor Besetzung. Unfortunately, however, Freud's word has no direct or uncontentious equivalent in English, and Strachey's well-established hellenism is therefore reluctantly retained throughout this present volume (together with the associated verb 'cathect').]

7. [The obfuscatory tendencies of the Standard Edition are epitomized by
the fact that it renders Freud’s Zauberkraft – a word that any child would instantly understand – as ‘thaumaturgic force’!

8. See the relevant sections of my book Totem und Tabu [Totem and Taboo] (1912–13). [See Chapter III.]


10. [See also Beyond the Pleasure Principle, below, p. 91. This idea will be revised later on, once Freud has evolved the notion of the ‘id’, see The Ego and the Id, below, p. 121, and the corresponding note 45. The Standard Edition carries a lengthy Appendix by the editors on the ‘considerable difficulty’ attaching to this particular metaphor of Freud’s.]

11. There are two mechanisms involved in this ‘end of the world’ scenario: when the entire libido-cathexis streams out onto the love-object, and when it all floods back into the ego.

12. [Cf. OED: ‘The germ-plasm is the essential part of the germ-cell, and determines the nature of the individual that arises from it’ (sample quotation dated 1890).]

13. [The first two German editions of the essay printed ersterwählte – the first hypothesis chosen – whereas subsequent editions printed ersterwähnte – the first hypothesis mentioned. The Standard Edition opts for the original version – but there seems little logic in this, given that Freud did indeed ‘mention’ this hypothesis just a few paragraphs earlier.]

14. [This curious term is Freud’s own (psychisches Interesse).]

15. [Freud is referring to Ferenczi’s review of Jung’s Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido (published in English under the title Psychology of the Unconscious).]

16. [Freud’s term is Realfunktion, derived from Pierre Janet’s la fonction du réel.]

17. [Freud gives this phrase in English.]

18. [Positionen. This is a recurrent term of Freud’s in connection with the libido, especially with regard to the lóci that it comes to occupy as a result of cathexis.]

19. [Ichveränderung. See also below, The Ego and the Id, note 43.]

20. [See the Longman Dictionary of Psychology and Psychiatry, ed. Robert M. Goldenson, New York and London, 1985: actual neurosis – a neurosis which, according to Freud, stems from current sexual frustrations, such as coitus interruptus, forced abstinence, or incomplete gratification, as contrasted with psychoneurosis, which stems from experiences in infancy or childhood. The term was applied primarily to anxiety neurosis, hypochondriasis, and neurasthenia, but is rarely used today. See also the final paragraph of Chapter IV of Inhibition, Symptom, and Fear below.]

21. [Angstneurose. The long-established term ‘anxiety neurosis’ is reluctantly retained here but it should be noted that Angst means ‘fear’, and is normally used in precisely that sense by Freud. See also below, Inhibition, Symptom, and Fear, note 3.]

22. Cf. ‘Über neurotische Erkrankstypen’ (1912) [‘Types of Onset of Neurosis’].

23. [Freud’s important but challenging term is Versagung, from the verb versagen, itself cognate with English ‘forsake’ – one now-obsolete meaning of which is ‘To decline or refuse (something offered)’ (OED). What he means by the term is rather more clearly shown by the opening sentences of ‘Die am Erfolge scheitern’ (‘Those who Founder on Success’): ‘Our work in psychoanalysis has presented us with the following proposition: People incur neurotic illness as a result of refusal. What is meant by this is that their libidinal desires are refused gratification – i.e. by the savagely censorious entity within that oversees their every thought and deed. See also the penultimate sentence of this present essay: ‘We can thus more readily understand the fact that paranoia is frequently caused by the ego being wounded, by gratification being refused within the domain of the ego-ideal.’ The Standard Edition routinely and astonishingly mistranslates the term as ‘frustration.’]

24. [The voice here is God’s; the lines are from Heine’s Neue Gedichte (‘Schöpfungsgedichte’, vii.).]

25. [‘Release’ is used throughout this volume to render Freud’s important but not readily translatable metaphor Abfuhr (the Standard Edition prefers ‘discharge’).]

26. [Konversion. See also below, Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through, note 3.]

27. [Freud’s term – used here for the first time in his œuvre – is Anlehungs­typus. Alas, it cannot be rendered directly into English, and so ‘imitative type’ is necessarily an approximate rather than a precise translation (as are the two immediately preceding instances of ‘imitate’, both rendering words derived from the verb sich anlehnen). However, this is a considerable improvement on the Standard Edition, which goes seriously awry when it translates Freud’s term as the ‘anaclitic’ or ‘attachment’ type. ‘Anaclitic’ is a specially concocted word – but concocted on the basis of a startling misunderstanding of the German expression sich anlehnen an, as the footnote in the Standard Edition makes embarrassingly clear: the expression does not imply ‘attach’ or ‘attachment’; it simply means that A ‘is modelled
on', 'is based on', 'follows the example of B; thus one might typically say that Beethoven's early symphonies *lehnen sich an* the mature work of Mozart, or that Freud's theories *lehnen sich an* the ideas and visions of nineteenth-century German literature (in the *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: New Series* Freud himself notes that the term 'id' (das Es) was devised on the model of Nietzsche's linguistic practice – *in Anlehnung an den Sprachgebrauch bei Nietzsche*).

28. [Freud's German is somewhat ambiguous; his wording is such that it could be understood to mean 'who have partly relinquished their own narcissism' (this is the interpretation preferred by the *Standard Edition*).]

29. [Freud cites the phrase in English, and is probably quoting the title of a painting exhibited in the Royal Academy, which depicted a baby being wheeled grandly across a busy London street while two policemen hold up the traffic.]

30. [sein aktuelles Ich.]

31. [Idea-bildung. Freud is particularly fond of creating compound nouns ending in -bildung, the gerund of the verb bilden, 'to form' (cognate with English 'build'), e.g. Reaktionsbildung, Symptombildung, Traumbildung.]

32. [Freud's word is Instanz – a cardinal term in his vocabulary, but one that has no direct linguistic or indeed cultural equivalent in English, with the result that a number of different renderings are deployed in this present translation to match the relevant context. The key feature of the word is that it implies some kind of judicial or quasi-judicial authority making judgements about what is permissible and impermissible, acceptable and unacceptable – and doing so very often in implacably harsh and even sadistic terms involving 'guilt', 'condemnation', 'punishment' etc. This vision of the human psyche as a domain under constant surveillance by draconian but shadowy forces is fascinatingly similar to that of Freud's fellow Jew and Austro-Hungarian near-contemporary, Franz Kafka.]

33. Merely by way of conjecture I would add that the development and consolidation of this all-scrutinizing entity might also embrace the ultimate emergence of (subjective) memory and of the phenomenon whereby time holds no validity for unconscious processes.

34. [Having thus far used abstract nouns (Instanz, Zensur) to convey the policing of the psyche, Freud gives the process a far sharper edge here by suddenly personifying it (Zensor).]

35. I cannot here resolve the issue whether the differentiation of this censorial entity from the rest of the ego is capable of providing a psychological substantiation of the philosophical distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness.
ON NARCISSISM: AN INTRODUCTION (1914)
EDITOR'S NOTE

ZUR EINFÜHRUNG DES NARZISSMUS

(a) German Editions:
1918 S.K.S.N., 4, 78-112. (1922, 2nd ed.)
1925 G.S., 6, 155-187.
1931 Theoretische Schriften, 25-57.
1946 G.W., Bd. 10, 138-170.

(b) English Translation:
'On Narcissism: an Introduction'
1925 C.P., 4, 30-59. (Tr. C. M. Baines.)

The present translation is based on the one published in 1925.

The title of this paper would have been more literally translated 'On the Introduction of the Concept of Narcissism'. Freud had been using the term for many years previously. We learn from Ernest Jones (1955, 388) that at a meeting of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on November 10, 1909, Freud had declared that narcissism was a necessary intermediate stage between auto-eroticism and object-love. At about the same time he was preparing the second edition of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) for the press (the preface is dated 'December, 1909'), and it seems probable that the first public mention of the new term is to be found in a footnote added to that edition (Standard Ed., 7, 145 n.)—assuming, that is to say, that the new edition appeared in the early part of 1910. For at the end of May in the same year Freud's book on Leonardo (1910c) appeared, in which there is a considerably longer reference to narcissism (Standard Ed., 11, 100). A paper on the subject by Rank, mentioned by Freud at the beginning of the present study, was published in 1911, and other references by Freud himself soon followed; e.g. in Section III of the Schreber

ON NARCISSISM: AN INTRODUCTION

analysis (1911c) and in Totem and Taboo (1912–13), Standard Ed., 13, 88–90.

The idea of writing the present paper emerges in Freud’s letters for the first time in June, 1913, and he finished a first draft of it during a holiday in Rome in the third week of September of the same year. It was not until the end of February, 1914, that he started on the final version and it was completed a month later.

The paper is among the most important of Freud’s writings and may be regarded as one of the pivots in the evolution of his views. It sums up his earlier discussions on the subject of narcissism and considers the place taken by narcissism in sexual development; but it goes far beyond this. For it enters into the deeper problems of the relations between the ego and external objects, and it draws the new distinction between ‘ego-libido’ and ‘object-libido’. Furthermore—most important of all, perhaps—it introduces the concepts of the ‘ego ideal’ and of the self-observing agency related to it, which were the basis of what was ultimately to be described as the ‘super-ego’ in The Ego and the Id (1923b). And in addition to all this, at two points in the paper—at the end of the first section and at the beginning of the third—it trenches upon the controversies with Adler and Jung which were the principal theme of the ‘History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement’, written more or less simultaneously with the present work during the early months of 1914. Indeed, one of Freud’s motives in writing this paper was, no doubt, to show that the concept of narcissism offers an alternative to Jung’s non-sexual ‘libido’ and to Adler’s ‘masculine protest’.

These are far from being the only topics raised in the paper, and it is therefore scarcely surprising that it should have an unusual appearance of being over-compressed—of its framework bursting from the quantity of material it contains. Freud himself seems to have felt something of the kind. Ernest Jones tells us (1955, 340) that ‘he was very dissatisfied with the result’ and wrote to Abraham: ‘The “Narcissism” had a difficult labour and bears all the marks of a corresponding deformation.’

However this may be, the paper is one which demands and repays prolonged study; and it was the starting-point of many later lines of thought. Some of these, for instance, were pursued further in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917e [1915]), p. 237


Wie dem auch sei – die Arbeit verlangt und verloht intensives Studium; im Ansatz enthält sie schon viele der späteren Gedankengänge Freuds. Einige davon werden z. B. in »Trauer und Melancholie« (1917 e), unten, S. 197 ff., und in
below, and in Chapters VIII and XI of *Group Psychology* (1921c). The subject of narcissism, it may be added, occupies the greater part of Lecture XXVI of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17). The further development of the fresh views on the structure of the mind which are already beginning to become apparent in the present paper led Freud later to a re-assessment of some of the statements he makes here, especially as regards the functioning of the ego. In this connection it must be pointed out that the meaning which Freud attached to ‘das Ich’ (almost invariably translated by ‘the ego’ in this edition) underwent a gradual modification. At first he used the term without any great precision, as we might speak of ‘the self’; but in his latest writings he gave it a very much more definite and narrow meaning. The present paper occupies a transitional point in this development. The whole topic will be found discussed more fully in the Editor’s Introduction to *The Ego and the Id* (1923b).

Extracts from the translation of this paper published in 1925 were included in Rickman’s *A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud* (1937, 118–41).
ON NARCISSISM:
AN INTRODUCTION

The term narcissism is derived from clinical description and was chosen by Paul Näcke\(^1\) in 1899 to denote the attitude of a person who treats his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated—who looks at it, that is to say, strokes it and fondles it till he obtains complete satisfaction through these activities. Developed to this degree, narcissism has the significance of a perversion that has absorbed the whole of the subject's sexual life, and it will consequently exhibit the characteristics which we expect to meet with in the study of all perversions.

Psycho-analytic observers were subsequently struck by the fact that individual features of the narcissistic attitude are found in many people who suffer from other disorders—for instance, as Sadger has pointed out, in homosexuals—and finally it seemed probable that an allocation of the libido such as deserved to be described as narcissism might be present far more extensively, and that it might claim a place in the regular course of human sexual development.\(^2\) Difficulties in psycho-analytic work upon neurotics led to the same supposition, for it seemed as though this kind of narcissistic attitude in them constituted one of the limits to their susceptibility to influence. Narcissism in this sense would not be a perversion, but the libidinal

\(^1\) [In a footnote added by Freud in 1920 to his Three Essays (1905d, Standard Ed., 7, 218 n.) he said that he was wrong in stating in the present paper that the term 'narcissism' was introduced by Näcke and that he should have attributed it to Havelock Ellis. Ellis himself, however, subsequently (1928) wrote a short paper in which he corrected Freud's correction and argued that the priority should in fact be divided between himself and Näcke, explaining that the term 'narcissus-like' had been used by him in 1898 as a description of a psychological attitude, and that Näcke in 1899 had introduced the term 'Narcissus' to describe a sexual perversion. The German word used by Freud is 'Narcissmus'. In his paper on Schreber (1911c), near the beginning of Section III, he defends this form of the word on the ground of euphony against the possibly more correct 'Narzissimus'.]

\(^2\) Otto Rank (1911c).

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Zur Einführung des Narzißmus

Der Terminus Narzißmus entstammt der klinischen Deskription und ist von P. Näcke\(^1\) 1899 zur Bezeichnung jenes Verhaltens gewählt worden, bei welchem ein Individuum den eigenen Leib in ähnlicher Weise behandelt wie sonst den eines Sexualobjekts, ihn also mit sexuellem Wohlgefallen beschaut, streichelt, liebkost, bis es durch diese Vornahmen zur vollen Befriedigung gelangt. In dieser Ausbildung hat der Narzißmus die Bedeutung einer Perversion, welche das gesamte Sexualleben der Person aufgesogen hat, und unterliegt darum auch den Erwartungen, mit denen wir an das Studium aller Perversionen herantreten.


\(^1\) [In einer 1920 den Drei Abhandlungen (1905 d), Studienausgabe, Bd. 5, S. 122 Anm. 3, hinzugefügten Fußnote bemerkt Freud, er habe in der hier vorliegenden Arbeit irrtümlich Näcke als den Urheber des Terminus »Narzißmus« bezeichnet; dieser sei vielmehr Havelock Ellis zuzuschreiben. Ellis selbst aber hat später in einem kurzen Artikel (1927) Freuds Korrektur berichtet: tatsächlich müßten er und Näcke sich die Priorität teilen; von ihm, Ellis, sei der Ausdruck »narcissus-like« 1898 zur Beschreibung einer bestimmten seelischen Einstellung gebraucht worden, während Näcke 1899 den Terminus »Narxismus« zur Beschreibung einer sexuellen Perversion verwendet habe. In seiner Arbeit über den Fall Schreber (1911 c), Studienausgabe, Bd. 7, S. 184, rechtfertigt Freud seine Wahl des Wortes »Narzißmus« statt des vielleicht korrekteren, aber weniger wohlklingenden »Narzissimus«.]

\(^2\) O. Rank (1911).
complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living creature.

A pressing motive for occupying ourselves with the conception of primary and normal narcissism arose when the attempt was made to subsume what we know of dementia praecox (Kraepelin) or schizophrenia (Bleuler) under the hypothesis of the libido theory. Patients of this kind, whom I have proposed to term paraphrenics, display two fundamental characteristics: megalomania and diversion of their interest from the external world—from people and things. In consequence of the latter change, they become inaccessible to the influence of psychoanalysis and cannot be cured by our efforts. But the paraphrenic's turning away from the external world needs to be understood more precisely. A patient suffering from hysteria or obsessive neurosis has also, as far as his illness extends, given up his relation to reality. But analysis shows that he has by no means broken off his erotic relations to people and things. He still retains them in phantasy; i.e. he has, on the one hand, substituted for real objects imaginary ones from his memory, or has mixed the latter with the former; and on the other hand, he has renounced the initiation of motor activities for the attainment of his aims in connection with those objects. Only to this condition of the libido may we legitimately apply the term 'intversion' of the libido which is used by Jung indiscriminately. It is otherwise with the paraphrenic. He seems really to have withdrawn his libido from people and things in the external world, without replacing them by others in phantasy. When he does so replace them, the process seems to be a secondary one and to be part of an attempt at recovery, designed to lead the libido back to objects.

The question arises: What happens to the libido which has been withdrawn from external objects in schizophrenia? The megalomania characteristic of these states points the way. This megalomania has no doubt come into being at the expense of

1 [For a discussion of Freud's use of this term, see a long Editor's footnote near the end of Section III of the Schreber analysis (1911c).]
2 [Cf. a footnote in 'The Dynamics of Transference' (1912b).]
3 In connection with this see my discussion of the 'end of the world' in [Section III of] the analysis of Senatorspräsident Schreber [1911c]; also Abraham, 1908. [See also below, p. 86.]

...
object-libido. The libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism. But the megalomania itself is no new creation; on the contrary, it is, as we know, a magnification and plainer manifestation of a condition which had already existed previously. This leads us to look upon the narcissism which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism that is obscured by a number of different influences.

Let me insist that I am not proposing here to explain or penetrate further into the problem of schizophrenia, but that I am merely putting together what has already been said elsewhere, in order to justify the introduction of the concept of narcissism.

This extension of the libido theory—in my opinion, a legitimate one—receives reinforcement from a third quarter, namely, from our observations and views on the mental life of children and primitive peoples. In the latter we find characteristics which, if they occurred singly, might be put down to megalomania: an over-estimation of the power of their wishes and mental acts, the 'omnipotence of thoughts', a belief in the thaumaturgic force of words, and a technique for dealing with the external world—"magic"—which appears to be a logical application of these grandiose premisses. In the children of to-day, whose development is much more obscure to us, we expect to find an exactly analogous attitude towards the external world. Thus we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out. In our


Ich bemerke nochmals, daß ich hier keine Klarung oder Vertiefung des Schizophrenieproblems geben will, sondern nur zusammentrage, was bereits an anderen Stellen gesagt worden ist, um eine Einführung des Narzißmus zu rechtfertigen.


1 [See, in particular, the works referred to in the last footnote. On p. 86 below, Freud in fact penetrates further into the problem.]  
2 Cf. the passages in my Totem and Taboo (1912-13) which deal with this subject. [These are chiefly in the third essay, Standard Ed., 13, 83 ff.]  
3 Cf. Ferenczi (1913a).  
4 [Freud used this and similar analogies more than once again, e.g. in Lecture XXVI of his Introductory Lectures (1916-17) and in his short paper on 'A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis' (1917a), Standard Ed., 17, 139. He later revised some of the views expressed here. See the end of the Editor's Note, p. 71 above.]  
5 [These Unterscheidung trifft Freud hier zum ersten Mal.]
ON NARCISSISM: AN INTRODUCTION

researches, taking, as they did, neurotic symptoms for their starting-point, this part of the allocation of libido necessarily remained hidden from us at the outset. All that we noticed were the emanations of this libido—the object-cathexes, which can be sent out and drawn back again. We see also, broadly speaking, an antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido. The more of the one is employed, the more the other becomes depleted. The highest phase of development of which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, when the subject seems to give up his own personality in favour of an object-cathexis; while we have the opposite condition in the paranoic's phantasy (or self-perception) of the ‘end of the world’. Finally, as regards the differentiation of psychical energies, we are led to the conclusion that to begin with, during the state of narcissism, they exist together and that our analysis is too coarse to distinguish between them; not until there is object-cathexis is it possible to discriminate a sexual energy—the libido—from an energy of the ego-instincts.

Before going any further I must touch on two questions which lead us to the heart of the difficulties of our subject. In the first place, what is the relation of the narcissism of which we are now speaking to auto-eroticism, which we have described as an early state of the libido? Secondly, if we grant the ego a primary cathexis of libido, why is there any necessity for further distinguishing a sexual libido from a non-sexual energy of the ego-instincts? Would not the postulation of a single kind of psychical energy save us all the difficulties of differentiating an energy of the ego-instincts from ego-libido, and ego-libido from object-libido?

As regards the first question, I may point out that we are

1 [This distinction is drawn here by Freud for the first time.]
2 [See footnote 3, p. 74 above.]
3 [Some account of the development of Freud's views on the instincts will be found in the Editor's Note to 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', below p. 113 ff.]
4 [See the second of Freud's Three Essays (1905d), Standard Ed., 7, 181-3.]
5 [Cf. a remark on this passage in the Editor's Note to 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', p. 115 below.]


1 [S. Anm. 3, oben, S. 42.] Es gibt zwei Mechanismen dieses Weltunterganges, wenn alle Libidobesetzung auf das geliebte Objekt abströmt und wenn alle in das Ich zurückfließt.
2 [Einiges zur Entwicklung der Ansichten Freuds über die Triebe findet sich in der 'Editorischen Vorbemerkung zu Trieben und Triebsschicksale (1915 c), S. 77 ff.]
3 [S. die zweite von Freuds Drei Abhandlungen (1905 d), Studienausgabe, Bd. 5, S. 88-9.]
4 [Vgl. eine Bemerkung zu dieser Passage in der 'Editorischen Vorbemerkung zu Trieben und Triebsschicksale (1915 c), unten, S. 79.]
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bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. The auto-erotic instincts, however, are there from the very first; so there must be something added to auto-eroticism—a new psychic action—in order to bring about narcissism.

To be asked to give a definite answer to the second question must occasion perceptible uneasiness in every psycho-analyst. One dislikes the thought of abandoning observation for barren theoretical controversy, but nevertheless one must not shirk an attempt at clarification. It is true that notions such as that of an ego-libido, an energy of the ego-instincts, and so on, are neither particularly easy to grasp, nor sufficiently rich in content; a speculative theory of the relations in question would begin by seeking to obtain a sharply defined concept as its basis. But I am of opinion that that is just the difference between a speculative theory and a science erected on empirical interpretation. The latter will not envy speculation its privilege of having a smooth, logically unassailable foundation, but will gladly content itself with nebulous, scarcely imaginable basic concepts, which it hopes to apprehend more clearly in the course of its development, or which it is even prepared to replace by others. For these ideas are not the foundation of science, upon which everything rests: that foundation is observation alone. They are not the bottom but the top of the whole structure, and they can be replaced and discarded without damaging it. The same thing is happening in our day in the science of physics, the basic notions of which as regards matter, centres of force, attraction, etc., are scarcely less debatable than the corresponding notions in psycho-analysis.¹

The value of the concepts 'ego-libido' and 'object-libido' lies in the fact that they are derived from the study of the intimate characteristics of neurotic and psychotic processes. A differentiation of libido into a kind which is proper to the ego and one which is attached to objects is an unavoidable corollary to an original hypothesis which distinguished between sexual instincts and ego-instincts. At any rate, analysis of the pure transference neuroses (hysteria and obsessional neurosis) compelled me to make this distinction and I only know that all attempts to

1 [This line of thought was expanded by Freud in the opening passage of his paper on 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915c), below, p. 117.]

daß eine dem Ich vergleichbare Einheit nicht von Anfang an im Individuum vorhanden ist; das Ich muß entwickelt werden. Die autoerotischen Triebe sind aber uranfällig; es muß also irgend etwas zum Autoerotismus hinzukommen, eine neue psychische Aktion, um den Narzismus zu gestalten.

Die Aufforderung, die zweite Frage in entschiedener Weise zu beantworten, muß bei jedem Psychoanalytiker ein merkliches Unbehagen erwecken. Man wehrt sich gegen das Gefühl, die Beobachtung für sterile theoretische Streitigkeiten zu verlassen, darf sich dem Versuch einer Klarung aber doch nicht entziehen. Gewiß sind Vorstellungen wie die einer Ichlibido, Ichtriebenergie und so weiter klarer und deutscher als z. B. im Laufe ihrer Entwicklung klarer zu erfassen hofft, eventuell auch gegen andere einzutauschen bereit ist. Diese Ideen sind nämlich nicht das Fundament der Wissenschaft, auf dem alles ruht; dies ist vielmehr allein die Beobachtung. Sie sind nicht das Unterste, sondern das Oberste des ganzen Baues und können ohne Schaden ersetzt und abgetragen werden. Wir erleben dergleichen in unseren Tagen wiederum an der Physik, deren Grundanschauungen über Materie, Kraftzentren, Anziehung und dergleichen kaum weniger bedenklich sind als die entsprechenden der Psychoanalyse.¹

Der Wert der Begriffe: Ichlibido, Objektlibido liegt darin, daß sie aus der Verarbeitung der intimen Charaktere neurotischer und psychotischer Vorgänge stammen. Die Sonderung der Libido in eine solche, die dem Ich eigen ist, und eine, die den Objekten angehört wird, ist eine unerläßliche Fortführung einer ersten Annahme, welche Sexualtirbe und Ichtriebe voneinander schied. Dazu nötigte mich wenigstens die Analyse der reinen Übertragungsneurosen (Hysterie und Zwang), und ich weiß nur, daß alle Versuche, von diesen Phänomenen mit anderen

¹ [Ober diesen Gedankengang verbreitet sich Freud in der Einleitungspassage seiner Arbeit 'Triebe und Triebshicksale' (1915c), unten, S. 81.]
² [Dieser Gedanke taucht in Das Ich und das Es (1923b), unten, S. 311, erneut auf.]
account for these phenomena by other means have been completely unsuccessful.

In the total absence of any theory of the instincts which would help us to find our bearings, we may be permitted, or rather, it is incumbent upon us, to start off by working out some hypothesis to its logical conclusion, until it either breaks down or is confirmed. There are various points in favour of the hypothesis of there having been from the first a separation between sexual instincts and others, ego-instincts, besides the serviceability of such a hypothesis in the analysis of the transference neuroses. I admit that this latter consideration alone would not be unambiguous, for it might be a question of an indifferent psychical energy which only becomes libido through the act of cathecting an object. But, in the first place, the distinction made in this concept corresponds to the common, popular distinction between hunger and love. In the second place, there are biological considerations in its favour. The individual does actually carry on a twofold existence: one to serve his own purposes and the other as a link in a chain, which he serves against his will, or at least involuntarily. The individual himself regards sexuality as one of his own ends; whereas from another point of view he is an appendage to his germ-plasm, at whose disposal he puts his energies in return for a bonus of pleasure. He is the mortal vehicle of a (possibly) immortal substance—like the inheritor of an entailed property, who is only the temporary holder of an estate which survives him. The separation of the sexual instincts from the ego-instincts would simply reflect this twofold function of the individual.1 Thirdly, we must recollect that all our provisional ideas in psychology will presumably some day be based on an organic substructure. This makes it probable that it is special substances and chemical processes which perform the operations of sexuality and provide for the extension of individual life into that of the species.2 We are taking this probability into account in replacing the special chemical substances by special psychical forces.

I try in general to keep psychology clear from everything that

Mitteln Rechenschaft zu geben, gründlich mißlungen sind.

Gerade weil ich sonst bemüht bin, alles andersartige, auch das biologi-
is different in nature from it, even biological lines of thought. For that very reason I should like at this point expressly to admit that the hypothesis of separate ego-insects and sexual instincts (that is to say, the libido theory) rests scarcely at all upon a psychological basis, but derives its principal support from biology. But I shall be consistent enough [with my general rule] to drop this hypothesis if psycho-analytic work should itself produce some other, more serviceable hypothesis about the instincts. So far, this has not happened. It may turn out that, most basically and on the longest view, sexual energy—libido—is only the product of a differentiation in the energy at work generally in the mind. But such an assertion has no relevance. It relates to matters which are so remote from the problems of our observation, and of which we have so little cognizance, that it is as idle to dispute it as to affirm it; this primal identity may well have as little to do with our analytic interests as the primal kinship of all the races of mankind has to do with the proof of kinship required in order to establish a legal right of inheritance. All these speculations take us nowhere.

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It would, of course, be a different matter if it were proved that the libido theory has already come to grief in the attempt to explain the latter disease. This has been asserted by C. G. Jung (1912) and it is on that account that I have been obliged to enter upon this last discussion, which I would gladly have spared. I should have preferred to follow to its end the course embarked upon in the analysis of the Schreber case without any discussion of its premisses. But Jung's assertion is, in its sense, a different matter. In the editions before 1924, the later editions read 'erstwähnt' ("first mentioned"), which seems to make less good sense and may be a misprint.\(^1\)

\(^{1}\) ['Ersterwähnt' ('first selected') in the editions before 1924. The later editions read 'erstwähnte' ('first mentioned'), which seems to make less good sense and may be a misprint.]
to say the least of it, premature. The grounds he gives for it are scanty. In the first place, he appeals to an admission of my own that I myself have been obliged, owing to the difficulties of the Schreber analysis, to extend the concept of libido (that is, to give up its sexual content) and to identify libido with psychical interest in general. Ferenczi (1913), in an exhaustive criticism of Jung's work, has already said all that is necessary in correction of this erroneous interpretation. I can only corroborate his criticism and repeat that I have never made any such retraction of the libido theory. Another argument of Jung's, namely, that we cannot suppose that the withdrawal of the libido is in itself enough to bring about the loss of the normal function of reality, is no argument but a dictum. It 'begs the question,' and saves discussion; for whether and how this is possible was precisely the point that should have been under investigation. In his next major work, Jung (1913 [339-40]) just misses the solution I had long since indicated: 'At the same time', he writes, 'there is this to be further taken into consideration (a point to which, incidentally, Freud refers in his work on the Schreber case [1911c])—that the introversion of the libido sexualis leads to a cathexis of the "ego", and that it may possibly be this that produces the result of a loss of reality. It is indeed a tempting possibility to explain the psychology of the loss of reality in this fashion.' But Jung does not enter much further into a discussion of this possibility. A few lines later he dismisses it with the remark that this determinant 'would result in the psychology of the loss of reality, in fact a Decret; it begs the question, it misses the Entscheidung, vorweg und erspart die Diskussion, denn ob und wie das möglich ist, sollte eben untersucht werden. In seiner nächsten großen Arbeit (1913 [339-40]) ist Jung an der von mir längst angedeuteten Lösung knapp vorbeigekommen: 'Dabei ist nun allerdings noch in Betracht zu ziehen—worauf übrigens Freud in seiner Arbeit in dem Schreberschen Falle [1911c] Bezug nimmt—, daß die Introversions der Libido sexualis zu einer Besetzung des 'Ich' führt, wodurch möglicherweise jener Effekt des Realitätsverlustes herausgebracht wird. Es ist in der Tat eine verlockende Möglichkeit, die Psychologie des Realitätsverlustes in dieser Arg zu erklären.' Allein Jung läßt sich mit dieser Möglichkeit nicht viel weiter ein. Wenige Zeilen später tut er sie mit der Bemerkung ab, daß aus dieser Bedingung die Psychologie eines asketischen Anachoretens hervorgehen würde, nicht aber eine Dementia praecox. Wie wenig dieser ungeeignete Vergleich eine Entscheidung bringen kann, mag die Be- merkung lehren, daß ein solcher Anachoret, der jede Spur von Sexualinteresse auszutrotten bestrebt ist (doch nur im populären Sinne des Wortes 'sexual'), nicht einmal eine pathogene Unterbringung der Libido aufzuweisen braucht. Er mag sein sexuelles Interesse von den Menschen gänzlich abgewendet und kann es doch zum gesteigerten Interesse für Göttliches, Natürliches, Tierisches sublimiert haben, ohne einer Introversions seiner Libido auf seine Phantasien oder einer Rück-

1 [The phrase is from Janet (1909): 'La fonction du réel'. See the opening sentences of Freud, 1911b.]
2 [In English in the original.]
3 [All the German editions read 'Seiten' ('pages'), a misprint for 'Zeilen'.]
his ego. This analogy would seem to rule out in advance the possibility of differentiating between interest emanating from erotic sources and from others. Let us remember, further, that the researches of the Swiss school, however valuable, have elucidated only two features in the picture of dementia praecox —the presence in it of complexes known to us both in healthy and neurotic subjects, and the similarity of the phantasies that occur in it to popular myths—but that they have not been able to throw any further light on the mechanism of the disease. We may repudiate Jung’s assertion, then, that the libido theory has come to grief in the attempt to explain dementia praecox, and that it is therefore disposed of for the other neuroses as well.
Certain special difficulties seem to me to lie in the way of a direct study of narcissism. Our chief means of access to it will probably remain the analysis of the paraphrenias. Just as the transference neuroses have enabled us to trace the libidinal instinctual impulses, so dementia praecox and paranoia will give us an insight into the psychology of the ego. Once more, in order to arrive at an understanding of what seems so simple in normal phenomena, we shall have to turn to the field of pathology with its distortions and exaggerations. At the same time, other means of approach remain open to us, by which we may obtain a better knowledge of narcissism. These I shall now discuss in the following order: the study of organic disease, of hypochondria and of the erotic life of the sexes.

In estimating the influence of organic disease upon the distribution of libido, I follow a suggestion made to me orally by Sándor Ferenczi. It is universally known, and we take it as a matter of course, that a person who is tormented by organic pain and discomfort gives up his interest in the things of the external world, in so far as they do not concern his suffering. Closer observation teaches us that he also withdraws libidinal interest from his love-objects: so long as he suffers, he ceases to love. The commonplace nature of this fact is no reason why we should be deterred from translating it into terms of the libido theory. We should then say: the sick man withdraws his libidinal cathexes back upon his own ego, and sends them out again when he recovers. 'Concentrated is his soul,' says Wilhelm Busch of the poet suffering from toothache, 'in his molar's narrow hole.' Here libido and ego-interest share the same fate and are once more indistinguishable from each other. The familiar egoism of the sick person covers both. We find it so natural because we are certain that in the same situation we should behave in just the same way. The way in which a lover's feelings, however strong, are banished by bodily ailments, and

1 [Einzig in der engen Höhle
Des Backenzahnes weilt die Seele.
_Baldwin Bühlamm, Chapter VIII_.]

1 [Baldwin Bühlamm, Kapitel VIII.]
suddenly replaced by complete indifference, is a theme which
has been exploited by comic writers to an appropriate
extent.

The condition of sleep, too, resembles illness in implying a
narcissistic withdrawal of the positions of the libido on to the
subject’s own self, or, more precisely, on to the single wish to
sleep. The egoism of dreams fits very well into this context.
[Cf. below, p. 223.] In both states we have, if nothing else,
examples of changes in the distribution of libido that are con-
sequent upon a change in the ego.

Hypochondria, like organic disease, manifests itself in dis-
tressing and painful bodily sensations, and it has the same effect
as organic disease on the distribution of libido. The hypochon-
driac withdraws both interest and libido—the latter specially
markedly—from the objects of the external world and con-
centrates both of them upon the organ that is engaging his
attention. A difference between hypochondria and organic dis-
ease now becomes evident: in the latter, the distressing sensa-
tions are based upon demonstrable [organic] changes; in the
former, this is not so. But it would be entirely in keeping with
our general conception of the processes of neurosis if we decided
to say that hypochondria must be right: organic changes must
be supposed to be present in it, too.

But what could these changes be? We will let ourselves be
guided at this point by our experience, which shows that bodily
sensations of an unpleasurable nature, comparable to those of
hypochondria, occur in the other neuroses as well. I have said
before that I am inclined to class hypochondria with neurasthenia
and anxiety-neurosis as a third ‘actual’ neurosis.1

It would probably not be going too far to suppose that in the
case of the other neuroses a small amount of hypochondria was
regularly formed at the same time as well. We have the best

1 [This seems to have been first hinted at in a footnote near the end
of Section II of the Schreber case (1911c). It was again briefly, though
more explicitly, mentioned by Freud in his closing remarks on matur-
boration at a discussion in the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society (1912f).
He returned to the subject later towards the end of Lecture XXIV of
the Introductory Lectures (1916-17). At a much earlier period, Freud had
already approached the question of the relation between hypochondria
and the other ‘actual’ neuroses. See Section I (2) of his first paper on
anxiety neurosis (1895b).]

through völlige Gleichgültigkeit, findet in der Komik entsprechende Aus-
nützung.

Ähnlich wie die Krankheit bedeutet auch der Schlafzustand ein nar-
zißtisches Zurückziehen der Libidopositionen auf die eigene Person, des
genauer, auf den einen Wunsch zu schlafen. Der Egoismus der Träume
fügt sich wohl in diesen Zusammenhang ein1. In beiden Fällen sehen
wir, wenn auch nicht anders, Beispiele von Veränderungen der Libido-
verteilung infolge von Idveränderung.

Die Hypochondrie äußert sich wie das organische Kranksein in pein-
lichen und schmerzhaften Körperempfindungen und trifft auch in der
Wirkung auf die Libidoverteilung mit ihm zusammen. Der Hypo-
chondrische zieht Interesse wie Libido – die letztere besonders deutlich –
von den Objekten der Außenwelt zurück und konzentriert beides auf
das ihn beschäftigende Organ. Ein Unterschied zwischen Hypochondrie
und organischer Krankheit drängt sich nun vor: im letzteren Falle sind
die peinlichen Sensationen durch nachweisbare [organische] Verände-
rungen begründet, im ersteren Falle nicht. Es würde aber ganz in den
Rahmen unserer sonstigen Auffassung der Neurosenvorgänge passen,
wen wir uns entschließen würden zu sagen: Die Hypochondrie muß
recht haben, die Organveränderungen dürften auch bei ihr nicht fehlen.
Worin bestünden sie nun?

Wir wollen uns hier durch die Erfahrung bestimmen lassen, daß Kör-
persensationen unlustiger Art, den hypochondrischen vergleichbar, auch
bei den anderen Neurosen nicht fehlen. Ich habe schon früher einmal die
Neigung ausgesprochen, die Hypochondrie als dritte Aktualneurose
neben die Neurasthenie und die Angstneurose hinzustellen8. Man geht
wahrscheinlich nicht zu weit, wenn man es so darstellt, als wäre regel-
mäßig bei den anderen Neurosen auch ein Stückschen Hypochondrie mit-
ausgebildet. Am schönsten sieht man dies wohl bei der Angstneurose

1 [Vgl. Metapsychologische Ergänzung zur Traumlehre (1917d), unten, S. 180.]
8 [Der wohl früheste Hinweis hierauf findet sich in einer Fußnote gegen Ende von
Abschnitt II der Schreber-Analyse (1911c), Studienausgabe, Bd. 7, S. 181, Anm. 2.
Eine nächste, kurze, aber mehr explizite Erwähnung erfolgte in Freuds Schlußbemer-
kungen zur Onanie-Diskussion der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung (1912 f).
In der 24. seiner Vorlesungen zur Einführung (1916-17), Studienausgabe, Bd. 1, S. 378,
kommt er später noch einmal auf das Thema zurück. Aber schon in einer sehr viel
früheren Schaffensperiode hatte Freud die Frage der Beziehung zwischen der Hypo-
chondrie und den anderen Aktual-Neurosen erwogen. S. Abschnitt I (2) seiner ersten
Arbeit zur Angstneurose (1895b), Studienausgabe, Bd. 6, S. 29.]
and der sie überbauenden Hysterie. Nun ist das uns bekannte Vorbild des schmerzhaft empfindlichen, irgendwie veränderten und doch nicht im gewöhnlichen Sinne kranken Organs das Genitale in seinen Erregungszuständen. Es wird dann blutdurchströmt, geschwollen, durchfeuchtet und der Sitz mannigfaltiger Sensationen. Nennen wir die Tätigkeit einer Körperstelle, sexualer erregender Reize ins Seelenleben zu schicken, ihre Erogenerität und denken daran, daß wir durch die Erwägungen der Sexualtheorie längst an die Auffassung gewöhnt sind, gewisse andere Körperstellen — die erogenen Zonen — könnten die Genitalien vertreten und sich ihnen analog verhalten, so haben wir hier nur einen Schritt weiter zu wagen. Wir können uns entschließen, die Erogenerität als allgemeine Eigenschaft aller Organe anzusehen, und dürfen dann von der Steigerung oder Herabsetzung derselben an einem bestimmten Körperteile sprechen. Jeder solchen Veränderung der Erogenerität in den Organen könnte eine Veränderung der Libidobesetzung im Ich parallel gehen. In solchen Momenten hätten wir das zu suchen, was wir der Hypochondrie zugrunde legen und was die nämliche Einwirkung auf die Libidoverteilung haben kann wie die materielle Erkrankung der Organe.

Wir merken, wenn wir diesen Gedankengang fortsetzen, stoßen wir auf das Problem nicht nur der Hypochondrie, sondern auch der anderen Aktualneurosen, der Neurasthenie und der Angstneurose. Wir wollen darum an dieser Stelle haltmachen; es liegt nicht in der Absicht einer rein psychologischen Untersuchung, die Grenze so weit ins Gebiet der physiologischen Forschung zu überschreiten. Es sei nur erwähnt, daß sich von hier aus vermuten läßt, die Hypochondrie stehe in einem ähnlichen Verhältnis zur Paraphrenie wie die anderen Aktualneurosen zur Hysterie und Zwangsneurose, hänge also von der Ichlibido ab, wie die anderen von der Objektlibido; die hypochondrische Angst sei das Gegenstück von der Ichlibido her zur neurotischen Angst. Ferner: Wenn wir mit der Vorstellung bereits vertraut sind, den Mechanismus der Erkrankung und Symtombildung bei den Übertragungsneurosen, den Fortschritt von der Introversion zur Regression, an eine Stauung der Objektlibido zu knüpfen, so dürfen wir auch der Vorstellung einer

1 [Cf. Three Essays (1905d), Standard Ed., 7, 183 f.]
2 Cf. [the opening pages of] 'Types of Onset of Neurosis' (1912).
of ego-libido as well and may bring this idea into relation with the phenomena of hypochondria and paraphrenia.

At this point, our curiosity will of course raise the question why this damming-up of libido in the ego should have to be experienced as unpleasurable. I shall content myself with the answer that unpleasure is always the expression of a higher degree of tension, and that therefore what is happening is that a quantity in the field of material events is being transformed here as elsewhere into the psychical quality of unpleasure. Nevertheless it may be that what is decisive for the generation of unpleasure is not the absolute magnitude of the material event, but rather some particular function of that absolute magnitude. ¹ Here we may even venture to touch on the question of what makes it necessary to pass beyond the limits of narcissism and to attach the libido to objects. ² The answer which would follow from our line of thought would once more be that this necessity arises when the cathexis of the ego with libido exceeds a certain amount. A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love. This follows somewhat on the lines of Heine’s picture of the psychogenesis of the Creation:

Krankheit ist wohl der letzte Grund
Des ganzen Schöpfdrangs gewesen;
Erschaffend konnte ich genesen,
Erschaffend wurde ich gesund. ³

We have recognized our mental apparatus as being first and foremost a device designed for mastering excitations which would otherwise be felt as distressing or would have pathogenic effects. Working them over in the mind helps remarkably towards an internal draining away of excitations which are incapable of direct discharge outwards, or for which such a

¹ [This whole question is discussed much more fully in ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ (1915c), below, p. 119 ff. For the use of the term ‘quantity’ in the last sentence, see Part I, Section 1, of Freud’s ‘Project’ (1950a), written in 1895.]

² [A more elaborate discussion of this problem too will be found in ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ (1915c), p. 134 ff. below.]

³ [God is imagined as saying: ‘Illness was no doubt the final cause of the whole urge to create. By creating, I could recover; by creating, I became healthy.’ Neue Gedichte, ‘Schöpfungslieder VII’.]

Stauung der Ichlibido nähertreten und sie in Beziehung zu den Phänomenen der Hypochondria und der Paraphrenie bringen.

Naturlich wird unsere Wißbegierde hier die Frage aufwerfen, warum eine solche Libidostauung im Ich als unlustvoll empfunden werden muß. Ich möchte mich da mit der Antwort begnügen, daß Unlust überhaupt der Ausdruck der höheren Spannung ist, daß es also eine Quantität des materiellen Geschehens ist, die sich hier wie anderwärts in die psychische Qualität der Unlust umsetzt; für die Unlustentwicklung mag dann immerhin nicht die absolute Größe jenes materiellen Vorganges entscheidend sein, sondern eher eine gewisse Funktion dieser absoluten Größe. ¹ Von hier aus mag man es selbst wagen, an die Frage heranzutreten, woher denn überhaupt die Notigung für das Seelenleben rührt, über die Grenzen des Narzißmus hinauszugehen und die Libido auf Objekte zu setzen. ² Die aus unserem Gedankengang abfolgende Antwort würde wiederum sagen, diese Notigung trete ein, wenn die Ichbesetzung mit Libido ein gewisses Maß überschritten habe. Ein starker Egoismus schützt vor Erkrankung, aber endlich muß man beginnen zu lieben, um nicht krank zu werden, und muß erkranken, wenn man infolge von Versagung nicht lieben kann. Etwa nach dem Vorbild, wie sich H. Heine die Psychogenese der Weltschöpfung vorstellt:

>Krankheit ist wohl der letzte Grund
Des ganzen Schöpfdrangs gewesen;
Erschaffend konnte ich genesen,
Erschaffend wurde ich gesund.« ³

Wir haben in unserem seelischen Apparat vor allem ein Mittel erkannt, welchem die Bewältigung von Erregungen übertragen ist, die sonst peinlich empfunden oder pathogen wirksam würden. Die psychische Bearbeitung leistet Außerordentliches für die innere Ableitung von Erregungen, die einer unmittelbaren äußeren Abfuhr nicht fähig sind oder


² [Eine viel ausführlichere Erörterung dieses Problems findet sich ebenfalls in ‘Trieb und Triebsschicksale’, unten, S. 97 ff.]

³ [So läßt der Dichter Gott sprechen. H. Heine, Neue Gedichte, ‘Schöpfungslieder’, VII.]
discharge is for the moment undesirable. In the first instance, however, it is a matter of indifference whether this internal process of working-over is carried out upon real or imaginary objects. The difference does not appear till later—if the turning of the libido on to unreal objects (introversion) has led to its being dammed up. In paraphrenics, megalomania allows of a similar internal working-over of libido which has returned to the ego; perhaps it is only when the megalomania fails that the damming-up of libido in the ego becomes pathogenic and starts the process of recovery which gives us the impression of being a disease.

I shall try here to penetrate a little further into the mechanism of paraphrenia and shall bring together those views which already seem to me to deserve consideration. The difference between paraphrenic affections and the transference neuroses appears to me to lie in the circumstance that, in the former, the libido that is liberated by frustration does not remain attached to objects in phantasy, but withdraws on to the ego. Megalomania would accordingly correspond to the psychical mastering of this latter amount of libido, and would thus be the counterpart of the introversion on to phantasies that is found in the transference neuroses; a failure of this psychical function gives rise to the hypochondria of paraphrenia and this is homologous to the anxiety of the transference neuroses. We know that this anxiety can be resolved by further psychical working-over, i.e. by conversion, reaction-formation or the construction of protections (phobias). The corresponding process in paraphrenics is an attempt at restoration, to which the striking manifestations of the disease are due. Since paraphrenia frequently, if not usually, brings about only a partial detachment of the libido from objects, we can distinguish three groups of phenomena in the clinical picture: (1) those representing what remains of a normal state or of neurosis (residual phenomena); (2) those representing the morbid process (detachment of libido from its objects and, further, megalomania, hypochondria, affective disturbance and every kind of regression); (3) those representing restoration, in which the libido is once more attached to objects, after the manner of a hysteria (in dementia praecox or paraphrenia proper), or of an obsessional neurosis (in paranoia). This fresh libidinal cathexis differs from the primary one in that it starts from another level and under other conditions.
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The difference between the transference neuroses brought about in the case of this fresh kind of libidinal cathexis and the corresponding formations where the ego is normal should be able to afford us the deepest insight into the structure of our mental apparatus.

A third way in which we may approach the study of narcissism is by observing the erotic life of human beings, with its many kinds of differentiation in man and woman. Just as object-libido at first concealed ego-libido from our observation, so too in connection with the object-choice of infants (and of growing children) what we first noticed was that they derived their sexual objects from their experiences of satisfaction. The first autoerotic sexual satisfactions are experienced in connection with vital functions which serve the purpose of self-preservation. The sexual instincts are at the outset attached to the satisfaction of the ego-instincts; only later do they become independent of these, and even then we have an indication of that original attachment in the fact that the persons who are concerned with a child's feeding, care, and protection become his earliest sexual objects: that is to say, in the first instance his mother or a substitute for her. Side by side, however, with this type and source of object-choice, which may be called the 'anaclitic' or 'attachment' type, psycho-analytic research has revealed a second type.

1 [See some further remarks on this at the end of the paper on ‘The Unconscious’ (pp. 203-4 below).]
2 ['Anlehnungstypus.' Literally, 'leaning-on type'. The term has been rendered in English as the 'anaclitic type' by analogy with the grammatical term 'enclitic', used of particles which cannot be the first word in a sentence, but must be appended to, or must lean up against, a more important one, e.g. the Latin 'emin' or the Greek 'of'. This seems to be the first published appearance of the actual term 'Anlehnungstypus'. The idea that a child arrives at its first sexual object on the basis of its nutritional instinct is to be found in the first edition of the Three Essays (1905d), Standard Ed., 7, 222; but the two or three explicit mentions in that work of the 'anaclitic type' were not added to it until the 1915 edition. The concept was very clearly foreshadowed near the beginning of the second of Freud's papers on the psychology of love (1912d), Standard Ed., 11, 180-1. The term 'angelehnte' (‘attached’) is used in a similar sense near the beginning of Section III of the Schreber case history (1911e), but the underlying hypothesis is not stated there.—It should be noted that the 'attachment' (or 'Anlehnung') indicated by the term is that of the sexual instincts to the ego-instincts, not of the child to its mother.]

1 [Der eigentliche Terminus 'Anlehnungstypus' erscheint hier wohl erstmals im Druck. Hingegen findet sich die Vorstellung, daß das Kind auf dem Wege über den Ernährungstrieb zu seinem ersten Sexualobjekt gelangt, schon in der ersten Auflage der Drei Abhandlungen (1905d), Studienausgabe, Bd. 5, S. 125-6; die zwei oder drei Stellen, an denen das Wort 'Anlehnungstypus' dort vorkommt, sind jedoch erst in der Auflage von 1915 hinzugefügt worden. Das Konzept erscheint in der zweiten von Freuds Arbeiten über die Psychologie der Liebe (1912d), ibid., S. 200, schon deutlich vorgebildet. Der Ausdruck 'angelehnt' wurde in ähnlichen Sinne nahe dem Anfang von Ab schnitt III der Schreber-Analyse (1911e), Studienausgabe, Bd. 7, S. 185, gebraucht, die ihm zugrundeliegende Hypothese aber nicht angeführt. — Man beachte, daß 'Anlehnung' in diesem Zusammenhang die Beziehung der Sexualtriib zu den Ichtrieben, nicht etwa die Beziehung des Kindes zur Mutter meint.]
type, which we were not prepared for finding. We have discovered, especially clearly in people whose libidinal development has suffered some disturbance, such as perverts and homosexuals, that in their later choice of love-objects they have taken as a model not their mother but their own selves. They are plainly seeking *themselves* as a love-object, and are exhibiting a type of object-choice which must be termed 'narcissistic'. In this observation we have the strongest of the reasons which have led us to adopt the hypothesis of narcissism.

We have, however, not concluded that human beings are divided into two sharply differentiated groups, according as their object-choice conforms to the anactic or to the narcissistic type; we assume rather that both kinds of object-choice are open to each individual, though he may show a preference for one or the other. We say that a human being has originally two sexual objects—himself and the woman who nurses him—and in doing so we are postulating a primary narcissism in everyone, which may in some cases manifest itself in a dominating fashion in his object-choice.

A comparison of the male and female sexes then shows that there are fundamental differences between them in respect of their type of object-choice, although these differences are of course not universal. Complete object-love of the attachment type is, properly speaking, characteristic of the male. It displays the marked sexual overvaluation which is doubtless derived from the child's original narcissism and thus corresponds to a transference of that narcissism to the sexual object. This sexual overvaluation is the origin of the peculiar state of being in love, a state suggestive of a neurotic compulsion, which is an intensification of the original narcissism, and this is traceable to an impoverishment of the ego as regards libido in favour of the love-object. A different course is followed in the type of female most frequently met with, which is probably the purest and truest one. With the onset of puberty the maturing of the female sexual organs, which up till then have been in a condition of latency, seems to bring about an intensification of the original narcissism, and this is unfavourable to the development of a true object-choice with its accompanying sexual overvaluation. Women, especially if they grow up with good looks, develop a certain self-contentment which

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1 [Freud returned to this in a discussion of being in love in Chapter VIII of his *Group Psychology* (1921c), Standard Ed., 18, 112 f.]
compensates them for the social restrictions that are imposed upon them in their choice of object. Strictly speaking, it is only themselves that such women love with an intensity comparable to that of the man's love for them. Nor does their need lie in the direction of loving, but of being loved; and the man who fulfills this condition is the one who finds favour with them. The importance of this type of woman for the erotic life of mankind is to be rated very high. Such women have the greatest fascination for men, not only for aesthetic reasons, since as a rule they are the most beautiful, but also because of a combination of interesting psychological factors. For it seems very evident that another person's narcissism has a great attraction for those who have renounced part of their own narcissism and are in search of object-love. The charm of a child lies to a great extent in his narcissism, his self-contentment and inaccessibility, just as does the charm of certain animals which seem not to concern themselves about us, such as cats and the large beasts of prey. Indeed, even great criminals and humorists, as they are represented in literature, compel our interest by the narcissistic consistency with which they manage to keep away from their ego anything that would diminish it. It is as if we envied them for maintaining a blissful state of mind—an unassailable libidinal position which we ourselves have since abandoned. The great charm of narcissistic women has, however, its reverse side; a large part of the lover's dissatisfaction, of his doubts of the woman's love, of his complaints of her enigmatic nature, has its root in this incongruity between the types of object-choice.

Perhaps it is not out of place here to give an assurance that this description of the feminine form of erotic life is not due to any tendentious desire on my part to depreciate women. Apart from the fact that tendentiousness is quite alien to me, I know that these different lines of development correspond to the differentiation of functions in a highly complicated biological whole; further, I am ready to admit that there are quite a number of women who love according to the masculine type and who also develop the sexual overvaluation proper to that type.

Even for narcissistic women, whose attitude towards men remains cool, there is a road which leads to complete object-love. In the child which they bear, a part of their own body Weib für die ihm sozial verkümmerte Freiheit der Objektwahl entschädi-<ref>

8.F.XIV-G

Weib für die ihm sozial verkümmerte Freiheit der Objektwahl entschädi-<ref>

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ditgt. Solche Frauen lieben, strenggenommen, nur sich selbst mit ähnlicher Intensität, wie der Mann sie liebt. Ihr Bedürfnis geht auch nicht dahin zu lieben, sondern geliebt zu werden, und sie lassen sich den Mann gefallen, welcher diese Bedingung erfüllt. Die Bedeutung dieses Frauentypus für das Liebesleben der Menschen ist sehr hoch einzuschätzen. Solche Frauen üben den größten Reiz auf die Männer aus, nicht nur aus ästhetischen Gründen, weil sie gewöhnlich die schönsten sind, sondern auch infolge interessanter psychologischer Konstellationen. Es erscheint nämlich deutlich erkennbar, daß der Narzißmus einer Person eine große Anziehung auf diejenigen anderen entfaltet, welche sich des vollen Ausmaßes ihres eigenen Narzißmus begeben haben und sich in der Werbung um die Objektliebe befinden; der Reiz des Kindes beruht zum guten Teil auf dessen Narzißmus, seiner Selbstgenügsamkeit und Unzugänglichkeit, ebenso der Reiz gewisser Tiere, die sich um uns nicht zu kümmernden scheinen, wie der Katzen und großen Raubtiere, ja selbst der großen Verbrecher und der Humorist zwingen in der poetischen Darstellung unser Interesse durch die narzißtische Konsequenz, mit welcher sie alles ihr Ich Verkleinernde von ihm fernzuhalten wissen. Es ist so, als beneideten wir sie um die Erhaltung eines seligen psychischen Zustandes, einer unangreifbaren Libidoposition, die wir selbst seither aufgegeben haben. Dem großen Reiz des narzißtischen Weibes fehlt aber die Kehrseite nicht; ein guter Teil der Unbefriedigung des verliebten Mannes, der Zweifel an der Liebe des Weibes, der Klagen über die Rätsel im Wesen desselben hat in dieser Inkongruenz der Objektwahltypen seine Wurzel.


Auch für die narzißtisch und gegen den Mann kühl gebliebene Frauen gibt es einen Weg, der sie zur vollen Objektliebe führt. In dem Kinde, das sie gebären, tritt ihnen ein Teil des eigenen Körpers wie ein frem
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confronts them like an extraneous object, to which, starting out from their narcissism, they can then give complete object-love. There are other women, again, who do not have to wait for a physiological and of women (1931b) and (1933a).

jpapen: firm by inference from elsewhere. If we look at the attitude of affectionate parents towards their children, we have to recog-

and which forms one of the postulates of libido, is less easy to grasp by direct observation than to con­

narcissism to object-love. Before puberty they feel masculine and develop some way along masculine lines; after this trend has been cut short on their reaching female maturity, they still retain the capacity of longing for a masculine ideal—an ideal which is in fact a survival of the boyish nature that they themselves once possessed.

1 What I have so far said by way of indication may be concluded by a short summary of the paths leading to the choice of an object.

A person may love:—

(1) According to the narcissistic type:
   (a) what he himself is (i.e. himself),
   (b) what he himself was,
   (c) what he himself would like to be,
   (d) someone who was once part of himself.

(2) According to the anaclitic (attachment) type:
   (a) the woman who feeds him,
   (b) the man who protects him,

and the succession of substitutes who take their place. The inclusion of case (c) of the first type cannot be justified till a later stage of this discussion. [P. 101.]

The significance of narcissistic object-choice for homosexuality in men must be considered in another connection.8

The primary narcissism of children which we have assumed and which forms one of the postulates of our theories of the libido, is less easy to grasp by direct observation than to con­

1 [Freud developed his views on female sexuality in a number of later papers: on a case of female homosexuality (1920a), on the effects of the physiological distinctions between the sexes (1925j), on the sexuality of women (1931b) and in Lecture XXIII of his New Introductory Lectures (1933a).]

2 [Freud had already raised this point in Section III of his study on Leonardo (1910c), Standard Ed., 11, 98 ff.]

Der von uns supponierte primäre Narzißmus des Kindes, der eine der Voraussetzungen unserer Libidotheorien enthält, ist weniger leicht durch direkte Beobachtung zu erfassen als durch Rückschluß von einem anderen Punkte her zu bestätigen. Wenn man die Einstellung zärtlicher Eltern gegen ihre Kinder ins Auge faßt, muß man sie als Wiederauf­

1 [Seine Ansichten über die weibliche Sexualität entwickelte Freud in einer Reihe späterer Arbeiten, so in «Über die Psychogenese eines Falles von weiblicher Homosexualität» (1920a), «Einige psychische Folgen des anatomischen Geschlechtsunterschieds» (1925j), «Über die weibliche Sexualität» (1931b) sowie in der 33. Vorlesung der Neuen Folge (1933a).]

1 [Diese Frage hatte Freud schon in Abschnitt III seiner Leonardo-Studie (1910c), Studienausgabe, Bd. 10, S. 124 ff., aufgeworfen.]
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recognize that it is a revival and reproduction of their own narcissism, which they have long since abandoned. The trustworthy pointer constituted by overvaluation, which we have already recognized as a narcissistic stigma in the case of object-choice, dominates, as we all know, their emotional attitude. Thus they are under a compulsion to ascribe every perfection to the child—which sober observation would find no occasion to do—and to conceal and forget all his shortcomings. (Incidentally, the denial of sexuality in children is connected with this.) Moreover, they are inclined to suspend in the child’s favour the operation of all the cultural acquisitions which their own narcissism has been forced to respect, and to renew on his behalf the claims to privileges which were long ago given up by themselves. The child shall have a better time than his parents; he shall not be subject to the necessities which they have long since abandoned. The trustworthy system, the immortality of the ego, which is so hard to conceal and forget all his shortcomings. (Incidentally, the denial of sexuality in children is connected with this.)

Moreover, they are inclined to suspend in the child’s favour the operation of all the cultural acquisitions which their own narcissism has been forced to respect, and to renew on his behalf the claims to privileges which were long ago given up by themselves. The child shall have a better time than his parents; he shall not be subject to the necessities which they have recognized as paramount in life. Illness, death, renunciation of enjoyment, restrictions on his own will, shall not touch him; the laws of nature and of society shall be abrogated in his favour; he shall once more really be the centre and core of creation—‘His Majesty the Baby’, as we once fancied ourselves. The child shall fulfil those wishful dreams of the parents which they never carried out—the boy shall become a great man and a hero in his father’s place, and the girl shall marry a prince as a tardy compensation for her mother. At the most touchy point in the upbringing of the child, Parental love, which is so moving and at bottom so childish, is nothing but the parents’ narcissism born again, which, transformed into object-love, unmistakably reveals its former nature.

1 [In English in the original. Perhaps a reference to a well-known Royal Academy picture of the Edwardian age, which bore that title and showed two London policemen holding up the crowded traffic to allow a nursery-maid to wheel a perambulator across the street.—‘His Majesty the Ego’ appears in Freud’s earlier paper on ‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’ (1908e).]


8 [Dies ist vielleicht eine Anspielung auf ein seinerzeit bekanntes, aus der Zeit Edwards VII. stammendes Bild der Royal Academy, das diesen Titel trägt und zwei Londoner Polizisten zeigt, die den dichten Straßenverkehr aufhalten, damit ein Kindermädchen den Kinderwagen über die Straße fahren kann. — Der Ausdruck »Seine Majestät das Id« kommt in Freuds früherer Arbeit »Der Dichter und das Phantasieren« (1908e), Studienausgabe, Bd. 10, S. 176, vor.]
The disturbances to which a child's original narcissism is exposed, the reactions with which he seeks to protect himself from them and the paths into which he is forced in doing so—these are themes which I propose to leave on one side, as an important field of work which still awaits exploration. The most significant portion of it, however, can be singled out in the shape of the 'castration complex' (in boys, anxiety about the penis—in girls, envy for the penis) and treated in connection with the effect of early deterrence from sexual activity. Psycho-analytic research ordinarily enables us to trace the vicissitudes undergone by the libidinal instincts when these, isolated from the ego-instincts, are placed in opposition to them; but in the particular field of the castration complex, it allows us to infer the existence of an epoch and a psychical situation in which the two groups of instincts, still operating in unison and inseparably mingled, make their appearance as narcissistic interests. It is from this context that Adler [1910] has derived his concept of the 'masculine protest', which he has elevated almost to the position of the sole motive force in the formation of character and neurosis alike and which he bases not on a narcissistic, and therefore still a libidinal, trend, but on a social valuation. Psycho-analytic research has from the very beginning recognized the existence and importance of the 'masculine protest', but it has regarded it, in opposition to Adler, as narcissistic in nature and derived from the castration complex. The 'masculine protest' is concerned in the formation of character, into the genesis of which it enters along with many other factors, but it is completely unsuited for explaining the problems of the neuroses, with regard to which Adler takes account of nothing but the manner in which they serve the ego-instincts. I find it quite impossible to place the genesis of neurosis upon the narrow basis of the castration complex, however powerfully it may come to the fore in men among their resistances to the cure of a neurosis. Incidentally, I know of cases of neurosis in which the 'masculine protest', or, as we regard it, the castration
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Observation of normal adults shows that their former megalomania has been damped down and that the psychical characteristics from which we inferred their infantile narcissism have been effaced. What has become of their ego-libido? Are we to suppose that the whole amount of it has passed into object-cathexes? Such a possibility is plainly contrary to the whole trend of our argument; but we may find a hint at another answer to the question in the psychology of repression.

We have learnt that libidinal instinctual impulses undergo the vicissitude of pathogenic repression if they come into conflict with the subject's cultural and ethical ideas. By this we never mean that the individual in question has a merely intellectual knowledge of the existence of such ideas; we always mean that he recognizes them as a standard for himself and submits to the claims they make on him. Repression, we have said, proceeds from the ego; we might say with greater precision that it proceeds from the self-respect of the ego. The same impressions, experiences, impulses and desires that one man indulges or at least works over consciously will be rejected with the utmost indignation by another, or even stifled before they enter consciousness. The difference between the two, which contains the conditioning factor of repression, can easily be expressed in terms which enable it to be explained by the libido theory. We can say that the one man has set up an ideal in himself by which he measures his actual ego, while the other has formed no characteristics from which we inferred their infantile narcissism

1 [In a letter dated September 30, 1926, replying to a question from Dr. Edoardo Weiss (who has kindly brought it to our attention), Freud wrote: "Your question, in connection with my assertion in my paper on Narcissism, as to whether there are neuroses in which the castration complex plays no part, puts me in an embarrassing position. I no longer recollect what it was I had in mind at the time. To-day, it is true, I could not name any neurosis in which this complex is not to be met with, and in any case I should not have written the sentence to-day. But we know so little of the whole subject that I should prefer not to give a final decision either way."—A further criticism of Adler's views on the 'masculine protest' will be found in the 'History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement', p. 54 f. above.]

2 [Cf. some remarks in the paper on repression (1915d), below, p. 150.]


Wir haben gelernt, daß libidinöse Triebsregungen dem Schicksal der pathogenen Verdrängung unterliegen, wenn sie in Konflikt mit den kulturellen und ethischen Vorstellungen des Individuums geraten. Unter dieser Bedingung wird niemals verstanden, daß die Person von der Existenz dieser Vorstellungen eine bloß intellektuelle Kenntnis habe, sondern stets, daß sie dieselben als maßgebend für sich anerkenne, sich den aus ihnen hervorgehenden Anforderungen unterwerfe. Die Verdrängung, haben wir gesagt, geht vom Ich aus; wir könnten präzisieren: von der Selbstachtung des Ichs. Dieselben Eindrücke, Erlebnisse, Impulse, Wunschregungen, welche der eine Mensch in sich gewähren läßt oder wenigstens bewußt verarbeitet, werden vom anderen in voller Empörung zurückgewiesen oder bereits vor ihrem Bewußtwerden erstickt. Der Unterschied der beiden aber, welcher die Bedingung der Verdrängung enthält, läßt sich leicht in Ausdrücke fassen, welche eine Bewältigung durch die Libidotheorie ermöglichen. Wir können sagen, der eine habe ein Ideal in sich aufgerichtet, an welchem er sein aktuelles
such ideal. For the ego the formation of an ideal would be the conditioning factor of repression.¹

This ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. The subject's narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego, which, like the infantile ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value. As always where the libido is concerned, man has here again shown himself incapable of giving up a satisfaction he had once enjoyed. He is not willing to forgo the narcissistic perfection of his childhood; and when, as he grows up, he is disturbed by the admonitions of others and by the awakening of his own critical judgement, so that he can no longer retain that perfection, he seeks to recover it in the new form of an ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal.²

We are naturally led to examine the relation between this forming of an ideal and sublimation. Sublimation is a process that concerns object-libido and consists in the instinct's directing itself towards an aim other than, and remote from, that of sexual satisfaction; in this process the accent falls upon deflection from sexuality. Idealization is a process that concerns the object; by it that object, without any alteration in its nature, is aggrandized and exalted in the subject's mind. Idealization is possible in the sphere of ego-libido as well as in that of object-libido. For example, the sexual overvaluation of an object is an idealization of it. In so far as sublimation describes something that has to do with the instinct and idealization something to do with the object, the two concepts are to be distinguished from each other.³

The formation of an ego ideal is often confused with the sublimation of instinct, to the detriment of our understanding of the facts. A man who has exchanged his narcissism for homage to a high ego ideal has not necessarily on that account succeeded in sublimating his libidinal instincts. It is true that the ego

¹ [A comment on this sentence will be found in a footnote to Chapter XI of *Group Psychology* (1921c), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 131 n.]

² [In the editions previous to 1924 this read "... is only the substitute..."]

³ [Freud recurs to the topic of idealization in Chapter VIII of his *Group Psychology* (1921c), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 112 f.]
ideal demands such sublimation, but it cannot enforce it; sublimation remains a special process which may be prompted by the ideal but the execution of which is entirely independent of any such prompting. It is precisely in neurotics that we find the highest differences of potential between the development of their ego ideal and the amount of sublimation of their primitive libidinal instincts; and in general it is far harder to convince an idealist of the inexpedient location of his libido than a plain man whose pretensions have remained more moderate. Further, the formation of an ego ideal and sublimation are quite differently related to the causation of neurosis. As we have learnt, the formation of an ideal heightens the demands of the ego and is the most powerful factor favouring repression; sublimation is a way out, a way by which those demands can be met without involving repression.\(^1\)

It would not surprise us if we were to find a special psychical agency which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic satisfaction from the ego ideal is ensured and which, with this end in view, constantly watches the actual ego and measures it by that ideal.\(^2\) If such an agency does exist, we cannot possibly come upon it as a discovery—we can only recognize it; for, we may reflect that what we call our ‘conscience’ has the required characteristics. Recognition of this agency enables us to understand the so-called ‘delusions of being noticed’ or more correctly, of being watched, which are such striking symptoms in the paranoid diseases and which may also occur as an isolated form of illness, or intercalated in a transference neurosis. Patients of this sort complain that all their thoughts are known and their actions watched and supervised; they are informed of the functioning of this agency by voices which characteristically speak to them in the third person (‘Now she’s thinking of that again’, ‘now he’s going out’). This complaint is justified; it describes the truth. A power of this kind, watching, discovering and criticizing all our intentions, does really exist. Indeed, it exists in every one of us in normal life.

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1. [The possible connection between sublimation and the transformation of sexual object-libido into narcissistic libido is discussed by Freud towards the beginning of Chapter III of *The Ego and the Id* (19236).]
2. [It was from a combination of this agency and the ego ideal that Freud was later to evolve the super-ego. Cf. Chapter XI of *Group Psychology* (1921c) and Chapter II of *The Ego and the Id* (19236).]
Delusions of being watched present this power in a regressive form, thus revealing its genesis and the reason why the patient is in revolt against it. For what prompted the subject to form an ego ideal, on whose behalf his conscience acts as watchman, arose from the critical influence of his parents (conveyed to him by the medium of the voice), to whom were added, as time went on, those who trained and taught him and the innumerable and indefinable host of all the other people in his environment—his fellow-men—and public opinion.

In this way large amounts of libido of an essentially homosexual kind are drawn into the formation of the narcissistic ego ideal and find outlet and satisfaction in maintaining it. The tendency towards repression develops out of a prohibition or obstacle that came in the first instance from without. The voices, as well as the undefined multitude, are brought into the foreground again by the disease, and so the evolution of conscience is reproduced regressively. But the revolt against this ‘censoring agency’ arises out of the subject’s desire (in accordance with the fundamental character of his illness) to liberate himself from all these influences, beginning with the parental one, and out of his withdrawal of homosexual libido from them. His conscience then confronts him in a regressive form as a hostile influence from without.

The complaints made by paranoics also show that at bottom the self-criticism of conscience coincides with the self-observation on which it is based. Thus the activity of the mind which has taken over the function of conscience has also placed itself at the service of internal research, which furnishes philosophy with the material for its intellectual operations. This may have some bearing on the characteristic tendency of paranoics to construct speculative systems.1

It will certainly be of importance to us if evidence of the

1 I should like to add to this, merely by way of suggestion, that the developing and strengthening of this observing agency might contain within it the subsequent genesis of (subjective) memory and the time-factor, the latter of which has no application to unconscious processes. [For some further light on these two points see ‘The Unconscious’, pp. 187 and 188–9 below.]

Wir erinnern uns, daß wir gefunden haben, die Traumbildung entstehe unter der Herrschaft einer Zensur, welche die Traumgedanken zur Entstellung nötigt. Unter dieser Zensur stellten wir uns aber keine besondere Macht vor, sondern wählten diesen Ausdruck für die den Traumgedanken zugewandte Seite der das Ich beherrschenden, verdrängenden Tendenzen. Gehen wir in die Struktur des Ichs weiter ein, so dürfen wir im Ichideal und den dynamischen Außerungen des Gewissens auch den Traumzensor erkennen. Merkt dieser Zensor ein wenig auch während

1 [S. Silberer (1909) und (1912). Im Jahr 1914, dem Jahr, in welchem Freud die vorliegende Arbeit niederschrieb, fügte er in die Traumdeutung (1900 a), Studienausgabe, Bd. 2, S. 483-5, eine weit ausführlichere Erörterung dieser Ercheinung ein.]
understand how it is that its suggested activity of self-observation and self-criticism—with such thoughts as, ‘now he is too sleepy to think’, ‘now he is waking up’—makes a contribution to the content of the dream.  

At this point we may attempt some discussion of the self-regarding attitude in normal people and in neurotics. In the first place self-regard appears to us to be an expression of the size of the ego; what the various elements are which go to determine that size is irrelevant. Everything a person possesses or achieves, every remnant of the primitive feeling of omnipotence which his experience has confirmed, helps to increase his self-regard.

Applying our distinction between sexual and ego-instincts, we must recognize that self-regard has a specially intimate dependence on narcissistic libido. Here we are supported by two fundamental facts: that in paraphrenics self-regard is increased, while in the transference neuroses it is diminished; and that in love-relations not being loved lowers the self-regarding feelings, while being loved raises them. As we have indicated, the aim and the satisfaction in a narcissistic object-choice is to be loved.

Further, it is easy to observe that libidinal object-cathexis does not raise self-regard. The effect of dependence upon the loved object is to lower that feeling: a person in love is humble. A person who loves has, so to speak, forfeited a part of his narcissism, and it can only be replaced by his being loved. In all these respects self-regard seems to remain related to the narcissistic element in love.

The realization of impotence, of one's own inability to love, in consequence of mental or physical disorder, has an exceedingly lowering effect upon self-regard. Here, in my judgement, we must look for one of the sources of the feelings of inferiority which are experienced by patients suffering from the transference neuroses and which they are so ready to report. The main source of these feelings is, however, the impoverishment of the ego, due to the extraordinarily large libidinal cathexes of the size of the ego; what the various elements are which go to determine that size is irrelevant. Alles, was man besitzt oder erreicht hat, jeder durch die Erfahrung bestätigte Rest des primitiven Allmachtsgefühls hilft das Selbstaufgefühl steigern.


Die Wahrnehmung der Impotenz, des eigenen Unvermögens zu lieben, infolge seelischer oder körperlicher Störungen, wirkt im hohen Grade herabsetzend auf das Selbstgefühl ein. Hier ist nach meinem Ermessen eine der Quellen für die so bereitwillig kundgegebenen Minderwertigkeitsgefühle der Übertragungsneurotiker zu suchen. Die Hauptquelle dieser Gefühle ist aber die Ichverarmung, welche sich aus den außer-

1 I cannot here determine whether the differentiation of the censoring agency from the rest of the ego is capable of forming the basis of the philosophic distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness.

2 [This subject is enlarged on by Freud in Chapter VIII of his Group Psychology (1921e), Standard Ed., 18, 113 f.]

3 Ob die Sonderung dieser censorischen Instanz vom anderen Ich imstande ist, die philosophische Scheidung eines Bewußtseins von einem Selbstbewußtsein psychologisch zu fundieren, kann ich hier nicht entscheiden.

4 [Ober dieses Thema verbreitet sich Freud in Kapitel VIII seiner Massenpsychologie (1921 e), Studienausgabe, Bd. 9, S. 106 f.]
which have been withdrawn from it—due, that is to say, to the injury sustained by the ego through sexual trends which are no longer subject to control.

Adler [1907] is right in maintaining that when a person with an active mental life recognizes an inferiority in one of his organs, it acts as a spur and calls out a higher level of performance in him through overcompensation. But it would be altogether an exaggeration if, following Adler’s example, we sought to attribute every successful achievement to this factor of an original inferiority of an organ. Not all artists are handicapped with bad eyesight, nor were all orators originally stammerers. And there are plenty of instances of excellent achievements springing from superior organic endowment. In the etiology of neuroses organic inferiority and imperfect development play an insignificant part—much the same as that played by currently active perceptual material in the formation of dreams. Neuroses make use of such inferiorities as a pretext, just as they do of every other suitable factor. We may be tempted to believe a neurotic woman patient when she tells us that it was inevitable she should fall ill, since she is ugly, deformed or lacking in charm, so that no one could love her; but the very next moment the neurotic will teach us better—for she persists in her neurosis and in her aversion to sexuality, although she seems more desirable, and is more desired, than the average woman. The majority of hysterical women are among the attractive and even beautiful representatives of their sex, while, on the other hand, the frequency of ugliness, organic defects and infirmities in the lower classes of society does not increase the incidence of neurotic illness among them.

The relations of self-regard to erotism—that is, to libidinal object-cathexes—may be expressed concisely in the following way. Two cases must be distinguished, according to whether the erotic cathexes are ego-syntonic, or, on the contrary, have suffered repression. In the former case (where the use made of the libido is ego-syntonic), love is assessed like any other activity of the ego. Loving in itself, in so far as it involves longing and deprivation, lowers self-regard; whereas being loved, having one’s love returned, and possessing the loved object, raises it once more. When libido is repressed, the erotic cathexis is felt as a severe depletion of the ego, the satisfaction of love is impossible, and the re-enrichment of the ego can be effected only by ordentlich großen, dem Ich entzogenen Libidobesetzungen ergibt, also die Schädigung des Ichs durch die der Kontrolle nicht mehr unterworfenen Sexualstrebungen.


Die Beziehungen des Selbstgefühls zur Erotik (zu den libidinösen Objektbesetzungen) lassen sich formelhaft in folgender Weise darstellen: Man hat die beiden Fälle zu unterscheiden, ob die Libesbesetzungen ichgerecht sind oder im Gegenteil eine Verdrängung erfahren haben. Im ersteren Falle (bei ichgerechter Verwendung der Libido) wird das Lieben wie jede andere Betätigung des Ichs gewertet. Das Lieben an sich, als Sehnen, Entbehren, setzt das Selbstgefühl herab, das Geliebtenwerden, Gegenliebe finden, Besitzen des geliebten Objekts hebt es wieder. Bei verdrängter Libido wird die Libesbesetzung als arge Verringerung des Ichs empfunden, Liebesbefriedigung ist unmöglich, die Wiederbereiche-
a withdrawal of libido from its objects. The return of the object-libido to the ego and its transformation into narcissism represents, just as it were, a happy love once more; and, on the other hand, it is also true that a real happy love corresponds to the primal condition in which object-libido and ego-libido cannot be distinguished.

The importance and extensiveness of the topic must be my justification for adding a few more remarks which are somewhat loosely strung together.

The development of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state. This departure is brought about by means of the displacement of libido on to an ego ideal imposed from without; and satisfaction is brought about from fulfilling this ideal.

At the same time the ego has sent out the libidinal object-cathexes. It becomes impoverished in favour of these cathexes, just as it does in favour of the ego ideal, and it enriches itself once more from its satisfactions in respect of the object, just as it does by fulfilling its ideal.

One part of self-regard is primary—the residue of infantile narcissism; another part arises out of the omnipotence which is corroborated by experience (the fulfilment of the ego ideal), whilst a third part proceeds from the satisfaction of object-libido.

The ego ideal has imposed severe conditions upon the satisfaction of libido through objects; for it causes some of them to be rejected by means of its censor, as being incompatible. Where no such ideal has been formed, the sexual trend in question makes its appearance unchanged in the personality in the form of a perversion. To be their own ideal once more, in regard to sexual no less than other trends, as they were in childhood—this is what people strive to attain as their happiness.

Being in love consists in a flowing-over of ego-libido on to the object. It has the power to remove repressions and re-instate perversions. It exalts the sexual object into a sexual ideal. Since, with the object type (or attachment type), being in love occurs

1 ['Dargestellt.' In the first edition only: 'herstellte', 'establishes'.]
2 [See footnote, p. 97.]

Die Verliebtheit besteht in einem Uberströmen der Ichlibido auf das Objekt. Sie hat die Kraft, Verdrängungen aufzuheben und Perversionen wiederherzustellen. Sie erhebt das Sexualobjekt zum Sexualideal. Da sie bei dem Objekt- oder Anlehnungstypus auf Grund der Erfül-

1 [Einzig in der Erstausgabe statt »dar« »her«.]
in virtue of the fulfilment of infantile conditions for loving, we may say that whatever fulfils that condition is idealized.

The sexual ideal may enter into an interesting auxiliary relation to the ego ideal. It may be used for substitutive satisfaction where narcissistic satisfaction encounters real hindrances. In that case a person will love in conformity with the narcissistic type of object-choice, will love what he once was and no longer is, or else what possesses the excellences which he never had at all (cf. (c) [p. 90]). The formula parallel to the one there stated runs thus: what possesses the excellences which the ego lacks for making it an ideal, is loved. This expedient is of special importance for the neurotic, who, on account of his excessive object-cathexes, is impoverished in his ego and is incapable of fulfilling his ego ideal. He then seeks a way back to narcissism from his prodigal expenditure of libido upon objects, by choosing a sexual ideal after the narcissistic type which possesses the excellences to which he cannot attain. This is the cure by love, which he generally prefers to cure by analysis. Indeed, he cannot believe in any other mechanism of cure; he usually brings expectations of this sort with him to the treatment and directs them towards the person of the physician. The patient's incapacity for love, resulting from his extensive repressions, naturally stands in the way of a therapeutic plan of this kind. An unintended result is often met with when, by means of the treatment, he has been partially freed from his repressions: he withdraws from further treatment in order to choose a lover-object, leaving his cure to be continued by a life with someone he loves. We might be satisfied with this result, if it did not bring with it all the dangers of a crippling dependence upon his helper in need.

The ego ideal opens up an important avenue for the understanding of group psychology. In addition to its individual side, this ideal has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, a class or a nation. It binds not only a person's narcissistic libido, but also a considerable amount of his homosexual libido, which is in this way turned back into the ego. The want of satisfaction which arises from the non-fulfilment of this ideal.

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2 [The importance of homosexuality in the structure of groups had been hinted at in Totem and Taboo (1912-13), Standard Ed., 13, 144, and was again referred to in Group Psychology (1921c), Standard Ed., 18, 124 n. and 141.]

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[1 [Die Bedeutung der Homosexualität für die Organisation von Gruppen ist schon in Totem und Tabu (1912-13), Studienausgabe, Bd. 9, S. 428, angedeutet worden; auch in der Massenpsychologie (1921c), ibid., S. 116, Anm., und S. 132, weist Freud darauf hin.]
liberates homosexual libido, and this is transformed into a sense of guilt (social anxiety). Originally this sense of guilt was a fear of punishment by the parents, or, more correctly, the fear of losing their love; later the parents are replaced by an indefinite number of fellow-men. The frequent causation of paranoia by an injury to the ego, by a frustration of satisfaction within the sphere of the ego ideal, is thus made more intelligible, as is the convergence of ideal-formation and sublimation in the ego ideal, as well as the involution of sublimations and the possible transformation of ideals in paraphrenic disorders.

erfüllung dieses Ideals macht homosexuelle Libido frei, welche sich in Schuldbewußtsein (soziale Angst) verwandelt. Das Schuldbewußtsein war ursprünglich Angst vor der Strafe der Eltern, richtiger gesagt: vor dem Liebesverlust bei ihnen; an Stelle der Eltern ist später die unbekannte Menge der Genossen getreten. Die häufige Verursachung der Paranoia durch Krankung des Ich, Versagung der Befriedigung im Bereich des Ichideals, wird so verständlicher, auch das Zusammentreffen von Idealbildung und Sublimierung im Ichideal, die Rückbildung der Sublimierungen und eventuelle Umbildung der Ideale bei den paraphrenischen Erkrankungen.