

<p>RADIOPHONIE continued Question IV The page numbers in brackets refer to the page numbers at the bottom of the page in the Scilicet 2/3 volume.</p>	<p>Anthony Chadwick Translation</p>	<p>Jack W. Stone Translation</p>
<p>QUESTION IV : <i>Vous dites que la découverte de l'inconscient aboutit à une seconde révolution copernicienne. En quoi l'inconscient est-il une notion-clé qui subvertit toute théorie de la connaissance?</i></p>	<p>QUESTION IV : <i>You say that the discovery of the unconscious ends up as a second Copernican revolution. In what way is the unconscious a key notion which subverts every theory of knowledge?</i></p>	<p>QUESTION IV : You say that the discovery of the unconscious led to a second Copernican revolution. How is the unconscious a key notion that subverts every theory of knowledge (connaissance)?</p>
<p>RÉPONSE : Votre question va à chatouiller les espoirs, teintés de fais-moi peur, qu'inspire le sens dévolu à notre époque au mot : révolution. On pourrait marquer son passage à une fonction de surmoi dans la politique, à un rôle d'idéal dans la carrière de la pensée. Notez que c'est Freud et non pas moi qui joue ici de ces résonances dont seule la coupure structurelle peut séparer l'imaginaire comme « superstructure ».</p>	<p>RESPONSE: Your question will rekindle hopes, tinged with give-us-a-thrill, that are inspired by the meaning, that has come down to our period, of the word revolution. One could mark its passage to a function of the superego in politics, to a role as ideal in the career of thought. Take note that it is Freud and not me who is playing here on the resonances from which only the structural cut can separate the imaginary as « superstructure ».</p>	<p>ANSWER : Your question is going to tickle the hopes, tinted to make me fear, inspired by our epoch's devolved sense for the word: revolution. One could mark its passage to a superegoistic function in politics, to the role of an ideal in the career of thought. Let us note that it is Freud, not I, who brings into play here those resonances from which only the structural cut can separate the imaginary as "superstructure."</p>

Pourquoi ne pas partir de l'ironie qu'il y a à mettre au compte d'une révolution (symbolique) une image des révolutions astrales qui n'en donne guère l'idée?

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Qu'y a-t-il de révolutionnaire dans le recentrement autour du soleil du monde solaire? À entendre ce que j'articule cette année d'un discours du maître, on trouvera que celui-ci y clôt fort bien la révolution qu'il écrit à partir du réel : si la visée de l' *επιστημη* est bien le transfert du savoir de l'esclave au maître, -- ceci au contraire du passez-muscade impayable dont Hegel voudrait dans le savoir absolu résorber leur antinomie --, la figure du soleil est là digne d'imaginer le signifiant-maître qui demeure inchangé à mesure même de son recel.

Why not start from the irony that one can put down to the account of a (symbolic) revolution that there is an image of the astral revolutions which hardly gives an idea of it?

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What is revolutionary about recentering the solar world around the sun? Listening to what I am articulating this year about the master's discourse, you will find that the master closes off quite well the revolution that he writes starting from the real : if the aim of the *επιστημη* is indeed the transfer of the slave's knowledge to the master, -- this contrary to the priceless sleight of hand with which Hegel would like to reconcile their antinomy in absolute knowledge --, the figure of the sun is there worthy of figuring the master-signifier which remains unchanged as long as it is being received as stolen property.

Why not take our departure from the irony there is in blaming a (symbolic) revolution for an image of astral revolutions that scarcely give an idea of it?

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What is revolutionary in the re-centering around the sun of the solar world? In hearing what I am articulating this year of a discourse of the master, one will find that this discourse closes there quite well the revolution it writes beginning from the real: if the aim of the *επιστημη*¹ is indeed the transference of the knowledge of the slave to the master--this contrary to the priceless conjurers game by which Hegel would like to re-absorb their antinomy in absolute knowledge--the figure of the sun is there worthy of imaging the master-signifier that remains unchanged in the measure itself of its concealment.

1.TN: *episteme*- (knowledge).

<p>Pour la conscience commune, soit pour le « peuple », l'héliocentrisme, à savoir que ça tourne autour, implique que ça tourne rond, sans qu'il y ait plus à y regarder. Mettrai-je au compte de Galilée, l'insolence politique que représente le Roi-Soleil?</p>	<p>For common consciousness, that is for the « people », heliocentrism, namely that things turn around it, implies that it is working smoothly without anyone needing to look at it any more. Shall I blame Galileo for the political insolence that the Sun-King represents?</p>	<p>For common consciousness, for the "people" that is, heliocentricism, namely that this turns around, implies that this turns in a circle, without it having to look at it any more. Shall I blame Galileo for the political insolence the Sun-King represents?</p>
<p>De ce que les ascendants contrariés qui résultent de la bascule de l'axe de la sphère des fixes sur le plan de l'écliptique, gardassent la présence de ce qu'ils ont de manifeste, les Anciens surent tirer les images à appuyer une dialectique guidée d'y diviser savoir et vérité : j'en épinglerais un photocentrisme d'être moins asservissant que l'hélio.</p>	<p>From the fact that the impeded ascendants, which result from tipping the axis of the sphere of the fixes on the plane of the ecliptic, maintain the presence of what they obviously have, the Ancients knew how to draw the images to support a guided dialectic by dividing knowledge and truth : I would call it photocentrism because it is less enslaving than heliocentrism.</p>	<p>From the contrary ascendants that result from the see-sawing of axis of the sphere of the fixed on the plane of the ecliptic retaining the presence of what makes them manifest, the Ancients knew to draw images to support a dialectic guided to divide there knowledge (savoir) and truth: I would pin down from it a photocentricism as being less enslaving than the helio.</p>

<p>Ce que Freud, à son dire exprès, dans le recours à Copernic allégorise de la destitution d'un centre au profit d'un autre, relève en fait de la nécessité d'abaisser la superbe qui tient à tout monocentrisme. Ceci en raison de celui auquel il a affaire dans la psychologie, ne disons pas : à son époque, parce qu'il est dans la nôtre encore inentamé : il s'agit de la prétention dont un champ s'y constitue au titre d'une « unité » dont il puisse se recenser. Pour bouffon que ce soit, c'est tenace.</p>	<p>What Freud, as he expressly said, allegorizes in his recourse to Copernicus about the destitution of one centre in favour of another, arises indeed from the necessity of knocking off its high horse anything which holds onto moncentrism. This by reason of the one he is dealing with in the psychology, don't let's say of his time, he is still in our time untouched : it is a question of the pretention with which a field constitutes itself with the title of a « unit » with which it can count up its members. As silly as that may be, it is tenacious.</p>	<p>What Freud, as he explicitly says, allegorizes in his recourse to Copernicus of the destitution of one center to the profit of another, arises in fact from the necessity to bring down the hautiness owed to any mono-centrism. This by reason of what he has business with in the psychology, let us not say: of his epoch, because it is still intact in ours: it is a question of the pretension from which a field is constituted there based on a "unity" by which it might take stock of itself. However farcical this might be, it is tenacious.</p>
<p>Pas question que cette prétention se soucie de la topologie qu'elle suppose : à savoir celle de la sphère, puisqu'elle ne soupçonne même pas que sa topologie soit problème : on ne peut supposer autre ce qu'on ne suppose nullement.</p>	<p>There is no question that that pretention worries itself about the topology which it supposes, namely that of the sphere, since it does not even suspect that its topology is a problem : one cannot suppose something as different if it is not supposed at all.</p>	<p>No question of this pretension worrying about the topology it supposes: namely, that of the sphere, since it does not even suspect that its topology might be a problem: one cannot suppose otherwise what one does not suppose at all.</p>

Le piquant, c'est que la révolution copernicienne fait métaphore appropriée au-delà de ce dont Freud la commente, et c'est en quoi de la lui avoir rendue, je la reprends.

The curious thing is that the Copernican revolution makes an appropriate metaphor beyond what Freud comments about, and it's in that, by having given it back to him, I take it back again.

The piquant thing is that the Copernican revolution^{rgk} makes a metaphor appropriated beyond what Freud comments on, and this is why from having returned it to him, I take it up again.
rgk: "In the course of centuries the naïve self-love of men has had to submit to two major blows at the hand of science. The first was when they learnt that our earth was not the centre of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic system of scarcely imaginable vastness. This is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus, though something similar had already been exerted by Alexandrian science. The second blow fell when biological research destroyed man's supposedly privileged place in creation and proved his descent from the animal kingdom and his ineradicable animal nature. This revaluation has been accomplished in our days by Darwin, Wallace, and their predecessors, though not without the most violent contemporary opposition. But human megalomania will have suffered its third and most wounding blow from the psychological research of the

		<p>present time which seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind.” Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, S.E, XVI, pages 284-285. Rephrased in A Difficulty in Psycho-Analysis, S.E. XVII, pages140-141. Described as a cosmological blow, a biological blow, and a psychological blow in Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, S.E. XIX, page 221.</p>
<p>Car l’histoire soumise aux textes où la révolution copernicienne s’inscrit, démontre que ce n’est pas l’héliocentrisme qui fait son nerf, au point que c’était pour Copernic lui-même – le cadet de ses soucis. À prendre l’expression au pied de la lettre, soit au [74] sens de : pas le premier, elle s’étendrait aux autres auteurs de la dite révolution.</p>	<p>For the history subjected to the texts in which the copernican revolution is inscribed demonstrates that it is not heliocentrism which makes its pressure point, to the point that it was for Copernicus himself, the last of his worries. To take the expression literally, that is [74] in the sense that, it was not the first, the expression would extend to the other authors of the said revolution.</p>	<p>For, the history submitted to the texts where the Copernican revolution is inscribed demonstrates that it is not heliocentricism that constitutes its nerve, to the point that this was for Copernicus himself--the least of his worries (<i>le cadet de ses soucis</i>). To take the expression completely literally (<i>au pied de la lettre</i>), that is, [74] in the sense of: not the first, it would extend to other authors of said revolution.</p>

<p>Ce autour de quoi tourne, mais justement c'est le mot à éviter, autour de quoi gravite l'effort d'une connaissance en voie de se réperer comme imaginaire, c'est nettement, comme on le lit à faire avec Koyré de l'approche de Kepler la chronique, de se dépêtrer de l'idée que le mouvement de rotation, de ce qu'il engendre le cercle (soit : la forme parfaite), peut seul convenir à l'affection du corps céleste qu'est la planète.</p>	<p>That around which turns, but that's precisely the word to avoid, around which gravitates the effort of a knowledge on the way to finding itself as imaginary, it is clearly, as one reads it by making with Koyré the chronicle of Kepler's approach, by ridding oneself of the idea that the movement of rotation, because it engenders the circle (that is, the perfect form), can alone be appropriate for the affection for the heavenly body that is the planet.</p>	<p>That around which turns, but this is precisely the word to avoid, around which gravitates the effort of a knowledge (<i>connaissance</i>) on the way to marking itself as imaginary, is sharply, as one reads it in making with Koyré the chronicle of Kepler's approach, to disentangle oneself from the idea that the movement of rotation, in that it engenders the circle (that is: the perfect form), can alone suit the affection of the celestial body that is the planet.</p>
<p>Introduire en effet la trajectoire elliptique, c'est dire que le corps planétaire vire à précipiter son mouvement (égalité des aires couvertes par le rayon dans l'unité du temps : deuxième loi de Kepler) autour du foyer occupé par le luminaire maître, mais s'en retourne à le ralentir du plus loin d'un autre foyer inoccupé, lui sans aucun feu à faire lieu.</p>	<p>To introduce in effect the elliptical trajectory, is to say that the planetary body turns by precipitating its movement (equality of the distances covered by the beam in the unit of time : Kepler's second law) around the focus occupied by the master luminary, but returns by slowing it down at its furthest point from another unoccupied focus, the latter having no fire to make a place.</p>	<p>Introducing in fact the elliptical trajectory, which is to say, the planetary body veers in precipitating its movement (equality of the aires covered by the ray in the unity of time: second law of Kepler^{rgk}) around the focus occupied by the master light, but turns around in slowing it down the farthest from another unoccupied focus, this without any fire taking place. rgk- Kepler's three laws of planetary motion can be described as follows:</p>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The path of the planets about the sun is elliptical in shape, with the center of the sun being located at one focus. (The Law of Ellipses) • An imaginary line drawn from the center of the sun to the center of the planet will sweep out equal areas in equal intervals of time. (The Law of Equal Areas) • The ratio of the squares of the periods of any two planets is equal to the ratio of the cubes of their average distances from the sun. (The Law of Harmonies)
<p>Ici gît le pas de Galilée : ailleurs que dans l'échauffourée de son procès où il n'y a parti à prendre que de la bêtise de ceux qui ne voient pas que lui, travaille pour le pape. La théologie a ce prix, comme la psychanalyse, de tamiser d'une telle chute les canailles. Le pas de Galilée consiste en ce que par son truchement, la loi d'inertie entre en jeu dont va s'éclairer cette ellipse.</p>	<p>Here lies Galileo's step, elsewhere than in the brawl of his trial where he has no side to take except against the stupidity of those who cannot see that he is working for the pope. Theology has this prize, like psychoanalysis, to sift out, from such a fall, the rogues. Galileo's move consists in the fact that by his intervention, the law of inertia enters into play through which this ellipse will be illuminated.</p>	<p>Here resides the step of Galileo: elsewhere than in the skirmish of his trial where he had no side to take but the stupidity of those who do not see that he works for the pope. Theology has this value, like psychoanalysis, of sifting out the rogues with such a fall. The step of Galileo consists of it being by his mediation that the law of inertia comes into play by which this ellipse is going to be clarified.</p>

<p>Par quoi enfin Newton, -- mais quel temps de comprendre doit-il encore s'écouler avant le moment de conclure --, Newton, oui, conclut à un cas particulier de la gravitation qui règle la plus banale chute d'un corps.</p>	<p>Through which finally Newton – but how much time to understand will have to pass before the moment to conclude --, Newton, yes, concludes on one particular case of gravitation which rules the most banal falling of a body.</p>	<p>By which Newton, finally--but what a time of understanding must still pass before the moment to conclude--Newton, yes, concludes with a particular case of gravitation that rules the most banal fall of a body.</p>
<p>Mais là encore la vraie portée de ce pas est étouffée : qui est celle de l'action, -- en chaque point d'un monde où ce qu'elle subvertit, c'est de démontrer le réel comme impossible --, de l'action, dis-je, de la <i>formule</i> qui en chaque point soumet l'élément de masse à l'attraction des autres aussi loin que s'étend ce monde, sans que rien y joue le rôle d'un médium à transmettre cette force.</p>	<p>But there again the true reach of this move is stifled, which is that of the action –in each point of a world where what that action subverts, is to demonstrate the real as impossible – of the action, I say, of the formula which in each point submits the element of mass to the attraction of the others as far as this world extends, without playing the role of a medium to transmit this force.</p>	<p>But there again the true reach of this step is stifled (<i>étouffée</i>): which is that of the action--in each point of a world where what it subverts is from demonstrating the real as impossible--of the action, I say, of the formula that in each point submits the element of mass to the attraction of the others as far as this world extends, without anything playing the role of a medium to transmit this force.</p>
<p>Car c'est bien là qu'est le scandale que la conscience laïque (celle dont la bêtise, tout à l'inverse, fait la commune canaille) a fini par censurer, simplement de s'y faire sourde.</p>	<p>For it is indeed there that lies the scandal that the lay consciousness (the one which stupidity, quite on the contrary, makes the common rogue) has ended up censoring, simply by turning a deaf ear to it.</p>	<p>For it is indeed there that is found the scandal that lay consciousness (which stupidity, quite inversely, makes the common rogue) ended up censoring, simply by making itself deaf to it.</p>

<p>Sous le choqué du moment, les contemporains pourtant y réagirent vivement, et il faut notre obscurantisme pour avoir oublié l'objection que tous sentaient alors: du <i>comment</i> chacun des éléments de [74] masse pouvaient être averti de la distance à mesurer pour qu'il en pesât à aucun autre.</p>	<p>Under the shock of the moment, contemporaries however reacted sharply to it, and it is because of our obscurantism that we have forgotten the objection that all were sensing at the time, about how each of the elements of [74] mass could be notified of the distance to measure so that it might weigh on any other.</p>	<p>Under the shock of the moment, the contemporaries nonetheless reacted to it in a lively way, and our obscurantism had to have come along for us to have forgotten the objection everyone felt then: concerning how each of the elements [74] of mass could be informed of the distance to measure for it to weigh on any other.</p>
<p>La notion de champ n'explique rien, met seulement noir sur blanc, soit supposé qu'est écrite ce que nous soulignons pour être la présence effective non de la relation, mais de sa formule dans le réel, soit ce dont d'abord j'ai posé ce qu'il en est de la structure.</p>	<p>The notion of field explains nothing, places only black on white, that is, supposing that there is written what we emphasize to be the effective presence not of the relation, but of its formula in the real, that is, that about which at first I posed what is going on with structure.</p>	<p>The notion of field explains nothing, but only puts black on white, that is, supposes as written what we stress as being the effective presence, not of the relation, but of its formula in the real, from which I have from the first posed what there is of structure.</p>

<p>Il serait curieux de développer jusqu'où la gravitation, première à nécessiter une telle fonction, se distingue des autres champs, de l'électro-magnétique par exemple, proprement faits pour ce à quoi Maxwell les a menés : la reconstitution d'un univers. Il reste que le champ de gravitation, pour remarquable que soit sa faiblesse au regard des autres, résiste à l'unification de ce champ, soit au remontage d'un monde.</p>	<p>It would be interesting to develop to what extent gravitation, the first to necessitate such a function, is distinguished from other fields, the electro-magnetic one for example, properly made for that to which Maxwell led them : the reconstitution of one universe. It remains that the field of gravitation, no matter how remarkable its weakness with regard to the others, resists the unification of this field, that is the remounting/rewinding of a world.</p>	<p>It would be curious to develop how far gravitation, the first field to necessitate such a function, is distinguished from the other fields, from electromagnetics, for example, properly made for what Maxwell led them to: the reconstitution of a universe. It remains that the field of gravitation, however remarkable its weakness might be in regard to the others, resists the unification of this field, that is, the remounting of a world.</p>
<p>D'où je profère que le LEM alunissant, soit la formule de Newton réalisée en appareil, témoigne de ce que le trajet qui l'a porté là sans dépense, est notre produit, ou encore : savoir du maître. Parlons d'acosmonaute plutôt que d'insister.</p>	<p>On the basis of which I suggest that the lunar module landing on the moon, that is Newton's formula realized in a machine, bears witness to the fact that the journey which carried it there without expense is our product, or again, the master's knowledge. Let's talk about acosmonaut rather than insisting.</p>	<p>Whence I proffer that the LEM landing on the moon, Newton's formula realized in an apparatus, testifies that the trajectory carrying it there without expenditure is our product, or again: a knowledge (<i>savoir</i>) of a master. Let us speak acosmonautically rather than insistently.</p>

<p>Il serait aussi intéressant de pointer jusqu'où la rectification einsteinienne dans son étoffe (courbure de l'espace) et dans son hypothèse (nécessité d'un temps de transmission que la vitesse finie de la lumière ne permet pas d'annuler) décolle de l'esthétique transcendantale, j'entends celle de Kant.</p>	<p>It would also be interesting to point out to what extent Einstein's rectification in its material (curvature of space) and in its hypothesis (necessity for a time of transmission that the finite speed of light does not allow one to render null) takes off from the transcendental aesthetic, I mean Kant's.</p>	<p>It would also be interesting to point out how far the Einsteinian rectification in its fabric (curvature of space) and in its hypothesis (necessity of a time of transmission that the finite speed of light does not permit us to annul) is unstuck from the transcendental aesthetic, I mean that of Kant.</p>
<p>Ce qu'on soutiendrait de ce qui la pousse, cette rectification, à l'ordre quantique : où le quantum d'action nous renvoie d'une butée plus courte qu'on ne s'y serait attendu de la physique, l'effet d'acte qui se produit comme déchet d'une symbolisation correcte.</p>	<p>Which one would sustain from what pushes this rectification to the quantic order, where the quantum of action sends us back from a shorter stopping point than one would have expected from physics, the act effect which is produced as cast off from a correct symbolization.</p>	<p>Which one would sustain by what pushes it, this rectification, to the quantic order: where the quantum of action returns us from a shorter stop than one would expect from physics, the act-effect produced as refuse of a correct symbolization.</p>
<p>Sans nous y risquer, posons que la charte de la structure, c'est <i>l'hypotheses non fingo</i> de Newton. Il y a des formules qu'on n'imagine pas. Au moins pour un temps, elles font assemblée avec le réel.</p>	<p>Without risking ourselves there, let us state that the charter for structure is Newton's <i>hypotheses non fingo</i>. There are formulae that one cannot imagine. At least for a time, they are in the same crowd as the real.</p>	<p>Without risking ourselves there, let us pose that the chart of structure is Newton's <i>hypotheses non fingo</i>. There are formulas one does not imagine. At least for a time, they make an assembly with the real.</p>

<p>On voit que les sciences exactes avec leur champ avaient articulé cette charte, avant que je ne l'impose à la correction des conjecturales</p>	<p>One can see that the exact sciences with their field had articulated this charter, before I imposed it on the correction of the conjecturals.</p>	<p>One sees that the exact sciences had articulated this chart with their field, before I might have imposed it for the correction of the conjecturals.</p>
<p>C'est le seul levier à pouvoir mettre hors d'état d'y faire couvercle ce qui tourne de la meule : psychologie d'indéchoussable à ce que Kant y relaie Wolff et Lambert, et qui tient en ceci : qu'axée [75] sur le même pivot dont traditionnellement s'embrochent ontologie, cosmologie, sans que théologie leur fasse leçon, l'âme, c'est la connaissance que le monde a de soi-même, et précisément ce qui pare à être reconnu ainsi, de l'alibi d'une Chose-en-Soi qui se déroberait à la connaissance.</p>	<p>It is the only lever capable of putting out of commission by putting a lid on that which turns from the mill : psychology whose foundation cannot be laid bare in that Kant takes up the baton from Wolff and Lambert, and which goes as follows, that oriented [75] on the pivot with which traditionally ontology and cosmology are skewered, without theology giving them a lesson, the soul is the knowledge that the world has of itself, and precisely that which wards off being recognized as such the alibi of a Thing-in-itself which would escape from knowledge.</p>	<p>It is the only lever able to put out of the question making a lid of what turns from the millstone: psychology of an un-deshoddable in that Kant relays in it Wolff and Lambert, and which owes to this: that axised (75) on the same pivot on which ontology, cosmology, without theology teaching them a lesson, spit the soul, is the connaissance that the world has of itself, and precisely what defends against being recognized thusly, from the alibi of a Thing-in-Itself that would escape connaissance.</p>
<p>À partir de là on ajoute aux fantasmes qui commandent la réalité, celui du contremaître.</p>	<p>Starting from there one adds to the phantasms which command reality, that of the foreman.</p>	<p>Beginning with this one adds to the fantasies commanding reality that of the foreman (<i>contremaître</i>).</p>

<p>C'est pour ramener à sa férule la révolution freudienne, qu'une clique mandatée pour la lyse-Anna de l'analyse a réédité ce Golem au titre du moi autonome.</p>	<p>It is to bring back to its iron rule the Freudian revolution that a clique mandated for the Lyse-Anna of analysis has re-published this Golem under the heading of the autonomous self.</p>	<p>It is to lead the Freudian revolution back to its iron rule (<i>ferule</i>), that a clique mandated for the lysis-Anna^{rgk} of analysis re-edited this Golem under the title of the autonomous ego. rgk-pun on lysée Anna (school of Anna Freud)</p>
<p>S'il y a trace chez Kant de l'office qu'on lui impute d'avoir paré à la «cosmologie» newtonienne, c'est à ce que s'y tope quelque part, comme d'une pomme à un poisson, la formule newtonienne, et pour marquer que la <i>Vernunft</i> ou le <i>Verstand</i> n'y ont rien à faire d'<i>a priori</i>. Ce qui est sûr non moins de l'expérience dite sensible, ce que je traduis : non avertie encore de la structure.</p>	<p>If there is a trace in Kant of the service imputed to him of having warded off Newton's « cosmology », it's because somewhere there is agreement on the Newtonian formula, like an apple shaking hands with a fish, and in order to make the point that <i>Vernunft</i> or <i>Verstand</i> have <i>a priori</i> nothing to do with it. Which is certain no less of so-called sensible experience, which I translate as not yet made aware of structure.</p>	<p>If there is a trace in Kant of the office one imputes to him of having defended against the Newtonian "cosmology," it is in that the Newtonian formula makes a deal somewhere, like a fish with an apple, and to mark that the <i>Vernunft</i>¹ or the <i>Verstand</i>² have nothing to do with it a priori. Which is no less sure of the experience called sensible, which I translate: not yet informed of structure. 1.TN: Reason. 2.TN: Understanding.</p>

Le noumène tient du mirage dont des fonctions veulent se faire prendre pour organes, avec pour effet d'embrouiller les organes à trouver fonction. Ainsi cette fonction veuve ne se fait valoir que comme corps étranger, chute d'un discours du maître quelque peu périmé. Ses sœurs en raison sont hors d'état, pures ou pratiques qu'elles s'affirment, d'en remonter plus que la spécularisation dont procèdent les solides qui ne peuvent être dits « de révolution » qu'à contribuer aux intuitions géométriques les plus traditionnelles qui soient.

The noumenon has something of the mirage some functions of which want to be taken as organs, with the effect of confusing the organs into finding a function. Thus this widowed function gets appreciated only as a foreign body, having fallen from a somewhat out-of-date discourse of the master. Its sisters in reason are out of commission, pure or practical as they affirm themselves, by adding more than the specularization from which proceed the solids which cannot be said to be « in revolution » except by contributing to the most traditional geometric intuitions possible.

The noumenon owes to the mirage by which some functions wish to be taken as organs, with the effect of entangling the organs in finding a function. Thus this widowed function only has value as an alien body, fallen from a master discourse a little outmoded. Its sisters for this reason are in no condition, however pure and practical they affirm themselves, to show anything more of it than the specularization from which proceed the solids that can only be called "of revolution" in contributing to the most traditional geometrical intuitions there are.

Que seule la structure soit propice à l'émergence du réel d'où se promeuve neuve révolution, s'atteste de la Révolution, de quelque grand R que la française l'ait pourvue. Elle se fût réduite à ce qu'elle est pour Bonaparte comme pour Chateaubriand : retour au maître qui a l'art de les rendre utiles (consultez l'Essai qui s'en intitule en 1801); le temps passant, à ce qu'elle est pour l'historien fort digne de ce nom, Tocqueville : shaker à faire dégradation des idéologies de l'Ancien Régime; à ce que les hommes d'intelligence n'y entendent pas plus que d'une folie dont s'extasie (Ampère) ou à camisoler (Taine); à ce qui en reste pour le lecteur présent d'une débauche rhétorique peu propre à la faire respecter.

That only structure is favourable to the emergence of the real from which is promoted new revolution, is attested by the Revolution, with some capital R that the French one has furnished for it. It has supposedly been reduced to what it is for Bonaparte as for Chateaubriand : return to the master who has the art of making them useful (consult the Essay which is titled thus in 1801); with the passage of time, reduced to what the Revolution is for the historian worthy of that name, Tocqueville, a Quaker degrading the ideologies of the Ancien Régime; reduced to what intelligent men not understanding in it anything more than a madness about which to go into ecstasy (Ampère) or to be put into a straight jacket (Taine); reduced to what remains for the present reader of a rhetorical debauch hardly designed to make it respected.

That only structure is propitious to the emergence of the real from which a new revolution might be promoted, is attested to by the Revolution, with the big R French provided it. It was reduced to what it is for Bonaparte as for Chateaubriand: a return to the master who has the art to render them useful (consult the Essay titled from it in 1801); the time passing, to what it is for the historian quite worthy of the name, Tocqueville: a shaker [in English] degrading the ideologies of the Ancien Régime; to what men of intelligence do not understand any more except as a madness from which one goes into ecstasies (Ampère^{rgk1}) or to a straight-jacket (Taine^{rgk2}); to what remains of it for the present reader of a rhetorical debauchery little suited to make it respected.

[rgk1: André-Marie Ampère 20 January 1775 – 10 June 1836\) was a French physicist and mathematician who was one of the founders of the science of classical electromagnetism, which he](#)

		<p>referred to as "electrodynamics". The <u>SI</u> unit of measurement of electric current, the ampere, is named after him</p> <p>rgk2: Hippolyte Adolphe Taine (21 April 1828 – 5 March 1893) was a French critic and historian. He was the chief theoretical influence of French naturalism, a major proponent of sociological positivism and one of the first practitioners of historicist criticism. Literary historicism as a critical movement has been said to originate with him. Taine is also remembered for his attempts to provide a scientific account of literature.</p>
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Il en serait ainsi si Marx ne l'avait remplacée de la structure qu'il en formule dans un discours du capitaliste, mais en ce qu'elle ait [76] forclos la plus-value dont il motive ce discours. Autrement dit c'est de l'inconscient et du symptôme qu'il prétend proroger la grande Révolution : c'est de la plus-value découverte qu'il précipite la conscience dite de classe. Lénine passant à l'acte, n'en obtient rien de plus que ce qu'on appelle régression dans la psychanalyse : soit les temps d'un discours qui n'ont pas été tenus dans la réalité, et d'abord d'être intenable.

It would be like that if Marx had not replaced it with the structure which he formulates in a capitalist discourse, but in that the structure [76] forcloses the surplus-value with which he motivates this discourse. In other words it is from the unconscious and the symptom that he claims to prorogue the great Revolution; it is from the discovered surplus-value that he precipitates the so-called class-consciousness. Lenin, passing to the act, obtains from it nothing more than what one calls regression in psychoanalysis, that is the times of a discourse which have not been held in reality, and first of all by being untenable.

It would be this way if Marx had not replaced it with a structure he formulates in a capitalist discourse, but in that this structure (76) had foreclosed the surplus value with which he motivates this discourse. In other words, it is from the unconscious and the symptom that he claims to prorogate the great Revolution: it is from the discovered surplus value that he precipitates the consciousness said to be of class. Lenin, passing to the act, obtains nothing more from it than what one calls regression in psychoanalysis: the times of a discourse not held in reality, and first of all from being untenable.

C'est Freud qui nous découvre l'incidence d'un savoir tel qu'à se soustraire à la conscience, il ne s'en dénote pas moins d'être structuré, dis-je, comme un langage, mais d'où articulé? peut-être de nulle part où il soit articulable, puis que ce n'est que d'un point de manque, impensable autrement que des effets dont il se marque, et qui rend précaire que quelqu'un s'y connaisse au sens où s'y connaître, comme fait l'artisan, c'est être complice d'une nature à quoi il naît en même temps qu'elle : car ici il s'agit de dénaturation; qui rend faux d'autre part que personne s'y reconnaisse, ce qui impliquerait le mode dont la conscience affirme un savoir d'être se sachant.

It is Freud who discovers for us the incidence of a knowledge such that by subtracting oneself from consciousness, it (knowledge) is not less denoted as being structured, as I say, like a language, but articulated from where? Perhaps from no place where it might be articulable, since it is only from a point of lack, unthinkable otherwise than from the effects with which it is marked, and which makes precarious that someone might know themselves in it where knowing oneself, as does the artisan, is to be complicit in a nature to which he is born at the same time as that nature; for here it is a question of denaturation, which makes false on the other hand that anyone can recognize themselves there, which would imply the mode with which consciousness affirms a knowledge by being self-knowing.

It is Freud who discovers for us the incidence of a savoir such that in being subtracted from consciousness it is no less denoted as being structured, I say, like a language, but articulated from where? Perhaps from nowhere where it is articulable, since it is only from a point of lack, unthinkable other than from the effects by which it is marked, and which renders it precarious for someone to know himself there in the sense where knowing oneself there (*s'y connaisse au sens où s'y connaître*), as the artisan does, is to be complicitous with a nature into which one is born at same time as she: for it is question here of a de-naturation; which renders it false moreover that anyone recognize himself there, which would imply the mode in which consciousness affirms a savoir as being self-knowing (*se sachant*).

<p>L'inconscience, on le voit, n'est que terme métaphorique à désigner le savoir qui ne se soutient qu'à se présenter comme impossible, pour que de ça l se confirme d'être réel, (entendez discours réel).</p>	<p>Unconsciousness, one can see, is only a metaphoric term to designate the knowledge which sustains itself only by presenting itself as impossible, in order that from that it conforms itself as being real (understand: real discourse).</p>	<p>The unconscious, one sees, is only a metaphoric term to designate the knowledge that only sustains itself in presenting itself as impossible, so that from that it is confirmed as being real (to be understood real discourse).</p>
<p>L'inconscient ne disqualifie rien qui vaille dans cette connaissance de nature, qui est plutôt point de mythe, ou même inconsistance à se démontrer de l'inconscient.</p>	<p>The unconscious disqualifies nothing worthwhile in that knowledge of nature, which is rather not at all of myth, or even inconsistency by demonstrating itself from the unconscious.</p>	<p>The unconscious disqualifies nothing of worth in this knowledge (<i>connaissance</i>) of nature, which is rather a point of myth, or even inconsistency, to be demonstrated by the unconscious.</p>

<p>Bref il suffit de rappeler que la bipolarité se trahit essentielle à tout ce qui se propose des termes d'un vrai savoir.</p>	<p>In short it is enough to recall that bipolarity betrays itself as essential for everything which proposes for itself some terms for a true knowledge.</p>	<p>In brief, it suffices to recall that bipolarity betrays itself as essential to all that is proposed of the terms of a true savoir.</p>
<p>Ce qu'y ajoute l'inconscient, c'est de la fournir d'une dynamique de la dispute qui s'y fait par une suite de rétorsions à ne pas manquer de leur ordre qui fait du corps table de jeu.</p>	<p>What the unconscious adds to it is to furnish it with a dynamic of the dispute which is carried on there as a result of the twists not to be missed in their order which makes of the body a gaming table.</p>	<p>What the unconscious adds there is to furnish it with a dynamic of the dispute which is made by a sequence of retaliations not to miss their order that make of the body a gaming table.</p>
<p>Les sommations qui en reviennent, selon notre schème : d'être le fait d'une fiction del'émetteur, c'est moins du refoulement qu'elles témoignent en ce qu'il n'est pas moins construit, que du refoulé à faire trou dans la chaîne de vigilance qui n'est pas plus que trouble du sommeil.</p>	<p>The summons which stem from that, according to our schema of being the result of a fiction of the emitter, it is less about repression that they bear witness to, in that it is nonetheless constructed, than about the repressed making a hole in the chain of vigilance which is nothing more than sleep disturbance.</p>	<p>The summations that return to it, according to our scheme: from being the fact of a fiction of the emitter, testify less to repression, in that it is no less constructed, than to the repressed in making a hole in the chain of vigilance which is no more than a sleep disorder.</p>

<p>À quoi prend garde la non-violence d'une censure dont tout sens reçoit le démenti à se proposer pour véritable, mais dont l'adversaire jubile d'y préserver le non-sens (<i>nonsense</i> plutôt), seul point par où il fait nature (comme de dire : qu'il fait eau). [77] Si l'inconscient d'une autre donne, fait sujet de la négation, l'autre savoir s'emploie à le conditionner de ce à quoi comme signifiant il répugne le plus : une figure représentable.</p>	<p>Against which takes care the non-violence of a censure from which all sense is challenged by proposing itself as true, but whose adversary is delighted by preserving there the non-sense (<i>nonsense</i> rather), the sole point by which it takes on nature (in the sense of taking on water). [77] If the unconscious of another card distribution is made the subject of negation, the other knowledge is used to condition it with which it finds the most repugnant : a representable figure.</p>	<p>Against which guards the non-violence of a censure from which all sense receives the denial (<i>démenti</i>) from proposing itself as veritable, but from which the adversary rejoices in preserving the non-sense there (<i>nonsense</i> [in English], rather), the only point where it makes nature (as in saying: it makes water). [77] If the unconscious from an other gives, makes a subject from negation, the other savoir is employed in conditioning it from what as signifier it most rejects: a representable figure.</p>
<p>À la limite s'avoue de quoi le conflit fait fonction à ce que place nette soit faite au réel, mais pour que le corps s'y hallucine.</p>	<p>At the limit there is admitted that of which conflict makes a function, that a clear place be made for the real, but in order that the body can hallucinate there.</p>	<p>At the limit is admitted what the conflict is a function of in that a clearing is made for the real, but for a body to be hallucinated there.</p>
<p>Tel est le trajet où naviguent ces bateaux qui me doivent, rappelons-le, d'être enregistrés comme formations de l'inconscient.</p>	<p>Such is the route where those boats sail who owe it to me to be registered as formations of the unconscious.</p>	<p>Such is the trajectory where navigate those boats that owe to me, let us recall, being registered as formations of the unconscious.</p>

<p>À en fixer le bâti correct, j'ai dû prêter patience à ceux dont c'était le quotidien, sans de longtemps qu'ils en distinguent la structure.</p>	<p>In order to fix the correct superstructure, I have had to lend patience to those whose daily bread it was, without their being able for a long time to distinguish the structure.</p>	<p>To fix the correct frame, I have had to offer patience to those for whom this was the everyday business, without their having for a long time distinguished its structure.</p>
<p>À vrai dire, il a suffi qu'ils craignent de m'y voir surgir au réel, pour qu'un réveil s'en produise, tel qu'ils ne trouvent pas mieux que, du jardin dont je peignais leurs délices, me rejeter moi-même. D'où je fis retour au réel de l'E.N.S, soit de l'étant (ou de l'étang) de l'École normale supérieure où le premier jour que j'y pris place, je fus interpellé sur l'être que j'accordais à tout ça. D'où je déclinai d'avoir à soutenir ma visée d'aucune ontologie.</p>	<p>Truth to tell, it was enough that they feared seeing me rise up in the real, so that an awakening might occur, such that they could find nothing better to do than to reject me from the garden of which I was painting their delights. Whence I returned to the real of the E.N.S, that is of the being (or the pond) of the École normale supérieure where the first day that I took my place I was called upon to explain the being that I accorded to all that. At which point I declined to have to defend my aiming at any ontology.</p>	<p>To tell the truth, it sufficed for them to fear seeing the real surge forth from me there for an awakening to be produced, such that they found nothing better to do than, from the garden where I painted their delights, to reject me myself. From which I returned to the real of the E.N.S, that is, of the being (<i>étant</i>) (or of the pond [<i>étang</i>]) of <i>l'École normale supérieure</i> where on the first day I took my place there I was interpellated on the being (<i>l'être</i>) I accorded to all this. From which I declined having to sustain my aim from any ontology.</p>

<p>C'est qu'à ce qu'elle fut, visée, d'un auditoire à rompre à ma logie, de son onto je faisais l'honteux.</p>	<p>It's because the aiming was, from an audience to be trained in my –ology, from its onto I appeared shameful.</p>	<p>It is insofar as it was, aimed, to break an audience to my logy, that of its onto I made the shameful (<i>l'honteux</i>).</p>
<p>Toute onto bue maintenant, je répondrai, et pas par quatre chemins ni par forêt à cacher l'arbre.</p>	<p>Having now swallowed my onto, I will answer, and without beating about the bush nor confusing the forest for the trees.</p>	<p>All onto now having been drunk, I will answer, and not in a round about way (<i>par quatre chemins</i>) nor by a forest hiding the tree.</p>
<p>Mon épreuve ne touche à l'être qu'à le faire naître de la faille que produit l'étant de se dire.</p>	<p>My proof does not touch being except by making it be born from the fault that the being produces by saying itself.</p>	<p>My proof only touches on being (<i>à l'être</i>) to give it birth from the flaw the being (<i>l'étant</i>) produces from being said (<i>de se dire</i>).</p>
<p>D'où l'auteur est à reléguer à se faire moyen pour un désir qui le dépasse.</p>	<p>Whence the author is to be reduced to making himself a means for a desire which is beyond him.</p>	<p>From which the author is to be relegated to making himself the means for a desire that passes beyond him.</p>

Mais il y a entremise autre qu'a dit Socrate en acte.	But there is an intermediary other than what Socrates said in act.	But there is another intermediation that Socrates said in act.
Il savait comme nous qu'à l'étant, faut le temps de se faire à être.	He knew like us that for the being, it takes time to get used to being.	He knew like us that for the being (<i>à l'étant</i>), it takes time (<i>faut le temps</i>) to make itself be (<i>à être</i>).
Ce « faut le temps », c'est l'être qui sollicite de l'inconscient pour y faire retour chaque fois que lui faudra, oui faudra le temps.	This « it takes time » it is being which solicits from the unconscious in order to make a return there each time it needs, yes needs time.	This " <i>faut le temps</i> " is the being (<i>l'être</i>) that solicits from the unconscious to return to it each time that it will have to (<i>que lui faudra</i>) take, yes, <i>faudra le temps</i>
Car entendez que je joue le cristal de la langue pour réfracter du signifiant ce qui divise le sujet.	For, understand that I am playing the crystal of language in order to refract from the signifier that which divides the subject.	For, understand that I play on the crystal of the tongue to refract from the signifier what divides the subject.
Y faudra le temps, c'est du français que je vous cause, pas du chagrin, j'espère.	Y'need time, it's French I'm talking to you, not causing you pain, I hope.	<i>Faudra le temps</i> there, it is of French that I chat with you; I hope this is not a problem (<i>c'est du français que je vous cause, pas du chagrin, j'espère</i>).

<p>Ce qui faudra, de ce qu'il faut le temps, c'est là la faille dont se dit l'être, et bien que l'usage d'un futur de cette forme pour le verbe : faillir ne soit pas recommandé dans un ouvrage qui s'a- [78] dresse aux belges, il y est accordé que la grammaire à le proscrire faudrait à ses devoirs.</p>	<p>What will be needed, because you need time, that's the fault with which being speaks itself, and although the use of a future of this form for the verb « <i>faillir</i> » is not recommended in a work [78] addressed to the Belgians, it is agreed that the grammar by proscribing it would be lacking in its duty.</p>	<p>What it will take in that it takes time (<i>Ce qui faudra de ce qu'il faut le temps</i>), there is the flaw (<i>faille</i>) from which being (<i>l'être</i>) is said, and indeed that the usage of a future of this form for the verb: <i>faillir</i> is not recommended in a work [78] addressed to Belgians, it is there accorded that grammar would be duty-bound (<i>faudrait à ses devoirs</i>) to proscribe it.</p>
<p>Si peu s'en faut qu'elle en soit là, ce peu fait preuve que c'est bien du manque qu'en français le falloir vient au renfort du nécessaire, y supplantant l'<i>il estuet de temps</i>, de l'<i>est opus temporis</i>, à le pousser à l'estuaire où les vieilleries se perdent.</p>	<p>If (grammar) is there « more or less », this less proves that it is indeed of the lack that in French « <i>falloir</i> » (to have to) comes to support the necessary, supplanting there the <i>il estuet de temps</i>, from the Latin <i>est opus temporis</i> (« it is the work of time »), by pushing it to the river mouth where old-fashioned things get lost.</p>	<p>However little it should be there (<i>Si peu s'en faut qu'elle en soit là</i>), this little proves that it is indeed from lack that in French the <i>falloir</i> reinforces the necessary, supplanting there the <i>il estuet de temps</i>, of the <i>est opus temporis</i>, to push it to the estuary where antiquities lose themselves.</p>
<p>Inversement ce falloir ne fait pas par hasard équivoque dit au mode, subjonctif du défaut : avant (à moins) qu'il ne faille venir...</p>	<p>Inversely this « <i>falloir</i> »[to have to] does not by accident equivocate in the subjunctive mood of default : before (unless) he almost comes...</p>	<p>Inversely it is not by chance that this falloir makes an equivocate said in the mode, subjunctive by default: avant (à moins) qu'il ne faille y venir...[before (unless) he</p>

		has to come there].
<p>C'est ainsi que l'inconscient s'articule de ce qui de l'être vient au dire. Ce qui du temps lui fait étoffe n'est pas emprunt d'imaginaire, mais plutôt d'un textile où nœuds ne diraient rien que des trous qui s'y trouvent.</p>	<p>It is thus that the unconscious articulates itself from what comes to speaking from being. What from time makes material for it is not a borrowing from the imaginary, but rather from a textile where knots would speak nothing except some holes found there.</p>	<p>This is how the unconscious is articulated from that which of being (<i>l' être</i>) comes to the saying. What makes the fabric of time is not a borrowing from the imaginary, but rather from a textile where knots would say nothing except of the holes found there.</p>
<p>Ce temps logique n'a pas d'En-soi que ce qui en choit pour faire enchère au masochisme.</p>	<p>This logical time does not have an In-itself except that which falls from it to make a higher bid in masochism.</p>	<p>This logical time has no In-itself except what falls there to make a bid for masochism.</p>
<p>C'est ce que le psychanalyste relaie d'y faire figure de quelqu'un. Le "faut du temps", il le supporte assez longtemps pour qu'à celui qui vient s'y dire, il ne faille plus que de s'instruire de ce qu'une chose n'est pas rien: justement celle dont il fait signe à quelqu'un.</p>	<p>It's what the psychoanalyst relays by making the figure of someone. The "it needs time" he supports long enough in order that for the one who comes to speak himself there, it does not need more than to teach oneself that a thing is not nothing: precisely the one with which one makes a sign to someone.</p>	<p>This is what the psychoanalyst relays in making a figure of someone. The "<i>faut du temps</i>," he supports it for a long enough time so that for what comes to be said there, he need do no more than instruct himself that a thing is not nothing: a thing (<i>celle</i>) is precisely this of which he makes a sign to</p>

		someone.
On sait que j'en introduisis l'acte psychanalytique, et je ne prends pas comme d'accident que l'émoi de mai m'ait empêché d'en venir à bout.	You know that I introduced the psychoanalytic act through that, and I don't take it to be an accident that the upset of May may have prevented me from getting to the end of it.	One knows that I introduced there the psychoanalytic act, and I do not take it for an accident that the commotion of May prevented me from coming to its end.
Je tiens ici à marquer que quelqu'un ne s'y assoit que de la façon, de l'effaçon plutôt, qu'il y impose au vrai.	I want to point out here that someone sits here only according to the way, rather the effacing, that he imposes on the true.	I owe it here to mark that someone might only seat himself there from the fashion (<i>façon</i>), the effacing (<i>effaçon</i>) rather, he imposes on the true.
Un seul savoir donne la dite effaçon : la logique pour qui le vrai et le faux ne sont que lettres à opérer d'une valeur.	A single knowledge gives the so-called effacing : the logic for which the true and the false are only letters to be operated from a value.	Only one knowledge (<i>savoir</i>) gives said effacing: the logic for which the true and the false are no more than letters operating from a value.
Les stoïciens le pressentirent de leur pratique d'un masochisme politisé, mais ne le poussèrent au point que les sceptiques dussent faire trêve de leur mythique invocation d'une vérité de nature.	The Stoics foretold it from their practice of a politicized masochism, but did not push it to the point that the sceptics had to call a truce with their mythical invocation of a truth from nature.	The Stoics presented it with their practice of a politicized masochism, but only pushed it to the point that the skeptics had to put the breaks on their mythic invocation of a truth of nature.

<p>Ce sont les refus de la mécanique grecque qui ont barré la route à une logique dont se pût édifier une vérité comme de texture.</p>	<p>It is the refusals of Greek mechanics which barred the route to a logic with which might be built a truth as of texture.</p>	<p>These are the refusals of the Greek mechanics that have barred the road to a logic from which a truth might be edified as texture.</p>
<p>À la vérité, seule la psychanalyse justifie le mythique ici de la nature à repérer dans la jouissance qui en tient lieu à se produire d'effet de texture.</p>	<p>In truth, only psychoanalysis justifies the mythical here of nature to be spotted in <i>jouissance</i> which stands in for it by producing itself from a effect of texture.</p>	<p>In truth, only psychoanalysis justifies the mythic here of nature to establish it in the <i>jouissance</i> that holds its place in producing itself from an effect of texture.</p>

Sans elle, il suffit de la logique mathématique pour faire superstition du scepticisme à rendre irréfutables des assertions aussi peu vides que :

[79] — un système défini comme de l'ordre de l'arithmétique n'obtient la consistance de faire en son sein départage du vrai et du faux, qu'à se confirmer d'être incomplet, soit d'exiger l'indémonstrable de formules qui ne se vérifient que d'ailleurs ;

—cet indémonstrable s'assure d'autre part d'une démonstration qui en décide indépendamment de la vérité qu'il intéresse ;

--- il y a un indécidable qui s'articule de ce que l'indémonstrable même ne saurait être assuré.

Without it (jouissance) all it needs is mathematical logic to make superstition out of scepticism in order to make irrefutable such empty assertions as :

[79] -a system defined as being of the arithmetical order does not obtain consistency by making in its bosom a separation of true from false, except by confirming itself as incomplete, that is by demanding the undemonstrable from formulae that can be verified only elsewhere ;

- this undemonstrable is assured on the other hand by a demonstration which decides independently concerning the truth that it (undemonstrable) interests ;
- there is an undecidable which is articulated on the basis that the undemonstrable itself could not be assured.

Without it, mathematical logic suffices to make a superstition of skepticism in rendering irrefutable some assertions as little empty as: [79])– a system defined as from the order of arithmetic obtains consistency from making in its breast a separation of the true and the false only in confirming itself from being incomplete, that is, from requiring the undemonstrable of formulas that are only verified from elsewhere;

– this undemonstrable, on the other hand, is insured from a demonstration that decides independently from the truth it concerns;
– there is an undecidable that is articulated in that the undemonstrable itself would not know how to be insured

<p>Les coupures de l'inconscient montrent cette structure, à l'attester de chutes pareilles à cerner.</p>	<p>The cuts of the unconscious show this structure, by attesting to it from falls similar to be circled.</p>	<p>The cuts of the unconscious show this structure, attesting to it from similar falls to be specified (<i>à cerner</i>).</p>
<p>Car me voici revenir au cristal de la langue pour, de ce que <i>falsus</i> soit le chu en latin, lier le faux moins au vrai qui le réfute, qu'à ce qu'il faut de temps pour faire trace de ce qui a défailli à s'avérer d'abord. À le prendre de ce qu'il est le participe passé de <i>fallere</i>, tomber, dont faillir et falloir proviennent chacun de son détour, qu'on note que l'étymologie ne vient ici qu'en soutien de l'effet de cristal homophonique.</p>	<p>For here I am coming back to the crystal of language in order to, since falsus means the fallen in Latin, link the false less to the true which refutes it than to the fact that it takes time to trace that which has failed to assert itself as true to start with. By taking it for what it is, the past participle of fallere, to fall, from which faillir (to fail, to « almost ») and falloir (to have to) each come in their own way, one notes that etymology here comes only as a support for the homophonic crystal effect.</p>	<p>For, to return myself here to the crystal of the tongue, in that falsus is the fall in Latin, to link the false less to the true that refutes it than to there having to be time to make a trace of what has failed to establish itself from the start. In taking it from its being the past participle of <i>fallere</i>, to fall, from which <i>faillir</i> and <i>falloir</i> proceed each by its detour, that one might note that the etymology only comes in here as a support of the homophonic crystal effect.</p>

<p>C'est le prendre comme il faut, à faire double ce mo, quand il s'agit de plaider le faux dans l'interprétation. C'est justement comme <i>falsa</i>, disons bien tombée, qu'une interprétation opère d'être à côté, soit: où se fait l'être, du pataqu'est-ce.</p>	<p>That is to take it as it is, to make this word double, when it is a question of pleading the false in interpretation. It is precisely as <i>falsa</i>, let's say quite properly, that an interpretation operates by being off the mark, that is where being is made, from slips of the tongue.</p>	<p>It to take it as one must, making this word double, when it is a question of pleading the false in the interpretation. It is precisely as <i>falsa</i>, let us say well fallen, that an interpretation operates from being to the side, that is: where being is made, it is from some false liaison (<i>du pataqu'est-ce</i>).</p>
<p>N'oublions pas que le symptôme est ce <i>falsus</i> qui est la cause dont l'analyse se soutient dans le procès de vérification qui fait son être.</p>	<p>Let us not forget that the symptom is this falsus which is the cause with which analysis supports itself in the trial of verification which makes its being.</p>	<p>Let us not forget that the symptom is the falsus that is the cause by which analysis is sustained in the process of verification that makes its being.</p>
<p>Nous ne sommes sûrs, pour ce que Freud pouvait savoir de ce domaine, que de sa fréquentation de Brentano. Elle est discrète, soit repérable dans le texte de la <i>Verneinung</i>.</p>	<p>We are not certain about what Freud knew of this domain except from his friendship with Brentano. It is discreet, that is noticeable in the text of the <i>Verneinung</i>.</p>	<p>We are not sure, as to what Freud might have known of this domain, except from his frequentation of Brentano^{rgk}. It is discrete, that is, establishable in the text of the <i>Verneinung</i>. rgk : Franz Clemens Honoratus Brentano; 16 January 1838 – 17 March 1917) was an influential German philosopher, psychologist, and priest whose work strongly influenced not only students Edmund</p>

		Husserl, Sigmund Freud, Tomáš Masaryk, Rudolf Steiner, Alexius Meinong, Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Kazimierz Twardowski, and Christian von Ehrenfels, but many others whose work would make use of his original ideas and concepts.
J'y ai frayé la voie au praticien qui saura s'attacher au ludion logique que j'ai forgé à son usage, soit l'objet <i>a</i> , sans pouvoir suppléer à l'analyse, dite personnelle, qui l'a parfois rendu impropre à la manier.	I have cleared the way for the practitioner who knows how to attach himself to the logical ludion that I have forged for his use, that is the object <i>a</i> , without being able to provide a supplement for so-called personal analysis which has sometimes made it improper to manipulate it (analysis).	I have cleared the path for the practitioner who will know to attach himself to the logical ludion I have forged for his usage, the objet <i>a</i> , without being able to supply for (<i>suppléer á</i>) the analysis, called personal, which has at times rendered it improper to manage it.
Un temps encore pour ajouter à ce dont Freud se maintient, un trait que je crois décisif : la foi unique qu'il faisait aux Juifs de ne pas faillir au séisme de la vérité. Aux Juifs que par ailleurs rien n'écarte de l'aversion qu'il avoue par l'emploi du mot : occultisme, pour tout ce qui est du mystère. Pourquoi ?	A time again to add to that with which Freud maintains himself, a trait which I consider decisive : the unique faith that he had in the Jews not to fail in the earthquake of truth. In the Jews from whom elsewhere nothing sets aside from the aversion that he admits through the use of the word « occultism », for everything that has to do with mystery. Why ?	Once again to add to what Freud is maintained by, a trait that I believe decisive: the unique faith he had in the Jews for not failing the seismic rupture of the truth. In the Jews whom moreover nothing separates him from any of the aversion he avows by the usage of the word: occultism, for all that is of mystery. Why?

<p>Pourquoi sinon de ce que le Juif depuis le retour de Babylone, est celui qui sait lire, c'est-à-dire que de la lettre il prend distance [79] de sa parole, trouvant là l'intervalle, juste à y jouer d'une interprétation.</p>	<p>Why if not because the Jew since the return from Babylon is the one who knows how to read, that is to say that from the letter he takes his distance [79] from his spoken word, finding there the interval, enough play for an interpretation.</p>	<p>Why except because the Jew, since the return from Babylon, is the one who knows how to read, which is to say, from the letter he takes distance [79] from his speech, finding there the interval, just right for bringing into play an interpretation.</p>
<p>D'une seule, celle du Midrash qui se distingue ici éminemment.</p>	<p>A single one, that of the Midrash which is here eminently distinguished.</p>	<p>A single one, that of the Midrash, which distinguishes itself here eminently.</p>
<p>En effet pour ce peuple qui a le Livre, seul entre tous à s'affirmer comme historique, à ne jamais préférer de mythe, le Midrash représente un mode d'abord dont la moderne critique historique pourrait bien n'être que l'abâtardissement. Car s'il prend le Livre au pied de sa lettre, ce n'est pas pour la faire supporter d'intentions plus ou moins patentes, mais pour, de sa collusion signifiante prise en sa matérialité : de ce que sa combinaison rend obligé de voisinage (donc non voulu), de ce</p>	<p>Indeed for this people which has the Book, the only one to affirm itself as historical, never to proffer a myth, the Midrash represents a mode first of all of which modern historical criticism could indeed be only a bastardization. For if it takes the Book literally it is not in order to make it support more or less patent intentions, but in order to, from its signifying collusion taken in its materiality – because its combination makes forced from its context (therefore not intended) because the grammatical variants impose an inflexional choice – draw a different</p>	<p>In fact for this people who have the Book, the only one among them all to affirm itself as historical, in never proffering myth, the Midrash represents a mode of approach of which the modern historical critique could indeed be only a bastardization. For if it takes the Book literally (<i>au pied de sa lettre</i>), it is not to make it support some more or less patent intentions, but, from its signifying collusion taken in its materiality: from what its combination renders obligatory from vicinity (<i>voisinage</i>) (thus not wanted), from what the</p>

<p>que les variantes de grammaire imposent de choix désinentiel, tirer un dire autre du texte : voire à y impliquer ce qu'il néglige (comme référence), l'enfance de Moïse par exemple.</p>	<p>speaking from the text, even to imply there what it does not know (as reference), the childhood of Moses for example.</p>	<p>variants of grammar impose of an inflectual (<i>désinentiel</i>) choice, to draw an other saying of the text: even in implying there what it neglects (as reference), the childhood of Moses for example.</p>
<p>N'est-il rien d'en rapprocher ce que de la mort du même, Freud tenait à ce qu'il fût su, au point d'en faire son message dernier ?</p>	<p>Is there nothing to bring this closer than the fact that, concerning the death of the same (Moses), Freud really wanted it to be known, to the point that he made of it his last message ?</p>	<p>Is it nothing in approaching what of the death of the same, Freud held to its being known, to the point of making of it his final message?</p>

Surtout à y mettre la distance – jamais prise avant moi – du travail de Sellin dont la rencontre sur ce point ne lui parut pas à dédaigner, quand son dévergondage d'être d'une plume fort qualifiée dans l'exégèse dite critique, va à jeter sur les gonds mêmes de la méthode la dérision.

Especially by putting into it the distance – never taken up before me – of the work by Sellin whose agreement on this point seemed to him not to be scorned, when his outrageousness by being a well qualified writer in the exegesis called critical goes as far as deriding the very tenets of the method.

Above all in putting there the distance--never taken before me-- from the work of Sellin^{rgk} with whom his meeting on this point did not appear to him something to disdain, when its corruption (*dévergondage*), from being from a pen highly qualified in the exegesis called critical, throws derision on the hinges (*gonds*) themselves of the method.

rgk-Ernst Sellin ((May 26, 1867- January 1, 1946) was a German Protestant theologian. Freud in his *Moses and Monotheism* with his controversial thesis that the Jews killed Moses referred to Sellin's *Mose und seine Bedeutung fur die israelitisch-jüdische Religionsgeschichte* See <https://www.freud2lacan.com/freud-philosophy/> no. 12 on the menu

<p>Occasion de passer à l'envers (c'est le propos de mon séminaire de cette année) de la psychanalyse en tant qu'elle est le discours de Freud, lui suspendu. Et, sans recours au Nom-du-Père dont j'ai dit m'abstenir, biais légitime à prendre de la topologie trahie par ce discours.</p>	<p>It's an occasion to go to the reverse side (that's the subject of my seminar this year) of psychoanalysis in as much as it is Freud's discourse, now suspended. And without recourse to the Name-of-the-Father from which I have said I abstain, a legitimate bias to take from the topology betrayed by this discourse.</p>	<p>An occasion to pass to the reverse side (this is the focus of my seminar of this year) of psychoanalysis inasmuch as it is the discourse of Freud, itself suspended. And, without recourse to the Name-of-the-Father from which I have said myself to abstain, a legitimate approach to be taken from the topology betrayed by this discourse.</p>
<p>Topologie où saille l'idéal monocentrique (que ce soit le soleil n'y change rien) dont Freud soutient le meurtre du Père, quand, de laisser voir qu'il est à rebours de l'épreuve juive patriarcale, le totem et le tabou l'abandonnent de la jouissance mythique. Non la figure d'Akhenaton.</p>	<p>Topology in which the monocentric ideal stands out (that it is the sun does not change anything) with which Freud sustains the murder of the Father, when, by letting it be seen that it runs counter to the Jewish patriarchal test, totem and taboo abandon him from the mythical jouissance. Not the figure of Akhenaton.</p>	<p>A topology where protrudes the monocentric ideal (this being the sun changes nothing) from which Freud sustains the murder of the Father, when, from letting it be seen that it is against the grain of the Jewish patriarchal test, the totem and the taboo abandon it from the mythic jouissance. Not the figure of Akhenaton.</p>
<p>Qu'au dossier de la signifiante ici en jeu de la castration, soit versé l'effet de cristal que je touche : de <i>la</i> faux du temps.</p>	<p>Let there be deposited into the file of the significance that is here in play of castration, the crystal effect that I draw on : of the scythe of time.</p>	<p>That in the dossier of signifiante here in play from castration, be poured the crystal effect I touch upon: from the false of time.</p>

<i>Note pour ma réponse à la 4^{ème} question :</i>	<i>Note for my response to the fourth question :</i>	Note on my answer to the 4th question:
Je voudrais qu'on sache que ce texte ne prétend pas rendre compte de la « révolution copernicienne » telle qu'elle s'articule [81] dans l'histoire, mais de l'usage... mythique qui en est fait. Par Freud notamment.	I want people to know that this text does not claim to give an account of the « Copernican revolution » such as it is articulated [81] in history, but of the mythical use that has been made of it. By Freud notably.	I would like it to be known that this text does not claim to account for the "Copernican revolution" such as it is articulated [81] in history, but of the usage . . . the mythical usage made of it. By Freud notably.
Il ne suffit pas de dire par exemple que l'héliocentrisme fut “le cadet des soucis” de Copernic. Comment lui donner son rang? Il est certain au contraire – on sait que j'ai été formé aux écrits de Koyré là-dessus - , qu'il lui paraissait admirable que le soleil fût là où il lui donne sa place parce que c'est de là qu'il jouait le mieux son rôle de luminaire. Mais en est-ce là le subversif?	It is not enough to say for example that heliocentrism was “the least of Copernicus' worries”. How can we give it a ranking? On the contrary, it is certain – you know that I have been trained by Koyré's writings on this point – that it seemed to him to be admirable that the sun was there where he gives it its place because it is from there that it best played its role as light-source. But is that the subversive point?	It does not suffice, for example, that heliocentrism was the "least of the cares" (<i>le cadet des soucis</i>) of Copernicus. On what rung are we to place it? It is certain, to the contrary--one knows that I was instructed by the writings of Koyré on this--that it appeared admirable to him that the sun was there where he gave it its place because it was from there that it best played its role as a light. But is this what is subversive there?

<p>Car il le place non pas au centre du monde, mais en un lieu assez voisin, ce qui, pour la fin admirée et pour la gloire du créateur, va aussi bien. Il est donc faux de parler d'héliocentrisme.</p>	<p>For he places it not in the centre of the world, but in a place quite close by, which, for the admired end and the glory of the creator, works just as well. It is therefore false to talk about heliocentrism.</p>	<p>For he does not place it at the center of the world, but in a place quite near, which, for the admired end and for the glory of the creator, goes as well. It is therefore false to speak of heliocentrism.</p>
<p>Le plus étrange est que personne, qu'on entende bien : des spécialistes hors Koyré, ne relève que les « révolutions » de Copernic ne concernent pas les corps célestes, mais les orbes. Il va de soi pour nous que ces orbes sont tracées par les corps. Mais, on rougit d'avoir à le rappeler, pour Ptolémée comme pour tous depuis Eudoxe, ces orbes sont des sphères qui <i>supportent</i> les corps célestes et la course de chacun est réglée de ce que plusieurs orbes la <i>supportent</i> concurremment, 5 peut-être pour Saturne, 3 à mon souvenir pour Jupiter. Que nous importe ! comme aussi bien de celles qu'y ajoute Aristote pour tamponner entre deux corps célestes, les deux qu'on vient de</p>	<p>The oddest thing is that no-one, and I mean specialists apart from Koyré, has picked up that Copernicus' « revolutions » do not concern the heavenly body, but the orbits. It is obvious for us that these orbits are traced by the bodies. But one blushes to have to remind people, for Ptolomeus as for all those since Eudoxus, these orbits are spheres which support the heavenly bodies and the course of each one is regulated by the fact that several orbits support it concurrently, 5 perhaps for Saturn, 3, from memory, for Jupiter. That's important for us ! as also those that Aristotle adds to buffer between two heavenly bodies, the two I have just mentioned for example, the effect of the orbits of the first on those of the second. (It's</p>	<p>The strangest thing is that no one, let it be well understood: of the specialists besides Koyré, brings up that the "revolutions" of Copernicus do not concern the celestial bodies, but the orbs. It goes by itself for us that these orbs are traced by the bodies. But, one blushes to have to remind people of it, for Ptolomy as for everyone since Eudoxes, these orbs are spheres that support the celestial bodies and the course of each is ruled by several orbs supporting it concurrently, 5 perhaps for Saturn, 3, as I remember it, for Jupiter. That matters to us! as do also those Aristotle adds to stamp between two celestial bodies, the two just named for example, the effect to be expected of the orbs</p>

nommer par exemple, l'effet à attendre des orbites du premier sur celles du second. (C'est qu'Aristote veut une physique qui tienne).

that Aristotle wants a physics that is consistent.)

of the first on those of the second. (This is because Aristotle wants a physics that works [*qui tienne*]).

<p>Qui ne devrait s'apercevoir de ça, je ne dis pas à lire Copernic dont il existe une reproduction phototypique, mais simplement à y épeler le titre : <i>De revolutionibus orbium coelestium</i> ? Ce qui n'empêche pas des <i>traducteurs</i> notoires (des gens qui ont traduit le texte) d'intituler leur traduction : Des révolutions des corps célestes.</p>	<p>Who could not see that, I don't say by reading Copernicus whose work exists in a phototypical reproduction, but simply by spelling out the title : <i>De revolutionibus orbium coelestium</i> ? Which doesn't prevent well-known translators (people who have translated the text) from titling their translation : <i>On the revolutions of heavenly bodies</i>.</p>	<p>Who could not grasp this, I do not say from reading Copernicus, of whom a phototyped reproduction exists, but simply from spelling out the title: <i>De revolutionibus orbium coelestium</i>? Which does not prevent some notorious <i>traducteurs</i> (some people who translate the text) from titling their translation: <i>On the Revolutions of Celestial Bodies</i>.</p>
<p>Il est littéral, ce qui équivaut ici à dire: il est vrai, que Copernic est ptolémaïste, qu'il reste dans le matériel de Ptolémée, qu'il n'est pas copernicien au sens inventé qui fait emploi de ce terme.</p>	<p>It is literal, which is here the equivalent of saying it is true that Copernicus is a ptolemaist, that he remains in the material of Ptolemaeus, that he is not Copernican in the invented sense which uses this term.</p>	<p>It is literal, which is equivalent here to saying: it is true, that Copernicus is a Ptolemean, that he remains in the material of Ptolemy, that he is not Copernican in the invented sense that makes use of this term.</p>
<p>Est-il justifié de s'en tenir à ce sens inventé pour répondre à un usage métaphorique, c'est le problème qui se pose en toute métaphore ?</p>	<p>Is it justified to stick with this invented sense to respond to a metaphorical usage, it's the problem which is posed in every metaphor.</p>	<p>Is it justified to hold to this invented sense to respond to a metaphoric usage? Is not this the problem posed by every metaphor?</p>

<p>Comme dit à peu près quelqu'un, avec les arts on s'amuse, on muse avec les lézards. On ne doit pas perdre l'occasion de rappeler [82] l'essence crétinisante du sens à quoi le mot commun convient. Néanmoins ce reste exploite stérile, si une liaison structurale n'en peut être aperçue.</p>	<p>As someone almost says, with the arts one amuses oneself, one muses with the lizards. One should not miss the opportunity to recall [82] the cretinizing essence of the sense for which the word « common » is appropriate. Nevertheless it remains a sterile exploit if a structural liaison can't be perceived from it.</p>	<p>As someone more or less has said, with the arts one amuses oneself, one muses with the lizards (<i>avec les arts on s'amuse, on muse avec les lézards</i>).¹ One must not lose the occasion to recall [82] the cretinizing essence of the sense for which the common word is suited. This nonetheless remains a sterile exploit, if a structural liaison cannot be grasped in it. 1.TN: This is a pun: <i>les arts</i> and <i>lézards</i> are homonyms.</p>
<p>À question d'interviewer, vaut réponse improvisée. Du premier jet ce qui m'est venu, – venu du fond d'une information que je prie de croire n'être pas nulle –, c'est d'abord la remarque dont à l'héliocentrisme, j'oppose un photocentrisme d'une importance structurale permanente. On voit de cette note à quelle naïveté Copernic de ce point de vue.</p>	<p>To a question from an interviewer, an improvised response is appropriate. First off what came to me – coming from the depth of an information that I beg you to consider not worthless – is first of all the remark that to heliocentrism I oppose a photocentrism having a permanent structural importance. One can see from this note to what stupidity Copernicus falls from this point of view.</p>	<p>An interviewer's question deserves an improvised answer. On first impulse (<i>du premier jet</i>) what has come to me--come from the depth of a piece of information I endeavor to believe not to be null--is to start with the remark with which, to heliocentrism, I oppose a photocentrism of a permanent structural importance. One sees from this note what naiveté Copernicus falls into from this point of view.</p>

Koyré la grandit, cette niaiserie, à la référer au mysticisme propagé du cercle de Marsile Ficin. Pourquoi pas en effet ? La Renaissance fut occultiste, c'est pourquoi l'Université la classe parmi les ères de progrès.

Koyré increased this stupidity by referring it to the mysticism propagated by Marsile Ficin's circle. Why not indeed ? The renaissance was occultist, that's why the University classes that period among the eras of progress.

Koyré increases it, this naiveté, in referring it to the mysticism propagated by Marsile Ficin's^{rgk} circle. Why not, in fact? The Renaissance was occultist, which is why the University classes it among the eras of progress.
rgk : Marsilio Ficino (Italian: Latin name: *Marsilius Ficinus*; 19 October 1433 – 1 October 1499) was an Italian scholar and Catholic priest who was one of the most influential humanist philosophers of the early Italian Renaissance. He was an astrologer, a reviver of Neoplatonism in touch with the major academics of his day and the first translator of Plato's complete extant works into Latin. His Florentine Academy, an attempt to revive Plato's Academy, influenced the direction and tenor of the Italian Renaissance and the development of European philosophy.

<p>Le tournant véritable est dû à Kepler et, j'y insiste, dans la subversion, la seule digne de ce nom, que constitue le passage qu'il a payé de combien de peine, de l'imaginaire de la forme dite parfaite comme étant celle du cercle, à l'articulation de la conique, de l'ellipse en l'occasion, en termes mathématiques.</p>	<p>The real turning point is due to Kepler and, I insist on this point, in the subversion, the only one worthy of that name, that is constituted by the passage that he paid for with such pain, from the imaginary of the form said to be perfect by being that of the circle, to the articulation of the conical, of the ellipsis in this case, in mathematical terms.</p>	<p>The veritable turning point is owed to Kepler and, I insist on it, in the subversion, the only one worthy of this name, constituted by the passage he paid for with so much trouble, from the imaginary of the form said to be perfect as being the that of the circle, to the articulation of the conic, of the ellipse on this occasion, in mathematical terms.</p>
<p>Je collapse incontestablement ce qui est le fait de Galilée, mais il est clair que l'apport de Kepler ici lui échappait, et pourtant c'est lui qui déjà conjugue entre ses mains les éléments dont Newton forgera sa formule : j'entends par là la loi de l'attraction, telle que Koyré l'isole de sa fonction hyperphysique, de sa présence syntaxique (cf. <i>Études newtoniennes</i>, p. 34).</p>	<p>I am collapsing together, I know, what is Galileo's doing, but it is clear that Kepler's contribution here was escaping him, and yet it is he who already is conjugating in his hands the elements with which Newton will forge his formula : I mean by that the law of attraction, as Koyré isolates it from its hyperphysical function, from its syntactic presence (cf <i>Études newtoniennes</i>, p.34)</p>	<p>I incontestably collapse what Galileo did, but it is clear that what Kepler brings in here escapes him, and nonetheless it is he who already combines between his hands the elements from which Newton will forge his formula: I mean by this the law of attraction, such as Koyré isolates it from its hyperphysical function, from its syntactic presence (cf. <i>Études newtoniennes</i>, p. 34).</p>
<p>À la confronter à Kant, je souligne qu'elle ne trouve place dans aucune critique de la raison</p>	<p>By confronting it with Kant, I am emphasizing that it does not find a place in any critique of imaginary</p>	<p>To confront it with Kant, I stress that it finds its place in no critique of imaginary reason.</p>

imaginaire.	reason.	
C'est de fait la place forte dont le siège maintient dans la science l'idéal d'univers par quoi elle subsiste. Que le champ newtonien ne s'y laisse pas réduire, se désigne bien de ma formule : l'impossible, c'est le réel.	It is in fact the strong place whose seat maintains in science the ideal universe through which it subsists. That the Newtonian field does not allow itself to be reduced to it, is well designated by my formula : the impossible is the real.	It is <i>de facto</i> the strong place whose siege maintains in science the ideal of a universe by which science subsists. That the Newtonian field does not let itself be reduced to this, is well designated by my formula: the impossible is the real.
C'est de ce point une fois atteint, que rayonne notre physique.	It is from this point, once attained, that our physics radiates out.	It is from this point once attained that shines our physics.
Mais à inscrire la science au registre du discours hystérique, je laisse entendre plus que je n'en ai dit.	But by inscribing science in the register of the hysteric's discourse, I imply more than I have said about it.	But in inscribing science at the register of hysteric discourse, I let be understood more than I have said of it.
L'abord du réel est étroit. Et c'est de le hanter, que la psychanalyse se profile.[83]	The approach to the real is narrow. And it is by hanging around it that psychoanalysis profiles itself. [83]	The approach to the real is narrow. And it is from haunting it that psychoanalysis looms forth. [83]