

S.I.R. The 1953 inaugural meeting of the SFP.

1950-1951			Seminar on Freud's case of Dora	Lacan's home, 5 rue de lille
1951	May	02	Some Reflections on the Ego	British Psycho- Analytic Society, London
1951	Oct	16	Lacan delivered a talk on Dora, Intervention sur le transfert. This text was later published in Lacan's <i>Écrits</i> , pp. 215-226.	XIVth Congrès dit des psychanalystes de langue romane, probably in Paris
1951-1952			Seminar on Freud's case of the Wolfman	Lacan's home, 5 rue de lille
1952-1953			Seminar on the Freud's case of the Ratman	Lacan's home, 5 rue de lille
1953	Jan	20	Jacques Lacan was elected president of the SPP (Société Psychanalytique de Paris)	
1953	Mar	04	The Individual Myth of the Neurotic.(on the Ratman)	Collège de Philosophie, at the invitation of Jean Wahl. Paris
1953	June	16	Jacques Lacan was outvoted as president of the SPP. He then resigned from the presidency. The vice-president, Daniel Lagache, is requested to act as president. But he announced his resignation from the SPP, as well as those of Juliette Favez-Boutonier and Françoise Dolto. During this same evening, Blanche Reverchon-Jouve and Jacques Lacan in turn resign.	
1953	June	18	Daniel Lagache announced the founding of the French SFP (Société française de psychanalyse), whose first office was made up of resigning members.	
1953	July	08	Inaugural meeting of the Société Française de la Psychanalyse: Le symbolique, l'imaginaire et le reel	La société française de Psychanalyse
1953	Sep	26-27	The Function and field of speech and of language in psychoanalysis (The Rome Discourse)	L'instituto de Psicologia della Università di Roma
1953	Nov	18	Séminaire I: Les Écrits Techniques de Freud, Leçon 1	Sainte-Anne, Paris

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From Robert Samuels: *Between Psychoanalysis and Philosophy*

"I would like to argue that Lacan's thesis shows that in 1932 he was already struggling with the interrelation among The Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary.

(Lacan, 1932, 42-3)", Translations are those of Robert Samuels.

"In order for any human manifestation to be related to personality it must imply":

"1. a *biographical development*, we define objectively through a typical evolution and through the *relations of comprehension* that interpret themselves. This translates itself for the subject by the modes of affectivity in which he lives his history (*Erlebnis*)" (THE REAL)

"2. a *conception of himself*, we define objectively by his vital attitudes and the *dialectical progress* that one can determine.

This translates itself by the more or less "ideal images" of himself that he brings to consciousness" (THE IMAGINARY)

" 3. a certain *tension of social relations*, we define objectively by the pragmatic autonomy of his conduct and the *bonds of ethical participation* which are recognized This translates itself for the subject by the representative value of which he feels himself affected vis-à-vis the Other" (THE SYMBOLIC)

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1953-07-08 LE SYMBOLIQUE, L'IMAGINAIRE ET LE REEL	1953-07-08 THE SYMBOLIC, THE IMAGINARY AND THE REAL	The Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real
Cette conférence « Le symbolique, l'imaginaire et le réel » fut prononcée le 8 juillet 1953 pour ouvrir les activités de la Société française de Psychanalyse. Cette version est annoncée dans le catalogue de la Bibliothèque de l'e.l.p. comme version J.L. Il existe plusieurs autres versions sensiblement différentes à certains endroits, dont une parue dans le Bulletin de l'Association freudienne, 1982, n° 1.	This conference "The symbolic, the imaginary and the real" was given on July 8, 1953 to open the activities of the <i>Société française de Psychanalyse</i> This version is announced in the catalog of the e.l.p. Library. as the J.L. version There are several other versions markedly different in some places, including one that appeared in the <i>Bulletin de l'Association freudienne</i> , 1982, n° 1.	The Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real This is the original title. The lecture as taken down by a stenographer and then typed up. The text published here was established by me. I have indicated the one place in the text where a few words are missing – not many, it seems. – Jacques-Alain Miller. <i>On the Names-of-the-Father</i> ; p. 92
The French text is from Pas-tout Lacan	Translation by Scott Savaiano	Translation by Bruce Fink
	Translated in 2002 for the Après Coup Psychoanalytic Association	From <i>On the Names-of-the-Father</i> by Jacques Lacan; Polity Press, Cambridge

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		UK and Malden, MA.; 2013, pages 1-53.
(1) Mes bons Amis,	My Dear Friends,	My friends.
Vous pouvez voir que pour cette première communication dite « scientifique » de notre nouvelle Société, j’ai pris un titre qui ne manque pas d’ambition. Aussi bien commencerai-je d’abord par m’en excuser, vous priant de considérer cette communication dite scientifique, plutôt comme, à la fois, un résumé de points de vue que ceux qui sont ici, ses élèves, connaissent bien, avec lesquels ils sont familiarisés depuis déjà deux ans par son enseignement, et aussi comme une sorte de préface ou <i>d’introduction à une certaine orientation d’étude de la psychanalyse.</i>	You can see that for this first so-called “scientific” meeting of our new Society, I have chosen a title that does not lack ambition. Furthermore I will start out by excusing myself for this, begging you to consider this so-called scientific paper rather as at one and the same time a summary of viewpoints that those who are here, its students, know quite well, with which they are familiar based on two years of its teaching, and also as a sort of preface or <i>introduction to a certain orientation toward the study of psychoanalysis.</i>	You can see that, for the first so-called scientific presentation of our new Society, I have selected a title that is quite ambitious. I will thus begin first by apologizing for it, asking you to consider this presentation both as a summary of viewpoints that those here who are my students know well, with which they have become familiar over the past two years through my teaching, and also as a sort of preface or introduction to a certain orientation for studying psychoanalysis.
En effet, je crois que le retour aux textes freudiens qui ont fait l’objet de mon enseignement depuis deux ans, m’a – ou plutôt, nous a, à tous qui avons travaillé ensemble, donné l’idée toujours plus certaine qu’il n’y a pas de prise plus totale de la réalité humaine que celle qui est faite par l’expérience freudienne et qu’on ne peut pas s’empêcher de retourner aux sources et à appréhender ces textes vraiment en tous les sens du mot. On ne peut pas s’empêcher de penser que la théorie de la psychanalyse (et en même temps la technique qui ne forment qu’une	Indeed, I believe that the return to the texts of Freud, which have been the object of my teaching for two years now, have given me — or rather have given <i>us</i> , we who have been working together, an ever more certain idea that there is no more complete a grasp of human reality than the one that is made by the Freudian experience, that we cannot help but return to its source and truly apprehend these texts in every sense of the word. Also we cannot help but think that the theory of psychoanalysis, and at the same time the technique with which it forms	Indeed, I believe that the return to Freud’s texts which my teaching has focused on for the past two years has convinced me – or rather <i>us</i> , all of us who have worked together – that there is no firmer grasp on human reality than that provided by Freudian psychoanalysis and that one must return to the source and apprehend, in every sense of the word, these texts. One cannot escape the conclusion that psychoanalytic theory, and at the same time its technique, which form but one and the same thing, have undergone a

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<p>seule et même chose) n'ait subi une sorte de rétrécissement, et à vrai dire de dégradation. C'est qu'en effet, il n'est pas facile de se maintenir au niveau d'une telle plénitude. Par exemple, un texte comme celui de « l'homme aux loups », je pensais le prendre ce soir pour base et pour exemple de ce que j'ai à vous exposer. Mais j'en ai fait toute la journée d'hier une relecture complète ; J'avais fait là-dessus un séminaire l'année dernière. Et j'ai eu tout simplement le ⁽²⁾sentiment qu'il était tout à fait impossible ici de vous en donner une idée, même approximative ; et que mon séminaire de l'année dernière, je n'avais qu'une chose à faire : le refaire l'année prochaine.</p>	<p>one and the same thing, has not undergone a sort of narrowing, truthfully speaking a degradation. Indeed this is because it is not easy to maintain such a level of fullness. For example: a text such as "the Wolf Man." I thought I would use it this evening as a foundation and example of what I had to say to you. But I spent all day yesterday completely re-reading it. I had given a seminar on it last year, and I quite simply had the (2) feeling that that it was totally impossible to give you even an approximate idea of it, and that as for my seminar of last year I had only one thing to do: redo it again next year.</p>	<p>sort of shrinkage and, to be quite frank, decay. For, in effect, it is not easy to remain at the level of such fullness. Take for example, a text like that of the Wolf [3] Man [<i>The History of an Infantile Neurosis</i> (1918), SE XVII]. I thought of taking it this evening as a basis for and as an example of what I wish to present to you. But although I gave a Seminar on it last year, I spent the entire day yesterday rereading the case and quite simply had the feeling that it was impossible to give you even an approximate idea of it here and that there was but one thing to be done – to give last year's Seminar again this year.</p>
<p>Car ce qui m'est apparu dans ce texte formidable, après le travail et le progrès que nous avons faits cette année autour du texte de « <i>l'Homme aux rats</i> », me laisse à penser que ce que j'avais sorti l'année dernière comme principe, comme exemple, comme type de pensée caractéristique fournis par ce texte extraordinaire était littéralement une simple « approche », comme on dit en langage anglo-saxon ; autrement dit un balbutiement. De sorte qu'en somme, j'y ferai peut-être incidemment une brève allusion, mais j'essaierai surtout, tout simplement, de dire quelques mots sur ce que veut dire la position d'un tel problème ; sur ce que veut dire <i>la confrontation de</i></p>	<p>Because what appeared to me in this tremendous text, following the work and progress that we have made this year on the text of "<i>The Rat Man</i>," leaves me thinking that what I came up with last year in terms of principles, of examples, of types of characteristic thinking that is furnished by this extraordinary text was literally a simple "approach," (<i>approche</i>) as is said in the Anglo-Saxon tongues; otherwise put a "stammering." So much so that in short I will perhaps make a brief allusion to it in incidental fashion, but will above all, quite simply, say a few words about what the position of such a problem means; about the meaning of <i>the confrontation between the three registers</i></p>	<p>Indeed, what I perceived in this incredible text, after the work and progress we made this year on the case of the Rat Man [<i>Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis</i> (1909), SE X], leads me to think that what I stressed last year as the crux, example or typically characteristic thought furnished by this extraordinary text was but a simple "approach" as the Anglo-Saxons say – in other words, a first step. The upshot being that this evening I will merely try to compare and contrast briefly the three quite distinct registers that are essential registers of human reality: the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real. [4]</p>

<p><i>ces trois registres qui sont bien les registres essentiels de la réalité humaine, registres très distincts et qui s'appellent : le symbolisme* , l'imaginaire et le reel.</i> * . sic.</p>	<p><i>that are really essential to human reality, very distinct registers that are called: the symbolic, the imaginary and the real.</i></p>	
<p>Une chose d'abord qui est évidemment frappant et ne saurait nous échapper ; à savoir qu'il y a, dans l'analyse, toute une part de réel chez nos sujets, précisément qui nous échappe ; qui n'échappait pas pour autant à Freud quand il avait à faire à chacun de ses patients. Mais, bien entendu, si ça ne lui échappait pas, c'était tout aussi hors de sa prise et de sa portée. On ne saurait être trop frappé du fait, de la façon dont il parle de son « homme aux rats », distinguant entre « ses personnalités ». C'est là-dessus qu'il conclut : « La personnalité d'un homme fin, intelligent et cultivé », il la met en contraste avec les autres personnalités auxquelles il a eu à faire. Si cela est atténué quand il parle de son « homme aux loups », il en parle aussi. Mais, à vrai dire, nous ne sommes pas forcés de contresigner ⁽³⁾toutes ses appréciations. Il ne semble pas qu'il s'agisse dans « l'homme aux loups » de quelqu'un d'aussi grande classe. Mais il est frappant, il l'a mis à part comme un [1] point particulier. Quant à sa « Dora », n'en parlons pas ; tout juste si on ne peut pas dire qu'il l'a aimée.</p>	<p>One thing which strikes us right away and that cannot fail to escape us: namely that there is, in analysis, an entire part of the real of the subject that precisely does escape us, that however did not escape Freud when he was faced with each of his patients. But, of course, if it didn't escape him it was also outside the range of his ability to grapple with. We couldn't be more struck by this fact, by the way in which he speaks of his "Rat Man," distinguishing between his "personalities." He concludes with the following: "The personality of a refined, intelligent and cultivated man," which he contrasts with the other personalities he came into contact with. Even though this is less the case when he speaks of his "Wolf Man," he still talks about it. But, truthfully speaking, we are not required to countersign all these appraisals. It does not appear that with the Wolf Man we are dealing with a person of equally "high class." But it is striking, he made special note of it. As for his "Dora," let's not even speak of her, at least if we cannot say that he loved her.</p>	<p>I One thing cannot escape us at the outset – namely, that there is in analysis a whole portion of our subjects' reality [<i>réel</i>]¹ that escapes us. It did not escape Freud when he was dealing with each of his patients, but, of course, it was just as thoroughly beyond his grasp and scope. We should be struck by the way in which he speaks of the Rat Man², setting him apart from his other patients. He concludes that he can see in him the personality of a "fine, intelligent, and cultured man," and he contrasts him with other patients he has worked with. This is not so much the case when he speaks of the Wolf Man, but he mentions it nevertheless. Still, we are not required to endorse all of his appraisals. The Wolf Man does not seem to have had quite as much class as the Rat Man. Yet it is striking that Freud singled him out as a special case. Not to mention Dora, about whom we can virtually say that he loved her. TN1. <i>Le réel</i> (the real) and <i>la réalité</i> (reality) are often indistinguishable in ordinary French usage as well as in this stage of Lacan's work. When I do not translate <i>le réel</i> as "the real," I always put the French in brackets.</p>

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		<p>TN2. In Strachey's renderings" "In his normal state he was kind, cheerful, and sensible – an enlightened and superior kind of person" (SE X. p.248).</p>
<p>Il y a donc là quelque chose qui, évidemment, ne manque pas de nous frapper et qui, en somme, est quelque chose à quoi nous avons tout le temps à faire. Et je dirai que cet élément direct, cet élément de pesée, d'appréciation de la personnalité est quelque chose d'assez à quoi nous avons affaire sur le registre morbide, d'une part, et même sur le registre de l'expérience analytique avec des sujets qui ne tombent pas absolument sous le registre morbide ; c'est quelque chose qu'il nous faut toujours, en somme, réserver et qui est particulièrement présent à notre expérience à nous autres qui sommes chargés de ce lourd fardeau de faire le choix de ceux qui se soumettent à l'analyse dans un but didactique.</p>	<p>Thus there is something here that, obviously, does not fail to strike us and that, in short, is something that we are always dealing with. And I would say that this direct element, this weighty element, this appraisal of the personality, is something that is uite...[indistinct]...which we deal with in the morbid register, on the one hand, and even in the register of psychoanalytic experience with subjects that do not fall entirely within the morbid register; in short this is something we must always keep in mind and that is particularly present in our experience, we others who are charged with the heavy burden of making a choice for those who suffer in analyses with didactic goals.</p>	<p>This direct element, whereby Freud weighs and appraises personalities, cannot fail to strike us. It is something that we deal with all the time in the register of morbidity, on the one hand, and [5] even in the register of psychoanalytic practice, with subjects who do not fall completely into the morbid category. It is an element that we must always reserve judgement about and that is especially prominent to those of us who bear the heavy burden of choosing among those who wish to go into analysis in order to undergo training as analysts.</p>
<p>Qu'est-ce que nous dirons en somme, au bout du compte ? Quand nous parlons, au terme de notre sélection, si ce n'est que tous les critères qu'on invoque (« faut-il de la névrose pour faire un bon analyste ? Un petit peu ? Beaucoup ? Sûrement pas : pas du tout ? ». Mais en fin de compte, est-ce que c'est ça qui nous guide dans un jugement qu'aucun texte ne peut définir, et qui nous fait apprécier les qualités personnelles, cette réalité ? et qui s'exprime en ceci : qu'un sujet <i>a de l'étoffe</i></p>	<p>All in all what are we saying, in the end, when we speak at the end of our selection, if not of all the criteria that we invoke "Is a neurosis required in order to make a good analyst?" "A little, a lot, surely not, not at all?" But in the end is it this that guides us in making a judgment that no text can define, and that leads us to appraise personal qualities, this "reality," and that is expressed in the following: That a subject has a forceful personality or not: that he is, as the</p>	<p>What can we say in the end, after our selection has been made? Consider the criteria that are mentioned – must someone be neurotic in order to be a good analyst? A little bit neurotic? Highly neurotic? Certainly not, but what about not at all neurotic? In the final reckoning, is this what guides us in a judgment that no text can define and which leads us to appraise personal qualities? In other words, do we rely on the reality expressed by the following – that a</p>

<p><i>ou n'en a pas ; qu'il est, comme disent les Chinois, (« She-un-ta ») ? ou « homme de grand format », ou (« Sha-ho-yen ») « un homme de petit format » ? C'est quelque chose dont il faut bien dire que c'est ce qui ⁽⁴⁾constitue les limites de notre expérience. Que c'est en ce sens qu'on peut dire, pour poser la question de savoir qu'est-ce qui est mis en jeu dans l'analyse : Qu'est-ce que c'est ? Est-ce ce rapport réel au sujet, à savoir selon une certaine façon et <i>selon nos mesures de reconnaître</i> ? Est-ce cela à quoi nous avons à faire dans l'analyse ? <i>Certainement pas</i>. C'est incontestablement autre chose. Et c'est bien là la question que nous nous posons sans cesse et que se posent tous ceux qui essaient de donner une théorie de l'expérience analytique. Qu'est-ce que c'est que <i>cette expérience singulière entre toutes, qui va apporter chez ces sujets des transformations si profondes</i> ? Et que sont-elles ? Quel en est le ressort ?</i></p>	<p>Chinese say, "she un-ta," "a large-sized man," or "sha ho-yen," a "small sized one?" This is something that we must admit constitutes the limits of our experience. That it is in the following sense that we can put it, in order to pose the question of knowing what is put into play in analysis: What is it? This real relation to the subject, that is according to a certain way and <i>according to our measures for recognizing him</i>, is it that with which we deal in analysis? <i>Certainly not</i>. It's incontestably something else. Here is really that question that we constantly ask ourselves and that is asked by all who try to formulate a theory of analytic experience. What is it <i>this singular among all experiences that will lead to such profound transformations in its subject?</i> And what are these transformations? What are their wellsprings?</p>	<p>subject either has the right stuff or he doesn't, that he is, as the Chinese say, <i>xian da</i>, a worthy man, or, <i>xiao ren</i>, an untrustworthy man? This is certainly something that constitutes the limits of our experience. What brought into play in analysis? Is it a real relation to the subject, namely, to recognize his reality in a certain way and according to our own measures? Is that what we deal with in [6] analysis? Certainly not – it is indisputably something else. This is a question we ask ourselves all the time, and that is raised by all those who try to formulate a theory of psychoanalytic practice [<i>expérience</i>]. What is this practice which is so different from all others and brings about such profound transformations in people? What are those transformations? What is their mainspring?</p>
<p>Tout ceci, l'élaboration de la doctrine analytique depuis des années est faite pour répondre à cette question. Il est certain que l'homme du commun public ne semble pas s'étonner autrement de l'efficacité de cette expérience qui se passe toute entière en paroles, et d'une certaine façon, dans le fond ; il a bien raison puisqu'en effet, elle marche, et que, pour l'expliquer, il semblerait que nous n'ayons d'abord qu'à démontrer le</p>	<p>All of the elaboration of psychoanalytic doctrine over many years was effected to answer this question. Certainly the common man does not appear to be less surprised by the effectiveness of this experience that takes place entirely in words, and in a way, at base, he's quite right since it does indeed work and in order to explain this it would appear that we have only to in the first instance demonstrate it while it is in the process of</p>	<p>For years the development of psychoanalytic theory has been designed to answer this question. The average person or man in the street does not seem terribly astonished by the effectiveness of this practice that occurs entirely through speech. And he is, in the end, quite right, for indeed it works, and it would seem that, in order to explain it, we need first but demonstrate its movement by working. To speak is</p>

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<p>mouvement en marchant. Et déjà « parler » c'est s'introduire dans le sujet de l'expérience analytique. C'est bien là, en effet, qu'il convient de procéder et de savoir ; d'abord de poser la question : « <i>Qu'est-ce que la parole ?</i> » c'est-à-dire le « symbole »</p>	<p>working. And already from the start to speak is to introduce the subject into analytic experience. Indeed this is an agreeable place from which to proceed to know, by first posing the question, "<i>What is speech, that is to say, the symbol?</i>"</p>	<p>already to go to the heart of psychoanalytic experience. Here it makes sense to first raise a question: What is speech? In other words, what are symbols?</p>
<p>À la vérité, ce à quoi nous assistons, c'est plutôt un évitement de cette question. Et, bien entendu, ce que nous constatons c'est qu'à la rétrécir cette question, à vouloir ne voir dans les éléments et les ressorts proprement techniques de l'analyse que quelque chose qui doit arriver, par une série d'approches, à modifier les conduites, les ressorts, les coutumes du ⁽⁵⁾sujet, nous aboutissons très vite à un certain nombre de difficultés et d'impasses, non pas certes au point de leur trouver une place dans l'ensemble d'une considération totale de l'expérience analytique ; mais à aller dans ce sens, nous allons toujours plus vers un certain nombre d'opacités qui s'opposent à nous et qui tendent à transformer dès lors l'analyse en quelque chose, par exemple, qui apparaîtra comme beaucoup plus irrationnel que cela n'est réellement.</p>	<p>In truth what we are taking part in is rather an avoidance of this question. And naturally what we observe serves to narrow its field. Not wanting to see in the elements and properly technical wellsprings of analysis something that must arrive at, via a series of approaches, modifications in the behaviors, the capacities and the habits of the subject, we quickly arrive at a certain number of difficulties and impasses: certainly not to the point that we find them a place in the ensemble of an overarching reflection on psychoanalytic experience, but to head in this direction we are always getting closer to a certain number of opacities that oppose themselves to us and that from then on tend to transform analysis into something that, for example, appears as being much more irrational than it really is.</p>	<p>In truth, we witness an avoidance of this question. And we note that in minimizing this question – in seeing in the strictly technical elements and mainsprings of analysis nothing more than instruments designed to modify, through a series of successive approximations, the subject's [7] behaviors and habits – we are led very quickly to a number of difficulties and dead ends. Going in this direction, we certainly don't go to the point of situating them in a global consideration of psychoanalytic practice, but we go ever further toward a certain number of opacities that arise and that then tend to turn analysis into a practice that seems far more irrational than it really is.</p>
<p>Il est très frappant de voir combien de récents et récemment venus à l'expérience analytique se sont produits, dans leur première façon de s'exprimer sur leur expérience, en posant la question</p>	<p>It is striking to see how many of those who are new to or who have recently delved into the analytic experience who have ended up, in their first mode of expressing their experiences, questioning its irrational</p>	<p>It is striking to see how many subjects who have recently engaged in analysis have talked, in their first way of expressing themselves regarding their experience, about its possibly irrational</p>

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<p>du caractère irrationnel de cette analyse, alors qu'il semble qu'il n'y a peut-être pas, au contraire, de technique plus transparente.</p>	<p>character, even though it perhaps seems that there is on the contrary no other technique that is so transparent.</p>	<p>character, whereas it seems, on the contrary, that there is perhaps no more transparent technique around.</p>
<p>Et, bien sûr, tout va dans ce sens. Nous abondons dans un certain nombre de vues psychologiques plus ou moins partielles du sujet patient ; nous parlons de sa « pensée magique » ; nous parlons de toutes sortes de registres qui ont incontestablement leur valeur [2] et sont rencontrés de façon très vive par l'expérience analytique. De là à penser que l'analyse elle-même joue dans un certain registre, bien sûr, dans la pensée magique, il n'y a qu'un pas, vite franchi quand on ne part pas et ne décide pas de se tenir tout d'abord à la question primordiale : « Qu'est-ce que cette expérience de la parole » et, pour tout dire, de poser en même temps la question de l'expérience analytique, <i>la question de l'essence et de l'échange de la parole</i>.</p>	<p>And, of course, everything heads in that direction. We concur with a certain number of psychological, more or less partial views of the patient-subject; we speak of his "magical thought," we speak of all sorts of registers that incontestably have their value and that are encountered in very lively ways in analytic experience. It only takes one step to go from this to the belief that analysis itself plays out in one of these registers, of course within magical thought. A step that is quickly taken when we don't start with and decide first of all not to hold fast to the primordial question: "What is this experience of speech" and, to say it all, to pose at the same time the question of psychoanalytic experience, <i>the question of the essence and the exchange of speech</i>.</p>	<p>Of course, in an analysis everything goes in this direction: we fall in with a certain number of the patient's more or less partial psychological views, we speak about magical thinking, we speak about all kinds of registers that indisputably have their value and are encountered in a very dynamic fashion in psychoanalysis. There is but one step from that to thinking that psychoanalysis itself operates in the register of magical thinking, and this step is quickly taken when one does not decide to raise the primordial question: What does [8] the experience of speaking involve? What is the essence and exchange of speech? And to raise at the same time the question of psychoanalytic practice [expérience].</p>
<p>Je crois que ce dont il s'agit c'est de partir de ceci :</p>	<p>I believe that what is in question starts with the following:</p>	
<p>Partons de l'expérience, telle qu'elle nous est ⁽⁶⁾d'abord présentée dans les premières théories de l'analyse : qu'est-ce que ce « névrosé » à qui nous avons affaire par l'expérience analytique ? Qu'est-ce qui va se passer dans l'expérience analytique ? Et ce passage du conscient à l'inconscient ? Et <i>quelles sont</i></p>	<p>Let us begin with the experience, such as it is presented to us in the first theories of analysis: What is this "neurotic" we come into contact with in analytic experience? What is going to happen in analytic experience and the passage from the unconscious to consciousness? <i>What are the forces that provide a certain existence</i></p>	<p>Let us begin with this practice as it is initially presented to us in the first theories of analysis. What is this <i>neurotic</i> whom we deal with psychoanalysis? What is going to happen during the analysis? What about the shift [in focus] from the conscious to the unconscious? What are the forces that give a certain</p>

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<p><i>les forces qui donnent à cet équilibre une certaine existence ? Nous l'appelons le principe du plaisir.</i></p>	<p><i>to this equilibrium? We call it the pleasure principle.</i></p>	<p>existence to the equilibrium we call the pleasure principle?</p>
<p>Pour aller vite nous dirons avec M. de Saussure que « le sujet hallucine son monde », c'est-à-dire que ses illusions ou ses satisfactions illusoire ne pouvaient être de tous les ordres. Il va leur faire suivre un autre ordre évidemment que celles de ses satisfactions qui trouvent leur objet dans le réel pur et simple. Jamais un symptôme n'a apaisé la faim ou la soif d'une façon durable, hors de l'absorption d'aliments qui les satisfont. Même si une baisse générale du niveau de la vitalité peut répondre, dans les cas limites, par exemple l'hibernation naturelle ou artificiel. Tout ceci n'est concevable que comme une phase qui ne saurait bien entendu durer, sauf à entraîner des dommages irréversibles.</p>	<p>Working quickly, we will agree with Mr. de Saussure that "the subject hallucinates his world," which is to say that his illusions or his illusory satisfactions cannot be of just any nature. He is naturally going to make them take on a different nature than the one that characterizes his satisfactions whose objects are in the real plain and simple. Never has a symptom ever appeased hunger or thirst in a durable way, save via the absorption of the foods that satisfy them. Even if a general lowering of the level of vital functions can meet this condition, in limit cases such as natural hibernation for example, this is not conceivable except as a phase that cannot of course last long without engendering irreversible harm.</p>	<p>To proceed quickly, I will say with Raymond de Saussure¹ that the subject hallucinates his world. The subject's illusory satisfactions are obviously of a different order than the satisfactions that find their object purely and simply in reality [réel]. A symptom has never sated a hunger or slaked thirst in a lasting manner, unless accompanied by the absorption of food or drink. No doubt a general decline in the subject's level of vitality can result in extreme cases, as we see for example in natural or artificial hibernation, but this is conceivable only as a phase that cannot last without leading to irreversible damage. <small>TN1. Regarding Raymond de Saussure, see his "Present Trends in Psychoanalysis," in <i>Actes du Congrès International de Psychiatrie V (1950): 95-166.</i></small></p>
<p>La réversibilité même des troubles névrotiques implique que l'économie des satisfactions qui y étaient impliquées fussent d'un autre ordre, et infiniment moins liées à des rythmes organiques fixes, quoique commandant bien entendu une partie d'entre eux. Ceci définit la catégorie conceptuelle qui définit cette sorte d'objets. C'est justement celle que je suis en train de qualifier : « l'imaginaire », si l'on veut bien y reconnaître toutes les</p>	<p>The very reversibility of neurotic difficulties implies that the economy of satisfactions that they pointed to were of another order, and infinitely less bound to fixed organic rhythms, although they make use of a portion of them. This defines the conceptual category that defines this kind of object. Exactly the kind of objects I am in the process of describing as the imaginary, if we want to really recognize all the implications that suit this</p>	<p>The very reversibility of a neurotic problem implies that the economy of [9] satisfactions that were involved in it were of a different order, and infinitely less tied to fixed organic rhythms, even if they command some of them. This defines the conceptual category that includes the sort of objects I am in the process of qualifying as imaginary, if you are willing to grant this term its full range of implications.</p>

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implications qui lui conviennent.	description.	
<p>À partir de là, il est tout à fait simple, clair, facile, de voir que cet ordre de satisfaction imaginaire ne peut se trouver que dans l'ordre des registres sexuels.</p>	<p>Starting from this it is totally simple, clear and easy to see that this order of imaginary satisfactions can only be found in the order of sexual registers.</p>	<p>On this basis, it is easy to see that the order of imaginary satisfaction can be found only in the sexual realm.</p>
<p>⁽⁷⁾Tout est donné là, à partir de cette sorte de condition préalable de l'expérience analytique. Et il n'est pas étonnant, encore que, bien entendu, des choses aient dû être confirmées, contrôlées, inaugurées, dirais-je, par l'expérience, qu'une fois l'expérience faite les choses paraissent d'une parfaite rigueur.</p>	<p>Everything is already said, starting with this sort of preliminary condition of analytic experience. And it is not surprising, even though, of course, things had to be confirmed, controlled for, unveiled, I would say, by experience, that once the experience was undergone things appeared with perfect rigor.</p>	<p>All of this is but a precondition for analytic practice. And it is not astonishing, even if thing had to be confirmed, verified, and inaugurated, I would say, by psychoanalytic practice itself. Once having gone through the experience of analysis, things seem to be perfectly rigorous.</p>
<p>Le terme « libido » est une notion qui ne fait qu'exprimer cette notion de réversibilité qui implique celle d'équivalence, d'un certain métabolisme des images ; pour pouvoir penser cette transformation, il faut un terme énergétique à quoi a servi le terme de libido. Ce dont il s'agit, c'est bien entendu, quelque chose de complexe. Quand je dis « satisfaction imaginaire », ce n'est évidemment pas le simple fait que Démétrios a été satisfait du fait d'avoir rêvé qu'il possédait la prêtresse courtisane... encore que ce cas n'est qu'un cas particulier dans l'ensemble... Mais c'est quelque chose qui va beaucoup plus loin et est actuellement recoupé par toute</p>	<p>The term "libido" is a notion that only serves to express this notion of reversibility, which implies an equivalence, a sort of metabolism of images. In order to be able to think this transformation, an energetic term is necessary which the term libido serves as. What is at issue is certainly something complex. When I say "imaginary satisfaction," this is obviously not the simple fact that Demetrius was satisfied by having dreamt that he possessed the courtesan priestess,¹ although this is only one particular case among many...But this is something that goes much further and is actually tied to a whole range of experiences evoked by biologists concerning instinctual cycles,</p>	<p>The term "libido" merely expresses the notion of reversibility that implies that there is a certain equivalence or metabolism of images. In order to be able to conceptualize this transformation, a term related to energy is necessary. This is the purpose served by the word "libido." What is involved is, naturally, something quite complex. Imaginary satisfaction is obviously not the simple fact that Demetrius¹ was satisfied by having dreamed that he possessed the courtesan priestess [Chrysis], even if this case is but a particular case in a larger whole. It involves an element that goes much further and that intersects all the phenomena that biologists mention</p>

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<p>une expérience qui est l'expérience que les biologistes évoquent concernant les cycles instinctuels, très spécialement dans le registre des cycles sexuels et de la reproduction ; à savoir que, mises à part les études encore plus ou moins incertaines et improbables concernant les relais neurologiques dans le cycle sexuel, qui ne sont pas ce qu'il y a de plus solide dans leurs études, il est démontré que ces cycles chez les animaux eux-mêmes ils n'ont pas trouvé d'autres termes que le mot même qui sert à désigner les troubles et les ressorts primaires sexuels des symptômes chez nos sujets, à savoir le « déplacement »</p>	<p>especially in the register of sexual cycles and reproduction; that is to say that, (leaving aside the more or less uncertain and improbable studies concerning neurological relays in the sexual cycle which are not what is most grounded in their studies), it has been demonstrated that these cycles in animals themselves... [indistinct] they have not found another term but the very word that serves to designate the difficulties and primary sexual impulses of the symptoms in our subjects, namely "displacement." ¹ Tr: <i>A reference to Lamia, the beautiful maid who exercised such a charm on Demetrius that he seems to have forsaken the love of all the other women who worshipped him. Lamia... "exercised over him so great a charm that all other women seemed to be amorous of Demetrius, but Demetrius amorous only of Lamia," (Plutarch).</i></p>	<p>concerning instinctual cycles, especially in the register of sexuality and reproduction. Apart from the still uncertain and improbable studies concerning neurological relays in sexual cycles, which are hardly what is most solid in their studies, it has been demonstrated that these cycles in animals themselves depend upon a certain number of triggering mechanisms that are essentially imaginary in nature. TN1. The reference to Demetrius is to a novel by Pierre Louÿs entitled <i>Aphrodite</i>, published in 1896.</p>
<p>Ce que montre l'étude des cycles instinctuels chez les animaux, c'est précisément leur dépendance d'un certain nombre de déclencheurs, de mécanismes de déclenchement ⁽⁸⁾ qui sont essentiellement d'ordre imaginaire, et qui sont ce qu'il y a de plus intéressant dans les études du cycle instinctuel, à savoir que leur limite, leur définition, la façon de les préciser [3] fondées sur la mise à l'épreuve d'un certain nombre de leurres jusqu'à une certaine limite d'effacement, sont susceptibles de provoquer chez l'animal cette sorte de mise en érection de la partie du cycle du comportement sexuel</p>	<p>What the study of sexual cycles in animals shows is precisely their dependence on a certain number of releases, of mechanisms of release that are essentially imaginary in nature (<i>d'ordre imaginaire</i>), which are what is most interesting in the study of the instinctual cycle; which is to say that their limit, their definition, the way in which they are described, founded upon the testing of a certain number of their [indistinct]...until a certain erasing limit, are susceptible to provoking in animals this kind of "erection" of the portion of the cycle of sexual behavior that we are dealing with. And the fact</p>	<p>What is most interesting in studies of instinctual cycles, their limits, and their definition is that, in testing a certain number of releasers to determine the lowest degree capable of producing an effect – in order to figure out exactly what these release mechanisms are – researchers have been able to provoke artificially in animals the activation of parts of the sexual behavior cycle in question. The fact is that, within a specific behavioral cycle, a certain number of displacements can always occur under certain conditions. Indeed, biologists</p>

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<p>dont il s'agit. Et le fait qu'à l'intérieur d'un cycle de comportement déterminé, il est toujours susceptible de survenir dans certaines conditions un certain nombre de déplacements ; par exemple, dans un cycle de combat, la brusque survenue, au retour de ce cycle (chez les oiseaux l'un des combattants qui se met soudain à se lisser les plumes), d'un segment du comportement de parade qui interviendra là au milieu d'un cycle de combat.</p>	<p>that, within the interior of a cycle of determined behavior, there is always a susceptibility under certain conditions, for a certain number of displacements to arise: for example, in a cycle of combat, the sudden appearance, as the cycle returns (with birds one of the combatants will suddenly begin smoothing its feathers), of a segment of parade-behavior that intervenes right in the middle of the combative cycle.² <i>¹ Tr: Hence even in the middle of a struggle "to the death" the importance of the image intervenes.</i></p>	<p>have not found any better term than the very one that serves to designate the primal [11] sexual troubles and mainsprings of symptoms in our patients: "displacement." For example, in the middle of a combat cycle, one can observe the swift supervening of a segment of display behavior. In birds, one of the combatants suddenly begins preening itself.</p>
<p>Mille autres exemples peuvent en être donnés. Je ne suis pas là pour les énumérer. Ceci est simplement pour vous donner l'idée que cet élément de déplacement est un ressort absolument essentiel de l'ordre, et principalement de l'ordre des comportements liés à la sexualité. Sans doute, ces phénomènes ne sont pas électifs chez les animaux. Mais d'autres comportements (cf. les études de Lorenz sur les fonctions de l'image dans le cycle du nourrissage), montrent que l'imaginaire joue un rôle aussi éminent dans l'ordre des comportements sexuels. Et du reste, chez l'homme, c'est toujours sur ce plan, et principalement sur ce plan, que nous nous trouvons devant ce phénomène.</p>	<p>A thousand other examples could be given. I am not here to list all of them. The above was simply to plant the idea that this element of displacement is an absolutely essential impulse in this order, and principally in the order of behaviors linked to sexuality. No doubt these phenomena are not elective in animals. But other behaviors (cf. the studies by Lorenz on the functions of the image in the cycle of feeding), show that the Imaginary plays a role in them that is equally eminent to the one it plays in the sexual behaviors. As for the rest, in Man, it is always in this domain, and principally in this domain, that we find ourselves faced with this phenomenon.</p>	<p>A thousand other examples could be given. I am not going to enumerate them here today. I am just trying to indicate that the element of displacement is an essential mainspring of the set of behaviors related to sexuality. No doubt, these phenomena do not occur in this realm alone. But the studies by Konrad Lorenz on the functions of images in the feeding cycle show that the imaginary plays just as eminent a role there as in the realm of sexual behavior. In man, it is principally at the latter level that we find ourselves faced with this phenomenon.</p>
<p>D'ores et déjà, signalons, ponctuons cet</p>	<p>Right from the start let us point out, let us</p>	<p>Let me punctuate this discussion by</p>

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<p>exposé par ceci : que ces éléments de comportements instinctuels déplacés chez l'animal sont susceptibles de quelque chose dont nous voyons l'ébauche de ce que nous appellerons un « comportement symbolique ».</p>	<p>punctuate this discussion with the following: that these elements of displaced instinctual behaviors in animals are susceptible to something whose outline we can see, and that we will call a "symbolic behavior."</p>	<p>saying that the elements of displaced instinctual behavior displayed by animals can give us a rough idea of a symbolic behavior.</p>
<p>⁽⁹⁾Ce que l'on appelle chez l'animal un comportement symbolique c'est à savoir que, quand un de ces segments déplacés prend une valeur socialisée, il sert au groupe animal de repérage pour un certain comportement collectif.</p>	<p>That which we call a symbolic behavior in animals is namely that which, when one of its displaced segments take on a socialized value, is used by the animal group as a foothold for a certain collective behavior.</p>	<p>What is called symbolic behavior in animals is the fact that a displaced segment of such behavior takes on a socialized value and serves the animal group as a marker for a certain collective behavior. [12]</p>
<p>Ainsi, nous posons qu'un comportement peut être imaginaire quand son aiguillage sur des images et sa propre valeur d'image pour un autre sujet le rendent susceptible de déplacement hors du cycle qui assure la satisfaction d'un besoin naturel.</p>	<p>Thus we posit that a behavior may be imaginary when its points within images, and its proper value as image for another subject, renders it susceptible to displacement outside the cycle that guarantees the satisfaction of a natural need.</p>	<p>We thus posit that a behavior can become imaginary when its directness towards images and its own value as an image for another subject make it capable of being displaced outside the cycle that assures the satisfaction of a natural need.</p>
<p>À partir de là, l'ensemble dont il s'agit à la racine, le comportement névrotique, peut être dit, sur le plan de l'économie instinctive, être élucidé – et de savoir pourquoi il s'agit toujours de comportement sexuel, bien entendu –. Je n'ai pas besoin d'y revenir, si ce n'est pour indiquer brièvement qu'un homme puisse éjaculer à la vue d'une pantoufle est quelque chose qui ne nous surprend pas, ni non plus qu'un conjoint s'en serve pour le ramener à de meilleurs sentiments, mais qu'assurément personne ne peut</p>	<p>With this in mind, the totality which at root we are dealing with, neurotic behavior, can be said to be elucidated in the area of instinctual economy – and also as concerns knowing why it is always a question of sexual behavior, of course. I scarcely need return to this point, if only to briefly point out that the fact that a man can ejaculate at the sight of a slipper is something that does not surprise us, nor is it surprising that his spouse can make use of it to make him feel higher sentiments, but that assuredly no one</p>	<p>On this basis, neurotic behavior can be said to be elucidated at the level of instinctual economy. As for knowing why it is always sexual behavior [that undergoes displacement], I need not return to this except to provide a brief indication. The fact that a man may ejaculate upon seeing a slipper does not surprise us, nor are we surprised when he uses it to bring his partner to feel better disposed toward him¹. But surely no one imagines that a slipper can serve to abate an individual's</p>

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<p>songer qu'une pantoufle puisse servir à apaiser une fringale, même extrême, d'un individu. De même ce à quoi nous avons à faire constamment c'est à des fantasmes. Dans l'ordre du traitement, il n'est pas rare que le patient, le sujet, fasse intervenir, au cours de l'analyse un fantasme tel que celui de la « fellatio du partenaire analyste ». Est-ce là aussi quelque chose que nous ferons rentrer dans un cycle archaïque de sa biographie d'une façon quelconque ? Une antérieure sous-alimentation ? Il est bien évident que, quel que soit le caractère incorporatif que nous donnions à ces fantasmes, nous n'y songerons jamais. Qu'est-ce à dire ?</p>	<p>would dream that a slipper could be used to appease the hunger, even the most ravenous, of an individual. Likewise what we constantly deal with is fantasms. In the arena of treatment, it is not rare to find a patient, the subject, during the course of analysis bring in a fantasm such as the one involving “fellatio with the analyst-partner.” Is this also something that we might squeeze back into the archaic cycles of his biography in any way whatsoever? An early lack of nourishment? It is obvious that no matter what sort of incorporative qualities we may attribute to these fantasms, we would never dream of doing something like this. What does this say?</p>	<p>hunger pangs, even extreme ones. Similarly, what we deal with constantly is fantasies. During the treatment, it is not uncommon that the patient or subject recounts a fantasy like that of performing fellatio on the analyst. Is that an element that we would characterize as an archaic cycle of his biography? Or relegate to a prior period of undernourishment? It is quite obvious that we wouldn't dream of such a thing, regardless of the incorporative character we attribute to such fantasies. [13] <small>TN1. One perhaps read: “nor are we surprised when a partner uses it to bring him to be better disposed toward her.”</small> What does this mean?</p>
<p>Cela peut dire beaucoup de choses. En fait, il faut bien voir que l'imaginaire est à la fois loin de se confondre avec le domaine de l'analysable, et que, d'autre ⁽¹⁰⁾part il peut y avoir une autre fonction que l'imaginaire. Ce n'est pas parce que l'analysable rencontre l'imaginaire que l'imaginaire se confond avec l'analysable, qu'il est tout entier l'analysable, et qu'il est tout entier l'analysable ou l'analysé.</p>	<p>It says many things. In fact, one must see that the Imaginary is at one and the same time far from being merged with the field of the “analyzable,” and that, on the other hand, there can be an other function than the Imaginary one. Just because the Imaginary encounters the analyzable doesn't mean that it is merged with it, that it is all that is analyzable, and that it is entirely the analyzable or the analyzed.</p>	<p>It can mean many things. In fact, we must realize that the imaginary can hardly be confused with the domain of what is analyzable. There may be another function than that of the imaginary. It is not because what is analyzable encounters the imaginary that the imaginary can be confused with analyzable. The imaginary is neither the entirety of what can be analyzed nor of what is analyzed.</p>
<p>Pour prendre l'exemple de notre fétichiste, bien que ce soit rare, si nous admettons qu'il s'agit là d'une sorte de perversion primitive, il n'est pas impossible d'envisager des cas semblables. Supposons qu'il s'agisse d'un</p>	<p>Taking for example our fetishist, even though it is rare, if we admit that we are dealing with some sort of primitive perversion — it is not impossible to imagine cases like it. Let's imagine that we are dealing with one of these types of</p>	<p>Let us return to the example of our fetishist, even if it is rather rare. If we accept that what is involved here is a sort of primitive perversion, it is not impossible to envision similar cases. Let us suppose it involves an imaginary</p>

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<p>de ces types de déplacement imaginaire, tel que ceux que nous trouvons réalisés chez l'animal. Supposons en d'autres termes que la pantoufle soit ici, très strictement, le déplacement de l'organe féminin, puisque c'est beaucoup plus souvent chez le mâle que le fétichisme existe. S'il n'y avait littéralement rien qui puisse représenter une élaboration par rapport à cette donnée primitive, ce serait aussi inanalysable qu'est inanalysable telle ou telle fixation perverse. [4]</p>	<p>imaginary displacements. Imaginary such as we find them actualized in animals. In other words let's imagine that the slipper is, very strictly speaking, a displacement of the feminine organ, (since fetishism occurs so much more frequently in the male). If there were literally nothing that could provide an elaboration of this primitive datum, it would be just as unanalyzable as any other perverse fixation.</p>	<p>displacement like the kind we find in the animal kingdom. Suppose, in other words, that the slipper here is a strict displacement of the female sexual organ, since fetishism is far more common among males. Were there nothing representing an elaboration on this primitive given, it would be as unanalyzable as is this or that perversion fixation.</p>
<p>Inversement, pour parler de notre patient, ou sujet, en proie à un fantasme, là c'est autre chose qui a un tout autre sens, et là, il est bien clair que si ce fantasme peut être considéré comme quelque chose qui représente l'imaginaire, peut représenter certaines fixations à un stade primitif oral de la sexualité, d'autre part, nous ne dirons pas que ce fellateur soit un fellateur constitutionnel.</p>	<p>Inversely, to speak of our patient, or subject, as preyed upon by a fantasm, now that's something that has a totally different meaning, it's quite clear that even if this fantasm can be considered as something that represents the Imaginary in order to represent certain fixations in the primitive oral stage of sexuality, on the other hand, we would not say that this fellator is a constitutional one.</p>	<p>Conversely, let us return to the case of the patient or subject in the grip of a fellatio fantasy. This is something that has a completely different meaning. We can no doubt consider that this fantasy represents the imaginary, a certain fixation [14] on a primitive oral stage of sexuality, but we will not say that this fellatio performer is constitutionally a fellatio performer.</p>
<p>J'entends par là qu'ici, le fantasme dont il s'agit, l'élément imaginaire n'a strictement qu'une valeur symbolique que nous n'avons à apprécier et à comprendre qu'en fonction du moment de l'analyse où il va s'insérer. En effet, même si le sujet en retient l'aveu, ce fantasme surgit et sa fréquence montre assez qu'il surgit à un moment du dialogue analytique. Il est fait pour s'exprimer, pour être dit, pour symboliser quelque ⁽¹¹⁾chose et quelque</p>	<p>By this I mean that in this case, the fantasm in question, the imaginary element has a strictly symbolic value only, that we must appreciate and understand exclusively as a function of the moment where it is going to insert itself into the analysis. Indeed, even if the subject refuses to admit it, the fantasm surges forth and its frequency shows well enough that it surges forth at a certain moment in the analytic dialogue. It is made to express</p>	<p>By which I mean that the fantasy or imaginary element in question has merely a symbolic value that we must assess only as a function of the moment in the analysis at which it occurs. In effect, the fantasy does arise – even if the subject does not always tell us about it – and it does so frequently enough to show that it arises within the psychoanalytic dialogue. It is designed to be expressed, to be spoken, and to symbolize</p>

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<p>chose qui a un sens tout différent, selon le moment même du dialogue.</p>	<p>itself, to be spoken, to symbolize something that has a totally different meaning according to the moment in the dialogue.</p>	<p>something – something that has a very different meaning depending on the moment in the dialogue at which it arises.</p>
<p>Donc, qu'est-ce à dire ? Qu'il ne suffit pas qu'un phénomène représente un déplacement, autrement dit s'inscrive dans les phénomènes imaginaires, pour être un phénomène analysable, d'une part, et que pour qu'il le soit, il faut qu'il représente autre chose que lui-même, si je puis dire.</p>	<p>So what does this say? On the one hand that it's not enough that a phenomenon represent a displacement, in other words that it be inscribed within imaginary phenomena, in order for it to be an analyzable phenomenon, and also that in order for it to be analyzable, it must represent something other than itself, if I may put it thus.</p>	<p>So what does this mean? First, it is not merely because a phenomenon represents a displacement – in other words, is inscribed in imaginary phenomena – that it is an analyzable phenomenon. Second, a phenomenon is analyzable only if it represents something other than itself.</p>
<p>Pour aborder, d'une certaine façon, le sujet dont je parle, à savoir le symbolisme, je dirai que toute une part des fonctions imaginaires dans l'analyse n'ont pas d'autre relation avec la réalité fantasmatic que qu'elles manifestent que, si vous voulez, la syllabe « po » n'en a avec le vase aux formes, de préférence simples, qu'elle désigne. Comme on le voit facilement dans le fait que dans « police » ou « poltron » cette syllabe « po » a évidemment une toute autre valeur. On pourra se servir du « pot » pour symboliser la syllabe « po », inversement, dans le terme « police » ou « poltron », mais il conviendra alors d'y ajouter en même temps d'autres termes également imaginaires qui ne seront pas pris là pour autre chose que comme des syllabes destinées à compléter le mot.</p>	<p>In order to tackle, in a certain way, the subject I am speaking about, namely symbolism, I would say that a large portion of imaginary functions in analysis have no more relation to the fantasmatic reality that they manifest, if you will, then the syllable “so” has with the word that deals with insemination that it designates. As we can easily see by the fact that in the words “solo” and “sojourn” this syllable “so” obviously takes on a totally different value. We can use the word “sow” to symbolize the syllable “so,” the inverse in the terms “solo” and “sojourn,” but then its advisable to add to it at the same time other equally imaginary terms that will not be understood as anything other than syllables destined to complete the word.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">2</p> <p>To broach the topic. I wish to speak about, namely symbolism, I will say that a broad range [15] of imaginary functions in analysis bear no other relation to the fantasmatic reality they manifest than the syllable “po” bears to the simply shaped vase it designates [in French the <i>t</i> in <i>pot</i> (meaning pot or vase) is silent]. In “police” or “poltroun,” the syllable “po” obviously has an entirely different value. One could use a vase to symbolize the syllable “po.” In the term “police” or “poltroun,” it would be necessary to add other equally imaginary terms that would not be taken for anything other than syllables designed to complete the word.</p>

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<p>C'est bien ainsi qu'il faut entendre le symbolique dont il s'agit dans l'échange analytique, à savoir que ce que nous trouvons, et ce dont nous parlons est ce que nous trouvons et retrouvons sans cesse, et que Freud a manifesté comme étant sa réalité essentielle, soit qu'il s'agisse de symptômes réels, actes manqués, et quoi que ce soit qui s'inscrit ; il s'agit encore et toujours de symboles et de symboles même très spécifiquement organisés dans le langage, donc fonctionnant à partir de cet équivalent du signifiant et du signifié : la structure même du langage.</p>	<p>It is thus that we must understand the symbolic which we deal with in the analytic exchange, namely that what we find, and that about which we speak is that which we find and rediscover constantly, and that Freud showed as being his essential reality, be it a question of real symptoms, parapraxes, and whatever else that gets inscribed: we continue to and always will deal with symbols and even symbols that are very specifically organized in language, thus functioning from the equivalence of the signifier and the signified: the very structure of language itself.</p>	<p>This is how we must understand the symbolic that is involved in psychoanalytic exchange. Whether it is a matter of real symptoms, bungled actions, or whatever we constantly find and re-find, which Freud referred to as its essential reality, it is always a matter of symbols – symbols organized in language and which thus function on the basis of the link between the signifier and the signified, which is equivalent to the very structure of language.</p>
<p>⁽¹²⁾ Il n'est pas de moi ce terme que « le rêve est un rébus » ; c'est de Freud lui-même. Et que le symptôme n'exprime, lui aussi, quelque chose de structuré et d'organisé comme un langage est suffisamment manifesté par le fait, pour partir du plus simple d'entre eux, du symptôme hystérique qui est, qui donne toujours quelque chose d'équivalent d'une activité sexuelle, mais jamais un équivalent univoque, au contraire il est toujours plurivoque, superposé, surdéterminé, et, pour tout dire, très exactement construit à la façon dont les images sont construites dans les rêves, comme représentant une concurrence, une superposition de symboles, aussi complexe que l'est une phrase poétique</p>	<p>I did not make up this expression “the dream is a rebus,” it was Freud himself. That symptoms also express something that is structured and organized like a language is sufficiently shown by the fact that, starting with the most simple among them, the hysterical symptom always leads us to something equivalent to a sexual activity, but never an univocal equivalence. On the contrary, it is always plurivocal, superimposed, overdetermined, and in sum very precisely constructed in the same way that images are constructed in dreams, as representations of a competition, a superimposition of symbols, as complex as a line of poetry that means something different according to its tone, its</p>	<p>The notion that a dream is a rebus¹ comes from Freud, not from me. The fact that a symptom expresses something structured and organized like language is sufficiently manifested by [16] hysterical symptoms, to begin with the simplest of symptoms, which always provide something equivalent to a sexual activity, but never a univocal equivalent. On the contrary, they are always polyvalent, superimposed, overdetermined, and, indeed, constructed in the exact same way as images are constructed in dreams. We find here a coming together or superimposing of symbols that is as complex as a poetic phrase whose tone, structure, puns, rhythms, and sound are all crucial. Everything occurs on several</p>

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<p>qui vaut à la fois par son ton, sa structure, ses calembours, ses rythmes, sa sonorité, donc essentiellement sur plusieurs plans, et de l'ordre et du registre du langage.</p>	<p>structure, its puns, its rhythms, and its sonority all at once, thus essentially in many domains, both of the order and in the register of language.</p>	<p>levels and partakes of the order and register of language. <i>TN1. The term "rebus" seems to appear initially on the first page of chapter 6, "The Dream Work," in Freud's Interpretation of Dreams (SE IV, p.277)</i></p>
<p>À la vérité, ceci ne nous apparaîtra peut-être pas suffisamment dans son relief, si nous n'essayons pas de voir quand même qu'est-ce que c'est, tout à fait originairement que le langage !</p>	<p>In truth, this may not appear to us in sufficient detail if we do not even at least try to see what language is at its most originary.</p>	<p>The importance of this will not sink in if we do not try to see what language is originally.</p>
<p>Bien entendu (la question de l'origine du langage, nous ne sommes pas ici pour faire un délire collectif, ni organisé, ni individuel. C'est un des sujets qui peuvent le mieux prêter à ces sortes de délires) sur la question de l'origine du langage ; le langage est là ; c'est un émergent. Et maintenant qu'il a émergé, nous ne saurons plus jamais quand ni comment il a commencé, ni comment c'était avant qu'il soit.</p>	<p>Of course the question of the origin of language, (we are not here to get a collective delusion going, nor an organized or individual one. This is one of those subjects that lends itself best to these kinds of delusions). Language is here, it comes forth (<i>c'est un émergent</i>). And now that it has emerged, we will never again know how or why it began, nor how things were before it was.</p>	<p>Of course, the question of the origin of language, is a topic that can easily lend itself to organized, collective, or individual delusions. We must not engage in that sort of thing. Language exists. It is something that has emerged. Now that it has emerged, we shall never know either when or how it began, or how things were before it came into being.</p>
<p>Mais quand même, comment exprimer ce quelque chose qui doit peut-être s'être présenté comme une des formes les plus primitives du langage ? Pensez aux mots de passe. Voyez-vous, je choisis exprès cet exemple, justement parce que l'erreur et le mirage, quand [5] on parle du sujet du langage, est toujours de croire que sa signification ⁽¹³⁾est ce qu'il désigne. Mais non, mais non. Bien sûr qu'il désigne quelque chose, il remplit une certaine fonction. Et je choisis exprès le mot de passe, parce que le mot de passe a cette</p>	<p>But even still, how to explain this something that perhaps must present itself as one of the most primitive forms of language? Think about passwords. You see, I purposefully choose this example precisely because the error and the mirage when we talk about the subject of language is always to believe that it means what it designates. Oh no, no, no. Of course it designates something, it performs a certain function. And I purposefully choose the password because the password has the property of</p>	<p>But still, how can we express what is perhaps one of the most primitive forms of language? Consider passwords. I am choosing this example deliberately because the illusion, when we speak [17] of language, is always to believe that its signification is what it designates. But this is not at all the case. Of course, it designates something, it serves a certain function at this level. But a password has the property of being chosen in a way that is thoroughly independent of its signification.</p>

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<p>propriété d’être choisi justement d’une façon tout à fait indépendante de sa signification (et si celle-ci est idiote, à quoi l’École répond – sans doute faut-il ne jamais répondre – que la signification d’un tel mot est de désigner celui qui le prononce comme ayant telle ou telle propriété répondant à la question qui fait donner le mot. D’autres diraient que l’exemple est mal choisi parce qu’il est pris à l’intérieur d’une convention, ça vaut mieux encore) et, d’un autre côté, on ne peut pas nier que le mot de passe n’ait les vertus les plus précieuses. Il sert tout simplement à vous éviter d’être tué.</p>	<p>being chosen precisely in a way that is totally independent of its meaning (and if this meaning is idiotic, which the School has an answer for – no doubt one must never respond – that the meaning of such a word is to designate that he who pronounces it as having this or that property that responds to the question that makes the word be given [<i>qui fait donner le mot</i>]. Others would say that this example is poorly chosen because it is taken from the interior of a convention, but that is even better) and, on the other hand, we cannot deny that the password has even more worthwhile virtues. It serves quite simply to prevent you from being killed.</p>	<p>But what if the latter is idiotic? The Scholastics reply – one should no doubt never reply (<i>répond</i>)¹ that the signification of such a word is to designate the person who pronounces it as having such and such a property corresponding to the question that makes him pronounce the word. Others would say that it is a poor example because it is selected from within a convention. But this makes it even better. On the other hand, you cannot deny that a password has the most precious qualities, since it can help you avoid getting killed. <small>TN1. Répondre (reply) also means “talk back” or give “backchat.”</small></p>
<p>C’est bien ainsi que nous pouvons considérer effectivement le langage comme ayant une fonction. Né entre ces animaux féroces qu’ont dû être les hommes primitifs (à en juger d’après les hommes modernes, ce n’est pas invraisemblable), le mot de passe est justement ce à quoi non pas « se reconnaissent les hommes du groupe », mais « se constitue le groupe »</p>	<p>This is thus the way in which, in effect, we may consider language as having a function. Born among the ferocious animals that primitive men must have been (judging by modern men this is not hard to imagine), the password is precisely not that by which “the men of the group recognize one another,” but rather that “by which the group is constituted.”</p>	<p>This is how we can consider language to have a function. Born among the ferocious animals that primitive men must have been – it’s not unlikely, judging on the basis of modern men – a password is something thanks to which a group is constituted, not something thanks to which the men in a group are recognized.</p>
<p>Il y a un autre registre où l’on peut méditer sur cette fonction du langage ; c’est celui du langage stupide de l’amour, qui consiste au dernier degré du spasme de l’extase – ou au contraire de la routine, selon les individus – à, subitement</p>	<p>There is another register in which we can think the function of language, that of the sappy language of love, which ultimately consists in the spasm of ecstasy – or on the contrary in the routine according to which individuals suddenly start describing</p>	<p>There is another realm in which one can meditate upon the function of language: the stupid [18] language of love. The latter consists – in the final spasm of ecstasy or, on the contrary, as part of the daily grind, depending on the individuals -</p>

<p>qualifier son partenaire sexuel du nom d'un légume des plus vulgaires, ou d'un animal des plus répugnants. Ceci exprime aussi certainement quelque chose qui n'est certainement pas loin de toucher à la question de l'horreur de l'anonymat. Ce n'est pas ⁽¹⁴⁾pour rien que telle ou telle de ces appellations, animal ou support plus ou moins totémique, se retrouve dans la phobie. C'est évidemment qu'il y a, entre les deux, quelque point commun ; le sujet humain est tout à fait spécialement exposé, nous verrons tout à l'heure, à cette sorte de vertige qui surgit et éprouve le besoin de l'éloigner, le besoin de faire quelque chose de transcendant ; ce n'est pas pour rien dans l'origine de la phobie.</p>	<p>their sexual partners with the names of the most common vegetables or of the most repugnant animals. This surely expresses something that is certainly not far from touching on the question of the fear of anonymity. It's not for nothing that one or the other of these animal names or more or less totemic objects is rediscovered in phobias. It's obvious that they share a point of commonality between them. The human subject is especially totally exposed, well shall soon see, to this kind of vertigo that surges forth and causes him to feel the need to distance himself, the need to make something transcendent. It's not for nothing that we find it at the origin of phobias.</p>	<p>- in suddenly calling one's sexual partner by the name of a thoroughly ordinary vegetable or repugnant animal.¹ This certainly borders on the question of the horror of anonymity. It is no accident that certain of these animal names or more or less totemic props are found anew in phobia. The two have something in common. The human subject is, as we shall see later, especially prone to vertigo, and to get rid of it feels the need to create something transcendent. This is not insignificant in the origin of phobia. <i>TN1. Regarding "calling one's sexual partner by the name of a thoroughly ordinary vegetable or repugnant animal," consider the French habit of calling loved ones by such names as <i>mon petit chou</i> (literally, my little cabbage, figuratively my darling) or <i>mon petit crapaud</i> (my little toad).</i></p>
<p>Dans ces deux exemples, le langage est particulièrement dépourvu de signification. Vous voyez là le mieux ce <i>qui distingue le symbole du signe à savoir la fonction interhumaine du symbole</i>. Je veux dire quelque chose qui naît avec le langage et qui fait qu'après que le mot (et c'est à quoi sert le mot) a été vraiment parole prononcée, les deux partenaires sont autre chose qu'avant. Ceci sur l'exemple le plus simple.</p>	<p>In these two examples language is particularly stripped of meaning. Thus here can best be seen <i>that which distinguishes the symbol from the sign, namely the interhuman function of the symbol</i>. I mean something that is born with language and makes it such that after the word, (and this is what the word is used for), was truly a spoken word, the two partners are something other than before – referring to the most elementary example.</p>	<p>In these two examples, language is particularly devoid of signification. We can clearly see here what distinguishes symbols from signs – namely, the interhuman function from signs – namely, the interhuman function of symbols. This is something which is born with language and which is such that, after the word has truly become pronounced speech, the two partners are no longer what they were before. This is what words are for, as I've shown you now using the simplest examples.</p>
<p>Vous auriez tort d'ailleurs de croire que ce n'est pas justement des exemples</p>	<p>By the way you are wrong if you believe that these are not particularly full</p>	<p>You would, moreover, be wrong to believe that these are not fully fledged</p>

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<p>particulièrement pleins. Assurément à partir de ces quelques remarques, vous pourrez vous apercevoir que, quand même, soit dans le mot de passe, soit dans le mot qu'on appelle d'amour, il s'agit de quelque chose, qui en fin de compte, est plein de portée. Disons que la conversation qu'à un moment moyen de votre carrière d'étudiant, vous avez pu avoir à un dîner de patron également moyen, où le mode et la signification des choses qu'on échange combien ce caractère est équivalent de conversations rencontrées dans la rue et dans l'autobus, et qui n'est pas autre chose qu'une certaine façon de se faire reconnaître, ce qui justifierait Mallarmé disant que le langage était ⁽¹⁵⁾ « comparable à cette monnaie effacée qu'on se passe de la main à la main en silence »</p>	<p>examples. Surely based on these few remarks you will notice that, nonetheless, be it a password or the speech of lovebirds, in the end we are dealing with something that has great importance. Let us say that the conversation you might have at a typical moment in your career as a student, that you were able to have at dinner at your equally typical boss' house, where the mode and the signification of the things that we exchange [indistinct] how much this characteristic is equivalent to that of the conversations we encounter on the sidewalk and on the bus, and which is nothing other than a certain way of getting oneself recognized, which justifies Mallarmé's having said that language was "comparable to the fake rubbed-out coins that get passed from person-to-person in silence".</p>	<p>examples. Whether in [19] the case of passwords or words of endearment, we are talking about something that is full-blown in scope. [Not so in the case of] a conversation that at an average moment of your career as a student you have at a dinner with equally average professors, where the signification of things exchanged has a character tantamount to that of conversations with people you meet on the street or the bus – nothing but a certain way of getting yourself recognized is involved here and this justifies Mallarmé's claim that language is "comparable to worn coins that are passed from hand to hand in silence." <small>TN1. The reference to Mallarmé is to a passage in his preface to René Ghil (1866), <i>Traité du Verbe</i>, see Stéphane Mallarmé, <i>Oeuvres complètes</i>, Paris: Gallimard, 1945, pp. 368 and 857. Words are apparently missing in the stenography of this sentence and the exact meaning is uncertain.</small></p>
<p>Voyons donc en somme de quoi il s'agit à partir de là, et, en somme ce qui s'établit quand le névrosé arrive à l'expérience analytique.</p>	<p>Let's take a look therefore at what we are dealing with here, and with what is established when the neurotic begins his analytic experience.</p>	<p>Let us consider on this basis what happens when the neurotic comes in for an analysis.</p>
<p>C'est que lui aussi commence à dire des choses. Il dit des choses, et les choses qu'il dit, il n'y a pas énormément à nous étonner si, au départ, elles ne sont pas non plus autre chose que ces paroles de peu de poids auxquelles je viens de faire allusion. Néanmoins, il y a quelque chose qui est fondamentalement différent, c'est</p>	<p>He also starts out by saying things. He says things, and it shouldn't be a huge surprise to us if the things he says in the beginning are not much besides the featherweight words I just alluded to. Nevertheless, there is something that is fundamentally different, which is that he comes to the analysis for something else than just to</p>	<p>He too begins to say things. We must not be surprised if, at the outset, the things he says have no more weight than the ones I just alluded to. Nevertheless, something is fundamentally different, which is that he comes to the analyst to exchange something other than idle chatter and</p>

<p>qu'il vient à l'analyste pour autre chose que pour dire des fadaises et des banalités que, d'ores et déjà, dans la situation est impliqué quelque chose, et quelque chose qui n'est pas rien, puisque en somme, c'est son propre sens plus ou moins qu'il vient chercher ; c'est que quelque chose est là mystiquement posé sur la personne de celui qui l'écoute. Bien entendu, il s'avance vers cette expérience, vers cette voie originelle, avec mon Dieu ! ce qu'il a à sa disposition : à savoir que ce qu'il croit d'abord c'est qu'il faut qu'il fasse le médecin lui-même, qu'il renseigne l'analyste. Bien entendu, vous avez votre expérience quotidienne ; le remettant à son plan, disons que ce dont il s'agit, ce n'est pas de cela, mais qu'il s'agit de parler, et, de préférence, sans chercher soi-même à mettre de l'ordre, de l'organisation, c'est-à-dire à se mettre, selon un narcissisme bien connu, à la place de son interlocuteur.</p>	<p>utter twaddle and banalities, that right from the start something is implied in this position, something that is not nothing, since in short it is his very own sense more or less that he has come looking for, and that something is mystically placed upon the person of the one who listens to him. Naturally he advances towards this experience, towards this originary pathway, using my God all that he has at his disposition: namely that what he at first believes is that he must make himself into the doctor and teach the analyst something! Naturally, you have your own everyday experience. To situate it in its proper domain, let us say that what we are dealing with is not that, but rather with speaking, and preferably speaking without one's looking to give order to it, organization, which is to say to put oneself, as in a well-known narcissism, in the place of one's interlocutor.</p>	<p>banalities. Something not insignificant is already implied in this situation, since, in short, it is his own meaning that he has basically come to seek. Something is mystically placed her on the person who listens to him. [20] Of course, the neurotic advances toward this experience, this original pathway, with – by God – what he has at his disposal. What he believes first is that he must play the part of the doctor himself, he must inform the analyst. Naturally, in your everyday practice, you set him straight, saying that that's not what it's about, but to speak and preferably without seeking to put his thoughts in order or organize them – in other words, without putting himself, in accordance with a well-known narcissistic maneuver, in the place of his interlocutor.</p>
<p>En fin de compte, la notion que nous avons du névrosé c'est que dans ses symptômes même, c'est une « parole bâillonnée » où s'exprime un certain nombre, disons ⁽¹⁶⁾ de « transgressions à un certain ordre », qui, par elles-mêmes crient au ciel l'ordre négatif dans lequel elles se sont inscrites. Faute de réaliser l'ordre du symbole d'une façon vivante, le sujet réalise des images désordonnées</p>	<p>In the end the notion that we have of the neurotic is that in his very symptoms there is a "muted speech" that expresses a certain number of let's say "transgressions of a certain order," that themselves shout out to the heavens the negative order in which they are inscribed. Failing to achieve the symbolic order in a living way, the subject produces disorganized images as substitutes and, of course, this is what</p>	<p>In the end, the notion we have of the neurotic is that gagged speech lives in his very symptoms, speech in which a certain number, let us say, of transgressions with respect to a certain order are expressed, which, by themselves, loudly fustigate the cruel world in which they have been inscribed. Failing to realize the order of symbols in a living fashion, the subject realizes disorganized images for which</p>

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<p>dont elles sont les substituts. Et, bien entendu, c'est cela qui va d'abord et d'ores et déjà s'interposer à toute relation symbolique véritable.</p>	<p>is going to intervene from the very start in every truly symbolic relation.</p>	<p>these transgressions are substitutes. This is what will initially get in the way of any true symbolic relationship.</p>
<p>Ce que le sujet exprime d'abord et d'ores et déjà quand il parle, s'explique, c'est ce registre que nous appelons les « résistances » ; ce qui ne veut et ne peut s'interpréter autrement que comme le fait d'une réalisation <i>hic et nunc</i>, dans la situation et avec l'analyste, de l'image ou des images qui sont celles de l'expérience précoce.</p>	<p>That which the subject expresses first of all and from the very start when he speaks is explicable; this is the register of that which we call "the resistances," which may not be interpreted otherwise than as the fact of a production (<i>réalisation</i>) in the <i>hic et nunc</i>, in the clinical setting and with the analyst, of the image or images that are part of the early experience.</p>	<p>What the subject expresses first when he speaks is the register of what we call resistances, which can only be interpreted as the fact of realizing an [21] image or images of early experience <i>hic et nunc</i>, here and now, in the analytic situation with the analyst.</p>
<p>Et c'est bien là-dessus que toute la théorie de la résistance s'est édifiée, et cela seulement après la grande reconnaissance de la valeur symbolique du symptôme et de tout ce qui peut être analysé.</p>	<p>And it is definitely upon this very point that the entire theory of resistance has been erected, and that only after the great recognition of the symbolic value of the symptom and of all that can be analyzed.</p>	<p>The entire theory of resistance was built upon this, but only after the major recognition of the symbolic value of symptoms and of everything that can be analyzed.</p>
<p>Ce que l'expérience prouve et rencontre, c'est justement autre chose que la réalisation du symbole ; c'est la tentative par le sujet, de constituer <i>hic et nunc</i>, dans l'expérience analytique, cette référence imaginaire, ce que nous appelons les tentatives du sujet de faire entrer l'analyste dans son jeu. Ce que nous voyons par exemple, dans le cas de « l'homme aux rats », quand nous nous apercevons (vite, mais pas tout de suite, et Freud non plus), qu'à raconter son histoire obsessionnelle, la grande observation autour du supplice des rats, il y a tentative du sujet de réaliser <i>hic et nunc</i>, ici et avec</p>	<p>What this experience encounters and affirms is precisely something other than the production (<i>réalisation</i>) of the symbol. It's the attempt by the subject to constitute in the <i>hic et nunc</i>, in the analytic experience, an imaginary reference. We call these the attempts by the subject to make the analysis play by his rules. Something we see, for example, in the case of the Rat Man when we soon notice, (though not right away, and Freud didn't either), that in telling his obsessional story, the great reproach of the rat punishment, there is an attempt by the subject to produce in the <i>hic et nunc</i>,</p>	<p>Now, what psychoanalysis encounters is precisely something other than realizing symbols. It is the subject's temptation to constitute this imaginary reference point here and now in psychoanalytic experience. We call this an attempt by the subject to draw the analyst into his game. This is what we see, for example in the case of the Rat Man, when we perceive – quickly, but not immediately, and Freud doesn't either – that, by recounting the grand obsessional story of the rat torture, the subject attempts to realize here and now with Freud the very imaginary anal-</p>

<p>Freud, cette sorte de relation sadique-anale imaginaire qui constitue à elle seule le sel de l'histoire. ⁽¹⁷⁾Et Freud s'aperçoit fort bien, qu'il s'agit de quelque chose qui se trahit et se traduit physiologiquement, sur la tête même, la face du sujet, par ce qu'il qualifie à ce moment-là « l'horreur de la jouissance ignorée »</p>	<p>there with Freud, a sort of imaginary anal-sadistic relationship that itself comprises the heart of the story. And Freud catches on fast that he was dealing with something that betrayed itself physiognomically in the subject's very face, because he describes it at that moment as marked by the horror of a jouissance of which the subject was unaware.</p>	<p>sadistic relationship that makes the story piquant. Freud perceives quite astutely that something is involved that is translated and betrayed physiologically on the subject's very face and that he qualifies as "<i>horror at a jouissance of his own of which he himself was unaware.</i>"¹ TN1. See SE X, pp. 166-7. In Strachey's translation, the passage reads as follows: "his face took on a very strange, composite expression I could only interpret as one of <i>horror at pleasure of his own which he himself was unaware.</i>"</p>
<p>À partir du moment où ces éléments de la résistance sont survenus dans l'expérience analytique, qu'on a pu mesurer, poser comme tels, c'est bien un moment significatif dans l'histoire de l'analyse. Et on peut dire que c'est à partir du moment où on a su en parler d'une façon cohérente et à la date, par exemple, de l'article de Reich, un des premiers articles à ce sujet (paru dans <i>l'International Journal</i>), au moment où Freud faisait surgir le second dans l'élaboration de la théorie analytique et qui ne représente rien d'autre que la théorie du moi ; vers cette époque, en 1920, apparaît « <i>das Es</i> » et à ce moment-là, nous commençons à nous apercevoir à l'intérieur (il faut toujours le maintenir à l'intérieur du registre de la relation symbolique), que le sujet résiste ; que cette résistance, ça n'est pas quelque chose comme une simple inertie opposée au mouvement thérapeutique, comme en physique on</p>	<p>Beginning with moment when these elements of resistance arose in analytic experience, that we were able to take stock of them, interrogate them as such, is a truly significant moment in the history of analysis. And we might say that starting with the moment when we became able to speak about them in a coherent way, at the very date for example when Reich's article, one of the very first on the subject, (which first appeared in the <i>International Journal</i>), during the period when Freud was fueling the emergence of the second elaboration of analytic theory, none other than the theory of the ego; around this time in 1920, "<i>Das Es</i>" appears, and at that very moment we come to notice that in the interior, (we must always retain him in the interior of the register of the symbolic relation), the subject resists; that this resistance is not something like a simple inertia that is opposed to motion of the therapy, as when we would say in</p>	<p>The moment at which people were able to gauge and posit as resistance elements that manifest [21] themselves in psychoanalytic practice was certainly a significant moment in analytic history. This was first spoken about in a coherent fashion in Reich's article, one of the first articles on the topic published in the <i>International Journal of Psychoanalysis</i>, at the same time at which Freud constructed the second stage in the development of psychoanalytic theory, which is no other than the theory of the ego. Around this time, in 1920, <i>das Es</i> [the id] appears. At that moment, we begin to perceive, within the register of the symbolic relationship – and it must always be maintained there – that the subject resists and that this resistance is not a simple inertia opposed to the therapeutic movement, as in physics one could say that a mass resists acceleration.</p>

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<p>pourrait dire que la masse résiste à toute accélération. C'est quelque chose qui établit un certain lien, qui s'oppose comme tel, comme une action humaine, à celle du thérapeute ; mais à ceci près qu'il ne faut pas que le thérapeute s'y trompe. Ce n'est pas à lui, en tant que réalité qu'on s'oppose, c'est dans la mesure où, à sa place, est réalisée une certaine image que le sujet projette sur lui.</p>	<p>physics that mass resists acceleration. It's something else, something that establishes a certain bond that opposes itself as such, as a human creation, to that of the therapist. Except that the analyst must not be fooled by this. It's not to him in reality that this resistance opposes itself, it's insofar as a certain image that the subject projects onto him succeeds in taking his place.</p>	<p>It establishes a certain bond that is opposed as such, like the human action, to the therapist's action, except that the therapist must not be misled by it. The patient is not opposing him as a real person [<i>réalité</i>], but rather as a certain image that the subject projects onto him, to the extent to which it is realized in his place.</p>
<p>À la vérité, ces termes même ne sont qu'approximatifs.</p>	<p>In truth, these very concepts are only approximations.</p>	<p>These terms are, in fact, merely approximate.</p>
<p>⁽¹⁸⁾C'est à ce moment également que la notion d'instinct agressif naît, qu'il faut ajouter à la libido le terme de <i>destrudo</i>. Et ceci, non sans raison. Car à partir du moment où son but les fonctions tout à fait essentielles de ces relations imaginaires, telles qu'elles apparaissent sous forme de résistance, un autre registre apparaît qui n'est lié à rien de moins qu'à la fonction propre que joue le moi, à cette théorie du moi dans laquelle je n'entrerai pas aujourd'hui, et qui est ce qu'il faut absolument distinguer dans toute notion cohérente et organisée du moi de l'analyse ; à savoir du moi comme fonction imaginaire, du moi comme unie [7] du sujet aliéné à lui-même, du moi comme ce dans quoi le sujet ne peut se reconnaître d'abord qu'en s'aliénant, et donc ne peut se retrouver qu'en abolissant l'alter ego du moi, qui</p>	<p>It's also at this time that the notion of the aggressive instinct (<i>instinct agressif</i>) is born, that it becomes necessary to add the term <i>destrudo</i>* to that of the libido. This is not without some rationale, because starting with the moment where its aim...[indistinct]...the functions that are totally essential to these imaginary relations, such as they appear in the form of resistance, another register appears that is tied to nothing less than the function that is properly played by the ego, to this theory of the ego into which I will not enter today, and which is what must be absolutely distinguished from any and every coherent and organized notion of the ego in analysis, namely the ego as an imaginary function – as a unity of the subject alienated from himself, from the ego as that from inside of which the subject can only recognize himself by first</p>	<p>The notion of an aggressive instinct is also born [23] at this moment, the term <i>destrudo</i> being added to libido, not without reason, for from the moment at which its goal [words missing here . . .] the essential functions of these imaginary relationships such as they appear in the form of resistance, another register appears that is linked to nothing less than the specific role played by the ego. I will not go into the theory of the ego today except to say that, in any coherent and organized analytic notion of the ego, we must absolutely define the ego's imaginary function as the unity of the subject who is alienated from himself. The ego is something in which the subject cannot recognize himself at first except by alienating himself. He can thus only find himself by abolishing the ego's <i>alter ego</i>. Here we see the development</p>

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<p>comme tel, développe la dimension, très distincte de l'agression, qui s'appelle en elle-même et d'ores et déjà : l'agressivité.</p>	<p>alienating himself and thus cannot rediscover himself save by abolishing the ego's alter ego which, as such, develops the dimension, very distinct from that of aggression, which is already from the very start in and of itself called "aggressivity."³¹ <i>*Destrudo is a term introduced by Italian psychoanalyst Edoardo Weiss in 1935 to denote the energy of the death instinct, on the analogy of libido—and thus to cover the energy of the destructive impulse in Freudian psychoanalysis. The term 'destrudo' does not appear at all in the Standard Edition or in the <i>Gesammelte Werke</i>. Tr: "Aggressivité:" Lacan distinguishes aggressivity from instinctive aggression (for example Lorenz's notion of "frustration") by linking it to the imaginary function of the ego and its dialectical conflict with the alter ego in analysis.</i></p>	<p>of the dimension that is already referred to as "aggressiveness," which is quite distinct from aggression.</p>
<p>Je crois qu'il nous faut maintenant reprendre la question en ces deux registres : la question de la parole et la question de l'imaginaire.</p>	<p>I believe we must now take up our question again in these two registers: the question of speech and the question of the Imaginary.</p>	<p>We must now take up anew the question in the following two registers: speech and the imaginary.</p>
<p>La parole, je vous l'ai montré sous une forme abrégée, joue ce rôle essentiel de médiation. De médiation, c'est-à-dire de quelque chose qui change les deux partenaires en présence, à partir du moment où il a été réalisé. Ceci n'a rien d'ailleurs qui ne nous soit donné jusque dans le registre sémantique de certains groupes humains. Et si vous lisez (ce n'est pas un livre qui mérite toutes les recommandations, mais il est assez expressif et particulièrement maniable et</p>	<p>Speech, I showed it to you already in abbreviated form, plays the essential role of mediation. Mediation, which is to say it is something that changes the two partners who are present, beginning with the moment when it is produced. This by the way is not anything not already shown by the semantic register of certain human groups. And if you read (it's not a book that really merits a full recommendation, but it is expressive enough and particularly suitable and excellent as an introduction</p>	<p>Speech, as I showed you in an abbreviated form, plays the essential role of mediation. From the moment it is realized, mediation changes the two partners who find themselves in each other's [24] presence. There is nothing to this that has not already been given to us in the semantic register of certain human groups. Read, in this regard, the book by Leenhardt entitled <i>Do Kamo</i>.¹ I wouldn't give it my highest recommendation, but it is expressive</p>

<p>excellent comme introduction pour ceux qui ont besoin d'être introduits),⁽¹⁹⁾le livre de Leenhardt : <i>Do Kamo</i>, vous y verrez que chez les Canaques, il se produit quelque chose d'assez particulier sur le plan sémantique, à savoir que le mot « parole » signifie quelque chose qui va beaucoup plus loin que ce que nous appelons tel. C'est aussi bien une action. Et d'ailleurs aussi pour nous « parole donnée » est aussi une forme d'acte. Mais c'est aussi bien quelquefois un objet, c'est-à-dire quelque chose qu'on porte, une gerbe... C'est n'importe quoi. Mais, à partir de là, quelque chose existe qui n'existait pas avant. Il conviendrait aussi de faire une autre remarque : c'est que cette parole médiatrice n'est pas purement et simplement médiatrice sur ce plan élémentaire ; qu'elle permet entre deux hommes de transcender la relation agressive fondamentale au mirage du semblable. Il faut qu'elle soit encore bien autre chose, car si l'on y réfléchit, on voit que non seulement elle constitue cette médiation, mais aussi bien, elle constitue la réalité elle-même : Ceci est tout à fait évident si vous considérez ce qu'on appelle une structure élémentaire, c'est-à-dire archaïque de la parenté. Loin d'être élémentaires, elles ne le sont pas toujours. Par exemple, spécialement complexe (mais, à la vérité ces structures complexes n'existeraient pas sans le système des</p>	<p>for those who have need of being introduced), the book by Leenhardt, <i>Do Kamo</i>, you will find that the natives of New Caledonia produce something quite particular in the semantic field, namely the word "speech" (<i>parole</i>) signifies something that goes much further than what we call it as such. It is also an act. And also by the way for us the "gift of speech" is a form of act. But it's also sometimes an object, meaning something that we carry around, a sheaf (<i>gerbe</i>)...it's any old thing. But from this point forward, something exists that didn't exist before. This is also a good time to make another remark: that this mediating speech is not purely and simply a mediator in this elementary domain, but that it also allows for two people to transcend the fundamental, aggressive relationship of the self to the mirage of its mirror image in the other (<i>le mirage du semblable</i>). It must be something more as well, because if you reflect on it, you can see that it not only constitutes a mediation, but also constitutes reality itself: this is totally obvious if you consider that which we call the elementary, meaning archaic, structure of parental lineage. Far from being elementary, they are not always so. For example, especially complex, (but in truth these complex structures would not exist without the system of words that express them), the fact that, for us, the</p>	<p>enough and quite approachable. It is an excellent introduction for those who need to be introduced to the topic. You will see therein that, among the Kanak people of New Caledonia, something rather peculiar occurs at the semantic level – namely, that the word "speech" signifies something that goes much further than what goes by that name for us. For them, speech is also an action. Note that it is for us too, for to give one's word is a kind of act. But, among the Kanaks, it is also sometimes an object-- in other words, something that one carries, a sheaf [<i>gerbe</i>], for example. It can be anything. But, on this basis, something exists that did not exist before. Another remark should also be made. This mediating speech is not purely and simply mediating at an elementary level. It allows two men to transcend the fundamental aggressive relation to the mirage of their semblable². It must be something else as well for, if one thinks about it, one [25] sees that not only does it constitute this mediation but it also constitutes reality itself. This is quite obvious if you consider what is called an elementary structure – in other words, an archaic structure –of kinship. The structures of kinship are not always elementary. Ours, for example, are especially complex, but, in truth, they would not exist without the system of</p>
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<p>mots qui les exprime), le fait que, chez nous, les interdits qui règlent l'échange humain des alliances, au sens propre du mot, soient réduits à un nombre d'interdits excessivement restreint, tend à nous confondre des termes comme « père, mère, fils... » avec des relations réelles.</p>	<p>prohibitions that regulate the exchange of human alliances, in the proper sense of the term, are reduced to a number of prohibitions that are excessively restrained, leads us to fuse the concepts "mother, father, son..." with relations that are real.</p>	<p>words that express them. And the fact is that the prohibitions that regulate among us the human exchange involved in marriage [<i>alliances</i>], in the strict sense of the word, are reduced to an excessively small number. This is why we tend to confuse terms such as father, mother, son, and so on, with real relationships.</p> <p>TN1. Regarding Leenhardt, see "La parole qui dure" (Tradition, mythe, statut), <i>Do Kamo: la personne et le mythe dans le monde mélanésien</i>, Paris: Gallimard, 1947, pp. 173ff.</p> <p>TN2. <i>Sembable</i> is often translated as "fellow man" or "counterpart," but in Lacan's usage it refers specifically to the mirroring of two imaginary others (<i>a</i> and <i>a</i>¹) who <i>resemble</i> each other (or at least see themselves in each other). "Fellow man" corresponds well to the French <i>prochain</i>, points to man (not woman), the adult (not the child), and suggests fellowship, whereas in Lacan's work <i>sembable</i> evokes rivalry and jealousy first and foremost. "Counterpart" suggests parallel hierarchical structures within which the two people take on similar roles, that is, symbolic roles, as in "The Chief Financial Officer's counterpart in his company's foreign acquisition target was Mr. Juppé, the <i>Direteur financier</i>." I have revived the somewhat obsolete English "sembable" found, for example in <i>Hamlet</i>, Act V, scene II, line 124: "his sembable is his mirror; and who else would trace him, his umbrage, nothing more."</p>
<p>C'est parce que le système des relations de parenté, pour autant qu'il ait été fait, s'est extrêmement réduit, dans ses bornes et dans son champ. Mais ⁽²⁰⁾si vous faisiez partie d'une civilisation où vous ne pouvez pas épouser telle cousine au septième degré, parce qu'elle est considérée</p>	<p>This is because the system of lineal relations, insofar as it has been constructed, is extremely reduced in terms of its borders and its field. But if you take part in a civilization where you cannot marry this or that cousin seven times removed because she is considered to be</p>	<p>It is because the system of kinship relations is extremely reduced, in its boundaries and in its field. But it concerns symbols.¹</p> <p>TN1. A passage appears to be missing here, which could be roughly rendered as follows: But if you live in a culture in which you cannot marry your seventh cousin</p>

<p>comme cousine parallèle, ou inversement, comme cousine croisée, ou se retrouvant avec vous dans une certaine homonymie qui revient toutes les trois ou quatre générations, vous vous apercevriez que le mot et les symboles ont une influence décisive dans la réalité humaine, et c'est précisément que les mots ont exactement le sens que je décrète de leur donner. Comme dirait Humpty Dumpty dans Lewis Carroll quand on lui demande pourquoi. Il fait cette réponse admirable : « parce que je suis le maître »</p>	<p>a parallel cousin or inversely, as an intersecting cousin, when you find yourself in a certain homonymy with her that returns ever three or four generations, you will begin to appreciate that words and symbols have a decisive influence on human reality, and that it is precisely words that have this sense that I decree them to have -- as Humpty Dumpty would say in Lewis Carroll when he was asked "why," and he gives the following admirable reply: "Because I am the master."</p>	<p>because she is considered to be a parallel cousin or conversely, a crossed cousin – or because she is in a certain homonymic relation to you that comes back every three or four generations – you would perceive that words and symbols play a decisive role in human reality and that words have exactly the meaning decreed by me. As Lewis Carroll has Humpty Dumpty² reply admirably: "Because I am the master." <i>*from fn. on page 100</i> <i>TN2. [The actual passage is as follows:</i> <i>"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument," Alice objected.</i> <i>"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less."</i> <i>"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."</i> <i>"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master – that's all."]</i></p>
<p>Dites-vous qu'au départ, il est bien clair que c'est l'homme en effet qui donne son sens au mot. Et que si les mots ensuite se sont trouvés dans le commun accord de la communicabilité, à savoir que les mêmes mots servent à reconnaître la même chose, c'est précisément en fonction de relations, d'une relation de départ, qui a permis à ces gens d'être des gens qui communiquent. En d'autres termes, il n'est absolument pas question, sauf dans une perception psychologique exprimée,</p>	<p>Tell yourselves that in the beginning it is very clear that it is Man who indeed furnishes his own sense to the word. And that later if words were found in common for purposes of communication, that is to say that the same words were used to recognize the same things, this is the result of a function of relationships, of a relationship that begins, that allowed these people to be people who communicate. In other words, it is absolutely not a question, except in a</p>	<p>It should be clear to you that, at the outset, it is indeed man who gives meaning to words. And if words are then commonly agreed upon for the sake of communicability – namely, the same words come to serve to recognize the same thing – it is precisely due to relations, to an initial relationship, that allowed these people to be people who communicate. In other words, there is absolutely no question – except in a certain psychological perception – of trying to deduce how words stem from</p>

<p>d'essayer de déduire comment les mots sortent des choses et leur sont successivement et individuellement appliqués ; mais de comprendre que c'est à l'intérieur du système total du discours, de l'univers d'un langage déterminé, qui comporte, par une série de complémentarités, un certain nombre de significations ; que ce qu'il y a à signifier, à savoir les choses, a à s'arranger à prendre place.</p>	<p>psychological perception that is expressed, of trying to deduce how words come from things and are successively and individually applied to them, but rather of understanding that it is from within the interior of an overall system of discourse, from the universe of an already determined language, that comprises, through a series of complementarities, a certain number of meanings – that what there is to signify, namely things, must arrange themselves and take their places.</p>	<p>things and are successively and individually applied to them. Rather we must understand that it is within the total system of discourse – the universe of a specific language that involves, through a series of complementaries, a certain number of significations – that what there is to be signified, namely, things, must manage to find their place. This is how things have been constituted throughout history. And it is what renders particularly childish the whole theory of language that assumes we have to understand the role it plays in the formation of symbols. Such is the one give by Masserman. . . *from fn. on page 101</p>
<p>C'est bien ainsi que les choses, à travers l'histoire, se constituent. C'est ce qui rend particulièrement puérile toute théorie du langage, pour autant qu'on aurait à comprendre le rôle qu'il joue dans la formation ⁽²¹⁾des symboles. Que celle qui est par exemple donnée par [8] Massermann*, qui a fait là-dessus (dans l'International Journal of Psycho-analysis 1944), un très joli article qui s'appelle : « Language, behaviour and dynamic psychiatry ». Il est clair qu'un des exemples qu'il donne montre assez la faiblesse du point de vue behavioriste. Car c'est de cela qu'il s'agit en cette occasion. Il croit résoudre la question de la symbolique du langage, en donnant cet exemple : le conditionnement qui aurait de l'effet dans la réaction de contraction de la pupille à la lumière, qu'on aurait</p>	<p>This is the way that things, throughout history, have been constituted: This is what renders any theory of language particularly childish, so long as we must understand the role it plays in the formation of symbols. Take the example of Masserman, who wrote a very pretty article on this subject, (in the <i>International Journal of Psychoanalysis</i> of 1944), called "Language, Behavior and Dynamic Psychiatry." One of the examples he gives demonstrates clearly enough the weaknesses of the behaviorist viewpoint. Because behaviorism is what we are talking about in this case. He believes he has resolved the symbolic question of language in providing the following example: There seems to be a conditioning that can be produced when a pupil regularly contracts in reaction to</p>	<p>Jules H. Masserman published a very nice article in the <i>International Journal of Psychoanalysis</i> in 1944 entitled "Language, Behaviour and Dynamic Psychiatry."¹ One of the examples he gives there shows clearly the weakness of the behaviorist standpoint. Masserman believes he can resolve the question of language's symbolism by providing an example of conditioning. Researchers coordinated people's automatic reaction to light [26] – the contraction of the pupils – with the ringing of a bell. When they eliminated the light stimulus, the subjects' pupils would contract when the bell was rung. In a further step, the researchers managed to trigger the same reaction simply by having the subjects hear the word "contract." Do you believe this resolves the question of language</p>

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<p>régulièrement fait se produire en même temps qu’une clochette. On supprime ensuite l’excitation à la lumière, la pupille se contracte quand on agite la clochette. On finirait par obtenir la contraction de la pupille par la simple audition du mot « contract ». Croyez-vous qu’avec cela, vous avez résolu la question du langage et de la symbolisation ? Mais il est bien clair que si, au lieu de « contract », on avait dit autre chose, on aurait pu obtenir exactement le même résultat. Et ce dont il s’agit n’est pas le conditionnement d’un phénomène, mais ce dont il s’agit dans les symptômes c’est de la relation du symptôme avec le système tout entier du langage. C’est-à-dire, le système des significations des relations interhumaines comme telles.</p> <p><i>*Masserman is the correct spelling of his name.</i></p>	<p>light at the same time as a bell is rung. Then the stimulus of the light is removed and the pupil contracts when the bell is rung only. Finally the contraction of the pupil is obtained through the simple audition of the word “contract.” Do you believe that with this you have resolved the question of language and of symbolization? But it must be quite clear that if instead of the word “contract” one had said something else, one could have obtained exactly the same result. And that what we are dealing with here is not a conditioned phenomenon but the same thing as we deal with in symptoms. It’s the relation of the symptom to the systemic entirety of language, meaning the system of the meanings of interhuman relations as such.</p>	<p>and symbolization? If, instead of the word “contract” the researchers had enunciated some other word, they could have obtained exactly the same results. What is involved is not the conditioning of a phenomenon but what is involved in symptoms: the relationship between symptoms and the entire system of language, the significative system of interhuman relations as such.</p> <p><i>TN1. Lacan discusses the paper by Masserman, found in <i>IJP XXV</i>, 1-2 (1944): 1-8, at length in the <i>Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English</i>, trans. B. Fink, H Fink and R. Grigg, New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2006, pp. 225-7.</i></p>
<p>Je crois que le ressort de ce que je viens de vous dire est ceci : qu’est-ce que nous constatons, et en quoi est-ce que l’analyse recoupe très exactement ces remarques et nous en montre jusque dans le détail la portée et la présence ?</p>	<p>I believe that the force of what I just told you is the following: What do we observe, and from what cloth does analysis repeatedly cut these remarks and show us in the finest detail their importance and their presence?</p>	<p>Psychoanalysis precisely intersects these remarks and shows us their scope and presence in detail.</p>
<p>C’est ni plus ni moins qu’en ceci : que toute relation analysable, c’est-à-dire interprétable symboliquement, ⁽²²⁾est toujours plus ou moins inscrite dans une relation à trois. Déjà nous l’avons vu dans la structure même de la parole : médiation</p>	<p>It is from no more and no less than the following: That every analyzable human relationship, meaning symbolically interpretable, is always more or less inscribed in a relation of three. We have already seen this in the very structure of</p>	<p>The crux of what I just told you is in fact the following: any analyzable relationship – that is, any relationship that is symbolically interpretable – is always inscribed in a three-term relationship. As we have already seen in the very</p>

<p>entre tel et tel sujet, dans ce qui est réalisable libidinalement ; ce que nous montre l'analyse et ce qui donne sa valeur à ce fait affirmé par la doctrine et démontré par l'expérience que rien finalement ne s'interprète, car c'est de cela qu'il s'agit : que par l'intermédiaire de la réalisation œdipienne. C'est cela que ça veut dire. Cela veut dire que toute relation à deux est toujours plus ou moins marquée du style de l'imaginaire ; et que pour qu'une relation prenne sa valeur symbolique, il faut qu'il y ait la médiation d'un tiers personnage qui réalise, par rapport au sujet, l'élément transcendant grâce à quoi son rapport à l'objet peut-être soutenu à une certaine distance.</p>	<p>speech: a mediation between such and such subject from that which can be libidinally produced – something that analysis demonstrates and which lends its force to a fact that has been affirmed by the doctrine and demonstrated by experience, that in the end nothing is interpreted – since this is what we are dealing with – save via the intermediary of an Oedipal production. This is what this means. It means that every relation between two is always more or less marked with the style of the Imaginary, and that in order for a relation to take on its symbolic value, there must be the mediation of a third figure⁴ who fills in as, <i>vis a vis</i> the subject, the transcendent element thanks to which his relation to the object can be maintained at a certain distance.</p> <p>⁴ <i>Tr:</i> Personnage – this could also be translated as “character,” as in a literary figure or character in an (Oedipal) production.</p>	<p>structure of speech, what is libidinally realizable between two subjects requires mediation. This is what gives its true value to the fact, asserted by psychoanalytical [27] theory and demonstrated by experience, that nothing can be interpreted in the end – for that is what is at stake – except via Oedipus. This means that every two-term relationship is already more or less marked as imaginary in style. In order for relationship to take on its symbolic value, the mediation of a third personage is necessary who, in relation to the subject, realizes the transcendent element thanks to what his relation to the object can be sustained at a certain distance.</p>
<p>Entre le rapport imaginaire et le rapport symbolique, il y a toute la distance qu'il y a dans la culpabilité. C'est pour cela, l'expérience vous le montre, que la culpabilité est toujours préférée à l'angoisse. L'angoisse est en elle-même d'ores et déjà, nous le savons par les progrès de la doctrine et de la théorie de Freud, elle est toujours liée à une perte, c'est-à-dire à une transformation du moi,</p>	<p>There is, between the imaginary relation and the symbolic relation (<i>entre le rapport imaginaire et le rapport symbolique</i>), all the distance there is in guilt (<i>la culpabilité</i>). This is why, experience shows you, guilt is always preferred to angst.⁵ Angst is in itself always – we know this based on the progress of the doctrine and of Freud's theory – already linked to a loss, meaning to a transformation of the ego,</p>	<p>Between the imaginary relation and the symbolic relation lies the entire distance attributable to guilt. This is why, as psychoanalytic practice shows us, people always prefer guilt to anxiety. Thanks to the progress made by Freud's doctrine and theory, we know that anxiety is always linked to a loss – in other word, to a transformation of the ego, to a two-term relationship that is on</p>

<p>c'est-à-dire à une relation à deux sur le point de s'évanouir et à laquelle doit succéder quelque chose d'autre que le sujet ne peut pas aborder sans un certain vertige. C'est cela qui est le registre et la nature de l'angoisse. Dès que s'introduit le tiers, et qui entre dans le rapport narcissique introduit la possibilité d'une médiation réelle, par l'intermédiaire essentiellement du personnage qui, par rapport au sujet, ⁽²³⁾représente un personnage transcendant, autrement dit une image de maîtrise par l'intermédiaire de laquelle son désir et son accomplissement peuvent se réaliser symboliquement. À ce moment intervient un autre registre, qui est justement celui qu'on appelle : ou celui de la loi, ou celui de la culpabilité, selon le registre dans lequel il est vécu. (Vous sentez que j'abrège un peu ; c'est le terme. Je crois en donnant d'une façon abrégée ne pas vous dérouter trop pour autant, puisqu'aussi bien ce sont des choses qu'ici ou ailleurs dans nos réunions, j'ai répétées maintes fois).</p>	<p>meaning a relation of two that is on the verge of disappearing, and which must be succeeded by something else that the subject cannot grapple with without a certain vertigo. This is the register and the nature of angst. As soon as the "third term"⁶ is introduced...[indistinct]... which enters into the narcissistic relation, the possibility of a real mediation is introduced, essentially via the intermediary of the figure (<i>personage</i>) who, in relation to the subject, represents someone transcendent, otherwise put an image of mastery, via the intermediary of which his desire and its accomplishment can be produced symbolically. At this moment another register intervenes which is exactly that which we call: either the register of the Law, or that of guilt, according to the register in which it is lived. (You get the impression I am abridging things a bit; this is the word for it. I hope to avoid derailing you too much by giving you an abridged version, since these are things that I have repeated many times in one of our meetings or another).</p> <p>⁴Tr: <i>Personnage – this could also be translated as "character," as in a literary figure or character in an (Oedipal) production.</i></p> <p>⁵Tr: <i>L'angoisse – Lacan uses the word angoisse in the same way Freud used "angst," closer to the English word "angst" than "anxiety."</i></p> <p>⁶ Tr: <i>Le tiers – This could also be translated as the</i></p>	<p>the verge of vanishing, and which must give way to something that the subject cannot approach without a certain vertigo. This is the register and nature of anxiety. As soon as a third party is introduced, as soon as it enters into the narcissistic relationship, the possibility of a real mediation opens up essentially by means of the [28] personage who, in relation to the subject, represents a transcendent personage – in other words, an image of mastery by means of which the subject's desire and fulfillment can be symbolically realized. At this moment another register manifests itself which is either that of the law or that of guilt, depending on the register in which it is experienced.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">3</p> <p>You can tell that I am abbreviating things here a little bit. I hope it is not too disconcerting, however, since these things that I have repeated many times in our meetings.</p>
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	<p>“third figure” or the “third character,” with reference to the Oedipal production just mentioned.</p>	
<p>Ce que je voudrais souligner concernant ce registre, du symbolique, est pourtant important. C’est à savoir ceci : dès qu’il s’agit du symbolique, c’est-à-dire ce dans quoi le sujet s’engage, dans une relation proprement humaine, dès qu’il s’agit d’un registre du « je », ce dans quoi le sujet s’engage. Dans « je veux... j’aime... » il y a toujours quelque chose, littéralement parlé, de problématique, c’est-à-dire qu’il y a là un élément temporel très important à considérer. Qu’est-ce que je veux dire ainsi ? Ceci pose tout un registre de problèmes qui doivent être traités parallèlement à la question du rapport du symbolique et de l’imaginaire. La question de la constitution temporelle de l’action humaine est, elle, [9] son ampleur ce soir, il faut au moins indiquer que nous la rencontrons sans cesse dans l’analyse, je veux dire de la façon la plus concrète. Là aussi, pour la comprendre, ⁽²⁴⁾il convient de partir d’une notion structurale, si on peut dire existentielle, de la signification du symbole.</p>	<p>However what I would like to underline for you concerning this symbolic register is quite important. Namely this: that as soon as it is a question of the symbolic – meaning that inside which the subject is engaged in a properly human relation, as soon as it is a question of the register of the “I,” this thing the subject engages in when he says “I want...I love...” – there is always something, literally spoken, that is problematic, meaning that there is in it a temporal element that is very important to take into consideration. What do I mean by this? This presents us with an entire register of problems that must be addressed in parallel to the question of the relationship between the symbolic and the imaginary. The question of the temporal constitution of human action is, itself, absolutely inseparable from this first question. Although I cannot truly elucidate the fullest implications of this question this evening, I must at least point out that we constantly encounter it in analysis, and I mean in the most concrete way. Here as well, in order to understand, it makes sense to begin with a structural notion, “existential” we might say, of the meaning of the symbol.</p>	<p>I would like to underscore once again an important point concerning the symbolic register. As soon as the symbolic – that which is involved when the subject is engaged in a truly human relationship – is involved, as soon as a commitment is made by the subject that is expressed in the register of <i>I</i>, by an “I want” or “I love you,” there is always something problematic. The temporal element must be considered, which raises a whole range of problems that must be dealt with parallel [29] to the question of the relationship between the symbolic and the imaginary. The question of the temporal constitution of human action is inseparable from that of the relationship between the symbolic and the imaginary. Although I cannot discuss this topic fully this evening, I must at least indicate that we encounter it constantly in psychoanalysis and in the most concrete manner. Here too, in order to understand it, we must begin from a structural and, so to speak, existential notion of the signification of symbols.</p>
<p>Un des points qui paraît des plus< texte manque > de la théorie analytique, à savoir celui de l’automatisme, du prétendu</p>	<p>One of the points that appear to be most essential to analytic theory, namely that of compulsion (<i>automatisme</i>), of the so-</p>	<p>One of what appears to be the most well-established points in psychoanalytic theory is that of automatism, so-called</p>

<p>automatisme de répétition, celui dont Freud a si bien montré le premier exemple, et comme la première maîtrise agit : l'enfant dont on abolit, par la disparition, son jouet. Cette répétition primitive, cette scansion temporelle qui fait que l'identité de l'objet est maintenue : et dans la présence et dans l'absence, nous avons là très exactement la portée, la signification du symbole en tant qu'il se rapporte à l'objet, c'est-à-dire à ce qu'on appelle le concept.</p>	<p>called repetition compulsion, the first and best example of which was given by Freud, as the first act of mastery: the child who abolishes, via its disappearance, his toy.⁷ This primitive repetition, this temporal scansion that causes the identity of the object to be maintained in both its presence and its absence, we find here the precise range, the meaning of the symbol insofar as it relates to the object, meaning that which we call <i>the concept</i>.⁸</p> <p>⁷Tr: <i>A reference to Freud's observation of the Fort-Da game, which Lacan is here comparing to the emergence of the compulsion to repeat signifiers in order to master the angst of loss by giving it a temporal dimension.</i></p> <p>⁸Tr: <i>"Le concept," usually translated in the English of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit as "Notion," in German Begriff, which Hippolyte translates as "concept."</i></p>	<p>repetition automatism [or "repetition compulsion"], the first example of which Freud explained so clearly in <i>Beyond the Pleasure Principle</i> [(1920), SE XVIII, pp. 14-17]. We see there the first form of mastery in the making: the child abolishes his toy by making it disappear. This primitive repetition [i.e., making the toy disappear and reappear again and again] or temporal scansion is such that the identity of the object is maintained in both presence and absence. This gives us the precise scope of signification of the symbol inasmuch as it is related to the object – in other words, to what is known as the [30] concept.</p>
<p>Or, nous trouvons là aussi illustré quelque chose qui paraît si obscur quand on le lit dans Hegel, à savoir : que « le concept c'est le temps ». Il faudrait une conférence d'une heure pour faire la démonstration que le concept, c'est le temps. (Chose curieuse, Monsieur Hyppolite, qui travaille la phénoménologie de l'esprit, s'est contenté de mettre une note disant que c'était un des points les plus obscurs de la théorie de Hegel).</p>	<p>Thus we also find illustrated here something that seems to be so obscure when we read Hegel, namely that <i>the concept is time</i>.⁹ It would take an hour-long lecture to complete a demonstration that the concept is time. (A curious thing: M. Hippolyte, who is working on the translation of <i>The Phenomenology of Spirit</i>, contents himself with putting a small note here, saying that this is one of the most obscure points in Hegel's theory).</p> <p>⁹Tr: <i>More specifically Hegel says "the Notion is the</i></p>	<p>Now, something that seems so obscure when one reads about it in Hegel – namely, that the concept is time – is illustrated here. It would require a one-hour lecture to demonstrate that the concept is time. Curiously enough, Jean Hyppolite, in his [1941 French] translation of Hegel's <i>Phenomenology of Spirit</i>, confined himself to adding a footnote saying that this is one of the most obscure points in Hegel's theory. But, thanks to Freud's example, we can put our finger on the simple point which</p>

	time of the object.”	consists in saying that the symbol of the object is precisely the object that is here [<i>l’objet là</i>]. ¹
<p>Mais là, vous avez vraiment touché du doigt cette chose simple qui consiste à dire que le symbole de l’objet, c’est justement « l’objet là ». Quand il n’est plus là, c’est l’objet incarné dans sa durée, séparé de lui-même et qui, par là même, peut vous être en quelque sorte toujours présent, toujours là, toujours à votre disposition. Nous retrouvons là le rapport qu’il y a entre le symbole et le fait que tout ce qui est humain (25) est considéré comme tel, et plus c’est humain, plus c’est préservé, si on peut dire, du côté mouvant et décompensant du processus naturel. L’homme fait, et avant tout lui-même fait subsister dans une certaine permanence tout ce qui a duré comme humain.</p>	<p>But with this we have really put our finger on the simple fact of saying that the symbol of the object, is precisely the object “there.”¹⁰ When it is no longer “there,” it is the object incarnated in its duration, separated from itself and which, via the “there” itself, can always be in some way present to you, always “there,” always at your disposal. Here we rediscover the relation between the symbol and the fact that all that is human is considered symbolic, and that the more it is human, the more it is preserved, if we can put it thus, from the shifts and decompositions of natural processes. <i>Man makes everything that endures as human, above all himself, live on in a certain permanence.</i></p> <p>¹⁰Tr: <i>L’objet là – which translates into the object “fort” in the conceptual apparatus of Freud’s grandson. In the sentence that follows, Lacan will play off the word “là” in French, which has polyvalent significations as both “here” (Fort) and “there” (Da, or “not here”). I have chosen to translate it always as “there” while placing the word in quote to emphasize the conceptual nature of Lacan’s use of the word là in this way.</i></p>	<p>When it is no longer here, we have the object incarnated in its duration, separated from itself, and which, owing to this very fact, can be in some sense always present for you, always here, always here, always at your disposal. This points to the relationship that exists between symbols and the fact that everything that is human is preserved as such. The more it is human, the more it is preserved from the shifting and decomposing² aspect of natural processes. Man gives everything human that has lasted—himself first and foremost – a certain permanence.</p> <p>TN1. Colloquially, we might translate <i>l’objet là</i> as “this here object.” It suggests “the object that is right in front of you.” The French formulation imitates the translation into French of Heidegger’s <i>Dasein</i> as <i>être-là</i>, literally “there being”; hence “there object” or “the object as present.”</p> <p>TN2. Reading <i>décomposant</i> (decomposing) instead of <i>décompensant</i> (decompensating).</p>
<p>Et nous retrouvons un exemple. Si j’avais voulu prendre par un autre bout la question du symbole, au lieu de partir du mot, de la parole ou de la petite gerbe, je</p>	<p>Here is an example. If I had wanted to approach this from the other side of the question of the symbol, instead of starting with the word, with speech or the small</p>	<p>Let me give another example. If I had wanted to broach the question of symbols from a [31] different angle, instead of beginning from the word,</p>

<p>serais parti du tumulus sur le tombeau du chef ou sur le tombeau de n'importe qui. C'est ce qui caractérise l'espèce humaine, justement, d'environner le cadavre de quelque chose qui constitue une sépulture, de maintenir le fait que « ceci a duré ». Le tumulus ou n'importe quel autre signe de sépulture mérite très exactement le nom de symbole, de quelque chose d'humanisant. J'appelle symbole tout ce dont j'ai tenté de montrer la phénoménologie.</p>	<p>sheaf, I would have started with the burial mound that rests atop the tomb of a chieftain or whoever else. This is exactly what characterizes the human species – to surround a cadaver with something that constitutes a grave, to maintain the fact that “this endured.” The burial mound or whatever other sign of a burial place merits very precisely the name of symbol, of something that makes human. Everything that I have heretofore tried to demonstrate the phenomenology of is what I call “symbol.”</p>	<p>speech, or small sheaf, I would have started from the tumulus over the chief's tomb, or over the tomb of anyone at all. What characterizes our species is precisely the fact of surrounding cadavers with something that constitutes a grave, marking the fact that this person lived. A tumulus or any other sign of burial warrants being called a “symbol.” It is something humanizing. I term “symbol” everything whose phenomenology I have tried to demonstrate.</p>
<p>C'est pourquoi si je vous signale ceci, ce n'est évidemment pas sans raison, et la théorie de Freud a dû se pousser jusqu'à la notion qu'elle a mise en valeur d'un instinct de mort, et tous ceux qui, dans la suite, en mettant l'accent uniquement sur ce qui est l'élément résistance, c'est-à-dire l'élément action imaginaire pendant l'expérience analytique, et annulant plus ou moins la fonction symbolique du langage, sont les mêmes pour qui l'instinct de mort est quelque chose qui n'a pas de raison d'être.</p>	<p>This is why -- if I am drawing your attention to this it is not without reason – Freud's theory had to push itself all the way to the concept (<i>notion</i>) that it valorized, that of a death instinct (<i>instinct de mort</i>), and why all those who came after, by putting the accent only on the element of resistance, meaning the element of imaginary action in analytic experience, and more or less nullifying the symbolic function of language, are the same ones for whom the death instinct is something that has no “raison d'être.”</p>	<p>I obviously have my reasons for pointing this out to you. Indeed, Freud's theory had to go so far as to highlight the notion of a death instinct. The analysts who, afterward, stressed only the element of resistance – in other words, the elements of imaginary action in analysis, more or less canceling out the symbolic function of language – are the same ones for whom the death instinct is a notion that has no <i>raison d'être</i>.</p>
<p>Cette façon de « réaliser », au sens propre du mot, de ramener à un certain réel l'image, bien entendu y ayant inclus comme une fonction essentiellement un particulier signe de ce réel, ramener au réel l'expression ⁽²⁶⁾analytique, est toujours chez ceux qui n'ont pas ce</p>	<p>This way of “producing,” (<i>réaliser</i>) in the proper sense of the word, of hauling the image back towards a certain real, the image of course being included here as a function, essentially a particular sign of the real, of hauling the expression of analysis back to the real, is always, for</p>	<p>To realize – in the strict sense of the word – to bring the image back to a certain reality [<i>réel</i>] after having included in it, of course, a particular sign of this reality [<i>réel</i>] as an essential function, to bring psychoanalytic expression back to reality [<i>réel</i>], is always correlated – among [32]</p>

<p>registre, qui la développent sous ce registre, est toujours corrélatif de la mise entre parenthèses, voire l'exclusion de ce que Freud a mis sous le registre de l'instinct de mort, ou qu'il a appelé plus ou moins automatisme de répétition.</p>	<p>those who do not work in this register, who develop it underneath this register, is always correlated to a putting in parentheses (viz. the exclusion) of what Freud placed in the register of the death instinct, or that which he more or less called the repetition compulsion.</p>	<p>those who developed it in this register because they have nothing else – with bracketing or even excluding what Freud placed under the heading of the death instinct, which is essentially called repetition automatism.</p>
<p>Chez Reich, c'est exactement caractéristique. Pour Reich tout ce que le patient raconte est « flatus vocis », la façon dont l'instinct manifeste son armure. Point qui est significatif très important, mais comme temps de cette expérience, c'est dans la mesure où est mise entre parenthèses toute cette expérience comme symbolique, que l'instinct de mort est lui-même exclu, mis entre parenthèses. Bien entendu, cet élément de la mort ne se manifeste pas que sur le plan du symbole. Vous savez qu'il se manifeste plus ou moins dans ce qui est du registre narcissique. Mais c'est autre chose dont il s'agit, et qui est beaucoup plus près de cet élément de néantisation finale, liée à toute espèce de déplacement. Bien entendu, on peut le concevoir. L'origine, la source, comme je l'ai indiqué à propos d'éléments déplacés [10] de la possibilité de transaction symbolique du réel. Mais c'est aussi quelque chose qui a beaucoup moins de rapport avec l'élément durée, projection temporelle, en tant que j'entends l'avenir</p>	<p>This is precisely characteristic of Reich. For him everything the patient tells him is “flatus vocis,” the mode in which the death instinct brandishes its armor. A very meaningful point, very important, but as one moment in this experience. It is insofar as the experience <i>as symbolic</i> is put in parentheses that the death instinct is itself excluded, put in parentheses. Of course, this element of death does not demonstrate itself in the domain of the symbol (<i>sur le plan du symbole</i>). You know that it is more or less manifested in that which is the narcissistic register. But we are dealing with something else here, something much closer to an element of indeterminate negation (<i>neantisation finale</i>) that is bound up with every displacement. Of course we can conceive of it. The origin, the source, as I pointed it out with respect to the elements displaced from the possibility of a symbolic transaction with the real. But this is also something that is much less related to the element of duration, temporal projection, which is what I mean by the essential</p>	<p>Reich provides us with a typical example of this. For him, everything the patient recounts is <i>flatus vocis</i>¹, it's the way instinct manifests its armor. The point is significant and very important, but it is merely a stage in psychoanalytic practice. When the entire symbolic component of psychoanalytic practice is bracketed, the death instinct is itself excluded. Of course, death as an element does not manifest itself only at the level of symbols. It also manifests itself in the narcissistic register. But there it concerns something else. Death in the narcissistic register is much closer to the element of final nullification that is linked to every type of displacement and about which one can conceive, as I already indicated, that it is the origin or source of the possibility of symbolically transacting reality [<i>réel</i>]. But it is also something that has much to do with the element of duration, temporal projection, or the future as the essential term in symbolic behavior as such. [33]</p> <p><small>TN1. The Latin <i>flatus vocis</i> means a mere name, word, or sound without a corresponding objective</small></p>

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<p>essentiel du comportement symbolique comme tel.</p>	<p>future of symbolic behavior as such.</p>	<p>reality, and was used by nominalists to qualify universals.</p>
<p>(Vous le sentez bien, je suis forcé d’aller un petit peu vite. Il y a beaucoup de choses à dire sur tout cela. Et il est certain que l’analyse de notions aussi différentes que ces termes de : résistance, résistance de transfert, transfert comme tel... La possibilité de faire comprendre à ce propos ce qu’il faut appeler ⁽²⁷⁾ proprement « transfert » et laisser à la résistance. Je crois que tout cela peut assez aisément s’inscrire par rapport à ces notions fondamentales du symbolique et de l’imaginaire).</p>	<p>(You can sense it well, I have been forced to go a bit fast. There is much to say about all this. It is certain that the analysis of notions as different as the terms resistance, transference- resistance, transference as such...The possibility of understanding in this regard that which must properly be called “transference” while leaving resistance aside -- I believe all this can be quite easily inscribed in relation to the fundamental notions of the symbolic and the imaginary).</p>	<p>As you can tell. I must go a bit quickly over these things. There is much to say about all of them. The analysis of notions as different as those that correspond to the terms of resistance, transference resistance, transference as such, the distinction between what one should strictly call transference and what should be left to resistance, all of that can quite easily be theorized in terms of the fundamental notions of the symbolic and the imaginary.</p>
<p>Je voudrais simplement, pour terminer, illustrer en quelque sorte (il faut toujours donner une petite illustration à ce qu’on raconte), vous donner quelque chose qui n’est qu’une approximation par rapport à des éléments de formalisation que j’ai développés beaucoup plus loin avec les élèves au Séminaire (par exemple dans l’Homme aux Rats). On peut arriver à formaliser complètement à l’aide d’éléments comme ceux que je vais vous indiquer. Ceci est une espèce qui vous montrera ce que je veux dire.</p>	<p>By way of a conclusion I would simply like to in a way illustrate (one must always provide some sort of little illustration of what one is saying) to furnish you with something which is only an approximation in relation to the formal elements I have developed with the students in my Seminar, (for example in the Rat Man case). We can arrive at a complete formalization with the help of elements like the ones I am about to point out to you. This is one type [of formalization] that will demonstrate to you what I mean.</p>	<p>In concluding today I would simply like to illustrate my remarks. One should always provide a little illustration for what one discusses. This is merely an approximation in relation to elements of formalization that I have developed much more extensively with my students in the Seminar – as regards, for example, the case of the Rat Man. It can be completely formalized with the help of elements like those that I will indicate to you. This will show you what I mean.</p>
<p>Voilà comment une analyse pourrait, très schématiquement, s’inscrire depuis son début jusqu’à la fin :</p>	<p>Here is how an analysis, very schematically, could be written from beginning to end:</p>	<p>Here is how an analysis could, very schematically, be written from its beginning to its end.</p>
<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>

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<p>rS – rI – iI – iR – iS – sS – SI – SR – iR – rS. rS : réaliser le symbole.</p> <p>rS. appears to be a typo for rR. See below: “À ce moment-là, nous retrouvons : – rR –<texte manqué> Ce qui nous permet d’arriver à la fin au : – rS –”</p>	<p>rS – rI – iI – iR – iS – sS – SI – SR – iR – rS. – rS: producing¹¹ the symbol.</p> <p>¹¹Tr: réaliser: Rendered here as “produce,” does not fully reflect the presence of the word “real” in the French.</p> <p>rS. appears to be a typo for rR. See below: “At this moment we rediscover: rR –<texte manqué>which permits us to at last arrive at: rS – meaning very precisely the place from which we started.”</p>	<p><i>rs-rl-il-iR-iS-sS-SI-SR-rR-rS,</i> in other words, realizing symbols. [34]</p>
<p>– rS : Cela, c’est la position de départ. L’analyste est un personnage symbolique comme tel. Et c’est à ce titre que vous venez le trouver, pour autant qu’il est à la fois le symbole par lui-même de la toute-puissance, qu’il est lui-même déjà une autorité, le maître. C’est dans cette perspective que le sujet vient le trouver et qu’il se met dans une certaine posture qui est à peu près celle-ci : « C’est vous qui avez ma vérité », posture complètement illusoire, mais qui est la posture typique.</p>	<p>-rS: that is the first position, the departure. The analyst is a symbolic figure (<i>personage</i>) as such. And you seek him out because he bears this title, insofar as he is at once himself the symbol of the all-powerful, that he is himself already an authority, the master. It is from this perspective that the subject seeks him out and that he places him in a certain position which is approximately the following: “It is you who know my truth.”¹² A completely illusory position, but which represents the one we find typically.</p> <p>¹² Tr: “C’est vous qui avez ma vérité,” which would be more literally translated as “it is you who have (or hold) my truth.”</p>	<p>rS: This is the initial position. The analyst is a symbolic person as such, and he is sought out insofar as he is both a symbol of omnipotence and is already an authority or master. Seeking him out, the patient adopts a certain stance which is approximately as follows: “You’re the one who possesses my truth” This stance is completely illusory, but it is the typical stance.</p>
<p>– rI : après, nous avons là : la réalisation de l’image.</p>	<p>rI – After that we have the production (<i>réalisation</i>) of the image.</p>	<p>rI: Next, we have the realizing of images –</p>
<p>⁽²⁸⁾C’est-à-dire l’instauration plus ou moins</p>	<p>This means the more or less narcissistic</p>	<p>that is, the more or less narcissistic</p>

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narcissique dans laquelle le sujet entre dans une certaine conduite qui est justement analysée comme résistance. Ceci en raison de quoi ? D'un certain rapport : il	institution into which the subject enters, which is a certain behavior that is analyzed as resistance. What is the cause of this? A certain relation: il	instating in which the subject enters into a certain behavior that is analyzed as resistance. Why, Because of a certain relation [<i>rapport</i>] <i>il</i> ,
– il : <u>imagination</u> image	– il : <u>imagination</u> image	<u>IMAGINATION</u> IMAGE
C'est la captation de l'image qui est essentiellement constitutive de toute réalisation imaginaire en tant que nous la considérons comme instinctuelle, cette réalisation de l'image qui fait que l'épinoche femelle est captivée par les mêmes couleurs que l'épinoche mâle et qu'ils entrent progressivement dans une certaine danse qui les mène où vous savez,	This is the captivation (<i>captation</i>) by the image, which is essentially constitutive of all imaginary productions (<i>réalisations</i>), insofar as we think of them as being instinctual ones, like the production of the image which causes the female stickleback bird to be attracted to the very colors of the male stickleback, and which leads them to enter into a dance that leads to you know where.	<i>il</i> . This stands for the captivation by images, which is essentially constitutive of all imaginary realization insofar as we consider it to be instinctual. The realizing of images is such that the female stickleback is captivated by the same colors as the male stickleback, and that they enter progressively into a certain dance which leads them you know where.
Qu'est-ce qui la constitue dans l'expérience analytique ? Je le mets pour l'instant dans un cercle (cf. schéma entre la fin de la conférence et la discussion).	What constitutes it in analytic experience? For the moment I shall inscribe it in a circle (see the schema between the end of the lecture and the discussion).	What constitutes it in analytic practice? I am situating it for the [35] being in a circle. See further on [schema missing].
Après cela, nous avons :	After this we have:	After that, we have
– iR – qui est la suite de la transformation précédente :	-iR – which is what follows after the preceding transformation.	<i>iR</i> , where
I est transformé en R.	I is transformed into R.	<i>I</i> is transformed into <i>R</i> .
C'est la phase de résistance, de transfert négatif, ou même, à la limite de délire, qu'il y a dans l'analyse. C'est une certaine façon dont certains analystes tendent toujours plus à réaliser : « L'analyse est un	This is the phase of resistance, of the negative transference, or even in certain limit cases of a delusion in analysis. This is, in a way, what some analysts always tend to produce: "Analysis is a controlled	This is the phase of resistance, negative transference, or even, in extreme cases, delusion that there is in the analysis. Some analysts tend to go even further in this direction. "Analysis is a well-

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délires bien organisés », formule que j'ai entendue dans la bouche d'un de mes Maîtres, qui est partielle, mais pas inexacte.	delusion," a phrase that was uttered by one of my teachers, which is partial, but not imprecise.	organized delusion," as I once heard one of my teachers say. This formulation is partially but not totally inaccurate.
Après, que se passe-t-il ? Si l'issue est bonne, si le sujet n'a pas toutes les dispositions pour être psychotique (auquel cas il reste au stade iR), il passe à :	What happens after this? If there is a proper exit, if the subject is not totally disposed to being psychotic, in which case he remains at the stage of iR, he passes on to:	What happens next? If the outcome is good, if the subject is not thoroughly disposed to becoming psychotic, in which case he remains at the stage iR, he moves on to
– iS – l'imagination du symbole. [11]	iS, the imagination of the symbol.	iS, the imaginary of symbols.
⁽²⁹⁾ Il imagine le symbole. Nous avons, dans l'analyse, mille exemples de l'imagination du symbole. Par exemple : le rêve. Le rêve est une image symbolisée.	He imagines the symbol. We have a thousand examples of the imagination of the symbol. For example: the dream. The dream is a symbolized image.	He imagines symbols. We have a thousand examples of the imagining of symbols in analysis, for example, dreams. A dream is a symbolized image.
Ici intervient :	At this point there is an intervention of	Here
– sS – qui permet le renversement.	-sS – which permits a reversal	sS comes in allowing for a reversal.
Qui est la symbolisation de l'image.	that is the symbolization of the image,	It is the symbolizing of images --
Autrement dit, ce qu'on appelle « l'interprétation »	otherwise put that which we call "interpretation."	In other words, what is known as interpretation.
Ceci uniquement après le franchissement de la phase imaginaire qui englobe à peu près :	This happens only after the crossing over of the imaginary phase that envelops approximately:	One reaches it only after going beyond the imaginary phase which basically encompasses
rl – il – iR – iS –	rl – il – iR – iS –	rl-il-iR-iS.
commence l'élucidation du symptôme par l'interprétation	which commences the elucidation of the symptom by interpretation – (sS),	The elucidation of symptoms through interpretation now begins
(SS)* – SI – <i>*typo, it should (sS)</i>	(sS) -- SI	sS -- SI.

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Ensuite, nous avons :	Then we have:	Next we have
– SR – qui est, en somme, le but de toute santé, qui est non pas (comme on le croit) de s’adapter à un réel plus ou moins bien défini, ou bien organisé, mais de faire reconnaître sa propre réalité, autrement dit son propre désir.	SR – which is, in short, the goal of all health, which is not (as some believe) an adaptation to a more or less defined, or well organized, real, but rather to have one’s own reality recognized, otherwise put one’s own desire.	SR, which is, in short, the goal of all health. The goal is not, as people believe, to adapt to a more or less well-defined or well-organized reality [<i>réel</i>], but to get one’s own reality – that is, one’s own desire – recognized.
Comme je l’ai maintes fois souligné, le faire reconnaître par ses semblables ; c’est-à-dire de le symboliser.	As I have underlined many times, to have it recognized by one’s mirror other (<i>semblables</i>): which is to say to symbolize it.	As I have emphasized many times, the goal is to get it recognized by one’s semblables – in other words, to symbolize it.
À ce moment-là, nous retrouvons :	At this moment we rediscover --	At this point, we come to
– rR –<texte manqué>	: rR –<texte manqué>	rR
Ce qui nous permet d’arriver à la fin au :	which permits us to at last arrive at:	Which allows us to reach
– rS –	-rS –	rS
⁽³⁰⁾ C’est-à-dire, bien exactement à ce dont nous sommes partis	meaning very precisely the place from which we started.	in the end – which is precisely where we began.
Il ne peut en être autrement, car si l’analyste est humainement valable, ça ne peut être que circulaire. Et une analyse peut comprendre plusieurs fois ce cycle	Things cannot proceed any other way, for if the analyst is decently humane, it can only be circular. And one analysis may follow this cycle several times.	It cannot be otherwise, for, if analysis ¹ is humanly viable, it can only be circular. And an analysis can go through this same cycle several times. TN1. Reading <i>analyse</i> (analysis) for <i>analyste</i> (analyst).
– il – c’est la partie propre de l’analyse,	il – this is the portion that belongs to analysis,	iS is the analysis proper.
c’est ce qu’on appelle (à tort) « la communication des inconscients ».	it is what some call, incorrectly, “unconscious communication” or “communication at the unconscious level” (<i>la communication des inconscients</i>).	It involves what is wrongly referred to as the communication of unconscious.

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<p>L'analyste doit être capable de comprendre le jeu que joue son sujet. Il doit comprendre qu'il est lui-même l'épinoche mâle ou femelle, selon la danse que mène son sujet.</p>	<p>The analyst must be capable of understanding the game his subject is playing. He must understand that he himself is the male or female stickleback bird, depending on the dance his subject is leading him into.</p>	<p>The analyst must be able to understand the game his subject plays. He must understand that he himself is the male or female stickleback, depending on the kind of dance initiated by his subject.</p>
<p>Le sS, c'est la symbolisation du symbole. C'est l'analyste qui doit faire ça. Il n'a pas de peine : il est déjà lui-même un symbole. Il est préférable qu'il le fasse avec complétude, culture et intelligence. C'est pour cela qu'il est préférable, qu'il est nécessaire que l'analyste ait une formation aussi complète que possible dans l'ordre culturel. Plus vous en saurez, plus cela vaudra. Et cela (sS) ne doit intervenir qu'après un certain stade, après une certaine étape franchie. Et en particulier, c'est en ce registre qu'appartient, du côté du sujet (ce n'est pas pour rien que je ne l'ai pas séparé)... Le Sujet forme toujours et plus ou moins une certaine unité plus ou moins successive, dont l'élément essentiel se constitue dans le transfert. Et l'analyste vient à symboliser le surmoi qui est le symbole des symboles.</p>	<p>The sS is the symbolization of the symbol. This is what the analyst must do. He has no trouble doing it, he is already a symbol himself. It is preferable for him to do it with fullness, culture and intelligence. This is why it is preferable, that it is <i>necessary</i> that the analyst have an as complete as possible education/formation in the cultural domain. The more you know about it, the more its worth. And this sS must only intervene after a certain stage, after certain steps have been taken. And in particular, it's in this register that appears, on the side of the subject – it's not for nothing that I haven't separated it – the subject always formulates a unity that is more or less successive, the essential element of which is constituted in the transference, and the analyst comes to symbolize the superego, which is the symbol of symbols.</p>	<p>sS stands for symbolizing symbols. The analyst is the one who must do that. It's not the problem for him as he himself is already a symbol. It is preferable that he do it thoroughly, with culture and intelligence. This is why it is preferable and [37] even necessary that he have as complete a background as possible in cultural matters. The more he knows about them the better. sS must not come in until a certain stage has been reached. The subject almost always forms a certain more or less successive unity whose essential element is constituted in the transference. And the analyst comes to symbolize the superego, which is the symbol of symbols.</p>
<p>Le surmoi est simplement une parole qui ne dit rien (une parole qui interdit). L'analyste n'a précisément ⁽³¹⁾aucune peine à la symboliser. C'est précisément ce qu'il fait.</p>	<p>The superego is simply a bit of speech (<i>une parole</i>) that says nothing, a bit of speech that prohibits. The analyst has precisely no difficulty symbolizing it. This is precisely what he does.</p>	<p>The superego is simply speech (<i>une parole</i>) that says nothing. The analyst has no problem symbolizing that speech, which is precisely what he does.</p>

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<p>Le rR est son travail, improprement désigné sous le terme de cette fameuse « neutralité bienveillante » dont on parle à tort et à travers, et qui veut simplement dire que, pour un analyste, toutes les réalités, en somme, sont équivalentes ; que toutes sont des réalités. Ceci part de l'idée que tout ce qui est réel est rationnel, et inversement. Et c'est ce qui doit lui donner cette bienveillance sur laquelle vient se briser<texte manqué> et mener à bon port son analyse.</p>	<p>The rR is his work, improperly subsumed under the infamous term “benevolent neutrality,” of which we speak in such a confused fashion and which simply means that for the analyst all realities, in short, are equivalent – that all realities are realities. This is based on the idea that all that is real is rational, and vice versa. And this is what must give him the kindness that blows <texte manqué> his analysis safely into harbor.</p>	<p>rR is the work the analyst does. It is improperly designated with the famous term “benevolent neutrality,” about which people speak any old which way, and which simply means that, to an analyst, all realities are basically equivalent, all of them are realities. This stems from the idea that all that is real is rational and vice versa. This is what must give him the quality of “benevolence,” upon which negative transference falls apart, and which allows him to bring the analysis safely to harbor.</p>
<p>Tout cela a été dit un peu rapidement.</p>	<p>All this has been said a bit rapidly.</p>	<p>All of this has been said a bit rapidly.</p>
<p>J'aurais pu vous parler de bien d'autres choses. Mais, au reste, ce n'est qu'une introduction, une préface à ce que j'essaierai de traiter plus complètement, plus concrètement, le rapport que j'espère vous faire, à Rome, sur le sujet du langage dans la psychanalyse. [12]</p>	<p>I would have liked to have been able to speak to you about other things. But this is merely an introduction, a preface to that which I will attempt to develop more completely, more concretely, the discussion that I hope to have with you in Rome*, on the subject of language in psychoanalysis. *Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en Psychanalyse, <i>Écrits</i>, pp.237-322. September 26th and 27th, 1953.</p>	<p>I could have spoken to you of many things. But it was merely an introduction, a preface to what I will try to discuss more completely and more concretely in the report that I will hope to deliver to you soon in Rome on the subject of language and psychoanalysis.</p>

<p>On a le schéma :</p>	<p>On a le schéma :</p>	
<p>⁽³²⁾DISCUSSION :</p>	<p>DISCUSSION:</p>	<p>Discussion</p>
<p>Le P^R LAGACHE remercie le conférencier et ouvre la discussion.</p>	<p>Dr. Lagache thanks the lecturer and opens the discussion.</p>	<p>Prof. Daniel Lagache thanks the lecturer and opens the floor for discussion.</p>
<p>M^{me} MARCUS-BLAJAN – Votre conférence a fait en moi « résonner les cloches... » il est dommage que je n'aie pas compris certains mots. Par exemple : « transcendants ».</p>	<p>Mrs. Marcus-Blajan — “Your lecture struck a few chords with me...It’s a shame that I did not understand some of the words. For example, “transcendent.”</p>	<p>Mrs. Marcus-Blajan indicates that she did not understand certain words, for example, “transcendent.” What the speaker said about anxiety and guilt made her think of agoraphobia.</p>

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Deux choses m'ont frappé particulièrement :	Two things struck me in particular:	
– ce que vous avez dit à propos de l'angoisse et de la culpabilité ;	what you said earlier concerning angst and guilt,	
et ce que vous venez de dire à propos de rR.	and what you just said concerning rR.	
Ce sont des choses que nous sentons très confusément. Ce que vous dites de l'angoisse et de la culpabilité m'a fait penser à des cas, à l'agoraphobie, par exemple.	These are things that we feel our way through very confusedly. What you say concerning angst and guilt made me think of certain cases, of agoraphobia for example.	
Ce que vous dites à propos de rR... que tout ce qui existe a le droit d'exister puisque c'est humain...	What you said concerning rR...that all that exists has the right to exist since it is human...	
D ^R LACAN – Ce que j'ai dit à propos de l'angoisse et de la culpabilité... la distance... L'angoisse est liée au rapport narcissique, Madame Blajan en donne une très jolie illustration, (car il n'y a pas de phénomènes plus narcissique) par l'agoraphobie.	Dr. Lacan — What I said concerning angst and guilt...distance...Angst is tied to the narcissistic relationship (<i>rapport narcissique</i>), Mrs. Blajan has given us a very nice example of this with agoraphobia (for there isn't a relation that is any more narcissistic).	J.L. – Anxiety is tied to the narcissistic relationship. Mrs. Blajan has provided a very nice illustration of it with agoraphobia, for there is no more narcissistic phenomenon around.
Chaque fois que j'ai commenté un cas dans mon séminaire, j'ai toujours montré les différents temps de réaction ⁽³³⁾ du sujet. Chaque fois qu'il se produit un phénomène à deux temps, dans l'obsession par exemple, le 1 ^{er} temps est l'angoisse, et le 2 ^e temps est la culpabilité	Each time I have commented on a case in my seminar, I have always shown the subject's different moments ¹³ of reaction. Each time he produces a phenomenon with two moments, in an obsession for example, the first moment is angst, and the second is guilt, which relieves the	Every time I have commented on a case in my Seminar, I have always shown the different stages [<i>temps</i>] of the subject's reactions. In each case in which we find a two-stage phenomenon – in obsession, for example – the first stage is anxiety and the second is guilt, which provides

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<p>qui donne apaisement à l'angoisse sur le registre de la culpabilité.</p>	<p>angst in the register of guilt. ¹³ Tr: "temps:" Which could be translated as "times," or perhaps "registers of time."</p>	<p>relief from the anxiety in the form of guilt. [39]</p>
<p>À propos du mot « transcendant »... ce n'est pas un mot très métaphysique, ni même métapsychologique. Je vais tâcher de l'illustrer. Qu'est-ce que c'est ? Qu'est-ce que ça veut dire, en l'occasion précise où je l'ai employé ? [13]</p>	<p>As for the word "transcendent..." this is not a very metaphysical concept, nor metapsychological. I will try to illustrate this. What is it? What does it mean in the precise sense in which I am using it here?</p>	<p>The word "transcendent" seems obscure to you. It is nevertheless not a very metaphysical or even metapsychological term. I will try to illustrate it. What does it mean in the precise context in which I used it?</p>
<p>C'est ceci : que dans le rapport à son semblable, en tant que tel, dans le rapport à deux, dans le rapport narcissique, il y a toujours, pour le sujet, quelque chose d'évanoui.</p>	<p>It means the following: that in the relation to the other in the mirror,¹⁴ as such, in the two-way relation, in the narcissistic pairing, there is always something that evaporates for the subject. ¹⁴Tr: "semblable," which means a relationship to the other to which one "resembles," or in some contexts one's "fellow man."</p>	<p>In the subject's relationship to his semblable – the two-term or narcissistic relationship – there is always something that has faded away.</p>
<p>Il sent en fin de compte qu'il est l'autre, et l'autre est lui. Et ce sujet défini réciproquement est un des temps essentiels de la constitution du sujet humain. C'est un temps où il ne veut pas subsister, encore que sa structure soit toujours sur le point d'apparaître, et très précisément dans certaines structures névrotiques.</p>	<p>In the end he senses that he is the other, and the other is him. And this reciprocally defined subject is one of the essential moments (<i>temps</i>) in the constitution of the human subject. It is a moment (<i>temps</i>) in which he does not want to remain, although its structure is always on the verge of appearing, and quite precisely in some neurotic structures.</p>	<p>The subject feels that he is the other and that the other is him. This reciprocally defined subject is an essential stage in the constitution of the human subject. It is a stage in which he cannot subsist even though his structure is always on the verge of appearing, especially in certain neurotic structures.</p>
<p>L'image spéculaire s'applique au maximum. Le sujet n'est que le reflet de soi-même. Le besoin de constituer un point qui constitue ce qui est</p>	<p>The specular image applies itself here to the highest degree. The subject is nothing more than the reflection of itself. The need to constitute a point that constructs</p>	<p>Where the specular image applies maximally, the subject is merely the reflection of himself. Hence his need to construct a point that constitutes</p>

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<p>transcendant, c'est justement l'autre en temps qu'autre.</p>	<p>something transcendent, this is exactly the other as other.¹⁵ ¹⁵ Tr: "l'autre en temps qu'autre." Keeping with the language of "moments," this might alternatively be rendered as "the other in the moment of the other" or "the other as the other moment."</p>	<p>something transcendent, which is precisely the other <i>qua</i> other.</p>
<p>On peut prendre mille exemples.</p>	<p>We could come up with a thousand other examples.</p>	<p>A thousand examples could be offered.</p>
<p>Par exemple, il est tout à fait clair, puisque je prenais l'exemple de la phobie. Le fait que c'est justement à une angoisse semblable que correspond le fait de subsister au partenaire humain quelque chose d'aussi étranger, d'aussi séparé de l'image humaine qu'est l'image animale. En fait, si nous voyons que quoi que nous puissions penser de la fonction, (car tout cela n'est pas transparent, quels que soient les travaux qu'on ait fait là-dessus), quoi que nous puissions penser de ⁽³⁴⁾l'origine historique réelle du totémisme, il y a une chose très certaine, c'est qu'il est en tout cas lié à l'interdiction du cannibalisme, c'est-à-dire qu'on ne peut pas manger... car c'est tout de même le mode de rapports humains primitifs. Le mode de rapport humain le plus primitif est certainement l'absorption de la substance de son semblable.</p>	<p>For example, it is perfectly clear in the case of phobia. The fact that it is precisely to an angst such as this that corresponds the subsistence in the human partner of something as strange, as separated from the human image, as the animal image is. In fact, if we can see that no matter what we might think of the function (for all this is not transparent, no matter what the work which might have already been done on the subject), no matter what we might be able to think about the real historical origin of totemism, one thing is quite certain, that it is always linked to a prohibition against cannibalism, meaning that we cannot eat...for this is the primitive mode of human relating all the same. The most primitive mode of human relating is certainly the absorption of the substance of the fellow man (<i>semblable</i>).</p>	<p>Let us consider that of phobia – that is, the fact that a similar anxiety corresponds to the subsistence in the human partner of animal images, which are quite foreign and separate from human images. In fact, whatever we may think of the real historical origin of totemism, and it is not transparent [40] despite the studies that have been devoted to the topic, there is one thing that is quite certain, which is that totemism is linked to the prohibition¹ of cannibalism – that is, the injunction not to eat each other. The most primitive form of human relationship is certainly the absorption of the substance of one's semblable. <i>TN1. Reading interdiction (prohibition) instead of interprétation (interpretation)</i></p>
<p>Là vous voyez bien quelle est la fonction du totémisme. C'est d'en faire un sujet transcendant à celui-là. Je ne pense pas</p>	<p>With this you can really see the function of totemism. It is done in order to make a transcendent subject. I don't think Dr.</p>	<p>Here you can clearly see the function of totemism, which is to create a subject that transcends the semblable. I don't</p>

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que le Dr Gessain me contredira ?.	Gessain will contradict me?	believe Dr. Gessain will contradict me here.
Là nous retrouvons différentes questions sur un des points qui nous intéresse le plus : le rapport entre enfants et adultes. Les adultes, pour l'enfant, sont transcendants pour autant qu'ils sont initiés. Le plus curieux est que justement les enfants ne sont pas moins transcendants pour les adultes. C'est-à-dire, par un système de réflexion caractéristique de toute relation, l'enfant devient, pour les adultes, le sujet de tous les mystères. C'est le siège de cette sorte de confusion des langues entre enfants et adultes, et un des points les plus essentiels dont nous devons tenir compte quant il s'agit d'intervention sur les enfants.	This leads us to other questions that most interest us: the relationship between children and adults. Adults, for children, are transcendent insofar as they are initiated. What is most intriguing is that children are no less transcendent for adults. Meaning that, via a system that is characteristic of all relations, the child becomes, for adults, the all mysterious subject. This is the cornerstone of a kind of confusion of tongues between children and adults*, and one of the most essential points that we must keep in mind when we are dealing with interventions with children. <i>*A reference to Sándor Ferenczi's (1873–1933) 1932 controversial paper, Confusion of the Tongues Between the Adults and the Child—(The Language of Tenderness and of Passion)". <i>International Journal of Psycho-Analysis</i>. 30 (4) 1949: 225–230.</i>	This intersects one of the points that interests you the most, the relationship between children and adults. To children, adults are transcendent insofar as they are initiated. What is rather curious is that children are no less transcendent to adults. By a system of reflection that is characteristic of all relations, a child becomes for an adult the subject of all mysteries. This is the source of the confusion of tongues between children and adults that we must take into account when treating children.
Il y aurait d'autres exemples à prendre.	There are other examples we might take up.	We could take other examples,
En particulier dans ce qui constitue la relation œdipienne de type sexuel, qui est quelque chose du sujet, et qui le dépasse en même temps, constitution d'une forme à une certaine distance.	In particular in that which constitutes the typical sexual Oedipal relation, which is something that is part of the subject, but which at the same time also exceeds him, as the constitution of a form at a certain distance.	In particular examples related to what constitutes the sexual type of Oedipal relations, which involves the subject in some way and yet simultaneously goes [41] beyond him. We see there the constitution of a form at a certain distance.
D ^R LIEBSCRUTZ* – Vous nous avez parlé du symbolique de l'imaginaire. Mais il y avait	Dr. Liebschutz*: You spoke of the symbolic and the imaginary, but there was also the	<i>Serge Leclaire</i> – You spoke to us about the symbolic and the imaginary. But you

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le réel, dont vous n’avez pas parlé. *a misspelling of ‘Liebschutz’	real, which you did not speak about. *Serge Liebschutz had already changed his name to Serge Leclair during WW2.	didn’t talk to us about the real.
(35)D ^R LACAN – J’en ai tout de même parlé quelque peu.	Dr. Lacan: Nonetheless I did speak of it a little.	J.L. – I did talk about it a little bit nonetheless.
Le réel est ou la totalité, ou l’instant évanoui...	The real is either totality, or the vanishing instant (<i>instant évanoui</i>)...	The real is either totality or the vanished instant.
Dans l’expérience analytique pour le sujet, c’est toujours le heurt à quelque chose, par exemple : le silence de l’analyste.	For the subject in analytic experience it is always a collision with something , for example, the silence of the analyst.	In analytic practice, it always appears for the subject when he runs up against something, for example, the analyst’s silence.
J’aurais dû dire que, tout de même, il se produit quelque chose que j’ai ajouté seulement à la fin. Il se produit tout de même, à travers ce dialogue, quelque chose qui est tout à fait frappant, sur lequel je n’ai pas pu insister, c’est-à-dire, c’est un des faits de l’expérience analytique qui vaudrait, à soi tout seul, beaucoup plus qu’une communication. On doit poser la question sous cet angle : comment se fait-il... ? (je prends un exemple tout à fait concret), qu’à la fin de l’analyse des rêves... (je ne sais pas si j’ai dit ou non qu’il sont composés comme un langage... effectivement, dans l’analyse, ils servent de langage. Et un rêve en milieu ou en fin de l’analyse c’est une partie du dialogue avec l’analyste...). Eh bien, comment se fait-il que ces rêves (et bien d’autres choses encore : la façon dont le sujet constitue ses symboles...) portent quelque chose qui est la marque	I should have said that, all the same, something happens that I only added at the end. All the same it is produced through this dialogue, something that is totally striking, that I could not place enough stress on, meaning that it is one of the facts of analytic experience that would merit all unto itself much more than a conference paper. We must pose the question from the following angle: How is it that... (I will use a totally concrete example), at the end of the analysis of dreams...(I don’t know if I mentioned or not that they are composed like a language...indeed in analysis they function as a language. And a dream in the middle of or at the end of analysis is a part of the dialogue with the analyst...). Well, how is it that these dreams (and many other things as well: the way in which the subject constructs his symbols...) bear something that is an absolutely striking mark of the	Through analytic dialogue, something quite striking occurs that I was not able to emphasize this evening. It is a facet of analytic experience that, in and of itself, would require far more than just one talk. Let me take an altogether concrete example, that of dreams, about which I no longer recall whether I said earlier that they are composed like a language. In analysis, they serve as a language. A dream that occurs in the middle or at the end of the analysis is part of the dialogue with the analyst. So how is it that these dreams – and many other things as well, [such as] the way in which the subject constitutes his symbols – bear the absolutely gripping mark of the reality of the [42] analyst, namely the analyst as a person, as he is constituted in his being? How is it possible that, through this imaginary and symbolic experience, the subject winds up in the final phase with a

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absolument saisissante de la réalité de l'analyste, à savoir : de la personne de l'analyste telle qu'elle est constituée dans son être ? Comment se fait-il qu'à travers cette expérience imaginaire et symbolique [14] on aboutisse à quelque chose qui, dans sa dernière phase, est une connaissance limitée, mais frappante, de la structure de l'analyste ? C'est quelque chose qui à soi tout seul pose un problème que je n'ai pas pu aborder ce soir.	reality of the analyst, namely: of the person of the analyst such as he is constituted in his very being? How is it that through this imaginary and symbolic experience we end up with something that is, in its final phase, a limited, but striking, knowledge of the analyst's structure? This is something that all by itself poses a problem that I was not able to get into this evening.	limited but striking knowledge of the analyst's structure? This in and of itself raises a problem that I was not able to broach this evening.
(36)D ^R MAUCO – Je me demande s'il ne faut pas rappeler les différents types (?) de symbols.	Dr. Mauco: I wonder if we might not need to remind ourselves of the different types (?) of symbols.	<i>Georges Mauco</i> – Perhaps we need to recall to mind the different types of symbols.
D ^R LACAN – ... C'est un emblème.	Dr Lacan: It's an emblem.	<i>J.L.</i> – A symbol is, in the first place, an emblem.
D ^R MAUCO – Le symbole c'est du vécu.	Dr. Mauco: The symbol comes from lived experience (<i>le vécu</i>).	<i>Georges Mauco</i> – Symbols are lived experience.
Par exemple, la maison, éprouvée d'abord par un symbole, est ensuite élaborée collectivement, disciplinée collectivement... Il évoque toujours le mot maison.	For example, a house, first lived via a symbol, is then collectively elaborated and disciplined...I always evokes the word house.	For example, a house is known first of all by a symbol, and is later elaborated and disciplined collectively. It always evokes the word "house."
D ^R LACAN – Laissez-moi vous dire que je ne suis pas absolument de cet avis, comme le démontre l'expérience analytique, à savoir que tout ce qui constitue le symbole, ces symboles qu'on retrouve aux racines de l'expérience	Dr. Lacan: Let me just say that I am not totally in agreement with this opinion, as analytic experience demonstrates that everything that constitutes the symbol, the symbols that we rediscover at the root of analytic experience, which constitute	<i>J.L.</i> – Let me just say that I do not entirely agree. Ernest Jones ¹ has drawn up a little catalogue of the symbols that one finds at the roots of analytic experience – which constitute symptoms, the Oedipal relationship, etc. – and he demonstrates

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<p>analytique, qui constituent les symptômes, la relation œdipienne... Jones en fait un petit catalogue et il démontre qu'il s'agit toujours et essentiellement des thèmes plus ou moins connexes aux relations de parenté, du thème du roi, de l'autorité du maître, et de ce qui concerne la vie et la mort.</p>	<p>symptoms, the Oedipal relation...Jones put together a small catalogue of them and he demonstrates that we are always and essentially dealing with themes that are more or less connected to parental relations, the theme of the king, the authority of the master, and with life and death.</p>	<p>that what is at stake are always essentially themes related to kinship relations, the master's authority, and life and death. <small>TN1. The paper by Ernest Jones that Lacan refers to here was published in the <i>British Journal of Psychology</i> IX, 2 (October 1916): 181-229. It was republished in Jones, <i>Papers on Psycho-Analysis</i>, 5th edn. Boston: Beacon, 1961. See Lacan's "In Memory of Ernest Jones: On His Theory of Symbolism." In <i>Écrits</i>, pp. 585-601.</small></p>
<p>Or, tout ce dont il s'agit là, ce sont évidemment des symboles. Ce sont précisément des éléments qui n'ont absolument rien à voir avec la réalité.</p>	<p>Now all of these things are obviously symbols. More precisely they are elements that have absolutely nothing to do with reality.</p>	<p>All of which obviously [43] involve symbols. The latter are elements that have nothing whatsoever to do with reality.</p>
<p>Un être complètement engagé dans la réalité, comme l'animal, n'en a aucune espèce d'idées.</p>	<p>A being who is completely caged in by reality, such as the animal, has no sort of idea of these things.</p>	<p>A being that is completely engaged in reality, like an animal, hasn't the slightest notion of them.</p>
<p>Ce sont justement des points où le symbole constitue la réalité humaine, où il crée cette dimension humaine sur laquelle Freud insiste à tout bout de champ quand il dit que le névrosé obsessionnel vit toujours dans le registre de ce qui comporte au maximum des éléments ⁽³⁷⁾d'incertitude, de ce qu'il désigne par : « la durée de la vie... « La paternité... ». Tout ce qui n'a pas évidence sensible. Tout ce qui est dans la réalité humaine construit est construit primitivement par certaines relations symboliques qui peuvent ensuite trouver leur confirmation dans la réalité. Le père est effectivement le géniteur. Mais avant que nous le sachions de source certaine, le nom du père crée la fonction</p>	<p>These are the exact points where the symbol constitutes human reality, where it creates the human dimension which Freud emphasized at every turn when he says that the obsessional neurotic always lives in the register of that which bears the maximum weight of elements of uncertainty, which he designates with: "the lifespan...'Paternity.'" All that does not meet the eye. Everything that is constructed in human reality, and constructed primitively via certain symbolic relations that can then find their confirmation in reality. The father is indeed the progenitor. But before we know this for certain, the name of the father creates the function of the father.</p>	<p>At stake here are precisely the points at which the symbol constitutes human reality, where it creates the human dimension Freud constantly emphasizes when he says that the obsessive neurotic always lives in the register of what involves the elements of greatest uncertainty: how long one's life will last, who one's biological father is, and so on. There is no direct perceptual proof of any of that in human reality. Such things are constructed and constructed primitively by certain symbolic relations that can then find confirmation in reality. A [child's] father is effectively its progenitor. But, before we can know who he is with certainty, the name of the</p>

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du père.		father creates the function of the father.
Je crois donc que le symbole n'est pas une élaboration de la sensation ni de la réalité. Ce qui est proprement symbolique (et les symboles les plus primitifs) est quelque chose d'autre qui introduit dans la réalité humaine quelque chose de différent, et qui constitue tous les objets primitifs de vérité.	I believe that the symbol is not an elaboration of either sensation or reality. That which is properly symbolic (including the most primitive symbols), is something other than this, that introduces something that is different into human reality, something that constructs all of the primitive objects of truth.	I believe thus that symbols are not elaborations of sensations or of reality. What is properly symbolic – and the most primitive of symbols – introduces something else, something different into human reality, something that constitutes all the primitive objects of truth.
Ce qui est remarquable est que la catégorie des symboles, des symboles symbolisants, sont tous de ce registre-là, à savoir comportant, par la création des symboles, l'introduction d'une réalité nouvelle dans la réalité animale ».	What is remarkable is that this category of symbols, symbols that symbolize (<i>symboles symbolisants</i>), are all in this register, meaning that they bear with them, via the creation of symbols, the introduction of a new, human, reality into the reality of the animal.	What is remarkable is that symbols, symbolizing [44] symbols, all fall under that heading. The creation of symbols accomplishes the introduction of a new reality into animal reality.
D ^R MAUCO – Mais sublimé et élaboré, on a le soubassement du langage ultérieur.	Dr. Mauco: But sublimated and elaborated, we see the base of the language that follows.	<i>Georges Mauco</i> -- . . . but sublimated and elaborated. This provides the foundation for later language.
D ^R LACAN – Là, tout à fait d'accord.	Dr. Lacan: I fully agree with you there.	<i>J.L.</i> – I completely agree with you there.
Par exemple, les relations, les logiciens eux-mêmes font tout naturellement appel au terme de parenté. C'est le premier modèle d'une relation transitive.	For example, lineal relations, logicians themselves naturally make use of them as the primary model for transitive relations.	For example, in order to designate relationships, logicians themselves quite naturally appeal to the term "kinship." It's the first model of a transitive relationship.
D ^R MANNONI – Le passage de l'angoisse à la culpabilité semble liée à la situation analytique. L'angoisse peut conduire à la honte, et non pas à la culpabilité. Lorsque l'angoisse n'évoque pas l'idée ⁽³⁸⁾ d'un	Dr. Mannoni: The passage from angst to guilt seems to be tied to the analytic situation. Angst can also lead to shame, and not to guilt. When angst does not evoke the idea of a punisher, but rather	<i>Octave Mannoni</i> – The shift from anxiety to guilt seems related to the analytic situation itself. Anxiety can lead to shame and not to guilt. When anxiety evokes the idea not of a punisher but of being

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punisseur, mais d'une mise à l'écart, c'est la honte qui apparaît.	towards a setting apart (<i>mise à l'écart</i>), shame appears.	ostracized, it is shame that appears.
L'angoisse peut se traduire non en culpabilité, mais en doute. Il me semble que c'est parce que l'analyste est là que l'angoisse se transforme en culpabilité.	Angst can be translated not into guilt, but into doubt. It seems to me that it is because the analyst is there that angst is transformed into guilt.	Anxiety can also be translated into doubt instead of guilt. It seems to me that it is because the analyst is present that anxiety transforms into guilt.
D ^R LACAN – Tout à fait d'accord ! C'est une situation privilégiée dans l'expérience analytique qui fait que l'analyste détient la parole, qu'il juge ; et parce que l'analyse s'oriente tout entière dans un sens symbolique, parce que l'analyste l'a substituée à ce qui a fait [15] défaut, parce le père n'a été qu'un Surmoi, c'est-à-dire une « Loi sans parole », pour autant que ceci est constitutif de la névrose, que la névrose est définie par le transfert. Toutes ces définitions sont équivalentes.	Dr. Lacan: I totally agree! It is a very privileged aspect of the analytic experience that the analyst refrains from speaking, that he judges; and because the analyst orients himself completely in the symbolic sense, because the analyst has substituted this for that which is missing, because the father had only been a Superego, meaning an "unspoken Law," insofar as this is what constitutes neurosis, that neurosis is defined by the transference. All of these definitions are equivalent.	J.L. – I quite agree with you. The analytic situation is unusual – the analyst [is felt by the patient [45] to be the one who] possesses speech and judges – because the analysis is quite thoroughly oriented in a symbolic direction and because the analyst has substituted speech for what was missing there, because the father was merely a superego –in other words, a law without speech, inasmuch as this is constitutive of neurosis inasmuch as neurosis is defined by transference. All of these definitions are equivalent.
Il y a en effet d'autres aiguillages infinis à la réaction de l'angoisse. Il n'est pas exclu que certaines apparaissent dans l'analyse... Chacune mérite d'être analysée comme telle.	All of these definitions are equivalent. Indeed there are infinite limit-points to the reaction to angst. It is certainly not out of the question that some of them appear in analysis...Each is worth analyzing as such.	There are, in effect, infinite routings to the reaction of anxiety, and it is not out of the question that certain of them appear in psychoanalysis. Each one deserves to be analyzed in its own right.
Je crois que la question du doute, elle, est beaucoup plus proche de la constitution symbolique de la réalité. Elle est en quelque sorte préalable. S'il y a une position qu'on puisse qualifier essentiellement au sens où je l'entends, de « subjective », c'est-à-dire que c'est elle qui constitue toute la situation. À	I believe that the question of doubt is much closer to the symbolic constitution of reality. It is in a way preliminary to it. If there is a position that is "subjective" that we might essentially qualify in the way that I understand it, which is to say the one that constitutes the entire situation. Namely: when and how is it produced?	The question of doubt is much closer to the symbolic constitution of reality. It is in some sense preliminary to it. If there is a position that one can essentially qualify as subjective, in the sense in which I mean it – in other words, that this is the position that constitutes the whole situation – it is clearly this one. When and

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savoir : quand et comment est-elle réalisée ? C'est un développement à part.	This is must be elaborated separately.	how is it realized? That would require a whole separate discussion.
D ^R BERGE – Le passage de l'angoisse à la culpabilité...	Dr. Berge: The passage from angst to guilt...	
Ce qui m'a frappé dans ces deux choses, c'est la notion d'insécurité. L'angoisse et la culpabilité : l'insécurité. L'angoisse et la culpabilité : l'insécurité... ⁽³⁹⁾ l'angoisse est ressentie sans savoir quel est le danger. La culpabilité est une défense, parce qu'il y a un objet, et on sait ce que c'est.	What struck me in this two things is the notion of insecurity. Angst and guilt: insecurity. Angst and guilt: insecurity...angst is felt without knowing the source of danger. Guilt is a defense, because it has an object, and we know what that object is.	
D ^R LACAN –... J'ai bien besoin d'un pont tournant... Un... indéterminé me devient un supplice dormant.	Dr. Lacan: ...I have need of a swing bridge...One...Indeterminate becomes for me a sleeping torture. ¹⁶ <i>¹⁶ Tr: "J'ai besoin d'un pont tournant...Un... indéterminé me devient un supplice dormant."</i>	
D ^R GRANOFF – Le parallélisme entre l'attitude des hommes vis à vis de l'anthropophagie et de leurs enfants.	Dr. Granoff: The parallelism between the attitude people take towards anthropology and towards their children.	
Sans remonter très loin dans l'Histoire, dans l'histoire des Normands, vers le 16 ^e siècle, certaines chartres de marins comportaient la renonciation à l'anthropologie* disant que les marins « renonçaient à boire du sang humain... à embrocher des enfants sur la broche... ». * . Il s'agirait plutôt d'anthropophagie !	Without going too far back in history, in Norman history, around the 16 th century, some marine charters contained the renunciation of anthropology*, stating that the sailors "renounced drinking human blood...the skewering of children on the lance..." <i>* Rather, it is anthropophagia!</i>	
Le schéma que vous donnez ici trouve son illustration dans le processus analytique,	The schema that you have given here finds its illustration in the analytic process, but	

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mais aussi dans la formation de la personnalité. Ce qui prouve que l'analyse ne fait que reprendre le processus de la formation de la personnalité.	also in the formation of the personality, something which proves that analysis only takes up the question of the process of the formation of the personality.	
D ^R LACAN – Le fétichisme est une transposition de l'imaginaire. Il devient un symbole.	Dr. Lacan: Fetishism is a transposition of the imaginary. It becomes a symbol.	J.L. -- The fetish is a transposition of the imaginary. It becomes a symbol.
D ^R GRANOFF – Pour parler du réel, on a tous besoin de l'aide de quelqu'un pour appréhender le réel. Et, au fond, la structure de la personnalité du fétichisme serait une analyse qui se serait interrompue après iS.	Dr. Granoff: In order to speak of the real, we all need the help of someone to apprehend it. And, in the end, the structure of the personality of the fetishist would that of an analysis that would be interrupted after iS.	Wladimir Granoff raises a question regarding fetishism. [46]
Le fétichisme** n'est pas un organe génital féminin nous apprend Freud, mais une image angoissante qui fait démarrer un processus de l'ordre de l'imaginaire. Et c'est la démarche qui, dans ce cas particulier n'aboutit ⁽⁴⁰⁾ jamais. Je n'ai jamais conduit un traitement de fétichisme jusqu'à la fin. Mais il me semble que l'exemple de fétichisme est irremplaçable. **. Le fétiche ?	Fetishism** is not a female genital organ, but an anxiety-ridden image that sets in motion a process that is imaginary in nature. And it is the starting up that, in this particular case, never stops. I have never conducted a treatment of fetishism to its end. But it seems to me that the example of fetishism is irreplaceable. ** "The fetish?"	
D ^R LACAN – En effet, je n'ai pas repris le fétiche...	Dr. Lacan: Indeed, I did not take up the fetish* again... *In 1956, both Lacan and Granoff return to the topic of the fetish in their jointly written paper (written mostly by Granoff and signed off by Lacan), <i>Fetishism: The Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real in Perversions, Psychodynamics and Therapy</i> ;	J.L. – Indeed I did not come back to fetishism .

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	Random House, N.Y., 1956. Pages 265-276.	
D ^R GRANOFF – Mais, sous le rapport de la culpabilité, dans la mesure où le fétiche lui permet un rapport entre...	Dr. Granoff: But as concerns the relation of guilt, insofar as the fetish permits him to have a relation between...	
D ^R PIDOUX – J’ai vu, à propos d’angoisse et culpabilité, je voudrais vous demander si vous ne pensez pas que le symbole n’intervient pas... (?)... Et de l’angoisse au travail, et de l’élément transférentiel.	Dr. Pidoux: I saw, talking about angst and guilt, I would like to ask you if you do not believe that the symbol doesn’t intervene...(?)...Both in anxiety at work, and in the element of transference.	A question is raised by Dr. Pidoux.
D ^R LACAN – Exactement, comme il intervient dans le moindre acting-out... ce qui est transfert et...	Dr. Lacan: Precisely, just as it intervenes in the least acting-out...that which is transference is...	J.L.—Symbols are involved in even the slightest acting out.
M. ANZIEU – Lorsque Freud a fait la théorie clinique, il a emprunté des modèles aux théories de son époque... En nous proposant ce début de schéma... j’aimerais savoir si ces modèles sont du registre du symbole ou de l’imaginaire. Et quelle origine donner à ces modèles ?	M. Anzieu: When Freud was formulating clinical theory, he borrowed models from the theories of his time...In proposing to us this debut of a schema...I would like to know if these models are registered in the symbolic or the imaginary. And what is the origin of these models?	Didier Anzieu – When Freud developed his clinical theory, he borrowed models from theories current at his time. I would like to know if those models come from the register of symbols or from the imaginary, and what origin should be given to them?
Ce que vous proposez aujourd’hui est-il un changement de modèle permanent de penser les données cliniques, adapté à l’évolution culturelle ? Ou quelque chose d’autre. [16]	Is what you propose today a permanent change in our model for thinking about clinical data, adapted to cultural evolution? Or is it something else?	As for the preliminary schema that you proposed today, are we talking about a change of models which would allow us to conceptualize clinical data adapted to cultural evolution or about something else?
⁽⁴¹⁾ D ^R LACAN – Plus adapté à la nature des choses, si nous considérons que tout ce dont il s’agit dans l’analyse est de l’ordre du langage, c’est à dire, en fin de compte,	Dr. Lacan: Better adapted to the nature of things, if we take into consideration that everything to do with analysis is of the order of language, which is to say, in the	J.L. It is more adapted to the nature of things, if we consider that everything involved in analysis is of the nature of language – that is, in the final analysis, of

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d'une logique.	end, a logic.	the nature of a logic.
Par conséquent, c'est ce qui justifie cette formalisation qui intervient comme une hypothèse.	Consequently, this is what justifies this formalization, which intervenes as a hypothesis.	This is what justifies the formalizations I provided as a hypothesis.
Quant à ce que vous dites de Freud, je ne suis pas d'accord que sur le sujet du transfert il ait emprunté des modèles plus ou moins atomistiques, associationnistes, voire mécanistes du style de son époque.	As for what you said concerning Freud, I do not agree that on the subject of the transference he borrowed more or less atomistic models, associationist, meaning mechanistic ones in the style of his time.	As for what you said about Freud, I do not [47] agree that, regarding the subject of transference, he borrowed the atomistic, associationistic, or even mechanistic models of his era.
Ce qui me paraît frappant, c'est l'audace avec laquelle il a admis comme mode tout à fait à ne pas répudier dans le registre du transfert : l'amour, purement et simplement. Il ne considère pas du tout que cela soit une sorte d'impossibilité, d'impasse, quelque chose qui sorte des limites. Il a bien vu que le transfert, c'est la réalisation même du rapport humain sous sa forme la plus élevée, réalisation du symbole, qui est là, au départ, et qui est à la fin de tout cela.	What strikes me is the audacity with which he admitted a mode that was absolutely not to be repudiated in the register of the transference: love, pure and simple. He did not at all consider it to be a kind of impossibility, an impasse, a generator of limits. He saw quite well that the transference is the very production of the human relation in its most elevated form, the production of the symbol, which is there at the beginning, and which is end of all things.	What strikes me is the audacity with which he accepted love, purely and simply, as something not to be repudiated within the register of the transference. He in no wise considered love to be an impossibility or a dead-end, something that goes beyond the bounds. He clearly saw that transference is the very realization of human relationships in their most elevated form, the realizing of symbols, which is there at the outset and which is also there at the end of all that.
Et entre un commencement et une fin, qui sont toujours le transfert ; au début, en puissance, donné par le fait que le sujet vient, le transfert est là, prêt à se constituer. Il est là depuis le début.	And between a beginning and an end, which are always the transference; in the beginning, already fully operational, proven by the fact that the subject comes, the transference is there, ready to be constructed. It is there from the beginning.	The beginning and the end always involve transference. In the beginning, potentially: owing to the fact that the subject comes [to see us], the transference is there ready to be constituted. It is there right from the outset.
Que Freud y ait fait rentrer l'amour, c'est une chose qui doit bien nous montrer à quel point il donnait à ses rapports symboliques leur portée, même sur le plan humain, car, en fin de compte, si nous	That Freud brought love in this picture is something must make us see the degree to which he gave importance to his symbolic relations, even in the human domain, because, in the end, if we must	The fact that Freud included love in it is something that must clearly show us to what degree he gave symbolic relations their full range at the human level. Indeed, if we were to bestow a meaning

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devons donner un sens à ce quelque chose de limite, dont on peut à peine parler, qu'est l'amour, c'est la conjonction totale de la réalité et du symbole qui font une seule et même chose.	find some sense in love, this extreme thing about which we can barely speak, it would be in the overarching conjunction of reality and the symbol which together comprise one and the very same thing.	on love – a borderline experience we can barely talk about—it would be the total conjunction of reality and symbols, which constitute one and the same thing. [48]
(42)D ^R DOLTO – Réalité et symbole, qu'est-ce que tu entends par réalité ?	Dr. Dolto: Reality and symbol, what do you mean by reality?	<i>Françoise Dolto</i> – You say reality and symbols. What do you mean by reality?
D ^R LACAN – Un exemple : l'incarnation de l'amour c'est le don de l'enfant, qui, pour un être humain a cette valeur de quelque chose de plus réel.	Dr. Lacan: An example: the incarnation of love is the gift of the child, who, has the value of being something more real for the human being.	<i>J.L.</i> – Let me provide an example. Giving someone a child as a gift is the very incarnation of love. For humans, a child is what is most real.
D ^R DOLTO – Quand l'enfant naît, il est symbolique du don. Mais il peut y avoir aussi don sans enfant. Il peut donc y avoir parole sans langage.	Dr. Dolto: When the child is born, he is symbolic of the gift. But there can also be a gift without a child. Therefore can there be language without the speech?	<i>Françoise Dolto</i> – When a child is born it symbolizes a gift. But there can also be a gift without a child. There can thus be speech without language.
D ^R LACAN – Justement, je suis prêt à le dire tout le temps : le symbole dépasse la parole.	Dr. Lacan: Exactly, I am always ready to admit it: the symbol exceeds speech.	<i>J.L.</i> -- I am always willing to say it: symbols go beyond speech.
D ^R DOLTO – Nous arrivons tout le temps à « qu'est-ce que le réel ? » et nous y échappons tout le temps. Et il y a une autre manière d'appréhender la réalité psychanalytique aussi que celle là, qui pour ma psychologie me semble très extrême. Mais tu es un Maître si extraordinaire qu'on peut te suivre si on ne comprend qu'après.	Dr. Dolto: We always end up at “what is the real?” and it always escapes us. There is another manner in which to apprehend psychoanalytic reality than this one, which appears to me to be very extreme from the perspective of my psychology. But you are such an extraordinary teacher (<i>Maître</i>) that we are able to go along with you even if we don't understand afterwards.	<i>Françoise Dolto</i> – We always arrive at the same question, “What is the real?” And we always manage to move away from it. There is another way in which to apprehend psychoanalytic reality than this one, which to my psychological sensibility seems quite extreme. But you are such an extraordinary teacher (<i>maître</i>) that we can follow you even if we only understand later.
Dans l'appréhension sensorielle, qui est un	In sensory apprehension, which is a	Sensory apprehension is a register of

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registre de la réalité, à des assises qui me paraissent plus sûres... préalables au langage, et l'image de notre corps. Et je pensais tout le temps, et surtout pour l'expression verbale, puisque l'adulte se passe surtout avec l'expression verbale de l'imaginaire, s'il n'y a pas l'image du corps propre... (?).	register of reality that appears to me to be better founded...preliminary to language and the image of the body. And I have always thought, and above all as concerns verbal expression, since adults come into being above all using the verbal expression of the imaginary, if there is not the image of the body itself...(?)	reality, and it has a foundation that seems more sure to me, since it is prior to language. If there is no [49] image of one's own body, everything occurs for the adult with the verbal expression of the imaginary.
Dès que l'autre a des oreilles, on ne peut pas parler... (?)	As soon as the other has ears, we cannot speak of...(?)	As soon as the other has ears, the subject cannot speak.
(43)D ^R LACAN – Tu y penses beaucoup, toi, que l'autre a des oreilles ?	Dr. Lacan: You fully believe this, you, that the other has ears?	<i>J. L.</i> – Do you think a lot about the fact that others have ears?
D ^R DOLTO – Pas moi, les enfants. Si je parle, c'est que je sais qu'il y a des oreilles. Je n'en parlerai pas avant l'âge œdipien, on parle même s'il n'y a pas d'oreilles.	Dr. Dolto: No me, children. If I speak, its because there are ears. I'm not talking about them before the pre-Oedipal age, we speak even if there are no ears.	<i>Françoise Dolto</i> – I don't, but children do. If I speak, it is because I know that there are ears to hear. Prior to the Oedipal stage, children speak even when there are no ears to hear. But after the Oedipal age on cannot speak if there are no ears around.
D ^R LACAN – Qu'est-ce que tu veux dire ?	Dr. Lacan: What do you mean?	<i>J.L.</i> – What do you mean?
D ^R DOLTO – Pour parler, il faut qu'il y ait bouche et oreilles. Alors il reste une bouche.	Dr. Dolto: In order to speak, there must be a mouth and ears. Therefore we are left with a mouth.	<i>Françoise Dolto</i> – In order to speak, there must be a mouth and ears. So a mouth remains.
D ^R LACAN – C'est l'imaginaire. [17]	Dr. Lacan: This is the Imaginary.	<i>J.L.</i> – That is the imaginary.
D ^R DOLTO – J'en ai eu hier en exemple. Hier, dans un enfant muet qui mettait des yeux sans oreille. Je lui ait dit (comme il est muet), je lui dis : « ce n'est pas	Dr. Dolto: I saw an example of this yesterday, with a mute child who was drawing eyes without ears. I said to him (since he is mute), I said to him: "It's not	<i>Françoise Dolto</i> – I met with a mute child yesterday who drew [a picture of a child with] eyes but no ears. As he is mute I said to him, "It's not surprising that the

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étonnant qu'il ne puisse pas parler, celui-là, puisqu'il n'a pas de bouche ».	surprising that he can't speak, since he does not have a mouth".	kid can't speak – he has no [50] mouth."
Il a essayé avec un crayon de mettre une bouche. Mais il l'a mise à l'enfant à l'endroit qui coupait le cou. Il perdait la tête s'il parlait ; il perdrait l'intelligence ; il perdrait la notion d'un corps vertical, s'il parlait. Pour parler, il faut la certitude qu'il y ait une bouche, et qu'il y ait des oreilles.	He tried to draw a mouth with his pencil. But he drew it on a spot that cut through the child's throat, it would lose its intelligence; it would lose the notion of the vertical body, if it were to speak. In order to speak, we must be certain that there is a mouth, and that there are ears.	The child tried to draw a mouth with a crayon. But he placed it on the kid in a place that cut the kid's throat. He would lose his head, his intelligence, and his notion of a vertical body if he spoke. In order to speak, one must be sure that there is a mouth and that there are ears.
D ^R LACAN – Oui, je veux bien.	Dr. Lacan: I'd like to believe you (<i>je veux bien</i>).	L.J. That is all fine and good,
Mais les faits très intéressants que tu mets en valeur sont tout à fait liés à quelque chose de complètement laissé de côté ; liés à la constitution de l'image du corps en tant qu'...*** du moi, et avec ce tranchant ambigu ; avec le corps morcelé. ***. À cet endroit une autre source indique le mot orbite. Serait-ce Urbild ?	But the very interesting facts that you have emphasized for us are completely linked to something you haven't mentioned; linked to the constitution of the image of the body as an <i>Urbild</i> ¹⁷ of the ego, and this ambiguous slicing up ¹⁸ is linked to the body in pieces. ***. At this point another source indicates the word orbit. Could it be Urbild? ¹⁸ Tr: The French text includes this word "Urbild" as a potential transcription of an indistinct word. ¹⁹ Tr: "ce tranchant ambigu," that is, of the child's throat in the drawing.	but the very interesting facts you highlight are connected to something that was completely left aside, the constitution of the body image <i>qua</i> the ego's <i>Urbild</i> ¹ , and with this ambiguous knife-edge, the fragmented body. TN1. Regarding the <i>Urbild</i> , see "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function," in <i>Écrits</i> , pp. 75-81.
Je ne vois pas où tu veux en venir...	I'm not sure I see where you are going with it.	I'm not sure where you are going with this.
(44)D ^R DOLTO – Le langage n'est qu'une des images. Ce n'est qu'une des manifestations de l'acte d'amour, qu'une des manifestations où l'être dans l'acte d'amour, est morcelé. Nous ne sommes	Dr. Dolto: Language is but one of many images. It is but one of the many manifestations of the act of love, but one of the manifestations where being is, in the act of love, rent to pieces. We are not	Françoise Dolto – Language is but one of the images. It is but one of the manifestations of the act of love, but one of the manifestations in which being, in the act of love, is fragmented. We are not

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<p>pas complets, puisque nous avons besoin de nous compléter quand nous avons besoin de parole. Il ne sais pas ce qu'il dit, c'est l'autre, s'il l'entend. Ce qui se passe par le langage peut se passer pas beaucoup d'autres moyens.</p>	<p>complete, because we begin to need to complete ourselves when we begin to need to speak. He does not know what he says, this other, if he is listening it. What happens via language can happen in many other ways.¹⁹ <i>²⁰ Tr: "Ce qui se passé par le langage peut se passer pas [sic!] beaucoup d'autres moyens." The French verb "se passer" literally means "to happen," but may also have the sense of "to come into being" insofar as it means "to occur [at all]." The text has the word "pas beaucoup d'autres moyens," which I have translated as "in many other ways," assuming that Dolto originally said "par beaucoup d'autres moyens."</i></p>	<p>complete since we need to be completed when we need speech. One does not know what one is saying – it is the other [who knows what one is saying], assuming the other hears one. What occurs through language can occur through many other means. [51]</p>
<p>D^R MANNONI – Une remarque : C'est que les dessins ne sont pas images, mais des objets et le problème de savoir si son image est symbole ou réalité ? C'est extrêmement difficile.</p>	<p>Dr. Mannoni: One comment: Drawings are not images, but objects, and the problem of knowing if one's image is a symbol or reality? This is extremely difficult.</p>	<p><i>Octave Mannoni</i> – Just one remark. Drawings are not images; they are objects. The question is whether an image is a symbol or a reality. This is extremely difficult.</p>
<p>D LACAN – C'est un des modes par lesquels en tout cas dans la phénoménologie de l'intention, on aborde l'imaginaire, par tout ce qui est reproduction artificielle, les plus accessibles.</p>	<p>Dr. Lacan: It [the drawing] is one of the modes by which, in the case of the phenomenology of intention anyhow, we cross over into the Imaginary, via all that is an artificial reproduction, the most accessible way.</p>	<p><i>J.L.</i> -- One of the most accessible ways by which one can approach the imaginary, at least in the phenomenology of intention, is by saying that the imaginary is everything that is artificially reproduced. [52] <i>TN: A number of ill-recorded questions and responses are not included in this publication.</i></p>
<p>M^{ME} MARCUS-BLAJAN – Il est frappant de voir la prédominance du visuel. Les rêves en général sont visuels.</p>	<p>Mrs. Marcus-Blajan: It is striking to see the predominance of the visual. In general</p>	

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	dreams are visual.	
Je me demande à quoi cela correspond ?	I wonder what that corresponds with?	
D ^R LACAN – ... Tout ce qui est captations...	Dr. Lacan: All that is illicitly captivating (<i>captation</i>).	