

DISCOURS DE TOKYO

1971	Mar	17 Wed	Book XVIII: <i>D'un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant</i> Lesson 6
1971	Apr	21 Wed	DISCOURS DE TOKYO
1971	May	12 Wed	Book XVIII: <i>D'un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant</i> Lesson 7 Lituraterre

French Text	Dany Nobus Translation	Jack W. Stone Translation
Pas-tout Lacan 1971-04-01	Journal for Lacanian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1. (2005) pages 129-144	
<p>Cette intervention du Dr Lacan a eu lieu le 21 avril 1971 à Tokyo, dans les locaux de l'éditeur Kobundo, qui a publié la traduction japonaise des Écrits, et à l'occasion d'une rencontre organisée par le Pr. Takatsugu Sasaki, avec l'équipe de traducteurs qu'il avait réunis autour de lui pour les Écrits. La transcription de cette intervention du Dr Lacan a été établie, à partir d'un enregistrement aujourd'hui perdu, par M. Philippe Pons, correspondant à Tokyo du journal Le Monde. C'est grâce au Pr. Sasaki qui a conservé cette transcription que ce document nous est parvenu. Ce texte a été traduit en japonais par le Pr. Sasaki, qui l'a fait publier sous le titre de « Discours de Tokyo », conjointement avec la traduction de « Radiophonie » réalisée par Mr Takuhiko Ichimura, dans un livre édité en 1985 par Kobundo, et intitulé « Discours de Jacques Lacan ». Photocopie pp. 1-21.</p>	<p>1. [Jacques Lacan, <i>Discours de Tokyo</i>, transcription d'une intervention le 21 avril 1971, dans les locaux de l'éditeur Kobundo, par M. Philippe Pons,, non-publié. Translated from unedited French type-scripts by Dany Nobus.]</p>	<p>This intervention by Dr. Lacan took place on April 21, 1971 in Tokyo in the office of Kobundo editions, the publisher of the Japanese translation of the Écrits, during a meeting organized by Prof. Takasugo Sasaki, with the team of translators who had gathered around him to work on Écrits. The transcription of this intervention by Dr. Lacan was established, beginning with a now lost recording, made by Mr. Philippe Pons, Tokyo correspondent for the newspaper Le Monde. It is thanks to Prof. Sasaki who preserved this transcription that this document has come to us. This text was translated into Japanese by Prof. Sasaki, who had it published under the title "Tokyo Discourse," along with Mr. Takuhiko Ichimura's translation of "Radiophonie," in a book published by Kobundo in 1985, entitled Discourse of Jacques Lacan. Photocopy pp. 1-21.</p>

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(1)Dr Jacques Lacan :	Jacques Lacan ¹	⁽¹⁾ Dr. Jacques Lacan :
<p>L'École Freudienne de Paris, dont les Écrits ne prétendent pas être le programme, est sortie de deux scissions qui se sont produites à l'intérieur du groupe psychanalytique de Paris. J'appelle groupe quelque chose de très général, simplement le fait qu'il y ait des psychanalystes à Paris. Il y a eu une première scission qui a abouti à la séparation de deux choses : l'une qui s'appelait l'Institut de Psychanalyse de Paris et l'autre qui s'appelait la Société Française. Quand je suis venu au Japon, il y a onze ans, je faisais partie de la Société Française de Psychanalyse. Ces sortes de scissions dans l'histoire des groupes de Psychanalyse en Europe ne sont pas rares. Prenons le cas de la Suisse, il y a plus d'un groupe et ces groupes sont reliés d'une manière très lâche.</p>	<p>The <i>'École Freudienne de Paris</i>, for which the <i>Écrits</i> do not claim to be the programme, resulted from two scissions that occurred inside the psychoanalytic group of Paris. What I call 'group', here, is something very general, quite simply the fact that there are psychoanalysts in Paris. There was a first scission which led to the separation of two things: one thing called <i>Institut de Psychanalyse de Paris</i> and the other thing called <i>Société Française</i>. When I first came to Japan, eleven years ago, I was a member of the <i>Société Française de Psychanalyse</i>. These kinds of scissions are by no means rare in the history of psychoanalytic groups in Europe. If we take the case of Switzerland, then there is already more than one group, and the groups are only very loosely related to one another.</p>	<p><i>L'École Freudienne de Paris</i>, of which the <i>Écrits</i> does not claim to be the program, emerged from two schisms produced within the Paris psychoanalytic group. I call something very general a group, simply the fact that there are some psychoanalysts in Paris. A first schism led to the separation of two things: one was called <i>l'Institut de Psychanalyse de Paris</i> the other was called <i>la Société Française</i>. When I came to Japan, eleven years ago, I belonged to the <i>la Société Française de Psychanalyse</i>. These kinds of schisms are not rare in the history of European psychoanalytic groups. Take the case of the Swiss: they have more than one group and these groups are very loosely affiliated.</p>
<p>Il s'est trouvé que pour des raisons contingentes, liées à des choses assez secondaires, comme des rivalités personnelles, c'est à la suite de ça que s'est produite cette première scission. Mais pour des raisons aussi très contingentes, un de ces groupes n'est pas resté dans ce que l'on appelle l'Association Internationale de Psychanalyse. Cela à cause des relations personnelles qu'une personne, qui est tout</p>	<p>It so happened that the first scission occurred for contingent reasons, related to quite secondary matters, such as personal rivalries. But for equally contingent reasons one of the two groups did not stay in what is called the 'International Psycho-Analytic Association'. And this because of the personal relations that one person, who is now largely forgotten and who is called Princess Marie of Greece, maintained with Anna Freud. Because of these personal</p>	<p>It was found that for contingent reasons, linked to some quite secondary things, such as personal rivalries--following one of these the first schism was produced. But also for very contingent reasons, one of these groups did not remain in what is called <i>l'Association Internationale de Psychanalyse</i>. This because of personal relations that someone, named Princess Marie of Greece, entertained with Anna Freud. These personal relations made it</p>

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<p>de même très oubliée, qui s'appelait la Princesse Marie de Grèce, entretenait avec Anna Freud. Ces relations personnelles ont fait qu'au lieu que ces deux Sociétés soient reconnues, ce qui aurait été le cas normal, on a argué d'une minutie juridique, à savoir que nous en étions sortis en donnant notre démission, ce qui était correct de donner notre démission de la société précédente, mais au point de vue formel ça nous excluait. Si l'Association Internationale avait joué un jeu normal, elle aurait considéré que c'était là un accident, et elle nous aurait reconnus comme l'autre groupe. Cela a eu des conséquences curieuses ; il y a des gens parmi nous qui sont restés nostalgiques à propos de cette séparation et qui ont tout fait pour rentrer dans cette Association Internationale.</p>	<p>relations instead of the two groups being recognized – which would have been the normal case – it was argued with juridical meticulousness that, in resigning from the previous society, which was correct, we had left the International Psycho-Analytic Association and that in this way we had formally excluded ourselves. If the International Association had played a normal game, it would have observed that this was merely an accident, and it would have recognized us, just like the other group. This has had some strange consequences. There are people among us who have remained nostalgic with regard to this separation and who have done everything they can in order to be accepted again by the International Association.</p>	<p>so that instead of two Societies being recognized, which would have been the normal case, it was argued from a bit of juridical minutia that we had left in turning in our resignation, which was correct insofar as we had turned in our resignation to the preceding society, but from the formal point of view this excluded us. If the <i>Association Internationale</i> had played the normal game, it would have considered this an accident, and it would have recognized us as the other group. This had curious consequences: there were people who remained nostalgic apropos of this separation and who have done everything to get back into this <i>Association Internationale</i>.</p>
<p>(2)Et c'est là que ce qui s'était développé depuis dix ans de mon enseignement a pris son importance, à savoir que ce que j'enseignais était tout à fait distinct par rapport à ce qui faisait le ton de ce qui se faisait dans la sphère de la psychanalyse anglo-américaine. Ce n'est pas là une chose surprenante, Freud l'avait prévue, Freud avait prévu que la psychanalyse subirait un infléchissement très important du fait d'être prise dans le système de pensée de la société américaine. Il y en a des traces</p>	<p>And this is where what I developed through my teaching, for ten years, became important: that what I taught was completely different from the tone of what was being done within the sphere of Anglo-American psychoanalysis. This, in itself, isn't all that surprising, since [129] Freud had foreseen it. Freud foresaw that psychoanalysis would undergo a very important reorientation as a result of it being taken up by the system of thought of American society. There are written traces of this in his work. He foresaw the whole thing. And things have</p>	<p>⁽²⁾ And it is from this that what has developed from ten years of my teaching has taken its importance, in that what I taught was altogether distinct in regard to what gave the tone to what was done in the sphere of Anglo-American psychoanalysis. This is nothing surprising, Freud foresaw it; Freud foresaw that psychoanalysis would undergo a very important inflection from being taken into the American society's system of thought. There are traces of this in his written work. He foresaw the thing. And</p>

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<p>écrites dans son œuvre. Il avait prévu la chose. Et c'est de la façon la plus déclarée que les choses se passent ainsi. C'est à savoir que quelqu'un comme Heinz Hartmann, qui fait la loi à la Société de New York, a nettement dit que ce qui devait faire le programme de la psychanalyse, de son travail et de son enseignement, devait consister à la faire rentrer dans les cadres, les concepts qu'il appelle lui-même la psychologie générale. C'est une chose qui a été dite et écrite et constitue le programme de l'école américaine, pour autant qu'elle suit le mouvement de New York – et dans l'ensemble l'école américaine suit avec plus ou moins de distance. Les États Unis c'est très grand, et cela offre une certaine diversité ; néanmoins quelque chose est resté des méthodes impératives que les émigrés d'Allemagne ont héritées d'un certain style universitaire qui est celui de l'Allemagne. Il est certain que ce groupe, que je connais très bien puisque je les ai vus dans les années qui ont précédé la guerre entre 33 et 38 – je les ai tous vus passer à Paris, je veux dire que je me suis même occupé d'eux –, a donné l'impulsion à partir de la guerre à la psychanalyse américaine. [1]</p>	<p>happened in precisely this way in a very explicit fashion. Someone like Heinz Hartmann, who rules the roost in the New York Society, clearly said that the programme of psychoanalysis, its work and its teaching, should consist in making it enter the frameworks and the concepts which he himself calls 'general psychology'. It has been said and written, and it constitutes the programme of the American school, in as much as it follows the movements of New York – on the whole the American school follows with a smaller or higher degree of distance. The United States is very big and that generates a certain diversity. But, none the less, something has remained from the compulsory methods that the German immigrants inherited through a certain German academic style. There is no doubt that this group – and I know them very well because I saw them during the years preceding the war, between 1933 and 1938; I saw them passing through Paris and I even attended to them – gave the impetus, after the war, to American psychoanalysis.</p>	<p>things happened this way in the most clear-cut fashion. Someone like Heinz Hartmann, who was the law for the New York Society, clearly said that the program of psychoanalysis, of its work and teaching, should consist in re-entering the frameworks, the concepts, of what he himself calls general psychology. This is a thing that has been written and said and constitutes the program of the American school, insofar as it follows the New York movement – and the whole of the American school follows it at a greater or lesser distance. The United States is very large, and this offers a certain diversity; nonetheless, something remains of the imperative methods the German emigrants inherited from a certain academic style which is that of Germany. It is certain that this group, whom I knew very well, since I had seen them in the years preceding the war between '33 and '38—I had seen them all pass through Paris; I mean I was even occupied with them—gave American psychoanalysis its impetuous beginning with the war.</p>
Le fait de ce qui s'est passé en 63, d'un besoin impérieux qui s'est manifesté parmi	What occurred in 1963, resulting from a pressing need, which manifested itself among	The fact of what happened in '63, out of an imperious need manifested among some

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<p>des gens qui étaient mes collègues, professeurs à la Sorbonne, de rentrer dans l'Association Internationale, leur a fait faire des concessions sur le sujet de ce en quoi mon enseignement se distinguait radicalement de ce qui faisait la loi, donnait le ton dans la psychanalyse américaine et dont on peut dire par exemple que Anna Freud, dans sa façon de traiter la psychanalyse des enfants, a poussé les choses à un (3)degré qui s'harmonise très bien avec le programme de la Société de New York.</p>	<p>people who were my colleagues and professors at the Sorbonne, to re-enter the International Association, forced people to make concessions about how my teaching was indeed radically different from the law and tone of American psychoanalysis. And we could say, for instance, that Anna Freud, in her way of treating the psychoanalysis of children, has pushed things to a level that is very much in accordance with the programme of the New York society.</p>	<p>people who were my colleagues, professors at the Sorbonne, to re-enter <i>l'Association Internationale</i>, which had made them make some concessions on the subject of what in my teaching radically distinguished it from the law that gave its tone to American psychoanalysis and of which one can say, for example, that Anna Freud, in her fashion of treating the psychoanalysis of children, pushed things to a degree ⁽³⁾ that harmonized very well with the program of the New York Society.</p>
<p>C'est à ce moment là que dans ces conditions et vu la tournure que prenaient les choses, j'ai moi-même dit que je ne continuerai plus l'enseignement que je donnais et qui était, il faut le dire, la vraie vie de la Société Française de Psychanalyse ; il est évident que c'est mon enseignement qui lui donnait son poids et son ton. Il n'y avait personne d'autre que moi à y donner à proprement parler un enseignement. Ce qu'apportaient les professeurs à la Sorbonne, que je n'ai pas à nommer, était vraiment de l'ordre de la répétition à thèmes, je dois dire assez usés, et qui ne manifestaient pas une grande fécondité. C'est à la suite de quoi, j'ai déclaré que je n'avais plus à continuer mon enseignement dans les conditions où les choses</p>	<p>At that very moment, under those circumstances and given the way in which things started to turn, I myself decided not to continue with my teaching, which constituted, it deserves to be said, the true life of the <i>Société Française de Psychanalyse</i>. It's evident that my teaching gave the group its weight and its tone. There was really no one else but me who was properly involved in teaching. What the professors (I don't need to mention their names) offered at the Sorbonne was really no more than a repetition of themes, which were moreover quite worn and which did not demonstrate great fertility. Following these events I declared that I had no reason for continuing with my teaching, at least not under the circumstances in which things were developing. I did it without any guarantee for</p>	<p>It was at that moment that in these conditions and having seen the turn things took, I myself said that I would no longer continue the teaching I was giving and which was, it must be said, the true life of <i>la Société Française de Psychanalyse</i>; it is obvious that it was my teaching that gave it its weight and its tone. There was no one except me to give a teaching there properly speaking. What was brought in by the Sorbonne professors, whom I need not name, was truly of the order of a repetition of some, I must say, quite threadbare themes, which did not manifest any great fecundity. It was after this that I declared that I did not have to continue my teaching in the conditions that prevailed. I did so without any guarantee of what was to come.</p>

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s’engageaient. Je l’ai fait sans avoir aucune garantie quant à l’avenir.	the future.	
<p>Il se trouve qu’à ce moment-là on m’a proposé de poursuivre mon enseignement dans une certaine 6e section de l’École Pratique des Hautes Études où il se trouve que je suis le collègue de gens comme Lévi-Strauss. Devant le fait que des gens qui avaient été mes élèves restaient avec moi et ne s’engageaient pas dans la voie du retour à la Société Internationale je me suis trouvé, si je puis dire, en charge d’eux et j’ai fondé ce qui s’appelle, ce que j’ai appelé puisque c’est moi qui lui ai donné son nom, l’École Freudienne de Paris. Il est certain que l’appeler Freudienne dans ces conditions, je veux dire en me séparant d’une association internationale qui prétend avoir le monopole de l’héritage freudien, je m’offrais une contestation, même juridique à l’occasion. Il est remarquable qu’il n’y en ait pas eu trace. Je veux dire que personne à Paris n’a osé contester que mon enseignement fut freudien. C’est ce que je peux dire quant à la situation actuelle de l’École.</p>	<p>It so happens that at that moment I was given an opportunity to continue my teaching within a certain sixth section of the <i>l’École Pratique des Hautes Études</i>, where I happened to be the colleague of people like [130] Lévi-Strauss. Faced with the fact that people who had been my pupils stayed with me and did engage themselves along the road of a return to the International Society, I found myself, if I may say so, in charge of them and so I founded what is called – what I have called, because it is I who gave it its name – the <i>École Freudienne de Paris</i>. By calling it ‘Freudian’ under these conditions, that is to say, in separating myself from an international association that claims to have the monopoly on the Freudian heritage, I no doubt exposed myself to contestation, perhaps even legal action. It is remarkable that there was no trace of it. I mean that nobody in Paris dared to dispute that my teaching was Freudian. This also applies to the present situation of the <i>École</i>.</p>	<p>It was found that at that moment they proposed that I pursue my teaching in a certain 6th section of <i>l’École Pratique des Hautes Études</i> where it is found that I am the colleague of people like Lévi-Strauss. Faced with the fact that some people who had been my students remained with me and did not take the return route to the <i>Société Internationale</i>, I found myself, if I can say so, in charge of them and I founded what is called, what I have called, since it is I who gave it its name, <i>l’École Freudienne de Paris</i>. It is certain that in calling it Freudian in these conditions, I mean in separating myself from an international association that claims to have the monopoly on the Freudian legacy, I would offer myself to a contestation, even a legal one on this occasion. It is remarkable that there has been no trace of one. I mean that no one in Paris has dared contest that my teaching was Freudian. That is what I can say of the current situation of the <i>École</i>.</p>
<p>Il y a beaucoup de gens, même dans les autres groupes, qui voient un faible avantage à être reliés à l’Association Internationale. J’en connais plus d’un qui ne mettent jamais les pieds dans les</p>	<p>There are many people, even in the other groups, who see little advantage in being connected to the International Association. I know of more than one who never attends conferences and who has a certain aversion to</p>	<p>There are many people, even in the other groups, who see little advantage in being affiliated with <i>l’Association Internationale</i>. I know more than one who never step foot into the congress and who have a certain</p>

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<p>congrès et qui ont une certaine aversion pour ces (4)manifestations. Ce qui est certain c'est que tous ceux qui, à quelque titre, ont goûté de mon enseignement, même quand ils font partie d'un autre groupe, car il s'est trouvé que pour des raisons d'ambition personnelle, certains m'ont juridiquement abandonné, même ceux-là se trouvent de leurs propres aveux très mal à l'aise dans les manifestations de ce qui domine dans l'Association Internationale, c'est-à-dire où les communications reposent sur des présupposés, sur des principes, sur ce qu'il faut bien aussi appeler des préjugés, c'est-à-dire des jugements fondamentaux qui ne sont jamais discutés.</p>	<p>these manifestations. It is certain that all those who have tasted my teaching, in whatever capacity, even when they belong to another group – because it has happened that for reasons of personal ambition some people have left me juridically – personally admit that they feel uncomfortable with manifestations of what dominates in the International Association, where papers rest on presuppositions, on principles, and on what we should really call prejudices, that is to say on fundamental judgements that are never discussed.</p>	<p>aversion for these ⁽⁴⁾manifestations. What is certain is that all of those who, on whatever basis, have tasted of my teaching, even when they belong to another group—for it is found that for reasons of personal ambition, certain of them have legally abandoned me—even they find themselves by their own admission very ill at ease with these manifestations of what dominates in <i>l'Association Internationale</i>, where the communication reposes on presuppositions, on principles, on what must also be called prejudices, which is to say, some fundamental judgments that are never debated.</p>
<p>Les choses qui s'énoncent dans ces congrès les mettent très mal à l'aise à partir du moment où ils se sont trouvés régler leur pratique sur certains principes que j'énonce, et dont il faut bien que je marque, que je souligne, que ce n'est pas rien que toute cette construction, disons, que j'ai faite au cours de ces années, ça dure depuis un bout de temps et même un petit peu trop à mon gré, enfin nous sommes dans la dix-huitième année de cet enseignement. Cet enseignement tel qu'il est, avec ce qui peut vous sembler abstrait, enfin tout dépend avec quelle oreille vous</p>	<p>What is being expressed at these conferences makes them feel very uncomfortable, from the moment they started organizing their practice on the basis of some of my principles. And I should note, here – I should really emphasize that it isn't just the construction, let's say, that I have made over the past years, but something that has lasted for quite a while now, and perhaps for a bit too long to my liking, for we are now in the eighteenth year of this teaching – this teaching as it stands, with what may seem abstract to you, but then again everything depends on the ear with which you read these things.</p>	<p>The things stated in these congresses put them very ill at ease from the moment they find themselves organizing their practice around certain principles that I articulate (<i>énonce</i>), and of which I must mark, I must stress, that it is not nothing, all this construction, let us say, that I have made in the course of these year; this has endured for a bit of time and even a little too long for my taste; indeed, we are in the eighteenth year of this teaching. This teaching such as it is, with what there is in it that might seem abstract to you, this all depends, finally, on the ear you read these things with.</p>

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pouvez lire ces choses.		
<p>Parmi vous personne n'est psychanalyste. C'est fâcheux. Cela pourrait aider certaines choses. Néanmoins, comme ce psychanalyste serait formé selon les principes qui doivent, – je n'en sais rien, dont je suppose qu'ils doivent dominer ici – quelque chose qui doit émaner d'une façon plus ou moins directe de l'École américaine, ce serait aussi une difficulté. Ce qui rend si pénible, pour ceux qui ont goûté de mon enseignement, un certain style d'énonciation, de visée donnée à leur pratique, c'est que ces choses qui peuvent vous paraître hautement abstraites – c'est le plus mauvais mot, ce n'est pas abstrait, ce sont toujours des choses très concrètes, – ces choses que, si vous n'êtes pas analyste vous [2] pouvez très difficilement imaginer, à savoir ce qu'est l'expérience de ce que nous appellerons l'expérience du divan. À savoir ce qui se passe quand quelqu'un est là, dans le cabinet de l'analyste, sur le divan et une fois entré dans cette (5) sorte d'artifice car c'est bien évidemment un artifice, la psychanalyse ; il ne faut pas s'imaginer ça comme quelque chose qui serait la découverte de je ne sais pas quel cœur de l'être ou de l'âme. Au nom de quoi cela se produirait-il ?</p>	<p>Nobody is a psychoanalyst here. It's annoying. It could have helped with certain things. None the less, as this psychoanalyst would be trained following the principles – I don't really know anything about it, but I assume they must dominate here too – that must emanate in a more or less direct way from the American school, that would be difficult, too. What makes a certain style of expression, a certain aim given to their practice so painful for those who have tasted my teaching, is that those things that may appear to you as highly abstract – it's a very bad word, because it's not abstract; it always concerns very concrete things – and which are very difficult to image if you are not an analyst, concern the nature of the experience of what we shall call the couch-experience. It concerns what happens when someone is there, in [131] the analyst's consultation room, on the couch, once someone has entered this kind of artifice, because psychoanalysis is obviously an artifice. One shouldn't imagine it as something that might concern the discovery of some kind of heart of being or of the soul. In the name of what would this occur?</p>	<p>No one among you is a psychoanalyst. This is unfortunate. It could help with certain things. Nonetheless, since this psychoanalyst would have been trained in accordance with principles that must—I know nothing about them, from which I suppose that they dominate here—something that must emanate in a more or less direct way from the American school, this would also be a difficulty. What makes so hard, for those who have tasted of my teaching, a certain style of enunciation, of aim given to their practice, are these things that appear to you highly abstract—this is the worst term for it; it is not abstract, these are always very concrete things—these things that you may find very difficult to imagine, the experience of what we will call the experience of the couch. That is, what happens when someone is there, in the office of the analyst, on the couch and has entered into this ⁽⁵⁾ sort of artifice—for it is quite obviously an artifice, psychoanalysis; one should not imagine it is something that would be the discovery of being or of the soul. In the name of what would this be produced?</p>
La psychanalyse n'est pas une ascèse, c'est	Psychoanalysis is not an asceticism. It's a	Psychoanalysis is not an ascesis (<i>ascèse</i>), it is

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<p>une technique, un artefact très précis qui est destiné à entrer dans quelque chose dont il s'agit justement de concevoir la nature véritable. Pour que ça puisse marcher dans les conditions où ça marche, c'est dire que l'on est dans une situation qui est celle-ci : des gens viennent demander quelque chose dont ils n'ont eux-mêmes aucune espèce d'idée ; ce qu'ils demandent, c'est je ne sais pas quoi de vague qui a au moins chez certains l'appui de certains symptômes dont ils souffrent et dont ils voudraient bien se débarrasser. Le psychanalyste est dès lors considéré comme une sorte de puissance obscure qui doit avoir le moyen de faire des merveilles. C'est évidemment pas quelque chose sur quoi nous jouons. Je veux dire par là que tout de même il faut rendre cette justice à la psychanalyse qu'elle n'essaie pas de jouer sur cette dimension de la suggestion et de la croyance et de la confiance ; de la prise en main, de la direction de ce qu'on appelle le patient. Si c'était cela, il y a longtemps que la psychanalyse serait disparue de ce monde comme c'est arrivé pour certaines techniques qui jouaient sur ce rapport humain.</p>	<p>technique, a very precise artifact that is designed to enter into something whose true nature needs to be conceived. For things to work in those circumstances when it actually works, the situation is as follows: people come and ask for something very vague that, at least in some of them, has the support of certain symptoms they are suffering from and would like to get rid of. Consequently, the psychoanalyst is perceived as a kind of obscure power who must have the means to perform miracles. Needless to say, this isn't what we play on. What I mean by this is that we need to do proper justice to psychoanalysis in that it does not try to play on these dimensions of suggestion, belief, and trust, on looking after and directing what we call the patient. Were this to be the case, psychoanalysis would have long since disappeared from this world, as has indeed happened with certain techniques that play on this human rapport.</p>	<p>a technique, a very precise artifact destined to enter into something of which it is precisely a question of conceiving the true nature. For it to work in conditions where it works, which is to say when one is in this situation: people come asking for something of which they have no idea what-soever; what they ask for is something very vague that at least for certain of them has the support of certain symptoms from which they suffer and which they would like to be rid of. The psychoanalyst is then considered a sort of obscure power who should have the means to perform miracles. This obviously is not something on which we play. I mean by this that we must render the justice to psychoanalysis of stating that it does not try to play on this dimension of suggestion and of belief and confidence: of the taking in hand, of the direction of what one calls the patient. If it were that, psychoanalysis would have disappeared from the world a long time ago as has happened to certain other techniques that have played on this human rapport.</p>
<p>La psychanalyse est une technique assez précise qui joue sur cette règle qu'on donne au patient de dire ce qui lui vient à</p>	<p>Psychoanalysis is quite a precise technique, which plays on this rule that is given to the patient, of saying what comes to mind. Of</p>	<p>Psychoanalysis is a quite precise technique that plays on the rule that one allow the patient to say whatever comes to him to say.</p>

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<p>dire. Naturellement, on l’oriente un peu vers ce qui pourrait être intéressant, on lui apprend à aller un peu plus loin que les rapports dits de l’aveu ne le comportent. On leur dit que cela vaut mieux qu’ils ne s’arrêtent à rien, même des choses qui peuvent leur paraître indifférentes ou malpolies, qu’ils les disent, comme ça leur vient à l’esprit. Que, à partir de cette pratique, quelque chose s’établisse qui est infiniment plus riche et plus compliqué, ça a tout de suite frappé les gens qui se sont mis à opérer avec cette pratique : c’est ce qu’on appelle le transfert.</p>	<p>course, we orientate the patient a little bit towards what might be interesting; we tell him to go a bit further than the relations of so-called ‘confession’ bring about. We tell them that it is better if they don’t withhold anything, even things that appear to them as indifferent or rough, and that they say them as they come to mind. Starting from this practice, something sets in which is infinitely more rich and more complicated, and this has instantly struck people who started working with this practice: it’s what we call transference.</p>	<p>Naturally, one orients him a little toward what might be interesting; one teaches him to go a little farther than the relations said to be of admission and behavior (<i>de l’aveu ne le comportent</i>). One tells him it will go better if he stops at nothing, even things that might appear to him indifferent or impolite, that he say them, as they come into his head. So that, starting with this practice, something is established that is infinitely richer and more complicated—this has immediately struck those who have taken upon themselves to operate with this practice – what is called the transference.</p>
<p>(6)Le transfert est alors quelque chose de tout à fait autre que cet accrochage de la confiance et de la foi en l’analyste, dans la mesure où, précisément, on l’analyse. Il y a une chose certaine, c’est que c’est quelque chose de très obscur que cette réalité du transfert ; et il vaudrait mieux savoir ce qu’on fait et qu’on mette l’accent sur ce qu’il en est de l’analyse de transfert. Il est bien certain qu’à en parler d’une certaine façon et à en faire la théorie d’une certaine façon, on aboutit à des choses très obscures et systématiques qui débouchent sur des impasses. Ceci est parfaitement repéré depuis toujours. Si on a parlé de</p>	<p>Transference is something completely different from putting one’s trust and expressing one’s belief in the analyst, in as much as the transference is analysed. It’s certain that the reality of the transference is something very obscure, and it would be better to know what one does and to place the emphasis on what the analysis of transference is about. It’s certain that in talking about it in a certain way and in theorizing it in a certain way, one arrives at very obscure and systematic things, which lead to a deadlock. This has always been perfectly understood. If people talked about transference-neurosis, it’s precisely because they noticed that the transference was less</p>	<p>⁽⁶⁾The transference is then something altogether other than this hook of confidence and faith in the analyst, precisely insofar as one analyses it. One thing is certain: it is that the reality of the transference is something very obscure, and it is better to know what one is doing and to put the accent on what there is of the analysis of the transference. It is quite certain that in theorizing it in a certain fashion, one ends up with some very obscure and systematic things that open onto some impasses. This has always been perfectly established. If one speaks of transference neuroses, it is precisely because one has seen</p>

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<p>névroses de transfert, c'est bien parce qu'on a vu justement que le transfert ne se maniait pas aussi aisément qu'on le pensait. À le manier d'une certaine façon, on l'éternise. On établit quelque chose qui est en quelque sorte une nouvelle forme de névrose, qui devient le tissu même des rapports de celui qui est analysé avec celui qui l'analyse.</p>	<p>easy to handle than they thought. In handling it in a certain way, the transference is eternalized. Something is created which is somehow a new form of [132] neurosis, and which becomes the very fabric of the relationships between the one who is analysed and the one who analyses him.</p>	<p>that the transference was not managed as easily as one thought. Managing it in a certain fashion eternalizes it. One establishes something that is in some way a new form of neurosis, which becomes the fabric itself of relations of the one who is analyzed with the one who analyzes him.</p>
<p>Ce que j'ai enseigné a tout de même cet effet que cela permet d'entendre d'une manière tout à fait différente ce que dit le patient. Pour ne pas compliquer les choses, limitons nous à l'appeler le patient ; ce qui est une assez mauvaise formule, et vous devez savoir que je l'appelle le psychanalysant ; ce qui n'est pas une chose faite pour étonner une oreille habituée à la langue anglaise, malgré qu'il y ait là un gérondif, qui veut dire « celui qui doit être psychanalysé », cela a tout de même un avantage sur le mot français jusqu'ici usuel, à savoir de l'appeler le psychanalysé ; parce qu'en réalité on aurait bien tort de l'appeler le psychanalysé tant qu'il ne l'est pas, et il ne l'est peut-être qu'à la fin. Tant qu'il ne l'est pas appelons-le le psychanalysant en français, cela mettra un peu plus l'accent sur quelque chose d'actif car il est bien certain que le psychanalysant n'est pas un pur et simple patient, mais</p>	<p>What I have taught has none the less this effect: that it allows us to understand what the patient is saying in a completely different way. In order not to complicate things, let us restrict ourselves to calling him the patient, which is a pretty bad formula – and you need to know that I call him “the psychoanalysand”, which isn't something I do to surprise those ears that are used to the English language, despite the fact that there is a gerund there, which means ‘the one who needs to be psychoanalysed’. The term has none the less an advantage over the French word that was common until now, namely the psychoanalysed’ (<i>le psychanalysé</i>), because we would be wrong to call him ‘the psychoanalysed’ when he isn't analysed yet, and perhaps he is only analysed at the end. In as much as he isn't analysed, let us call him ‘the psychoanalysand’, which will put more emphasis on something that is more active, since it's certain that the psychoanalysand is not simply a patient, because he has to do</p>	<p>What I have taught nonetheless has the effect of allowing us to hear what the patient says in an altogether different way. So as not to complicate things, we will limit ourselves to calling him the patient; which is quite a bad formula, and you should know that I call him the <i>pschanalysant</i>; which should not surprise an ear used to the English tongue, despite there being a gerund there, which means “the one who must be psychoanalysed;” this nonetheless has an advantage over the French word generally used up until now, calling him the psychoanalysed (<i>le psychanalysé</i>); because in reality one would be very wrong to call him the psychoanalyzed while he is not psychoanalyzed, and will perhaps not be until the end. While he is not, let us call him the <i>pschanalysant</i> in French, which will put the accent a little more on something active, for it is quite certain that the <i>pschanalysant</i> is not purely and simply a patient, but that he</p>

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<p>qu'il a un travail à fournir, mais ce travail il s'agit de ne pas le laisser se perdre, à savoir de reconnaître ce qui se passe. Il est tout à fait frappant pour les gens qui suivent mon enseignement, combien de fois ça arrive que des gens qui suivent des patients – (7)revenons [3] à notre ancienne dénomination – ou en ont en analyse, m'apportent le témoignage que ce que je viens de dire dans mon dernier séminaire, ça leur a été dit mais textuellement, comme par miracle, par un malade quarante huit heures avant. Il est probable que s'il n'y avait pas eu mon séminaire, ils n'auraient littéralement pas entendu ce que le patient disait. Nous en sommes tous là, il y a une façon d'entendre qui fait que nous n'entendons jamais que ce que nous sommes déjà habitués à entendre. Quand quelque chose d'autre se dit, la règle du jeu de la parole fait que simplement nous le censurons. La censure est une chose très banale, cela ne se produit pas seulement au niveau de notre expérience personnelle, cela se produit à tous les niveaux de ce que nous appelons nos rapports avec nos semblables, à savoir que ce que nous n'avons pas déjà appris à entendre, nous ne l'entendons pas. Nous ne nous apercevons pas que tout un morceau, tout un paragraphe de ce qui vient d'être dit,</p>	<p>work. Yet it is important that this work isn't allowed to lose itself, and that what is happening is being recognized. It's very striking that those people who follow my teaching, and it often happens to people who follow patients – let us return to our old designation – or who have them in analysis, bear witness to the fact that what I've just said in my last seminar had been said to them textually, as if by miracle, by a patient forty-eight hours before. It's highly likely that were it not for my seminar, they wouldn't have heard, quite literally, what the patient said. It has happened to all of us: there's a way of hearing and understanding that entails that we only ever hear and understand what we have grown used to hearing and understanding. When something else is being said, the rule of the speech game makes us censor it. Censorship is something very banal. It doesn't occur only at the level of our personal experience, but at all levels of what we call our relationships with our equals: what we haven't already learnt how to hear and understand we don't hear and understand. We don't realize that a whole piece, an entire paragraph of what has just been said, its entire weight, wants to say something that isn't included in the text. Here we enter into what is important within my teaching: it <i>wants</i> to say something, but wanting isn't enough. One wants to say, but what one wants to say is</p>	<p>has a labor to furnish; but it is a question of not letting this labor get lost, of recognizing what happens. It is altogether striking for the people who follow my teaching how many times that people who follow patients–⁽⁷⁾let us return to the former denomination – or have some in analysis, testify to me of what I say in my most recent seminar, said to them word for word (<i>textuellement</i>), as if by a miracle, by a sick person forty-eight hours earlier. It is probable that if not for my seminar they would literally not have heard what the patient said. We are all in on this. There is a way of hearing that makes it so we only ever hear what we are already habituated to hearing. When something else is said, the rule of the game of speech makes it so we simply censor it. Censorship is a very commonplace thing; it is not only produced at the level of our personal experience, it is produced at all the levels of what we call our relations with our peers (<i>semblables</i>): what we have not already learned to hear, we do not hear. We fail to grasp that a whole piece, a whole paragraph of what is said, all its particular weight, means (<i>veut dire</i>) something that is of course not the text. It is here that we enter into what is important in what I teach: it <i>wants</i> to say (<i>veut dire</i>) but it does not suffice to want it. One wants to say but what one wants to say generally misses</p>

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<p>tout son poids particulier, veut dire quelque chose qui n'est bien entendu pas le texte. C'est là que nous entrons dans ce qui est important dans ce que j'enseigne : il veut dire mais ça ne suffit pas de vouloir. On veut dire mais ce qu'on veut dire est en général raté. C'est là que l'oreille du psychanalyste intervient à savoir qu'il s'aperçoit de ce que l'autre vraiment voulait dire. Et ce qu'il voulait dire, en général, ce n'est pas ce qui est dans le texte.</p>	<p>generally missed. This is where the psychoanalyst's ear intervenes, in so far as it notices what the other really wanted to say. And what he wanted to say is, generally speaking, not what appears in the text.</p>	<p>the point. Here is where the ear of the psychoanalyst intervenes insofar as he grasps something of what the other truly wants to say. And what he wants to say is generally not what is in the text.</p>
<p>Je ne sais pas ce qu'est la linguistique au Japon, sur quels registres vous travaillez. Dans mon enseignement, la linguistique n'a qu'une valeur de référence initiatrice. Il faut bien dire que si je n'avais pas eu le public que j'avais, à savoir des médecins ou des psychologues, c'est-à-dire des gens absolument incultes, – je ne dis pas incultes linguistiquement, je dis incultes tout court ; ils ne savent rien –. C'est de là qu'il fallait que je parte. Il fallait que je parte de là parce que c'est là ce que dans mon langage signifie le retour à Freud. Cela ne veut pas du tout dire qu'il faut reculer, revenir à je ne sais quelle imagination ou pureté primitive.</p>	<p>I don't know what linguistics is like in Japan, on which registers you are working. In my teaching, linguistics only has value as an initiatory reference. It needs to be said that if I hadn't had the audience I had, [133] doctors and psychologists, that is to say completely uncultivated people – I don't mean uncultivated linguistically, but just uncultivated; they don't know anything . . . I had to take my departure from there, because this is what it means in my language to return to Freud. It doesn't mean to at all that we need to move back, or that we need to return to some kind of imagination or primitive purity.</p>	<p>I do not know what linguistics is in Japan, with what registers you work. In my teaching, linguistics has only an initiatory reference value. It must be said that if I had not had the public I had, of doctors and psychologists, which is to say some absolutely uneducated people – I am not saying linguistically uneducated, I am saying uneducated, period; they know nothing – that is what I had to start with. I had to start from there because this is what in my language the return to Freud signifies. This does not at all mean that we must move back, return to some kind of primal imagination or purity.</p>
<p>(8)S'il y avait eu depuis Freud, et il y a eu depuis Freud des choses vraiment nouvelles, il est certain que je n'y vois non</p>	<p>If there have been some truly new things since Freud, and this is definitely the case, it's certain that not only don't I see any obstacle</p>	<p>⁽⁸⁾If since Freud there have been—and there have—some truly new things, it is certain that I see no obstacle in this but am very</p>

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<p>seulement aucun obstacle mais que je suis très intéressé. Par exemple il est clair que ce qu'a apporté Mélanie Klein malgré que ce soit exprimé de manière absolument sauvage, c'est tout de même quelque chose de pris dans l'expérience qui est tout à fait saisissant et qu'il faut essayer de comprendre d'une manière conceptuellement saisissable et non pas d'une obscurité telle qu'elle le présente. Malgré tout ça porte la marque d'une expérience, d'une expérience vive, d'une chose qu'elle a osé avec les enfants. On peut le discuter du point de vue thérapeutique, enfin ce qui est certain c'est que ça a donné des résultats et ça n'a pas eu les effets qui quelques fois, quand on entend du dehors la manière dont elle manie ces enfants, on pourrait croire que cela pourrait avoir des conséquences redoutables, il n'en est certainement pas le cas. C'est très bien toléré, et extrêmement fécond cette analyse.</p>	<p>whatsoever there, but I am also very interested. It's clear, for example, that what Melanie Klein has contributed, despite the fact that it's expressed in a completely wild fashion, is none the less something taken from experience, which is totally captivating and which one should try to understand in a way that is conceptually graspable and not with the obscurity with which she presents it. Despite everything, it bears the stamp of experience, of a lively experience, of something she has dared to do with children. We could discuss it from a therapeutic point of view, but it's certain that it has produced results, and not the effects that one might sometimes believe this could have, when one understands the way in which she handles these children from the position of an outsider. One might believe this could have fearsome consequences, but it's definitely not the case. This type of analysis is very well tolerated and extremely fertile.</p>	<p>interested. For example, it is clear that what Melanie Klein has contributed, despite it being expressed in an absolutely savage manner, is all the same something taken from experience that is quite gripping (<i>saisissant</i>) and that we must try to understand in a conceptually graspable way and not with the obscurity with which she presents it. Despite everything, it bears the mark of an experience, of a lively experience, of something she dared with children. One can argue with it from the therapeutic point of view, but finally what is certain is that it has given some results and has not had the effects that sometimes, when one hears from the outside how she managed these children- one might believe that it could have some fearful consequences. This is certainly not the case. This analysis is very well tolerated and extremely fecund.</p>
<p>Donc ce n'est pas un retour à Freud en lui-même. C'est simplement parce que je pense que Freud a d'abord été lu de la façon dont on peut lire n'importe quoi qui se présente comme nouveau à savoir en le tirant complètement du côté des notions déjà reçues. Il s'agissait de quelque chose d'absolument subversif. Il a fallu à tout prix</p>	<p>Hence, it's not a return to Freud as such. It's simply because I think that Freud was initially read like one might read any old thing that is presented as new knowledge, in pulling him completely towards notions that are already established. It concerned something totally subversive. It was necessary at all costs to construct little mental schemas that would</p>	<p>Hence, this is not a return to Freud in himself. It is simply that I think that Freud was from the start read in a way one can read anything that presents itself as new; that is, in pulling it completely to the side of already accepted notions. It was a question of something absolutely subversive. One had at all cost to construct some little mental schemas that</p>

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<p>qu'on construise des petits schémas mentaux qui permettaient en fin de compte de ne pas bouger, de rester sur les mêmes pensées de l'homme, qu'on pouvait avoir sur ce qu'il en est de l'homme, qu'avant. Il fallait à tout prix qu'on y reste. De sorte qu'on a lu Freud en y lisant ce qu'on voulait y lire et entendant absolument pas ce qui pourtant était là écrit en clair. Il y a quand même trois livres initiaux qui sont : <i>L'interprétation des rêves</i>, la <i>Psychopathologie de la vie quotidienne</i> et <i>Le mot d'esprit</i>.</p>	<p>eventually allow things not to move any more, to stay put concerning the same ideas about human beings, concerning the ideas that one could have about what human beings are, as those existing before. It was necessary at all costs for these things to say the same. In this way, people have read in Freud what they wanted to read, completely failing to understand what was none the less written there in very clear terms. After all, there were three initial books: <i>The Interpretation of Dreams</i>, the <i>Psychopathology of Everyday Life</i>, and <i>Jokes</i>.</p>	<p>allowed one in the final analysis not to budge, to remain on the same thoughts about man, that one could have had on what there is of man, as before. One had at all cost to remain there. So one read Freud in reading in him what one wanted to read and absolutely not understanding what was clearly written there. There were none theless three initial books that are: <i>The Interpretation of Dreams</i>, <i>The Psychopathology of Everyday Life</i>, and <i>Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious</i>.</p>
<p>Malgré tout le lecteur, au moins le lecteur occidental, et extrême-oriental aussi je pense, il lui faut de l'âme. L'âme c'est quelque chose qui doit exister, qui est détachable du corps et qui doit avoir ses règles propres. Je sais bien que pour vous la tradition est différente et qu'il vous a fallu avoir les (9)occidentaux sur le poil, si j'ose dire, pour commencer à parler de psychologie ; il n'y a pas à proprement parler d'enseignement de psychologie, il y a [4] l'enseignement d'un certain nombre de pratiques diverses de méditation. Mais dans l'Université en occident depuis qu'elle existe, c'est-à-dire la fin du Haut Moyen Âge, la psychologie a pris sa place avec un certain nombre d'autres choses et que le résultat a été certains présupposés qui sont</p>	<p>In spite of everything, the reader – at least, the Western reader, but the Far-Eastern reader too, I think – needs soul. Soul is something that must exist, and that is detachable from the body and that must have its own rules. I know very well that your tradition is different and that you needed Westerners under your skin, if I may say so, in order to talk about psychology, for there is, strictly speaking, no instruction in [134] psychology – there is instruction in a certain number of diverse practices of meditation. Yet since the Western university came into existence, that is to say towards the end of the high Middle Ages, psychology has taken its place, together with a number of other things, and this resulted in certain prejudices that have entered common consciousness and that have become</p>	<p>Despite everything, the reader, at least the western reader, and the far-eastern one too I think, had need of the soul. The soul is something that must exist, that is detachable from the body and must have its own rules. I know that for you the tradition is different and that you needed to have⁽⁹⁾ westerners in he mix (<i>sur le poil</i>), if I dare say so, to begin to speak of psychology; there is properly speaking no teaching of psych-ology here, there is a teaching of a certain number of diverse practices of meditation. But in the western university, for as long as it existed, which is to say from the end of the High Middle Ages, psychology has taken its place among a certain number of other things and the result has been certain presuppositions that have passed into common consciousness</p>

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passés dans la conscience commune et sont devenus quelque chose d'absolument essentiel.	something absolutely essential.	and have become something absolutely essential.
Si vous n'entrez pas dans la lecture de Freud avec les préjugés psychologiques, et peut-être avez-vous plus de chance que les occidentaux de le faire, il ne peut pas manquer de vous frapper qu'on ne parle que de choses qui sont des mots. Quand on parle de <i>L'interprétation des rêves</i> qu'est-ce que Freud en dit ? Dès le début, il le dit : « le rêve c'est un rébus ». Quand je dis retour à Freud, je dis lisez ce qui est vraiment écrit sans commencer immédiatement par essayer de voir ce que c'est que cette boule de coton qui s'appelle l'inconscient et dont il s'irradie quelques plumes qui seraient alors le conscient. Ne vous faites pas des schémas qui reposent toujours sur l'idée qu'il y a une substance appelée âme qui a sa vie autonome, car c'est ça qu'on ne peut plus empêcher les gens de penser, c'est que l'âme a sa vie distincte et on est tout près de l'idée que c'est elle la vie tout simplement, que c'est elle qui anime le corps. On a lu Freud comme ça à savoir que l'inconscient est une substance.	If you don't start reading Freud with psychological prejudices, and perhaps you have a better chance than Westerners of doing this, you cannot but be struck by the fact that the only things that are being talked about are words. When one talks about <i>The Interpretation of Dreams</i> , what does Freud say about it? From the start, he says it: "the dream is a rebus". When I talk about the return to Freud, I mean that you should read what is really written there, without immediately starting to understand the nature of this ball of cotton wool which is called the unconscious and from which some feathers irradiate that would then be consciousness. Don't make schemas for yourself that always rest on the idea that there is a substance called 'the soul', which has an autonomous life, because this is what one can no longer prevent people from thinking: that the soul has its own life, and one comes very close to the idea that this is quite simply life as such, that it is the soul which animates the body. This is how Freud has been read, as the unconscious being a substance.	If you do not enter into the reading of Freud with psychological prejudices, and perhaps you will have more luck than westerners with this, it cannot fail to strike you that he speaks of nothing but things that are words. When one speaks of <i>The Interpretation of Dreams</i> , what is it that Freud says about them? From the beginning, he says "the dream is a rebus." When I say return to Freud, I am saying read what is truly written without beginning by trying to see what this ball of thread called the unconscious is and from which some plumes irradiate that would then be the conscious. Do not make schemas still reposing on the idea that there is a substance called soul that has an autonomous life, for this is what can prevent people from thinking: the idea that the soul has its distinct life, and then one sidles up to the idea that it is simply life, and that it animates the body. They read Freud to know that the unconscious is a substance.
Le début de ce qui fut mon enseignement, et je me suis mêlé de ces choses en ayant pris mon temps, j'ai commencé en 51,	The start of my teaching – and I took time to occupy myself with these things, I started in 1951. I had twelve to thirteen years of practice	The beginning of my teaching—I got mixed up in these things in taking my time, I began in '51; I had behind me twelve to thirteen years

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<p>j'avais derrière moi douze à treize ans de pratique, je ne vois pas pourquoi j'aurais enseigné des choses prématurément, c'est après que j'ai eu une certaine expérience d'analyste et que ce soit accompagné d'une lecture de Freud, assez dépourvue de préjugés. C'est après cela que j'ai choisi, étant donné le public de médecins que j'avais pour qui c'est encore plus fort que pour les autres justement parce qu'ils sont médecins et qu'ils s'occupent du corps, comme ces corps en fin de compte, c'est quelque chose dont ils ne savent rien : un médecin en sait moins qu'un masseur, (10)en fin de compte, il est ravi quand on lui parle d'âme. Quand on lui explique que les maladies c'est l'âme, c'est la relation médecin-malade, ils sont dans la jubilation : ils ont trouvé quelque chose qui va justifier leur existence. Le malheureux, c'est que c'est encore pire que ça a pu être depuis toujours. Tout cela s'arrange très bien avec le système religieux général, il n'y a rien, en fin de compte qui soit plus organiciste, qui désire plus que les histoires du corps se résolvent par des petites mécaniques, qui soit plus porté aux explications somaticiennes, que l'Église catholique. Malheureusement, il est clair qu'au fur et à mesure que la biologie avance c'est autrement compliqué que les petites idées</p>	<p>behind me – well, I don't see why I should have taught things prematurely. It was after I had some analytic experience, accompanied by a reading of Freud, sufficiently devoid of prejudices. After that, I chose, given the audience of doctors I had – and for them it is even more difficult than for the others, precisely because they are doctors and they are concerned with the body, since at the end of the day they don't really know anything about bodies: a doctor knows less about bodies than a masseur and he is eventually quite elated when someone talks to him about the soul. When it's being explained to him that these diseases concern the soul, that is to say, the doctor-patient relationship, they are jubilant: they have found something that justifies their existence. The poor soul, it means that it's even worse than it has always been. Everything is very well arranged with the general religious system: in the end, there's nothing more organicist; nothing is more keen than the Catholic church to see these body-stories resolved with little mechanical things; nothing is more committed to somatic explanations. Unfortunately, it's clear that as biology advances things are more complicated than the little synthetic ideas which have made the medical tradition into what it is. By simply putting the idea on the [135] horizon that the soul, for instance, is the doctor-patient</p>	<p>of practice: I do not see why I should have taught things prematurely, and it was after a certain experience of being an analyst accompanied by reading Freud, quite deprived of prejudices. It was after this that I chose, given the doctor public I had, for whom this is still more strong than for the others because they are doctors and they are occupied with the body, since finally these bodies are something they know nothing about: a doctor knows less about them than a masseuse; (10)finally, he is enraptured when one speaks to him of the soul. When one explains to them that illnesses are the soul, the doctor-patient (<i>médecin -malade</i>) rapport, they are in jubilation: they have found something that is going to justify their existence. Poor things, this is worse still than it may have always been. All this arranged itself very well with the general religious system; finally there is nothing more organicist, that desires more that the histories of the body be resolved by some little mechanisms, that is more inclined toward somatic explanations, than the Catholic church. Unfortunately, it is clear that to the extent biology advances it is complicated by other things than the little summary ideas that have constituted medical tradition. When they simply put at the horizon that, for example, the soul is the</p>

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sommaires qui ont fait la tradition médicale. Quand on met simplement à l'horizon que l'âme par exemple c'est le rapport médecin-malade, ils se trouvent un peu justifiés.	relationship, they find themselves slightly justified.	doctor-patient rapport, they find themselves a little justified.
La psychanalyse n'est nullement faite pour encourager cette tendance et elle montre tout autre chose qui n'a rien à faire avec la psychologie d'une façon quelconque. Voilà ce qu'il faut savoir. Et pour le savoir, comme on ne peut pas se battre avec des ombres, je n'ai pas à me battre avec les médecins pour leur dire que leur médecine est imbécile, j'ai choisi de voir ce qu'on pouvait faire à partir de ce que Freud tout à fait génialement avait su entendre. Entendre de qui ? De rien d'autre que de ses hystériques. Au niveau des hystériques il se produit quelque chose de tout à fait exceptionnel, c'est que ce qui se révèle ce sont un certain nombre de phénomènes, je veux dire les mécanismes de ces phénomènes réparables chez bien d'autres mais qui sont obscurcis par toutes sortes de choses dont la première est la psychologie elle-même. Quoi de plus psychologue qu'un obsessionnel ? Il fait de la psychologie à longueur de journée. C'est une des formes de sa maladie.	Psychoanalysis is by no means designed to encourage this tendency. It demonstrates something very different, which has nothing to do with psychology, in any way. This is what needs to be known. And in order to know it, and since it is impossible to fight with shadows – I don't need to fight with the doctors to tell them that medicine is stupid – I have chosen to have a look at what could be done on the basis of what Freud, in totally brilliant fashion, was able to hear and understand. Hear and understand from what? From nothing less than his hysterical patients. At the level of hysteria, something totally exceptional is being produced, namely that a certain number of phenomena are being revealed. I mean the mechanisms of these phenomena that can be traced in many other conditions, but which are obfuscated by all kinds of things, the first of which is psychology itself. What could be more psychological than an obsessional? The obsessional practices psychology all day long. It is one of the forms of his illness.	Psychoanalysis is not at all made to encourage this tendency and it shows a whole other thing that has nothing whatsoever to do with psychology. That is what must be known. And to know it--since one cannot fight shadows, I do not have to fight with doctors to tell them that their medicine is stupid--I have chosen to see what one can do beginning with what Freud quite superbly knew how to hear. Hear from whom? From none other than his hysterics. At the level of hysterics was produced something altogether exceptional: what are revealed are a certain number of phenomena, I mean mechanisms of these phenomena, noticeable in many others, but which are obscured by all sorts of things, the first of which is psychology itself. What is more psychologizing than an obsessional? He does psychology all day long. It is one of the forms of his sickness.
L'hystérique révèle les dessous de ça. Les dessous consistent très exactement dans	Hysteria reveals the underside of this. The underside consists, precisely, of this surprising	The hysteric reveals the underpinnings (<i>les dessous</i>) of that. The underpinnings consist

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<p>cette chose surprenante qu'il y a chez l'homme un certain niveau de phénomènes qu'on ne peut expliquer que par un moyen de traduction. Au sens littéral de ceci, il ne s'agit pas de transposition, il s'agit de traduction, une (11)traduction ne peut exister qu'à partir du langage. Puisque le rêve est un rébus, qu'est-ce que ça peut bien vouloir dire sinon que sous les figures du rêve, il y a des mots. Ou bien Freud ne savait pas ce qu'il disait ou bien ça doit [5] avoir un sens et le sens ne peut être que sous les figures du rêve, à la fin on doit trouver une phrase. Il se pourrait que l'on soit dans un de ces délires qui ont existé depuis des siècles car on a toujours opéré avec les rêves comme ça. On n'a eu qu'un tort c'est de croire que le rébus était toujours fait avec les mêmes éléments : il faut savoir que quand on rêvait d'un fort vent ou d'une colique ça voulait dire bonheur en amour etc. c'était déjà un rébus mais traduit d'une façon idiote ; on ne sait pas d'où ça vient ces choses. C'est exemplaire dans la mesure où ça permet d'illustrer de ce qui mérite d'être appelé un savoir. Dans l'histoire de l'humanité un savoir c'est toujours quelque chose qui a été traité d'une façon très obscurantiste en fin de compte. C'est ça qui distingue à proprement parler un savoir. Dans tout</p>	<p>thing that in human beings there is a certain level of phenomena that can only be explained by means of translation. In quite a literal sense – it doesn't concern transposition, but translation, and translation can only exist on the basis of language. If the dream is a rebus, what could this possibly mean, if not that under the figures of the dream there are words? Either Freud didn't know what he was talking about, or this must have some form of meaning, and the meaning can only exist beneath the figures of the dream – at the end one has to find a sentence. It could be the case that we are confronted, here, with one of these delusions that have existed for ages, because one has always operated with dreams in this way. Only one mistake was made, namely to believe that the rebus was always made with the same elements: one should know that if one is dreaming of strong wind or a colic, it meant being lucky in love, etc. It was already a rebus, but a rebus translated in an idiotic fashion: one didn't know where these things were coming from. It's exemplary in so far as it allows us to illustrate what deserves to be called a knowledge. In the history of humanity, a knowledge is always something that has been treated in obscurantist fashion. This is what properly speaking distinguishes a knowledge. In all knowledge, there is know-how, of which we know very well that it is not all that obvious.</p>	<p>exactly in this surprising thing that there is for man a certain level of phenomena that one can only explain by means of translation—in the literal sense: it is not a question of transposition, but of translation, and a ⁽¹¹⁾translation can only exist starting with language. Since the dream is a rebus, what indeed can this mean except that beneath the figures of the dream there are words? Either Freud did not know what he was saying or else this must have a sense and the sense can only be that beneath the figures of the dream one must in the end find a sentence. It could be that we are in one of those delusions that have existed for centuries, for we have always worked with dreams in this way. The only mistake we have made was to believe that the rebus was always made up of the same elements: one had to know that when one dreamt of a strong wind or of diarrhea it meant good luck in love, etc.— this was already a rebus but translated in an idiotic fashion; one does not know where these things came from. This is exemplary in the measure that it permits what merits being called a <i>savoir</i>. In the history of humanity a <i>savoir</i> is always something that has been treated of in a finally very obscurantist fashion. This is what properly speaking distinguishes a <i>savoir</i>. In every <i>savoir</i>, there is a <i>savoir-faire</i>, of which</p>

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savoir, il y a du savoir-faire, dont nous savons bien que ce n'est pas si évident.		we know well that this is not so obvious.
<p>Nous avons avec Freud une chance, un petit aperçu de quelque chose qui, concernant certains phénomènes, pourrait aboutir à une certaine rigueur scientifique. C'est en ça que ça me paraît intéressant. C'est d'ailleurs la seule chose qui justifie le maintien de ces cadres à l'intérieur desquels fonctionne la psychanalyse. Il y a là une chance d'un abord scientifique de quelque chose qu'il ne s'agit pas de définir prématurément comme un domaine. Je ne suis pas pour dire que c'est le début d'une psychologie scientifique. Ce qu'il y a de scientifique là-dedans, c'est que l'on peut s'appuyer sur quelque chose dont la connaissance est suffisamment éclaircie pour décoller du terme même de connaissance. C'est autre chose. Il y a un monde entre ce qui est une articulation scientifique et ce que de toujours on a mis sous ce terme en fin de compte naturaliste de connaissance.</p>	<p>With Freud we have an opportunity, a small insight into something which, as far as certain phenomena are concerned, could lead to a certain scientific rigour. This is how it seemed interesting to me. Besides, it's the only thing that justifies the maintenance of these frameworks [136] in which psychoanalysis functions. There is an opportunity there for approaching scientifically something that doesn't need to be defined prematurely as a domain. I'm not in favor of saying that it is the beginning of a scientific psychology. What's scientific in it, is that one can take one's bearings from something whose knowledge (<i>connaissance</i>) is sufficiently clarified for the term knowledge (<i>connaissance</i>) itself to be left behind. It's something else. There's a world between what constitutes a scientific articulation and what has always been placed under this naturalistic term of knowledge (<i>connaissance</i>).</p>	<p>We have with Freud a chance, a little <i>aperçu</i> of something that, concerning certain phenomena, could lead to a certain scientific rigor. It is in this that it appears to me interesting. Besides, it is the only thing justifying the maintenance of those frameworks within which psychoanalysis functions. There is a chance here of a scientific approach to something that it is not a question of defining prematurely as a domain. I am not one to say that this is the beginning of a scientific psychology. What there is of the scientific herein is that we can take support from something the knowledge (<i>connaissance</i>) of which is clarified in detaching it from the term itself of <i>connaissance</i>. It is another thing. There is a world of difference between a scientific articulation and what I have always placed under the all told naturalist term of <i>connaissance</i>.</p>
Que la linguistique ait actuellement ce caractère de champ en fusion, c'est une chose qu'il faut prendre en compte comme elle est, mais dont on a tout de même le sentiment qu'on y obtient sur certains points des résultats. Quand Jakobson arrive à mettre en (12)ordre le système	The fact that linguistics can actually be characterized as a molten field is something we need to take into account for what it is, but it can none the less be felt that in linguistics one has obtained results at certain points. When Jakobson succeeds in putting the French phonematic system in order, this is an	That linguistics currently has the character of a field in fusion is a thing that must be taken into account of as it is, but about which we all the same have the feeling that we obtain some results on certain points. When Jakobson succeeds in putting in ⁽¹²⁾ order the phonemic system of French, it is an

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phonématique du français, c'est un résultat incontestable. Ça n'éclaire pas les fonds de l'âme, la nature humaine, mais c'est parfaitement opératoire. C'est ce qu'il est possible d'articuler phonématiquement en français. C'est une autre espèce de savoir que ce savoir, qui est aussi un savoir, et qui est celui de toute personne qui parle le français.	indisputable result. It doesn't clarify the depths of the soul, human nature, but it's perfectly operative. It means that it's possible to articulate phonematically in French. It's another type of knowledge than this knowledge, which is also a knowledge of all people who speak French.	incontestable result. It does not illuminate the depths of the soul, of human nature, but it is perfectly operatory. It is what it is possible to articulate phonemically in French. This is an other kind of <i>savoir</i> than that <i>savoir</i> , which is also a <i>savoir</i> , and which is that of every person who speaks French.
Quelle est la nature du savoir qu'il y a à parler sa langue ? Rien qu'à poser cette question, cela ouvre toutes les questions. Qu'est-ce que c'est savoir le Japonais ? C'est quelque chose qui contient en soi un monde de choses dont on ne peut pas dire qu'on les sait tant qu'on ne peut pas arriver à l'articuler.	What is the nature of this knowledge that exists when speaking one's language? Simply posing this question opens up all kinds of questions. What does it mean to know Japanese? It's something that in itself contains a world of things of which one cannot say that one knows them if one doesn't succeed in articulating them.	What is the nature of the <i>savoir</i> that he has in speaking his own language? Just in asking this question every question is opened. What is it to know Japanese? This is something that contains in itself a world of things we cannot say we know so long as we do not succeed in articulating it.
Cette ambiguïté du savoir, arriver à la toucher si bien au niveau de l'opération de la parole, c'est quelque chose dont il faut tout le temps mettre le fait à l'épreuve pour se rendre compte quel rapport étroit cela a avec ce qui se passe dans une analyse. Car c'est à ça que vous avez affaire dans une analyse : c'est une personne qui vous raconte des choses et vous apercevez à quel point est ambigu ce qu'il sait, ce qui est impliqué de ce qu'il sait dans ce qu'il dit, et dont en fin de compte il n'a pas la moindre idée, car à une certaine façon de l'écouter vous vous apercevez que vous	This ambiguity of knowledge, succeeding in touching it so well at the level of operation in speech, is something we constantly need to put to the test in order to realize how closely it is linked with what's happening in analysis. Because this is what you are dealing with in an analysis: someone tells you things and you notice at which point his knowledge is ambiguous, what is implied of what he knows in what he's saying, and of which he eventually doesn't have a clue, because when using a certain type of listening with him you notice that you hear and understand something very different.	This ambiguity of knowledge, succeeding so well at touching on it at the level of speech, is something that requires all the time it takes to put the fact to the test to account for what direct relation it has with what happens in an analysis. For this is what we deal with in analysis: it is a person who tells you some things and you grasp to what point he knows that they are ambiguous, what is implied by what he knows in what he says, and of which finally he hasn't the least idea, for in a certain way of listening to it you grasp that you are hearing a whole other thing.

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entendez tout autre chose.		
<p>Ce serait une opération tout à fait obscure si Freud n'avait pas fait, dans ces trois livres dont je parle, l'analyse tout à fait précise d'un certain nombre de faits ; car j'ai parlé tout à l'heure du rêve mais il y a aussi toutes sortes de trébuchements qui ont l'air, le fait du hasard, par exemple le fait que vous ne trouviez pas votre clef dans votre poche alors qu'il s'agit de rentrer chez vous ou qu'au contraire vous tiriez votre clef de votre poche pour rentrer chez quelqu'un d'autre ; Freud nous montre que derrière ces actes qui ont l'air d'être des actes de fatigue ou de distraction, il y a une déclaration. Elle dira par exemple « si en allant chez telle personne je tire ma clef, ça voudra dire je suis chez moi ». Et ça ne peut se comprendre que si ça veut dire cela. Mais le plus important, c'est la suite. Le « je suis chez moi » n'est pas n'importe quel « je suis chez moi » ; il y (13) a plus d'une façon d'être chez soi quelque part, et qui porte justement la marque de quelque chose qui donne la véritable position de quelque chose que l'on peut appeler la pensée... pour l'instant disons X. Cet X j'ai eu l'audace de l'appeler le sujet. [6]</p>	<p>It would be a very obscure operation if, in the three books I mentioned, Freud hadn't done a very precise analysis of a certain number of facts. I just spoke about the dream, but there are also all kinds of mishaps that seem to be accidental; for example the fact that you couldn't find your key in your pocket when you wanted to enter your house, or the fact that you took your key from your pocket to enter someone else's house. Freud shows us that behind these acts, which appear to be the result of fatigue or distraction, there is a declaration. It would say, for instance: 'If, in going to this person, I pull my key, it will mean that I'm home'. And it can only be understood if this is what it means. But the most important thing is what follows. The 'I'm home' [137] is not any 'I'm home'. There is more than one way of being at home somewhere, and it bears the mark of something that renders the true position of something that can be called 'thought' . . . for the moment, let us call it X. I had the audacity of calling this X the subject.</p>	<p>This would be an altogether obscure operation if Freud had not made, in these three books of which I speak, the altogether precise analysis of a certain number of facts; for I have just spoken of the dream, but there are also all sorts of stumblings which have this quality, the fact of chance, for example the fact that you did not find your key in your pocket when you came home or on the other hand you pulled out your key when you came to the home of someone else; Freud shows us that behind these acts which have the air of acts of fatigue or distraction, there is a declaration. It will say for example "if in going to the home of this person I pull out my key, it would mean that I am at my own home." And this can only be understood if it means that. But the most important thing is what follows. The "I am at home (<i>chez moi</i>)" is not just any "I am at home"; there is ⁽¹³⁾ more than one way of being at home (<i>chez soi</i>) somewhere, and this precisely bears the mark of something that gives the true position of something that one can call thought . . . for the moment let us say "x." I have the audacity to call this "x" the subject.</p>
Évidemment ce sujet a une histoire qui paraît avoir la plus grande contradiction avec ce que je suis en train de dire. Mais il	Of course, this subject has a history that seems to stand in the greatest possible contradiction to what I'm currently saying. But it's clear that	Obviously this subject has a history that appears greatly to contradict what I am saying. But it is clear that one must choose:

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est clair qu'il faut choisir : ou bien le sujet est ce qu'a tout à fait bien délimité une certaine tradition occidentale, quelque chose de lié au fait qu'il semble qu'on ne peut pas penser sans savoir en même temps qu'on pense.	one needs to choose: or the subject is that which a certain Western tradition has very well delineated, something related to the fact that it seems impossible to think without at the same time knowing that one is thinking.	where the subject is what a certain western tradition has very well delimited, something linked to the fact that it seems that you cannot think without at the same time knowing that you think.
Qu'est ce que Freud nous apporte ? Ceci qu'il y a tout un monde qu'il s'agit de savoir qualifier et dont il faut le manier avec une très grande précaution, puisque je vous ai dit qu'il faut commencer par rejeter tout ce qui est de l'appareil mental impliqué par des concepts substantiels comme l'âme etc. Allons donc prudemment : disons ce que sont des pensées ; il est difficile de ne pas qualifier de pensée quelque chose qui prend un sens si clair à partir du moment où on sait le lire.	What does Freud contribute? The fact that we need to know how to qualify an entire world and which needs to be handled with extreme precaution, because I told you that one needs to start by rejecting everything that relates to the mental apparatus as implied by substantial concepts such as the soul, etc. Thus, let's proceed prudently: let's say what thoughts are. It's difficult not to qualify as thoughts something that acquires such a clear meaning as soon as one knows how to read it.	What is it that Freud brings us? That there is a whole world that it is a question of knowing how to qualify and that we must manage with a very great precaution, since I have told you that we must begin by rejecting all there is of the mental apparatus implied by substantializing concepts (<i>concepts substantiels</i>) like the soul, etc. Thus, let us go prudently: let us say what thoughts are; it is difficult not to qualify as thought something that takes on so clear a sense starting from the moment when one knows how to read it.
Le propre de l'inconscient est ceci : de témoigner d'un savoir et même d'un vouloir dire, d'un besoin de reconnaissance, puisque chacun de ces symptômes c'est quelque chose qui veut dire quelque chose : mais à qui ? Il est clair que de prime abord un rêve ne s'adresse à personne ; ce n'est pas vrai d'ailleurs, car il est tout à fait évident, dans l'expérience analytique, qu'au commencement d'une analyse, il arrive qu'il y ait des rêves qui sont littéralement rêvés à l'adresse du	The distinctive feature of the unconscious is this: to bear witness to a knowledge and even to a wanting to say, to a need for recognition, because each of its symptoms is something that wants to say something. But to whom? It's clear that a dream isn't addressed to anyone at first. Actually, this isn't true, because it's completely obvious in the analytic experience that at the beginning of an analysis it happens that there are dreams that are literally dreamt for the psychoanalyst. They have this unique value of being the equivalent of the first	What distinguishes the unconscious is this: it testifies to a <i>savoir</i> and even to a wanting-to-say (<i>vouloir dire</i>), a need for recognition, since each of these symptoms is something that wants to say (<i>veut dire</i>) something: but to whom? It is clear that on first consideration a dream is addressed to no one; however this is not true, for it is altogether obvious, in the analytic experience, that at the beginning of an analysis, it happens that there are some dreams that are literally addressed to the psychoanalyst. They

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psychanalyste. Ils ont cette valeur unique d'être l'équivalent du premier discours à l'analyste. Il y a quelque chose qui commence à vouloir se dire sur ce plan.	discourse to the analyst. There is something that starts wanting to be said at this level.	have this unique value of being the equivalent of the first discourse to the analyst. There is something that begins to want to be said on this plane.
Ce que je veux marquer, c'est donc, à l'intérieur du fait que l'expérience analytique se manifeste comme se situant dans un biais tissé de langage, c'est ce que j'appelle « est structuré comme un langage ». À partir de là, il est certain que la distinction signifiant signifié est à manier d'une certaine façon, et est profitable pour faire saisir certains des registres que (14) j'essaie de vous faire sentir. Ce qu'il faut éviter, c'est de vouloir séparer, – et c'est pourquoi votre tâche est si difficile – cet appareil de ce qui est l'expérience analytique, de ce qui en marque les limites.	What I want to highlight is, thus, within the fact that within the analytic experience manifests itself as being situated on a piece of cloth woven by language, and this is what I call 'is structured like a language'. Starting from there, it's certain that the distinction between the signifier and signified needs to be handled in a certain way, and that it's profitable in order to make conceivable some of the registers that I try to make you experience. What needs to be avoided is wanting to separate – and this is why your task is so difficult – this apparatus from the nature of the analytic experience, from what marks its limits.	Thus what I want to mark, within the fact that the analytic experience is manifested as situating itself on a side woven by language, is what I call "is structured like a language." Starting from here, it is certain that the distinction signifier-signified is to be managed in a certain fashion, and is profitable for allowing you to grasp certain registers that (14) I try to make you feel. What must be avoided is wanting to separate – and this is why your task is so difficult – this apparatus from the analytic experience, from what marks its limits.
Que l'expérience analytique soit elle-même essentiellement de nature linguistique, c'est là le fait massif.	The huge fact is that the analytic experience is itself essentially of a linguistic nature.	That the analytic experience is itself essentially linguistic in nature, is the unignorable fact (<i>le fait massif</i>).
La façon dont j'opère avec les termes de Saussure, – et qui d'ailleurs ne sont pas de Saussure ; <i>les signans</i> et le <i>signatum</i> , les stoïciens en avaient senti le besoin dans la logique – a essentiellement cet intérêt de montrer que dans le langage, il y un appareil en quelque sorte définissable d'une façon matérielle qui est irréductible :	The way in which I work with Saussure's terms – and which are not by Saussure, actually; the Stoics had already felt the need to use the <i>signans</i> and the <i>signatum</i> within logic – has essentially the importance that it shows that there is an apparatus in language that can somehow [138] be defined in an irreducible material fashion: the fact that language is	The way I operate with the terms of Saussure – and which, besides, are not from Saussure; the Stoics had felt the need for the <i>signans</i> and the <i>signatum</i> in logic – has the essential interest of showing that in language there is an apparatus to some extent definable in a material fashion that is irreducible: the fact that language is articulated, proceeds by

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à savoir que le fait que le langage soit articulé, procède par des combinaisons qui sont par nature des différences, c'est la seule définition qu'on puisse donner de ce qui est des signes, c'est que ça se pose comme différent de tout le reste, c'est en ce sens que l'appareil phonématique est exemplaire. Il est bien évident que ça ne suffit pas.	articulated and proceeds with combinations that are by their very nature differences. It's the only definition that can be given of what signs are; it's that it is being posed as different from everything else, and it's in this sense that the phonematic apparatus is exemplary. It's obvious that it is not sufficient.	combinations which by nature are differences; the only definition one can give for what signs are is that they pose themselves as different from all the rest, and in this respect the phonemic apparatus is exemplary. But it is quite obvious that this does not suffice.
Que l'appareil grammatical soit quelque chose d'essentiel, c'est une chose également sur laquelle il faut mettre l'accent. Ai-je besoin de vous rappeler qu'en définissant des termes comme <i>Verdrängung</i> (le refoulement), <i>Verneinung</i> (c'est-à-dire faire usage de la négation), <i>Verwerfung</i> (l'exclusion, le fait de ne pas même articuler quelque chose qui est certainement situable dans la structure du langage), en articulant cela, Freud nous donne la clef d'un certain type de grammaire. Il s'agit de savoir si cela a vraiment le caractère complet de grammaire.	One should also emphasize the fact the grammatical apparatus is something essential. Do I need to remind you that in defining terms such as <i>Verdrängung</i> (repression), <i>Verneinung</i> (that is to say, making use of negation), <i>Verwerfung</i> (exclusion, the fact that something which can certainly be situated within the structure of language is not even articulated), that in articulating this, Freud provides us with the key to a certain type of grammar. It comes down to knowing whether this has really the complete character of grammar.	That the grammatical apparatus is something essential, is a thing that must be accentuated equally. Need I remind you that in defining terms like <i>Verdrängung</i> (repression), <i>Verneinung</i> (which is to say, making use of negation), <i>Verwerfung</i> (exclusion, the fact of not even articulating something that is certainly situable in the structure of language), in articulating this, Freud gives us the key to a certain type of grammar. It is a question of knowing if this has the complete character of grammar.
C'est précisément ce qu'avec un certain nombre de petites choses j'essaie de construire : c'est quelque chose dont eux, les linguistes, devraient se servir. C'est vous dire que je ne me sens pas du tout dans la dépendance du linguiste. Ce que le linguiste m'apporte, j'en fais ce qui me	This is precisely what I attempt to construct with a certain number of little things. It's something they, the linguists, should make use of. I am telling you that I don't experience myself at all as being dependent on the linguist. What the linguist offers me, I make out of it that which I fancy, that is to say, what can be of	This is precisely what I try to construct with a certain number of little things: it is something they, the linguists, should make use of.. This is to say that I do not at all feel I depend on the linguist. What the linguist brings me, I make of it what speaks (<i>chante</i>) to me, which is to say what I can make use of. In the

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<p>chante, c'est-à-dire ce qui peut me servir. Dans le signifiant et le signifié, il est tout à fait clair que Jakobson peut très légitimement s'apercevoir que la façon qu'il a de traiter le terme de la métaphore et de la métonymie, j'en use d'une façon légèrement à côté de la sienne. (15) Pour ce qui est de la négation, les linguistes auraient tout à gagner à se mettre au pas de l'expérience psychanalytique.</p>	<p>use to me. With regard to the signifier and the signified, it's entirely clear that Jakobson may legitimately observe that the way in which he treats the terms 'metaphor' and 'metonymy', that I use them slightly differently. As far as negation is concerned, linguists would have everything to gain if they were to follow the path of psychoanalytic experience.</p>	<p>signifier and the signified, it is altogether clear that Jacobson can very legitimately grasp that I make use of of the terms metaphor and metonymy slightly to the side of how he does. ⁽¹⁵⁾As regards negation, linguists would have everything to gain by putting themselves in step with the psychoanalytic experience.</p>
<p>Le signifiant et le signifié, c'est tout à fait capital. Tout ce qui est de l'appareil du langage est en fin de compte inclus dans cette distinction. Le signifié, il faut bien le dire, c'est [7] toujours autre chose que ce que le signifiant a l'air d'indiquer. Le côté index du signifiant c'est très précisément celui dont tout premier abord de la langue consiste à le dépasser.</p>	<p>The signifier and the signified are of capital importance. Everything concerning the apparatus of language is included in this distinction. The signified, it must be said, is always different from what the signifier appears to indicate. The indexical side of the signifier is precisely that which every first approach of language is required to surpass.</p>	<p>The signifier and the signified are altogether capital. All that is of the apparatus of language is finally included in this distinction. The signified, it must be said, is always an other thing than what the signifier has the air of indicating. The index side of the signifier is very precisely the one that any first approach to a language (<i>la langue</i>) consists in passing beyond.</p>
<p>Si on croit que « table », ça veut dire table, on ne peut plus parler, c'est très simple. Il y a un usage du mot table qui s'applique à tout autre chose qu'à cette planche avec quatre pieds, et c'est ça qui est essentiel. Il n'y a pas un seul mot de la langue qui échappe à cette règle que, ce qu'il a l'air d'indiquer, c'est justement ça dont il convient de se détacher pour comprendre ce que c'est que l'usage de la langue. Ce qui est frappant, c'est que ce qui fait sens dans</p>	<p>If one believes that 'table' means 'table', it becomes impossible to speak – it's as simple as that. There is a usage of the term 'table' which applies to something very different than this plank with four legs, and that's what is essential. Not one word in language escapes this rule, according to which what it appears to indicate is precisely that from which it is advisable to detach oneself, in order to understand what the usage of language is all about. It is very striking that what makes sense</p>	<p>If one believes that "table" means table, one can no longer speak, it is very simple. There is a usage of the word table that is applied to a whole other thing than this plank with four legs, and this is what is essential. Not a single word in the language escapes this rule that what it has the air of indicating is precisely what one ought to detach oneself from to understand what the use of the language is. What is striking is that what makes sense in a word is directly linked—we can demonstrate</p>

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<p>un mot, c'est justement étroitement lié, on peut démontrer la connexion de ce qui fait sens, avec ce fait caractéristique du langage qu'il n'est jamais un décalque des choses. C'est en cela qu'il fait sens. Si table a un sens c'est justement de ne jamais désigner purement et simplement la table. Tout ce que vous signifiez avec ce signifiant, il est bien certain que c'est lié à deux dimensions : la métaphore, par exemple quand je dis que je fais table rase en telle matière, – il n'y a aucune table que je vais balayer ; cette métaphore est mise à la place de quelque chose qu'il faudrait que j'articule autrement – ; et puis il y a l'autre dimension, c'est si je mets le mot table dans une phrase, il prendra du fait de ma phrase une couleur et une dimension qui, elle, est à la fois individualisée si on découpe la phrase et la moins individualisée du monde si on considère l'ensemble de mon discours. Le mot table peut se trouver avoir pour moi une qualité et une fonction qui lui donnent une place sensible, qui est une constante de ma personnalité. Si on met le mot table dans l'expression « se mettre à table » : c'est-à-dire parler devant la police, on voit à quel point est dominant dans la phrase l'inclusion dans la phrase de (16)l'effet de signification. Le signifié, c'est quelque</p>	<p>in a word is intricately linked; one can demonstrate the connection between what makes sense and this characteristic fact of language that it's never a blueprint of things. It's in this way that it makes sense. If 'table' has a meaning, it's precisely that it never simply and purely designates 'table'. It's quite certain that everything you signify with this signifier is linked to two dimensions: metaphor, for example, when I say that I make a clean sweep of something – there isn't any [139] table that I am going to clean.² This metaphor is put in the place of something that would have to be articulated differently. And then there is the other dimension: if I put the word 'table' in a sentence, it will adopt, by virtue of my sentence, a colour and a dimension that are simultaneously individualized if the sentence is cut, and the least individualized of all if one considers the totality of my discourse. To me, the word 'table' may have a quality and a function that give it a sensitive place, which forms a constant factor of my personality. If one places the word 'table' in the expression 'to sit down to eat' [<i>se mettre à table</i>], that is to say 'to come clean' (<i>parler devant la police</i>), one notices at which point the inclusion of the effect of signification is dominant in the sentence. The signified is something that demands to be looked at twice before it's being talked about.</p>	<p>the connection of what makes sense—with the characteristic fact of language that it is never a simple tracing of things. This is how it makes sense. If table has a sense it is precisely in never purely and simply designating the table. Everything you signify with this signifier is quite certainly linked to two dimensions: metaphor, for example, when I say I am going to make a <i>tabula rasa</i> (<i>table rase</i>) of some material—there is no table I am going to clear (<i>balayer</i>); this metaphor is put in the place of something that I would have to articulate otherwise – and then there is another dimension, which is that if I put the word table in a sentence, it will take from my sentence a color and a dimension that is at the same time individualized, if one dissects (<i>découpe</i>) the sentence, and the least individualized thing in the world if one considers the whole (<i>l'ensemble</i>) of my discourse. The word table can have for me a quality and a function that gives it a palpable place (<i>une place sensible</i>) that is a constant of my personality. If one puts the word table in the expression "<i>se mettre à table</i>," which is to say, to speak before the police, one sees to what point the inclusion of the sentence in the ⁽¹⁶⁾effect of signification is dominant in the sentence. The signified is something that demands we look twice before we speak of it.</p>

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chose qui demande d’y regarder à deux fois avant d’en parler.	TN 2. The French expression, here, is ‘faire table rase’, the whole point being that the term ‘table’ appears in a sentence that doesn’t refer to ‘tables’ at all.	
<p>Il est d’autant plus difficile d’en parler qu’on ne pourra jamais le faire qu’avec des paroles, c’est-à-dire qu’on ne peut pas en sortir. Si vous ne prenez pas au départ la notion qu’il n’y a pas de métalangage, c’est ce que j’enseigne, vous tomberez dans tous les pièges. Il n’y a pas de métalangage, c’est-à-dire plus on parle du langage plus vous vous enfoncez dans ce que l’on pourrait appeler ses failles et ses impasses. Je ne fais là que donner l’amorce de ce qu’implique un certain usage des termes linguistiques : usage dans lequel je ne me sens aucunement dans la dépendance du linguiste. J’en fais ce qui me convient, et jusqu’à un certain point, si j’écris comme j’écris, c’est à partir de ceci, que je n’oublie jamais, à savoir qu’il n’y a pas de métalangage. En même temps que j’énonce certaines choses sur les discours, il faut que je sache que d’une certaine façon c’est impossible à dire. C’est justement pour ça que c’est réel.</p>	<p>It’s all the more difficult to talk about it since we will only ever be able to do it with words, that is to say, it’s impossible to escape from it. If you don’t take the notion that there is no such thing as a meta-language as a starting-point – this is what I teach – then you will fall into all kinds of traps. There’s no such thing as meta-language, that is to say, the more one talks about language the more you sink into its flaws and deadlocks. I only give you a glimpse there of what a certain usage of linguistic terms implies: a usage in which I don’t experience myself as being dependent upon the linguist at all. I make of it what is convenient to me, and up to a certain point, if I write the way I do, it’s because I never forget that there is no such thing as a meta-language. While enunciating certain things about the discourses, I need to know that in a certain way it’s impossible to say. It is precisely for this reason that it is real.</p>	<p>It is all the more difficult to speak of it in that one can never do so except with words, which is to say one cannot escape them. If you do not begin with the notion that there is no metalanguage, which is what I teach, you will fall into all the traps. There is no metalanguage, which is to say that the more one speaks language the more one mires oneself in what one can call its flaws and impasses. I am doing no more here than giving a sampling of what a certain usage of linguistic terms implies: a usage in which I do not feel myself at all dependent on the linguist. I am doing what suits me, and up to a certain point, if I write as I write, it is beginning with my never forgetting, never forgetting that there is no metalanguage. At the same time as I state certain things about the discourses, I have to know that in a certain fashion this is impossible to say. It is precisely in this that it is real.</p>
Et c’est pourquoi ces <i>Écrits</i> représentent quelque chose qui est de l’ordre du réel. Je veux dire que c’est forcé qu’ils soient écrits comme ça ; je veux dire par là non pas	And this is why these <i>Écrits</i> represent something that belongs to the order of the real. I mean by this that it’s inevitable that they are written like that. I don’t mean that they are	And this is why these <i>Écrits</i> represent something that is of the order of the real. I mean that it is forced that they are written like this; I do not mean to say by this that

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<p>qu'ils sont inspirés, c'est le contraire, c'est justement parce que chacun a été le fait d'une conjoncture singulière, qu'il m'était demandé quelque chose pour une certaine revue et que j'avais essayé d'y condenser six mois de mon discours. Cet écrit n'est évidemment pas ce que j'ai dit ; c'est quelque chose qui en fait pose toute la question des rapports entre ce qui est parlé et ce qui vient dans l'écriture. Ce qui est certain c'est que je n'ai pas pu l'écrire autrement et que ça n'a certainement pas été pour venir s'inscrire dans un livre ; c'est bien pour ça que j'ai mis Écrits au pluriel. Chacun est l'émergence de quelque chose qui, lui aussi, a un certain rapport avec le langage.</p>	<p>inspired, quite the contrary. It's precisely because each one of them has been produced through a singular conjunction – I was asked something for a certain journal and I tried to condense six months of my discourse. This writing is obviously not what I said; it's something that actually poses the entire question of the relationships between what is spoken and what appears through writing. What is certain, though, is that I couldn't write it differently and that it certainly didn't exist in order to be inscribed into a book. That's why I put <i>Écrits</i> in the plural. Each one is the emergence of something which also has a certain relationship with language.</p>	<p>they are inspired; on the contrary, this was precisely because each was the fact of singular conjuncture, because I was asked for something for a certain revue and I tried to condense six months of my discourse into it. This <i>écrit</i> is obviously not what I said; this is something that in fact poses the whole question of the relations between what is spoken and what comes into writing. What is certain is that I could not have written it otherwise and it was certainly not for it to end up in a book; this is why I put <i>Écrits</i> in the plural. Each is the emergence of something that--it too--has a certain rapport with language.</p>
<p>Pour prendre des métaphores chacun de ces écrits semble comme les petits rochers que l'on voit dans les jardins Zen. Ça représente ça. Moi, j'ai ratissé autour et puis il s'est trouvé que ce quelque chose se présentait comme un rocher. Un rocher très composite mais dont la principale chose est que j'avais affaire à (17)énormément de bêtise et d'inertie. C'est la définition de l'être humain, c'est un chou-fleur de la bêtise. Mais ce n'est qu'un aspect de la question. L'autre aspect c'est que c'est aussi un certain roc qui a les plus grandes choses à faire avec le discours.</p>	<p>To use metaphors, each of these writings seems like the small rocks one sees in Zen-gardens. That represents that, I myself, I raked around it and then it so happened that this thing presented itself as a rock. A [140] very composite rock, but whose principal thing is that I had to deal with an enormous amount of stupidity and inertia. It's the definition of the human being: it is a cauliflower of stupidity. But that's only one aspect of the question. The other aspect is that it's also a rock which has a huge amount of things in common with discourse. Something which discourse, in raking, may succeed in grasping. What I called</p>	<p>To take up some metaphors, each of these <i>écrits</i> seems like the little rocks one sees in Zen gardens. That represents this. Me, I have raked about and found that something presents itself as a rock. A very composite rock but concerning which the principal thing is that I was dealing with ⁽¹⁷⁾an enormous amount of stupidity and inertia. This is the definition of the human being: it is a cauliflower of stupidity. But this is only one aspect of the question. The other aspect is that this is also a rock that has a great deal (<i>les plus grandes choses</i>) to do with discourse. Something that discourse in raking</p>

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<p>Quelque chose que le discours en ratissant peut arriver à cerner. Ce que j'appelais tout à l'heure l'impossible à dire, c'est en fin de compte ce que nous cherchons toujours à dire. Il s'agit de ne pas se tromper. Il y a un piège là. C'est de croire [8] que ce roc s'adresse à quelqu'un. C'est le piège dans lequel on est tombé depuis des siècles. Ce n'est pas parce que ce roc ne se situe qu'avec le ratissage du discours que le roc s'adresse à quiconque. C'est précisément ce qui fait la beauté de ces jardins, c'est précisément qu'ils ne s'adressent à personne. Mais personne ne semble s'en être aperçu du moins jusqu'à maintenant. Par contre le ratissage lui, c'est-à-dire le discours, il s'adresse à quelqu'un que j'appelle le grand Autre.</p>	<p>the impossibility of saying, a moment ago, is at the end of the day that which we always seek to say. It's about not fooling oneself. There is a trap there. It's believing that this rock is addressed to someone. It's the trap in which one has fallen for centuries. It's not because this rock is only situated through the raking of discourse that the rock is addressed to whomever. This is precisely what makes these gardens so beautiful: they aren't addressed to anyone. Yet nobody seems to have noticed it, at least until now. The raking, however, that is to say, the discourse, it is addressed to someone I call the Big Other.</p>	<p>around can succeed at encircling. This is what I just called the impossible to say, which finally is what we always seek to say. One must not be mistaken. There is a trap here. It is to believe that this rock is addressed to someone. This is the trap we have fallen into for centuries. It is not because this rock is only situated by the raking of discourse that the rock is addressed to whomever. This is precisely the beauty of these gardens: it is precisely that they are addressed to no one. But no one seems to have grasped this, at least until now. On the other hand, the raking itself, which is to say discourse, is addressed to someone I call the big Other.</p>
<p>Quand je vous disais tout à l'heure à qui s'adressent les symptômes, il est bien évident que ça s'adresse à un lieu où bien évidemment il n'y a personne. Le grand Autre, ça n'existe pas. Mais tout ce qui s'inscrit dans le langage n'est pensable que par référence au grand Autre. C'est ce qui distingue radicalement ce qui est de l'imaginaire de ce qui est du symbolique.</p>	<p>When I asked you a moment ago 'whom do the symptoms address themselves to', it's quite obvious that it is addressed to a place where there is obviously nobody. The Big Other doesn't exist. Yet everything that is inscribed in language can only be thought with reference to the big Other. This is what distinguishes radically between the imaginary and the symbolic.</p>	<p>When I told you a little while ago to whom symptoms are addressed, it was quite obvious that they are addressed to a place where quite obviously there is no one. The big Other does not exist. But all that is inscribed in language is only thinkable in reference to the big Other. This is what radically distinguishes what is of the imaginary from what is of the symbolic.</p>
<p>Dans ce qui est de l'imaginaire vous en avez des exemples : il suffit de voir opérer deux lutteurs, deux personnages qui se battent</p>	<p>Concerning the imaginary, you have examples of it: it suffices to see two fighters in action, two persons who fight one another in a duel. In</p>	<p>You have some examples of what is of the imaginary: it suffices to see two combatants at work, two characters fighting a duel. In</p>

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<p>en duel. Dans ce qui est de l'ordre de cette prise, d'une action d'une image par une autre, il n'y a aucun moyen de distinguer ce qui est feinte de ce qui est vrai. La feinte, c'est l'action même. Feindre, c'est ce qu'on a à faire quand on se bat en duel ; feindre ce n'est pas mentir. Feindre c'est faire ce qu'on a à faire dans cette étreinte. Tout ceci est réglé par cette chose fondamentale, aussi vraie pour les animaux que pour les hommes, que dans cette espèce de réel si mystérieux qu'on appelle la vie, ce fonctionnement imaginaire est absolument essentiel. La capture, la prise par l'image est une chose radicale. Aucune vie n'est pensable sans cette dimension.</p>	<p>the order of this capture, this action of one image through another, there is no way of distinguishing between what is fake and what is true. The faking is the action itself. Faking is what one needs to do when one is fighting in a duel; faking is not lying. Faking is doing what one is supposed to do in this embrace. Everything is regulated by this fundamental thing, equally true for animals as it is for human beings, that in this kind of mysterious real that is called life, this imaginary functioning is absolutely essential. Being captured, being taken by the image is a radical thing. No life is possible without this dimension.</p>	<p>what is of the order of this taking (<i>prise</i>) of an action of one image by another, there is no way of distinguishing what is a feign from what is true. The feign is the action itself. Feigning is what one does when one fights a duel; feigning is not lying. Feigning is what one has to do in this strangle-hold. All is ruled by this fundamental thing, as true for the animals as for men, that in this kind of so mysterious real that one calls life, this imaginary functioning is abso-lutely essential. The capture, the taking by the image is a radical thing. No life is thinkable without this dimension.</p>
<p>(18) Mais dans le discours c'est tout à fait autre chose car le discours n'a de fonction que parce qu'il se situe quelque part, dans un lieu tiers, où il s'affirme comme vérité. Il n'y a pas moyen de faire un mensonge sans supposer cette dimension de la vérité alors qu'il n'y a dans la feinte pas trace de mensonge. C'est la prise même du corps à corps. La pensée de ce que représente le grand Autre par rapport à tout ce qui peut être duel et, bien sûr, il n'y a pas que des relations duelles, je ne le prends que comme cas particulier parce que c'est le plus simple, si nous en mettons trois, ça devient comme pour la gravitation, ça</p>	<p>However, in discourse things are very different, because a discourse only has a function because it is situated somewhere, in a third place, where it is affirmed as true. There is no possibility of lying without presupposing this dimension of truth, whereas in faking there is no trace of the lie. It is the capture itself of one body by another body. The thought of what represents the Big Other with regard to everything that could constitute a duel – and, of course, there are other than dual relationships. I only use it as a specific case because it is the simplest one. If we put three people into it, it becomes like gravity, of such an extreme complexity that even in the field of</p>	<p>(18) But in discourse this is altogether something else, for discourse only has a function because it is situated somewhere, in a third place, where it is affirmed as truth. There is no way of making a lie without supposing this dimension of truth, while in the feign there is no trace of a lie. It is the <i>prise</i> itself of body-to-body. The thought of what the big Other represents in relation to all that might be dual, and, of course, there are not only dual relations; I am only taking this as a particular case because it is the most simple; if we put in three, it becomes like gravitation: it takes on an extreme complexity such as no one has succeeded in</p>

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devient d'une complication extrême que même sur le terrain de la gravitation on n'est pas arrivé à résoudre.	gravity one hasn't succeeded in resolving it. [141]	resolving even on the terrain of gravitation.
<p>Pour ce qu'il en est de la prétendue communication, il n'y a rien qui semble dérouter plus que ce qui paraît pourtant évident, qu'il est impossible de donner un schéma correct de ce qu'on appelle communication et qui commence comme le b.a.ba de la cybernétique, à savoir de limiter les choses à l'émetteur et le récepteur. Il est évident que même à ce niveau même, quand les gens s'expriment, quand ils parlent de la communication, il y a ce tiers élément qui est le code. Alors d'où vient-il ce code ? C'est là que commencent les difficultés. Ce code n'est pas sans valeur indicative pour ce que j'ai appelé le grand Autre. Seulement, il est bien évident que, dans un domaine comme celui de la psychanalyse, on ne peut s'en contenter, puisque précisément il s'y démontre qu'on opère avec un code qui lui est tout à fait insaisissable. C'est structuré comme un langage, ces choses qui sont d'abord les symptômes, mais le code, dans cette chose qui pourtant opère comme un langage, le code, nous sommes incapables de mettre la main dessus.</p>	<p>As far as so-called communication is concerned, there's nothing that seems to disconcert more than that which nonetheless seems obvious, namely that it's impossible to come up with a correct schema of what one calls communication, and which starts as the ABC of cybernetics, limiting things to the sender and the receiver. It's obvious that even at that level, when people express themselves, when they talk about communication, there's this third element called the code. Where does this code come from? That's where the problems start. This code is not without indicative value for what I called the Big Other. However, it's quite obvious that in a domain such as psychoanalysis one cannot be satisfied with it, precisely because it is being demonstrated there that one is working with a code that is totally ungraspable. These things that are first of all symptoms, they are structured like a language, but the code, in this thing that nonetheless operates like a language, we are incapable of putting our finger on it.</p>	<p>As for so-called communication, there is nothing that seems more to lead us astray than what nonetheless appears obvious, that it is impossible to give a correct schema for what one calls communication and which begins as the a,b,c of cybernetics, that is, limiting things to emitter and receiver. It is obvious that even at this level itself, when people express themselves, when they speak of communication, there is a third element that is the code. Where does this code come from? Here is where the difficulties begin. This code is not without an indicative value for what I have called the big Other. Only, it is quite obvious that, in a domain like that of psychoanalysis, one cannot be content with this, since it is precisely here that it is demonstrated that one operates with a code that is altogether ungraspable. They are structured like a language, these things that are to begin with symptoms, but the code, in this thing that nonetheless operates like a language, the code, we are incapable of putting our hand on it.</p>
Nous sommes capables de mettre la main sur une structure qui se définit d'une façon	We are capable of putting our finger on a structure, which is defined in such a way that it	We are capable of putting our hand on a structure that is defined in a fashion such

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telle qu'elle détermine une certaine fonction de sujet qui a des propriétés, des liaisons particulières avec le savoir, et met en question le savoir. Il est clair que c'est là que cette entrée en jeu de cette trame qui s'appelle l'inconscient freudien, c'est là que l'on peut s'apercevoir de son rapport avec la chose la moins connue qui soit, à savoir ce qu'on (19)appelle la sexualité. Qu'est ce que démontre l'expérience analytique sinon que nous sommes amenés par le texte même à nous apercevoir que dans la constitution de ce code, ce code si ambigu au regard du savoir, il y a une fonction qui a à faire avec les relations sexuelles.	determines a certain function of the subject, which has properties, specific relationships with knowledge and which questions knowledge. It's clear that this is where this framework called the Freudian unconscious enters the game; this is where we can observe one's relationship with the least known of all things, that is, what is called sexuality. What does the analytic experience demonstrate, if not that we are prompted by the text itself to observe that in the constitution of this code, this code which is so ambiguous with regard to knowledge, there is a function which concerns sexual relationships.	that it determines a certain function of the subject that has some properties, some particular liaisons with <i>savoir</i> , and puts <i>savoir</i> in question. Clearly it is here that the coming into play of this weft (<i>trame</i>) called the Freudian unconscious, it is here that we can grasp its rapport with the least known (<i>connue</i>) thing there is, what we ⁽¹⁹⁾ call sexuality. What is it that analytic experience demonstrates if not that we are lead by the text itself to grasp that in the constitution of this code, this code so ambiguous in regard to <i>savoir</i> , there is a function that has to do with sexual relations.
Ça démontre que c'est une relation tout à fait compliquée en ceci qu'elle a cette structure ternaire dont je viens de dire qu'elle est essentielle au langage. Là encore il faut se [9] méfier, car c'est une structure ternaire qu'on ne peut appeler ainsi car aucun de ces termes n'est au même niveau. Il n'y a aucun rapport entre l'émetteur et le récepteur, supposé son semblable, – supposé son semblable dans l'imaginaire –, mais pas au niveau symbolique pour cette simple raison que, contrairement à l'apparence, c'est de lui que part le message : recevoir son propre message sous forme inversée.	It demonstrates that it's a very complicated relationship, in that it has this threefold structure of which I just said that it is essential for language. Even there one has to be careful, because it's a threefold structure that one can only call threefold because none of its terms is situated at the same level. There's no relationship between the sender and the receiver, who is supposedly its equal – supposedly its equal in the imaginary, but not at the symbolic level, for the simple reason that, contrary to appearances, it is from him that the message starts: receiving one's own message in inverted form.	This demonstrates that this is a rapport altogether complicated in that it has this ternary structure that I say to be essential to language. Here again we must be careful (<i>se méfier</i>), for it is a ternary structure that we cannot call this, for none of these terms is at the same level. There is no relation between the emitter and the receiver, supposed his peer (<i>semblable</i>) – supposed his peer in the imaginary – but not at the symbolic level for the simple reason that, contrary to appearances, it is from him that the message comes: receiving his own message in inverted form.
Ce que j'ai appelé le grand Autre, ce lieu	What I have called the big Other, this place that	The principal characterisic of what I have

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<p>indispensable à penser même ce qui est de l'ordre du symbolique ; sa principale caractéristique c'est qu'il n'existe pas. C'est bien pour ça que j'ai écrit signifiant de grand A barré. C'est un signifiant de la non-existence du grand Autre comme tel. C'est un signifiant indispensable à ce que fonctionne tout l'appareil. Il est bien certain qu'il ne faut jamais oublier que puisque il n'y a pas de métalangage, en disant même quelque chose comme ça, nous disons quelque chose qui doit forcément y échapper, n'être pas maniable.</p>	<p>is indispensable for thinking, even, what constitutes the symbolic order: its principal characteristic is that it doesn't exist. This is why I have written the signifier of the barred Big Other. It is a signifier of the non-existence of the Big Other as such. It's a signifier that is indispensable if any apparatus is to function. It's quite certain that one should never forget that, since there is no such thing as a metalanguage, that in saying something like that, we are saying something that can only escape it, that cannot be handled. [142]</p>	<p>called the big Other, this indispensable place for thinking even what is of the order of the symbolic, is that it does not exist. This is why I have written signifier of the big A barred. This is the signifier of the big Other as such. It is a signifier indispensable to the functioning of the whole apparatus. We must certainly never forget that since there is no metalanguage, even in saying something like this we are saying something that must necessarily escape us, not be manageable.</p>
<p>Ce n'est pas parce que c'est articulé que c'est articulable et c'est bien pour ça que je ne l'articule pas mais je l'écris. C'est quelque chose de différent d'écrire ou d'articuler avec la voix. Contrairement à certains qui ont pris leur matériel dans ce que j'enseigne et qui sont en train d'articuler d'une façon vraiment bêtifiante que le langage écrit est premier par rapport au langage parlé. C'est absurde. Il est bien certain qu'il y a un langage parlé et langage écrit et il suffit de distinguer ceci que le langage écrit c'est très probablement pas du langage. Cela ne veut pas dire que ça n'a pas une très grande influence sur le langage. C'est même pour ça que ça a une grande influence sur le langage parlé. C'est comme le reste de ce à quoi à affaire le</p>	<p>It's not because it's articulated that it is therefore possible to articulate it and this is why I don't articulate it but write it instead. Writing is quite different from articulating with one's voice. This contrasts with some people, who have taken their materials from what I teach and who are articulating in a really nonsensical fashion that written language is primary with regard to spoken language. It's absurd. It's certain that there is a spoken language and a written language, and it suffices to distinguish this: written language is probably not language. It's even for this reason that it has such a profound influence on spoken language. It's like the rest of what language is dealing with, it's something else. The importance of Kanji, is precisely that it's like a thing, which doesn't mean that language</p>	<p>It is not because it is articulated that it is articulable and this is why I do not articulate it but write it. Writing is something different from articulating with the voice, contrary to what certain people say who have taken their material from what I teach and who are in the process of articulating in a truly stupefying fashion that written language is first in relation to spoken language. This is absurd. It is quite certain that there is a spoken language and a written language, and it suffices to distinguish this: that written language is very probably not of language. This is not to say that it has not had a very great influence on language. This is even why it has had a great influence on spoken language. It is like the remainder (<i>reste</i>) of what language has business with, ⁽²⁰⁾ it is an</p>

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<p>langage, (20)c'est autre chose. L'importance du Kanji, c'est justement que c'est comme une chose ce qui ne veut pas dire que le langage l'atteigne plus que tout autre chose. Le langage tourne autour. Ce n'est pas contradictoire avec ce que je dis qu'il n'y a pas de métalangage : on écrit S(A) c'est-à-dire Signifiant de A barré – il faut absolument écrire A et le barrer ensuite pour que ça fasse un signifiant –. Sans ce signifiant tout ce qui est de l'ordre de la communication est impensable et en particulier l'expérience analytique.</p>	<p>reaches it more than anything else. Language turns around it. It doesn't contradict what I say about there being no such thing as a meta-language: One writes S (\emptyset), that is to say, signifier of the barred Other – it's imperative that one writes O and that it is barred afterwards for it to constitute a signifier. Without this signifier, everything of the order of communication is unthinkable, and in particular the analytic experience.</p>	<p>other thing. The importance of <i>Kanji</i> is precisely that it is like a thing, which does not mean that language attains to it more than to any other thing. Language turns around it. This does not contradict my saying that there is no metalanguage: one writes S(A), which is to say, Signifier of A barred – one absolutely must write A and then bar it for this to make a signifier – without this signifier all that is of the order of communication is unthinkable and in particular the analytic experience.</p>
<p>Ce que montre l'expérience analytique c'est que le rapport sexuel n'est pas pensable sans quelque chose de tiers qui n'est certes pas le grand Autre dans ce cas mais cette entité autour de laquelle tourne la fonction de castration, et que je note là aussi uniquement d'une façon écrite par le grand Φ pour désigner la fonction tierce, dans le rapport sexuel, du phallus. C'est là que nous en sommes, c'est dire que nous n'avons pas beaucoup avancé.</p>	<p>What the analytic experience demonstrates is that the sexual relationship cannot be thought without something in a third place, which is definitely not the big Other in this case, but this entity around which the function of castration revolves, and which I note there as well only in a written fashion, as the big Φ, in order to designate the third function in the sexual relationship, of the phallus. This is where we are, and I guess it means that we haven't made a lot of progress.</p>	<p>What the analytic experience shows is that the sexual rapport is not thinkable without something third, which is certainly not the big Other in this case, but this entity around which the function of castration turns, and that I note here also solely in a written fashion with the big Φ to designate the function third, in the sexual rapport, of the phallus. That is where we are, which is to say we have not much advanced.</p>
<p>Il n'y a aucune chance que la psychanalyse aboutisse à quoi que ce soit, avance dans sa construction, c'est sur ce terme que Freud achève ses écrits, qu'elle sorte de cette espèce de ressassage que constituent les publications analytiques – on n'a qu'à faire l'expérience de lire simplement</p>	<p>There's no chance of psychoanalysis leading to anything, advancing in its construction – it's on this term that Freud ends his writings – coming out of this kind of endless turning over which makes up the analytic publications – one only needs to have the experience of reading the <i>International Journal of Psychoanalysis</i>, which</p>	<p>There is no chance that psychoanalysis will lead to anything whatsoever, advance in its construction: it is on this term that Freud completes his writings, that psychoanalysis (<i>elle</i>) escapes the kind of rumination (<i>ressassage</i>) constituting analytic publications – one has simply to have the</p>

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<p><i>l'International Journal of Psychoanalysis</i> qui paraît en même temps à Londres et à New York pour s'en rendre compte, on raconte toujours la même chose et dans les mêmes termes qui ont plutôt pour effet d'opacifier les choses. Il n'y a aucune chance de progresser si ce n'est dans cette voie qui est celle de serrer de plus près ce qu'il en est de l'expérience, de voir de quoi est fait le matériel qui est là opérant et dont l'analyse se trouve parfaitement dépendre.</p>	<p>is published in simultaneously in London and New York, in order to realize it; one is always saying the same thing and in the same terms, which rather has the effect of making things more obscure. There's no chance of making progress if it is not along this path of grasping more clearly what analytic experience is about, of seeing what the operative material is made of there, and on which analysis can perfectly depend.</p>	<p>experience of reading the <i>International Journal of Psychoanalysis</i>, which appears at the same time in London and New York, to confirm that these publications always tell the same story and in the same terms, which rather has the effect of opacifying things. There is no chance of progressing if not by way of tightening our grip on what there is of the experience, to see what the material that is operative in it is made of and on which analysis finds itself perfectly dependent.</p>
<p>Car il est certain que l'analyste est impliqué dans toute analyse. Et c'est pour cela que les analystes sont si décidés à ce que les choses n'avancent pas, parce que leur situation est déjà bien suffisamment désagréable, dans la situation actuelle, pour qu'ils n'aient aucune envie de l'aggraver. Quand il s'agit de devenir le roc soi-même ça pose bien d'autres problèmes et c'est (21)de ça dont il s'agit pour l'analyste, mais il ne veut à aucun prix devenir ce roc.</p>	<p>Because it's certain that the analyst is implicated in every analysis. And this is why analysts are so decisive about the fact that things aren't advancing, because their situation is already sufficiently unpleasant, in the current situation, that they have no desire to make it worse. When it concerns becoming the rock oneself, it poses different kinds of problems. And this is what matters for the analyst, but he doesn't want to be this rock at all costs. [143]</p>	<p>For it is certain that the analyst is implicated in every analysis. And this is why analysts are so decided that things will not advance, for their situation is already quite sufficiently disagreeable, in the current situation, for them not to have any desire to aggravate it. When it is a question of becoming the rock itself, this poses many other problems and ⁽²¹⁾this is what it is a question of for the analyst, but he does not want at any price to become this rock.</p>
<p>La grande ambiguïté est dans la relation duelle, et s'il y a une chance que nous avancions dans ce qu'il en est de notre relation avec notre semblable, c'est bien la psychanalyse qui peut nous le montrer. C'est dans la mesure où c'est beaucoup plus que notre semblable que nous avons</p>	<p>The great ambiguity is situated in the dual relationship and if we have a chance to move on in what our relationship with our equal is about, it's really psychoanalysis that can demonstrate it to us. It is in so far as it is much more than our equal we have in front of us, it is our neighbor; that is to say, what we carry most</p>	<p>The great ambiguity is in the dual relation, and if there is a chance that we might advance in what there is of our rapport with our <i>semblable</i>, it is indeed psychoanalysis that can show it to us. This in the measure where it is more than our <i>semblable</i> that we have in front of us, it is our neighbor</p>

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<p>en face de nous, c'est notre prochain, c'est-à-dire ce que nous avons le plus au cœur de nous-mêmes. On s'était aperçu de ça bien avant la psychanalyse, mais on l'a vu sur un plan qui n'est pas celui qui nous intéresse, puisque c'est sur le plan scientifique qu'il s'agit de le voir.[10]</p>	<p>of all in our own hearts. This had been noticed long before psychoanalysis, but on a level that isn't the one that interests us, because it needs to be observed at the scientific level.</p>	<p>(<i>prochain</i>), which is to say, what we have most at the heart of ourselves. This was grasped well before psychoanalysis, but it was seen on a plane that is not that which interests us, since it is on the scientific plane that it is a question of seeing it.</p>
<p>Ce qui ne veut pas dire que le savoir non scientifique n'a pas été capable d'atteindre des choses qui ont un rapport étroit avec la jouissance. Dans la psychanalyse, on peut viser ce qu'il en est de la jouissance et c'est très probablement en ça qu'elle a une fonction initiatrice. La science, qui procède d'une mise hors de jeu, d'une mise hors de champ de la jouissance, peut trouver dans la psychanalyse son nœud, son lien, son pédicule, son articulation.</p>	<p>This doesn't mean that non-scientific knowledge hasn't been capable of accomplishing things that have an intimate relationship with jouissance. In psychoanalysis, one can aim at jouissance and this is probably how psychoanalysis may have an initiatory function. Science, which proceeds by putting jouissance out of the game, out of the field, can find in psychoanalysis its knot, its bond, its support, its articulation.</p>	<p>Which does not mean that non-scientific <i>savoir</i> has not been capable of attaining to some things that have a direct rapport with <i>jouissance</i>. In psychoanalysis, one can aim for what there is of <i>jouissance</i> and it is very probably in this that it has an initiatory function. Science, which proceeds from a putting out of play, from a putting of <i>jouissance</i> out of its field, can find in psychoanalysis its knot, its link, its pedicle, its articulation.</p>
<p>C'est ça qui fait l'intérêt de la psychanalyse, c'est ce qui permet que se fasse autour cette accumulation de nuages qu'on appelle les sciences humaines. Je veux bien que la psychanalyse ait quelque chose à faire avec les sciences humaines à une seule condition, c'est que les sciences humaines disparaissent, qu'on s'aperçoive que la psychanalyse n'est là que le fil, le pic, qui permet à cette accumulation d'avoir un semblant d'existence. Mais dès que quelque chose fonctionne en son centre, il</p>	<p>This is what constitutes the importance of psychoanalysis, and it is what allows this accumulation of clouds called the human sciences to develop itself around it. I really want psychoanalysis to have something to do with the human sciences, on one condition, namely that the human sciences disappear, that one notices that psychoanalysis is but the backbone there, the peak which allows this accumulation to have a semblance of existence. But as soon as something functions in its centre, nothing can be left of what is currently</p>	<p>This is what makes psychoanalysis interesting, what allows this accumulation of clouds called the human sciences to gather around (<i>fasse autour</i>) it. I do want psychoanalysis to have something to do with the human sciences, on one condition, which is that the human sciences disappear, that one grasp that psychoanalysis is no more there than the thread, the peak, that allows this accumulation to have a semblance (<i>semblant</i>) of existence. But as soon as something functions in its center, nothing</p>

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ne peut plus rien rester de ce qui s'appelle actuellement Sciences Humaines.	called Human Sciences.	more can remain of what are currently called Human Sciences.
Maintenant, il faut que la psychanalyse survive, c'est un grave problème. Survivra-t-elle quand je serai mort ?	Now, psychoanalysis needs to survive, it's a big problem. Will it survive after my death? [144]	For now, psychoanalysis must survive; this is a grave problem. Will it survive when I am dead?